TRADOC Pam 525-3-6

The United States Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver

2016-2028

13 October 2010

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Foreword

From the Director
U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center

The U.S. Army continues to answer the Nation's call, as it has since its inception over 235 years ago. As we look to the future, our Army faces a complex and uncertain operational environment that will challenge our Soldiers, leaders, and organizations in many ways. Future enemies are likely to emulate the adaptations of recent opponents while taking advantage of emerging technologies and growing instability to pursue their objectives and avoid what they perceive as U.S. military strengths. The challenges of future armed conflict make it an imperative for our Army to produce leaders and forces that exhibit a high degree of operational adaptability.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-6, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver 2016-2028*, provides a conceptualization of how the Army will move and maneuver its forces to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies in the future operational environment. It builds on the ideas expressed in TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, the ACC, and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, the AOC, and carries forward three new conceptual terms: combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and the co-creation of context. In addition, it expands on the idea of mission command as a prerequisite of decentralized operations. This concept also highlights the Army's approach to conducting operations in both contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations using a variety of brigade-level combat formations as the centerpiece of the Army's tactical forces.

In addition to the warfighting challenges of the future, the Army also faces a number of institutional challenges. The rapid pace of technological change, prolonged acquisition timelines, and growing resource constraints make it necessary for the Army to adopt a more responsive approach to capabilities development. Accordingly, TRADOC is shifting from a 5-year to a 2-year cycle for concept development and revision. As a result, the Army Capabilities Integration Center will update and revise the entire Army Concept Framework every 2 years. This significant change will enable more effective input into the major budget and programming decisions across our Army.

Concepts lead change for the Army and drive the development and integration of future capabilities. They provide a framework for analysis, readiness assessments, prioritization, and feedback. In addition, they serve as a foundation to help the Army maximize effectiveness and minimize risk through both materiel and nonmaterial capability trades. Thus, they enable the Army to identify redundancies and determine which capabilities to pursue, both within and across its warfighting functions, with a better understanding of how such decisions will impact the overall combat effectiveness of the future force.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 makes an important contribution to realizing the broad vision outlined in both the ACC and AOC. It provides a vision of future movement and maneuver that supports greater decentralization of more capable tactical formations, while emphasizing the need for increased cohesion and trust among leaders at all levels. This concept also serves as a point of

departure for wide-ranging discussions, wargames, and experimentation. It represents a significant step forward in an ongoing campaign of learning and directly contributes toward achieving greater institutional adaptation across our Army.



MICHAEL A. VANE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Director, Army Capabilities
Integration Center

Department of the Army ***TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6**

Headquarters, United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1046

13 October 2010

Military Operations

THE U.S. ARMY FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT FOR MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 2016 – 2028

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

JOHN E. STERLING, JR.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commanding General/
Chief of Staff



LUCIOUS B. MORTON
Colonel, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

History. This publication is a revision of TRADOC Pams 525-3-2, *Tactical Maneuver* and 525-3-6, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Move 2015-2024*. It combines both functions into TRADOC Pam 525-3-6, the *U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver 2016-2028*. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 addresses maneuver at the tactical level.

Summary. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 is the conceptualization of how the Army future force will execute the movement and maneuver warfighting function to achieve dominance during joint operations. The central idea is that brigades conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations under the mission command of divisions and corps in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. The ideas presented here are fully integrated within the evolving context of U.S. estimates of the future operating environment, joint and Army strategic guidance, and the joint framework.

Applicability. This concept applies to all Department of the Army (DA) services, agencies, and activities involved in future Army forces. It functions as the basis for developing required solution sets related to future Army force movement and maneuver function within the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.

*This regulation supersedes TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-2, dated 2 October 2006 and 525-3-6, dated 30 April 2007.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this pamphlet is the Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1046.

Suggested Improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, TRADOC (ATFC-ED), Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1046. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).

Distribution. This publication is only available on the TRADOC Homepage at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm.

Summary of Change

TRADOC Pam 525-3-6
The United States Army Movement and Maneuver Concept 2016 - 2028

This revision, dated 13 October 2010-

o Consolidates TRADOC Pam 525-3-2, *Tactical Maneuver* and TRADOC Pam 525-3-6, *Move*, under TRADOC Pam 5253-6, renamed *Movement and Maneuver*.

o Covers new timeframe, 2016-2028.

o Expands on the ideas in TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1.

o Describes how combined arms maneuver and wide area security define the Army's core contributions to the joint force.

o Introduces the co-creation of context as a way of operating at all levels.

o Emphasizes fighting for information in close contact with the enemy.

o Defines, revises, and creates terminology.

o Updates assumptions and describes required capabilities organized by warfighting function.

o Provides a list of implications for joint forces and interagency partners.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1-1. Purpose

TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 describes corps, division, and brigade operations in the future. It identifies the capabilities required to enable them to conduct combined arms maneuver[1] and wide area security successfully. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 requires that the Army develop adaptive and agile Soldiers and leaders imbued with the Warrior Ethos to lead combined arms formations capable of functioning effectively in the complex environment as integral members of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational team.

1-2. Defining the function

The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes the related tasks and systems that move forces to positions of advantage in relation to the enemy. These tasks include deploying, moving, maneuvering, employing direct fires, occupying an area, performing mobility and countermobility operations, and employing battlefield obscuration.[2] Movement is the dispersion and displacement of forces during maneuver. Maneuver is the employment of movement and fires to move to positions of advantage to defeat the threat.

1-3. The movement and maneuver concept framework

a. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 (the ACC) establishes the foundation on which TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 (the AOC) builds. Nested within the ACC and AOC, TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 expands on their foundational concepts to describe combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and co-creation of context in the execution of operations.

b. Army leaders and formations continue to face a broad range of threats and conditions of uncertainty in complex environments. To be successful, leaders must understand the situation in width, depth, and context, and then develop the situation through action in close contact with the enemy and civil populations. Building on a foundation of combined arms maneuver, close combat competencies, and wide area security, maneuver formations must gain, sustain, and exploit control over land and resources; and, exert psychological influence over people by force if necessary. U.S. forces must also be prepared to work closely with the population and through wide area security operations, secure them, and establish relationships built on trust and common purpose to enable stable conditions for progress.

c. Army forces are maneuver-focused with units capable of moving to positions of advantage to defeat enemy forces and capable of establishing conditions that accomplish the joint force commander's mission. They are rapidly[3] deployable, able to operate in a wide variety of environmental conditions and operationally mobile using available joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational movement systems.

d. The maneuver force has the lethality necessary to win the close fight, is sufficiently protected and robust enough to endure the effects of multiple and protracted engagements, and is led by adaptable leaders trained to operate and prevail in conditions of uncertainly and complexity. These formations transition effectively across offensive, defensive, and stability, or

civil support operations conducting combined arms maneuver and wide area security to achieve campaign objectives. The cohesion of well trained squads creates resilient Soldiers. Cohesive small units led by adaptive leaders are paramount to success. Soldiers possess the training and expertise required to interact in close proximity with local populations in the conduct of combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Maneuver forces achieve the desired effects with minimal collateral damage.

1-4. The operational environment

The future operational environment (OE) presents future Army maneuver forces with complex and challenging conditions. The OE remains difficult to predict and is subject to rapid and even radical changes. The OE includes threats ranging from roving bands of criminals and private militias, to military formations experienced in close fighting who are well equipped, well led, well trained, and dedicated to their cause. They routinely employ regular conventional armies supported by irregular forces[4] and an ever-changing variety of conventional and unconventional tactics. Threats may possess weapons of mass destruction and technology allowing them to be disruptive over widespread areas. At the same time, the indigenous local population may remain uncommitted to the U.S. cause unless and until the U.S. assures the population's security. This combination of fighting a determined enemy while securing the population will challenge future Army forces formations.

1-5. The military problem

Future OE conditions challenge the Army to develop agile adaptive leaders and combined arms formations capable of full-spectrum operations that are proficient in combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and co-creation of context. They must be skilled in conducting sustained decentralized operations to defeat enemy forces and consolidate gains; secure populations, land, and resources; and set the conditions for future operations. Army formations must be strategically, operationally, and tactically mobile, versatile, networked, and enabled with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities, to defeat hostile forces while simultaneously influencing and protecting the population, organizations, and governments in support of the commander's objectives.

1-6. Assumptions

a. The future OE will place added emphasis on small unit cohesion, the human dimension, rules of engagement, protecting the civilian population, maintaining infrastructure and building partnerships. This will fundamentally change the way future Army forces fight and the way it focuses on warfighting.

b. There will not be a revolution in military technology that eliminates the need for movement and maneuver–moving to a position of advantage and applying lethal and nonlethal effects; the force will fight with systems in place today albeit with some incremental improvements in systems capability.

c. Army forces will continue to depend on joint transportation for strategic movement and maneuver.

d. The corps, division, and theater Army echelons will remain viable as operational headquarters (HQ). Brigades will remain the primary tactical fighting formations.

e. The enemy will employ a mix of regular and irregular forces. Enemy forces will remain adaptive, committed, and in some cases, well equipped and will continue to attempt to counter or interrupt U.S. advantages in communications, surveillance, long-range precision fires, armor protection and mobility.

1-7. Linkage to the human dimension

TRADOC Pam 525-3-7, *The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full-Spectrum Operations 2015-2024*, emphasizes optimization of the cognitive, physical, and social components of every Soldier with the objective to improve the acquisition and selection of personnel; maximize leader and organizational development; establish the ability to rapidly adjust, deliver, and provide accessibility of training and education ultimately balancing Soldier knowledge, skills, and abilities with full-spectrum operation mission requirements.

1-8. References

Required and related publications are in appendix A.

1-9. Explanations of abbreviations and terms

Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary.

Chapter 2
Movement and Maneuver Concept

2-1. Central idea

a. In 2016-2028, brigades conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations under the mission command of divisions and corps in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. The current brigade organizations which are capable of conducting combined arms maneuver and wide area security, often with task organized forces or augmentation, include the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), heavy combat aviation brigade (CAB), full spectrum CAB, maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB), and battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB). Co-creation of context enables them to conduct operations with an improved understanding of the situation.

b. Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success.

c. Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to develop the situation through action, gain, or maintain contact with the enemy, and to deny the enemy positions of advantage. The intent is to protect forces, populations, infrastructure, activities, and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals. Therefore, the conduct of wide area security requires a wide range of considerations and operational activities intended to secure the

population, host nation, and infrastructure. Wide area security can be conducted in all types of combined arms maneuver (offense, defense, stability, and support). Figure 2-1 below shows the relationships between the types of combined arms maneuver including wide area security in full-spectrum operations.



Figure 2-1. Movement and maneuver concept hierarchy of terms

d. Co-creation of context is a continuous process in which commanders direct reconnaissance, intelligence priorities, intelligence collectors, analysts, and systems to understand the environment and to drive operations. This enables commanders to execute operations based on an improved understanding of the situation.

2-2. The movement and maneuver concept

a. Future Army forces, operating against a broad range of threats, conduct full-spectrum operations under conditions of uncertainty against a highly adaptive enemy through a combination of combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations, providing joint force commanders the ability to succeed. Formations use physical, temporal, and psychological advantages and maneuver to seize the initiative and establish momentum. They maneuver to ensure freedom of movement and action, consolidate gains, retain the initiative, and conduct wide area security operations to secure the population, infrastructure, and facilities and set conditions for achieving campaign objectives.

b. Combined arms formations have the lethality necessary to win the close fight, are sufficiently protected, and are robust enough to endure the effects of multiple and protracted engagements. They have the means to achieve the desired effects with minimal collateral damage using both lethal and nonlethal means.

c. Regionally aligned general purpose forces from corps through BCTs provide combatant commanders specially trained forces, with competence in the languages, cultures, histories, governments, security forces, and threats in areas where conflict is likely. These forces support combatant command security cooperation plans by developing sustained relationships with partner nation governments and their security forces. They routinely participate in multinational exercises and security force assistance missions to reassure allies and friends while deterring potential adversaries. Regionally aligned general purpose forces also have a habitual relationship with regionally aligned Army special operations forces (ARSOF).

d. Leaders and Soldiers remain the key to success. They are imbued with the Warrior Ethos. As a result of the focus on human dimension, Soldiers are more capable than in the past and masters of adaptability. Trained and equipped small units are an essential part to operations in BCTs.

2-3. Concept execution

The brigade, division, and corps operate in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (doctrinally referred to as unified action). The HQ integrates all available forces and synchronizes their effects to achieve success. The commander arranges forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situation. Commanders design the framework by allocating forces and organizing the battlefield to concentrate combat power against decisive points. The commander may employ contiguous or noncontiguous boundaries based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). This framework helps the commander visualize forces and control operational tempo. The commander uses mission command to direct the application of all elements of combat power and combined arms maneuver to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative through combinations of offense, defense, and stability or civil support (See figure 2-2.).

2-4. Corps

a. Corps are the Army's principal operational HQ designed to command a combination of divisions, BCTs, and other functional and supporting brigades. The corps can serve as an intermediate tactical HQ, Army forces (ARFOR). With augmentation, the corps can serve as a joint task force (JTF) HQ or joint force land component commander (JFLCC) HQ. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 focuses on the corps as an ARFOR HQ. Applying the tenets of mission command, corps HQ maneuver Army forces to conduct multiple, simultaneous, or sequential offense, defense, and stability operations, and integrate unified action capabilities to achieve assigned objectives. As an echelon HQ, the corps exercise mission command over forces provided through the training, readiness, and deployment cycles of Army forces.



Figure 2-2. Maneuver forces conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security

b. The corps maneuvers forces, establishes priorities of support, task organizes, and establishes command relationships within major subordinate organizations. The corps' ability to conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security over vast areas and over time permits it to designate decisive and shaping operations, synchronize the operations of subordinates operating in the same time and space, and integrate joint capabilities.

c. A mix of capable forces enables the corps and its subordinate forces to accomplish campaign objectives. Forces include, but are not limited to, a combination of division HQ and BCTs, CAB, and support brigades, (such as, fires, maneuver enhancement, battlefield surveillance, and sustainment), elements of functional brigades, (such as, air defense, engineer, chemical, military intelligence, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), signal, medical and military police), and functional commands. Functional brigades may be designated as the main effort for some phases of an operation or as the decisive operation for humanitarian assistance, stability, and civil support operations, where functional capabilities are more in demand than destructive combat power. Enablers needed to accomplish the mission may come from joint, multinational, and interagency sources.

d. Corps employs intelligence, surveillance, and continuous reconnaissance to synchronize and integrate the planning and operation of sensors, reconnaissance assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function using the process of co-creation of context. Co-creation of context is a continuous process in which commanders from company to corps direct intelligence priorities to drive operations, and the intelligence that these operations produce causes

commanders to refine operations based on their improved understanding of the situation. The corps sets the conditions for successful mission accomplishment by providing the lowest levels of the corps with the assets necessary to collect and report required information, and by employing collection assets at corps level to support corps specific collection priorities. Corps directs the employment of BFSB and combined arms air-ground forces conducting continuous and persistent reconnaissance to gather current information to answer the commander's critical intelligence requirements. These forces conduct reconnaissance and security operations to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, develop the situation through action, retain freedom of maneuver, consolidate gains, secure the force, and to protect the local population. If required, these forces can be tailored to fight and finish the enemy.

e. As part of a joint or multinational force, corps project forces to positions of advantage and conduct shaping and entry operations to create conditions favorable to combined arms maneuver and decentralized full-spectrum operations. Commanders use forcible entry in operations where the entry force can hold its own against an expected enemy force, or can secure a lodgment for the introduction of follow-on forces. Units can execute forcible entry via parachute, air assault, or amphibious assault. A forcible entry operation is inherently joint. The corps HQ will normally conduct forcible entry operations in conjunction with joint partners. The corps forces will establish a lodgment, then expand, and use regionally familiar forces to set conditions for future operations. After securing the lodgment, forcible entry forces may perform wide area security, clear routes, and repel counterattacks. These operations may use any combination of divisions or BCTs and supporting units from multiple air ports and sea ports of embarkation.

f. Corps coordinates with theater level Army ARSOF and its persistent presence and forcible entry forces to integrate their effects within the corps operations plan. The familiarity of ARSOF with the AO makes these forces an ideal strategic reconnaissance and surveillance asset. In addition, regionally aligned, persistent presence and early entry forces equip, train, advise, and assist foreign forces to provide for the security of their populations, and assess foreign security forces and local governments' ability to provide for their populations.

g. The corps' ability to see further into the future provides time to set conditions by, with, and through the JTF, host nation forces, and U.S. state agencies. The corps' ability to assess the progress of the operation and to sense the OE defines commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and allows decision points to shift resources and to exploit opportunities.

h. The theater sustainment command provides sustainment to Army and other forces as directed. It normally plans and provides sustainment to a corps through a forward deployed expeditionary sustainment command (ESC). The corps establishes priorities of sustainment support, monitors execution, and coordinates changing sustainment requirements with the supporting ESC. The ESC provides point of manufacturing to point of need sustainment support through a single logistics chain of command.

i. Corps HQ will train routinely with augmentation units identified in approved joint manning documents and manpower exchange programs to develop a common understanding of how to conduct operations as a JTF.[5] Augmentation units are assigned based on contingency plans and may include diverse elements such as civil affairs teams, digital liaison detachments, public

affairs detachments, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) detachments, and information operations (IO) teams.

2-5. Division

a. Divisions are the Army's primary deployable tactical warfighting HQs and assign missions to organic or habitually aligned subordinate BCTs and other functional and supporting brigades in support of achieving corps and division mission objectives and commanders' intents. The division can serve as a tactical HQ or ARFOR. With augmentation, it can serve as a JTF or JFLCC HQ for small scale contingencies. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 focuses on the division as a tactical HQ. The division performs mission command to direct and coordinate the activities of assigned, operational command, and attached forces; it allocates resources, and synchronizes the efforts with joint enablers.

b. The division employs land forces as part of a joint, interagency, and multinational force during full-spectrum operations. The division executes simultaneous offensive, defensive, and either stability or civil support operations (depending on whether or not it is operating in a foreign country or the U.S.) in an assigned AO to establish specific conditions. It combines tactical tasks and missions through its organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to accomplish its assigned mission. The division is the primary tactical warfighting HQ for mission command of land force BCTs.

c. Like corps, the division allocates resources, establishes priorities of support, task organizes and establishes command relationships within major subordinate organizations, designates decisive and shaping operations, synchronizes the operations of subordinates operating in the same time and space, and integrates joint capabilities to achieve operationally significant results. The division commander establishes priorities and allocates resources through distributing combat power, allocating enablers, and shifting the main effort as required. Weighting the decisive operation is the most direct way of influencing mission accomplishment. The commander does this by allocating resources.

d. In addition to its attached BCTs and CABs, the division normally includes at least one of each of the following brigades: fires, maneuver enhancement, and battlefield surveillance. The division receives sustainment support from a theater support command or ESC on an area basis, in a supporting to supported relationship. Divisions can simultaneously provide mission command up to six BCTs and two CABs engaged in major combat operations but may control more maneuver brigades during the conduct of protracted stability operations. The division may employ any mix of heavy, infantry, and Stryker BCTs, or full spectrum and heavy CABs. Each division's task organization differs, not only for a particular campaign, but also for different phases of the campaign. The division directs brigades to conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security.

e. In addition to BCTs, the division uses mission orders to direct the execution of the other warfighting functions organized under support and functional brigades. These include the fires brigade, the MEB, the CAB, and the BFSB. One or more sustainment brigades assigned to the theater sustainment command as well as other forces support the division to establish temporary

bases along a line of operations or in an AO. The division employs available BCTs and MEBs to provide area security for these bases.

f. The division weights the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts with assets from theater army and corps forces based on CCIRs. Collection from BFSBs, CABs, MEBs, and reconnaissance units of subordinate BCTs combine with national, joint, and strategic-level collection platforms to fill information and intelligence requirements. The division can allocate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to the lowest tactical level. The co-creation of context is achieved as decentralized collection assets, (such as, providing BCTs with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), give the lowest tactical levels imagery, and signals intelligence support. Divisions also direct the employment of BFSB and combined arms air-ground forces to conduct continuous reconnaissance to gather current information to answer the CCIR. These forces conduct reconnaissance and security operations to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, develop the situation through action, deny the enemy freedom of maneuver, secure the force, and protect the local population. Assigned collectors and combat forces enable reconnaissance forces to develop the situation rapidly in contact and find, fix, and finish enemy forces.[6]

g. As part of a joint or multinational force, divisions plan and execute intratheater maneuver integrating joint or Army assets to project forces to positions of advantage. As part of a joint force, divisions can execute forcible entry via parachute, air assault, or amphibious assault to conduct wide area security, secure routes, lodgments, and secure key terrain. A forcible entry operation is inherently joint. These operations may use any combination of BCTs and supporting units from multiple air ports and sea ports of embarkation.

h. Divisions integrate joint and multinational partner capabilities to achieve operational objectives. Divisions shape operations beyond the influence and planning horizons of subordinate brigades. The division conducts combined arms maneuver, combined arms air-ground reconnaissance, and wide area security operations to develop the situation through action, consolidate gains, and retain freedom of movement and action. Divisions employ offensive and defensive joint and Army fires in support of combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations. The division protects lines of communication (LOCs) to ensure freedom of action across the AO using BCTs, support, and functional brigade assets as required.

i. Divisions direct the employment of BCTs, support, and functional brigades in combined arms maneuver to gain positions of advantage, win the close fight, defeat enemies, and stabilize environments through security force assistance (SFA) and building partnerships with local governments, forces, and civil populations. Additionally, divisions employ forces to conduct area security operations to include the area between major subordinate organizations.

2-6. Brigades

a. BCTs are the principal tactical echelon formations. The versatile nature of these formations allows commanders from corps to division to task organize BCTs with cross attachment of battalions, companies, and augmenting enablers making them more effective over a broad range of METT-TC conditions. Brigades conduct combined arms maneuver to place the enemy in a

position of disadvantage, and to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to achieve decisive results. Brigades conduct wide area security operations to establish conditions for freedom of movement and freedom of action for themselves, host nation forces, government, and nongovernmental agencies. BCTs conduct decentralized full-spectrum operations. They conduct these operations simultaneously or transition among them as they sense and understand the environment. This sensing and understanding, when shared up, down, and laterally across the command, enables a co-creation of context, a more comprehensive assessment of the operating environment at all echelons. Using network enabled mission command, brigades direct and coordinate the activities of subordinate battalions, and supporting battalions, to gain positions of advantage through tactical maneuver, win the close fight, and stabilize environments through SFA and building partnerships with local authorities and civil populations.

(1) The core capability of the BCT is combined arms maneuver and wide area security employing all elements of combat power[7] to defeat enemy forces and provide stability to secure the population and infrastructure. BCTs are organized with an expanded set of organic capabilities that enhance unit cohesion for increased combat effectiveness.[8] BCTs have sufficient maneuver forces to provide depth and endurance in sustained combat, and sufficient organic fires, engineer mobility, and construction assets. They also possess organic reconnaissance formations with sufficient combat power to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, fight for information, and conduct wide area security.[9] BCTs employ augmenting enablers that enhance their capabilities as required by METT-TC. This includes attack, reconnaissance, and lift aviation to include both manned and unmanned systems.[10] It also includes,[11] long-range and satellite communications systems,[12] and enhanced sustainment capabilities,[13] and other capabilities as required. BCTs are augmented during train-up to allow for team building, which enhances unit cohesion and combat effectiveness.

(2) BCTs are trained and equipped to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, fight for information, and develop the situation through action. BCTs conduct combined arms air-ground reconnaissance using subordinate combined arms battalions, organic UAS, and other Army aviation support as required. HBCTs and SBCTs can conduct wide area security missions for the division or corps. With significant mobility augmentation, IBCTs can also perform wide area security.

(3) BCTs with augmentation and training may conduct SFA and build partnerships with the host nation. These efforts focus on providing equipment, training, education, sustainment, and infrastructure to indigenous organizations and forces including government and nongovernment organizations, military, paramilitary, police, intelligence forces, and others, to increase a foreign nation's capability and capacity to provide its own security. Soldiers are trained with the skill sets necessary to build effective partnerships. Soldiers will possess sufficient knowledge and understanding of the indigenous culture to cultivate the empathy needed for productive interaction and long term partnership. Units require foreign language capabilities to enable communication. This capability is provided organically through training, or it may require augmentation with either linguists or translators.

(4) Each BCT brings core capabilities and unique strengths to perform combined arms maneuver and wide area security. They are network enabled, with significant intelligence,

surveillance, reconnaissance, and fires capabilities. Companies within BCTs conduct decentralized operations enabled by company level operations cells facilitating intelligence collection, analysis, indirect fires targeting, and sustainment operations.

(5) BCTs can cross-attach battalions and companies with other BCTs based on METT-TC. They can also provide forces to the CABs, MEBs, and BFSBs.

(6) Each BCT has a brigade engineer battalion consisting of two engineer companies, (a combat engineer company and an engineer construction company), a military intelligence company, a signal company, a military police platoon, and a CBRNE platoon. The BCT commands and controls assigned and attached units providing general support. With augmentation, the BCT can act as a terrain manager; however, when performing this task, its ability to operate as a functional HQ is diminished greatly. When required for gap crossing, it is augmented by assets from the mobility augmentation company.[14]

(7) The combat engineer company operates throughout the BCT's area of operation and is employed in a direct support role to maneuver battalions. It provides engineer support with the construction of obstacles and defensive positions, obstacle breaching operations, river crossing assault operations, and the construction of fixed and floating bridges. It provides survivability advice, assistance, and equipment in the construction of fighting positions for individuals and weapons systems. The combat engineer company prepares and executes target demolition such as bridge destruction, creating road and runway craters, *abatis*, or other roadblocks, and tunnel and railroad destruction. It prepares and executes obstacles or other combat engineer missions to degrade enemy mobility, including berms, ditches, log posts, log cribs, and wire entanglements. It emplaces mines and provides technical assistance in the emplacement of mines. It provides advice to commanders on the employment of scatterable mines. The combat engineer company supports combined arms obstacle breaching operations and provides technical advice, assistance, and equipment support for assault and obstacle breaching operations.

(8) An engineer construction company is assigned to a BCT to provide engineer construction support throughout its AO. It provides mobility and countermobility capability enabling force application and protection. Some specific tasks include construction, emplacing culverts, hauling, force protection, and limited clearing operations.

(9) While all BCTs bring a significant core capability, each type of BCT has its own specific strengths and limitations.

b. The IBCT.

(1) The IBCT has three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion with organic precision effects, an engineer battalion, and a support battalion. It is optimized for operations in restricted and complex terrain and densely populated areas and requires less sustainment support than other types of BCTs. The IBCT can deploy large numbers of cohesive squads, short and medium range close combat missiles, and organic man-packable mortars. It requires less strategic lift than other BCTs and, when supported with intratheater airlift, has theater wide operational reach. The IBCT has very limited mobile protective firepower.

Selected IBCTs include special-purpose capabilities for early (initial) or forcible entry airborne or air assault operations. All IBCTs can conduct air assault operations.

(2) Capabilities of the IBCT include conducting small-unit operations; conducting operations with armored, mechanized, or wheeled forces; conducting operations with ARSOF; maintaining the ability to conduct forcible entry or early entry operations; and conducting air assault, or airborne operations. Capabilities also include maintaining brigade support battalion and forward support company transportation assets that allow four rifle companies to be truck-borne for any operation, and maintaining a reconnaissance squadron consisting of both mounted and dismounted personnel.

(3) Limitations of the IBCT include the lack of firepower, mobility, or inherent protection found in the HBCT. The three maneuver battalions of the IBCT move predominately by foot; organic vehicles must move either Soldiers or supplies. Infantry Soldiers are especially vulnerable to enemy fires and CBRNE attacks while moving. Soldiers of the IBCT require U.S. Air Force support for airborne assault. For a brigade-level air assault, the IBCT requires the support of at least two combat aviation brigades.

(4) The IBCT conducts offensive operations as part of a division plan to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. The IBCT is the lightest of the three BCTs and thus, the most flexible. The IBCT conducts combined arms maneuver in restricted and complex terrain against conventional and unconventional forces. It can adapt quickly to all types of terrain and situations. The IBCT's many organic elements provide increased flexibility of employment and make it a highly adaptable organization. The reconnaissance squadron gains accurate and timely information about the enemy in concert with IBCT sensors and other information systems to enable the commander to visualize the battlefield accurately and apply the elements of combined arms maneuver to reduce uncertainty. This allows the IBCT commander to achieve surprise by attacking the enemy at an unexpected time or place, and maneuver the three infantry battalions to positions of advantage, disrupt enemy movement, and maintain a robust reserve to exploit enemy weaknesses and opportunities. When augmented with protected mobility, it is well suited to conduct operations over larger areas in less restricted terrain.

(5) The IBCT executes defensive operations to defeat enemy attacks, buy time, economize forces, and develop favorable conditions for offensive operations. The purpose is to create conditions for future offensive operations that enable Army forces to regain the initiative. As part of division defensive operations, the IBCT may defend, delay, withdraw, or counterattack. The IBCT conducts area defense to deny the enemy access to designated terrain for a specified time, rather than the outright destruction of the enemy. The IBCT can control key terrain and help set the conditions for counterattacks and resumption offensive operations. The IBCT controls key terrain by creating integrated defensive positions and strong points that enemy forces must overcome or bypass. This creates opportunities for mobile protected firepower forces to gain positions of advantage. Multiple organic close combat missile systems and indirect fires make assault of the IBCT's defensive positions difficult for mobile and armored enemy forces.

(6) The IBCT conducts stability operations to demonstrate resolve through the commitment of time, resources, and forces to establish and reinforce diplomatic initiatives and military operations. These stability operations are inherently complex and place great demands on the organization's small-unit leadership. Junior leaders are required to possess noncombat and nation building skills while simultaneously maintaining essential warfighting skills. In a noncontiguous AO, a forward operating base is considered a perimeter defense and is used as a sanctuary from which forces may operate. The IBCT is generally unable to conduct an effective mobile defense without significant mobility augmentation.

(7) The IBCT conducts wide area security throughout full-spectrum operations to secure the AO and simultaneously secure civil populations and infrastructure against enemy action and influence. Wide area security is a continuous operation that the IBCT performs simultaneously with other offensive, defensive, or stability operations to both set the conditions desired for those operations, and to minimize impact on the local population. The IBCT performs decentralized small unit combat patrols throughout its area to establish rapport and trust with the local populations that contributes to the overall brigade and division effort. The brigade establishes long term relationships between individual small units and specific populations and geographic areas. The IBCT lacks mounted tactical mobility and requires mobility augmentation to perform this mission over larger areas. It may also require augmentation to provide the necessary language and human intelligence (HUMINT) skills applicable to the geographic area of interest.

(8) The IBCT executes continuous information operations, integrated with the division's overall plan, to give the enemy a false sense of the tactical environment. Effective IO can weaken the enemy's will to resist while denying him information on friendly forces.

(9) The IBCT achieves concentration by massing of overwhelming effects of combat power to achieve a single purpose. This is facilitated through the proliferation of digital communications systems and the principals of mission command.

c. The HBCT.

(1) The HBCT has three balanced battalions of mechanized infantry and armor. It also has a reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, an engineer battalion, and a support battalion. HBCTs are designed for combined arms offensive operations – to fight and hold terrain in a mobile protected firepower environment. They can also provide forces to reconnaissance or guard ahead or on the flanks of the BCT.

(2) Capabilities of the HBCT include conducting sustained operations in most environments; accomplishing very rapid movement and deep penetrations; conducting security operations; conducting offensive and defensive operations; and maintaining the ability to integrate light or ARSOF. Capabilities also include possessing mobile, protected firepower; providing digital situational awareness down to vehicle-level; and performing company-sized air assaults.

(3) Limitations of the HBCT include a high dependence on radio communications; restricted mobility in highly mountainous terrain or dense forests; high usage rate of consumable

supplies particularly class III, V, and IX; vulnerability to mines and antitank weapons; and the HBCT footprint is usually larger than a lighter force. Further, the HBCT staff does not have an S3 air section to plan and oversee air assault operations. The HBCT possesses no organic gap crossing capabilities, require significant strategic airlift and sealift to deploy and sustain and can conduct offense in urban terrain but may require additional augmentation from IBCTs for dismounted infantrymen.

(4) The HBCT conducts wide area security with the same doctrine and by the same methods as the IBCT. Depending on METT-TC factors, the HBCT may require infantry augmentation to provide the presence necessary to achieve the desired effects of its decentralized small unit combat patrols. It may also require wheeled vehicle augmentation to maximize its presence while minimizing the impact of its combat vehicles on the local population and infrastructure. Other augmentation may be necessary to provide language and HUMINT skills applicable to the assigned mission and operational area.

(5) The HBCT conducts offensive operations as part of a division plan to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. The HBCT's unique capabilities enable it to conduct offensive operations with great precision, speed, and overwhelming firepower. The HBCT is particularly adept at concentrating overwhelming amounts of combat power due to the high mobility and protection of its combat systems.

(6) The HBCT executes defensive operations to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. The HBCT is well suited for mobile defense by orienting on the destruction of the enemy through decisive attacks.

(7) The HBCT conducts stability operations through the commitment of time, resources, and forces to establish and reinforce diplomatic and military resolve. Like wide area security, this may require augmentation with Infantry depending on METT-TC.

d. Stryker BCT.

(1) The SBCT has three infantry battalions motorized with Stryker vehicles. It also has a reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, an engineer, military intelligence, signal, and antitank companies, as well as a support battalion. The SBCT possesses significant strategic mobility, considerable operational reach, and excellent dismounted infantry capability. It is more deployable than the HBCT and has greater tactical mobility, protection, and firepower than the IBCT, but it does not have the firepower or protection to survive in a tank intensive fight without augmentation.

(2) Capabilities of the SBCT include its role as an infantry-centric organization with 108 infantry squads; each infantry battalion contains organic armor in its mobile gun system platoons; in-theater mobility and greater strategic mobility than the HBCT; lower usage rate of class III supplies as compared to the HBCT, with nearly the same mobility; greater survivability than an IBCT. The SBCT has the ability to conduct forcible entry operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance can be conducted with organic assets assisted by Soldiers trained in HUMINT Soldiers. SBCTs are optimized for infantry intensive operations requiring protected mobility. In

wide area security operations, SBCTs have the organic mounted mobile protection to cover large areas and to develop the situation thru action but without the firepower of an HBCT. SBCTs can conduct offense and defensive operations across the full spectrum of military operations. However, it requires augmentation for operations against an armored force.

(3) Limitations of the SBCT include the absence of firepower or inherent protection of the HBCT. The SBCT requires more air assets to deploy than an IBCT. The brigade support battalion does not have forward support companies for each maneuver battalion. The SBCT has limited organic gap crossing capabilities. There is no brigade special troops battalion for command and control of brigade troops. Finally, the SBCT requires augmentation for engagements with an armored force.

(4) The SBCT conducts wide area security with the same doctrine and by the same methods as the other BCTs. The SBCT is particularly suited for wide area security missions due to its large number of mobile infantry squads and its wheeled, protected combat vehicles. Like other BCTs, it may require augmentation to provide language and HUMINT skills.

(5) The SBCT conducts offensive operations as part of any North Atlantic Treaty Organization, joint, or Army organization's plan to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. The SBCT's unique capabilities enable it to conduct offensive operations with speed and with the ability to dismount large numbers of infantry. It is also adept at concentrating forces rapidly enabled by the high mobility of its combat systems.

(6) The SBCT executes defensive operations to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Like the HBCT, it is well suited for mobile defense by orienting on the destruction of the enemy through decisive attacks. However, it lacks the organic firepower necessary for protracted engagements with armored forces.

(7) The SBCT conducts stability operations like the other BCTs. Its infantry-centric organization and its protected mobility give the SBCT the ability to develop close associations with dispersed populations quickly.

e. The CAB.

(1) The full spectrum and heavy CABs are organized to operate primarily with the division, to conduct combined arms maneuver to achieve full spectrum capabilities and to synchronize and orchestrate the operations of multiple aviation battalion task forces simultaneously. The heavy CAB is identical to the full spectrum CAB except it replaces the attack reconnaissance squadron with a second attack reconnaissance battalion. The CAB is also capable of working directly for a JTF, theater Army, corps, or a multinational HQ to conduct combined arms maneuver and sustainment operations. It has the functionality to fully integrate into all operations of the maneuver air-ground team as well as operate in the AO of the controlling division, corps, or theater not occupied by ground maneuver brigades.

(2) CABs are trained and equipped to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, fight for information, and develop the situation through action. CABs conduct combined arms air-ground reconnaissance in coordination with maneuver forces. CABs conduct aerial maneuver operations across the spectrum of conflict as an integral member of the joint combined arms team. A CAB conducts close combat attack, interdiction attack; reconnaissance; security; air assault; aeromedical evacuation; and additionally performs vital air movement of critical personnel, equipment, and supplies; and provides other crucial support. When task organized with BCT ground maneuver and fires organizations, CABs can conduct wide area security to secure the population and infrastructure and deny the enemy freedom of maneuver.

(3) Additional capabilities provided by CABs include command and control enhancement by providing the maneuver commanders with a highly mobile, self-contained, reliable airborne digital command post, communications relay with UAS, and air traffic services. CABs deliver the combat and sustainment support to enable steady state operations[15] required in an era of persistent conflict.

(4) The full spectrum and heavy CABs are similar except for the number and type of attack, reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms. They are deliberately designed to enable task organization to optimize aviation capabilities for specific missions of specified duration, and constructed to deliver combat power while maximizing efficiencies. Full spectrum CABs have one attack reconnaissance battalion; an attack reconnaissance squadron; an assault helicopter battalion, a general support aviation battalion, a separate extended range multipurpose UAS company, and an aviation support battalion.

f. The BFSB.

(1) The BFSB performs a multitude of functions for its supported commander. Two major functions it performs in support of division or corps priority intelligence requirements are discussed below.

(a) The BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance tasks (to include military intelligence discipline collection) and reinforces the collection capabilities of other modular brigades when necessary.

(b) It is the second role that makes the BFSB uniquely well-suited to support wide area security operations. The BFSB's HUMINT collection teams, multifunctional teams, signal intelligence platoons, and counterintelligence teams support nearly every brigade in a division or corps AO. The combat information they collect is not limited to answering BCT priority intelligence requirements. When fused with information collected from throughout the division or corps AO and analyzed by the BFSB's fusion element, the resulting actionable intelligence supports area security operations, improves situational understanding throughout the AO, and allows the commander to make informed decisions and allocate appropriate resources to accomplish operational objectives.

(2) Reconnaissance and surveillance tasks are not limited to the BFSB's mounted troops and long range surveillance company. The BFSBs HUMINT Soldiers conduct human

reconnaissance and surveillance. The unit's signal intelligence Soldiers conduct signals reconnaissance and surveillance. Similarly, the BFSB's counterintelligence Soldiers conduct a form of counter reconnaissance directed against threat collection attempts. When formed into combined arms reconnaissance and surveillance teams, the BFSB's Soldiers are capable of producing multiple and complimentary layers of combat information. The BFSB's combined reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and analysis capabilities provide a single source for information and intelligence previously unavailable to operational level commanders.

(3) BFSB full spectrum roles and missions. The BFSB can serve in a number of roles and missions that directly support full-spectrum operations and combined arms maneuver. The most important are described below.

(a) Early entry. Among other tasks, BFSB elements can conduct population assessments, coordinate with host nation forces, and conduct reconnaissance of host nation infrastructure and transportation networks. The long range surveillance company, teamed with other BFSB elements, can participate directly in joint forcible entry operations.

(b) Early follow on. The BFSB can follow and support assault forces by assisting with expansion of the lodgment area, identifying potential threats, making contact with the transitional government, coordinating with joint, interagency, intergovernmental or multinational elements operating in the AO, and enhancing the situational understanding of follow-on BCTs as they occupy their AOs.

(c) Economy of force. The BFSB mitigates risk in AOs where BCTs are not otherwise available. It identifies and neutralizes threats within its capabilities, provides early warning when threats exceed its capabilities, and conducts battle handover with maneuver forces as required by the situation.

(d) Identification, tracking, and defeat of threat networks. Since the BFSB is itself a network, it is well positioned to identify, track, and ultimately defeat threat networks during stability operations. Its combination of target interdiction teams, mounted scouts, and military intelligence assets allow it to neutralize threats using both lethal and nonlethal means and to develop additional intelligence for use by other brigades and BCTs.

(e) Echelons above brigade intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration, synchronization, and technical exploitation coordination. The BFSB is organized to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration and synchronization tasks with limited augmentation.

(f) Echelons above brigade intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance command and control. The BFSB is a modular brigade designed to receive attachments. It has a robust HQ comparable in size to a BCT, provides the capability to command and control both organic, and attached units including maneuver, manned and unmanned aviation, fires, and echelons above division intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. This enables the supported commander (division, corps and/or JTF) to focus on the planning and execution of the overall operation rather than subordinate unit execution. It has the capability to command and control

dispersed operations through the employment of a main command post and a tactical command post.

(g) Offensive operations. The BFSB contributes to offensive operations by collecting information against supported higher unit intelligence requirements before, during, and after execution. This information contributes to the common operational picture (COP), allows the supported staff to develop and refine plans, enhances the commander's ability to exercise command and control, and provides relevant information necessary for the commander to make informed decisions. The BFSB employs organic and augmenting assets in conjunction with links to higher level and joint assets to answer intelligence requirements. In addition, the BFSB has the ability to call for and observe fires when supporting assets are available. It conducts reconnaissance and surveillance operations in unassigned areas, in a BFSB AO, or in a combination of the two as directed by the supported higher commander. The BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance of subsequent objectives and potential air assault objectives, contributes to the targeting process, and collects against priority intelligence requirements related to decision points.

(h) Defensive operations. In defensive operations, the BFSB focuses its assets in unassigned areas, an AO assigned to it by the supported HQ, or some combination of the two to gain information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. The information gathered by the BFSB helps the supported higher unit develop and refine the plan for the defense, as well as plans for future offensive operations and for ongoing and future stability operations. The information contributes to the supported unit's targeting efforts for strike operations that enhance both the defense and preparations for offensive operations. The BFSB can enhance the employment of fires by providing targeting information and as necessary by providing observation of fires and battle damage assessments.

(i) Stability operations. Among other tasks, the BFSB provides the supported higher HQ with the capability to conduct reconnaissance and assessments of key civilian infrastructure. These missions can be conducted when the higher unit focuses on either offensive or defensive operations in preparation for a shift in focus to stability operations. The BFSB conducts reconnaissance of civilian infrastructure in coordination with supported G/J-9, civil affairs assets, and other government agencies. It can provide valuable information about the future needs and planning requirements for stability operations. The BFSB's ability can be greatly enhanced by task organizing assets such as engineers, civil affairs, and CBRNE reconnaissance teams. The reconnaissance teams provide the expertise to assess infrastructure in such areas as bulk storage facilities for toxic industrial chemicals and petroleum, oils, and lubricants; water, fuel, and electrical distribution lines; medical infrastructure; and government capabilities. This allows the supported higher unit to put plans, personnel, and materiel in place as it shifts its focus to stability operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance of the civilian infrastructure continues during focused stability operations to provide continued assessments, and in some cases, to enhance security.

(4) BFSB limitations. The BFSB's organic capabilities allow it to operate routinely in close contact with the local population and it is well-suited to make first contact with potential threat networks. It fights for information at the lowest tactical level and often develops the

situation at the small unit level through both lethal and nonlethal action. Fighting for information above the small unit level, however, requires augmentation. In addition to supporting wide area security operations for a corps or division, the BFSB can conduct guard or cover missions if required within the limitations of METT-TC. These missions; however, require significant maneuver, sustainment, and possibly aviation augmentation to the unit's organic capabilities. Depending on the situation, the BFSB also requires additional staff enablers such as engineer, civil affairs, public affairs, and liaison officers, among others to perform these missions properly. Since the BFSB has only one organic tactical UAS platoon, some security missions may require tactical UAS augmentation and additional extended range multipurpose UAS sorties from the CAB.

g. MEB.

(1) The MEB is a command and control HQ with a multifunctional brigade staff optimized to conduct maneuver support operations (integrate the complementary and reinforcing capabilities of key protection, movement and maneuver, and sustainment tasks), support area operations, stability operations, and consequence management operations. Beyond its three organic units (HQ and HQ company, network support company, and brigade support battalion), the MEB is a combined arms maneuver organization that is task-organized based on the assigned mission of the higher echelon's METT-TC requirement. The MEB is primarily designed to provide support to division operations but is capable of being employed to support echelons above division structures as well. The MEB receives and controls forces to provide protection and mobility to prevent or mitigate effects of hostile action against divisional forces. It provides critical capabilities to enhance freedom of movement and maneuver for the tactical and operational commanders.

(2) The MEB's components may be in direct support of a BCT or task organized from a MEB in support of a division. The MEB's key tasks may include mobility and countermobility, route reconnaissance, battlefield obscuration, movement corridor operations, route clearance, police intelligence, EOD protection support, law enforcement, survivability, area security, area damage control, terrain management force response operations, fire support coordination, airspace management, establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, respond to CBRNE operations and incident response, and post incident response.

(3) The MEB may serve a vital economy of force role by supporting and/or freeing BCTs to concentrate on their priorities in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. Typically, the MEB simultaneously reinforces maneuver with mobility missions or tasks that complement the movement with protection coordination. The MEB may conduct wide area security missions in support of the division unassigned areas to protect critical lines of communication.

(4) The MEB is normally assigned an AO where it conducts division support area operations and establishes movement corridors to assist in providing protection for tenant units and units conducting movement through its AO. Based on METT-TC requirements, the MEB executes limited offensive and defensive operations, using a tactical control force. The MEB primarily performs protection support coordination, movement corridor operations, and selected sustainment operations to enhance freedom of movement.

(5) The MEB has limited organic structure and depends on other organizations for some additional capabilities. Detailed mission analysis during the operations process will identify requirements. Examples of MEB dependencies include fires (counterfire radar, forward observers, and ability to lase targets, Air Force tactical control party), sustainment (forward support company, area support medical company, aerial medical evacuation), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability UAS, military intelligence units, and geospatial staff). (See figure 2-3.)

	IBCT	HBCT	SBCT	BFSB	CAB	MEB
OFFENSE -Movement To Contact - Search and Attack -Attack - Ambush - Raid -Exploitation -Pursuit	• Combined Arms maneuver & Wide Area Security • Optimized for restricted terrain • Forcible Entry (Air Assault, Airborne) and Strategic movement • May require augmentation with mounted firepower and mobility	• Combined Arms maneuver & Wide Area Security • Optimized for Firepower and • May require augmentation with Infantrymen in restricted terrain • Early Entry	• Combined Arms maneuver & Wide Area Security • Optimized for infantry intensive operations requiring protected mobility and intratheater movement • Early Entry • May require augmentation with mounted firepower	• Optimized for ground reconnaissance and aerial surveillance operations and reinforces the collection capabilities of other brigades • Typically requires augmentation with combat forces, fires, and aviation • Early Entry • Security Force Assistance	• Optimized for aerial reconnaissance, security and attack operations, vertical maneuver and air movement of critical personnel and equipment, mission command, and crucial sustainment support • May require augmentation with combat forces • Early Entry • Security Force Assistance	• Optimized to provide staff planning for and C2 of the units required to conduct maneuver support operations, support area operations, and consequence management operations • Requires augmentation for all operations • Early Entry • Security Force Assistance
DEFENSE - Area Defense - Mobile Defense - Retrograde Operations - Delay - Withdrawal	• Combined Arms maneuver & Wide Area Security • Optimized for restricted terrain • May require augmentation with mounted firepower	• Combined Arms maneuver & Wide Area Security • Optimized for all but the most restricted terrain • May require augmentation with Infantrymen	• Combined Arms maneuver & Wide Area Security • Optimized for Operations in a variety of terrain • May require augmentation with mounted firepower			
STABILITY OPERATIONS - Peace Operations -Foreign Internal Defense -Security Assist - Humanitarian & Civic Assist - Combating Terrorism - Show of Force	• Combined Arms Maneuver • Wide Area Security with mobility augmentation • Security Force Assistance	• Combined Arms maneuver & Wide Area Security • Organic mounted mobile protection to cover large areas and to develop the situation thru action • Security Force Assistance	• Combined Arms maneuver & Wide Area Security • Organic mounted mobile protection to cover large areas and to develop the situation thru action but without the firepower of an HBCT • Security Force Assistance			
SUPPORT -Domestic Support Operations -Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	• Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security • Relief Operations • Support to Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction • Support to Civil Law Enforcement • Community Assistance					

Figure 2-3. Summary of brigade competencies in combined arms maneuver

Chapter 3
Core Operational Actions

3-1. Conduct combined arms maneuver

a. Maneuver forces engage the enemy in close combat. This requires the Warrior Ethos and a winning attitude. Placing Soldiers in sufficient numbers with the right capabilities in the AO remains essential to winning the close fight. Soldiers are equipped with systems that complement their survivability and lethality without hindering their mobility. They are fully networked and able to share and receive situational awareness and able to access the full suite of joint enablers. Maneuver forces are able to identify and be identified by joint and Army units to enable them to fight close engagements with confidence, maintain the initiative, and minimize the danger of fratricide.

b. Maneuver forces, enabled by intelligence, the network and leadership must decisively win the close fight. BCTs in the close fight have sufficient combat power to enable commanders to

weight the main effort and simultaneously maintain a fully capable reconnaissance and surveillance force. Both mounted and dismounted systems combine lethal and nonlethal fires to ensure overmatch.

c. Timely and effective intelligence produced through a systematic application of co-creation of context is a precursor to successful maneuver operations. Maneuver forces see themselves, see host nation populations, and see and perceive the environment. Effective maneuver seeks to place the enemy at a positional and situational disadvantage. It is a principal purpose of intelligence to enable the commander's effective maneuver through the reduction of uncertainty to exploit the enemy's positional disadvantage. Effective maneuver and fires require timely, accurate intelligence and intelligence has the task to support the commander's situational understanding.[16] Intelligence enables effective mission command execution by leveraging intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and delivery of fires to provide situational awareness and positional advantage to the maneuver commander.

d. Maneuver forces develop the situation through action in stability operations through culturally aware leaders and Soldiers who operate among the population, impose their will, build trust, and develop relationships. Developing the situation through action begins with effective reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence collection to fill in the gaps in the commander's understanding of the situation. Combined arms maneuver requires combined arms capabilities, access to joint capabilities, specialized training, and the employment of appropriate combinations of manned and unmanned air and ground systems to see and fight across the depth and breadth of the AO. It includes the ability to conduct both mounted and dismounted reconnaissance and surveillance. Army forces gain and maintain contact with the enemy to observe, assess, and interpret enemy reactions and the ensuing opportunities or threats to friendly forces or the mission.

e. Maneuver forces are enabled by combined arms mobile protected firepower with unmanned systems having detection and lethal capabilities. These systems enable the force to survive first contact with peer and near-peer forces and enable the force, supported by networked joint fires, to dominate the close fight with lethal and nonlethal protected and survivable systems. This allows maneuver forces to maintain the initiative and dominate the close fight. Mobile protected systems with the ability to detect hazards such as CBRNE, mines, and improvised explosive devices (IED) enable maneuver formations to maintain momentum and dominate the close fight. Protected combat vehicles and tactical wheeled vehicles enable sustaining the distributed force across extended distances.

f. Maneuver forces are enabled with organic precision indirect fires, air and missile defense, close air support, and Army aviation close combat attack and area suppression. Lethal overmatch facilitates the destruction of enemy formations or targets using precision and joint fires engagements with long range precision guided and area munitions.

g. Maneuver forces are enabled with complementary nonlethal capabilities to achieve effects while limiting casualties among adversaries and the civilian population. Wide area security operations require nonlethal systems to enable commanders to control their AOs without inflicting critical wounds or killing combatants or noncombatants. Nonlethal capabilities serve

as substitutes for conventional munitions when collateral damage and civilian casualties are at risk. Thus, they are particularly useful against enemy elements that employ practices such as using human shields or sheltering within populated areas. Nonlethal capabilities may also significantly reduce costs in such areas as reconstruction and reparations, reduce the volume of munitions required, and have a positive effect on domestic and foreign populations' perceptions on the use of military force.

h. Unmanned ground and aircraft systems provide formations with persistent surveillance of the AO to dominate the close fight. These systems will allow engagement of enemy personnel and systems through a combination of selected unmanned platforms equipped with both lethal and nonlethal weapons. Sensors on these platforms provide the information necessary to employ fires against detected threats, and complement manned reconnaissance and surveillance. BCTs low level air picture will include awareness of unmanned aerial systems to facilitate airspace management and to protect the force.

i. Maneuver forces continue to operate in difficult OE and will require mobility and counter-mobility capabilities to ensure freedom of movement.

3-2. Conduct wide area security

a. Maneuver forces conduct wide area security to deny the enemy's ability to threaten joint forces, partners, or populations. The objective is to protect and legitimize local friendly governments, and facilitate reconstruction, development, and rule of law efforts. Wide area security includes all doctrinal stability tasks and focuses on engagement with local populations, partners, local security forces, and governments. Maneuver forces provide wide area security by simultaneously creating secure conditions for dispersed locations, assets, and populations. This includes static facilities, mobile assets, and indigenous governments, organizations, and populations. This requires an adaptive force that can be task organized for combined arms operations at the lowest tactical levels, yet can aggregate quickly for operations.

b. Regionally aligned general purpose forces from corps through BCTs provide combatant commands with specially trained forces with competence in the languages, cultures, history, governments, security forces, and threats in areas where conflict is likely. These forces support combatant command security cooperation plans by developing sustained relationships with partner nation governments and their security forces. They routinely participate in multinational exercises and SFA missions to reassure allies and friends while deterring adversaries. Regionally aligned general purpose forces also have a habitual relationship with regionally aligned ARSOF.

c. Areas of responsibility for security forces may be quite expansive. Distances between subordinate units may make mutual support a challenging proposition. The wide area security force requires highly mobile elements that can span the gaps between areas of persistent presence as well as surveillance systems that augment knowledge gained through presence. Air-ground integration is critical. Aviation enhances the security force's ability to reconnoiter gaps between ground units and areas ahead, to the flanks, and rearward of maneuvering units.

d. Maneuver forces develop situational understanding throughout their operational area. This requires the capability to conduct continuous reconnaissance and surveillance with a full integration of human interaction and observation with manned and unmanned systems, ground and air platforms, and organic and nonorganic surveillance systems for the security force to understand the evolving situation over a complex area.

e. Dispersed units develop their own collection efforts and shape the collection efforts of adjacent and higher organizations. They coordinate their information requirements with multiple forces and agencies as well as access and assess information from nonorganic sources to identify indicators of enemy activity and intent. Dispersed companies collect and analyze local information and integrate higher level intelligence to enable decisionmaking in support of decentralized operations. Corps and divisions have AOs that may extend beyond the AOs of subordinate brigades. As a result, they require the capability to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in these areas to ensure threats do not develop that could significantly impede other operations.

f. The maneuver force also collects information in close contact with the enemy and the local population to develop unity of effort with the local populace and host nation forces. This requires mobility, protection, and firepower overmatch and a blend of combat power provided by combined arms formations with access to joint enablers. Effective partnerships built over time facilitate access to information, the sharing of intelligence, and the ability to act quickly in concert when required.

g. To be effective in wide area security the maneuver force maintains continuous presence (direct, human observation, and interaction) and active pursuit of information on selected targets of interest. Continuous presence requires Soldiers trained, equipped, and comfortable interacting with indigenous populations in a HUMINT collecting capacity. Future Army maneuver forces must be able to transition from area security to SFA.

3-3. Full-spectrum operations

a. Maneuver forces are prepared to conduct full-spectrum operations – simultaneous offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations. These operations are conducted across the range of conditions from peacetime military engagement to major combat operations.[17] Leader flexibility and operational adaptability are critical for success in this complex environment.

b. Maneuver formations can think, operate, and prevail in three interrelated dimensions of full-spectrum operations. These dimensions are the psychological contest of will against implacable foes, warring factions, criminal groups, and potential adversaries; strategic engagement to sustain public support at home, gain allies abroad, and generate support or empathy for the mission; and the cyber/electromagnetic contest where increasingly adaptive enemies have demonstrated the ability to dominate local cyber networks to win the war of information and public opinion.

c. The maneuver force maintains the capability to fight and win against peer and near-peer adversaries in major combat operations. This capability is among the reasons for the maneuver force.

d. Maneuver forces conduct combined arms maneuver to develop the situation through action; to fight for information; and to place adversaries at a disadvantage to employ best a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms. They employ appropriate combinations of combined arms assets, and through wide area security operations employ combinations of cooperative, persuasive, and coercive means to assist and support allies and partners, protect and reassure populations, and isolate and defeat enemies.

e. Maneuver forces fight for and collect information in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations through continuous physical reconnaissance, persistent surveillance, and HUMINT to develop the contextual understanding to defeat enemy countermeasures, compensate for technological limitations, and adapt continuously to changing situations.

f. When METT-TC conditions warrant, future Army forces operate in a more decentralized manner. In decentralized operations, leaders react to unique developments in their assigned AOs. These developments often are significantly different across the AOs, forcing each commander to conduct operations in accordance with the higher commander's intent. Each situation will demand unique solutions requiring different combined arms capabilities. The organic capabilities of each unit will necessitate access to additional combined arms capabilities and joint effects and the authority to employ them. Operating within the commander's intent, lower echelon tactical units conduct operations to develop the situation in their areas and influence the populace and hostile forces.

g. The Army continues to capitalize on technology to detect threats from multiple sources. Corps and divisions provide communications and digital networks that have the capability to receive, analyze, store, retrieve, manipulate, display, and share enormous volumes of information and intelligence within a secure and adaptable network. Commanders and leaders at both the tactical and operational echelons possess the capability to develop the situation by collecting and fighting for information and integrating information and intelligence received from higher level commands. In offensive and defensive operations, all combat formations are capable of conducting reconnaissance, security, and surveillance while remaining undetected. If detected, maneuver forces can survive an initial engagement, suppress potential threats, and move to positions of advantage to employ joint and Army lethal and nonlethal effects. In stability and civil support operations, developing the situation through action remains a primary principle. It is achieved through living and operating by, with, and through host nation security forces and by moving and living with the population.

3-4. Projecting forces to positions of advantage: conduct intertheater and intratheater maneuver

a. Intertheater maneuver is maneuver over extended distances to enable the force to gain positional advantage over an enemy. It includes force projection tasks including deployment to intermediate staging bases and entry operations, both unopposed and forcible. The goal is to

move combat power from garrisons directly into action in a ready to fight configuration through military and commercial air ports and sea ports of embarkation. This produces strategic and operational surprise and limits antiaccess efforts of enemy forces. For example, intertheater airborne operations should not require intermediate staging bases. The development of capabilities, such as future theater lift and sea bases, is required for efficient and timely intertheater operational maneuver for heavier forces.

b. Intratheater maneuver is maneuver within a theater to achieve a positional advantage over an enemy. The future force may conduct intratheater maneuver to dominate an AO by seizing key terrain, securing populations, or destroying enemy forces and capabilities in depth. Air assault and airborne operations are crucial components of intratheater maneuver. The force must have platforms with sufficient speed, range, lift capacity, and the ability to land at unimproved, degraded, or less than optimal locations to enable maneuver and mitigate risks posed by enemy antiaccess and area-denial operations.

c. The future maneuver force remains campaign quality and is supported by seabasing and ship-to-shore capabilities. An afloat forward staging base affords a forcible entry capability by seabasing a BCT and provides the capability to conduct shipboard operations from or through the joint sea base for early entry, personnel movement, or sustainment operations. This includes the ability to conduct vertical maneuver of forces from specifically configured sea-based platforms to counter antiaccess. Joint airlift platforms are capable of shipboard operations to project combat power directly ashore while limiting the effects of antiaccess efforts. Seabasing allows Army aviation to maintain a projection platform that can be globally deployed while limiting the effects of antiaccess efforts within a theater of operations. Army aviation platforms will possess the capabilities required for shipboard operations.

d. Improved vertical lift over current systems provides intratheater aerial extension to joint deployment and employment. This capability provides continuous, precise, assured provisioning of deployed forces in virtually any environment, guaranteeing their ability to generate, maintain, and employ combat power throughout the campaign.

e. The Army must increase the mobility and protection of the maneuver force to ensure they can move and maneuver to positions of advantage. The ideal combination of combat power in the maneuver force is achieved with a force combining the strategic mobility of the IBCT, the mobility and flexibility of the SBCT, and the firepower and protection of the HBCT. These combinations of strategic and tactical mobility create complex dilemmas for the enemy.

f. During the conduct of opposed entry, maneuver forces use multiple distributed points of entry. These points of entry include unimproved landing sites that must be improved quickly to provide entry for heavy forces from the sea or air. The selections of quickly converted unimproved sites require geospatial intelligence and reconnaissance of the potential entry sites.

3-5. Conduct shaping and entry operations

a. Access to ports, airfields, foreign airspace, coastal waters, and host nation support in potential commitment areas is a challenge and requires active peacetime engagement with states

in volatile areas. Army forces conduct a broad range of theater security cooperation activities such as training foreign military forces, developing infrastructure, providing specialized capabilities, and providing other assistance to establish trust, develop relationships, and promote regional stability. These activities, also known as military engagement, enable forces to maintain freedom of action and access and aim to improve the capabilities of, or cooperation with, allies and partners, build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. ARSOF and general purpose forces move to locations around the globe using strategic and theater air, sea, and ground assets to participate in these shaping operations as directed by the joint force commander.

b. Peacetime shaping operations are enabled by capabilities that allow the future force to easily move within the area of operations; to provide mission command over extended distances; to sustain the effort to train or build infrastructure; to communicate with the local populace, local security forces and governments, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners; and to connect with subject matter experts from a distance. Task organized IBCTs, HBCTs, SBCTs, BFSBs and CAB formations that possess a greater variety of capabilities relevant to training, communication, and infrastructure development permit adaptive decentralized operations operating within the commander's intent.

c. When peacetime efforts fail, maneuver forces participate in joint entry operations. Maneuver forces move into a required operational area by air, land, or sea port, or if opposed, by seizing a lodgment to enable the operations of follow-on forces or to conduct a specific operation. Since advanced air and sealift capabilities that permit strategic or intertheater movement of unimproved ports of debarkation are not fielded in the quantities required in the 2016-2028 timeframe, the future Army forces will use access to nearby ports (ports where access is granted) and intermediate staging bases or sea bases to commence entry operations.

d. To avoid, neutralize, or counter threats to shaping and entry operations, maneuver forces rely on intelligence to support future operations by accurately identifying reactions to U.S. actions, anticipating their response to our counteractions and predicting additional courses of action. Predictive intelligence also supports the decisions the commander and staff must make about the size, composition, structure, and deployment sequence of the force to create the conditions for success.

e. Maneuver forces conduct shaping operations to create and preserve conditions for the success of operations. The future force conducts shaping operations, in concert with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, with combinations of organic long range joint networked fires, reconnaissance and surveillance elements, aviation units, and ground maneuver units. In this context, the movement and maneuver warfighting function includes the related tasks and systems that move forces to positions of advantage in relation to the enemy. Key to success in future operations is the development and acquisition of mobility systems to increase the mobility of maneuver formations while maintaining an adequate protection level. Additionally, the Army must make provision for accelerated strategic deployment of maneuver forces to allow maximum combat power to be applied early in the shaping phase of the larger operation.

f. Strategic movement.

(1) The future OE describes an international security environment in which U.S. future Army forces are committed more frequently to intervene in regional crises and conflicts, both planned and unplanned, which may range from short duration, smaller scale contingencies to major combat operations in theater war. Future adversaries will actively seek to deny, delay, or disrupt the U.S. access to conflict areas through antiaccess capabilities. This environment will require future Army forces to respond rapidly from a strategic expeditionary posture for immediate employment in theater and move throughout the depth of the AO to defeat the efforts of an aggressor swiftly or to win decisively in an extended campaign.

(2) Exploiting multiple entry points and simultaneous force flows by air and sea, future Army forces will be able to achieve a level of deployment momentum that helps overcome enemy antiaccess efforts, increases the opportunity for operational surprise, and closes the gap that exists today between early entry and campaign forces. In addition, improvements within the force deployment process, including reliable visibility of forces and sustainment in transit, coupled with continuously updated situational awareness, enable commanders to adjust force projection plans in stream and adapt to changing conditions.

(3) As the theater matures and the active AO expands, force elements deploy from outside the theater directly into forward objective areas rather than through forward operations bases or lodgment areas. The commander employs combinations of strategic and intratheater lift throughout the campaign to project forces and sustainment within the AO. Blending strategic force projection with operational employment in this manner generates the operational adaptability.

g. Unopposed entry. During unopposed entry operations, forces deployed rapidly prepare for immediate employment. Preceded by IO, closely integrated with diplomatic, political, economic, and overt military actions, maneuver forces require an uninterrupted flow of combat power into the AO to achieve a deployment and employment momentum that allows the enemy little time to adjust. Advanced air and sea lift is critical to enable rapid entry and sustainment. This enables delivery of support directly to the point of need, bypassing unsecured LOCs, and preventing loss of momentum of operations.

h. Opposed entry. When opposed, maneuver forces conduct airborne, air assault, or over-the-horizon sea-based joint forcible entry operations. ARSOF support forcible entry by conducting shaping including reconnaissance and raids. Forcible entry enables friendly forces to seize or occupy key terrain and facilities from which to repel enemy forces, secure populations, and/or continue the flow of follow-on forces. To conduct joint forcible entry operations, maneuver units require combined arms capabilities and access to joint capabilities, especially intelligence, fires (offensive and defensive), sustainment, airlift, and sealift. Successful joint forcible entry operations and follow-on operations require protection under a joint air and missile defense umbrella.

3-6. Network enabled mission command

a. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by commanders, supported by their staffs, using the art of command and the science of control to integrate warfighting functions in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. Mission command uses mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative within the commander's intent, enabling agile and adaptive commanders, leaders, and organizations.[18] Successful mission command relies on co-creation of context to direct intelligence priorities and drive operations based on improved understanding of the situation. Coupled with mission command, co-creation of context enables subordinate leaders at all echelons to exercise disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to accomplish missions. Co-creation of context requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. Successful mission command rests on commander's intent, subordinates' initiative, mission orders, and resource allocation, and demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively to changing conditions to accomplish the mission within the commander's intent. Mission command requires leaders and Soldiers to understand the impact of every action and its effect on the intended outcome of the operation and campaign. The network assists the successful conduct of mission command, but the key drivers are the leader and Soldier and they must continue to exercise effective mission command in the absence of full network capabilities.

b. Combined with the network, mission command enables maneuver force leaders to execute decentralized operations in accordance with the commander's intent. Further, it enables them to integrate joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities to support their maneuver. The integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities is critical for synchronization of air operations as numerous manned and unmanned aircraft and various munitions are employed simultaneously in support of maneuver. The maneuver force will integrate all ground and air operations within their area of operations in support of the commander's scheme of maneuver by employing the network to enable mission command. No matter how robust and redundant the command and control systems of the future, commanders at every level must anticipate interruptions in network connectivity during maneuver and train to continue operations under degraded network conditions.

c. The network must provide the force with a shared relevant COP to enable the application of combat power and to enhance force protection. The network must enable decentralized operations and the efficient flow of information vertically and horizontally with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, host nation, and strategic partners to facilitate both ground and air maneuver. This is particularly true for the preservation of support and sustainment forces.

d. Maneuver forces require a shared relevant COP at all echelons down to dismounted team leaders and individual platforms. This shared operational picture enables common situational awareness and collaborative planning to mass combat power and to enhance force protection.

e. Adversaries continue to take action to negate the joint force's technical advantage of network enabled mission command. Maneuver forces have a secure network to company level with Soldiers and small unit leaders in the network to facilitate mission command and enable

decentralized operations. Decentralized operations require network enabled command and control capability available to the lowest level to enable leaders to make decisions and mass the effects of combat power at the right time and location. Maneuver forces possess battle command on the move to maintain momentum, flexibility, and adaptability.

3-7. Distributed support and sustainment

a. Operational maneuver is sustained through a globally-networked sustainment system. Increased operational distances, nonsecure LOCs, and a noncontiguous OE results in a greater reliance on aerial distribution platforms as a means of providing responsive and agile support from multiple locations within the theater. This, coupled with increased vertical maneuver support requirements, to include preparedness for quick repositioning of inserted units, results in increased aviation lift requirements. These assets include unmanned ground and air systems to detect and allow avoidance of enemy threats attempting to disrupt lines of communication or fixed base operations. Additionally, unmanned ground and air systems provide sustainment support directly to units in forward areas, allowing sustainment units to avoid unsecured LOCs.

b. The theater sustainment command provides this sustainment system for future Army forces. It normally plans and provides sustainment through a forward deployed ESC. Corps and division establish priorities of sustainment support, monitor execution, and coordinate changing sustainment requirements with the supporting ESC. The ESC provides point of manufacturing to point of need sustainment support through a single logistics chain of command.

c. Maneuver formations are capable of conducting sustained operations over extended distances and prolonged periods. These increasingly dispersed operations increase the support challenge faced by sustainment force elements. Protected tracked and tactical wheeled vehicles are essential for sustaining the distributed force across extended distances. Maneuver forces must integrate protection of the logistics chain and major deployment hubs into their operational and tactical plans.

d. Maneuver forces require increased air and ground transportation. Aviation platforms possess increased cargo load capability, greater operational availability, greater power efficiency with increased operational range, speed, and endurance, and increased reliability. Tactical and operational distances demand superior reliability and availability, which enhances force protection and survivability and reduces demands for supplies and personnel. The Army must retain and improve the capability (equipment, personnel, and training) to quickly plan and design, construct and deconstruct, and operate base camps to sustain operations over extended distances and prolonged periods.

e. Maneuver force operations require forces that are able to accomplish more, while utilizing fewer resources. Maneuver forces must reduce their demand for resources including: the number of supported personnel; the types, production methods, and distribution of food, water, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies; the reliability, availability and maintainability of vehicles and equipment; energy; personnel service requirements; medical service requirements; and financial support requirements.

3-8. Leader training and development[19]

a. The Army Training Strategy and field manual (FM) 7-0 provide the foundations and vision to generate cohesive, trained, and ready forces that can dominate at any point on the spectrum of conflict, in any environment, and under all conditions.

b. Leaders direct offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously while integrating combined arms operations and partners. They are capable of conducting decentralized operations under conditions of uncertainty and complexity. The OE requires leaders with flexible mindsets who can work through ambiguity, and have the ability to conceptualize information and employ skills gained through lifelong learning. Leaders require the ability to recognize when operational and tactical situations require nonstandard solutions derived from assessment and creative thinking. Challenging training in all live, virtual, and constructive environments under conditions which replicate the OE is essential to rapidly inculcating this ability into the maneuver forces' leaders.

c. Developing creative leaders comfortable with uncertainty and capable of mission command is vital for maneuver forces. Leaders synchronize forces in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. Training provides the greatest possible freedom of action to enhance a leader's ability to develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively in fluid, chaotic situations.

d. At increasingly lower levels, commanders and leaders think, operate, and prevail in three interrelated dimensions of full-spectrum operations: psychological contest of wills, strategic engagement, and cyber/electromagnetic contest. The ability to think and operate in these dimensions demands that leaders master the art of design so that they can link the tactical employment of forces to policy goals and strategic objectives. Leaders down to battalion level effectively integrate maneuver enablers (such as, the military police, engineers, aviation, public affairs, psychological operations, civil affairs, and other forces and assets) with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and private partners to achieve synergy and unity of effort.

e. The Army conducts training in a realistic manner that replicates the uncertainty, stress, and complexity of the various theaters of operations to speed the process of growing experienced leaders and Soldiers. The Army has a fully networked structure of live, virtual, and constructive training systems and approaches that are applicable to both mounted and dismounted Soldiers which uses networked collective training capabilities embedded on Army systems.

f. Leaders require progressive and continuous training on the systems that support networked collaborative planning and decisionmaking, so their use becomes second nature. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities must be incorporated repeatedly into this training so they can be integrated at the point of decision as a common occurrence. Virtual embedded and networked training facilitates this training.

g. The institutional domain must digitally link, in real time, training resources to the operational domain. Institutions must have a training network infrastructure that can link to the operational network (units, command and control systems, platforms, leaders, and Soldiers) to

support training. This includes deployed in-theater operational networks. This capability needs to be robust enough so that it could support Army deployment cycles of corps, divisions, and brigades training, and even unit mission rehearsals for real world missions. The commander, from within the tactical operations center, must be able to train in a virtual environment one minute and fight in the real world the next.

h. To achieve this nexus of institutional and operational domains, material solutions must have integrated on-board training and training networking capabilities. Embedding training capabilities in material solutions reduces the need for training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations, facilities, transportation costs, and increases training opportunities. Embedded training capabilities enhance and improve training, both individual and collective. Embedded training provides leaders a capability to operate in a synthetic environment, supported by a ubiquitous network able to support individual and collective training events while increasing available training opportunities by replicating situations, environments, and events that cannot be replicated in a live training environment. It also provides the ability to repeat training until the training audience has reached a high proficiency level.

i. Home stations and combat training centers both provide appropriate replications of the complex OE to support live training under conditions similar to expected AOs. The integrated training environment supplements this live maneuver capability with virtual and/or constructive simulations that expand training opportunities. The integration of instrumented live-fire ranges and force-on-force maneuver areas with simulators, embedded training systems, and constructive simulations provides commanders and trainers a seamless integrated training environment that extends multiechelon collective training opportunities.

3-9. Conducting SFA

a. Maneuver forces conduct SFA within the framework of full-spectrum operations in situations ranging from stable peace to general war. Additionally, the maneuver force transitions quickly from any point on the operational spectrum to SFA and back as dictated by local conditions.

b. Maneuver forces conduct SFA to increase a foreign nation’s capability and capacity to provide security for its own population. These efforts focus on training, providing equipment, supporting sustainment, infrastructure, and education to indigenous organizations and forces including government and nongovernment civil organizations, military, paramilitary, police, intelligence forces, and others.

c. Regionally aligned ARSOF are the primary Army providers of SFA and advisory skills. ARSOF assists maneuver forces by providing detailed information on the local OE. ARSOF also provides maneuver forces a bridging capability to interagency and foreign security forces. However, large contingency operations may require general purpose maneuver forces to conduct SFA to achieve strategic objectives, especially when building or rebuilding conventional forces and government institutions.

d. The amount and type of maneuver forces use in SFA efforts is based on METT-TC and an assessment of the local security forces and government institutions. Maneuver forces create conditions necessary for success and may participate directly in SFA by providing trainers, advisors, or other direct support. This includes creating a secure environment free from threat interference and building the partnerships necessary to facilitate SFA programs. Maneuver forces achieve success when indigenous forces and organizations operate independently, provide effective support of U.S. forces and objectives, and create and sustain a stable and secure environment for the civilian populace. Bearing in mind the overarching objectives of legitimacy and influence, the maneuver force must be precise and discriminate in attacking and defeating the threat while also shaping and influencing the operating environment itself.[20]

e. SFA requires decentralized, small-unit operations and integrated military-civilian teams with a mix of mutually supporting ARSOF and maneuver forces. Decentralized operations place great stress on enablers' capacity such as providing mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote sustainment, engineering planners, construction, intelligence, regional specialists, interpreters, translators, communications, close air support specialists, security forces, and base operating support.[21]

f. Maneuver force leaders conducting SFA are skilled in training, advising, negotiations, mediation, and arbitration.[22] Leaders are also trained in partnering and augmenting host-nation forces and organizations.

g. Leaders at all levels must embrace the idea that strategic engagement drives operations in SFA, vice conducting operations and attempting to tell a favorable U.S. story in the aftermath. The battle of the narrative is waged primarily through critical elements of the population who have formal or informal power or standing to sway the sentiments or induce the compliance of the general population.[23] In short, the maneuver force message must be credibly coercive to the target audience. Leaders receive a tiered approach to cultural awareness where some personnel get all the requisite training and education, some personnel receive additional specialized training, and a third smaller tier receives the most highly specialized skills. These skills must provide an appreciation of the environment, as well as social and societal aspects of specified regions.[24] Training programs include nongovernmental organizations and provincial reconstruction teams as part of military training events and predeployment training.[25]

3-10. Building partnerships

a. The battlefield and the complexity of the OE require maneuver forces to partner with joint forces, allies, government organizations, nongovernmental organizations, ARSOF, local military, paramilitary, police groups, and civil populations. The objective of partnerships is to harness the capabilities of partners into a synergistic whole that enhances local security, to achieve U.S. objectives, and build and sustain peace and security. Maneuver forces set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities for mutual benefit. The various actors present in—or influencing—the operational area each possesses unique capabilities relevant to the situation and strategic goals. Maneuver forces achieve success in building partnerships by creating broad based support for

U.S. forces and objectives and active cooperation in achieving these objectives. Additionally, corps and divisions will seek to build partner capacity to prepare for contingencies and enable deployment.

b. Maneuver forces require specific training to enable them with the skill sets necessary to build effective partnerships. Leaders must possess the knowledge to appreciate the constraints and limitations of partners while fully integrating their capabilities and contributions towards achieving U.S. strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Leaders at all levels of the maneuver force require a broad knowledge base to place military efforts in context and must be comfortable serving on civil-military teams to integrate complementary capabilities. All Soldiers must possess sufficient knowledge and understanding of the indigenous culture to cultivate the empathy needed for productive interaction and long term partnership. Units require foreign language capabilities to enable communication. This capability may be provided organically through training or may require augmentation with either linguists or translators.

Chapter 4
Conclusion

a. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 builds on the ACC and the AOC, and establishes the foundation for the capabilities necessary to meet the demands of the OE as envisioned in *TRADOC Operational Environment 2009-2025*. The Army must adapt to enable the force to gain, maintain, and exploit the initiative in full-spectrum operations against diverse enemies. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 describes how the Army conducts combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations under the mission command of divisions and corps in the conduct of full-spectrum operations.

b. Nine years of constant war reinforce the Army's need to maintain its understanding of the complexity of the close fight and its proficiency in small unit combat operations. Recent experience also clearly highlights the need to generate an adaptable force able to conduct full-spectrum operations under conditions of uncertainty and in the presence of an adaptable enemy. To prevail in the face of these operational realities, the Army must apply the lessons learned in the current conflict and adopt solutions that will increase its competency in future conflicts.

c. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 identifies that in the 2016-2028 timeframe there likely will not be a revolution in military technology that eliminates the need for traditional movement and maneuver – moving to a position of advantage and applying lethal effects; therefore, effective combined arms maneuver will remain the central focus of maneuver forces.

d. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 proposes that the near term objectives should be the following.

(1) Improve the Army's combined arms formations. Make them more versatile and give them more network capability to enable more effective full-spectrum operations.

(2) Organize, train, and equip formations to conduct simultaneous, decentralized operations in noncontiguous areas. Enable them to defeat hostile forces while simultaneously conducting

wide area security operations to influence civil populations, organizations, and governments in support of U.S. objectives.

(3) Develop adaptive and agile leaders and Soldiers, instilled with the Warrior ethos, which possess an in-depth experience level previously gained only after long tours in operational theaters, to lead units that are organized and trained to win in the OE.

(4) Provide corps and divisions with a flexible dedicated force to conduct reconnaissance and security operations to enable large unit operations.

(5) Update the Army's ability to support joint entry operations, forcible or unopposed from strategic distances.

Appendix A
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Required References

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Appendix B
Required Capabilities

B-1. ACC movement and maneuver required capabilities

a. Project forces to positions of advantage. The Army requires forces that can establish strategic mobility and operational reach to positions of advantage while avoiding or overcoming adversary or enemy employment of strategic preclusion, operational exclusion, antiaccess, and area denial capabilities to respond to a broad range of threats and challenges.

b. Fight for information. Army units will have to fight for and collect information in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations through continuous physical reconnaissance, persistent surveillance, and human intelligence to develop the contextual understanding to defeat enemy countermeasures, compensate for technological limitations, and adapt continuously to changing situations.

c. Improve civil support readiness. Future forces requires the capability to provide responsive DOD support, in accordance with the National response framework for natural or manmade disasters or attacks in the U.S. and its territories, to U.S. Federal, state, and local civilian command structures.

d. Win the close fight. Future units require the manpower, assured mobility, firepower (lethality), and protection to close with and defeat the enemy in conditions of uncertainty and in and among the populace to fight for information, conduct effective reconnaissance and security operations, effectively decentralize operations, develop the situation through action, and adapt continuously to changing situations.

e. Provide mobile protected firepower. Future forces require mobile protected firepower that can maneuver against the enemy under all conditions of battle, deliver precise lethal and nonlethal effects, is interoperable with joint and multinational partners, and provide adequate integrated command and communications systems to overwhelm the enemy and apply firepower with discrimination while operating among the population.

f. Conduct area security over wide areas. The Army must be capable of conducting area security operations over wide areas to deny the enemy's use of an area to prepare for or conduct operations that threaten joint forces, partners, or populations and to protect civilian populations,

friendly forces, installations, routes, borders, extended infrastructure and other friendly actions (such as support to governance, reconstruction, development, and rule of law efforts).

g. Large force operations. The Army requires a force capable of conducting and sustaining large force operations (corps and division) to conduct full-spectrum operations in the context of campaigns.

h. Conduct flexible civil security. The Army requires the capability to secure populations (for example, civil security, discriminate application of firepower, operations conducted within and understanding of cultural considerations) to gain and maintain the trust and confidence of the civilian population or to establish control for joint force operations.

i. Build partnership capacity. The Army requires the capability to conduct security force assistance and civil military operations (such as military support to governance, rule of law, and institutional capacity building) in a multinational environment with partners and among diverse populations to support allies and partners, protect and reassure populations, and isolate and defeat enemies.

B-2. AOC movement and maneuver required capabilities

a. The Army requires the capability to detect threats at extended ranges and with sufficient target location accuracy to permit engagements and provide early warning to friendly forces and populations.

b. The Army requires the capability to seize and control key terrain while conducting combined arms operations to accomplish mission objectives through a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms.

c. The Army requires the capability to close with and defeat enemy forces while conducting combined arms operations to accomplish mission objectives.

d. The Army requires the capability to conduct joint vertical maneuver with mounted and dismounted forces into austere environments and unimproved entry locations while conducting combined arms operations to exploit positional advantage, put large areas at risk for the adversary, shorten the duration of battle, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and contribute to the more rapid disintegration of the enemy force.

e. The Army requires the capability to engage and control populations to ensure freedom of movement and uninterrupted maneuver, and to reduce noncombatant casualties.

f. The Army requires the capability to maneuver in all tactical and operational environments to destroy enemy capabilities and accomplish JTF objectives by employing a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms.

g. The Army requires the capability to detect, locate, identify, and track friendly and enemy forces, neutrals, and organizations in close proximity and at standoff distances while conducting full-spectrum operations in all operational environments to prevent fratricide.

h. The Army requires the capability to detect, locate, identify, track, and engage individual leadership figures and high value targets while conducting combined arms operations in all operational environments to exert technical and psychological influence while employing a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms.

i. The Army requires the capability to rapidly transition between operations, shift between missions and engagements at distances from standoff range to close combat, and adjustment of geographical sectors while conducting full-spectrum operations to seize and retain the initiative.

B-3. Movement and maneuver warfighting function required capabilities

a. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. Direct fires is inherent in maneuver, as is close combat. The function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a positional advantage over an enemy. One example is moving forces to execute a large-scale air or airborne assault. Another example is deploying forces to intermediate staging bases in preparation for an offensive. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination with fires. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Both tactical and operational maneuver require sustainment support.

b. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes deploying; moving; combined arms maneuver; wide area security; employing direct fires; occupying an area; conducting mobility and countermobility operations; and employing obscuration.

c. The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include administrative movements of personnel and materiel. These movements fall under the sustainment warfighting function.

d. Movement and maneuver warfighting function required capabilities:

(1) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability of a versatile mix of task organized and networked combined arms organizations trained and ready to conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security in full-spectrum operations.

(2) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to fire, maneuver, and survive in close combat to close with and capture, kill, or neutralize the enemy.

(3) Future Army divisions and corps, as Army tactical HQ, require a capability to conduct reconnaissance and security to conduct wide area security, to deny the enemy freedom of action, to enable the commander to maneuver at will, and to exploit success rapidly during offensive operations.

(4) Future Army maneuver forces require capability to conduct simultaneous, combined arms decentralized operations in noncontiguous AOs to conduct wide area security.

(5) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to conduct joint entry operations, forcible or unopposed, from strategic distances to move to positions of advantage to defeat enemy forces, control and influence populations, and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander's end state.

(6) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to develop leaders and soldiers educated and trained in the social, cultural, political, and linguistic aspects of the OE to build partnerships.

(7) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to seize and control key terrain to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy.

(8) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to maneuver combat-configured Soldiers and platforms tactically from land or sea bases to operational depths, utilizing austere landing zones to bypass unsecure LOCs and overcome antiaccess efforts.

(9) Future Army maneuver forces require lethal and nonlethal capabilities coupled with sensors to effectively engage targets at extended range to shape the fight, reduce casualties, and minimize damage.

(10) Future Army BCTs require capabilities to enable effective maneuver, and to allow the reconnaissance squadron to focus on reconnaissance and security to enable the commander to maneuver at will, to exploit success rapidly, and to provide flexibility to the BCT.

(11) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to conduct integrated air and ground wide area persistent aerial reconnaissance and reporting while conducting area surveillance and security operations to collect actionable combat information.

(12) Future Army maneuver force platforms require increased mobility and survivability to ensure off road mobility in all OEs to achieve positional advantage and win the close fight.

(13) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to conduct counter mobility measures by creating barriers and obstacles to deny enemy freedom of movement.

(14) Future Army maneuver forces require engineer capabilities to conduct route clearance, gap crossing, rapid construction, repair of routes, and rapid infrastructural improvements to enable freedom of maneuver.

(15) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to conduct armed aerial reconnaissance with the man-in-the-loop decider forward during joint and combined arms air-ground operations to produce actionable combat information to update the air-ground COP.

(16) Future Army maneuver force platforms require the capability to acquire and identify targets beyond enemy direct fire ranges and perform unexploded ordnance, mine, IED, and CBRNE detection, in complex terrain, during joint operations to provide lethal overmatch of threat while avoiding fratricide and collateral damage to improved security for the air-ground team in support of tactical movement and maneuver.

(17) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to employ remotely fired munitions to increase survivability and lethality during operations.

(18) Future Army maneuver forces require precision, volume fire, and scalable (nonlethal to lethal) munitions, interoperable between joint and Army air platforms, to destroy or neutralize threat forces to support ground maneuver forces.

(19) Future Army maneuver forces require obscuration in a joint OE to decrease the threat's ability to detect friendly forces, increase survivability, and mask friendly intent.

(20) Future Army maneuver force HQ requires the capability to self-secure to preclude having to task organize part of the maneuver force.

(21) Future Army forces require the capability to determine friend, enemy, neutral, and noncombatant combat identification during full-spectrum operations to prevent fratricide and protect populations.

(22) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate mortars with other indirect fires systems and air and missile defense through the network to provide offensive and defensive fires for decentralized operations across wide areas.

(23) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate mounted and dismounted maneuver sensors to locate targets and provide offensive and defensive fires for decentralized operations across wide areas.

(24) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct reconstruction efforts in a joint environment to increase stability and security for the host nation.

(25) Future maneuver forces require the capability to predict, detect, prevent, neutralize, and protect from hazards and obstacles in a joint OE to assure mobility for the joint force, and to deploy and maneuver where and when desired without interruption or delay.

(26) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to fight for information to contribute to situational awareness to shape the battlefield and win the close fight.

(27). Future Army BCT reconnaissance squadrons require sufficient Soldiers to enable them to simultaneously conduct mounted and dismounted reconnaissance and surveillance operations with organic reconnaissance platoons to maintain the tempo of operations.

B-4. Movement and maneuver dependencies on other warfighting functions

a. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the OE, enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. It includes tasks associated with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, and is driven by the commander. Intelligence is more than just collection. It is a continuous process that involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation.

b. The intelligence warfighting function includes support to situational understanding; support to strategic responsiveness; conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations; providing intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities; and the co-creation of context.

(1) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to identify hazards, such as mines and IEDs, from standoff distances, while moving, to provide freedom of maneuver.

(2) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to detect, identify, and classify threats through noncooperative methods, at ranges in excess of the threat's detection and weapon systems effective ranges, and inside the threat's detection and response time to maintain the initiative.

(3) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to provide persistent surveillance across broad areas, to understand the dynamic OE,
and answer the CCIR.

(4) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to conduct reconnaissance to collect precise and timely information to enable the commander to maneuver at will, to provide flexibility, and to rapidly exploit success.

(5) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to tag, track, and locate neutral and hostile individuals in all domains to control populations.

(6) Future Army maneuver forces require cultural awareness of the AO to conduct full-spectrum operations.

(7) Future Army maneuver forces require accurate intelligence collection and analysis at company to support direct and indirect fires targeting to support the commander’s scheme of maneuver.

(8) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability at the company and platoon level to communicate with local populations to collect information and build partnerships.

(9) Future Army maneuver force aviation platforms require the capability provided by improved sensors that acquire and identify targets beyond enemy direct fire ranges and perform mine and IED detection and CBRNE survey and detection, in complex terrain, during joint and combined arms air-ground operations to provide lethal overmatch, early warning, and improved security for the air-ground team.

(10) Future Army corps and divisions require the capability to monitor, collect, and analyze multiple sources of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information in foreign languages to determine the perceptions, attitudes, and sentiment of key populations to rapidly exert psychological influence in full-spectrum operations.

c. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, joint fires, and command and control warfare, including scalable fires, through the targeting process. It includes tasks associated with integrating and synchronizing the effects of these types of fires and command and control warfare—including nonlethal fires—with the effects of other warfighting functions. These are integrated into the concept of operations during planning and adjusted based on the targeting guidance. Fires normally contribute to the overall effect of maneuver but commanders may use them separately for the decisive operation and shaping operations.

d. The fires warfighting function includes deciding surface targets; detecting and locating surface targets; providing fire support; assessing effectiveness; and integrating command and control warfare, including nonlethal fires.

(1) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to employ precision indirect fires (lethal and nonlethal effects) to prevent collateral damage and fight within the rules of engagement.

(2) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to employ networked joint fires that links sensors to shooters with scalable capabilities to achieve the desired effects to support the close fight and commander’s maneuver.

(3) Maneuver forces require the capability to provide indirect fire support to widely dispersed subordinate units to support decentralized operations.

(4) Maneuver forces require the capability to perform precision target location during operations to employ precision munitions.

e. The protection warfighting function provides and integrates capabilities to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations to preserve combat power and freedom of action. The future Army force requires integrated and synchronized protection activities derived by a combination of complementary or reinforcing capabilities from one or more elements of combat power, focused by leadership and information. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function effectively protect the force.

(1) Future Army maneuver forces require combat vehicles and tactical wheeled vehicles with sufficient protection against mines and IEDs to protect the crew and allow freedom of maneuver.

(2) Future Army maneuver forces require combat vehicles and tactical wheeled vehicles with sufficient scalable modular protection to protect against explosively formed projectile, kinetic energy, chemical energy, and tandem blast and warhead, to protect the crew and allow freedom of maneuver.

(3) Future Army sustainment forces require lethal and protected platforms to fully support and sustain maneuver force operations from and across extended distances.

(4) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability for a networked system of sensors to identify enemy activity and weapons firing in all environments to automatically cue on board protection systems or automated targeting systems to prevent or neutralize a threat.

(5) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to employ unmanned systems equipped with sensors, explosive device neutralization, and offensive weapon systems that can operate in all terrain, weather, and spectrum environments, to increase BCT lethality and mobility and enhance Soldier protection.

(6) Future Army maneuver forces require combat vehicles and tactical wheeled vehicles with remote weapons system capabilities to enhance crew survivability, vehicle lethality, and to enhance freedom of maneuver.

(7) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to detect and identify rapidly from standoff range, defend against, and recover from CBRNE attacks to maintain momentum.

(8) Future Army maneuver force aviation platforms require the capability to avoid detection, avoid acquisition, avoid, deny, and survive engagements, defeat munitions, while continuing the mission to improve aircraft and aircrew survivability.

(9) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability for organic protection in a joint OE to maintain security in mobile and austere bases.

(10) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to predict, detect, prevent, neutralize, and protect in a joint OE assuring the ability of the joint force to deploy and maneuver where and when desired and without interruption or delay.

(11) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to provide counter-IED operations in a joint OE to enable the movement of forces.

(12) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to provide for explosive ordnance disposal in a joint OE to prevent, mitigate, or remove the explosive hazard to host nation personnel or friendly forces.

f. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and service to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach and prolong endurance. Sustainment facilitates uninterrupted operations through the means of adequate sustainment support. It is accomplished through the supply systems, maintenance, and other services that ensure continuous support throughout an operation. Sustainment includes those tasks associated with maintenance, transportation, supplying, field services, EOD, human resources, and financial management support. Sustainment also includes health service support, command and control, related engineer support, and band support.

(1) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to provide rapid air movement and delivery of critical supplies, personnel, and repair parts directly to forward battlefield locations using manned and unmanned aerial systems to bypass unsecure LOCs, overcome antiaccess efforts, and maintain the momentum of operations.

(2) Future Army maneuver force support units require platforms with the capabilities equal to the supported units, sufficient lethality to enable survivability, and command and control systems to maintain the momentum of operations.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to support a force with dramatic reductions of demand requirements using technological advancements in power, fuel, water, ammunition, and distribution advancements that maximize production as close to the point of use as possible, to support decentralized full-spectrum operations in the future OE.

(4) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to have platforms with less fuel consumption per vehicle pound than the current fleet of platforms to support and sustain operations from and across extended distances.

(5) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to have systems with increased operational availability and reduced sustainment requirements to support the concept of operating over extended distances.

(6) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to have sufficient sustainment distribution assets to support widely dispersed noncontiguous operations to support decentralized operations.

(7) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to store, issue, refrigerate, and deliver classes I, II, III (P), IV, V, VI, VII, and IX in the context of an OE, to provide distributed sustainment in full-spectrum operations.

(8) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to treat and evacuate casualties from point of injury, under close combat conditions, to save Soldiers lives.

(9) Future Army maneuver forces require the capability to generate and maintain high operational readiness rates for aviation platforms while reducing maintenance and sustainment requirements to support simultaneous aerial reconnaissance, aerial attack, air assault, vertical maneuver, and aerial resupply missions.

(10) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct reconstruction efforts in a joint environment to increase stability and security for the host nation.

(11) Future Army forces require the capability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces throughout the AO in multiple locations down to point of employment to conduct combined arms maneuver.

g. The mission command warfighting function is the art and science of integrating the warfighting functions to conduct decentralized operations to accomplish the mission. Mission command capitalizes on mutual trust and initiative to empower lower echelons with the combined arms capabilities, competency, and authority to achieve operational and strategic advantage. Mission command includes those tasks associated with acquiring friendly information, managing all relevant information, and directing and leading subordinates. Mission command systems is defined as the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations support mission command.

(1) Future Army forces require the ability to conduct IO to degrade adversary command and control, protect friendly capabilities and intentions, and influence various audiences in the AO and area of interest.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability for a fully integrated ground and air situational awareness system which will provide a COP to subordinate units to enable decentralized operations.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability for subordinate elements to maintain communications during widely dispersed and decentralized operation to enable mission command.

(4) Future Army forces require the capability for voice and digital communications to the dismounted Soldier, to provide them with accurate and timely situational awareness to enable mission command and decentralized operations.

(5) Future Army forces require sufficient communications capabilities to enable them to mass the effects of combat power to win the close fight.

(6) Future Army forces require sufficient capability to integrate augmentation to company level in areas including electronic warfare (EW), IO, EOD, CBRNE, interpreters, and detainee experts to support full-spectrum operations.

(7) Future Army forces require mission command on-the-move systems equal to their current static capabilities to maintain the momentum in the offense.

(8) Future Army forces require both secure and unsecured networks to the company level to enable them to share information with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational and host nation partners to support decentralized operations and to improve interoperability.

(9) Future Army forces require the capability for a system that provides sufficient dismounted situational awareness and communications to win the close fight.

(10) Future Army forces require the capability to establish a secure COP to enable mission command.

(11) Future Army forces require the capability to maintain current situational awareness on the location of the sustainment vehicles operating in an AO to support and sustain operations from and across extended distances.

(12) Future Army forces require systems that enable training and virtual interactive mission rehearsals to support operations to enable mission command.

(13) Future Army force aviation platforms require the capability to exercise control of unmanned aircraft (manned-unmanned teaming) during joint and combined arms air-ground operations to extend range and resolution, protect manned platforms, and improve persistence of the manned-unmanned team when conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

(14) Future Army aviation platforms require the capability for direct access to joint and Army fires delivery systems to provide extended range, networked, responsive precision, or volume fires and the capability to provide and/or integrate close air support on demand during joint and combined arms air-ground operations to support tactical maneuver.

(15) Future Army aviation platforms require the capability to receive air threat warning, alerting, and cueing information and to detect, identify, and defeat low, slow flying UAS and rotary wing threats down to platform level during joint and combined arms air-ground operations to provide lethal overmatch against threats and provide security to friendly forces.

(16). Future Army forces require the capability to automatically integrate airspace users (airspace command and control) supporting ground maneuver operations in accordance with commanders' priorities and risk assessment during planning and execution to execute effective and timely joint and combined arms operations.

(17) Future Army forces require the capability to operate and provide air traffic services for joint and Army airfields and provide tactical air traffic services in support of air-ground operations to optimize joint air capabilities and reduce the risk of fratricide.

(18) Future Army forces require the capability to communicate through non-line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight (voice, data, imagery, and video), through a single integrated mission command system that is joint capable to the lowest levels, to enable mission command on the move from both ground and aerial platforms, to provide commanders and crews the ability to maintain situational awareness and command and control operations.

(19) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct en route planning and mission rehearsal at home station, during deployment, and in theater to facilitate immediate employment upon arrival.

(20) Future Army forces require an integrated, protected, layered, and secure voice and data communications network capable of both line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight to enable the timely flow of essential information in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment characterized by the decentralized planning and execution of full-spectrum operations.

(21) The future Army force maneuver requires the capability to conduct offensive and defensive EW and electromagnetic spectrum operations in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment to degrade and/or destroy enemy capabilities and protect friendly capabilities to provide freedom of action during full-spectrum operations.

(22) Future Army forces require a live, virtual, and constructive system to support mission rehearsals.

(23) Future Army forces require the capability to see the low-level air picture (friendly and enemy) to facilitate airspace command and control and provide early warning for self protection actions, to employ friendly fires and air systems effectively and to protect the force.

B-5. Movement and maneuver capabilities required by other functions

a. Intelligence.

(1) Intelligence requires the capability to integrate movement and maneuver sensors and activity results (that is, target acquisition, surveillance, and reconnaissance) with intelligence collection planning and analysis, to enhance operations and intelligence integration and provide intelligence that supports all levels of decisionmaking.

(2) Intelligence requires the capability to integrate every Soldier as sensor information with intelligence collection, planning, and analysis, to enhance operations and intelligence integration and provide intelligence that supports all levels of decisionmaking.

b. Fires.

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate mortars with other indirect fires systems through the network to provide offensive and defensive fires for decentralized full-spectrum operations across wide areas.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate mounted and dismounted maneuver sensors to locate targets and provide offensive and defensive fires for decentralized full-spectrum operations across wide areas.

c. Protection.

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to detect threats to provide early warning and protect personnel and vital physical assets

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to prevent threats through the employment of active defensive measures during full-spectrum operations, to protect personnel and vital physical assets.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to protect Soldiers during mounted and dismounted operations to reduce casualties.

(4) Future Army forces require the capability to employ nonlethal effects to minimize casualties and influence populations.

d. Sustainment. Sustainment has no dependencies from movement and maneuver.

e. Mission command.

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to degrade adversary command and control, protect friendly capabilities and intentions, and influence various audiences in the AO and area of interest.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to fully integrate a ground and air situational awareness system, which will provide a COP to subordinate units to enable operating decentralized in a unified action OE.

(3) Future maneuver forces require the capability to enable subordinate elements to maintain communications when widely dispersed and operating decentralized to enable mission command.

(4) Future forces require the capability to enable voice and digital communications to the dismounted Soldier, to provide them with accurate and timely situational awareness to enable mission command.

(5) Future forces require sufficient communications capabilities to enable massing the effects of combat power to win the close fight.

(6) Future forces require the capability to integrate augmentation to company level to support full-spectrum operations.

(7) Future forces require the capability to execute mission command on-the-move to maintain the momentum in the offense.

(8) Future forces require the capability to access secure and unsecured networks to the company level to enable them to share information with unified action and host nation partners to improve interoperability.

(9) Future forces require the capability to provide dismounted situational awareness and communications sufficient to win the close fight.

(10) Future forces require the capability to establish a secure and integrated COP to enable mission command.

(11) Future Army forces require the capability to maintain current situational awareness on the location of sustainment vehicles operating within an AO to support and sustain operations from and across extended distances.

(12) Future forces require the capability to access systems that enable training and virtual interactive mission rehearsals to support operations and enable mission command.

(13) Future forces require the capability to exercise control of unmanned aircraft (manned-unmanned teaming) during joint and combined arms air-ground operations to extend range and resolution, protect manned platforms, and improve persistence of the manned-unmanned team when conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

(14) Future aviation platforms require the capability to have direct access to joint and Army fires delivery systems to provide extended range, networked, responsive precision, or volume fires, and the capability to provide and/or integrate close air support on demand during joint and combined arms air-ground operations to support tactical maneuver.

(15) Future aviation platforms require the capability to receive air threat warning, alerting and identifying information and to detect, identify and defeat low, slow flying UAS and rotary wing threats down to platform level during joint and combined arms air-ground operations, to provide lethal overmatch against threats and provide security to friendly forces.

(16) Future forces require the capability to automatically integrate airspace users (airspace command and control) supporting ground maneuver operations in accordance with commanders' priorities and risk assessment during planning and execution, to conduct effective and timely joint and combined arms operations.

(17) Future forces require the capability to operate and provide air traffic services for Army and joint airfields and provide tactical air traffic services in support of air-ground operations to optimize joint air capabilities and reduce the risk of fratricide.

(18) Future forces require the capability to communicate non-line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight (voice, data, imagery, and video) through a single integrated mission command system, joint capable to the lowest levels, to enable mission command on-the-move from both ground and aerial platforms to provide commanders and crews the ability to maintain situational awareness and exercise mission command.

(19) Future forces require the capability to conduct en route planning and mission rehearsal at home station, during deployment, and in theater to facilitate immediate employment upon arrival.

(20) Future forces require the capability to utilize integrated, protected, layered, and secure voice and data communications network capable of both line-of-sight and beyond-line-of sight to enable the timely flow of essential information in a unified action OE characterized by decentralized planning and execution of full-spectrum operations.

(21) Future forces require the capability to conduct offensive and defensive EW and electromagnetic spectrum operations in a unified action OE to degrade or destroy enemy capabilities and protect friendly capabilities, to provide freedom of action during full-spectrum operations.

(22) Future forces require the capability to access live, virtual, and constructive system to support mission rehearsals.

(23) Future forces require the capability to see the low-level air picture (friendly and enemy) to facilitate airspace command and control and provide early warning for self-protection actions, to effectively employ friendly air systems and protect the force.

(24) Future forces require the capability to process and transform data and information rapidly and accurately into usable knowledge across a wide range of subjects from military logistics to culture and economics.

Appendix C
Movement and Maneuver by Echelons

C-1. Overview

a. TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 considers the future OE and proposes how the army will address the threat in the conditions of the OE. It builds on the ACC and the AOC and carries forward the three new concept terms: combined arms maneuver, wide area security and co-creation of context, and it expands on the term mission command.

b. The central idea is in the 2016-2028 timeframe. Brigades conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations using co-creation of context under the mission command of divisions and corps in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. The concept includes the role of ARSOF and regionally aligned forces.

C-2. Movement and maneuver by echelon

a. Corps.

(1) Corps are the Army's principal operational HQ designed to command a combination of divisions, BCTs, and other functional and supporting brigades. The corps can serve as an intermediate tactical HQ, ARFOR. With augmentation, the corps can serve as a JTF HQ, or JFLCC HQ. Corps HQ direct Army forces to conduct multiple, simultaneous, or sequential operations, and integrate joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partner capabilities to achieve assigned objectives. As an echelon HQ, corps exercise mission command over forces and assets provided by the Army force generation system.

(2) Forces include, but are not limited to, a combination of division HQ and BCTs, support brigades (aviation, fires, maneuver enhancement, battlefield surveillance, and sustainment), functional brigades (air defense, engineer, chemical, military intelligence, EOD, signal, medical and military police).

(3) As part of a joint or multinational force, corps project forces to positions of advantage and conduct shaping and entry operations to create conditions favorable to combined arms maneuver and decentralized full-spectrum operations. Commanders use forcible entry in operations where the entry force either can hold on its own against the expected enemy force, or they anticipate a friendly ground force can link up with the entry force to protect it and continue operations. Units can execute forcible entry via parachute, air assault, or amphibious assault. The corps HQ will normally conduct forcible entry operations in conjunction with joint partners.

(4) Corps coordinate with theater level ARSOF persistent presence and early entry forces to integrate their effects with the corps operations plan. ARSOF's familiarity with the AO makes them the ideal strategic reconnaissance and surveillance asset. In addition, regionally aligned, persistent presence and early entry forces equip, train, advise, and assist foreign forces to provide for the security of their populations, and assess foreign security forces and local governments' ability to provide for their populations.

b. Division.

(1) Divisions perform as the Army's primary deployable tactical warfighting HQs and assign missions to organic or habitually aligned subordinate BCTs and other functional and supporting brigades in support of achieving corps and division mission objectives and commanders' intents. The division can serve as a tactical HQ or ARFOR. With augmentation, it can serve as a JTF or JFLCC HQ for small scale contingencies. The division will employ land forces as part of a joint, interagency, and multinational force during full-spectrum operations. The division executes simultaneous offensive, defensive, and either stability or civil support operations in an assigned AO to establish specific conditions. It combines tactical tasks and missions through its organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to accomplish its assigned mission.

(2) The division also allocates resources, establishes priorities of support, task organizes and establishes command relationships within major subordinate organizations, designates decisive and shaping operations, synchronizes the operations of subordinates operating in the same time and space, and integrates joint capabilities to achieve operationally significant results. The division commander establishes priorities and allocates resources in several ways, including

distribution of combat power, allocation of enablers, and shifting the main effort as required. Weighting the decisive operation is the most direct way of influencing mission accomplishment. The commander does this by allocating resources.

(3) The division weights the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts with assets from theater army and corps forces based on CCIRs. Collection from battlefield surveillance brigades, combat aviation brigades, maneuver enhancement brigades, and reconnaissance units of subordinate BCTs combine with national- and strategic-level collection platforms to fill information and intelligence requirements.

(4) Divisions direct the employment of BCTs, support and functional brigades in combined arms maneuver to gain positions of advantage, win the close fight, defeat enemies, and stabilize environments through security force assistance and building partnerships with local governments, forces, and civil populations. Additionally, divisions employ forces to conduct area security operations to include the area between major subordinate organizations.

c. Brigades.

(1) BCTs are the principal tactical echelon formations. The versatile nature of these formations allows commanders to tailor them with cross attachment of battalions and companies making the BCTs more effective over a broader range of METT-TC conditions. Each BCT is optimized uniquely in the areas of firepower, mobility, protection, or its ability to operate in restricted terrain. BCTs execute decentralized full-spectrum operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to achieve decisive results.

(2) BCTs, with augmentation and training, conduct SFA to build partnerships with host nations. These efforts focus on providing equipment, sustainment, infrastructure, training, and education to indigenous organizations and forces including but not limited to government and nongovernment organizations, military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces to increase a foreign nation’s capability and capacity to provide security for itself.

(3) While all BCTs bring a significant core capability, each type BCT has its own specific strengths and limitations as discussed below.

(a) IBCT. It is optimized for operations in close terrain and densely populated areas and requires less sustainment support than other types of BCTs. It requires less strategic lift than other BCTs and when supported with intratheater airlift, has theater-wide operational reach.

(b) HBCT. HBCTs are optimized for combined arms offensive operations – to fight and hold terrain. They can also provide forces to recon or guard ahead or on the flanks of the BCT.

(c) SBCT. SBCTs are optimized for infantry intensive operations requiring protected mobility. SBCTs can conduct offense and defensive operations in any terrain. The SBCT requires augmentation for engagements with an armored force.

d. BFSB. The BFSB provides assets to enhance collection capability of other brigades, including BCTs, and when directed, produces intelligence for its supported higher HQ. It routinely operates in close contact with the local population and is best organized to make first contact with potential threat networks. The BFSB fights for information at the lowest tactical level and often develops the situation at the small unit level through both lethal and nonlethal action. Fighting for information above the small unit level requires augmentation.

e. CAB. The full spectrum and heavy CABs are organized to operate primarily with the division, to support forces to achieve full spectrum capabilities and to synchronize and orchestrate the operations of multiple aviation battalion task forces simultaneously.

f. MEB. The MEB is a command and control HQ with a multifunctional brigade staff optimized to conduct maneuver support operations. The MEB is specifically designed and equipped to support protection requirements across the spectrum of military operations. It provides critical capabilities provided through various combat and combat support components, enabling the division's ability to shape the operation.

Glossary

Section I
Abbreviations

ACC	Army Capstone Concept
AO	area of operations
AOC	Army Operating Concept
ARFOR	Army forces
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
BCT	brigade combat team
BFSB	battlefield surveillance brigade
CAB	combat aviation brigade
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
COP	common operational picture
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ESC	expeditionary sustainment command
EW	electronic warfare
FM	field manual
HBCT	heavy brigade combat team
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
IBCT	infantry brigade combat team
IED	improvised explosive device
IO	information operations
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force
LOC	lines of communication
MEB	maneuver enhancement brigades
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations
OE	operational environment
Pam	pamphlet
SBCT	Stryker brigade combat team
SFA	security force assistance
TRADOC	U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
U.S.	United States

Section II
Terms

abatis
A line of defense consisting of a barrier of felled or live trees with branches (sharpened or with barbed wire entwined) pointed toward the enemy.

actors
State-sponsored operators, nonstate actors, legitimate businesses, criminal organizations, groups, and individuals with different levels of education, training, skills, motivation, and capabilities.

adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.

airborne force
Forces comprised of specialist troops landed by parachute, gliders, or helicopter trained to effect, following transport by air, an assault debarkation, either by parachuting or touchdown.

air assault force
Air assault forces execute forcible entries using fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. Air assault forces can deploy from land-based facilities and naval platforms. These forces can rapidly project combat power throughout the depth of an operational area.

amphibious force
Forces launched from the sea. An amphibious force, composed of an amphibious task force, and a landing force, together with other forces trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations, may project power directly against the enemy in a coup de main or may attack across a beach and/or by vertical envelopment to establish a lodgment to enable the introduction of follow-on forces.

area security
Form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (FM 3-90, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

Army capstone concept
A holistic future concept that is a primary reference for all other concept development. Provides direct linkages to national and defense level planning documents (TR 71-20, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

balance
Careful consideration of as many factors as possible and making choices that achieve the necessary goals and objectives (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

building partner capacity
The ability to assist domestic and foreign partners and institutions with the development of their capabilities and capacities - for mutual benefit - to address U.S. national or shared global security interests (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

civil support operations
DOD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities (JP 3-26, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

close combat
Warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct, indirect, and air-delivered fires (FM 3-0).

combat power
The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action (FM 3-0, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

common operational picture
A single display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command (TRADOC Pam 525-2-1).

contest of wills
A psychological condition that involves the understanding of human behavior and crafting clear communications reinforced with military actions against implacable foes, warring factions, criminal groups, and potential adversaries (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

convoy security
Specialized area security operations conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security operations anytime there are not enough friendly forces to secure LOCs continuously in an AO and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

counterattack
A form of attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying the enemy his goal in attacking. The commander directs a counterattack—normally conducted from a defensive posture—to defeat or destroy enemy forces, exploit an enemy weakness, such as an exposed flank, or to regain control of terrain and facilities after an enemy success. A unit conducts a counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy through offensive action (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

cyberspace
A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent transport layer of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications

transport layers, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

decentralization
The dispersion or distribution of power from a central authority to regional and local authorities (TRADOC Pam 525-3-3).

decisive operations
Operation that directly accomplishes the mission; determines the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. The focal point around which commanders design the entire operation (FM 3-0).

forcible entry
Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition (JP 3-18, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

full-spectrum operations
Army's operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the OE. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces (FM 3-0, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

geospatial intelligence
Intelligence derived from the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities in the OE consisting of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. (TRADOC Pam 525-2-1).

human intelligence
Collection by trained HUMINT collectors of foreign (HUMINT) information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities (TRADOC Pam 525-2-1).

information operations
Integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking while protecting U.S. information operations (JP 3-13, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function (TRADOC Pam 525-2-1).

mission command systems
Replaces command and control systems. The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned and attached forces pursuant to the missions assigned.

nonlethal weapons
Weapons, devices, and munitions that are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or environment. Nonlethal weapons are intended to have reversible effects on personnel or materiel (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

partner
Persons, groups, or nations working with the U.S. toward the achievement of one or more aims (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

persistent surveillance
The synchronization and integration of available transport layered sensors and analysts across warfighting functions and OEs, to provide commanders with combat information, actionable intelligence, and situational understanding. In response to the tactical CCIR, tactical persistent surveillance missions detect, characterize, locate, track, target, and assess specific objects or areas, in real or near-real-time despite target countermeasures or natural obstacles. A collection strategy that emphasizes the ability of some collection systems to linger on demand in an area to detect, locate, characterize, identify, track, target, and possibly provide battle damage assessment and retargeting in near or real-time.

reconnaissance
Operations undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical, or geographical characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area. Relies primarily on the human dynamic rather than technical means. A focused collection effort. Performed before, during, and after other operations to provide information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, as well as by the commander to formulate, confirm, or modify his course of action. The four forms of reconnaissance are route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

security
Operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. The ultimate goal of security operations is to protect the force from surprise and

reduce the unknowns in any situation. Security operations orient on the force or facility being protected, while reconnaissance is enemy and terrain oriented. Security operations are shaping operations (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

security force assistance
Unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. SFA improves the capability and capacity of host nation or regional security organization's security forces (FM 3-07, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

seize the initiative
All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Emphasizes opportunity created by action through full-spectrum operations, whether offensive, defensive, stability, or civil support (FM 3-0, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

shaping operations
Operations at any echelon that create and preserve conditions for the success of decisive operations are shaping operations (FM 3-0, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

stability operations
Encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

strategic engagement
Informing and educating U.S., allied, and other relevant publics and actors to gain and maintain trust, confidence, and support. Characterized by a comprehensive commitment to transparency, accountability, and credibility, and is an imperative of future operations (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means (TRADOC Pam 525-2-1).

sustain
The sustain SFA activity occurs when the institutional capacity of the foreign security force has been developed to a point where it is self-sustaining. It may continue to have security force assistance contact through combined exercises, educational opportunity exchange, intelligence sharing, and foreign military sales (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

synchronization
The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.

transition
The transition SFA activity defines the transition between two security forces, when applicable. This could be a transition of authority between U.S. forces to a new foreign security force. Another example could be from a regional foreign security force to a foreign security force with U.S. advisors. It could also be from a host-nation military force to a host nation police force, with or without U.S. advisor (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

unified action
The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (ACC).

unity of effort
Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action (JP 1-02, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

Section III
Special terms

co-creation of context
A continuous process in which commanders direct intelligence priorities to drive operations, and the intelligence that these operations produce causes commanders to refine operations based on their improved understanding of the situation.

combined arms
The combination of the elements of combat power with the integration and sequencing of all actions, activities, and programs necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in the context of full-spectrum operations.

combined arms maneuver
The application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success.

cyber/electromagnetic contest
The ability to gain friendly information that is timely, accurate, and relevant. Involves information protection denying enemies, adversaries, and others the opportunity to exploit friendly information. It exploits advantages by attacking enemy decisionmaking systems and resource structures in the highly contested and congested cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrums.

mission command
The exercise of authority and direction by commanders, supported by their staffs, using the art of command and the science of control to integrate warfighting functions in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. Mission command uses mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative

within the commander's intent, enabling agile and adaptive commanders, leaders, and organizations.

network
A single, secure, standards-based, versatile infrastructure linked by networked, redundant transport systems, sensors, warfighting and business applications, and services that provide Soldiers and civilians timely and accurate information in any environment, to manage the Army enterprise and enable full-spectrum operations with joint, allied, and interagency partners.

operating decentralized
A manner of conducting military operations which enables subordinates to act aggressively and independently with disciplined initiative to develop the situation; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and cope with uncertainty to accomplish the mission within the commander's intent.

operational adaptability
A quality that Army leaders and forces exhibit based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation.

wide area security
The application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals.

Endnotes

[1] Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success.
[2] FM 3-0, 4-3.
[3] Army deployment goals are move a BCT in 4-7 days, 3 BCTs in 10 days, 9 BCTs in 20 days, and 15 BCTs in 30 days. ACC, 7.
[4] Reference from OE: regular and irregular forces.
[5] Corps and Division Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Gap Analysis, No. 08-37, June 2008, Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.
[6] 15 July 2009 memorandum from MG Robert Caslen, CG Multinational Division North, Contingency Operating Base Speicher, Iraq, to COL David Teeples, Chief of Armor, Subject: Response to White Paper for Full Spectrum Cavalry Regiment.
[7] FM 3-0, para 4-2. Commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. There are eight elements of combat power. These are leadership, information, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, and protection. Leadership and information are applied through, and multiply the effects of, the other six elements of combat power. These six—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, and protection—are collectively described as the warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.
[8] Organize for Maneuver paper, UQ 10, 18 May 2010, Routine augmentations and risks taken in brigade task organization in current operations illustrate a number of organizational shortcomings. Future force design decisions must be based on the foundation of combined arms maneuver capability in the context of extended land campaigns.
[9] The Complex Web Defense Experiment conducted at the Mounted Maneuver Battle Lab in July 2008 concluded that the HBCT reconnaissance squadron, operating using a force design update organization with cavalry troops organized with Abrams tanks and Bradley cavalry fighting vehicles, enhanced the HBCT's freedom of maneuver to close with and defeat threats in the close fight. During the simulation, the augmented HBCT closed capability gaps of existing organizations by distinguishing combatants and noncombatants within a complex urban environment and securing lines of communications.
[10] UQ senior working group and simulation exercise observations in discussions from operational panel members in Central Command and Africa Command regional panels, 26-30 April 2010.
[11] Decentralized Operations Doctrine Panel Paper, "Across the full spectrum of operations, the [brigade] needs increased engineer capabilities in order to adequately perform its assigned missions." 2; "The battalion has insufficient engineer capacity and capability." 3.
[12] Decentralized Operations Doctrine Panel Paper, "The current battalion level authorization does not provide an adequate communications infrastructure to allow the commander to communicate to subordinate units across wide areas." 2.
[13] Decentralized Operations Transitions Panel Paper, "Depending on the environment and other factors, requirement to support operations will vary between decentralized and centralized operations. Sustainment requirements may also change as a result of the transition [between centralized and decentralized operations]." "Decentralized units must have sufficient organic or attached sustainment capability to maintain the force, or have timely and reliable access to sustainment capabilities." 5; Decentralized Operations Doctrine Panel Paper, "Sustainment units are currently not adequately equipped to conduct operations in a decentralized environment." 2.
[14] The mobility augmentation company conducts assault gap crossings, conducts mounted and dismounted breaches, and emplaces obstacles in support of BCTs to enable force application, focused logistics, and protection. It is equipped with a variety of assault-breaching and countermobility equipment. It is organized with two assault breach platoons and one obstacle platoon. It can provide four assault gap crossings for a BCT, four mounted breaches for an IBCT or SBCT, two mounted breaches for an HBCT, and four additional dismounted breaches for a BCT. It can emplace 4,432 linear meters of fix or disrupt tactical obstacle frontage without reloading. FM 3-34.22.
[15] Aviation Study II
[16] FM 3-0.
[17] FM 3-0, para 2-8.
[18] Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by commanders, supported by their staffs, using the art of command and the science of control to integrate warfighting functions in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. Mission command uses mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative within the commander's intent, enabling agile and adaptive commanders, leaders, and organizations
[19] FM 7-0.
[20] Joint Operating Concept, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats.
[21] Ibid, 31.
[22] Army Future Game and Senior Leader Seminar 3-8 May 2009, UQ09, p. F4. "There is a need to develop skills and capabilities for security force assistance, some of which are not typical. In most discussions, these include topics like negotiation skills and cultural awareness."
[23] Joint Operating Concept, Irregular, 11-12.
[24] Ibid, 34.
[25] Ibid, 35.