
Lead Inspector General for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE FY 2015 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan



Map source: U.S. Department of Defense, Central Command



March 31, 2015

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
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This FY 2015 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE was prepared pursuant to section 8L of the “Inspector General Act of 1978,” as amended, which establishes the responsibilities for a Lead Inspector General to provide for coordinated and comprehensive execution of oversight during an overseas contingency operation. These responsibilities are directed to the Inspectors General for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Department of State (DOS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).


In accordance with this requirement, on December 17, 2014, the Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency designated the Inspector General for DoD as the Lead Inspector General for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, which was designated as an overseas contingency operation on October 17, 2014. The Inspector General for DOS was appointed as the Associate Inspector General for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE on December 18, 2014.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This FY 2015 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE is as of March 31, 2015. This plan is approved upon the signature by all Parties below.


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**Lead Inspector General for
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE**

FY 2015 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan

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FY 2015 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE

Introduction

The United States, with its coalition partners, has committed to degrade and destroy the terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This group poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and to the broader Middle East, as well as to U.S. persons, allies, and interests in the region. This terrorist organization has killed innocents, including captured American journalists. If left unchecked, ISIL could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States.

On October 15, 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Central Command (USCENTCOM) announced that U.S. military operations in Iraq and Syria against ISIL terrorists were designated as Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR).¹ On October 17, 2014, the Secretary of Defense designated OIR a contingency operation.² Accordingly, pursuant to Section 849 of the 2013 NDAA and 10 U.S.C. 101(a) (13), OIR is an overseas contingency operation, or an OCO, for purposes of Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

On November 10, 2014, the President submitted to Congress a \$5.6 billion OCO budget amendment for FY 2015 to provide the resources needed to support the U.S. strategy to degrade and defeat ISIL, including military operations as part of OIR. This budget request included \$5 billion for DoD activities and \$520 million for DOS and Other International Programs (State/OIP) activities.

The OIR budget was included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriation Act, 2015 in December 2014.³ The FY 2015 budget for DoD includes \$1.6 billion to establish the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) to develop and support Iraqi national security forces, including Kurdish forces, as they confront ISIL in Iraq.⁴

The President's FY 2016 budget request for OIR was submitted in February 2015. The request includes \$5.3 billion for DoD, of which \$0.7 billion is for ITEF to continue training and equipping the Iraqi forces, and \$0.6 billion is for the Syria Train and Equip Fund (STEF) to train

¹ U.S. Central Command News Article, "Iraq and Syria Operations Against ISIL Designated as Operation Inherent Resolve," October 15, 2014; posted at <http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/iraq-and-syria-ops-against-isil-designated-as-operation-inherent-resolve>.

² Internal Department of Defense documents.

³ H.R. 83 December 16, 2014, became Public Law No. 113-235.

⁴ White House Fiscal Year 2015 Budget amendment, November 10, 2014; posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_11_10_14.pdf.

and equip vetted Syrian opposition forces.⁵ The budget request also includes \$3.5 billion for DOS and USAID activities to strengthen regional partners, counter ISIL, provide humanitarian assistance, and strengthen Syria’s moderate opposition to advance the conditions for a negotiated political transition.⁶

On February 11, 2015, the President submitted to Congress a draft joint resolution for authorization for the continued use of U.S. military force against ISIL for the next 3 years.⁷ According to the White House release of this proposal, the authorization is not for long-term, large-scale combat operations like those conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, this authorization would provide the flexibility to conduct ground combat operations in other, more limited circumstances, such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel or the use of special operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership. It would also authorize the use of U.S. forces in situations where ground combat operations are not expected or intended, such as intelligence collection and sharing, missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational planning and other forms of advice and assistance to partner forces. This resolution was submitted to support the comprehensive strategy to destroy ISIL.

The U.S. strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL involves several agencies, for a whole-of-government approach, and multiple lines of effort, including providing military support to coalition partners, preventing the flow of funds and fighters to ISIL, addressing humanitarian crises in the region, and exposing ISIL’s true nature.

Purpose

This joint strategic oversight plan was prepared pursuant to section 8L of the “Inspector General Act of 1978,” as amended,⁸ to provide for coordinated and comprehensive execution of oversight during an OCO. This authority requires the designation by the Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) of a Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) from among the permanent IGs for the DoD, the Department of State (DOS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and, in turn, the appointment of an Associate IG by the Lead IG from among the offices of the other two Inspectors General. For the full text of section 8L, see Appendix A.

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request, February 2015, Chapter 7; posted at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.

⁶ Fact Sheet: Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development FY 2016 Budget, February 2, 2015; posted at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/236859.htm>.

⁷ White House Release, “Letter from the President -- Authorization for the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in connection with ISIL,” February 11, 2015; posted at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter-president-authorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-connection>.

⁸ Section 8L, Title 5, United States Code Appendix (also known as the “The Inspector General Act of 1978,” as amended).

Responsibilities for the Lead IG are triggered by the commencement or designation of a military operation as an OCO that exceeds 60 days. Not later than 30 days after the commencement or designation, the CIGIE Chair shall designate the Lead IG. In consideration of the October 17, 2014, designation of OIR as an OCO, the CIGIE Chair designated the DoD IG as the Lead IG for OIR on December 17, 2014; who in turn appointed the DOS IG as Associate IG on December 18, 2014.

The permanent IGs for DoD, DOS, and USAID are responsible for staffing and supporting the Lead IG in the discharge of responsibilities in accordance with section 8L of the IG Act of 1978. This plan identifies the unified oversight of the interagency OIR mission to be conducted through the execution of audits, inspections, evaluations, and technical assessments by these IG organizations. The results of this comprehensive approach are intended to increase the effectiveness of oversight capabilities across agency jurisdictional divisions and provide results to help Congress and agency leadership make informed program, policy, and funding decisions.

Although this plan does not specifically address law enforcement efforts in detail, it is important to note that when criminal activity is suspected during the course of an audit, evaluation, or inspection, the allegations are referred to the respective law enforcement component for investigation. IG Hotlines also provide a confidential avenue for individuals to report allegations of wrongdoing pertaining to programs, personnel, and operations. In addition, public confidence in the integrity and accountability of agency leadership is promoted by investigating allegations of misconduct by senior officials and protecting whistleblowers from reprisal.

The development of this plan was initiated prior to the designation of the Lead IG by the CIGIE Chair. It includes ongoing, planned, and recently completed audits, evaluations, and inspections that may also relate to the OIR mission or ISIL regional area. The contributing oversight agencies will continue to develop and update this plan as the U.S. strategy and mission objectives are more clearly defined or modified.

Background

ISIL was formerly al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq and has taken advantage of sectarian strife and Syria's civil war to gain territory on both sides of the Iraq-Syrian border. Foreign fighters from about 80 countries have traveled to Syria to fight alongside terrorist groups, including some Americans. ISIL is recognized by no government nor by the people it subjugates.⁹

In August 2014, the President ordered the U.S. military to take targeted action against ISIL.¹⁰ On September 10, 2014, the President announced that the United States had conducted over 150 successful airstrikes in Iraq, which helped save the lives of thousands of innocent men, women,

⁹ The White House, Statement by the President on ISIL, released on September 10, 2014; posted at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1>.

¹⁰ Ibid, and The White House, Statement by the President, released on August 7, 2014; posted at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-president>.

and children.¹¹ These strikes had kept personnel and facilities in Baghdad and Erbil safe, killed ISIL fighters, destroyed ISIL equipment, protected Iraqi critical infrastructure, and broken ISIL sieges against an Iraqi city and civilians trapped on a mountain. In his statement, the President announced that America will lead a broad coalition to roll back this terrorist threat.

On September 10, 2014, The White House released “Fact Sheet: Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).”¹² In concert with coalition partners, the United States will carry out a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIL and deny them safe-haven. For the complete text of this strategy, see Appendix B. On November 7, 2014, the White House released a summary of this strategy and announced a \$5.6 billion FY 2015 budget request for OCO activities to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL.¹³ The strategy has the following nine lines of effort:

- Supporting Effective Governance in Iraq
- Denying ISIL Safe-Haven
- Building Partner Capacity
- Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIL
- Disrupting ISIL’s Finances
- Exposing ISIL’s True Nature
- Disrupting the Flow of Foreign Fighters
- Protecting the Homeland
- Humanitarian Support

On September 16, 2014, the President appointed General John Allen (USMC, Ret.) as the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.¹⁴ In this role, he will help build and sustain the coalition so it can operate across multiple lines of effort in order to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.¹⁵

On September 24, 2014, the White House released “Fact Sheet: Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria and the Broader Region.”¹⁶ This

¹¹ The White House, Statement by the President on ISIL, released on September 10, 2014.

¹² <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/fact-sheet-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-levant-isil>.

¹³ The White House Fact Sheet: “The Administration’s Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Updated FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Request,” released November 7, 2014; posted at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/07/fact-sheet-administration-s-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-leva>.

¹⁴ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/title/as/231681.htm>.

¹⁵ <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/231627.htm>.

¹⁶ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/24/fact-sheet-comprehensive-us-government-approach-foreign-terrorist-fighte>.

approach is an interagency effort to address the terrorist threat posed by fighters in Iraq, Syria, and the broader region, including foreign terrorist fighters. More than 15,000 foreign terrorist fighters from more than 80 countries have traveled to Syria to fight alongside terrorist groups, including dozens of Americans from a variety of backgrounds. The U.S. approach brings together homeland security, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, military, capacity building, and information sharing efforts. For the complete text of this interagency approach, see Appendix C.

There are three overarching elements to this approach:

- Broad Engagement with Foreign Partners
- Drawing on Law Enforcement and Homeland Security Tools
- Maintaining Domestic Vigilance

As described in these aforementioned White House releases and related DOS Fact Sheet,¹⁷ the agencies in this whole-of-government approach include:

- DoD
- DOS
- USAID
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Department of Justice (DOJ)
- Department of the Treasury (Treasury)
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
- U.S. Intelligence Community
- National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

According to DOS,¹⁸ over 60 coalition partners have committed to the goals of eliminating the threat posed by ISIL and have already contributed in various capacities to the effort to combat ISIL in Iraq, the region, and beyond. Some partners are contributing to the military effort by providing arms, equipment, training, or advice. These partners include countries in Europe and in the Middle East region that are contributing to the air campaign against ISIL targets. For a partial listing of coalition partners, see Appendix D.

International contributions are not solely or primarily for the military effort and include essential humanitarian assistance. On September 29, 2014, the DOS reported¹⁹ that the United States had

¹⁷ Ibid, and U.S. Department of State “Fact Sheet: Syrian Crisis: U.S. Assistance and Support for the Transition,” September 29, 2014; posted at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232266.htm>. See Appendix E for full text.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, “Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL”; posted at <http://www.state.gov/s/seci/index.htm>. Accessed on March 26, 2015.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Syrian Crisis: U.S. Assistance and Support for the Transition,” September 29, 2014. See Appendix E.

contributed more than \$2.9 billion in humanitarian assistance to help those affected by the crisis in Syria – the most from any single donor. These resources support international and non-governmental organizations. One-half of the \$2.9 billion was being distributed to organizations working inside Syria, with the balance going to assist refugees and to the communities that host them. USAID, through the United Nations (UN) World Food Program (WFP), began distributing food and water in August 2014 in support of tens of thousands of people in northern and central Iraq under assault and displaced by ISIL. This included airdrops of food rations and water to the large community of Iraqi Yezidis who were trapped by ISIL on Mount Sinjar.²⁰

On November 22, 2014, the White House announced²¹ that the United States was providing nearly \$135 million in additional humanitarian assistance to help feed civilians affected by the ongoing conflict in Syria. According to this announcement, the United States has provided more than \$3 billion in critical humanitarian aid since the start of the crisis, including \$222 million for international humanitarian organizations working with the Government of Turkey as they continue to help those affected by the war in Syria. The announcement acknowledged that Turkey kept its doors open to Syrians fleeing the brutality of ISIL. Of this total new U.S. funding for the Syrian crisis, more than \$132.8 million will go to the WFP and other partners to respond to ongoing emergency food needs inside Syria and in countries hosting Syrian refugees, including Turkey. Nearly \$11 million of the new assistance will support the WFP in Turkey.

The United States is also providing \$330 million in non-lethal support to the moderate Syrian opposition (MSO).²² This non-lethal assistance is helping the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), local opposition councils, and civil society groups provide essential services to their communities, extend the rule of law, and enhance stability inside liberated areas of Syria. These funds are also being used to provide non-lethal assistance to vetted, moderate opposition units, which are fighting violent extremist groups, notably ISIL, on behalf of the Syrian people.

In addition, the United States will train and equip appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian armed opposition. The program, through the DoD, will help moderate Syrian fighters defend the Syrian people from attacks by ISIL and the Syrian regime, stabilize areas under opposition control, and empower a subset of the trainees to go on the offensive against ISIL.²³ For the details of the U.S. assistance and support to Syria reported by DOS, see Appendix E.

²⁰ USAID Press Release, “USAID Providing Life-Saving Aid in Northern Iraq,” August 9, 2014, posted at <http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaid-providing-life-saving-aid-northern-iraq>. USAID Press Release, “Statement from Administrator Shah on Humanitarian Situation in Iraq,” August 11, 2014, posted at <http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/aug-11-2014-statement-administrator-shah-humanitarian-situation-iraq>.

²¹ The White House, “Fact Sheet: Vice President Joe Biden Announces \$135 Million in Additional Humanitarian Assistance for Syria Crisis,” released November 22, 2014, posted at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/22/fact-sheet-vice-president-joe-biden-announces-135-million-additional-hum>

²² U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Syrian Crisis: U.S. Assistance and Support for the Transition,” September 29, 2014. See Appendix E.

²³ Ibid.

U.S. Strategy to Counter ISIL

In concert with coalition partners, the United States will carry out a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIL and deny them safe-haven. This approach brings together homeland security, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, military, capacity building, and information sharing efforts.

On November 10, 2014, the President proposed a \$5.6 billion FY 2015 OCO budget amendment in support of activities for DoD, DOS, and Other International Programs to counter ISIL. For a breakdown of the FY 2015 budget amendment for OIR by agency and area, see Appendix F.

The FY 2015 OCO funding is included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriation Act, 2015.²⁴ This Act includes the FY 2015 Appropriations Acts for DoD (Division C); and DOS, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (Division J).

Nine Lines of Effort of the U.S. Strategy

Below is an overview of the U.S. Strategy to Counter ISIL. The agency designations are based on the “Terms of Reference for Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.” The descriptions for the nine lines of effort were extracted from the unclassified White House strategy document.²⁵ For the full text, see Appendix B.

1. Supporting Effective Governance in Iraq (DOS)
 - a) Support the new Iraqi government in efforts to govern inclusively and to take significant, concrete steps to address the legitimate grievances and needs of all Iraqis.
2. Denying ISIL Safe-Haven (DoD)
 - a) Conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against these terrorists;
 - b) Work with the Iraqi government, expand our efforts beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions so that we are hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on offense;
 - c) Take direct military action against ISIL terrorists in Syria and in Iraq; and
 - d) Degrade ISIL’s leadership, logistical and operational capability, and deny it sanctuary and resources to plan, prepare, and execute attacks.

²⁴ H.R. 83 December 16, 2014, became Public Law No. 113-235.

²⁵ On September 10, 2014, The White House released “Fact Sheet: Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”;
posted at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/fact-sheet-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-levant-isil>.

3. Building Partner Capacity (DoD)

- a) Send an additional 475 U.S. Service members to Iraq to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence, and equipment;
- b) U.S. Special Operations Forces will:
 - provide weapons, ammunition, and equipment; and
 - train and advise Iraqi forces, including Kurdish forces, improving their ability to plan, lead, and conduct operations against ISIL;
- c) The new Iraqi government has asked for help forming National Guard units that would be recruited locally and be responsible for protecting their own communities and securing areas freed from ISIL's control;
- d) Call on Congress to provide additional authorities and resources to train and equip Syrian opposition fighters so they can defend themselves and their neighborhoods against ISIL incursions and ultimately push back on ISIL forces and the Assad regime; and
- e) Other: The Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF). The CTPF request for \$5 billion would allow us to train, build capacity, and facilitate support for partner countries on the front lines of countering shared terrorist threats, both in the region and beyond. The CTPF includes \$500 million for a Department of Defense program to train and equip the Syrian opposition as described above and \$1 billion to build resiliency in the states neighboring Syria to ensure they can continue to counter threats to their internal stability and to support communities that are contending with refugees.

4. Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIL (DNI/NCTC)

- a) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance flights and other important efforts will strengthen our ability to understand this threat, as well as to share vital information with our Iraqi and other regional partners to enable them to effectively counter ISIL.

5. Disrupting ISIL's Finances (Treasury/DOS)

- a) Per U.N. Security Council Resolution 2170 (August 15, 2014):
 - reducing ISIL's revenue from oil and assets it has plundered;
 - limiting ISIL's ability to extort local populations; and
 - stemming ISIL's gains from kidnapping for ransom and disrupting the flow of external donations to the group.
- b) U.S. domestic laws also provide additional tools in this effort, enabling us to sanction or prosecute those who fund ISIL's activities.

6. Exposing ISIL's True Nature (DOS/NCTC)

- a) We will work with our partners throughout the Muslim world to highlight ISIL's hypocrisy and counter its false claim to be acting in the name of religion.

7. Disrupting the Flow of Foreign Fighters (DOS/NCTC)
 - a) Foreign terrorist fighters are ISIL's lifeblood and a global security threat—with citizens of nearly 80 countries filling its ranks. Over 100 foreign fighters from the United States have traveled or attempted to travel to the conflict. On September 24, the United States [convened] a historic Summit-level meeting of the UN Security Council focused on this issue.²⁶
8. Protecting the Homeland (DHS/FBI)
 - a) Continue to use the criminal justice system as a critical tool in our counterterrorism toolbox. Federal criminal laws provide a sound basis to prosecute those who provide material support to ISIL or who conspire with ISIL to plot attacks at home or abroad;
 - b) With respect to aviation security, we will work with air carriers to implement responsible threat-based security and screening requirements, and provide additional screening to individuals suspected of affiliation with ISIL; and
 - c) Counter violent extremism here at home, including tailored domestic programs to prevent violent extremism and radicalization in order to intervene with at-risk individuals before they become radicalized toward violence and decide to travel abroad to Syria and Iraq to join ISIL.
9. Humanitarian Support (USAID/DOS)
 - a) Continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced and vulnerable in Iraq and Syria;
 - b) Continue to work with host governments to mitigate the humanitarian and economic effects of the conflict in neighboring countries,²⁷ recognizing that the refugee crisis calls on our common humanity and presents a significant challenge to regional stability; and
 - c) Continue to work to help prevent mass atrocities, particularly against vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities.

²⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 was adopted by the Security Council at its 7272nd meeting on September 24, 2014. Noting the continued threat to international peace and security posed by terrorism, and affirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, including those perpetrated by foreign terrorist fighters, this resolution identifies 27 actions directed, as specified, at Member States, States, UN Committee, Interpol, and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. Resolution posted at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20(2014)). For descriptions of UN Member States and States, see Glossary.

²⁷ The USAID mission includes Jordan and Lebanon.

Lead IG for OIR: Oversight Approach

The value of the oversight planned and executed by the Lead IG will correspond with an independent and comprehensive assessment of the efficiencies and effectiveness of the U.S. mission objectives for OIR and will be conducted by the oversight components of the IGs for DoD, DOS, and USAID.

Scope

Section 8L (d)(2) of the IG Act includes the following responsibilities for the Lead IG:

(B) To develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation.

(C) To review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by Federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.

Joint Risk-Based Oversight Planning Process

A joint risk-based planning process is used that includes conducting outreach with department, agency, and military leadership, and congressional stakeholders. To maintain situational awareness of the overall OIR mission, oversight representatives will meet, on a recurring basis, with various senior officials responsible for the significant operations and programs in their respective departments and agencies to include acquisition/contracting, security, humanitarian, financial, logistics, and transportation operations.

Planning includes reviews of department, agency, and commanders' strategic plans and mission execution documentation related to the OIR contingency operation. Planning also considers the amount, purpose, and expenditure of funds authorized for specific OIR programs and activities. Other inputs to planning include reviews of media releases, statements, and testimony presented by senior agency leadership, reported management and program challenges, and the results of information gathered during audit, evaluation, and inspection work. Also considered are reports on prior oversight, lessons learned, and best practices to help identify systemic trends congruent with a contingency operation.

This framework of relevant information assists in targeting immediate and future value-added oversight efforts by identifying existing and emerging systematic management challenges faced by the departments, agencies, commanders, and senior civilian leaders. Individually and collectively, the oversight components of the three IGs continuously assess risk to make decisions on appropriate oversight areas and projects to pursue.

Value-added Oversight Objectives:

- Provide insight and recommendations to agency and military leadership and Congress, and keep the public informed.
- Enable DoD to accomplish its national security mission.
- Enhance the capability of our fighting forces.
- Promote accountability, integrity, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.
- Amplify the impact of humanitarian and development assistance.
- Ensure the safety and needs of U.S. civilians and Service members.
- Identify, deter, and investigate fraud, waste, and abuse.

Value-added Oversight Outcomes:

- Support to agency and military leadership by identifying challenges in critical operations and funds that can be put to better use to support operations.
- Support to the military, civilians, and contractors by identifying life and safety risks and whether they have the necessary equipment, training, and resources to conduct missions within acceptable risks.
- Support to senior leadership by providing independent, reliable, timely, and relevant reporting to internal and external organizations on the use of funds provided to achieve the national goals of the United States.
- Support for the improvement of contingency business operations, including contracting, logistics, and financial management.
- Support for the reform of acquisition and support processes.

Joint Oversight Execution

Unlike the agency-centric jurisdiction of an individual IG, the mission of the Lead IG includes coordinating, developing, and executing a joint strategic oversight plan to conduct comprehensive oversight and reporting over all aspects of the contingency operation. To execute this plan for the oversight of OIR, the Office of Inspectors General (OIGs) for DoD, DOS, and USAID have identified, assigned, and are managing staff to conduct and report the results of audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations in accordance with the standard operating procedures in place for each IG.

As this joint plan is updated to correspond with the execution of the U.S. Strategy to Counter ISIL, the level of coordination and effort for oversight may correspond to a variety of project types and coverage, including:

- Individual OIG projects for oversight of agency programs executed independently by DoD, DOS, or USAID;
- Joint OIG projects for oversight of interagency programs executed by DoD, DOS, and/or USAID; and

- Joint OIG projects that include one or more of the OIGs for DoD, DOS, and USAID and other federal OIGs or oversight organizations, where feasible, for oversight coverage of additional interagency programs.
- Also, communication and coordination, where feasible, with other federal OIG organizations conducting oversight of agency programs exclusive of DoD, DOS, or USAID, for awareness and monitoring of whole-of-government oversight coverage.

When joint oversight projects are to be carried out among the three IGs, the Lead IG, in consultation with the other two IGs, will designate one of the three IG staffs to lead the project, and the standard operating procedures of that IG will take precedence. To ensure proper jurisdictional referrals and coverage, joint agreements will be developed for carrying out investigative and hotline functions.

The three IGs will also use an interagency capacity to accomplish all operational responsibilities of the Lead IG. This interagency operational structure will address the goals of increasing the efficiencies and effectiveness of support capabilities across jurisdictional lines and providing comprehensive results to help Congress and agency leadership make informed program, policy, and funding decisions.

As such, the Lead IG will use an organizational structure that leverages dedicated, rotational, and temporary staff from each of the three IGs to best complement major lines of operation, including joint strategic planning, program management, and communications. This operational structure will be responsible for maintaining liaison relationships through existing IG and oversight component protocols to include agency officials, Congress, and other IGs who may have oversight roles beyond the three IGs for the U.S. whole-of-government strategy for OIR. The communications component will have responsibility for preparing the bi-annual and quarterly reports to Congress, pursuant to Section 8L.

Because the nine lines of effort regarding the U.S. Strategy to Counter ISIL are structured in a whole-of-government approach, the designated Lead IG will also consider opportunities for interagency coordination beyond the IGs for DoD, DOS, and USAID. This broader reach will consider the benefits of engaging and leveraging the IGs for other federal agencies identified in the U.S. strategy for a holistic identification of government-wide oversight of the OIR mission.

Strategic Oversight Issue Areas

Key U.S. efforts during prior OCOs have included security, governance, and development. Contractor support has been pivotal to mission execution in prior contingencies. The initial ongoing and planned oversight projects to be executed by the Lead IG agencies have been associated within the nine lines of effort of the U.S. Strategy to Counter ISIL to those that pertain to DoD, DOS, and USAID. This determination was made based on information described in restricted documents. Investigations into fraud and corruption will also be pursued by the Lead IG agencies when criminal activity is suspected.

The initial oversight projects have also been categorized into the following five strategic oversight issue areas. These areas were determined based on oversight coverage in prior overseas contingency operations, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- A. Oversight of Contracts
- B. Operations
- C. Governance
- D. Humanitarian and Development Assistance
- E. Intelligence

A. Oversight of Contracts

The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan²⁸ released a final report in August 2011,²⁹ which found as much as \$60 billion of waste and fraud in wartime contracts for the two wars. Moreover, oversight components determined that contract requirements were frequently not well defined and that the contracting arrangements were often not the most appropriate for ensuring the efficient and effective use of resources.

The Commission's report and other initiatives have increased awareness of the need for improved surveillance of contractor performance in a contingency environment. With anticipated obligations of significant amounts of contract funding in support of the U.S. Strategy to Counter ISIL, there is a clear need to assess the use of contractors in support of U.S. military and civilian organizations, the adequacy of oversight of those contracts, and the controls over funds.

Further, prior oversight efforts found that contract oversight responsibility was given to a contracting workforce, including the contracting officers' representatives, that was not properly sized, not sufficiently trained, and did not possess the experience necessary to manage the complexities of these acquisitions. For these reasons, contract management and oversight remains a high-risk area and continues to be vulnerable to increased fraud, waste, and mismanagement of taxpayer funds.

B. Operations

Many risks and challenges associated with building and sustaining security capacity and capabilities of a host country were identified during oversight of the contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These risks included defining requirements; acquisition planning; training, advising, and assisting; financial management and accountability; and corruption.

²⁸ Section 841 of the NDAA for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-181) established the Commission on Wartime Contracting to investigate federal agency contracting for: the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan; the logistical support of coalition forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the performance of security functions in such operations.

²⁹ Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan, "Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risk, Final Report to Congress," August 2011.

Sustainment challenges included developing literacy and vocational skills and building institutional capabilities, controls, and processes for effective performance by host country defense, police, and other government authorities.

As security and sovereignty-building activities are undertaken, there are also emergency response efforts underway for populations in need of humanitarian assistance. As ISIL forces seized control of several areas, large populations of people were internally displaced, and many became refugees in neighboring countries. The insecurity in conflict-affected areas creates access constraints that impede the delivery of assistance by U.S., international, and local relief organizations.

The U.S. Government's support to capability building and stability development programs are intended to ensure the host country's government is capable of performing necessary functions and providing key services. Failure by the U.S. Government to adequately address the capacity of the host country to sustain U.S. programs and investments will not only waste U.S. taxpayers' funds but will undermine the credibility of the host country governments and other entities supported by the U.S.

C. Governance

Governance should include an operational approach, adequate resources, and a definition of what constitutes victory or success in achieving the overall U.S. strategic objectives. An integrated approach is needed to identify, connect, and assess the dependencies, cooperation, planning, and coordination required to reach intermediate and long-term objectives.

Oversight will assess the extent that the U.S. Government's strategy includes an understanding of the operational environment to identify the problem(s); anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, adversarial, and neutral actions and how these actions affect achieving the end state. This will include monitoring and assessing the extent of the U.S. Government's engagement, performance, progress, and accomplishments regarding:

- Multinational planning and coordination with Coalition leadership;
- Interorganizational planning and coordination with Iraqi government leadership and moderate Syrian opposition groups; and
- Interagency planning and coordination by U.S. agencies for whole-of-government governance of the OIR mission.

D. Humanitarian and Development Assistance

U.S. humanitarian assistance and the oversight of these activities together face unusual challenges when conducted in regions where active hostilities are underway. Humanitarian assistance programs in these settings are exposed to heightened levels of risk if they are not provided an appropriate security envelope and support system in which to operate. This is also true for the accompanying program reporting necessary for meaningful oversight. Previous audits and inspections identified the need for more informed tradeoffs between risk

and rewards in determining which programs to execute. Reports have also pointed to a need for better defined program objectives and metrics; increased coordination among programs; and integration of host-country sustainability into program design and implementation. Past OIG work has also emphasized the importance of monitoring programs that may not be showing progress in delivering intended outcomes and may be at risk of failing.

E. Intelligence

The synergy among components of the Intelligence Community should be monitored to assess whether the U.S. goal of gaining fidelity on ISIL's capabilities, plans, and intentions is working and effective in degrading and destroying this terrorist group. Intelligence is enhanced by effective collaboration, coordination, and deconfliction. Oversight of these fundamentals, as well as elements of the intelligence cycle and sensitive activities, and supporting functions, such as training, funding, and proper use of intelligence authorities in a classified and coalition environment, will provide an improved position to make key intelligence decisions operationally and through policy.

Investigations: Fraud and Corruption

Although this plan does not specifically address law enforcement efforts in detail, it is important to note that when criminal activity is suspected during the course of an audit, evaluation, or inspection, the allegations are referred to the respective law enforcement component for investigation. Bribery, kickbacks, and criminal conflicts of interest were by far the most prevalent categories of crimes identified that related to contingency contracts in prior contingency operations.

For more than a decade during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the collective experience of the many law enforcement agencies charged with investigating fraud and corruption in wartime contracting proved that a collaborative team model was the most effective approach.

For OIR, an investigative working group will be formed to include not only the investigative components of the designated Lead IG agencies but other cognizant law enforcement agencies as well. While each participating agency will maintain their investigative jurisdiction and purview in accordance with their respective agency authorities, mission, and investigative priorities, the working group will serve as a cohesive and streamlined information sharing and deconfliction cooperative. It will increase efficiency by fostering joint investigations where appropriate, encouraging resource sharing, and eliminating unnecessary duplication of effort. The working group will also act proactively through coordinated outreach efforts to educate stakeholders about fraud indicators and avenues of redress.

Investigations: Outreach Activities

A function of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) of the DoD IG Investigations component is to maintain regular liaison with contracting and support commands, such as the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Joint Regional Contracting Commands, as well as to provide Fraud Awareness briefings and DCIS Mission Briefings to U.S. military leaders, civilian contracting officials, Defense contractor personnel, and host nation law enforcement and civilian personnel.

The purpose of these briefings is to educate these relevant personnel about recognizing, reporting and countering fraud, waste, and abuse related to Defense contract dollars.

The DOS OIG Investigations component engages the employees and the individual bureaus and offices of DOS and Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) in order to conduct effective oversight and address priorities and challenges. One way that this is accomplished is through conducting marketing and integrity awareness briefings to increase awareness of vulnerabilities and to highlight the Hotline and whistleblower protections to DOS and BBG officials, employees, and other external stakeholders, including DOS and BBG contractors and grantees. This process also includes the distribution of marketing materials such as brochures and posters to DOS and BBG employees and their contractors and grantees.

USAID OIG conducts outreach to provide Fraud Awareness Briefings to U.S. and non-U.S. USAID implementers and intended beneficiaries, and Accountability Training to host countries. Assistance projects implemented in developing countries are at significant risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Those risks are multiplied when the project unfolds during a disaster or military contingency. To help address these risks, OIG staff provides USAID officials, implementing partner staff, and local auditors with training in identifying fraud, complying with the requirements of USAID contracts and agreements, and reporting potential violations to OIG. This training will be presented in Iraq and neighboring states.

Specialized Expertise: Technical Evaluations

DoD IG also conducts technical evaluations using various engineering disciplines to help identify and deter fraud, waste, and abuse, and to detect health and safety concerns. For instance, prior evaluations of multiple OCO-related structures identified hazardous conditions to the warfighter and other personnel due to the lack of consistent adherence to minimum electrical and fire protection standards. During OIR, DoD IG will conduct evaluations of construction projects for compliance with DoD and other Federal environmental health and safety policies and standards. The DoD IG technical evaluators, along with required subject-matter engineers, will also work with all Lead IG oversight teams, as needed, for comprehensive technical evaluations of compliance with contracts, agreements, and applicable codes and standards, including international standards, where applicable.

Lead IG for OIR: FY 2015 Oversight Projects

This plan includes audit, evaluation/assessment, and inspection projects developed by the IGs for DoD, DOS, and USAID prior to and after the designation of a Lead IG, including projects that were underway that may also relate to the OIR mission or ISIL regional area. Through ongoing strategic planning, the contributing oversight agencies will continue to develop and update this plan as the U.S. strategy and mission objectives are more clearly defined and additional areas requiring oversight are identified.

The following tables list ongoing and planned oversight projects by each of the five strategic oversight issue areas. The applicable U.S. strategy line of effort (1 through 9) that the project pertains to is identified in the first column. These projects were identified by the oversight components of the three IGs, as of March 31, 2015.

Five strategic oversight issue areas:

- A. Oversight of Contracts
- B. Operations
- C. Governance
- D. Humanitarian and Development Assistance
- E. Intelligence

Nine lines of effort of the U.S. Strategy:

- 1. Supporting Effective Governance in Iraq (DOS)
- 2. Denying ISIL Safe-Haven (DoD)
- 3. Building Partner Capacity (DoD)
- 4. Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIL (DNI/NCTC)
- 5. Disrupting ISIL's Finances (Treasury/DOS)
- 6. Exposing ISIL's True Nature (DOS/NCTC)
- 7. Disrupting the Flow of Foreign Fighters (DOS/NCTC)
- 8. Protecting the Homeland (DHS/FBI)
- 9. Humanitarian Support (USAID/DOS)

An OIR Reference Number is assigned to each project as a unique identifier for internal tracking purposes only.

U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	Oversight Agency	A. OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTS
Ongoing		
2	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-008 Audit of Basic Life Support Services Contract Oversight for the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center - Jordan</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether DoD’s controls for monitoring contractor performance are adequate for the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) basic life support services contract.</p> <p>(DoD IG/AUD: Project No. D2015-D000CJ-0069.000)</p>
1	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-009 Audit of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ Aviation Support Services Contract in Iraq</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether the Department of State is administering the contract for aviation support services for Mission Iraq in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/AUD-MERO: Project No. 13-AUD-087)</p>
1	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-010 Audit of the Medical Support Service Iraq Contract</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether the Department of State is administering the contract for medical support services for Mission Iraq in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/AUD-MERO: Project No. 14-AUD-013)</p>
1	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-011 Audit of Department of State Management of the Worldwide Protective Services Task Order No. 3</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether the Department of State is administering WPS Task Order No. 3 in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/AUD-MERO: Project No: 15-AUD-018)</p>

U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	Oversight Agency	A. OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTS
Planned		
2	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-012 Audit of Oversight of the Base Operating Support Services Contract at King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) Jordan (Phase II)</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether DoD is providing effective contract oversight for base operating support services at KASOTC-Jordan. (DoD IG/AUD)</p>
1	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-013 Audit of the Baghdad Life Support Services (BLISS) Contract</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether the Department of State is administering the BLISS contract in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions. (DOS OIG/AUD-MERO)</p>
1	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-014 Audit of Department of State Management of the Operations and Maintenance Contract for U.S. Mission Iraq</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether the Department of State is administering the contract for operations and maintenance in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions. (DOS OIG/AUD-MERO)</p>
1	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-015 Audit of Department of State Management of the Worldwide Protective Services Task Order No. 12 for Security Services at Consulate General Basrah</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether the Department of State is administering WPS Task Order No. 12 in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions. (DOS OIG/AUD-MERO)</p>
9	USAID OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-016 Review of USAID Middle East Bureau's Use of Other Than Full and Open Competition</p> <p>Objectives: This regional review will determine to what extent the Middle East Bureau is using other than full and open competition and whether the Middle East Bureau is complying with Federal Acquisition Regulations when using other than full and open competition in awarding contracts. (USAID OIG)</p>

U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	Oversight Agency	B. OPERATIONS
Ongoing		
2, 3	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-017 Assessment of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with “Section 1206” Funding</p> <p>Objective: This follow-up assessment will determine whether the DoD Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program is providing the intended results. (DoD IG/SPO: Project No. D2014-D00SPO-0190.000)</p>
3	DoD IG	<p>Ref No. OIR-018 Research on United States Military Housing Inspections – Middle East</p> <p>Objective: To collect information and data to determine if U.S. controlled and occupied military housing facilities in the Middle East comply with Federal and DoD policy regarding environmental health policy and safety standards. No reports will be issued from this research effort. (DoD IG/P&O: Project No. D2015-D000PT-0148.000)</p>
3	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-019 Evaluation of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Syria (CJIATF-Syria) Personnel Identification and Vetting Procedures to Determine Suitability for Inclusion in the Moderate Syrian Opposition (MSO) Forces</p> <p>Objective: To assess the planning and implementation of CJIATF’s MSO vetting plans and procedures and their probable efficacy by U.S. and Coalition forces supporting CJIATF-Syria. (DoD IG/SPO/ISPA: Project No. D2015-D00SPO-0155.000)</p>
2, 3	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-020 Assessment of DoD/CENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Iraqi Army to Defeat ISIL</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether DoD/CENTCOM and Coalition goals, objectives, plans, guidance, operations, and resources to train, advise, and assist the Iraqi Army to defeat ISIL are operationally effective to initiate and sustain successful combat operations. (DoD IG/SPO: Project No. D2015-D00SPO-0170.000)</p>

U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	Oversight Agency	B. OPERATIONS
Ongoing		
3	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-021 Research for United States Military Controlled and Occupied Facilities Inspections – King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center</p> <p>Objective: To collect information and data to determine if U.S. military controlled and occupied facilities at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center comply with DoD safety and occupational health policy and standards, specifically the Unified Facilities Criteria, National Electrical Code, and National Fire Protection Association standards. No reports will be issued from this research effort.</p> <p>(DoD IG/P&O: Project No. D2015-DTPTAD-0004.000)</p>
2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-022 Research on DoD Reporting of Financial and Operational Information for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE</p> <p>Objective: To obtain and analyze DoD reporting of financial and operational information for OIR. This information will be used to develop a methodology for determining the accuracy of the information provided by DoD for OIR. No reports will be issued from this research effort.</p> <p>(DoD IG/AUD: Project No. D2015-D000JB-0169.000)</p>
1	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-023 Audit of Emergency Action Plans for U.S. Missions in North Africa</p> <p>Objective: To determine to what extent the EAP of each audited post is current and reflective of EAP guidance in 12 FAH-1; the EAP encompasses all personnel under Chief of Mission (COM) authority; designated resources are available, accessible, and adequate to respond to emergencies outlined in the twelve EAP annexes; and the EAP was implemented and tested in practice drills and exercises, as well as by actual emergency events.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/AUD-MERO: Project No. 15-AUD-013)</p>

U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	Oversight Agency	B. OPERATIONS
Planned		
3	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-024 Army Property Accountability for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE in Kuwait</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether the Army had effective controls for maintaining property accountability for equipment in Kuwait. (DoD IG/AUD)</p>
3	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-025 Military Facilities Inspections – King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) Jordan</p> <p>Objective: To protect the health and safety of the warfighter by inspecting U.S. controlled and occupied military facilities for compliance with DoD and Federal environmental health and safety policies and standards. These policies and standards include the Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), National Electrical Code (NEC), and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards.</p> <p>* This project may be broken into several distinct projects, depending on scope development. (DoD IG/P&O)</p>
2, 3	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-026 Assessment of DoD/CENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Iraq National Guard Brigades to Defeat ISIL</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether DoD/CENTCOM and Coalition goals, objectives, plans, guidance, operations, and resources to train, advise, and assist the Iraq National Guard Brigades to defeat ISIL are operationally effective to initiate and sustain combat operations. (DoD IG/SPO)</p>

U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	Oversight Agency	C. GOVERNANCE
Ongoing		
9	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-027 Inspection of Embassy Amman</p> <p>Objective: As part of the inspection of Embassy Amman, determine if the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting ISIL-related programs and operations such as those of the mission’s refugee coordinator.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/ISP: Project No. 15-ISP-020)</p>
3	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-028 Inspection of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs</p> <p>Objective: As part of the inspection of the PM Bureau’s overall programs and operations, assess the adequacy of the support for and coordination with other DOS and DoD offices related to ISIL programs.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/ISP: Project No. 15-ISP-024)</p>
3	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-029 Inspection of the Bureau of International Organizations</p> <p>Objective: As part of the inspection of the IO Bureau’s overall programs and operations, assess the adequacy of the bureau’s role and oversight of its missions (including the U.S. Mission to the United Nations) related to ISIL initiatives.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/ISP: Project No. TBD)</p>
Planned		
6	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-030 Audit of the Middle East Partnership Initiative</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether the Department of State’s administration of the Middle East Partnership Initiative Program has been effective and whether the Program is achieving its stated objectives.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/AUD-MERO)</p>
6	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-031 Audit of the Financial Management of the Middle East Partnership Initiative</p> <p>Objective: To determine whether the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau is complying with Federal and Department guidance concerning the financial management of the Middle East Partnership Initiative Program.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/AUD-MERO)</p>

U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	Oversight Agency	C. GOVERNANCE
Planned		
1, 5, 6, 7, 9	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-032</p> <p>Research on DOS Reporting of Financial and Operational Information for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE</p> <p>Objective: To obtain and analyze the Department of State’s reporting of financial and operational information for OIR. This information will be used to develop a methodology for determining the accuracy of the information provided by DOS for OIR. No reports will be issued from this research effort.</p> <p>(DOS OIG/AUD)</p>

U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	Oversight Agency	D. HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Ongoing		
9	DOS OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-033 Audit of Department of State Assistance to Syrian Refugees and Opposition Forces</p> <p>Objectives: To determine the Department of State’s effectiveness in managing and coordinating (1) the humanitarian response for Syrian refugees, and (2) nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition forces. Two reports will be issued from this project.</p> <p>(DOS OIG: Project No. 14-AUD-045)</p>
Planned		
9	USAID OIG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-034 Survey of Selected USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Activities (OFDA) in Iraq</p> <p>Objective: Although USAID’s bilateral assistance program in Iraq has been winding down, the current crisis arising from the military advances made by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have resulted in significant U.S. humanitarian assistance to Iraq. This survey will determine if USAID/OFDA and its implementers are taking reasonable steps to manage and mitigate risks for selected OFDA activities while responding to the needs of the internally displaced Iraqi population.</p> <p>(USAID OIG)</p>

U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	Oversight Agency	E. INTELLIGENCE (unclassified)
Ongoing		
4	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-035 Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence and Information Sharing with Coalition Partners in Support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE</p> <p>Objective: Evaluate DoD’s procedures and guidelines for sharing information, to include Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, with coalition partners in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.</p> <p>(DoD IG/ISPA: Project No. D2015-DISPA2-0139.000)</p>
Planned		
4	DoD IG	<p>Ref. No. OIR-036 Assessment of Insider Threat Policy Implementation</p> <p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Determine if the Department has integrated insider threat considerations among non-DoD and coalition partners. b) Determine the extent of implementation of insider threat policy requirements. <p>(DoD IG/ISPA)</p>

Lead IG for OIR: FY 2015 Final Oversight Reports

Below is a listing of final reports, as of March 31, 2015, for oversight projects that were quickly initiated or on-going when Operation INHERENT RESOLVE was designated and during the development of this joint plan. The results of these reports are relevant to activities identified in the current U.S. Strategy regarding this contingency operation. Unless restricted, summaries for these reports follow this table.

Report Date	Oversight Agency	Report No.	Report Title	Country	U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	OIR Ref. No.
A. OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTS						
03/31/2015	DoD OIG	DODIG-2015-101	Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform - 2015 Update <i>(Project: D2015-D000AU-0099.000)</i>	Iraq Afghanistan	All	OIR-004
01/09/2015	DoD IG	DODIG-2015-059	Military Construction in a Contingency Environment: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued From January 1, 2008, Through March 31, 2014 <i>(Project: D2014-D000RE-0141.000)</i>	Iraq Afghanistan	3	OIR-002
12/23/2014	DOS OIG	AUD-MER0-15-20	Management Assistance Report: Concerns With the Oversight of Medical Support Service Iraq Contract No. SAQMMA11D0073 <i>(Project: 14-AUD-013)</i>	Iraq	1	OIR-001
B. OPERATIONS						
03/31/2015	DoD IG	DODIG-2015-093	Summary of Lessons Learned: DoD IG Assessment Oversight of “Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip” Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan <i>(Project: D2015-D00SPO-0077.000)</i>	Iraq Afghanistan	2, 3	OIR-006

Report Date	Oversight Agency	Report No.	Report Title	Country	U.S. Strategy Line of Effort	OIR Ref. No.
B. OPERATIONS						
03/27/2015	DoD IG	DODIG-2015-100 (Classified)	(U) Information Operations in a Contingency Environment: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued From October 6, 2006, Through November 7, 2013 <i>(Project: D2015-D000CF-0108.000)</i>	Iraq Afghanistan Africa	2, 3	OIR-005
C. GOVERNANCE						
			<i>None to report.</i>			
D. HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE						
03/31/2015	DOS OIG	AUD-MERO-15-22	Audit of Department of State Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the Syrian Crisis (1 of 2 reports) <i>(Project: 14-AUD-045)</i>	Jordan Turkey	9	OIR-007
01/20/2015	USAID OIG	8-278-15-001-P	Audit of USAID/Jordan's Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Project <i>(Project: 66100514)</i>	Jordan	9	OIR-003
E. INTELLIGENCE						
			<i>None to report.</i>			

FY 2015 FINAL OVERSIGHT REPORT SUMMARIES
(as of March 31, 2015)

DoD IG: <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm#3>

(Ref. No. OIR-006)

Summary of Lessons Learned: DoD IG Assessment Oversight of “Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip” Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
Report No. DODIG-2015-093, March 31, 2015

Summary of Lessons Learned from the DoD IG, Special Plans and Operations’ body of work in Iraq and Afghanistan that might prove useful to DoD in the execution of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. This summary project identifies systemic challenges and problem areas, with related lessons learned, in the U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop partner nation security forces, such as those of Iraq and Afghanistan.

(Ref. No. OIR-004)

Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform - 2015 Update
Report No. DODIG-2015-101, March 31, 2015

Since the issuance of “Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform 2012 Update,” Report No. DODIG-2012-134, September 18, 2012, DoD IG personnel issued 40 reports and participated in 21 fraud investigations pertaining to Overseas Contingency Operations. These reports and investigations identified a variety of problems relating to DoD officials not properly awarding, administering, or managing contingency contracts in accordance with Federal and DoD policies. DoD IG reviewed the 40 reports and identified 9 systemic contracting problem areas relating to contingency operations. The five most prevalent problem areas reported were: 1. Oversight and Surveillance; 2. Requirements; 3. Property Accountability; 4. Financial Management; and 5. Contract Pricing. The 21 fraud investigations affected 6 contracting areas: source selection, oversight and surveillance, financial management, contractor personnel, property accountability, and contract documentation.

(Ref. No. OIR-005)

(U) Information Operations in a Contingency Environment: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued From October 6, 2006, Through November 7, 2013
(Classified) Report No. DODIG-2015-100, March 27, 2015

(U) This report summarizes DoD information operations challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa identified in audit reports issued by the DoD OIG.

(Ref. No. OIR-002)

Military Construction in a Contingency Environment: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued From January 1, 2008, Through March 31, 2014
Report No. DODIG-2015-059, January 9, 2015

The DoD Office of Inspector General and Air Force Audit Agency issued 11 reports that identified weaknesses with contingency construction contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq valued at about \$738 million. The weaknesses include inadequate quality assurance and contract oversight, inadequate requirements, acceptance of substandard construction, unclear guidance, lack of coordination between commands, lack of contract files, and funding approval process. The recurring weaknesses indicate that there is an opportunity to apply lessons learned from military construction projects and minimize their recurrence in future contingency environments.

(Ref. No. OIR-007)

**Audit of Department of State Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the Syrian Crisis
Report No. AUD-MER0-15-22, March 31, 2015**

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this audit to determine whether the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration's (PRM) administration and oversight of its humanitarian assistance provided in response to the Syrian crisis have been in accordance with Federal and Department of State (Department) regulations and guidance. From January 2012 through December 2013, PRM obligated \$635 million through cooperative agreements, a grant, and voluntary contributions for humanitarian assistance projects in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Then, from January 2014 through September 2014, funds obligated for humanitarian assistance more than doubled in just 9 months—increasing to a total of \$1.36 billion. OIG reviewed a judgment sample representing 64 percent of the humanitarian assistance funds obligated at that time.

OIG found that PRM's performance in managing and overseeing the assistance instruments was mixed. Although PRM had personnel in-country to conduct site visits and program evaluations, PRM staff did not always monitor or follow administrative procedures for PRM's assistance instruments in accordance with Department guidance. Noncompliance with Department guidance creates increased risks for fraud, waste, and abuse. The limited oversight of these awards limits the Department's ability to ensure that taxpayer funds were used as intended and that the activities funded met the goals and objectives of the award and the outcomes that were expected.

OIG made recommendations to improve the administration and monitoring of the PRM's assistance instruments, and recommendations to develop comprehensive guidance for grants to public international organizations.

(Ref. No. OIR-001)

**Management Assistance Report: Concerns With the Oversight of Medical Support Service
Iraq Contract No. SAQMMA11D0073**

Report No. AUD-MER0-15-20, December 23, 2014

The OIG learned of recent actions directing the contractor to perform work outside the scope of the MSSSI contract and of limited onsite oversight of the contract by a technically qualified and designated Contracting Officer's Representative (COR). These actions expose the Department to incurring unauthorized commitments and possible contractor claims. Urgent attention to these concerns was recommended. OIG is finalizing an audit of the U.S. Mission Iraq Medical Service, which will result in the issuance of a final audit report.

(Ref. No. OIR-003)

**Audit of USAID/Jordan’s Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Project
Report No. 8-278-15-001-P, January 20, 2015**

This audit examined whether USAID/Jordan’s Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Project was meeting the mission’s goal to provide engineering support to the Jordanian Government. The audit found that the mission was making progress toward the goal but noted that the water sector was inherently unsustainable because the Government of Jordan was not recovering all the costs of operating, replacing, and building infrastructure in the water and wastewater sectors. Further, the audit found that mission officials did not review certain information and omitted other information when they certified that the Jordanian Government—specifically the Water Authority—had the capability to maintain and use a new wastewater treatment plant in Tafilah Governorate worth about \$18 million; certification is required by Section 611(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

Prior Oversight Coverage

Below is a listing of final oversight reports related to U.S. missions in the Southwest Asia area issued over the last several years. These reports may be used for continuing joint strategic oversight planning purposes, including identifying lessons learned, best practices, systemic problem areas, trends, and oversight coverage gap. Unless restricted, summaries for these reports are in Appendices G (DoD IG), H (DOS OIG), and I (USAID OIG).

Oversight Agency	Report No.	Report Title	Report Date	Country
DoD IG				
DoD IG	DODIG-2015-067	Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police	01/30/2015	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2015-047	Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army	12/19/2014	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2014-102	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions	08/29/2014	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2014-079	Evaluation of the Department of Defense Combating Trafficking in Persons Program (Capping Report)	06/16/2014	Afghanistan Iraq Kuwait Qatar Others
DoD IG	DODIG-2014-027 (Classified)	Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities Part II - Cross-Cutting Issues of Afghan National Army Enabler Development	12/23/2013	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2013-129 (Classified)	Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities Part I - Afghan National Army Enabler Description	09/20/2013	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2013-136	Assessment of the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq Mission Capabilities	09/18/2013	Iraq
DoD IG	DODIG-2013-099	Compliance with Electrical and Fire Protection Standards of U.S. Controlled and Occupied Facilities in Afghanistan	07/18/2013	Afghanistan

Oversight Agency	Report No.	Report Title	Report Date	Country
DoD IG	DODIG-2013-094	Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army	06/24/2013	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2013-081	Executive Summary–Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Border Police	05/24/2013	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2013-058	Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Army Command, Control, and Coordination System	03/22/2013	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2013-030 (FOUO)	Counterintelligence Screening Needed to Reduce Security Threat That Unscreened Local National Linguists Pose to U.S. Forces	12/07/2012	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2012-141 (Classified)	Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip and Field the Afghan Air Force	09/28/2012	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2012-133 (Classified)	(U) DoD Lacks Policy and Strategic Plans for Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Process	09/27/2012	various
DoD IG	DODIG-2012-134	Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform 2012 Update	09/18/2012	various
DoD IG	DODIG-2012-109	Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police	07/09/2012	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2012-086	Evaluation of DoD Contracts Regarding Combating Trafficking in Persons: Afghanistan	05/15/2012	Afghanistan
DoD IG	DODIG-2012-063	Assessment of the DoD Establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq	03/16/2012	Iraq
DoD IG	DODIG-2012-028	Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army	12/09/2011	Afghanistan
DoD IG	D-2011-112 (FOUO)	Counterintelligence Interviews for U.S.-Hired Contract Linguists Could Be More Effective	09/30/2011	Afghanistan
DoD IG	SPO-2011-009	Exposure to Sodium Dichromate at Qarmat Ali Iraq in 2003: Part II - Evaluation of Army and Contractor Actions Related to Hazardous Industrial Exposure	09/28/2011	Iraq

Oversight Agency	Report No.	Report Title	Report Date	Country
DoD IG	SPO-2011-008	Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority	08/25/2011	Iraq
DoD IG	11-INTEL-13 (Classified)	(U) Improvements Needed in Sharing Tactical Intelligence with the International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan (ISAF)	07/18/2011	Afghanistan
DoD IG	SPO-2011-003	Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police	03/03/2011	Afghanistan
DoD IG	SPO-2011-001	Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces	11/17/2010	Iraq
DoD IG	D-2010-079 (FOUO)	Security Provisions in a U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Contract for Linguist Support	08/13/2010	Afghanistan
DoD IG	SPO-2010-002	Review of Intra-Theater Transportation Planning, Capabilities, and Execution for the Drawdown from Iraq	04/20/2010	Iraq
DoD IG	SPO-2009-007	Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces	09/30/2009	Afghanistan
DoD IG	SPO-2008-001 (Redacted)	Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq	09/28/2009	Iraq
DoD IG	SPO-2009-006	Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan	09/11/2009	Afghanistan
DoD IG DOS OIG	IE-2009-007 ISP-I-09-69	Joint Report: Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program	08/31/2009	various
DoD IG	SPO-2009-003	Assessment of the Accountability of Night Vision Devices Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq	03/17/2009	Iraq

Oversight Agency	Report No.	Report Title	Report Date	Country
DoD IG	SPO-2009-002	Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Logistics Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces	12/19/2008	Iraq
DoD IG	SPO-2009-001	Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces	10/24/2008	Afghanistan
DoD IG	IE-2008-010	Information Report on the Assessment of DoD Support to the Iraqi Security Forces Inspector General	07/31/2008	Iraq

Oversight Agency	Report No.	Report Title	Report Date	Country
DOS OIG				
DOS OIG	AUD-MERO-15-03	Audit of Bureau of Diplomatic Security Worldwide Protective Services Contract Task Order 10 Kabul Embassy Security Force	10/30/2014	Afghanistan
DOS-OIG	AUD-MERO-14-06	Audit of the Contract Closeout Process for Contracts Supporting the U.S. Mission in Iraq	12/31/2013	Iraq
DOS OIG	AUD-MERO-13-25	Audit of Bureau of Diplomatic Security Worldwide Protective Services Contract – Task Order 5 for Baghdad Movement Security	03/31/2013	Iraq
DOS OIG	MERO-I-11-09	Training and Logistical Support for Palestinian Authority Security Forces Logistical Support for Palestinian Authority Security Forces	07/31/2011	The West Bank
DOS OIG	MERO-I-11-07	Performance Evaluation of Department of State Contracts to Monitor Vulnerability to Trafficking in Persons Violations in the Levant	03/31/2011	Israel Jerusalem Jordan Lebanon Syria
DOS OIG	MERO-I-11-03	Performance Evaluation of Palestinian Authority Security Forces Infrastructure Construction Projects in the West Bank	03/31/2011	The West Bank
DOS OIG	MERO-I-10-08	The Second Worldwide Personal Protective Services Contract: Management by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Contractor Performance, Capping Report	08/31/2010	Afghanistan Iraq The West Bank
DOS OIG	MERO-I-10-04	Limited-Scope Review of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration's Oversight of the United Nation's Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in Gaza	02/28/2010	Jordan Gaza
DOS OIG DoD IG	MERO-A-10-06 D-2010-42	Joint Report: DOD Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to the Department of State for the Training and Mentoring of the Afghan National Police	02/09/2010	Afghanistan

Oversight Agency	Report No.	Report Title	Report Date	Country
USAID OIG				
USAID OIG	8-276-14-003-P	Audit of USAID's Office Of Food For Peace Syria-Related Activities	07/30/2014	Syria
USAID OIG	8-276-14-002-P	Audit of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives' Syria-Related Activities	07/30/2014	Syria
USAID OIG	6-276-14-001-S	Survey of Selected USAID Syria-Related Activities	12/01/2013	Syria
USAID OIG	6-267-14-006-P	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Broadening Participation through Civil Society Project	02/12/2014	Iraq
USAID OIG	6-267-14-004-P	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Administrative Reform Project	12/15/2013	Iraq
USAID OIG	6-267-14-002-P	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Elections Support Follow-on Project	12/05/2013	Iraq
USAID OIG	6-267-13-013-P	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Primary Health Care Project in Iraq	06/16/2013	Iraq
USAID OIG	6-267-13-002-S (Revised)	Survey of Security Services Employed by USAID/Iraq's Contractors and Grantees	06/13/2013	Iraq
USAID OIG	6-267-13-004-P	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Access to Justice Program	12/16/2012	Iraq
USAID OIG	6-267-13-001-P	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Legislative Strengthening Program	10/03/2012	Iraq
USAID OIG	E-267-12-004-P	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Performance Evaluation and Reporting for Results Management Program	06/30/2012	Iraq
USAID OIG	E-267-12-003-P	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Electoral Technical Assistance Program	03/22/2012	Iraq
USAID OIG	E-267-12-002-P	Audit of the Sustainability of USAID/Iraq-Funded Information Technology Systems	03/21/2012	Iraq
USAID OIG	E-267-12-001-S	Survey of USAID/Iraq's Awards and Subawards	11/30/2011	Iraq
USAID OIG	E-267-12-001-P	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Community Action Program Activities Implemented by International Relief and Development	11/15/2011	Iraq
USAID OIG	6-278-14-005-P	Audit of USAID/Jordan's Strengthening Family Planning Project	01/22/2014	Jordan
USAID OIG	6-278-14-003-P (Revised)	Audit of USAID/Jordan's Fiscal Reform Project II	12/11/2013	Jordan

Oversight Agency	Report No.	Report Title	Report Date	Country
USAID OIG	6-278-13-010-P	Audit of USAID/Jordan's Youth for the Future Program	04/15/2013	Jordan
USAID OIG	6-278-13-007-P	Audit of USAID/Jordan's Education Reform Support Program	02/18/2013	Jordan
USAID OIG	6-278-13-001-S	Review of USAID/Jordan's Cash Transfer Activities	01/31/2013	Jordan
USAID OIG	6-278-12-002-P	Audit of USAID/Jordan's Design for Sustainability in its Water Resources Program	12/22/2011	Jordan
USAID OIG	8-268-14-001-P	Audit of USAID's Lebanon Industry Value Chain Development Project	07/08/2014	Lebanon
USAID OIG	6-268-13-015-P	Audit of USAID/Lebanon's Investment in Microfinance Program	07/17/2013	Lebanon
USAID OIG	6-268-13-014-P	Audit of USAID/Lebanon's Water and Wastewater Sector Support Program	06/23/2013	Lebanon
USAID OIG	6-268-13-011-P	Audit of USAID/Lebanon's Developing Rehabilitation Assistance to Schools and Teacher Improvement Program	04/28/2013	Lebanon
USAID OIG	6-268-12-006-P	Audit of USAID/Lebanon's University Student Assistance Program I	04/30/2012	Lebanon
USAID OIG	6-268-12-004-P	Audit of USAID/Lebanon's Landmines and War Victims Program	01/18/2012	Lebanon
Other Oversight Agencies				
GAO	GAO-14-161	Countering Overseas Threats: DOD and State Need to Address Gaps in Monitoring of Security Equipment Transferred to Lebanon	03/04/2014	Lebanon
GAO	GAO-13-289	Security Assistance Evaluations Needed to Determine Effectiveness of U.S. Aid to Lebanon's Security Forces	03/19/2013	Lebanon

GAO is the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

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APPENDICES

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended

Title 5, United States Code Appendix

§8L Special Provisions Concerning Overseas Contingency Operations

(a) Additional Responsibilities of Chair of Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.—Upon the commencement or designation of a military operation as an overseas contingency operation that exceeds 60 days, the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) shall, in consultation with the members of the Council, have the additional responsibilities specified in subsection (b) with respect to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c).

(b) Specific Responsibilities.—The responsibilities specified in this subsection are the following:

- (1) In consultation with the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), to designate a lead Inspector General in accordance with subsection (d) to discharge the authorities of the lead Inspector General for the overseas contingency operation concerned as set forth in subsection (d).
- (2) To resolve conflicts of jurisdiction among the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on investigations, inspections, and audits with respect to such contingency operation in accordance with subsection (d)(2)(B).
- (3) To assist in identifying for the lead inspector general for such contingency operation, Inspectors General and inspector general office personnel available to assist the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on matters relating to such contingency operation.

(c) Inspectors General.—The Inspectors General specified in this subsection are the Inspectors General as follows:

- (1) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
- (2) The Inspector General of the Department of State.
- (3) The Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.

(d) Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operation.—

- (1) A lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall be designated by the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) under subsection (b)(1) not later than 30 days after the commencement or designation of the military operation concerned as an overseas contingency operation that exceeds 60 days. The lead Inspector General for a contingency operation shall be designated from among the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c).
- (2) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall have the following responsibilities:

(A) To appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under this subsection.

(B) To develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation.

(C) To review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by Federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.

(D)(i) If none of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) has principal jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation, to exercise responsibility for discharging oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.

(ii) If more than one of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) has jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation, to determine principal jurisdiction for discharging oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.

(E) To employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.

(F) To submit to Congress on a bi-annual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including—

(i) the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and

(ii) overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.

(G) To submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.

(H) To carry out such other responsibilities relating to the coordination and efficient and effective discharge by the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of duties relating to the contingency operation as the lead Inspector General shall specify.

(3)(A) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation may employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of, annuitants covered by section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of assisting the lead Inspector General in discharging responsibilities under this subsection with respect to the contingency operation.

(B) The employment of annuitants under this paragraph shall be subject to the provisions of section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, as if the lead Inspector General concerned was the Department of Defense.

(C) The period of employment of an annuitant under this paragraph may not exceed three years, except that the period may be extended for up to an additional two years in accordance with the regulations prescribed pursuant to section 3161(b)(2) of title 5, United States Code.

(4) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall discharge the responsibilities for the contingency operation under this subsection in a manner consistent with the authorities and requirements of this Act generally and the authorities and requirements applicable to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) under this Act.

(e) Sunset for Particular Contingency Operations.—The requirements and authorities of this section with respect to an overseas contingency operation shall cease at the end of the first fiscal year after the commencement or designation of the contingency operation in which the total amount appropriated for the contingency operation is less than \$100,000,000.

(f) Construction of Authority.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the ability of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) to enter into agreements to conduct joint audits, inspections, or investigations in the exercise of their oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to overseas contingency operations.

By reference: Pub. L. 95–452, §8L, as added Pub. L. 112–239, div. A, title VIII, §848(2), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 1851.

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**The White House Fact Sheet:
Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)³⁰**

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 10, 2014

FACT SHEET: Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses a clear threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and to the broader Middle East, as well as U.S. persons, allies and interests in the region. Left unchecked, ISIL could pose a growing threat beyond the region, including to the U.S. homeland.

The United States is meeting this threat with strength and resolve. In recent weeks, we have increased intelligence resources devoted to the threat and sent U.S. personnel to assess the situation on the ground. We have responded with immediate action to protect Americans in Iraq and to prevent large-scale humanitarian catastrophes, including by conducting over 150 successful airstrikes in Iraq. These strikes have kept our personnel and facilities in Baghdad and Erbil safe, killed ISIL fighters, destroyed ISIL equipment, protected Iraqi critical infrastructure, and broken ISIL sieges against an Iraqi city and civilians trapped on a mountain. Along with dozens of international partners, we have provided material support for Iraqi forces to support their fight against ISIL. Our strikes and resupply efforts have enabled Iraqi forces to take the fight to ISIL on the ground, reclaim key territory, and saved thousands of innocent lives.

Our goal is clear: to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy so that it's no longer a threat to Iraq, the region, the United States, and our partners. To achieve this goal, our strategy will be underpinned by a strong coalition of regional and international partners who are willing to commit resources and will to this long-term endeavor. Dozens of countries are already contributing in Iraq – from military to humanitarian support – and in coming days and weeks we will work to strengthen and expand that coalition.

In concert with our coalition partners, the United States will carry out a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIL and deny them safe-haven. That strategy harnesses all elements of national power and features the following core elements:

³⁰ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/fact-sheet-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-levant-isil>

Supporting Effective Governance in Iraq: We have made clear that additional U.S. action depended on Iraq forming an inclusive government, because only a united Iraq -- with a government in Baghdad that has support from all of Iraq's communities -- can defeat ISIL. A new Iraqi government was formally sworn in on September 8 and we will support it in efforts to govern inclusively and to take significant, concrete steps to address the legitimate grievances and needs of all Iraqis.

Denying ISIL Safe-Haven: The Iraqi Government is taking the fight to ISIL, and will ultimately be the one to defeat it in Iraq. But our Iraqi and regional partners need our support and unique capabilities to blunt ISIL's advance. The President announced that we will conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against these terrorists. Working with the Iraqi government, we will expand our efforts beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions so that we're hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on offense. The President also made clear that we will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are. The President will not hesitate to take direct military action against ISIL terrorists in Syria and in Iraq. We will degrade ISIL's leadership, logistical and operational capability, and deny it sanctuary and resources to plan, prepare and execute attacks. Simply put, ISIL will find no safe-haven.

Building Partner Capacity: We will build the capability and capacity of our partners in the region to sustain an effective long-term campaign against ISIL. The President announced that he will send an additional 475 U.S. service members to Iraq to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment. In addition to providing weapons, ammunition and equipment, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) will train and advise Iraqi forces, including Kurdish forces, improving their ability to plan, lead and conduct operations against ISIL. Further, the new Iraqi government has asked for help forming National Guard units that would be recruited locally and be responsible for protecting their own communities and securing areas freed from ISIL's control - a step that, along with long overdue political reforms, can drive a wedge between ISIL and Sunnis who have been alienated by their central government.

The President is also calling on Congress to provide additional authorities and resources to train and equip Syrian opposition fighters in the Continuing Resolution they are debating this work period, so they can defend themselves and their neighborhoods against ISIL incursions and ultimately push back on ISIL forces and the Assad regime. We will strengthen the opposition as the best counterweight to extremists like ISIL, while pursuing the political solution necessary to solve Syria's crisis once and for all.

The growing and evolving nature of the ISIL threat underscores the importance of the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF). The CTPF request for \$5 billion would allow us to train, build capacity, and facilitate support for partner countries on the front lines of countering shared terrorist threats, both in the region and beyond. The CTPF includes \$500 million for a Department of Defense program to train and equip the Syrian opposition as described above and \$1 billion to build resiliency in the states neighboring Syria to ensure they can continue to counter threats to their internal stability and to support communities that are contending with refugees.

Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIL: Continuing to gain more fidelity on ISIL’s capabilities, plans, and intentions is central to our strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy the group. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance flights and other important efforts will strengthen our ability to understand this threat, as well as to share vital information with our Iraqi and other regional partners to enable them to effectively counter ISIL.

Disrupting ISIL’s Finances: ISIL’s expansion over the past year has given it access to significant and diverse sources of funding. The U.N. Security Council resolution that passed unanimously in August demonstrated the broad international consensus to disrupt ISIL’s finances. We are already working aggressively with our partners on a coordinated approach that includes: reducing ISIL’s revenue from oil and assets it has plundered; limiting ISIL’s ability to extort local populations; stemming ISIL’s gains from kidnapping for ransom; and disrupting the flow of external donations to the group. Our domestic laws also provide additional tools in this effort, enabling us to sanction or prosecute those who fund ISIL’s activities.

Exposing ISIL’s True Nature: Clerics around the world have spoken up in recent weeks to highlight ISIL’s hypocrisy, condemning the group’s barbarity and criticizing its self-proclaimed “caliphate.” We will work with our partners throughout the Muslim world to highlight ISIL’s hypocrisy and counter its false claim to be acting in the name of religion.

Disrupting the Flow of Foreign Fighters: Foreign terrorist fighters are ISIL’s lifeblood, and a global security threat—with citizens of nearly 80 countries filling its ranks. Over 100 foreign fighters from the United States have traveled or attempted to travel to the conflict. On September 24, the United States will convene an historic Summit-level meeting of the UN Security Council, focused on this issue.

Protecting the Homeland: We will continue to use the criminal justice system as a critical tool in our counterterrorism toolbox. Federal criminal laws provide a sound basis to prosecute those who provide material support to ISIL or who conspire with ISIL to plot attacks at home or abroad. With respect to aviation security, we will work with air carriers to implement responsible threat-based security and screening requirements, and provide additional screening to individuals suspected of affiliation with ISIL. Finally, we will counter violent extremism here at home, including tailored domestic programs to prevent violent extremism and radicalization in order to intervene with at-risk individuals before they become radicalized toward violence and decide to travel abroad to Syria and Iraq to join ISIL.

Humanitarian Support: We and our partners will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced and vulnerable in Iraq and Syria. We will also continue to work with host governments to mitigate the humanitarian and economic effects of the conflict in neighboring countries, recognizing that the refugee crisis calls on our common humanity and presents a significant challenge to regional stability. As ISIL seeks to destroy the diversity of the territories it terrorizes, we will continue to work to help prevent mass atrocities, particularly against vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities.

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**The White House Fact Sheet:
Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria and the
Broader Region³¹**

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 24, 2014

FACT SHEET: Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria and the Broader Region

As the President has said, we take seriously the terrorist threat posed by fighters in Iraq, Syria, and the broader region, including foreign terrorist fighters. More than 15,000 foreign terrorist fighters from more than 80 countries have traveled to Syria to fight alongside terrorist groups including dozens of Americans from a variety of backgrounds. The White House is leading an interagency effort to address this threat. Our approach brings together homeland security, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, military, capacity building, and information sharing efforts.

Broad Engagement with Foreign Partners

We employ a whole-of-government outreach effort with foreign partners to highlight the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters as well as their funding streams and to urge steps to interdict wherever possible. The countries involved in this effort are long-time counterterrorism partners, and together, we are committing significant resources to track and disrupt foreign terrorist fighter travel.

- President Obama, exercising the United States' current position as the rotating President of the UN Security Council, will chair a meeting of the Council focused on foreign terrorist fighters on September 24. The President has been focused on this issue, and the convening of world leaders is another element of our comprehensive, whole-of-government response to this challenge. We expect that during that session a binding UN Security Council Resolution will be adopted to expand upon current obligations within international law and underscore the centrality of countering violent extremism efforts to respond to and suppress the foreign terrorist fighter threat.

³¹ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/24/fact-sheet-comprehensive-us-government-approach-foreign-terrorist-fighte>

- Over the course of the last several months, Lisa Monaco, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, and other senior administration officials have consulted with foreign partners and allies on this issue.
- The Department of State in March appointed Ambassador Robert Bradtke as Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on Syria Foreign Fighters. Since then, Ambassador Bradtke has led a comprehensive effort, including marshaling representatives from a number of U.S. departments and agencies, to encourage key European, North African, and Middle Eastern partners to prioritize the threat, address vulnerabilities, and adapt to prevent and interdict foreign terrorist fighters. Ambassador Bradtke is actively engaging partners through multilateral fora, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and the International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law, which recently opened in Malta to serve as a hub for training judges and prosecutors on counterterrorism-related casework, beginning with a focus on foreign fighter facilitation.
- Secretary of State John Kerry co-chaired the GCTF ministerial meeting on September 23. At the ministerial meeting, the GCTF adopted a framework of good practices that countries can use to counter the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters.
- The Department of State also hosts the interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) to counter recruitment and radicalization online through counter-messaging, a tool State encourages partner countries to employ as well. CSCC is engaged in a sustained campaign against Syria and Iraq-based terrorists' online messaging to combat their ability to recruit foreign terrorist fighters.
- Further, the U.S. Intelligence Community works closely with foreign partners to identify and assess both tactical developments as well as broader trends vis-à-vis foreign terrorist fighters. The Intelligence Community's robust sharing of intelligence and analytic insights with foreign counterparts ensures that the proper authorities and senior officials are aware of relevant developments and are best placed to take steps to interdict foreign fighters and disrupt their support networks.

Drawing on Law Enforcement and Homeland Security Tools

Together, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are working closely with a group of European Justice and Home Affairs Ministers to address a wide range of measures focused on enhancing counter-radicalization, border security, aviation security, and information sharing.

- DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson has made aviation security his priority, and DHS is engaging with foreign partners and industry to share and implement capabilities to detect potential threats. DHS has shared best practices, tools, and programs with foreign partners to help address the challenges posed by porous borders in detecting foreign fighter travel.
- DHS, alongside DOJ, also continues to encourage foreign Ministries of Interior and Justice to adopt similar techniques and expand operational collaboration. Most recently, Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and Deputy Attorney General James Cole have led multiple engagements with European Union member countries. We share the concern of our partners abroad over the hundreds of Europeans who have traveled to fight with terrorists in Syria.

- The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center's information-sharing agreements with over 40 international partners provide a mechanism for identifying and sharing terrorist travel activity. DHS is also encouraging more countries to join the United States and more than 60 other countries in using travel information like Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data to identify both known and previously unknown foreign terrorist fighters.
- DOJ is working with European and other foreign partners to exchange best practices on enacting criminal laws to address foreign terrorist fighters and developing investigative tools to bring effective prosecutions. U.S. law enforcement authorities also support INTERPOL's Fusion Cell, which focuses on information sharing on foreign terrorist fighters.

Maintaining Domestic Vigilance

At home, we have multiple efforts underway to develop a comprehensive framework to counter violent extremist recruitment, including programs with non-traditional partners, such as mental health, social service, and education providers.

- Local communities are the front lines of defense and response, and are essential in addressing foreign terrorist fighter recruitment, especially as Syria-based groups focus on recruiting Westerners. Local law enforcement authorities and community members are often best able to identify individuals or groups exhibiting suspicious or dangerous behaviors and to intervene before they commit acts of violence or attempt to travel overseas to foreign conflict zones.

DOJ, DHS, and NCTC work with local law enforcement to build on community-based activities to strengthen resilience in communities targeted by violent extremist recruitment and undermine narratives used by foreign fighter facilitators. For example, U.S. Attorney Offices have co-hosted Community Resilience Exercises in Durham, Seattle, and Houston; and the DHS Secretary is hosting an exercise in Columbus, Ohio, on September 24.

- The FBI also works closely with DHS, the Intelligence Community, federal and state law enforcement agencies to share information and identify, investigate, and prosecute U.S. citizens with intentions to travel to foreign countries to support designated terrorist groups. For example, DHS has developed tools to aide its front-line personnel—be they transportation security officers, customs or border patrol, or immigration officials--in identifying suspected violent extremists.

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**Partial Listing: Global Coalition to Degrade and Defeat
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)**

**Source: U.S. Department of State
Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL**

The breadth and diversity of partners supporting the coalition demonstrate the global and unified nature of this endeavor. Below are some (this list is not exhaustive) of the partners identified by the Special Presidential Envoy that have joined this effort.³²

Albania	Finland	Lebanon	Republic of Korea
Arab League	France	Lithuania	Romania
Australia	Georgia	Luxembourg	Saudi Arabia
Austria	Germany	Macedonia	Serbia
Bahrain	Greece	Moldova	Singapore
Belgium	Hungary	Montenegro	Slovakia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Iceland	Morocco	Slovenia
Bulgaria	Iraq	The Netherlands	Somalia
Canada	Ireland	New Zealand	Spain
Croatia	Italy	Norway	Sweden
Cyprus	Japan	Oman	Taiwan
Czech Republic	Jordan	Panama	Turkey
Denmark	Kosovo	Poland	Ukraine
Egypt	Kuwait	Portugal	United Arab Emirates
Estonia	Latvia	Qatar	United Kingdom
European Union			United States

³² U.S. Department of State; posted at <http://www.state.gov/s/seci/index.htm>. Accessed on March 26, 2015.

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Syrian Crisis: U.S. Assistance and Support for the Transition³³

U.S. Department of State

Fact Sheet

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

September 29, 2014

The United States supports the Syrian people’s struggle for a democratic, inclusive, and unified Syria. The regime of Bashar al-Assad violently suppressed what began as a peaceful protest movement in Dar’a in March 2011, and Assad has proven through his brutal and repressive tactics that he has lost all legitimacy. His continued tenure only fuels extremism and inflames tensions throughout the region.

The United Nations estimates that more than 191,000 people have been killed since the unrest and violence began three years ago. The number of civilians fleeing Syria and seeking refuge in neighboring countries has increased sharply as violence has escalated. More than 3 million people are now refugees in neighboring countries while, inside Syria, nearly 6.5 million people are displaced and nearly 11 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Despite the improved UN access following adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2165, the UN and others in the humanitarian community continue to face significant challenges reaching many people in need in Syria. Obstruction and ongoing violence by the regime, opposition, and terrorist groups are continuing to hinder the delivery of urgent, life-saving assistance to those in need inside Syria. All parties to the conflict in Syria must allow safe, unfettered access to all in need.

To help those affected by the crisis in Syria, the United States has contributed more than \$2.9 billion in humanitarian assistance – the most from any single donor. These resources support international and non-governmental organizations assisting those affected by the conflict both inside Syria and across the region.

The United States is also providing \$330 million in non-lethal support to the moderate Syrian opposition. This non-lethal assistance is helping the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), local opposition councils, and civil society groups provide essential services to their communities, extend the rule of law, and enhance stability inside liberated areas of Syria. These funds are also being used to provide non-lethal assistance to vetted, moderate opposition units, which are

³³ U.S. Department of State; posted at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232266.htm>

fighting both the Assad regime and violent extremist groups, notably the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), on behalf of the Syrian people.

Diplomatic Support

The United States continues to work vigorously to advance a political transition in Syria. Efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis are based on the Final Communiqué of the 30 June 2012 Action Group meeting in Geneva. The process set forth by the Communiqué is supported by the United States and the broad partnership of nations known as the “London 11,” which are pressing for a negotiated political solution to the Syria conflict. After two rounds of UN-sponsored negotiations in Geneva, the Assad regime’s refusal to engage meaningfully in talks stalled progress towards reaching a political settlement to the Syrian crisis.

Simultaneous diplomatic efforts are helping coordinate the provision of assistance with other partners and allies in support of the moderate Syrian opposition. Diplomatic efforts also seek to isolate the regime further, both politically and economically through comprehensive sanctions; to support the Syrian people’s calls for an end to the conflict; and to reinforce the moderate Syrian opposition’s ability to act as a counterweight to the regime and ISIL.

The United States remains firmly committed to the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal, a grave danger to the Syrian people and their neighbors. Since September 2013, as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2118, the international community cooperated to remove and destroy Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpiles. Less than one year later, in August 2014, under the leadership of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) – UN Joint Mission, the deadliest chemical weapons in the Assad regime’s declared stockpile have been destroyed. The United States contributed tens of millions of dollars in assistance to the OPCW–UN Joint Mission, including outfitting a U.S. ship with hydrolysis technology to neutralize safely at sea the most dangerous of Syria’s chemical agents and precursors. We are grateful for the OPCW-UN Joint Mission’s leadership and for the contributions of the entire international coalition in reaching this unprecedented achievement. Although this advances our collective goal to ensure that the Assad regime cannot use its declared chemical arsenal against the Syrian people or Syria’s neighbors, serious questions remain with respect to the omissions and discrepancies in Syria’s declaration to the OPCW and reports of continued use of chlorine as a weapon by the Assad regime. These concerns must be addressed, and we will work closely with the OPCW and the international community to ensure these open issues are fully resolved and that the Assad regime is held accountable for any failure to meet its obligations.

Humanitarian Assistance

The United States and the international community are working tirelessly to provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by the brutal conflict in Syria. One-half of our \$2.9 billion in humanitarian assistance is being distributed to organizations working inside Syria; the balance is going to assist refugees and to the communities that host them.

For those affected by the crisis inside Syria and in neighboring countries, the United States is providing medical care and supplies, shelter, childhood immunizations, food, clean water, relief

supplies, and access to education and protection – including activities to prevent and respond to gender-based violence . U.S. assistance supports the activities of UN agencies – including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) – and numerous non-governmental organizations, in Syria and neighboring countries.

In response to growing incidents of gender-based violence during the conflict, the United States is also providing psychological and social support for women and children from Syria through women’s health centers, mobile clinics, and outreach workers.

Within Syria, U.S. humanitarian assistance is reaching more than 4.5 million people across all 14 of the country’s governorates through the United Nations, international and non-governmental organizations, and local Syrian organizations, as well as in coordination with the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) and Interim Government. To ensure the safety of recipients and humanitarian workers and to facilitate passage while en route to beneficiaries, U.S. humanitarian assistance is often not branded or marked. The United States supports approximately 260 field hospitals and clinics across Syria. These facilities have treated nearly 1.9 million patients and performed more than 358,240 surgeries. To meet the need for more medical staff capable of saving lives, the United States trained nearly 3,000 health care providers and community health workers inside Syria.

The United States continues to work closely with countries in the region hosting refugees fleeing Syria, supporting communities that have generously opened their schools, hospitals, and homes. For more details on the U.S. humanitarian response to the Syria crisis and what U.S. humanitarian assistance is being provided, please visit: www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria.

Non-lethal Transition Assistance to the Syrian Opposition

The United States is working in partnership with the international community to support the Syrian opposition and is providing \$330 million in non-lethal transition assistance to help the moderate opposition meet daily needs, provide essential services, and support a transition. U.S. support includes \$15 million provided to the multi-donor Syria Recovery Trust Fund, designed to help with Syria’s recovery effort in areas controlled by the moderate opposition, as well as its reconstruction and economic needs after the formation of a transitional governing body.

Non-lethal assistance is being provided to a range of civilian opposition groups, including local councils, civil society organizations, and SOC-affiliated entities to bolster their institutional capacity, create linkages among opposition groups inside and outside Syria, and help counter violent extremism. These efforts enable the Coalition, including its interim governance structures, to deliver basic goods and essential services to liberated communities as they step in to fill the void left by the regime. In addition to civil administration training programs, these entities are provided with a wide array of critical equipment, including generators, ambulances, cranes, dump trucks, fire trucks, water storage units, search and rescue equipment, education kits for schools, winterization materials, and commodity baskets for needy families.

The United States is also helping to strengthen grassroots organizations and local administrative bodies— a foundation of democratic governance – as they step in to fill the void left by the regime and provide basic services, including emergency power, sanitation, water, and educational services to their communities. U.S. assistance also is being directed to maintaining public safety, extending rule of law and mitigating sectarian violence.

U.S. non-lethal assistance includes training and equipment to build the capacity of a network of more than 3,000 grassroots activists, including women and youth, from more than 400 opposition councils and organizations from around the country to link Syrian citizens with the national- and local-level Syrian opposition. This support enhances the linkages between Syrian activists, human rights organizations, and independent media outlets and empowers women leaders to play a more active role in transition planning.

Support to independent media includes assistance to both television and radio stations; mentoring from Arab media experts to broadcast professionals inside Syria; training for networks of citizen journalists, bloggers, and cyber-activists to support their documentation and dissemination of information on developments in Syria; and technical assistance and equipment to enhance the information and communications security of Syrian activists within Syria. U.S. technical and financial assistance is also supporting the Coalition’s outreach to Syrians through the internet, local, independent radio stations, and satellite television.

The United States continues to assist in laying the groundwork for accountability by supporting the Syria Justice and Accountability Center’s efforts to document violations and abuses of international human rights law committed by all sides of the conflict, and by bolstering the capacity of civil society organizations to build the foundations for lasting peace. The United States also works at the grassroots levels with groups and individuals across a broad spectrum of Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic communities to empower women, religious leaders, youth, and civil society to advocate for their communities, build trust and tolerance, and mitigate conflict.

In addition to this transition assistance to local communities, the United States has been providing direct non-lethal assistance to the moderate, armed opposition. We have delivered to moderate armed elements 550,000 MREs, 4,500 medical kits, more than 17,000 food baskets, more than three tons of surgical and triage medical supplies, vehicles, heavy machinery, communications and computer equipment, generators, and other basic supplies.

Train and Equip Program

The United States will train and equip appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian armed opposition. The program, through the Department of Defense, will help moderate Syrian fighters defend the Syrian people from attacks by ISIL and the Syrian regime; stabilize areas under opposition control; and empower a subset of the trainees to go on the offensive against ISIL.

Additional Support for the Syrian People

To help Syrians begin to rebuild, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a Statement of Licensing Policy inviting U.S. persons to apply for

specific licenses to participate in certain economic activities in Syria. The OFAC Statement focused on applications to engage in oil-related transactions that benefit the Syrian Opposition Coalition, or its supporters, and transactions involving Syria's agricultural and telecommunications sectors. OFAC also amended Syria General License 11 to authorize the exportation of services and funds transfers in support of not-for-profit activities to preserve and protect cultural heritage sites in Syria.

The U.S. Department of Commerce has waived certain restrictions, accepting license applications for the export and re-export of certain commodities, software, and technology for the benefit of the Syrian people, including but not limited to: water supply and sanitation; agricultural production and food processing; power generation; oil and gas production; construction and engineering; transportation; and educational infrastructure.

To support educational opportunities for Syrians during the conflict, the United States continues to engage Syrians directly, offering academic advice to young people hoping to study in the United States and opportunities to participate in State Department exchanges and other outreach programs. The State Department is also contributing to the Syrian Scholar Rescue program, which supports higher education in Syria by offering outstanding professors, researchers, and intellectuals fellowship grants and temporary academic appointments at partnering academic institutions. Additionally, the State Department remains focused on supporting the preservation of Syria's rich cultural heritage and continues to work with a range of Syrian, American, and international partners to protect Syrian antiquities. For more information, please visit: <http://damascus.usembassy.gov/resources/cultural-events.html>

The State Department maintains an active dialogue to coordinate policy and assistance for Syria with a broad cross-section of Syrian opposition groups, including with the Syrian Opposition Coalition. The American people, including Syrian-Americans, have contributed generously and have organized to provide assistance to Syrians in need.

The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations. A list of humanitarian organizations that are accepting cash donations to help those in need in Syria and the region can be found at www.cidi.org.

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FY 2015 BUDGET AMENDMENT REQUEST

Below is a summary breakdown of the \$5.6 billion FY15 OCO budget amendment submitted by the President on November 10, 2014, in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR).³⁴

Proposed Amendment Amount	Area	Purpose
Department of Defense – Military Programs (DoD)		
\$118,467,000	Military Personnel, Army	Active, Guard, and Reserve
\$819,000	Military Personnel, Navy	Active and Reserve
\$2,084,000	Military Personnel, Marine Corps	Active and Reserve
\$19,987,000	Military Personnel, Air Force	Active, Guard, and Reserve
\$779,554,000	Operation and Maintenance (O&M), Army	OIR and Iraqi train and equip support
\$122,628,000	Operation and Maintenance, Navy	O&M
\$12,970,000	Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps	O&M
\$931,637,000	Operation and Maintenance, Air Force	O&M
\$463,962,000	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide	O&M
\$4,960,000	Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve	O&M
\$1,618,000,000	Iraq Train and Equip Fund (see note)	To remain available until Sept. 30, 2017
\$3,036,000	Missile Procurement, Army	Replacement of Hellfire missiles
\$51,030,000	Other Procurement, Army	Counter intelligence communications and electronics equipment programs
\$55,000,000	Aircraft Procurement, Navy	Small, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles
\$54,329,000	Weapons Procurement, Navy	Replacement of tactical missiles
\$2,510,000	Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps	Replacement of General Purpose Bombs
\$8,270,000	Other Procurement, Navy	Counter intelligence communications and electronics equipment programs
\$21,250,000	Missile Procurement, Air Force	Replacement of Hellfire tactical missiles and Small Diameter Bombs
\$49,053,000	Procurement of Ammunition, Air Force	Replacement of conventional ammunition
\$544,502,000	Other Procurement, Air Force	For classified purposes
\$38,845,000	Procurement, Defense-Wide	Special Operations Command equipment and various intelligence support programs
\$940,000	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy	Small, tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems research and Special Operations Command
\$14,706,000	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force	For classified purposes. To remain available until Sept. 30, 2016
\$129,050,000	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide	For classified purposes
\$5,047,589,000	Subtotal - DoD	

³⁴ White House Fiscal Year 2015 Budget amendment, November 10, 2014; posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_11_10_14.pdf.

Proposed Amendment Amount	Area	Purpose
Department of State and Other International Programs (DOS/OIP)		
\$8,600,000	Diplomatic and Consular Programs	To expand the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications' counterterrorism messaging and other programs
\$100,000,000	Economic Support Fund	To support Syrian stabilization strategies
\$250,000,000	Foreign Military Financing Program	To support Jordan and Lebanon's efforts regarding ISIL and other extremists in the region
\$65,000,000	Peacekeeping Operations	To bolster the capacity of the moderate Syrian opposition to counter ISIL and other extremist groups
\$90,000,000	International Disaster Assistance	USAID – for continued support to address the humanitarian crisis in Iraq
\$6,300,000	International Broadcasting Operations	Broadcasting Board of Governors – for international communication activities. To remain available until Sept. 30, 2016.
\$519,900,000	Subtotal – DOS/OIP	
\$5,567,489,000	TOTAL Budget Amendment Request for OIR	

Note:

This amendment would provide \$1.6 billion for assistance to military and other security forces of, or associated with, the Government of Iraq (GoI), including Kurdish and tribal security forces, with a national security mission to counter ISIL. The authority includes the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, construction, and stipends. Of note, the proposal for this authority also includes provisions to ensure Iraqi contributions to this effort, since Iraqi partnership is critical to this effort. Specifically, the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) addresses the requirement to build the Iraqi military, other security forces, and Peshmerga proficiency; and to provide material support to tribal elements allied with Iraqi forces. The GoI will be required to contribute to the cost burden, including items such as site operations, life support of its forces, and other costs; coalition partners will contribute personnel and support for this effort.

Key principals of the ITEF are that (1) the GoI is in the lead and will share the cost burden, (2) U.S. assistance levels are limited and are focused on bridging the most critical near-term capabilities consistent with the campaign plan, and (3) coalition participation and support will be actively sought for both personnel and financial support.

The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriation Act provides that the appropriation for ITEF remain available until September 30, 2016. See Section 2, Division C, Title IX of the Act.

Summaries of Prior Reports – DoD IG

<http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm#3>

Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police

Report No. DODIG-2015-067, January 30, 2015

The DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD IG) assessed the planning and execution of the Afghan National Police (ANP) logistics, supply, and maintenance systems developed and implemented by U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Coalition force and ANP leaders recognized that development of logistics, including supply and maintenance capabilities, was crucial to long-term ANP success. Coalition force advisors identified a need for certain policy updates in support of logistics transition, and encouraged the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and ANP leaders to implement and enforce established logistics policies and processes. Coalition, MoI, and ANP leaders readily offered input on and analysis of MoI and ANP logistics development, and the importance of implementing a demand-based logistics, supply, and maintenance system to ANP mission success. Key logistics issues were identified in three areas—resources, policy implementation and enforcement, and emerging logistics processes.

Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army

Report No. DODIG-2015-047, December 19, 2014

DoD IG evaluated the progress made by U.S. and Coalition Forces to train, advise, and assist in the development of an enduring logistics sustainment capability for the Afghan National Army (ANA). Issues requiring attention were identified in four general areas:

- ANA development of a sustainable logistics planning capability. Specific issues were outdated and incomplete logistics policy and guidance; underdeveloped capability to forecast and generate logistic requirements; retention of trained mechanics; nascent contracting expertise; partial decentralization of logistics training; and inefficient use of information management systems.
- ANA equipment disposal processes. Specific issues were implementation of turn-in and disposal of irreparable equipment; turn-in of useable excess equipment, parts, and other supplies; and planning for vehicle fleet management.
- Coalition Forces advisor support to ANA logistic system development. Specific issues were unity of effort among Coalition subordinate staffs; obtaining the required number of logistics advisors with the right experience and expertise; and planning for post-2014 continued contractor support.
- Coalition Forces initial issue of sufficient spare parts to generate authorized stockage and prescribed load lists for major pieces of ANA equipment at the ANA Central Supply Depot and Regional Logistic Support Centers.

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions

Report No. DODIG-2014-102, August 29, 2014

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIROA) lacked the basic controls to provide reasonable assurance that it appropriately spent \$3.3 billion of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) direct contributions. These controls are key aspects of a transparent and accountable fiscal process. This occurred because GIROA did not develop the ministerial capability and capacity to manage and oversee ASFF direct contributions and Combined Security Transition Command– Afghanistan (CSTC-A) had not held GIROA accountable for not implementing controls and improper handling of ASFF direct contribution funds. As a result of GIROA's internal control weaknesses, CSTC-A could not verify that the ASFF direct contributions were properly spent or used for their intended purposes.

Evaluation of the Department of Defense Combating Trafficking in Persons Program (Capping Report)

Report No. DODIG-2014-079, June 16, 2014

DoD IG reviewed the DoD Combating Trafficking in Persons program performance and compliance with DoD Instruction 2200.01, "Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP)," September 15, 2010. This capping report summarizes findings resulting from multi-year reviews, which began in 2009, conducted in response to the requirement in section 232 of P.L. 110-457 to investigate a sample of contracts for which there was a heightened risk that contractors may engage in acts related to trafficking in persons. Despite positive actions by DoD Components, DoD CTIP programs still did not meet current U.S. Government and DoD policy standards. Most DoD Components also had not reviewed their CTIP programs. Additionally, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness had not completed any routine reviews of DoD Components' self-assessments of their CTIP programs. Further, the Joint Staff and combatant commands have not adequately addressed CTIP in operational and contingency plans. Lastly, DoD CTIP training compliance was incomplete and did not provide specific CTIP training for certain job functions.

(U) Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities Part II - Cross-Cutting Issues of Afghan National Army Enabler Development

(Classified) Report No. DODIG-2014-027, December 23, 2013

(U) DoD IG reviewed U.S. and Coalition plans and activities to develop and mature (Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) enabling capabilities (enablers) identified as being critical to the ability of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to conduct and sustain independent operations. This is the second of two reports and described seven enabler-related systemic challenges facing U.S. and Coalition forces today. This report also provided recommendations for improving the continuing development of the ANA.

**(U) Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities Part I - Afghan National Army Enabler Description
(Classified) Report No. DODIG-2013-129, September 20, 2013**

(U) DoD IG reviewed U.S. and Coalition plans and activities to develop ANSF enabling capabilities (enablers) identified as being critical to the ability of the ANA to conduct and sustain independent operations.

**Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq Mission Capabilities
Report No. DODIG-2013-136, September 18, 2013**

This assessment evaluated the adequacy of DoD support for executing security cooperation programs in Iraq and whether the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I) is organized, equipped and prepared to successfully accomplish its mission. The assessment recommended accelerating the integration of the OSC-I into the U.S. Mission Iraq and observed that the DOS and DoD had not come to an agreement on the OSC-I’s mission and supporting personnel resources.

**Compliance with Electrical and Fire Protection Standards of U.S. Controlled and Occupied Facilities in Afghanistan
Report No. DODIG-2013-099, July 18, 2013**

At selected U.S. controlled and occupied facilities in Kandahar Air Field and Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, DoD IG inspected for compliance with the National Electrical Code (NEC), the Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards and corrective actions for previous DoD IG electrical and fire protection findings. Hazardous conditions due to a lack of consistent adherence to minimum NEC and NFPA standards were evidenced by 1,089 findings; 440 findings violated NEC electrical standards and 649 findings violated UFC and/or NFPA fire protection standards. DoD IG recommended that all findings, including 71 critical findings, be addressed and prioritized according to a robust risk management plan.

**U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army
Report No. DODIG-2013-094, June 24, 2013**

This assessment evaluated the sufficiency and effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop officers and noncommissioned officers within the ANA. While the ANA leader development programs were determined to be effective and on schedule for transition to the ANA, the report pointed out that the lack of a true merit-based personnel promotion and assignment system within the ANA negatively impacted the further development of a new generation of ANA leaders. The assessment also revealed a wide variance in aptitude and competence for the advising mission among U.S. and Coalition advisors; this unevenness of advisor preparation limited advisor effectiveness and may have delayed the professional development of ANA leaders.

**U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Border Police
Report No. DODIG-2013-081, May 24, 2013**

This assessment evaluated whether the planning and operational implementation of efforts by U.S. and Coalition forces to recruit, train, advise, and assist in the development of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) were effective. The assessment revealed that the Afghan Ministries of

Interior and Defense had failed to fully integrate the ABP with Afghan National Police (ANP) and ANA forces so as to create an effective, reinforcing, in-depth defensive strategy. To compensate for this lack of coordinated strategy, the Government of Afghanistan relied on U.S. and Coalition resources to support the ABP and compensate for its border security limitations. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Army Command, Control, and Coordination System
Report No. DODIG-2013-058, March 22, 2013

This assessment determined that extensive U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop ANA Command and Control (C2) systems had produced a marginally sufficient capability that was adequately resilient to provide minimal essential support for transition to Afghan lead in plans and operations by 2014. However, U.S. and coalition enablers would still be required to ensure momentum for and execution of the planned transition. While the ANA C2 structures were developing they were hindered by a host of multifaceted challenges, including limited command authority to remove ineffective senior officers, logistical impediments that limit the ANA's operational independence, limited capacity for both human capital and physical infrastructure to integrate complex technology and automation, and a significant reliance on U.S. and coalition enablers, such as aviation, signals, intelligence and engineering.

(U) U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip and Field the Afghan Air Force (Classified) Report No. DODIG-2012-141, September 28, 2012

(U) This assessment examined whether U.S. and Coalition Forces goals, objectives, plans, and guidance to train, equip, and field a viable and sustainable Afghan Air Force (AAF) were achieving the intended results. The assessment identified a number of areas of concern, including: senior Afghan officials responsible for the AAF did not have a common vision for the roles, missions and capabilities of the AAF; the training, guidance and oversight of U.S. and Coalition air advisors assigned to train the AAF needed reinforcement to enable the effective conduct of air advisor flying duties; and different air worthiness standards among the U.S. military services excluded the use of U.S. Army aviators as advisors on the Afghan-owned Mi-17 helicopters.

Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform 2012 Update
Report No. DODIG-2012-134, September 18, 2012

This report discussed current contingency contracting problems, and re-emphasized ongoing problems identified in the DoD IG Report No. D-2010-059, "Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform," May 14, 2010. Since issuing that report, DoD IG personnel issued 38 reports and were involved with 20 fraud investigations pertaining to Overseas Contingency Operations. These reports and investigations identified a variety of problems relating to DoD officials not properly awarding, administering, or managing contingency contracts in accordance with Federal and DoD policies. DoD IG reviewed the 38 reports and identified 9 systemic contracting problem areas relating to contingency operations. The five most prevalent problem areas reported were: 1. Oversight and Surveillance, 2. Financial Management, 3. Contract Pricing, 4. Requirements, and 5. Property Accountability. The 20 fraud investigations affected 3 contracting areas: source selection, oversight and surveillance, and financial management.

**U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police
Report No. DODIG-2012-109, July 9, 2012**

This assessment determined whether the planning and operational implementation of efforts by U.S. and Coalition forces to train, advise, and assist in the development of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) were effective and coordinated across all relevant commands. The assessment identified weaknesses in the areas of planning and coordination, training, logistics system processes and procedures, and Coalition and U.S. personnel resourcing, including that the lack of sufficient and trained Coalition personnel, in particular U.S. Special Operations Forces, put the expansion of the program to 30,000 ALP at risk.

**DoD Contracts Regarding Combating Trafficking in Persons: Afghanistan
Report No. DODIG-2012-086, May 15, 2012**

This assessment reviewed a sample of 240 DoD contracts that had Afghanistan as the place of performance for compliance with the “William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008.” The assessment found that the mandatory CTIP clause was included in 93 percent of the 240 contracts reviewed, a significant improvement from previous assessments. Further, a local supplemental CTIP clause concerning living conditions and retention of passports was included in 89 percent of contracts reviewed. A second local clause concerning contractor demobilization was included in 91 percent of reviewed contracts written after the requirement was established in November 2010. However, U.S. Central Command subordinate commands in Afghanistan had not developed localized policies, procedures or training regarding combating trafficking in persons.

**Assessment of the DoD Establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
Report No. DODIG-2012-063, March 16, 2012**

This assessment determined that the establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) was on track and on schedule to meet its full operating capability target date of October 1, 2011, and to operate independently as an element of U.S. Mission to Iraq by January 1, 2012. However, DoD IG identified key areas that required management attention. DoD IG determined that U.S. Forces – Iraq Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training:

- was managing crucial security cooperation activities with incomplete theater and country-level plans and without the required planning capability;
- had not clearly communicated information about the OSC-I enduring role regarding security cooperation programs with key Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials;
- had not fully engaged and shared essential transition details with key personnel at prospective outlying OSC-I sites; and
- had not established detailed internal standard operating procedures for the OSC-I essential to adequately manage its major functions within the framework of the U.S. Mission to Iraq.

Among other things, DoD IG recommended that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, promptly issue completed Iraq Country Plan details.

U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army

Report No. DODIG-2012-028, December 9, 2011

This assessment examined whether planning and operational implementation of efforts by U.S. and Coalition forces to train, advise, and assist in the development of an enduring logistics and maintenance capability for the ANA was effective and integrated across all levels of U.S. and Coalition commands, as well as with the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD). The assessment revealed that while an aggressive strategy by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to develop an ANA logistics sustainment capability had achieved some progress in developing ministerial logistics and maintenance policy and capability, and building logistics infrastructure, ISAF still lacked a plan to integrate the efforts of its various commands with the MoD and ANA to address the complexities of timely development of a core ANA logistics capability.

Exposure to Sodium Dichromate at Qarmat Ali Iraq in 2003: Part II - Evaluation of Army and Contractor Actions Related to Hazardous Industrial Exposure

Report No. SPO-2011-009, September 28, 2011

This assessment, the second of a two-part series on the same topic, reviewed DoD actions regarding the exposure of approximately 1,000 U.S. Army soldiers and civilians to sodium dichromate, a carcinogen, while working to restore a water treatment plant in Qarmat Ali, Iraq in 2003. The evaluation found that DoD military, civilian and contractor personnel did not effectively address environmental hazards found prior to beginning work at Qarmat Ali. Further, DoD response to identified sodium dichromate contamination lacked urgency and was incomplete. As a result, DoD military, civilian and contractors were first exposed when personnel deployed to the site in April 2003 and continued to be exposed until mid-September 2003. (For Part I, see Report No. SPO-2010-006, September 17, 2010.)

Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority

Report No. SPO-2011-008, August 25, 2011

This assessment evaluated whether U.S. plans and guidance were issued and operative for transitioning the Security Assistance mission in Iraq from DoD to DOS. The assessment found that while plans and guidance had been sufficiently developed and were operative for transitioning security assistance from DoD to DOS, it was due to an ad-hoc group of strategic planners operating within the U.S. command in Iraq. However, there was no overarching plan between U.S. Forces-Iraq and U.S. Central Command that bridged planning horizons and defined a timeline for transitioning responsibilities with respect to establishing the full operating capability of the new Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq at the U.S. Embassy by October 2011.

U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police

Report No. SPO-2011-003, March 3, 2011

The assessment found that while ISAF had taken the initiative to close the ANP logistics capability gap, implementing a logistics infrastructure development plan that is building supply depots across the regional commands, ISAF needs to institutionalize the ANP force development and coordination process between its subordinate commands, and document the ANP force size

necessary to execute the counterinsurgency strategy. Further, the numbers of on-the-ground trainers and mentors working to execute ANP fielding plans were insufficient.

U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces

Report No. SPO-2011-001, November 17, 2010

This assessment evaluated U.S. efforts to develop an effective logistics sustainment capability within the Iraqi Security Forces that would have supported its enduring security operations by the time U.S. forces withdrew at the end of 2011. Significant gaps between the Minimum Essential Capabilities and ISF logistics capability were identified. To close this capability shortfall in a relatively brief time required an intensified effort involving additional subject matter expertise support from DoD and its supporting CONUS-based logistics organizations.

Review of Intra-Theater Transportation Planning, Capabilities, and Execution for the Drawdown from Iraq

Report No. SPO-2010-002, April 20, 2010

This assessment determined that the U.S. Central Command and its subordinate and supporting organizations' intra-theater logistical planning appeared to be sufficient to effectively manage and support the movement of materiel being withdrawn from Iraq. Additionally, we observed that the logisticians in these organizations were continuing to gain efficiencies in their planning processes, which we anticipate will progressively improve and enhance intra-theater transportation capabilities.

U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces

Report No. SPO-2009-007, September 30, 2009

This assessment evaluated whether U.S. and Coalition plans to train, equip, field, and mentor the ANSF were effective. The assessment revealed that the development of the logistics sustainment capability of the ANSF significantly lagged behind its operational capacity. Also during this timeframe, U.S. and Coalition advisors and mentors were under-resourced (51%) against required personnel levels, which delayed the development of the ANSF.

(U) Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq

Report No. SPO-2008-001

Classified version issued July 3, 2008; redacted version issued September 28, 2009

(U) This assessment evaluated U.S. and Iraqi systems for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition to determine if they were adequate. The assessment team evaluated the munitions supply chain from port of entry, through transportation, storage, distribution and formal turnover to the Iraqi Security Forces, to issuance to individual Iraqi military and police personnel. The report contains cogent observations and recommendations pertinent to the proper accountability and control of any sensitive item.

Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan

Report No. SPO-2009-006, September 11, 2009

This assessment evaluated U.S. and Afghan systems for munitions accountability and control to determine if they were adequate. The assessment team evaluated the munitions supply chain

from port of entry, through transportation, storage, distribution and formal turnover to the ANSF, to issuance to individual Afghan military and police personnel. During this timeframe, the ANP significantly lagged behind the ANA in establishing a comprehensive oversight system, including developing a “culture of accountability.” Finally, sufficient and appropriately trained U.S. and Coalition police mentors were required to develop the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and ANP oversight capability.

Joint Report – DoD IG and DOS OIG

Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program

Report Nos. IE-2009-007 and ISP-I-09-69, August 31, 2009

An interagency DoD and DOS IG team evaluated Section 1206 program effectiveness in building partner capacity for counterterrorist operations, and stability and military operations. Overall, the program was effective; however, there were opportunities to improve effectiveness and efficiency of the process for project selection, program execution, and project implementation. The report made recommendations in the following areas: the proposal submission template; DoD directives for program policies and instructions; shipment priorities; management review processes; military-to-military training objectives; security assistance officer training; munitions safety training; and performance measures.

Accountability of Night Vision Devices Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq

Report No. SPO-2009-003, March 17, 2009

This assessment evaluated U.S. and Iraqi systems for the accountability and control of Night Vision Devices to determine if they were adequate. At the time of this report, the U.S. had procured 50,740 NVDs for the Iraqi Security Forces, however, the U.S. command could only account for 46,876. Further, the U.S. command could not provide issue documentation for more than 21,000, could not provide serial numbers for more than for 26,000, and could seldom identify specific ISF units receiving the NVDs. In addition, U.S. forces’ policies and standard operating procedures were not always issued, complete, or implemented and in some cases were contradictory. Furthermore, ISF had not issued policies and standard operating procedures for the management, accountability, and control of NVDs.

Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Logistics Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces

Report No. SPO-2009-002, December 19, 2008

This assessment evaluated the status of corrective actions that were to be implemented by the DoD in response to a July 2008 report (DoD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001, issued July 3, 2008). In addition, the assessment team reviewed whether security assistance processes were responsive to ISF equipment requirements, and whether the ISF logistics sustainment and healthcare delivery systems were being effectively developed.

Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces

Report No. SPO-2009-001, October 24, 2008

This assessment evaluated U.S. and Afghan systems for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition to determine if they were adequate. In addition, the assessment team reviewed whether security assistance processes were responsive to ANSF equipment requirements, and

whether the ANSF logistics sustainment and healthcare delivery systems were being effectively developed.

DoD Support to the Iraqi Security Forces Inspector General

Report No. IE-2008-010, July 31, 2008

This assessment evaluated DoD support to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and Joint Headquarters Inspectors General in establishing a self-sustaining Inspector General (IG) function under Iraqi law. The DoD-supported program to foster IG development within the ISF was generally well conceived and delivered in a satisfactory manner. IG offices have been established at the MoD headquarters and at all appropriate levels in the Iraqi military. IG offices have also been established at the MoI headquarters. A MoI IG provincial presence is evolving and may complement the existing MoI IG structure. Although the fundamental concepts of economy, efficiency, and integrity, as well as deterring corruption and enhancing organizational performance, were grasped by Iraqi ISF personnel, those concepts were not yet ingrained throughout the ISF. Survival of an ISF IG system requires a sustained multi-year commitment of advisory personnel and training support from DoD.

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Summaries of Prior Reports – DOS OIG

<http://oig.state.gov/find-a-report>

Audit of Bureau of Diplomatic Security Worldwide Protective Services Contract Task Order 10 Kabul Embassy Security Force

Report No. AUD-MERO-15-03, October 30, 2014

The OIG conducted this audit to assess the Department's oversight of the Aegis contract, whether the contractor's work is adequately monitored, whether invoice review and approval procedures are in place to ensure accuracy and completeness of costs, and whether Department monitoring and contractor performance ensures compliance with regulations related to Trafficking in Persons (TIP).

OIG found that Bureau of Administration, Office of Logistics Management, Office of Acquisitions Management (A/LM/AQM) did not ensure all contract-required documentation was maintained at place of performance as required by the contract. OIG also identified \$8,642,484 in questioned costs – \$1,726,154 in costs that may be unallowable by the contract and \$6,916,330 in costs that are not supported in accordance with contract requirements – paid on 57 Task Order 10 invoices. OIG also found that some issues with contractors compliance with TIP requirements. OIG made five recommendations to the Department to address these findings.

Audit of the Contract Closeout Process for Contracts Supporting the U.S. Mission in Iraq

Report No. AUD-MERO-14-06, December 31, 2013

OIG contracted with an external audit firm to determine whether the Department had effectively and efficiently closed contracts supporting the U.S. Mission in Iraq. The audit firm, acting under OIG's direction, determined that the contract closeout teams and the contracting officers had not consistently met Federal and Department contract closeout requirements for the 115 Iraq-related contract task orders included in the review because the Department had not established comprehensive procedural guidance for contract closeout or ensured that existing guidance was accurate. As a result, the risk of financial mismanagement was increased, and, as of May 10, 2013, \$38.7 million had not been de-obligated in a timely manner and had expired, preventing its use for other purposes. OIG recommended that the Bureau of Administration revise Department guidance, and develop and implement an automated application to track contract status from award through contract closeout.

Audit of Bureau of Diplomatic Security Worldwide Protective Services Contract Task Order 5 for Baghdad Movement Security

Report No. AUD-MERO-13-25, March 31, 2013

OIG determined that the contractor movement security staffing requirements exceeded the actual staffing needs. Specifically, only 49 percent of the contractor-provided movement security personnel were used, on average, to conduct daily movement missions. The overstaffing occurred because the Department did not conduct a needs analysis for staffing requirements before it awarded the task order and it unnecessarily exercised an optional program which added more movement security personnel to the task order. As a result, the Department paid, at a minimum, \$20.6 million during the base year to retain contractor security personnel for the

optional program who were not needed. OIG also determined that the COR approved contractor invoices totaling about \$1.8 million that included unallowable, unsupported, or erroneous costs. OIG recommended that the Department conduct a needs-based analysis and further adjust staffing as needed; and recommended that the Department collect any unallowable or unsupported costs paid to the contractor.

Performance Evaluation of Training and Logistical Support for Palestinian Authority Security Forces

Report No. MERO-I-11-09, July 31, 2011

This evaluation was conducted in response to congressional interest in the training and equipping of Palestinian Authority Security Forces. OIG found that INL generally provided adequate oversight and management of its contractor DynCorp International. However, INL had not obtained the required contract implementation plan or performance measures from DynCorp and therefore was not able to fully measure progress or document comprehensive program management.

OIG found that the INL office director at Consulate General Jerusalem was the only U.S. Government direct-hire employee. The INL deputy director was a personal services contractor who sometimes performed the duties of the INL director, to include signing donation letters of agreement transferring U.S. Government-purchased equipment to the Palestinian Authority. OIG also found that there was no contract administration training program for contractors and locally employed staff, even though these individuals were conducting most of the on-site management and oversight. OIG recommended among other things that INL require DynCorp to submit performance measures; review the duties, responsibilities and authorities of the INL deputy director position; and ensure that all staff members in INL's office in Jerusalem are properly trained in contract administration.

Performance Evaluation of Department of State Contracts to Monitor Vulnerability to Trafficking in Persons Violations in the Levant

Report No. MERO-I-11-07, March 31, 2011

OIG evaluated 10 contracts at Embassy Damascus, Embassy Beirut, Embassy Tel Aviv, Embassy Amman, and Consulate General Jerusalem, and found no direct evidence that contractors violated the provisions of the TVPA or the mandatory FAR clause. The management practices of 9 of the 10 contractors showed no increased risk of TIP. One contractor engaged in practices that increase the risk of TIP, including long work hours and payment issues, but the contractor was disqualified from issuing a proposal for a new contract.

All five missions are following Federal contracting guidelines to prevent trafficking. Nine of 10 contract reviewed contained the mandatory citation or reference to FAR clause 52.222-50. Nine of 10 contracts also included language on contractor compliance with local labor laws, regulations, customs, and practices pertaining to labor, safety, and similar matters.

FAR clause 52.222-50 does not provide guidance on monitoring for TIP, and mission offices including CORs received little guidance from the Department. However, OIG found there were efforts to monitor for TIP including translation of the required FAR clause into Arabic, screening for underage employees, determining whether contractors have a history or ongoing suspicions of TIP problems, and training of CORs in TIP prevention.

Performance Evaluation of Palestinian Authority Security Forces Infrastructure Construction Projects in the West Bank

Report No. MERO-I-11-03, March 31, 2011

Under a 2007 Framework Agreement, the U.S. Government committed to provide up to \$80 million to professionalize the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). INL had estimated that an additional \$50 million would be required to complete construction to support PASF infrastructure, and OIG noted the Department had signed an agreement in December 2010 to provide funding not to exceed \$150 million in total.

OIG noted that infrastructure construction appeared to be of generally good quality and on schedule. The Palestinian Authority has cooperated effectively with INL and the U.S. Security Coordinator to oversee the contract award process and monitor construction projects, has acquisition regulations that closely resemble those of the U.S. Government, and checks contractors for any links to terrorist organizations. INL representatives at Consulate General Jerusalem have fulfilled their responsibilities, and have provided adequate oversight of construction contract awards and project implementation. OIG recommended that INL coordinate with the USSC to develop detailed plans to complete and sustain the PASF construction program. OIG also recommended that INL conduct a staffing analysis of its office at Consulate General Jerusalem.

The Second Worldwide Personal Protective Services Contract: Management by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Contractor Performance Capping Report

Report No. MERO-I-10-08, August 31, 2010

In 2008, MERO began its reviews of WPPS II contract management and contractor performance by examining the status of recommendations made by the Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq. This review was followed by performance evaluations of all three security contractors operating in Baghdad, Jerusalem, and Kabul. OIG identified several trends that weakened DS' management and oversight of the WPPS II contract and task orders including U.S. Government direct-hire staffing problems, as well as issues with accounting for contractor personnel. Although protection was generally satisfactory, OIG found issues with personal security specialist training, the ability to fill some contractor positions, inventorying and storage of U.S. Government property, armored vehicles, explosives detection canines, and radios. DS responded quickly to OIG's recommendations.

Limited Scope Review of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration's Oversight of the United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in Gaza

Report No. MERO-I-10-04, February 28, 2010

This limited-scope review was performed at the request of Congress to determine conformity of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with the conditions in Section 301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, as amended. OIG was reasonably assured that PRM and UNRWA were achieving U.S. Government objectives by investigating and verifying conformity following the employee union elections. PRM and UNRWA have extensive policies and procedures to monitor and evaluate compliance with both the UN neutrality policy and Section 301(c). OIG concluded that UNRWA had taken all possible measures to follow the guidelines in Section 301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, as amended.

**Department of Defense Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to the Department of State for the Training and Mentoring of the Afghan National Police
Report No. MERO-A-10-06, February 9, 2010**

The objective of this congressionally requested joint audit was to review Afghanistan Security Forces (ASF) funds provided by the DOD to the Department for training the Afghan National Police (ANP), contract management activities, and the ability of the ANP training program to address security needs in Afghanistan. OIG and the DOD Inspector General found that the Department's Civilian Police contract does not meet DOD's needs in developing the ANP to counter the rising insurgency in Afghanistan. The Inspectors General found that the Department's internal controls were ineffective, which led to weaknesses in contract oversight and management. The Department did not adequately oversee U.S. Government property, maintain contract files as required by Federal Acquisition Regulations, did not always match goods to receiving reports, or require in-country CORs to review contractor invoices. The Inspectors General were unable to determine if the Department expended ASF funds in accordance with Congressional intent, but identified \$80 million that may need to be returned. Finally, the Department and DOD have not provided enough resources to adequately train members of the Afghan Women's Police Corps. Twenty-two recommendations were made to DOD, the Department, or both agencies.

Summaries of Prior Reports – USAID OIG

<http://oig.usaid.gov/auditandspecialbyyear>

Audit of USAID’s Office of Food for Peace Syria-Related Activities

Report No. 8-276-14-003-P, July 30, 2014

This audit examined USAID’s Food for Peace (FFP) program was providing food for the intended recipients in Syria. The audit concluded that food commodities, including flour and food rations, were reaching northern and southern Syria through the program. As of February 2014, FFP implementers had procured more than 24,000 metric tons of flour and more than 195,000 food parcels. However, the audit identified areas for improvement for which we made recommendations.

Audit of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives’ Syria-Related Activities

Report No. 8-276-14-002-P, July 30, 2014

This audit examined whether USAID’s Office of Transition Initiative’s (OTI’s) efforts were building inclusive and accountable governance structures that reflect the will and needs of the Syrian people. It determined that the extent to which OTI’s efforts were successfully building inclusive and accountable governance structures was unclear because the contractor had not conducted formal evaluations of overall program impact because the program was still relatively new—only slightly more than 1 year into the 3-year program. However, the program had made progress on awarding grants with the program goal in mind and the contractor had taken steps to establish mechanisms to monitor both program activities and the changing environment in Syria. The audit identified inconsistencies in some activity data and made recommendations related to these areas.

Audit of USAID’s Lebanon Industry Value Chain Development Project

Report No. 8-268-14-001-P, July 8, 2014

This audit examined whether USAID/Lebanon’s Industry Value Chain Development Project is developing competitive value chains to increase income for rural populations. The audit found that, the project generally was making progress toward targets but lacked a definition for a “fully functioning value chain” that would enable the mission to evaluate the impact of this project objective. The audit also found that the project did not conduct full grant sustainability analyses in all cases. The report included recommendations to address these issues.

Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Broadening Participation through Civil Society Project

Report No. 6-267-14-006-P, February 12, 2014

This audit examined whether USAID/Iraq’s Broadening Participation through Civil Society Project has increased the ability of civil society to contribute to Iraq’s democratic and community development. The audit determined that the project activities implemented in its first year generally had positive results. However, the project as a whole was behind, and numerous activities were changed substantially or canceled. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

**Audit of USAID/Jordan’s Strengthening Family Planning Project
Report No. 6-278-14-005-P, January 22, 2014**

This audit examined whether USAID/Jordan’s Strengthening Family Planning Project achieved its goal of expanding access to and improving quality and use of family planning services. The project made clear progress toward these goals. The project made it easier to access family planning services through its primary implementer and improved the quality of and increased demand for services. However, the program identified that the primary implementer was not making progress towards financial sustainability because it lost money on each client by offering deeply discounted services. The report included recommendations addressing this and other problems.

**Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Administrative Reform Project
Report No. 6-267-14-004-P, December 15, 2013**

This audit examined whether USAID/Iraq’s Administrative Reform Project achieved its goal of improving the functions of Iraqi Government institutions to improve service delivery processes through better governance and resource management. The audit determined that the project had mixed results. It is carrying out the second component successfully. However, it struggled with its first and third components, and together they represent 72 percent of the funding. Problems included a lack of support from the Iraqi government, the payment of \$1,071,658 in fees for contract deliverables that did not meet contract requirements, and weak oversight of the project by USAID/Iraq, among other issues. The report included recommendations to address these problems.

**Audit of USAID/Jordan’s Fiscal Reform Project II
Report No. 6-278-14-003-P (Revised), December 11, 2013**

This audit examined whether USAID/Jordan’s Fiscal Reform Project II was achieving its main goals of macroeconomic stability and economic growth through improving the Jordanian Ministry of Finance’s public financial management and fiscal policy. The project was partially meeting its goals. Staff at the Ministry of Finance and other counterparts said the project has provided valuable technical assistance and analysis. Nevertheless, the audit also determined that the sustainability of the government’s system for financial management information was uncertain, USAID/Jordan’s monitoring of project performance was inadequate, and the mission did not manage trade and investment funds effectively. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

**Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Elections Support Follow-on Project
Report No. 6-267-14-002-P, December 5, 2013**

This audit examined whether actions taken in response to recommendations from a previous audit of elections support were incorporated into the follow-on project and how they affected the project performance. The audit determined that the actions USAID/Iraq took in response were effective. However, it also determined that many of the strategic planning and capacity-building activities were not meeting targets, thus jeopardizing the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission’s ability to strategically plan for future elections effectively. The report included recommendations to rectify this situation.

Survey of Selected USAID Syria-related Activities

Report No. 6-276-14-001-S, December 1, 2013

This survey identified USAID's activities related to the Syrian crisis and determined whether USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and its implementers had taken reasonable actions to manage and mitigate risks while responding to the Syrian crisis. It described USAID's assistance activities, the majority of which supported activities in a variety of sectors such as health, logistics support, commodities (food and nonfood assistance), and protection. The report also noted that USAID and its implementers have taken steps to manage the significant risks associated with working in Syria by implementing a variety of internal controls.

Audit of USAID/Lebanon's Investment in Microfinance Program

Report No. 6-268-13-015-P, July 17, 2013

This audit examined whether USAID/Lebanon's Investment in Microfinance program was achieving its goals to increase sales, create jobs, and advance economic growth. The audit found that while the program generally improved access to credit by providing loans to more than 6,300 borrowers, there was insufficient data to confirm anecdotal examples that borrowers' income increased as a result. The audit also found that the mission did not obtain sustainability commitments from two of eight microfinance institutions. The report included recommendations to address these issues.

Audit of USAID/Lebanon's Water and Wastewater Sector Support Program

Report No. 6-268-13-014-P, June 23, 2013

This audit examined whether USAID/Lebanon's Water and Wastewater Sector Support Program was improving water and wastewater treatment services in Lebanon. We found that the program is achieving its goal to improve water services, but not in the case of wastewater which was eliminated from the program. The program implemented small- and medium-scale water projects while also increasing the capacity of the water establishments by training establishment employees on lab equipment, enterprise resource planning systems, and operations and maintenance. The audit also found that sustainability of water projects was questionable. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

Audit of USAID/Iraq's Primary Health Care Project in Iraq

Report No. 6-267-13-013-P, June 16, 2013

This audit examined whether USAID/Iraq's Primary Health Care Project was achieving its main goals of supporting management systems and processes, delivering quality health care, and expanding community partnerships in Iraq. The project has taken steps to address the sustainability of its activities. The project, in coordination with the Ministry of Health, established a national technical advisory group and brought together multiple ministries and donors to share information on activities that affect the delivery of primary health care. However, USAID/Iraq's oversight of contract administration was weak. Specifically project deliverables were late and steps to promote the sustainability of the project in Kurdistan were limited. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

**Survey of Security Services Employed by USAID/Iraq’s Contractors and Grantees
Report No. 6-267-13-002-S, June 13, 2013**

This survey examined whether security and life support costs billed by Sallyport Global Services (Sallyport) were allocated reasonably among USAID/Iraq contracts and to follow up on Recommendations 1 and 3 of “Survey of Security Incidents Reported by Private Security Contractors of USAID/Iraq’s Contractors and Grantees” (Report No. E-267-11-001-S), issued November 29, 2010. This survey found that Sallyport did not allocate costs reasonably and that USAID/Iraq should update serious incident reporting to clarify lines of communication since the U.S. military is no longer in Iraq. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

Audit of USAID/Lebanon’s Developing Rehabilitation Assistance to Schools and Teacher Improvement Program

Report No. 6-268-13-011-P, April 28, 2013

This audit examined whether USAID/Lebanon’s Developing Rehabilitation Assistance to Schools and Teacher Improvement Program was achieving its goal to improve educational outcomes. While as of December 2012—more than 2 years into the 5-year program—29 of the 1,400 schools slated for rehabilitation were completed, and 154 more were under way, the mission would not be able to complete all of the renovations by the end of the program. Furthermore, the mission did not make sure that program activities were sustainable. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

Audit of USAID/Jordan’s Youth for the Future Program

Report No. 6-278-13-010-P, April 15, 2013

This audit examined whether USAID/Jordan’s Youth for the Future Program was achieving its goal to improve the livelihood opportunities for disadvantaged young people through training and improving public sector policies and practices that increase the number of youth finding employment, engaging in their own business, or returning to school. The program succeeded at building capacity in some community organizations and Ministry of Social Development. At least 20 community organizations improved in the areas of youth outreach and recruitment, life skills training, career guidance and mentoring, and parent participation. However, the program was not satisfying employment needs as only 785, or 19 percent, of the 4,081 youths who completed program-supported training had retained work for 6 months as of September 2012. The report included recommendations addressing this and other problems.

Audit of USAID/Jordan’s Education Reform Support Program

Report No. 6-278-13-007-P, February 18, 2013

This audit examined whether USAID/Jordan’s Education Reform Support Program was achieving its primary goal of helping the Jordanian Government make progress in implementing its education initiative through renovating schools and building capacity of educational institutions. The audit determined that the mission was making progress through renovations of kindergarten classrooms, career counseling centers, and counselor offices, which met Ministry of Education standards. The audit found several issues in the monitoring and administration of the program such as the program missing targets on training indicators. The report included recommendations addressing this and other problems.

**Review of USAID/Jordan’s Cash Transfer Activities
Report No. 6-278-13-001-S, January 31, 2013**

This review was conducted at the request of USAID/Jordan to examine whether the mission managed the cash transfer program in accordance with the agreement and statutory requirements. The review found that while the agreement was helping the Jordanian Government pay its external debt to foreign lenders, USAID/Jordan generally did not manage the agreement in accordance with the agreement and statutory requirements in all respects. The audit found that the mission did not fully document its local currency needs assessment; and the Government of Jordan withdrew funds before qualified debt payments were reimbursed and used funds on prohibited activities. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

**Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Access to Justice Program
Report No. 6-267-13-004-P, December 16, 2012**

This audit examined whether USAID/Iraq’s Access to Justice Program was achieving its objective of improving vulnerable and disadvantaged Iraqis’ access to the legal system. The program made some progress in implementing activities under grants. Activities included public awareness campaigns about women’s rights, advocacy forums about the rights of the disabled, training lawyers to provide services to vulnerable and disadvantaged Iraqis, and providing training and resources to legal clinics that assist and represent vulnerable and disadvantaged citizens. However, the audit found that data to measure overall progress toward the program’s goal was unreliable and that certain activities were not sustainable after USAID ceased funding them. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

**Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Legislative Strengthening Program
Report No. 6-267-13-001-P, October 3, 2012**

This audit examined whether USAID/Iraq’s Legislative Strengthening Program achieved its objectives of supporting a parliamentary institute and developing the capacity of ministers of parliament (MPs) and staff. While the program had some accomplishments such as providing assistance to MPs and staff in developing and managing budgets and implementation of a fellowship program for professionals to provide research to inform Parliament on legislative matters; the mission did not adequately manage implementation issues. The Government of Iraq refused to continue participating in the program and the mission terminated it. As a result key activities were not implemented. The report made recommendations to help avoid similar issues in the future.

**Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Performance Evaluation and Reporting for Results Management Program
Report No. E-267-12-004-P, July 30, 2012**

This audit examined whether USAID/Iraq’s use of a contractor for monitoring and evaluation services improved program management and oversight of USAID/Iraq programs. The audit determined that the program did not operate as intended and, therefore, the contract did not significantly improve program management and oversight at USAID/Iraq. The audit determined that among other problems, the mission did not fully use the contracted monitoring services, or completely implement USAID OIG recommendations from a predecessor program. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

**Audit of USAID/Lebanon's University Student Assistance Program I
Report No. 6-268-12-006-P, April 30, 2012**

This audit examined whether USAID/Lebanon's University Student Assistance Program I was achieving its goal to provide scholarships to undergraduate students at Lebanese American University and Haigazian University based on established criteria. The audit determined that the program was achieving its goals, but that several monitoring activities required improvement such as developing annual and overall program performance targets. The report included recommendations to address this and other problems.

**Audit of USAID/Iraq's Electoral Technical Assistance Program
Report No. E-267-12-003-P, March 22, 2012**

This audit examined whether USAID/Iraq's electoral program was achieving its main goals of (1) providing technical assistance to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to conduct elections and (2) building capacity for a sustainable electoral system that would require minimal international assistance. Regarding the first goal, the audit determined that both the program and United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq provided technical assistance to IHEC in support of elections conducted in Iraq between January 2005 and September 2011. Nevertheless, the extent to which the program played a role was unclear because the program did not use a performance management plan to define the assistance to be provided and the results to be achieved or to measure what the program actually achieved. As for the goal to build capacity for a sustainable electoral system, the technical assistance provided built IHEC's capacity to conduct elections to some extent. However, all parties involved acknowledged that IHEC is not sustainable at this point. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

**Audit of the Sustainability of USAID/Iraq-Funded Information Technology Systems
Report No. E-267-12-002-P, March 21, 2012**

This audit examined whether USAID/Iraq-funded IT systems were used as intended. The audit determined that, of the 24 USAID/Iraq-funded IT systems, (1) 10 systems, totaling \$62.1 million, were not completed, not functional when delivered, or not used by the Government of Iraq as intended, (2) 3 systems, totaling \$1.5 million, were used as intended, and (3) 2 systems, totaling \$2.5 million, were partially used. For the remaining nine systems, totaling \$7.1 million, the mission was unable to provide documentation that the systems were used or to provide direct contact information for the end users. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

**Audit of USAID/Lebanon's Landmines and War Victims Program
Report No. 6-268-12-004-P, January 18, 2012**

This audit examined whether USAID/Lebanon's Landmines and War Victims Project was achieving its main goals of expanding viable, sustainable economic opportunities for victims of landmines and war in the District of Jezzine, Lebanon. Although the project has had some successes in providing income-generating opportunities and ancillary or indirect benefits to some beneficiaries, its sustainability is questionable. The audit also identified several monitoring and financial management issues. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

Audit of USAID/Jordan’s Design for Sustainability in its Water Resources Program Report No. 6-278-12-002-P, December 22, 2011

This audit examined whether USAID/Jordan built sustainability into its water resources program to ensure that impact continues after USAID funding ceases. USAID/Jordan’s water program has achieved notable successes. For example, the construction of a desalination plant, a water demand project, and a community-based initiative for water demand management designed to increase the availability of water and improve water efficiency have benefited over 1 million people in the cities of Amman and Jerash. However, despite the successes achieved by USAID/Jordan, some of the mission’s projects to assist the Jordanian water sector may not be sustainable after USAID funding ceases because the projects have not addressed Jordan’s main water management concerns—specifically, water consumption by Jordan’s agriculture sector. The report included recommendations addressing this and other problems.

Survey of USAID/Iraq’s Awards and Subawards Report No. E-267-12-001-S, November 30, 2011

The objectives of this survey were to (1) compile and report data on USAID/Iraq awards, (2) compile and report data on USAID/Iraq-funded subawards, and (3) determine whether recipients of USAID awards have complied with applicable audit requirements for their subawardees. This report contained no recommendations.

Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Action Program Activities Implemented by International Relief and Development

Report No. E-267-12-001-P, November 15, 2011

This audit examined whether USAID/Iraq activities implemented by IRD under the Community Action Program were achieving their main goals of communities better articulating their needs and mobilizing their resources to solve common problems. The audit determined that IRD’s activities under USAID/Iraq’s Community Action Program partially achieved their goals. IRD effectively formed community action groups and developed initial community action plans, completed projects, and used a process for project development. However, the principal hindrances to the achievement of IRD’s goals were that completed projects did not target the identified, prioritized needs of the communities and that USAID/Iraq’s decision to accelerate the spending of program funds had negative consequences. The report included recommendations addressing these and other problems.

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GLOSSARY

Contingency Operation: U.S. Code, Title 10 – Armed Forces, section 101(a)(13)

The term “**contingency operation**” means a military operation that—(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or (B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or 12406 of this title, chapter 15 of this title, section 712 of title 14, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.

Execute Order (EXORD): As defined in DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed.

Overseas Contingency Operations: As defined in Sections 849 and 1273 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013

The term “overseas contingency operations” means military operations outside the United States and its territories and possessions that are a contingency operation (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(13) of title 10, U.S. Code).

United Nations Security Council – Current Members³⁵

The UN Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote.

Permanent and Non-Permanent Members

The Council is composed of 15 Members:

- five permanent members:
 - China,
 - France,
 - Russian Federation,
 - the United Kingdom, and
 - the United States

³⁵ Posted at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/>.

- and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly (with end of term date):
 - Angola (2016)
 - Chad (2015)
 - Chile (2015)
 - Jordan (2015)
 - Lithuania (2015)
 - Malaysia (2016)
 - New Zealand (2016)
 - Nigeria (2015)
 - Spain (2016)
 - Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (2016)

Non-Council Member States

More than 60 United Nations Member States have never been Members of the Security Council.

A State which is a Member of the United Nations but not of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the Council considers that that country's interests are affected. Both Members and non-members of the United Nations, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Council, may be invited to take part, without a vote, in the Council's discussions; the Council sets the conditions for participation by a non-member State.

ACRONYMS

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CTPF	Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DOS	U.S. Department of State
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GoI	Government of Iraq
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ITEF	Iraq Train and Equip Fund
MSO	Moderate Syrian Opposition
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operation
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OIR	Operation INHERENT RESOLVE
SOC	Syrian Opposition Coalition
STEF	Syria Train and Equip Fund
UN	United Nations
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
WFP	UN World Food Program

Lead Inspector General for
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE
FY 2015 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan

