

THE CHALLENGE OF THE GRAY ZONE

Presentation to the Strategic
Multilayer Assessment

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The argument:

In an era of networks and nuclear weapons, constrained military operations potentially become the tool of choice.



Revisionist states seek to change power relationships



A silhouette of a military tank is shown against a bright, hazy sky, likely at sunrise or sunset. The tank's main gun barrel is prominent, extending horizontally across the middle of the frame. The rest of the tank's body, including the turret and rear sections, is also visible in dark silhouette. The overall scene is a high-contrast, atmospheric image.

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Interdependence and escalation create appetite
for campaigns short of war

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
New technologies and techniques expand capabilities
at the thresholds

Sources of analysis and evidence




Comparative literature review

Classic concepts of constrained operations: Coercive diplomacy, measures short of war, *faits accomplis*, salami slicing



Comparing forms of conflict

Hybrid, unconventional war



Case studies: Russia and China

Statements, doctrines/concepts, behavior


Gray-zone campaigns

- Pursue political objectives through integrated campaigns
- Employ nonmilitary tools
- Strive to remain under key thresholds
- Move gradually toward objectives

Coherent, intentional campaigns



A spectrum of gray-zone techniques



Chinese and Russian gray-zone strategies



Why it is a concern

- Breaks thresholds for response
- Creates dilemma: Allow aggressions or be seen as author of risk
- Tests long-term resilience
- Democracies less comfortable in the in-between zones
- Generates a dangerous sense of persistent conflict
- Constant potential for escalation



And yet . . . real limits to the gray zone

- Operating from position of weakness
- Can fail to achieve larger goal:
Russia does not have dominance in Ukraine proper
- More costly than realized
- Prompt response coalitions



Key condition
Strength of international order

The gray zone as a subset of larger political realities




The success or failure of campaigns depends largely on the resilience of international norms and institutions



RECOMMENDATIONS

Impulse is to look to military forces and escalatory concepts, but this is a fundamentally geopolitical problem





Punish revisionist actions and broadcast red lines

- ✓ Reinforce Article V/Baltics + Senkakus
- ✓ Display deterrent capability vs. MSW/Baltics




Strengthen institutions and norms to control revisionist tactics: transparency, confidence building

- ✓ Maritime transparency in Asia: Awareness
- ✓ Rules of the road; UNCLOS jurisdiction
- ✓ Senior political engagement; hotlines; expect crises



Decide where accommodation is possible

- ✓ Political dialogue with Russia on reassurance signals



Build forces, systems, technologies, concepts, and doctrines for a gray zone environment

- ✓ Information operations, social media analytics
- ✓ “Human domain”: analyses and awareness; locally integrated civil affairs units, military police, SOF
- ✓ Systems to be shared with partners: ISR, info ops

Key Challenges/Areas for Further Research

- Are the campaigns coherent, and—if so—what components?
 - What is the larger perspective or grand strategic design from which they flow?
 - How can the U.S. lead responses under rubric of international norms?
- What operational concepts would represent effective responses and deterrents? How to integrate MSW/Phase 0 with Phase 3 concepts of operations.
 - How can the U.S. promote more holistic campaigns in interagency?

Can we assemble truly integrated responses?





QUESTIONS?



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