



# The United States Army Functional Concept for Protection

2016-2028

13 October 2010



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## Foreword

### *From the Director U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center*

The U.S. Army continues to answer the Nation's call, as it has since its inception over 235 years ago. As we look to the future, our Army faces a complex and uncertain operational environment that will challenge our Soldiers, leaders, and organizations in many ways. Future enemies are likely to emulate the adaptations of recent opponents while taking advantage of emerging technologies and growing instability to pursue their objectives and avoid what they perceive as U.S. military strengths. The challenges of future armed conflict make it an imperative for our Army to produce leaders and forces that exhibit a high degree of operational adaptability.


TRADOC Pam 525-3-5, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Protection 2016-2028*, describes the broad requirements for protection of future Army forces. It emphasizes the need for Soldiers, leaders and organizations to identify, prevent, and mitigate a wide variety of threats to Army forces in a complex future operational environment. Expanding on the ideas contained in TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, the ACC, and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, the AOC, the document also identifies the need to integrate joint and interagency capabilities to provide mutually supporting and overlapping protection throughout the conduct of all operational and tactical level actions. In this way, TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 serves as a foundation for future force development pertaining to protection and the protection warfighting function.

In addition to the warfighting challenges of the future, the Army also faces a number of institutional challenges. The rapid pace of technological change, prolonged acquisition timelines, and growing resource constraints make it necessary for the Army to adopt a more responsive approach to capabilities development. Accordingly, TRADOC is shifting from a five-year to a two-year cycle for concept development and revision. As a result, the Army Capabilities Integration Center will update and revise the entire Army Concept Framework every two years. This significant change will enable more effective input into the major budget and programming decisions across our Army.

Concepts lead change for the Army and drive the development and integration of future capabilities. They provide a framework for analysis, readiness assessments, prioritization, and feedback. In addition, they serve as a foundation to help the Army maximize effectiveness and minimize risk through both materiel and non-material capability trades. Thus, they enable the Army to identify redundancies and determine which capabilities to pursue, both within and across its warfighting functions, with a better understanding of how such decisions will impact the overall combat effectiveness of the future force.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 makes an important contribution to realizing the broad vision outlined in both the *Army Capstone Concept* and *Army Operating Concept*. With an eye toward developing agile and adaptive leaders throughout the force, this concept imparts essential guidance on the protection of Army forces at all echelons and promotes the development of

unique and innovative solutions to military problems by empowering leaders at the lowest practical level. This concept also serves as a point of departure for wide-ranging discussions, wargames, and experimentation. It represents a significant step forward in an ongoing campaign of learning and directly contributes toward achieving greater institutional adaptation across our Army.

  
MICHAEL A. VANE  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, Army Capabilities  
Integration Center

Department of the Army  
Headquarters, United States Army  
Training and Doctrine Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1046

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-5

13 October 2010

Military Operations


THE U.S. ARMY FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT FOR PROTECTION 2016 – 2028

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

JOHN E. STERLING, JR.  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Deputy Commanding General/  
Chief of Staff



LUCIOUS B. MORTON  
Colonel, GS  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

**History.** This publication is a revision of United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-5, developed as part of the Army Concept Framework for future Army forces.

**Summary.** TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 is the overarching conceptual visualization of how the Army's future force will execute the protection function during joint operations across full-spectrum operations. The ideas presented here are fully integrated within the evolving context of our estimates of the future operating environment, joint and Army strategic guidance, and the joint framework.

**Applicability.** This concept applies to all Department of the Army (DA) services, agencies, and activities involved in modifying the future force. It functions as the conceptual basis for developing required solution sets related to the protect function in the future force within the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.

**Proponent and Exception Authority.** The proponent of this pamphlet is the Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Concept Development and Learning Directorate, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1046.

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This pamphlet supersedes TRADOC Pam 525-3-5, dated 30 April 2007.

**Suggested Improvements.** Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, TRADOC (ATFC-ED), Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1046. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).

**Distribution.** This publication is only available on the TRADOC homepage at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm>.

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## Summary of Change

TRADOC Pam 525-5-3  
U.S. Army Functional Concept for Protection 2016-2028

This revision dated 13 October 2010-

- o Changes the functional title from *Protect* to *Protection* and the applicable date to 2016-2028.
  - o Incorporates and reflects current Army capstone, operating, and functional concepts, to include wide area security, combined arms maneuver, and co-creation of context.
  - o Places uncertainty and complexity at the forefront of future full-spectrum operations.
  - o Updates or establishes definitions for specific protection terms.
  - o Places less emphasis on process and technical capabilities.
  - o Places more emphasis on the synchronization and integration of existing capabilities to support joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
  - o Updates required capabilities.
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## **Chapter 1 Introduction**

### **1-1. Purpose**

a. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-5, *The United States Army Functional Concept for Protection*, describes how future Army forces will identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations to preserve combat power and freedom of action. Building on TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 (the ACC) and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 (the AOC), TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 describes how the Army applies protection capabilities in the 2016-2028 timeframe as part of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational team, while maintaining operational adaptability in uncertain and complex operational environments (OE). This concept describes how the future Army force protects personnel and vital assets while executing full-spectrum operations. These operations include homeland defense, civil support, sustained engagement, entry operations, proliferation prevention, combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), military cyberspace operations, and foreign humanitarian assistance.

b. This concept brings to the fore specific implications from the AOC to facilitate the protection of personnel and vital assets involved in core operational actions. In view of these implications, this concept will address required protection capabilities in support of security force assistance (SFA), shaping and entry operations, intertheater and intratheater operational maneuver, full-spectrum operations, overlapping protection operations, distributed support and sustainment, and network enabled mission command.

c. Protecting future Army forces under conditions of uncertainty and complexity in an era of persistent conflict requires continuous application of the ideas contained in TRADOC Pam 525-3-0. Capabilities that emerge from an assessment will help guide and focus Army modernization efforts, the capability-based assessments, changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, facilities, and programs related to protection.

d. TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 asks and answers the following questions:

(1) How do future Army forces identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of threats while conducting full-spectrum operations?

(2) What capabilities are required to identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of threats while conducting full-spectrum operations?

(3) How are protection capabilities integrated, synchronized, and organized to support full-spectrum operations?

(4) How should the Army organize to synchronize, integrate, and execute protection tasks effectively?



## 1-2. Background

a. The ACC gives direction to the evolutionary development of the Army operating force and institutional capabilities based on a projection of future armed conflict. It is the conceptual foundation for building a force that has the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously attacking to defeat enemy organizations and conducting operations to gain physical control and psychological influence over people, land, and resources. The AOC addresses the need for a full spectrum force that demonstrates operational adaptability. It describes characteristics and identifies solutions to the military problem of employing combined arms operations to gain, maintain, and exploit the initiative in an increasingly complex future OE. TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 addresses protection as the integrator of combined arms capabilities needed to protect future Army forces in complex operating environments.

b. As outlined in TRADOC Pam 525-3-5, the protection warfighting function has evolved from elements of current doctrine, lessons learned from ongoing combat operations, and studies conducted to remedy identified gaps and shortfalls. These facilitate the synchronization, integration, and organization of protection assets to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats and hazards to maintain combat power and freedom of action in full-spectrum operations. This approach also focuses on synchronization of complementary and reinforcing capabilities provided from other warfighting functions across all related activities.

## 1-3. Assumptions

a. The assumptions from the ACC and the AOC apply equally to this pamphlet. Additional assumptions pertinent to the protection functional concept are provided to clarify the ACC assumptions.

b. The following assumptions concerning the character of future armed conflict are applicable to TRADOC Pam 525-3-5:

(1) There will be an increasing demand for synchronized, integrated, and mutually supporting protection capabilities to support the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational team.

(2) Force structure changes will enable the integration and employment of more effective capabilities in an uncertain environment; however, they will not lessen the need for protection.

(3) There will be an increasing demand for future Army forces to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions, requiring coordination with Federal, state, and local government agencies to effectively protect civilian populations and infrastructure.

c. The Army's conventional modernization goals must be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries.<sup>1</sup> This concept makes a grounded projection into the future and derives future Army forces requirements from an examination of the Army's mission, emerging threat capabilities, and characteristics of the future OE. It is important to begin with a consideration of the range of threats to U.S. vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations

to preserve combat power and freedom of action. TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 describes capabilities required to address protection problems that will better enable future Army forces to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats.

#### **1-4. Linkage to ACC**

The ACC gives direction to the evolutionary development of the Army operating force and institutional capabilities based on a grounded projection of future armed conflict. It is the conceptual foundation for building a force that has the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously attacking to defeat enemy organizations and conducting operations to gain physical control and psychological influence over people, land, and resources. The ACC addresses the need for a full spectrum force that demonstrates operational adaptability while operating under conditions of uncertainty and complexity. TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 establishes linkage to the ACC by describing the protection capabilities required to overcome adaptive enemies and protect personnel and vital assets in the future OE.

#### **1-5. Linkage to the AOC**

The future Army will face adaptive adversaries with varying motivations. To defeat these adversaries, the Army must field forces capable of prompt and sustained combat operations. Army operations address broadly the nature and type of operations which require integrated and synchronized protection capabilities. These core operational actions also provide a context wherein protection tasks, systems, and capabilities will be applied. During the execution of these core operational actions, future Army forces will routinely employ combined arms maneuver and wide area security as part of a joint campaign to gain physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy, deny the enemy positions of advantage, and consolidate gains. Enabled through the co-creation of context, these operations will drive protection requirements thereby manifesting continuity with this pamphlet.

#### **1-6. Linkage to the human dimension**

TRADOC Pam 525-3-7, *The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full-Spectrum Operations 2015-2024*, emphasizes optimization of the cognitive, physical, and social components of every Soldier with the objective to improve the acquisition and selection of personnel; maximize leader and organizational development; establish the ability to rapidly adjust, deliver, and provide accessibility of training and education, ultimately balancing Soldier knowledge, skills, and abilities with full-spectrum operations mission requirements.

#### **1-7. References**

Required and related publications are in [appendix A](#).

#### **1-8. Explanations of abbreviations and terms**

Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the [glossary](#).

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## **Chapter 2**

### **Military Problem and Components of the Solution**

#### **2-1. Military problem**

a. How do future Army forces protect vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations to preserve combat power and freedom of action?

b. Drawing from combat experiences and lessons learned in Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, it is evident that future Army forces will face adaptive enemies that will continue to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in protection. These perceived vulnerabilities stem from previous Army modernization efforts that have advanced communication, information, surveillance, and technical intelligence capabilities. While these capabilities have provided an unprecedented awareness of every aspect of the OE, they have also reminded the Army of the opaque intentions, dynamic relationships, and covert actions of human groups that are invisible to advanced technology.

c. Enemy forces have exploited the confidence U.S. forces have in advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies. An adaptive enemy has operated within the gaps and seams of protection, targeting the host nation populace; disrupting extended lines of communication with snipers, ambushes, and improvised explosive devices (IED); and delivering harassing mortar fires. This adaptive enemy has also conducted coordinated attacks against our bases to assess our responses. This has exposed the limited ability of selected base commanders to provide a coordinated response and mutually supporting and overlapping protection coverage. As illustrated by their current use of rockets, artillery, and mortars to attack bases and IEDs to disrupt lines of communications, future adversaries will continue to rely on asymmetric capabilities as a substitute for, or complement to, large conventional forces. Future adversaries will also undermine U.S. relationships with host nations, media, commercial interests, and multinational and intergovernmental agencies through the employment of weapons of mass effects, terrorism, irregular warfare, and criminal means.

d. Enemy forces will learn and adapt, seeking advantage through combinations of regular and irregular forces, conventional and unconventional tactics unified in purpose.<sup>2</sup> Enemy forces, including state and nonstate actors, criminal, and extremist groups, will fight using combinations of organizations and tactics acquired after decades of observing U.S. force operations. Enemy forces have demonstrated both their ability to dominate regionally and a growing versatility to adapt to U.S. operations. Enemies will focus on lethal and nonlethal operations that enable them to preserve their own military capability while attacking intangible factors, including will, alliances, coalitions, and leadership. In many cases, enemy forces will execute their strategy through decentralized operations. These operations will enable them to avoid detection by U.S. forces and exert influence in places where joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational forces are limited or absent. When they are able, enemies will seek to emulate U.S. doctrine through well planned deception operations and comprehensive information campaigns.

e. The Army must be prepared to conduct operations to help protect or advance U.S. interests in complex operational environments and against adversaries capable of employing a broad range of capabilities. Assessing and continually reassessing how adversaries are likely to employ their forces and other means to pursue strategies and objectives that threaten national interests is critical to outlining the problems of future armed conflict.<sup>3</sup>

f. As described in greater detail in the ACC, the future OE is one of complexity and uncertainty, marked by rapid change and persistent conflict.<sup>4</sup> A wide range of security threats will challenge the national conscience, and require joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational cooperation to solve. Ideology will remain a significant driver of conflict. Opposing tribal, ethnic, and religious beliefs will create divisions and fragment societies. Environmental fragility (natural instabilities resulting in tenuous and unpredictable effects) will result in water, food, and job shortages. This will result in increased migration, growing urbanization, and human security concerns that outweigh state interests. Globalization will create tense relations between state and nonstate actors that will challenge the current state system, creating disparity between “haves” and “have-nots.” This disparity will lead some to turn to acts of terrorism to promote their agendas, while others build new conventional capabilities to present the U.S. with an enduring risk of attack on the homeland. Weaker actors will seek to achieve parity through the proliferation of and innovative use of existing low cost technology, including ones to develop weapons of mass destruction.

g. The emerging OE and enemies within it will present significant challenges for future Army forces. (Sophisticated antiaccess campaigns consisting of terrorist attacks on the homeland, coercion of coalition partners, advanced air defense attacks, harassment of tactical assembly areas by insurgents, and strikes by ballistic missile and air forces will challenge the ability of U.S. forces to deploy forward.) Increasingly available WMD that include homemade biological and chemical contaminants, in addition to nuclear, will add complexity to operations. The decreasing cost of technology will foster a growing presence of robots, drones, and unmanned vehicles on the battlefield. The enemy will achieve tactical surprise through the use of advanced mines, more lethal IEDs, and other yet to be identified capabilities as they discover new ways to exploit existing low cost technology to their advantage.

h. Additionally, significant advances in commercial communications technology will provide enemies with the ability to challenge the U.S. for parity in the cyber domain and deny access to critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets for periods of time. The cyber domain has the potential to enhance enemy ability to conduct decentralized operations with a low probability of detection. Finally, U.S. enemies are also making investments in critical conventional capabilities that include advanced protection systems, Soldier body armor, precision munitions, artillery, armor, and antitank guided munitions that will enhance their survivability and lethality in the future OE.

i. Primary threats to future Army forces conducting full-spectrum operations include organizations, people, groups, and conditions potentially capable of damaging or destroying personnel and physical asset (vital resources or institutions). Specifically, these threats include a variety of current and emerging explosives; direct fire; indirect fire; chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE); CBRNE delivery systems, information; and criminal as described below:

(1) Explosives threats include improvised IEDs, person-borne and suicide vest IEDs, vehicle borne IEDs, mines, booby traps, antihelicopter mines, remotely delivered radio frequency controlled smart and sensor-fuzed mines, and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

(2) Direct fire threats include conventional and extended range surface-to-air missiles; man portable air defense systems (MANPADS); antitank guided missiles; air defense artillery (ADA); small arms fire from hostile civilians, insurgents, and terrorists; and small arms ground engagements with special purpose forces, paramilitary, and militia; precision munitions (such as lasers, infrared, and multisensors); and shoulder-launched hypervelocity missiles and weapons.

(3) Indirect fire threats include missile and unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV)-delivered electromagnetic pulse munitions, large caliber rockets, ballistic and cruise missiles, precision strike technology, radio frequency guided missiles; and integrated air defense systems.

(4) CBRNE threats, including toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial materials, and dirty bombs.

(5) Information threats include hostile media and broadcasts; information operations; reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; electronic and/or information warfare across and throughout the cyberspace domain; intercept and jamming; commercial satellite imagery, micro UAVs; and helicopter acoustic detection systems.

(6) Criminal threats include sabotage, espionage, and hostile civilians committing lawless acts.

## **2-2. Central idea**

Synchronized and integrated protection capabilities, enabled by organizational support, enhance operational adaptability, enable Army forces to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats and hazards, maintain combat power and freedom of action, and facilitate combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations.

## **2-3. Solution synopsis**

a. The employment of synchronized and integrated reinforcing and complementary capabilities combined with the co-creation of context will enable effective combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations to maintain combat power and freedom of action. The ability to collaborate and identify, prevent, and mitigate threats, combined with the unique capabilities provided by other warfighting functions, (such as, movement and maneuver, which is built upon maneuver and provides a certain degree of protection), will permit joint force commanders to preserve combat power and freedom of action.

b. Effective combined arms maneuver depends on the ability to employ protection capabilities rapidly. For example, in forcible entry operations, effective combined arms maneuver depends on integrated and synchronized protection measures to identify and prevent enemy antiaccess and area denial efforts, allowing maneuver and maneuver support forces to transition rapidly to reconnaissance and security operations. In stability operations, commanders combine maneuver and protection by inserting friendly forces (maneuver and maneuver support) between the population and threats to security, and denying sanctuary to the enemy and fostering stability consistent with policy goals. Army forces follow up rapidly to prevent recovery and continue operations to destroy the enemy's will to fight.

c. Army forces establish wide area security to protect forces, populations, infrastructures, and activities. Successful wide area security also denies the enemy the ability to gain physical, temporal, or psychological advantages. For example, Army forces establish wide area security to protect a friendly population, but such security is only truly successful when it also denies enemy forces the ability to intimidate the people. In this instance, future Army forces in support of wide area security primarily employ stability mechanisms to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to the civilian population. Future Army forces may be required to control civil unrest, support election events and polling stations, protect police stations, or simply occupy the space between the population and threats to the population.

d. Co-creation of context is a continuous process in which commanders direct intelligence priorities to drive operations, and the intelligence that these operations produce causes commanders to refine operations based on their improved understanding of the situation.<sup>5</sup> To develop the situation through action, commanders employ intelligence collectors, analysts, and associated protection systems as part of combined arms maneuver and wide area security. The ongoing interplay between the various intelligence disciplines and units conducting operations requires analysts and operators to collaborate at the lowest level. This continuous dialogue creates timely, relevant, and clear information on which commanders direct protection activities.

#### **2-4. Components of the solution**

a. Protection is a warfighting function which provides and integrates capabilities to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations to preserve combat power and freedom of action. Protection in support of combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and the core operational actions will be part of an integrated approach involving military and civilian joint and multinational forces. It is crucial for the capabilities to identify, prevent, and mitigate (addressed below) threats to personnel and vital assets are based on an integrated, synchronized, and mutually supporting approach. Capabilities must be complementary with the other warfighting functions and reinforced within the same warfighting function to increase overall protection.

b. To achieve maximum protection, TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 proposes four key components to the solution. These include: the *identification, prevention, and mitigation* of threats to personnel and vital assets; the *simultaneous synchronization and integration* of multiple and mutually supporting protection related tasks at multiple locations; the availability of *organizations to execute* a wide variety of protection missions; and the *education and development* of future

Soldiers and leaders aimed at conducting protection related functions during decentralized operations and in uncertain environments.

(1) Identify, prevent, and mitigate.

(a) Identify. Future Army forces require integrated and synchronized capabilities to identify the full range of threats to provide the real-time situational awareness needed to prevent or mitigate their effects on personnel and vital assets. These include the capability to obtain, monitor, and record information (behaviors and characteristics) about persons, places, or things located in air, land, and water using visual, aural, electronic, human, photographic, or other means.

(b) Prevent. Future Army forces require integrated and synchronized capabilities to prevent the full range of threats against personnel and vital assets. These include the capability to analyze, interpret, and synthesize threat information to provide situational understanding, likely hostile intent, and positive identification of threats. They also include the capability to issue an early warning and disseminate information. Further, they also include proactive capabilities to deter, restrict, resist, or defeat adversary action or adversaries who have demonstrated hostile intent.

(c) Mitigate. Future Army forces require integrated and synchronized capabilities to mitigate the effects of the full range of threats against personnel and vital assets. These include reactive (such as counter fire after receiving incoming rounds on a base) and survivability capabilities that lessen the effects of adversary action. They also include capabilities to redistribute and restore mission essential assets, and to reallocate capabilities and resources.

(2) Synchronization and integration.

(a) Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. Synchronization will allow commanders to execute multiple and mutually supporting protection related tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than when executed alone. These tasks and associated systems are exercised through the protection warfighting function and should be synchronized with the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and mission execution. Since commanders have an inherent responsibility to protect and preserve their forces, they must synchronize protection capabilities. Protection capabilities (including detect, assess, warn, defend, and recover) enable the synchronization of functional tasks (such as route clearance and convoy security) and systems when supported by other tools and processes (such as MDMP, composite risk management, and synchronization and execution matrix) used in planning and execution. Enabled by synchronization, *mutual support* is described as the exchange of protection capabilities and is required to provide to, receive from, or utilize the systems and forces of other organizations or joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners (such as exchanging up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles for mine resistant, ambush protected vehicles when traveling along routes with an increased threat).

(b) When synchronizing the simultaneous application of the elements of combat power, leaders must consider an expanded concept of combined arms to include joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and Army special operations forces (ARSOF) capabilities, and emerging technologies to complement or reinforce future Army forces. In support of combined arms operations, unified actions (those integrating the capabilities of joint forces with those of multinational and civilian organizations) are required. Commanders must carefully integrate and synchronize all actions and associated resources to maximize the effects of combat power. Required protection activities begin soon after receipt of mission and continue throughout preparation and execution.

(c) TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 builds upon the conceptual framework and required capabilities presented in the ACC and AOC. These higher concepts envision a future Army force that conducts decentralized combined arms operations at the lowest practical level, maximizes joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, and requires an understanding of human groups in specified areas to exert psychological influence over people. In light of this vision, TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 underscores integration to the lowest practical level, combining the tasks and systems of the six warfighting functions and the actions or effects of the elements of combat power. As a critical element of combat power, protection must be integrated into all planning and mission analysis processes. When properly integrated, associated tasks and capabilities will identify, evaluate, and monitor threats as they emerge, and will enable the commander's risk decisions and implementation of protection measures. Integration will also enable the synchronization of capabilities contained in the protection warfighting function, as well as the balanced combination of all the elements of combat power.

(d) Future Army forces will fight as part of a networked joint force, interdependent on the integration and use of government assets and mutually supporting capabilities.<sup>6</sup> Operating effectively under conditions of uncertainty and complexity in an era of persistent conflict will require integrated systems. These systems must be combined with Soldier and leader initiative and creativity, unprecedented technical and tactical skills, and organizational flexibility pitted against thinking, adapting adversaries. Organization flexibility will allow commanders to temporarily integrate and reorganize their forces to perform required warfighting functions. This is critical to brigade combat team (BCT) commanders who are not organically equipped with the full mix of capabilities (such as Army aviation, air and missile defense, ARSOF, and maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB)) needed for protection.

### (3) Organization.

(a) Protection can be achieved through task organization changes to complement or reinforce the full potential of combat power. Synchronization and integration do not start when forces arrive in a theater of operations. They are achieved through organizational practice and assignment at home station, and continue throughout operations. To adequately synchronize and integrate protection capabilities, the Army should establish a dedicated and cohesive protection organization designed to the specific needs and unique capabilities of each brigade and higher unit. Primary members of this protection organization should include a chief protection integrator and assigned representatives from selected functional components as required. Dedicated staff members of the protection organization, representative of all warfighting



functions, must affect internal and external coordination as required with each other as well as their parent organization to effectively integrate and synchronize capabilities of the protection warfighting function into the operations process.

(b) Protection requirements apply to all levels of command; however, the integration, synchronization, and implementation of these capabilities vary based on the level of command. Army structure provides established protection cells at the division level and above. Protection cells are found in the main and tactical command posts at division and corps levels of command and in main or contingency command posts at the Army level. At brigade and below levels, the commander normally designates a senior leader to this role. The protection cell is generally responsible for integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating tasks and systems that fall under the protection warfighting function. (See appendix C for specific command-level responsibilities.)

(c) Commanders at operational and tactical levels provide the capabilities to identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of all threats to vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations during full-spectrum operations. To accomplish this, commanders employ a combination of synchronized and integrated protection capabilities realized through the elements of combat power, guided by information and leadership, and executed under the detailed direction of planning, decisionmaking, and risk mitigation processes. Future Army forces will conduct full-spectrum operations through the combined efforts of combat units, ARSOF, and the protection capabilities provided by the MEB as described below.

(d) The MEB is a multifunctional brigade, designed to operate across full-spectrum operations, that also possesses unique protection capabilities. The MEB's key tasks include conduct maneuver support operations (mobility, protection, and sustainment), support area operations (operations area security, response force operations, area damage control, terrain management, fire support coordination, and airspace management), consequence management operations (respond to CBRNE incidents, support law enforcement, and conduct post-incident response operations), and stability operations (establish civil security, civil control, and restore essential civil services). The MEB provides a collection of critical protection capabilities through various functional and support components to execute these tasks.

(e) While the MEB is primarily organized to provide direct support to the division, it can also provide general support to other echelons. The MEB will require habitual relationships with military police, engineer, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) functional elements as well as other organizations to provide the necessary baseline capabilities to enhance the MEB's ability to support maneuver brigades and division operations. Collectively, these elements preserve combat power, enable freedom of action, and facilitate shaping operations in support of the division.

(f) Based on the mission, protection priorities, and operational risks, the commander may designate elements of the MEB to support a BCT conducting a SFA mission, or a corps conducting entry operations. As required, the MEB will receive augmentation or tactical control of other protection-related elements, to include explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), civil affairs (CA), field artillery (FA), ADA, and military intelligence (MI). These elements will provide the personnel and organizations necessary to execute the unique tasks, systems, and capabilities to

identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to personnel and vital assets. These elements will enhance the MEB's ability to provide sufficient protection across the full spectrum of operations in the division area.

(g) Military police forces provide a light, mobile fighting force that can move, shoot, and communicate against level I and II threats.<sup>7</sup> Their tasks include reconnaissance operations; area damage control; base and air-base defense; response force operations; and critical site, asset, and high risk personnel security. For instance, military police forces can provide protection from criminal threats through physical security, which will prevent unauthorized access to critical facilities and equipment supporting wide area security operations. Military police forces can provide engagement, intelligence, criminal investigative, and law enforcement activities to promote stability, protect the civilian populace, and maintain law and order. These activities will also enable the prevention of threats in the area of operations (AO).

(h) In their wide area security role, the military police can conduct specific mobility and maneuver support to safeguard lines of communication and supply routes (such as rail, pipeline, and highway) and establish movement corridors to protect against direct fire and explosive threats attempting to impede, harass, or destroy traffic. In this capacity, military police forces can employ active and passive protection measures to control freedom of movement. These measures may include lethal and nonlethal fires, checkpoints, combat outposts, reconnaissance, and surveillance, employment of barriers and access control points, to identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of explosive, direct fire, information, and criminal threats. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations can support the collection of information on all threats to the forces involved in wide area security. This will be accomplished through both the S-2s and G-2s intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the police information assessment process.

(i) Additionally, military police can protect sustainment vehicles and forces, and government officials through convoy and escort security operations when there is a threat of enemy ground action. Military police forces also train host nation security forces, support antiterrorism operations, secure critical mission command nodes, perform straggler and displaced civilian control, and augment response force operations. These activities will enable the identification, prevention, and mitigation of the effects of all threats to involved security personnel and physical assets.

(j) Engineer forces can support area security operations by providing and integrating protection capabilities; such as construction, repair, maintenance, and operation of infrastructure, facilities, lines of communication and bases; terrain modification and repair; and selected explosive hazards activities. These activities will enable the prevention and mitigation of the effects of explosive, direct fire, indirect fire, and information threats. General engineer forces can also provide route reconnaissance, clearance, maintenance capabilities, as well as convoy security to guard against explosive and direct fire threats. Combat engineer forces can enhance the protective posture of U.S. and host nation personnel and critical assets. This will be accomplished by developing defensive positions into fortifications and strong points. For instance, if an indirect threat exists (such as mortar or missile) combat engineer forces can harden critical infrastructure, such as government facilities, host nation police stations, and polling stations. They can help mitigate explosive, direct fire, indirect fire, and information

threats by augmenting the survivability of host nation and U.S. operated entry control points, guard towers, and mission command cells. Engineers enhance the freedom of movement of forces conducting full-spectrum operations through mobility and countermobility operations. These operations are designed to clear or emplace obstacles. For example, engineers can remove obstacles put in movement corridors by direct fire and criminal threats, such as insurgents or dissidents; or can emplace obstacles in movement corridors to control traffic and prevent explosive, direct fire, or criminal threats.

(k) CBRN forces can identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of CBRNE threats through active and passive defenses. CBRN forces can interdict, track, and conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of CBRNE threats and hazards. They can provide standard and rapid warnings through the CBRN warning and reporting system. CBRN forces can also provide decontamination operations to enable the restoration of affected personnel and physical assets.

(l) EOD forces can identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of explosive threats and hazards (such as, explosive ordnance, unexploded ordnance, IEDs, and homemade explosives). They can detect and enable the identification of all explosive hazards. They can train future forces, as well as other foreign security forces to recognize explosive hazards. If required, EOD forces can detect, identify, render-safe, and dispose of conventional unexploded ordnance, including U.S. and foreign ordnance items that threaten host nation and friendly personnel, operations, installations, property, or materiel.

(m) FA and ADA forces can increase airspace situational awareness. They can provide active measures to intercept indirect fire threats, such as mortar fires and aerial surveillance systems. When required, these forces can detect, intercept, and defeat over-the-horizon conventional and unconventional warheads, and their delivery systems. These forces can enable the mitigation of effects of indirect fire threats, provide early warning through the air defense warning system, conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, and enable the employment of observation posts. They can also provide passive measures, such as camouflage, cover, concealment, hardening, and operational security to protect defensive integrated air and missile defense systems against information threats during the conduct of full-spectrum operations.

(n) CA forces can prevent the employment of threats through civil-military operations, which are intended to win the hearts and minds of the civilian host nation population. These forces can also be utilized to train predeployed forces in the history, culture, religion, language, tribal affiliations, local politics, and cultural sensitivities as well as any significant nongovernmental organizations operating in the AO.

(o) MI forces can enable the identification, prevention, and mitigation of the effects of all threats by providing situational understanding. These forces employ electronic warfare countermeasures to prevent information threats such as cyber and directed energy weapons. These countermeasures will also prevent electromagnetic based devices, such as cellular telephones and garage door openers, from detonating radio-controlled IEDs.

(p) Aviation forces can enable protection during wide area security operations through the utilization of attack reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft will focus on reconnaissance and

security missions and can provide quick reaction to protect forces conducting wide area security which may be in contact with direct fire and indirect fire threats. Both manned and unmanned aircraft can enable protection of the OE through aggressive reconnaissance and security operations against all threats.

(q) The future Army force Soldier is the primary instrument in planning, assessing, and executing protection capabilities. These include information protection capabilities. The individual Soldier can employ integrated active and passive defensive measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of information threats to involved future Army forces information and information systems. The Soldier can provide bottom up situational awareness to support co-creation of context, to identify all threats, and to determine changes in the environment that could threaten protected personnel and vital assets at all levels. The Soldier provides early warning to help mitigate the effects of threats in the environment and AO. The Soldier can execute defensive measures that will prevent or mitigate to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation during the conduct of full-spectrum operations.

(4) Training and leader development.

(a) Future Army forces must be resourceful, led by innovative and adaptive leaders. Future Soldiers and leaders must conduct protection training in an environment that integrates tasks and systems, and empowers commanders to utilize mutually supporting joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities. Future commanders and noncommissioned officers must train their units to understand historical, political, and cultural aspects of human groups in specified areas to exert psychological influence over people. Future Army leaders must have the ability to understand the protection problem, make decisions in time-sensitive situations, and employ capabilities with confidence gained through a knowledge base founded on training and experience.

(b) An effective protection knowledge base will have the following three main components: Information about available and emerging protection materiel and nonmateriel capabilities; theater, regional, and local intelligence; and information on training requirements, standards, observations, insights, and lessons learned.

(c) The Army has a number of forums as part of its Battle Command Knowledge System, one of which is the ProtectionNet forum, which allows the sharing of protection related knowledge across the Army. Future Army leaders must understand the full capacity of and continue to manage protection capabilities such as this to validate and integrate the latest protection trends; tactics, techniques, and procedures; organizational design; equipment improvements; and changes to Soldier and leader training.

(d) An effective protection knowledge base will fuse information concerning unit activities such as training, equipment maintenance, and personnel administration. Leaders must be trained institutionally to effectively manage the protection knowledge base to enable unit readiness and remove information gaps and redundancies. As such, they will require the protection knowledge base kept current and relevant at each level of command through deliberate review, purging, and archiving outdated information.

(e) Commanders of future Army forces must be capable of providing protection to support their units during full- spectrum decentralized operations. This requires resourceful leaders able to exploit the potential of integrated combined arms technologies. The future OE requires leaders able to work through ambiguity and have the ability to conceptualize information based on the tactical situation and an understanding of behavior and differences among human groups. These abilities will allow adaptive leaders with flexible mindsets to protect effectively personnel and physical assets during the conduct of decentralized operations and execution of mission command. Future Army leaders will require the ability to understand the full potential of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational protection capabilities and when nonstandard solutions are needed. This understanding is derived from the protection knowledge base and flexible, creative leaders. Challenging training, under conditions which replicate combat operations and the OE, combined with an institutional knowledge base will build this capacity into future leaders in future Army forces.

(f) Future Army forces must train leaders and Soldiers at all levels to operate protection capabilities that support collaborative planning and decisionmaking so that utilization becomes second nature. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities must be integrated during training to enable mutual support and enhance overlapping protection operations. Future Army leaders must assess training readiness and adjust training conditions in the integrated training environment to meet training objectives and desired outcomes. Coupled with training environments that replicate real complex operations, such as those at home station and combat training centers, the virtual and/or constructive simulations of the integrated training environment will expand the collective protection knowledge base and build leaders with flexible mindsets.

(g) Future Army leaders will be required to think, operate, and prevail in three interrelated dimensions of full-spectrum operations: psychological contest of wills, strategic engagement, and cyberspace and electromagnetic contest. The ability to think and operate in these dimensions will require leaders trained to link the tactical employment of forces to policy goals and strategic objectives. Leaders down to battalion level must be able to integrate effectively, protection capabilities and enablers (military police, engineer, aviation, public affairs, psychological operations, CA, and others) with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to achieve synergy and unity of effort. Protection in these dimensions will require leaders with the ability to assess the tactical situation, develop trends, and form logical conclusions about potential adversaries and human groups.

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## **Chapter 3**

### **Core Operational Actions**

#### **3-1. Introduction**

In addition to the components of the solution described above, future Army forces must also identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to personnel and vital assets during the conduct of a set of core operational actions to meet future security challenges. These core operational actions range from the engagement of allies and indigenous forces to the conduct of full-spectrum operations,

and include—security force assistance, shaping and entry operations, intertheater and intratheater operational maneuver, full-spectrum operations, overlapping protection operations, distributed support and sustainment, and network enabled mission command.

### **3-2. Security force assistance**

a. Security force assistance is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.<sup>8</sup> Host nation security forces are collectively referred to as foreign security forces<sup>9</sup> and may include military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards, and correctional personnel.

b. Protection capabilities support SFA forces by integrating key capabilities required to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to personnel and vital assets. Personnel may be foreign security forces, host nation civilian population, and future Army forces operating from a base, conducting convoy operations, participating in escort and security operations, supporting election events, and providing protection. Assets may be military equipment, police stations and/or headquarters, and polling facilities.

c. Future Army forces will normally operate from a forward operating base (FOB) to provide protection, extend command, control, and communications, and to support training and tactical operations. Protecting the FOB depends on the ability of units to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities based on higher headquarters and local vulnerability assessments. These assessments should be supported by intelligence efforts to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and strategies of threats in the AO and to enable the understanding of friendly government and security force capabilities. Future Army forces will require a mix of wide-area coverage protection capabilities during the conduct of SFA missions.

d. When effectively integrated and synchronized with available joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, these capabilities will provide future Army forces with overlapping detection, tracking, and classification of all threats; assured mobility; convoy security; and broad area reconnaissance and surveillance of host nation populace which will lessen the surprise to U.S. forces. These capabilities will also enable the defense against physical attacks from criminal elements to paramilitary action. When required, the ability of future Army forces to conduct wide area security will deny the enemy sanctuary, provide early and accurate warnings, and give forces time to react, and space to maneuver. Success will ultimately result in stability, law and order, secure lines of communication, host nation and host population support, the preservation of government services, and focused protection forces and capabilities.

e. Forces conducting SFA may be required to first defeat enemy forces, and then establish area security to enable foreign security forces time and space to develop capabilities. These situations and other phases of the SFA mission will pit involved forces and capabilities against a variety of threats ranging from the common criminal to special purpose forces. These threats will use a variety of means to threaten stability and law and order, interdict lines of communication, attempt to turn the host population against future forces, disrupt host nation

support and government services, and divert protection capabilities away from their assigned mission during SFA.

f. The BCT is the primary conventional force that performs SFA operations. The BCT commander has the flexibility to add selective units to assist in the conduct of SFA which is based on the protection requirements and the desired end state, and may include forces that provide key functional capabilities (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, mission command, and protection). In support of SFA operations, future Army forces have four protection imperatives. These imperatives are base protection, convoy protection, infrastructure protection, and noncombatant protection. These imperatives will focus protection capabilities and provide perspective to aid the commander in determining support requirements. The tasks, systems, and capabilities required of these imperatives should be integrated and synchronized into planning and mission analysis processes to enable the effective employment of combined arms protection capabilities.

g. Future Army forces require enhanced detection, intelligence, and assessment capabilities to support protection requirements driven by the diversity of threats, operational proximity (force operating near and among potential threats), operational adaptability, and the impact of information during joint operations. Leaders will be required to interact with civilian populations during SFA missions. This interaction will enable a multilayered human intelligence collection and assessment capability, which is needed to effectively inform the common operating picture and provide situational understanding.

h. ARSOF will leverage the framework of conventional and host nation forces in all countries in which they operate. They will affect coordination and synchronization, as necessary, to gain access to supporting protection capabilities. Due to their size, ARSOF units will combine supporting protection capabilities with their ability to conduct covert and low visibility operations to avoid contact when possible. If supporting host nation and conventional capabilities are unavailable, ARSOF units will provide their own protection. To enhance their efforts, ARSOF units will coordinate with the embassy, country team, or any existing human intelligence and protection capabilities resident in the country, including the use of indigenous or surrogate personnel. Effective coordination will enable detailed preparations and facilitate site surveys and appropriate support from military groups and the theater special operations command.

### **3-3. Shaping and entry operations**

a. Shaping and entry operations create and preserve conditions for the success of follow-on decisive and intertheater and intratheater operations. They begin with unopposed or forcible entry (parachute, air, or amphibious assault) and continue with simultaneous shaping operations.

b. Shaping operations support decisive and intertheater and intratheater maneuver operations by affecting the enemy's capabilities and forces, and influencing their actions. Shaping operations may involve any combination of future forces and can occur throughout the depth of the AO. Some shaping operations, especially those that occur simultaneously with entry or maneuver operations, are economy-of-force actions. In these instances, protection capabilities

may be limited and should be used in support of mission essential and critical capabilities determined by commander priorities.

c. Whenever possible, future Army forces seek an unopposed entry, either unassisted or assisted by the host nation. Deployment into a permissive environment requires forces to assess the host nation security, police forces, and port security operations. Planners should not assume that existing or host nation forces will automatically provide protection. Commanders should ensure their units arrive prepared to protect themselves based on threat conditions. They must consider host nation restrictions and sensitivities and affect coordination as necessary with protection assets already at the site location. In an assisted entry, the host nation will facilitate the rapid transition of initial entry forces to follow-on operations. The host nation may be able to provide capabilities to support protection. These capabilities can lessen the requirement for future Army forces to provide equivalent capabilities, thereby reducing the sustainment footprint. In an unassisted entry, a balanced force package with enough combat power to secure an adequate lodgment and perform reception, staging, onward movement, and integration is required.

d. A forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition.<sup>10</sup> Forcible entry operations require extensive mission analysis to adequately protect the force. Commanders should balance the need for rapid response with the mix of combat power and resources that support mission accomplishment. This balance should be sufficient to provide protection and flexibility to respond to complex and uncertain conditions. Future adversaries will employ a variety of means to disrupt entry operations. These include enemy command and control elements, air defense systems, ballistic missiles, and shore-to-ship missile capabilities. They may also include enemy observation, explosives (such as an IED or vehicle borne IED), snipers, rocket-propelled grenades, MANPADS, cyber, and information. Additionally, the adversary may conduct a wide variety of tactical actions to deny access, delay future forces, and divert dedicated protection capabilities.

e. The protection warfighting function supports entry operations by providing and integrating the capabilities needed by future forces to identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of threats, and enable follow on force flow and employment of other joint assets. Future Army forces must possess early entry reconnaissance and security forces to preserve freedom of action; protect the force, populations, and critical infrastructure; and deny enemy freedom of movement. The force requires reconnaissance and intelligence collection capabilities to develop situational understanding. Entry forces should coordinate with local security forces to ensure freedom of movement, protect the lodgment, and fight for information. Guided by mission requirements, leaders must coordinate, integrate, and synchronize all available supporting capabilities with local security and combined arms forces to achieve maximum protection. The commander may require specialized protection capabilities such as military police, engineer, medical, chemical, FA, ADA, CA, and other forces to support the conduct of entry operations.

### **3-4. Intertheater and intratheater operational maneuver**

a. Operational maneuver will seek to sequence engagements in time, space, and purpose to achieve a positional advantage over enemies from which U.S. forces can reach decisive military



results. The two forms of operational maneuver, intertheater and intratheater, are described below.

(1) Intertheater maneuver is the maneuver over extended distances, of air, ground, sea, and space capabilities to achieve a positional advantage over enemies. The goal of future intertheater maneuver is to move sufficient combat power and sustainment from garrisons, through intermediate staging bases if necessary, directly into action. Deployment of ground forces directly into the AO provides the Army, in partnership with the joint force, the ability to achieve surprise and bypass enemy antiaccess and area denial capabilities. It also permits friendly forces to occupy or protect key terrain and facilities, and provides areas from which friendly forces can repel enemy forces or secure populations and continue the flow of follow-on forces.

(2) Intratheater maneuver is the movement within a theater of air, ground, sea, and space capabilities to achieve a positional advantage over enemies. Intratheater maneuver using platforms with sufficient speed and ability to land at unimproved, degraded, or less than optimal locations will mitigate risks posed by enemy antiaccess and area denial operations. Future Army forces will also conduct intratheater maneuver to seize key terrain, secure populations, and to destroy enemy forces and capabilities in depth. Mounted vertical maneuver and seabasing will be critical capabilities for future force entry intratheater maneuver operations.

b. The nature of intertheater and intratheater maneuver will inherently offer protection to future Army forces. The use of stealth, speed, and dispersion will reinforce protection of the force during maneuver. These maneuver activities and information dominance will not only protect, but will expand the operational reach of future Army forces, allowing them to act against potential threats first, and destroy enemy capabilities through the direct engagement of the enemy's decisive points and centers of gravity. When coupled with increased mobility and information dominance, the deliberate use of protection capabilities will protect future Army forces and enable their maneuver.

### **3-5. Full-spectrum operations**

a. The Army's operational concept is full-spectrum operations; Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability and civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.<sup>11</sup> As such, future forces require the ability to sustain operations as long as necessary to accomplish the mission and for peaceful processes to prevail. This requires operational endurance, the preservation of combat power, and freedom of action, which is enabled by the protection of vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations against the broad spectrum of threats. Protection starts at the home station, supporting the full spectrum of offensive, defensive, stability, or civil support operations; from the point of origin through transit; and during employment, sustainment, and redeployment.

b. According to the Quadrennial Defense Review report, U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.<sup>12</sup> Consequentially, future Army forces must be prepared to work alongside joint,

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to conduct simultaneous combat and governance operations (such as, economic and political reconstruction). The transition between combat and governance operations may require a surge of protection capabilities. Future Army leaders must be prepared to execute tasks critical to economic and political order. These tasks include protracted counterinsurgency and state-building efforts that require population security and the protection of critical infrastructure, such as government facilities, host nation police stations, and polling stations. Commanders can meet protection requirements by integrating and synchronizing all reinforcing and complementary capabilities from available joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational forces in primary, supporting, or economy-of-force roles.

c. Future Army leaders will require a combination of security and offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support protection tasks implemented through the elements of operational design. The effective execution of these tasks will depend on their integration with the composite risk management and MDMP, and the leader's ability to conduct decentralized operations, integrate intelligence and operations, conduct air-ground operations, expand capabilities at the brigade level, inform, and influence populations to conduct effective transitions, and enhance unit cohesion.

(1) Security.

(a) TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 focus on wide area security operations. Wide area security is a form of security operations conducted to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic goals. Future forces will perform wide area security during all operations and should take advantage of other military and civilian capabilities, and local security measures performed by units in the AO. Future Army forces are required to protect friendly forces (to include the population), installations, routes, and assets within a specific area. Forces conducting wide area security can saturate an area or position on key terrain to deny the enemy positions of advantage or protect against unexpected hostile attacks through early warning, reconnaissance, surveillance, and application of defensive measures.

(b) When in contact, forces conducting wide area security may have to first develop the situation and then maintain contact to provide the time and space needed by the assault force to effectively maneuver on and defeat the enemy. Forces conducting wide area security operations must be able to accurately detect and assess threats to support positive identification and provide leaders with situational understanding of threat capabilities arrayed against the protected element throughout their assigned areas. This will allow leaders to employ the most effective force and related active or passive protection capabilities. Forces must be able to disseminate information and provide early warning to prevent surprise, mitigate threat effects, and maintain freedom of action. They must be able to effectively redistribute and restore mission-essential assets to preserve combat power and provide protection for ongoing operations.

(2) Offensive. During offensive operations, leaders should integrate protection tasks with other elements of combat power at the lowest possible level and synchronize them simultaneously or sequentially where and when significant threats are anticipated.

(3) Defensive. During defensive operations, commanders should employ integrated and synchronized combined arms capabilities to retain key terrain, safeguard the population, and protect critical assets (such as mission command centers, and key communications nodes). Survivability and antiterrorism related protection tasks and capabilities are essential during defensive operations. Army leaders should integrate and synchronize these protection tasks and capabilities in conjunction with deliberate and detailed area security operations supported by decision support tools and analysis to assess critical assets and key vulnerabilities.

(4) Stability. As with offensive and defensive operations, future Army forces can derive protection during stability operations by integrating and synchronizing tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function. Stability operations require commanders to balance protection needs between forces and civilian populations. One of the most important elements of stability operations is the protection of civil institutions, processes, and systems that are critical in reaching end-state conditions. As key protection enablers, leaders will be required to perform information engagement tasks during stability operations to support co-creation of context and influence the will of neutral audiences and adversaries.

(5) Civil support. Civil support operations are conducted as a means to protect critical assets, facilities, and personnel, maintain freedom of action, and restore essential services. Army leaders will be required to provide protective services (such as antiterrorism and operational security procedures or police and physical security reinforcement) to reduce crime-conducive conditions. During heightened readiness conditions, future forces may be required to protect police and polling stations, other government facilities (such as power generation, water treatment, and transportation), and hospitals. As with stability operations, significant leader and Soldier engagement with the local population will be required.

d. In support of full-spectrum operations, future Army forces will routinely operate in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment which will require integrated and synchronized capabilities operating with the framework of the protection warfighting function. Commander will require future forces to expand protection to local populations, critical infrastructure, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, and to integrate their protection capabilities with those of other forces to create unity of effort. Future Army forces require mutually supporting and interoperable capabilities to assimilate and employ the resources of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners whenever appropriate.

e. Future Army forces commanders must understand how Army protection capabilities can enable mission success through unity of effort with our joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. Leaders overall awareness and visibility will improve their ability to provide to, receive from, or utilize available joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partner resources and training. When properly integrated and synchronized across full-spectrum operations in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment, mutually supporting capabilities will provide commanders and leaders enhanced unity of effort. This will ultimately result in effectively protecting the force, enhancing the preservation of combat power, and increasing freedom of action.

f. During full-spectrum operations, ARSOF will conduct operations led and controlled by host nation forces and country teams. ARSOF units are ideally suited to develop long-term relationships through their special training in regional history, language skills, and cultural understanding. This will allow ARSOF units to build and employ the protection capabilities of host nation forces and country teams, and enhance the protection posture of future Army forces. Future Army forces should form habitual relationships with ARSOF and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to enhance effectiveness.

g. Homeland defense.

(1) In the homeland, future forces may be task-organized to integrate and distribute protection capabilities to assist local, state, and federal agencies in the conduct of civil support operations. These operations will ensure the protection of all citizens, critical assets, and key infrastructure. Future Army forces may be required to provide capabilities to support sustainment and emergency operations, such as rescuing trapped persons; providing emergency medical care; preventing and controlling disease; and providing food, water, shelter, and sanitation provisions. Future Army forces may be required to effectively integrate and synchronize protection capabilities to enable mobility (such as, the restoration of critical road networks, major thoroughfares, and bridges) and counter mobility (such as barriers, obstacles, road blocks and checkpoints) efforts. Future Army forces may be required to harden critical sites and infrastructure. They may be required to support remediation efforts to enable environmental cleanup and consequence management. Additionally, future Army forces may be required to support the restoration of public health, services, communications, and civil order in a homeland defense mission to provide continuity of operations and government.

(2) Title 10, Title 32, and the Posse Comitatus Act<sup>13</sup> may limit protection capabilities. When authorized, however, future Army forces can augment civil authorities by providing support to civil law enforcement. They may be required to provide riot control and curfew enforcement, and use appropriate lethal and nonlethal capabilities to secure and protect selected civilian critical infrastructure, and sites of national importance.

h. Sustained engagement.

(1) Sustained engagement is a long term investment to develop partner security capabilities. Future Army forces will conduct sustained engagement to assist partners in improving and maintaining their security capacity. The future force will accomplish this through SFA, forward positioning of forces, combined or multinational training, and regionally aligning forces to combatant commands. While sustained engagement may require brigade or larger units when internal or external enemies threaten the host nation, smaller units and teams down to individual advisors will conduct the majority of sustained engagement activities. The protection warfighting function will support sustained engagement by providing and integrating the capabilities needed to identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of all threats to vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations.

(2) Army special operations forces will remain the primary organization for sustained engagement in countries with mature security forces operating in relatively stable environments.

Based on the needs of the supported security force and the priorities of the theater security cooperation plans, sustained engagement may require future forces to augment ARSOF efforts to conduct multinational training or combined operations with foreign security forces.

i. Prevent proliferation and combat WMD. Adversaries seek capabilities to dominate their regions, deter external intervention, or both through the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD ranging from homemade biological and chemical contaminants to nuclear warheads. Protection against these threats requires a proactive effort to develop interagency relationships among partners to monitor, track, and interdict any proliferation of WMD or their components, and if necessary, their elimination before they can be used. Assigned protection forces require the capability to classify, neutralize, or render safe WMD and their components. Additionally, they require combined arms capabilities and unity of effort to protect the force and civilian populations while containing and responding to the release of any harmful effects. Future Army forces must have standoff radiological and nuclear detection capabilities and improve the responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management forces.<sup>14</sup>

j. Military cyberspace operations.

(1) Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructure including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and established procedures and controllers. Full-spectrum operations require enhanced protection capabilities to counter adversaries from individual hackers, to terrorists and organized criminal groups, foreign intelligence services, as well as nation states. To counter these adversaries, future Army forces will be required to operate simultaneously across three interconnected dimensions of full-spectrum operations including the psychological contest of wills, strategic engagement, and the cyber/electromagnetic contest.

(2) Protection in the cyber/electromagnetic contest first requires commanders to recognize that associated information and networks are not only operational tools, but are themselves weapon systems. To this end, commanders must enforce standards and conduct training across the force to ensure compliance with standing operating procedures regarding network defense and information insurance. Future Army forces require improved detect capabilities to sense and track potential cyberspace and electromagnetic threats to develop trends and form logical conclusions about potential threats in the cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrums. Future Army forces require improved warning capabilities to communicate real-time standard and rapid warnings at all echelons. This will provide timely situational awareness of the status of networks to facilitate mission command, and to defend against network intrusions. Future Army forces require improved defend capabilities to prevent or mitigate damage to computer and telecommunications networks. Finally, future Army forces require improved recovery capabilities to enable the restoration of damaged technologies and networks in support of the cyber/electromagnetic contest.

k. Foreign humanitarian assistance. The future force must be prepared to conduct relief operations to assist government and security organizations in easing human suffering caused by natural and manmade disasters (such as hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, terrorist attacks) in

both austere and nonpermissive environments. Depending on the type and scope of the disaster, the future force may require protection capabilities similar to those required for forcible entry, wide area security, or sustained engagement operations. For instance, humanitarian response forces must be able to secure the humanitarian “lodgment” to enable force protection, conduct law and order operations to prevent looting, or conduct wide area security operations to deny a takeover of relief aid.

I. Mass atrocity response operations (MARO).

(1) Future Army forces must be prepared to conduct MARO as part of full-spectrum operations.<sup>15</sup> In support of mass atrocity response operations, the future force must have the capability to protect a certain group (the victims) from another group (the perpetrators). Protection enables the first steps toward preventing mass atrocities by providing capabilities to assess risks and generate early warning of potential atrocities. These first steps require the U.S. to access intelligence and information concerning specific situations of interests wherever it exists, including foreign academia, international nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, grassroots civil society groups, church groups, other governments, and intergovernmental organizations.

(2) Mass atrocity response operations is usually conducted as part of a larger stability operation, and combined with myriad of tasks, such as protection. In planning and executing MARO, commanders must anticipate victims and perpetrators switching roles. They must also plan for and execute protection measures to identify, prevent, and mitigate second and third order effects that U.S. force intervention may provoke. Future Army force commanders must anticipate and plan to execute specific tasks to protect forces, key infrastructure, and the population in support of wide area security, reconnaissance and intelligence collection efforts, building credible security forces, establishing (or re-establishing) the rule of law, humanitarian relief, and restoring stable governance.

### **3-6. Overlapping protection**

a. Thinking, adaptive adversaries constitute threats who strive for increasing lethal capabilities aimed at perceived seams and gaps in the future force protective posture. Gaps and seams will likely be the result of a combination of natural or unnatural, realized or unrealized events and conditions. Naturally occurring gaps and seams may result from terrain, atmospheric and weather conditions, or threats that extend beyond the range of U.S. protection capabilities. Most often, these gaps and seams are realized. For example, defensive integrated air and missile defense may be unable to track enemy indirect fires throughout their flight path. This is a realized gap. Unnatural gaps and seams are those that occur as a result of accepted risk levels; lack of coordination, redundancy, or mutual support; or lagging support. These gaps can either be realized or unrealized. For example, overextended supply routes may be the result of realized and acceptable risk. These gaps and seams can be stressed by the actions of both friendly and enemy forces. For instance, limited resources and other realities in the AO often force units to be spread thin and accept risk in their protection coverage. As such, it may be impossible to employ timely overlapping protection coverage to support forces operating in an extended

movement corridor. An adversary emplacing obstacles or explosives may exploit this specific gap in the corridor to disrupt, impede, or destroy traffic.

b. The tactics employed by insurgent forces will themselves exploit those areas where U.S. forces are most vulnerable. Gaps and seams in protection coverage can also occur from the geographic separation of units where one unit exceeds the maximum range of another unit's supporting fires. This may result from limits in visibility due to weather conditions or terrain. Gaps and seams in protection coverage will be exploited by the full spectrum of threats, to include explosives, direct fire, indirect fire, CBRNE, information, and criminal. To counter these seams and gaps, the Army future force must provide innovative, conditions-based protection capabilities that are integrated, synchronized, and overlapping.

c. Future Army forces must be able to capitalize on combined arms operations, as well as mutually supporting protection capabilities of joint and multinational partners. Future forces require mutually supporting, combined arms protection capabilities that can provide mobile, long-range support to convoy and other ground operations. These capabilities should be integrated and synchronized during planning and execution to support maneuver and static defensive operations. Future Army forces require enhanced detection, assessment, and warning capabilities to identify threats operating within gaps and seams. This will allow future Army forces to either avoid the threat or engage them using the most effective means. Under a single, integrated umbrella, future Army forces will have the ability to share and exchange capabilities, information, and data with other services and multinational partners to support all protection tasks required of overlapping protection.

### **3-7. Distributed support and sustainment**

a. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. Distributed support and sustainment is the ability to provide continuous and uninterrupted supplies, personnel, and equipment to geographically dispersed forces conducting decentralized full-spectrum operations to enable freedom of action.

b. Uncertain conditions under which the future force operates will demand decentralization of logistical support to ensure continuous and uninterrupted supplies, personnel, and equipment to avoid missed opportunities and minimize the risks associated with operational pauses. Effective support and sustainment can have far-reaching and significant direct and indirect impacts on future forces and the ultimate success of their mission. Effective distributed support and sustainment during full-spectrum operations is enabled by the ability of future Army forces to identify, prevent, or mitigate threats to personnel and vital assets in the environment. This will be reflected in a unit's ability to conduct decisive maneuver operations without delays caused by support and sustainment issues.

c. Future distributed support and sustainment forces require integrated and synchronized protection capabilities to preserve the uninterrupted flow of supplies, personnel, and equipment so the commander can apply maximum combat power across the full spectrum of military operations. Preserving the flow of supplies, personnel, and equipment (including all distributed

support and sustainment forces and the physical assets they possess or bring to supported units) will require future Army forces to employ closely coordinated complementary and reinforcing protection capabilities provided by an integrated protection warfighting function.

### **3-8. Network-enabled mission command**

a. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by commanders, supported by their staffs, using the art of command and the science of control to integrate warfighting functions in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. Mission command uses mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative within the commander's intent, enabling agile and adaptive commanders, leaders, and organizations.<sup>16</sup> Land conflict is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent operations. For this reason, mission command is ideally suited for land conflict. In addition to an adaptive and thinking adversary, unpredictability will result, making centralized decisionmaking and orderly processes ineffective. Under such conditions, future forces in contact can exercise effective mission command by applying their own decisionmaking and processes. This will allow the future force to adapt the operation to the situation quickly and retain the initiative.

b. In exercising network-enabled mission command, future forces must be able to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats across the spectrum of conflict. Often the OE encountered during SFA or shaping and entry operations will be more complex than that encountered in intertheater and intratheater maneuver. The continuous, often volatile, interaction of units with the local host nation populace during SFA operations will require the application of mission command and unique protection requirements. For instance, future Army forces will encounter riots, unruly civilians and criminals, vehicle and human-borne IED threats, snipers on rooftops, and so forth. During other operations, units that are high payoff targets may exercise mission command. These units and their physical assets may encounter high volumes of indirect fire, such as rockets, artillery, and mortars, or over-the-horizon conventional and WMD warheads.

c. Imperative to successful network-enabled mission command, future Army forces will require the ability to identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of information threats on the network. These threats include operations employed against friendly information and information systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; cyber; directed energy weapons; and so forth. Protection of information and information systems will enable extended connectivity from higher levels to the individual Soldier.

d. Future Army forces require the availability of a complete and accurate common operating picture to support mission command. An awareness of the overall operation, to include current locations and progress of friendly, enemy, and hazardous elements, is critical to the commander. This will allow the commander to understand and direct protection capabilities against a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy.

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## **Chapter 4**

### **Conclusion**

a. Protection is a critical element of combat power. Combined with effective leadership and information, the protection warfighting function provides and integrates the capabilities needed to identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of threats to vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations, particularly in an environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Protection draws its potential from the other warfighting function's, including mission command, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, and sustainment; and subsequently imparts the full capacity of that potential through integrated combined arms operations and operational adaptability.

b. Protection must always include the clever combination of detect, assess, warn, defend, and recover capabilities in which commanders at all levels employ against adaptive adversaries. Similar to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, protection in the future will require an enhanced awareness and understanding of the history, politics, and cultural differences of human groups. This awareness and understanding will allow future Army forces to psychologically influence these groups and increase overall protection by adding a critical human dimension.

c. TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 describes the broad requirements Soldiers and leaders will need to identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of threats in the 2016-2028 timeframe. Building off the ACC and AOC, this concept identifies the imperatives to integrate effectively joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities to provide mutually supporting and overlapping protection during full-spectrum operations. The detailed aspects of these imperatives will help organize and focus required future protection capabilities to enable combat development and force modernization. TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 will guide ongoing evolutionary developments of future Army forces and institutional capabilities based on a grounded projection of future armed conflict.

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## **Appendix A**

### **References**

Army Regulations (AR), DA Pams, field manuals (FM), and DA forms are available to Army Publishing directorate Homepage: <http://www.usapa.army.mil>. TRADOC publications and forms available at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil>

### **Section I**

#### **Required Publications**

TRADOC Operational Environment 2009-2025

TRADOC Pam 525-3-0

The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, 2016-2028

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1

The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028

### **Section II**

#### **Related Publications**

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Army Directive 2008-02

Army Protection. Retrieved from [http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/ad2008\\_02.pdf](http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/ad2008_02.pdf)

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DOD Quadrennial Defense Review Report. (2010, February 1). Washington DC. Retrieved from <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/>

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Gates, R. (2009, April 6). Defense Budget Recommendation Statement. Arlington, VA.  
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National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Army Special Operations Forces Capstone Concept Directive 2010

TRADOC Pam 525-2-1  
The United States Army Functional Concept for Intelligence 2016-2028

TRADOC Pam 525-3-3  
The United States Army Functional Concept for Mission Command 2016-2028

TRADOC Pam 525-3-4  
The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires 2016-2028

TRADOC Pam 525-3-6  
The United States Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver 2016-2028

TRADOC Pam 525-3-7  
Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations 2015-2024

TRADOC Pam 525-3-5

TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01

Army Study of the Human Dimension in the Future 2015-2024

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The United States Army Functional Concept for Sustainment 2016-2028

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U.S. Code. Title 10–Armed Forces. Retrieved from [http://uscode.house.gov/download/title\\_10.shtml](http://uscode.house.gov/download/title_10.shtml)

U.S. Code. Title 32–National Guard. Retrieved from [http://uscode.house.gov/download/title\\_32.shtml](http://uscode.house.gov/download/title_32.shtml)

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## **Appendix B Required Capabilities**

### **B-1. ACC protection required capabilities**

a. The following capabilities outlined in the ACC are required to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to personnel and vital assets:

b. Detect and assess threats and hazards. Future Army forces require the capability to detect and assess threats and hazards directed against personnel and physical assets to provide the situational understanding and positive identification necessary to prevent or mitigate their effects and maintain freedom of action.

c. Warn the force. Future Army forces require the capability to disseminate early warnings to achieve the desired degree of protection for personnel and physical assets.

d. Protect personnel and physical assets. Future Army forces require the capability to prevent and mitigate an attack and other hazards to protect personnel and physical assets.

e. Recover from attack. Future Army forces require the capability to mitigate the effects from attack and other threats to recover and restore mission essential capabilities.

### **B-2. AOC protection required capabilities**

a. The following capabilities outlined in the AOC are required to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to personnel and vital assets.

b. Future Army forces require the capability to integrate protection efforts and systems that are interoperable with joint partners to recommend and identify opportunities as they develop the situation through action.

c. Future Army forces require the capability to sense, monitor, and record activity (behaviors, characteristics, and others) about persons, places, or things to maintain freedom of action.

d. Future Army forces require the capability to integrate gathered data and previously produced intelligence, including threat, military, and physical environments, and social, political, and economic factors to provide commander(s) decisionmakers possible courses of action.

e. Future Army forces require the capability to determine enemy and friendly capabilities, hostile intent, and enemy courses of action to preserve the force.

f. Future Army forces require the capability to disseminate appropriate warning about potential threats and hazards to protect personnel and physical assets.

g. Future Army forces require the capability to execute defensive measures that generally operate independently and do not require manning and aid in preventing, deterring, or restricting the enemy from taking hostile actions otherwise employed against the joint force, to protect the force.

h. Future Army forces require the capability to execute active measures that prevent, deter, restrict, resist, or defeat enemy action or enemies who have demonstrated hostile intent to protect the force.

i. Future Army forces require the capability to provide convoy and movement protection to maintain freedom of action.

j. Future Army forces require the capability to employ survivability measures aimed at decreasing the impact of enemy attacks to maintain mission effectiveness.

k. Future Army forces require the capability to recover from the attack, manage the effects of the attack, and redistribute and restore capabilities to maintain mission effectiveness.

l. Future Army forces require the capability to provide area and fixed site protection to preserve combat power, enable sustainment operations, and allow a position from which the force can be projected.

m. Future Army forces require the capability to operate in a CBRNE environment and against nuclear armed enemies.

### **B-3. Protection required capabilities**

a. The following capabilities, unique to protection, are required to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to personnel and vital assets:

b. Future Army forces require the capability to identify threats to protect personnel and vital physical assets.

c. Future Army forces require the capability to prevent threats to protect personnel and vital physical assets in support of full-spectrum operations.

d. Future Army forces require the capability to mitigate threats to protect personnel and vital physical assets.

e. Future Army forces require the capability for organic protection while conducting mobile operations, away from maneuver units, and protect personnel and vital physical assets.

f. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct law and order operations to strengthen host nation security forces to protect the population and preserve the rule of law.

g. Future Army forces require the capability to neutralize concealed improvised IEDs to reduce casualties and maintain freedom of action.

h. Future Army forces require the capability to protect communications infrastructure and information gathering capabilities (equipment, personnel, and sensors) to provide commanders with information needed to make timely decisions.

i. Future Army forces require the ability to integrate protection capabilities with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to recommend and identify opportunities to senior commanders as they develop the situation through action.

j. Future Army forces require the capability to protect Soldiers during mounted and dismounted operations to reduce casualties.

k. Future Army forces require the ability to identify and render safe conventional and unconventional explosive threats utilizing advanced technology in a distributed operating environment to ensure protection of forces and freedom of movement throughout full-spectrum operations in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

l. Future Army forces require the capability to prevent the enemy from detecting, tracking, and targeting forces while operating in all environments, to reduce their capability to inflict losses.

m. Future Army forces require the capability to avoid or reduce detection by the enemy to protect Soldiers and the population.

n. Future Army forces require the capability to protect equipment and infrastructure from small arms, the effects of explosives and fragments, and directed energy, to preserve combat power.

- o. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct critical site and high risk personnel security in a joint operational environment, to protect those personnel and assets against threats.
- p. Future Army forces require the capability for decontamination of all CBRNE hazards in a joint operational environment to reduce losses and quickly recover capabilities.
- q. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct multiple military operations in a CBRNE environment with minimal performance degradation due to impaired flexibility in maneuver and dexterity caused by cumbersome personal protective equipment.
- r. Future Army forces require the capability to avoid contamination under CBRNE hazard conditions to prevent or reduce casualties.
- s. Future Army forces require the capability to determine extent of CBRN contamination at specific locations to protect personnel and physical assets.
- t. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct military operations involving explosives with minimal performance degradation due to impaired flexibility in maneuver and dexterity caused by cumbersome personal protective equipment.
- u. Future Army forces require the capability to contain and/or prevent the spread of contamination to protect lives and prevent casualties.
- v. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct law and order operations on military installations to improve host nation rule of law and protect personnel and vital physical assets.
- w. Future Army forces require the capability to protect personnel conducting personnel recovery operations after an attack or incident, to protect lives and prevent casualties.
- x. Future Army forces require the capability to provide forensic analysis to facilitate rule of law and evidentiary procedures against individuals.
- y. Future Army forces require the capability to provide forensic collection to facilitate intelligence information and target identification.
- z. Future Army forces require the capability to employ nonlethal effects to minimize casualties and influence populations.
- aa. Future Army forces require the capability to detect subterranean passageways to prevent undetected adversary movements.

#### **B-4. Dependencies on other functional concepts**

- a. Intelligence.

(1) Future Army forces require military law enforcement the capability to extrapolate forensic evidence from battlefield exploitation, supporting full-spectrum operations by providing enhanced criminal intelligence to dismantle insurgent transport layers and permanently remove the criminal combatants from the battlefield through the judicial process.

(2) Future Army forces require military law enforcement the capability to identify, investigate, document, analyze, generate, and disseminate criminal intelligence products regarding criminals and criminal transport layers in support of kinetic targeting, judicial process, and overall force protection.

(3) Future Army forces require military law enforcement provide the commander a more robust common operating picture as a force multiplier by leveraging military police knowledge, skills, and abilities through the development of host nation security forces, judicial processes, and community interaction.

(4) Future Army forces require a military law enforcement capability to support maneuver commanders as a primary advisor, trainer, and technician in the areas of forensics, criminal methodology, and law enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures to combat threats.

(5) Future Army forces require military law enforcement to administer and maintain all criminal databases throughout all theaters of operations to maximize the application of non-classified information and intelligence to support judicial operations in support of full-spectrum operations.

(6) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct site exploitation operations; to locate, search, identify, capture, and process information, materials, and personnel found on a site, analyze the collected information, and disseminate the relevant collected information and derived intelligence across all spectrums of operations.

(7) Future Army forces require Army law enforcement the capability to collect, access, process, and exploit biometrics data to include fingerprint, handprint, iris, DNA, and facial recognition.

b. Movement and maneuver.

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to detect threats to provide early warning and protect personnel and vital physical assets.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to prevent threats through the employment of active defensive measures during full-spectrum operations to protect personnel and vital physical assets.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to protect Soldiers during mounted and dismounted operations to reduce casualties.



(4) Future Army forces require the capability to employ nonlethal effects to minimize casualties and influence populations.

c. Fires.

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to detect rockets, artillery, and mortar projectiles, provide early warning, and protect personnel and vital assets during full-spectrum operations.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to provide offensive and defensive fires to preempt enemy actions and protect personnel and vital assets during full-spectrum operations.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to intercept threat rockets, artillery, and mortar projectiles to protect personnel and vital assets during full-spectrum operations.

(4) Future Army forces require the capability to employ scalable fires capabilities that minimize casualties and reduce collateral damage to protect personnel and vital assets during full-spectrum operations.

d. Sustainment. The future force requires the capability to conduct law and order operations on military installations, and to strengthen host nation security forces in full-spectrum operations to protect the personnel and population and preserve the rule of law.

e. Mission command.

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to execute tactical network operations which give commanders and leaders the ability to provide early warning, and match network resources to changes in mission and unique functional requirements envisioned to provide protection and ensure network enabled mission command during full-spectrum operations.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate antiterrorism and force protection planning in a joint operational environment to prepare and integrate protection measures into current and future operations.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate sensor capabilities to create and maintain situational understanding for future assessments, and provide early warning.

f. ARSOF.

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to identify threats to protect personnel and vital physical assets.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct critical site and high risk personnel security in a joint operational environment to protect those personnel and assets against threats.

## **B-5. Dependencies from other functions**

### **a. Intelligence.**

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate CBRN and engineer sensors with intelligence collection, planning, and analysis to enhance operations and intelligence integration and provide intelligence that supports all levels of decisionmaking.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate police intelligence operations with intelligence collection, planning, and analysis to enhance operations and intelligence integration and provide intelligence that supports all levels of decisionmaking. .

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to manage intelligence collection in compliance with status of forces agreements or other governing regulations to enhance operations and intelligence integration and provide intelligence that supports all levels of decisionmaking.

(4) Future Army forces require the capability to provide assistance with criminal activities intelligence with intelligence collection, planning, and analysis to enhance operations and intelligence integration and provide intelligence that supports all levels of decisionmaking.

(5) Future Army forces require the capability to provide intelligence support during SFA to host nation security forces to enhance operations and intelligence integration and provide intelligence that supports all levels of decisionmaking in support of full-spectrum operations.

(6) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate every Soldier as a sensor information with intelligence collection, planning, and analysis to enhance operations and intelligence integration and provide intelligence that supports all levels of decisionmaking.

### **b. Movement and maneuver.**

(1) Future Army forces require combat vehicles and tactical wheeled vehicles with sufficient protection against mines and IEDs to protect the crew and allow freedom of maneuver.

(2). Future Army forces require combat vehicles and tactical wheeled vehicles with sufficient protection against explosively formed projectiles, kinetic energy, chemical energy, and tandem blast and/or warhead, to protect the crew and allow freedom of maneuver.

(3) Future Army forces require lethal and protected platforms to fully support and sustain maneuver force operations from and across extended distances.

(4) Future Army forces require the capability for networked system of sensors to identify enemy activity and weapons firing in all environments to automatically cue on board protection systems or automated targeting systems to prevent or neutralize a threat.

(5) Future Army forces require the capability to employ unmanned systems equipped with sensors, explosive device neutralization, and offensive weapon systems that can operate in all terrain, weather, and environments to increase BCT lethality and mobility and enhance Soldier protection.

(6) Future Army forces require combat vehicles and tactical wheeled vehicles with remote weapons system capabilities to enhance crew survivability, vehicle lethality and to enhance freedom of maneuver.

(7) Future Army forces require the capability to rapidly detect and identify from standoff range, defend against, and recover from CBRNE attacks to maintain the momentum.

(8) Future Army forces require maneuver force aviation platforms with the capability to avoid detection, avoid acquisition, avoid, deny, and survive engagements, defeat munitions, while continuing the mission, to improve aircraft and aircrew survivability.

(9) Future Army forces require the capability for organic protection in a joint OE to maintain security in mobile and austere bases.

(10) Future Army forces require the capability to predict, detect, prevent, neutralize, and protect in a joint OE assuring the ability of the joint force to deploy and maneuver where and when desired and without interruption or delay.

(11) Future Army forces require the capability to provide counter-IED operations in a joint OE to enable the movement of forces.

(12) Future Army forces require the capability to provide for explosive ordnance disposal in a joint OE to prevent, mitigate, or remove the explosive hazard to host nation personnel or friendly forces.

c. Fires. Future Army forces require the capability to provide early warnings and/or warnings of rocket, artillery, mortar, manned and unmanned aircraft, and missile threats to friendly forces and populations to prevent or reduce casualties in full-spectrum operations.

d. Sustainment.

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to secure and protect sustainment assets and personnel in full-spectrum operations in the future operating environment.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to provide early warning of offensive indirect fires directed against sustainment sites and convoys to maintain freedom of action in full-spectrum operations in the future operating environment.

e. Mission command. Mission command has no specific dependencies from protection.

f. ARSOF.

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate protection efforts with their joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to recommend and identify opportunities to senior commanders as they develop the situation.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability and authority to support law enforcement operations in a joint operational environment to strengthen host nation police effectiveness, sustain security, and promote the rule of law.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to detect, track, and classify threats to prevent surprise and maintain freedom of action.

(4) Future Army forces require the capability to protect communications networks, mission command nodes, and information gathering capabilities (equipment, personnel, and sensors) to provide commanders with the information they need to make timely decisions.

(5) Future Army forces require the capability to protect civilian populations and infrastructure during operations combining lethal and nonlethal capabilities to meet mission requirements.

(6) Future Army forces require the capability to counter the employment of hostile nonlethal and directed effects in combat and noncombat situations to protect the individual and platforms, and decrease casualties.

(7) Future Army forces require the capability to provide protection for equipment and infrastructure from small arms, the effects of explosives and fragments, and directed energy to preserve combat power.

(8) Future Army forces require the capability to provide ballistic protection during the construction of walls and windows to protect the military and civilian workforce.

(9) Future Army forces require the capability to monitor and assess the degree of contamination to protect lives and prevent casualties.

(10) Future Army forces require the capability to contain and/or prevent the spread of contamination to protect lives and prevent casualties.

(11) Future Army forces require the capability to protect personnel conducting rescue operations after an attack or incident to protect lives and prevent casualties.

(12) Future Army forces require the capability for individual protective armor systems in mounted and dismounted operations to reduce casualties.

(13) Future Army forces require the capability to provide early warning and warnings of threats in all environments to reduce casualties.

(14) Future Army forces require the capability for lightweight and mobile shelter systems with increased ballistic protection in combat operations to protect Soldiers and shelter-mounted and dismounted systems.

(15) Future Army forces require the capability for lightweight and mobile shelter systems that provide protection against thermal, pressure, and radioactive hazards, and that filters biological and chemical agents to reduce casualties.

(16) Future Army forces require the capability for decontamination of all chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards in a joint operational environment to take preventive measures, reduce losses, and quickly recover capabilities.

(17) Future Army forces require the capability for detection of all chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards in a joint operational environment to take preventive measures, reduce losses, and quickly recover capabilities.

(18) Future Army forces require the capability for toxic industrial material hazard detection and decontamination in a joint operational environment to take preventive measures, reduce losses, and quickly recover capabilities.

(19) Future Army forces require the capability for organic protection while operating in austere locations, or while mobile and away from maneuver units, to help maintain security and reduce casualties.

(20) Future Army forces require the capability to develop and maintain technical and tactical proficiency with automated, robotic, and sensor capabilities to protect the force.

(21) Future Army forces require the capability to employ nonlethal effects to minimize casualties and influence populations.

(22) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct critical site and high-risk personnel security in a joint operational environment to protect those personnel and assets against threats.

(23) Future Army forces require the capability to prevent the enemy from detecting, tracking, and targeting forces while operating in all environments to reduce their ability to inflict losses.

(24) Future Army forces require the capability to avoid contamination under chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards conditions to prevent or reduce casualties.

(25) Future Army forces require the capability to detect tunnels to prevent undetected adversary movements.

(26) Future Army forces require the capability to rapidly warn forces on changes to enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures to reduce casualties and maintain freedom of action.

(27) Future Army forces require the capability to neutralize concealed IEDs to reduce casualties and maintain freedom of action.

(28) Future Army forces require the capability to detect, identify, warn, and react to explosive hazards from safe distances to preserve combat power and lines of communication needed for sustainment, maintaining freedom of action, and reducing casualties.

(29) Future Army forces require the capability to detect hidden threats at standoff distances to reduce casualties.

(30) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate sensor capabilities, synchronize all sensors, and to store and organize raw data from various detection assets to create a common operational picture for future assessment.

(31) Future Army forces require the capability to provide forensic analysis to facilitate rule of law and evidentiary procedures against individuals.

(32) Future Army forces require the capability to provide forensic analysis to facilitate intelligence information and target identification.

(33) Future Army forces require the capability for camouflage and deception in combat operations to reduce detection by the enemy.

(34) Future Army forces require an organic special operations forces-specific, light, agile forward resuscitative surgical element capability to support low-density and contingency operations in the far-forward, austere foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and irregular warfare environments.

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## **Appendix C**

### **Protection by Echelon**

#### **C-1. Theater**

Theater protection capabilities are synchronized and integrated through the staff function of a dedicated protection cell within the theater headquarters. The protection cell recommends required protective elements to support campaign and major operational objectives. These protective elements provide complementary or reinforcing capabilities and disciplines (such as, civil-military activities and information engagement tasks) from within the force to achieve protection. The theater Army protection cell also examines protection plans, concepts, and strategies for insights on survivability, security force employment, task organization, and economy-of-force options. After gaining insight, the protection cell must consider how best to integrate and synchronize all capabilities (multinational, host nation, and force capabilities) to support campaign objectives.

**C-2. Corps**

The corps has transformed from an organization with significant assigned capability to a headquarters organization that requires attachments and augmentation to accomplish assigned missions. These organizations rely on a range of joint capabilities (including protection) from the combined arms team to support operations. Functional components of corps and division will organize specific capabilities to execute protection missions. Such protection capabilities include military police, engineer, CBRN, EOD, CA, FA, ADA, and MI units. At the corps level, a dedicated protection cell and the chief of protection recommends the task organization of units whose primary mission is protection. These units will act to preserve combat power, enable the movement and maneuver of forces, and influence hostile actions prior to an attack to protect personnel and physical assets across full-spectrum operations.

**C-3. Division**

At the division level, a dedicated protection cell and the chief of protection recommends the task organization of units whose primary mission is protection. The protection cell is responsible for integrating protection tasks and systems into the operations process. Additionally, it helps the commander establish protection priorities, deconflict responsibilities, recommend command and control relationships, affect coordination, allocate resources, and consider various time horizons to ensure capabilities are available to support ongoing operations.

**C-4. Operational and tactical**

Commanders at operational and tactical levels provide the capabilities to identify, prevent, and mitigate the effects of all threats to vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations during full-spectrum operations. To accomplish this, they should employ a combination of synchronized and integrated protection capabilities realized through the elements of combat power, guided by information and leadership, and executed under the detailed direction of planning, decisionmaking, and risk mitigation processes. Future Army forces will conduct full-spectrum operations through the combined efforts of combat units, ARSOF, and the protection capabilities mentioned in earlier paragraphs.

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## Glossary

### Section I

#### Abbreviations

ACC	Army Capstone Concept
ADA	air defense artillery
AO	area of operations
AOC	Army Operating Concept
ARCIC	Army Capabilities Integration Center
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
BCT	brigade combat team
CA	civil affairs
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives
DA	Department of the Army
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
FA	field artillery
FM	field manual
FOB	forward operating base
IED	improvised explosive device
JP	joint publication
MANPADS	man portable air defense systems
MARO	mass atrocity response operations
MDMP	military decisionmaking process
MEB	maneuver enhancement brigade
MI	military intelligence
OE	operational environment
Pam	pamphlet
SFA	security force assistance
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
U.S.	United States
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

### Section II

#### Terms

##### **active defense**

The employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area position to the enemy.

##### **Battle Command Knowledge Center**

Develops and implements knowledge management products and services that support collaboration among Soldiers and units.



**combat identification**

The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision.

**convoy security**

Specialized area security operations conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security operations anytime there are not enough friendly forces to continuously secure lines of communication in an area of operations and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy.

**cyberspace**

A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 1-02).

**defensive fires**

Protect friendly forces, populations, and critical infrastructure. Examples of defensive fires include: ballistic missile defense; support to defensive counterair operations; AMD; counter rocket, artillery, and mortars; counterfire; and final protective fires.

**forcible entry**

Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition (JP 3-18).

**identify**

The process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an unknown detected contact. The discrimination between recognizable objects as being friendly or enemy, or the name that belongs to the object as a member of a class.

**passive defense**

Measures taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the initiative.

**route security**

Specialized kind of area security operations conducted to protect lines of communication and friendly forces moving along them.

**security**

Operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or installation to protect against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness (DOD).

**security force assistance**

The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of legitimate authority. Security force assistance consists of plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain.

**shaping operations**

An operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for the success of the decisive operation (FM 3-0).

**Section III**

**Special Terms**

**co-creation of context**

A continuous process in which commanders direct intelligence priorities to drive operations, and the intelligence that these operations produce causes commanders to refine operations based on their improved understanding of the situation.

**combined arms**

The application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success.

**combined arms maneuver**

The application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success.

**complementary protection capabilities**

Capabilities that protect the weakness of one system or organization with the capabilities of a different warfighting function.

**contest of wills**

A psychological condition that involves the understanding of human behavior and constructing clear communications reinforced with military actions against implacable foes, warring factions, criminal groups, and potential adversaries.

**cyber/electromagnetic contest**

The ability to gain friendly information that is timely, accurate, and relevant. It involves information protection denying enemies, adversaries, and others the opportunity to exploit friendly information. It exploits advantages by attacking enemy decisionmaking systems and resource structures in the highly contested and congested cyberspace domain and electromagnetic spectrum.

**integrated protection**

Protection that is integrated with all other activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities associated with military operations to provide strength and structure to the overall protection effort.

Integration must occur vertically and horizontally in all phases of the operations process. Integrated protection should complement other warfighting functions without significantly inhibiting the potential of combat power.

**mission command**

The exercise of authority and direction by commanders, supported by their staffs, using the art of command and the science of control to integrate warfighting functions in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. Mission command uses mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative within the commander's intent, enabling agile and adaptive commanders, leaders, and organizations.

**mitigate**

The ability to minimize the effects and manage the consequences of attacks and designated emergencies on personnel and physical assets through the use of lethal and nonlethal effects.

**network**

A single, secure, standards-based, versatile infrastructure linked by networked, redundant transport systems, sensors, warfighting and business applications, and services that provide Soldiers and civilians timely and accurate information in any environment, to manage the Army enterprise and enable full-spectrum operations with joint, allied, and interagency partners.

**operating decentralized**

A manner of conducting military operations which enables subordinates to act aggressively and independently with disciplined initiative to develop the situation; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; and cope with uncertainty to accomplish the mission within the commander's intent.

**operational adaptability**

A quality that Army leaders and forces exhibit based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation.

**operations conducted decentralized**

Commanders delegate decisionmaking authority and available resources required to adapt to the situation and seize and retain the initiative. The delegation of authority and resources and an environment of trust among commanders enable units to develop the situation, identify opportunities and take action within the commander's intent. Operations conducted decentralized enables subordinates to act aggressively and independently with disciplined initiative to develop the situation; seize and retain the initiative; and cope with uncertainty to accomplish the mission within the commander's intent.

**overlapping protection**

The ability to identify, prevent, or mitigate threats that attempt to operate or exploit the gaps and seams in coverage.

**prevent**

The ability to neutralize an imminent attack or defeat attacks on personnel and physical assets through the use of kinetic and nonkinetic effects.

**protection**

A warfighting function which provides and integrates capabilities to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to vital assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations to preserve combat power and freedom of action.

**reinforcing protection capabilities**

Capabilities that combine similar systems or capabilities within the same warfighting function to increase the function's overall capabilities.

**synchronized protection**

The arrangement of protection tasks, systems, and capabilities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power where and when it is needed.

**wide area security**

The application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals.

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## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Defense Budget Recommendation Statement (Arlington, VA); As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Monday, April 06, 2009. “Our conventional modernization goals should be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries – not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources. I believe the decisions I am proposing accomplish this step.”

<sup>2</sup> Training and Doctrine Command’s Operational Environment 2009-2025.

<sup>3</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, 15.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid p. 5

<sup>5</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 15.

<sup>6</sup> The Department of Defense National Defense Strategy, June 2008, 18. “We will continue to rely on adaptive planning, on integration and use of government assets....”

<sup>7</sup> Level 1 threat is a small enemy force that can be defeated by a unit’s organic resources. Level II is an enemy activity that requires the commitment of a reaction force to defeat it (FM 3-37, App C).

<sup>8</sup> FM 3-07, 6-14.

<sup>9</sup> FM 3-07.1, 1-1.

<sup>10</sup> JP 3-18, 1-1.

<sup>11</sup> FM 3-0, 3-1.

<sup>12</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, 39.

<sup>13</sup> Latin for, *power of the county*, substantially limits the powers of the federal government to use the military for law enforcement.

<sup>14</sup> QDR, vii.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, vi.

<sup>16</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-3-3, 49.