

From Afghanistan through  
Sequestration  
toward Regionally Aligned  
and Mission Tailored Forces



# **ARMY**

# **EQUIPPING GUIDANCE**

# **2013 THROUGH 2016**



U.S. ARMY

# **ARMY EQUIPPING GUIDANCE 2013 THROUGH 2016**

**From Afghanistan through Sequestration  
toward Regionally Aligned and Mission Tailored Forces**

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20 June 2013




## **FOREWORD**

The enclosed Army Equipping Guidance is to ensure we get the right equipment, to the right units, on the right installations, at the absolute least possible cost. Using the tenets of Mission Command, this guidance is meant to empower decision making at the lowest and most efficient level possible. Army Sustainment Command, exercising its new role as the Lead Materiel Integrator, will serve as the focal point for synchronizing and directing many of these efforts.

We are experiencing turbulent times as we work through major force structure and stationing changes, with potentially more to follow, while deploying and redeploying units into combat and other named operations. These activities are difficult during “normal” times, but conditions today are anything but normal. Efficiency is paramount. We have less time for our civilian workforce to get this difficult work done with furloughs. We have less money for costs such as contractors and transportation because of sequestration cuts and the added pressure of unforecasted Overseas Contingency Operations requirements. Every minute or dollar used inefficiently now produces a very steep reduction to our warfighting capability.

This guidance lays out three lines of effort: equipping units for their missions; increasing readiness by redistributing equipment; and saving money. To do this, we have identified a multitude of tasks, missions, and challenges we will face; each of which we must tackle at the lowest possible command-levels and at the least possible cost.

This guidance is effective immediately. I encourage you to share this across your formations to ensure everyone understands our intent and path forward.



**JOHN F. CAMPBELL**  
General, U.S. Army  
Vice Chief of Staff



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**INTRODUCTION**

*“An Army that is capable of many missions, at many speeds, at many sizes, under many conditions, and can operate in any environment.”<sup>1</sup>*

We are in an incredibly turbulent time for equipping our units and, as the Vice Chief of Staff states in the foreword, we have to “get the right equipment, to the right units, on the right installations, at the least possible cost.” Over the next three years, we have to: deploy and redeploy units to combat in Afghanistan; retrograde theater provided equipment from Afghanistan; be prepared for possible reorganization of our Brigade Combat Teams and other forces; keep Korea-based forces ready-to-fight; reestablish our global and regional response forces; reset our equipment from a decade plus of war; re-station forces as we reduce the active Army from a wartime high of 570,000 in 2010; replace equipment in our reserve components per Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1225.06; integrate wartime equipment into our permanent structure; remain prepared for Defense Support to Civil Authorities and other Homeland Defense priorities; improve mission command through capability set fielding; divest equipment we no longer need; and do it all with substantially less money than we had planned due to sequestration and other budget reductions. Failure to get these tasks right will impact the equipment readiness of our units for years to come

The Army’s plan for accomplishing this immense equipment challenge is outlined in a series of three documents, this is the third.

- **Army Equipment Modernization Strategy (March 2013)**: This Secretary of the Army (SecArmy) and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) multi-year strategy provides guidance and establishes a framework for synchronizing the requirement, resourcing, and acquisition processes to modernize our equipment with the underlying foundation of being “*Versatile and Tailorable, yet Affordable and Cost-Effective.*” It provides the strategic underpinnings for how we will adjust our equipment modernization programs due to changes in the strategic, technological, and fiscal environments across our equipment portfolios.
- **2014 Army Equipment Modernization Plan (May 2013)**: This SecArmy and CSA yearly plan provides the results of the annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process and summarizes how the Army's Research Development and Acquisition budget request is linked to the Army's strategy. It details the dollars, quantities, and rationale for the equipment we will procure in the yearly President’s Budget and is based upon the underlying foundation of “*Starts with the Soldier and Squad.*”
- **Army Equipping Guidance 2013 – 2016 (June 2013)**: This Headquarters, Department of the Army multi-year guidance provides direction for Army Components, major Commands, and units to allocate and distribute equipment. The underlying foundation is to identify and minimize equipment risks and costs as we transition “*from Afghanistan through Sequestration towards Regionally Aligned and Mission Tailored Forces.*” This guidance also outlines:
  - o **Lead Materiel Integrator**: The role of the Army’s Lead Materiel Integrator is to synchronize the

<sup>1</sup> General Raymond T. Odierno, Military Strategy Forum: The Future of the United States Army: Critical Questions for a Period of Transition, CSIS, 1 November 2012



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distribution and redistribution of Army equipment and to provide the force with visibility of the Army's inventory, a key condition to achieving cost-effective equipment readiness across the force (see Annex D);

- o Future Force Generation Model: The developing vision of how the Army will resource rotational and non-rotational operational force units;
- o Total Force: Reiterates the Army's commitment to equipping the reserve components by providing information on how the Army will meet Critical Dual Use and DoDI 1225.06 equipment needs in accordance with the Secretary of the Army's Total Force Policy (see Annex C).

After a decade of war, the Army finds itself in reasonably good shape in terms of equipment on hand. In the aggregate, the Army has just under ninety percent of its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) required equipment, much of which is new or recently refurbished. However, this does not represent a true or accurate picture of the Army's equipment health. After the drawdown from Afghanistan is complete, it will

take up to five years for the Army to complete reset due to the impact of sequestration. Some of the challenges are:

- Delaying Wartime Reset: Some of the equipment is returning from combat, requiring it to be reset, rebuilt, or recapitalized; however, budget reductions will delay this process at both depot and field sites;
- Equipment in the Wrong Place: While our equipment is in the right place today sustaining active combat operations in Afghanistan, there is a significant portion of our gear that is in the wrong place for the future given the adjustments to regionally aligned forces and redesigned units. Our challenge is to manage retrograde and redistribution to ensure equipment is delivered to the correct formations at the minimum cost possible. Minimizing second destination transportation will be one of the essential elements in our equipping guidance;
- Changing Organizational Designs and Force Reductions: Force structure decisions have been delayed, with further delays anticipated, making planning problematic. Therefore, we must maintain the flexibility for redistribution between and within installations to support reorganizations with short implementation timelines.

# FACTORS AFFECTING THE EQUIPPING GUIDANCE



## FACTORS AFFECTING THE EQUIPPING GUIDANCE

This equipping guidance is affected by several important factors. This section describes some important implications:

**Fiscal Environment – Rapidly Declining Resources:** Already planned budget reductions, Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)-to-Base funding transitions, and sequestration will be at the forefront of all equipping guidance decisions for the next several years.

- **Implication:** Our ability to move equipment across the Army will need to be carefully synchronized and constantly adjusted. Procurement quantities we had planned to receive will be reduced due to sequestration; limited second destination transportation funding will impact equipment movement; maintenance restrictions will impede the ability to transfer fully operational equipment; and units will be required to assume certain risks in the support of MTOE equipment to sustain non-standard equipment prior to documentation and sustainment funding being in place. Utilizing the Decision Support Tool (DST) to minimize costs is a guiding imperative, along with solving equipment shortages at the lowest levels possible.

**Strategic Environment – Changing Force Structure:** We will retrograde from Afghanistan; reduce and/or change force structure across all components; change Force Generation models; and alter the equipment mix and density in our formations. Additionally, sequestration may drive force structure to lower levels, creating more equipment challenges.

- **Implication:** We must initially focus on returning equipment from Afghanistan to the correct source of repair or unit. We will initiate a program that will allow redeploying units to

bring theater excess to their home installations to fill organization shortages across their installations. Since force files detailing unit inactivations and reorganizations have not been released early in the process, we will have to do prudent planning to ensure we do not cause instant unreadiness or strand equipment at an installation that has no capability to maintain it. Given recurring tensions in Korea, it is critical we keep units there ready to fight, prepare units for rotation to Korea, and balance new fieldings with training schedules.

**Technological Environment – Rapidly Integrating Equipment:** New technologies will create training and equipping challenges. While the rate of innovation provides us with unprecedented opportunities, it can also make us extremely vulnerable to adversaries who can quickly create and/or exploit capability gaps.

- **Implication:** Many new technologies will be fielded in capability sets or deployment bundles requiring a complex series of actions to integrate these capabilities and, as we move to regionally aligned and mission tailored forces, we expect units to need unique equipment. Coordination, integration, and synchronization of fielding schedules and equipment distribution will be essential element of success. All of this will place an additional burden on our property accountability systems and processes.

**Business Process – Lead Materiel Integrator:** We are implementing Army Directive 2011-06 designating the Army Materiel Command as the Army's Lead Materiel Integrator. Their mission is to synchronize the distribution and redistribution of materiel in accordance with Army directives and priorities. This concept separates allocating equipment to the Components (an Army headquarters' responsibility) from managing

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equipment distribution and redistribution to Army commands (the Lead Materiel Integrator mission). Army priorities drive both activities.

- **Implication:** This change in business process effects training, automation, and authorities. To achieve the benefits of the Lead Materiel Integrator initiative, we must exercise Mission Command within our materiel enterprise and rapidly embrace this opportunity to streamline our processes and procedures to become more effective and efficient.

**Implementing the New Defense Strategy - Regionally Aligned and Mission Tailored Forces:** Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to Joint Task Force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable them to shape the environment. This includes Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command,

and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. Mission Tailored Forces will be those Army units aligned against a particular mission. These forces will maintain proficiency in the fundamentals of unified land operations, but also possess particular capabilities tailored for one or more of the specified missions.

- **Implication:** These forces may need only their MTOE equipment or could be provided mission specific equipment. This approach requires us to adapt forces from the lowest levels and will create unique challenges in aligning equipment needs, non-standard equipment, and training specifically tailored to the mission on what could be very short timelines. It will also change how we think about equipment readiness metrics.



THE EQUIPPING GUIDANCE  
LINES OF EFFORT





*Toward Regionally Aligned and Mission Tailored Forces*

# THE EQUIPPING GUIDANCE LINES OF EFFORT

The centerpiece of the Army's 2014 Equipment Modernization Plan is the Soldier and Squad. Whether in combat, executing Theater Cooperation Operations, or providing Defense Support to Civilian Authorities, Soldiers must be equipped, trained, organized, and prepared to operate in all conditions, on complex and uncertain battlefields, with overmatch capabilities.

This equipping guidance encompasses three lines of effort:

Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities responsibilities.

1. **Equip Units for their Missions:** Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the structured progression of readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units. Equipping to ARFORGEN is the main line-of-effort. Unit-based equipping provides increasing levels of equipment to rotational units based on their ARFORGEN phase, critical equipping points, and assigned mission. It also equips non-rotational units and ensures the reserve components have the MTOE-authorized equipment they need to support Homeland

• **Significant Challenge:** For the next two years, we are caught between two different models to equip the force: the current model based upon an Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) ARFORGEN and the future Force Generation model based upon three distinct force pools. As the Army transitions the force generation process, priorities will continue to drive distribution and redistribution.

2. **Increase Readiness by Redistributing Equipment:** This supporting effort's focus is to




Figure 1. The Army Equipping Guidance

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## *From Afghanistan through Sequestration*

move equipment we already own or will procure in the near-term to increase overall unit readiness.

- **Significant Challenge:** While the Army has just under ninety percent of its MTOE equipment on-hand, at the individual unit level they either have too much or not enough. Additionally, we have to transition away from a theater provided equipment model, to a pre-positioned and training activity set model for selected missions and capabilities.

3. **Save Money:** Our institutional processes and policies must take into account the significant

reduction in funding that we are now operating under. Every dollar that is not spent wisely directly diminishes the opportunity to reduce risk elsewhere.

- **Significant Challenge:** The implementation of the Budget Control Act of 2011, commencement of sequestration in 2013, higher than expected war costs in Afghanistan, and reductions in 2014 and beyond will reduce the operations, maintenance, and procurement funding needed to keep our formations ready for their assigned missions.



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# EQUIP UNITS FOR THEIR MISSIONS

We will use a series of “Aim Points” and “S-level goals” to ensure equipment is delivered at the correct time in the right quantities:

- **Aim Points:** Aim Points provide a means to track units’ state of readiness as they move through ARFORGEN. They are targets at specified points in time that enable training to increase readiness. They enhance the ability of Army leadership, resource managers, and force

providers to make accurate and timely decisions to mitigate risk and synchronize manning, equipping, training, and sourcing.

- **S-level Goals:** Equipping (S)-level goals provide a means to measure units’ equipment levels to achieve a prescribed state of readiness (see Annex B). Like Aim Points, these metrics enhance our ability to make accurate and timely decisions. The goals are applied to




FIGURE 2. Current ARFORGEN equipping targets

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all echelons, but most commonly are applied to brigade-sized units (for example Brigade Combat Teams, and functional and multi-functional brigades).

**Current ARFORGEN Model:**

For the immediate future, the ARFORGEN model remains largely unchanged. The Army's equipping goals for active units, with a deployment dwell of 1:2, is to equip them to S-3 at Aim Point # 1 (Reset (R) + 180 days) and S-2 at Aim Point # 2 (R+1 year). The Army's equipping goals for the reserve components are in line with those of the active force.

- Equipping Priorities: Will be based on the Dynamic Army Resource Priority List (DARPL) which for the next two years includes Expeditionary, Mission Critical, and Enhanced Mission Capability forces such as units in Afghanistan, the Global Response Force, forward deployed units, and low density/high-demand units.

**Future Force Generation Model:**

The Army is developing a Future Force Generation model that according to the 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance: "sustains the Army's ability to provide a manned, trained, and equipped Total Force to meet the full range of current and emerging combatant commander requirements. The Army must remain able to tailor its versatile mix of both active and reserve capabilities and deploy them rapidly for unified land operations of various durations. The Army will avoid the costs caused by generating readiness in excess of requirements."

The Future Force Generation model consists of three distinct Force Pools: Mission Force Pool, Rotational Force Pool, and the Operational Sustainment Force Pool. The equipping goals are not the same for all units in all force pools.

- Mission Force Pool: Consists of theater committed forces such as the 2nd Infantry Division Brigade Combat Team in Korea, low density units with high operational demand requirements (e.g. Terminal High Altitude




FIGURE 3. Future Force Generation Force Pools

Air Defense), and units required to maintain a sustained mission readiness like the 20th Support Command. In general, Mission Force Pool corps, divisions, and Brigade Combat Teams will be maintained at S-1. Some Army Reserve functional and multi-functional brigades will be equipped to at least S-2, the rest will be equipped to S-1. Army Special Operation Forces will be maintained at no less than ninety percent of their required equipment.

- **Rotational Force Pool:** Consists of those units allocated for deployment or apportioned against a contingency plan. These units move through the Reset, Train/ Ready, and Available cycles in preparation for a rotation into a known deployment in support of planned operations or remain within the Available state for potential contingency operations. The majority of units currently scheduled to deploy in support of OEF are examples of these units. Rotational Force Pool units will be incrementally equipped to S-1, like the current ARFORGEN model, but should be able to retain much of their equipment when they return to the Reset Pool.
- **Operational Sustainment Force Pool:** Is comprised of units not currently allocated to planned operations or apportioned to contingency operations. Units in this pool may be manned and equipped at lower levels and achieve training proficiency levels based on available training days. Examples include 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at the National Training Center, and Army National Guard division headquarters. Operational Sustainment Force Pool units will be equipped incrementally to S-2 at two years into their training cycle and, in some cases, S-1 three years into their training cycle.

**Generating Force:** The Army's institutional training and force generation structure will be equipped with the appropriate mix of modernized equipment to ensure that Soldiers train on the equipment they will encounter in units. The minimum level of equipping necessary to meet programmed training mission demands is at least eighty percent for training units, however, we will strive to exceed that. In all cases, existing Army prioritization processes (e.g. the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board, Training Resource Arbitration Panel, and the Equipment Changes in MTOE/TDA (4610-R) process) will determine whether specific capabilities or units will be filled to higher minimum levels. Equipping installations for training support and funding sustainment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**Equipping the Reserve Components:** In accordance with Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, the reserve components will be equipped to provide the operational capabilities and strategic depth required of an operational force. They will be "consistently and predictably equipped" and that the "priority for the distribution of new and combat-serviceable equipment, with associated support and test equipment, shall be given to units scheduled for mission deployment or employment first, regardless of component." (see Annex C)

**Critical Dual Use (CDU) Equipment:** Army Regulation 220-1 establishes the process for designating a list of Army MTOE equipment that is deemed critical to the execution of Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) missions by Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. The goal is to equip these units to no less than eighty percent of their required critical dual use items, ensuring they have the equipment needed to meet domestic operational needs regardless of the ARFORGEN cycle. Some

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states may have insufficient quantity on-hand due to deployments. To compensate for this shortfall they enact Emergency Management Assistance Compacts with neighboring states in which they pledge to assist each other. The list of critical dual use items is available at [www.g8.army.mil](http://www.g8.army.mil).

## **Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Requirements:**

Units that have specific CBRNE response force missions, such as Civil Support Teams and Homeland Response Forces will be equipped for and ready to meet these specific mission sets.

**Non-standard Equipment:** Eleven years of war led to a proliferation of non-standard equipment purchases to fill Quick Reaction Capabilities gaps. This equipment must be properly documented (requirements, cataloging, and component listing) to

ensure visibility and accountability. The individual capability portfolio Non-Standard Equipment Army Requirements Oversight Council results in the Capability Retention Requirement and Implementation Plan that outlines actions necessary for disposition of this equipment. In accordance with the Secretary of Defense guidance regarding the reinvestment of OCO capabilities, OCO funding should be used to the greatest extent possible to replace, reset, or recapitalize this equipment. Those pieces of equipment that are not needed must be divested to avoid unnecessary storage and sustainment cost. Non-standard equipment (such as equipment to support Capability Set 13/14) must be documented with component listings to ensure visibility and accountability of assets. A crosswalk of this non-standard equipment to standard capabilities will provide readiness improvements until the type classification process is completed.



*Toward Regionally Aligned and Mission Tailored Forces*

## INCREASE READINESS BY REDISTRIBUTING EQUIPMENT

Currently we have a very high level of equipment on hand at the aggregate level across all components but it is not where it needs to be. Part of the reason for misaligned equipment is that we have equipment sets in Afghanistan, equipment in transit, and equipment in depot maintenance being recapitalized or reset. Because of the pace of combat operations and units deploying with mission tailored equipment packages, we have many units with equipment excess to their MTOE authorizations that must be redistributed. Our documentation of required equipment, in certain cases, is incorrect thereby showing an imbalance.

**Lead Materiel Integrator:** Army Materiel Command is the Army’s Lead Materiel Integrator (LMI) with the mission to synchronize the distribution and redistribution of materiel in accordance with directives, priorities, and changes to Army requirements. To do this, it utilizes the Decision Support Tool, a Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW) application with visibility of all equipment, all materiel requirements, and priorities that enable decision making. While a full summary of this concept is at Annex D, this process enables:

- Redistribution at the Lowest Level: Users from HQDA all the way to brigade level,

are given permission (commensurate with their authority) to redistribute and optimize equipment distributions at any time. Designed as a bottom-up approach, the Lead Materiel Integrator process encourages units to redistribute at the lowest level possible;

- Collaborative Decision Making: To achieve the desired results, users must collaborate within the tool through a vetting module that allows stakeholders to comment and recommend approval or disapproval of recommended sourcing solutions;
- Accurate Data: The Lead Materiel Integrator process relies on accurate data to achieve an optimal distribution of equipment across the Army. Army Materiel Command’s Logistics Support Activity’s (LOGSA) Logistics Information Warehouse is the Army’s single authoritative materiel data repository. The Army requires that units ensure property books in Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE), the Army’s web-based Combat Service Support property accountability system, reflect all equipment-on-hand. The Logistics Support Activity provides authoritative Sustaining Program Evaluation Group funded depot output data to the Army Equipping Enterprise System (AE2S).

Once allocations are set by the System Synchronization Officer (SSO) in AE2S those allocations are provided to LOGSA for inclusion in the Decision Support Tool. The Army Sustainment Command’s Materiel Integrators use the Decision Support Tool in distribution planning. Once final distribution plans are produced,

| INCREASE READINESS BY REDISTRIBUTING EQUIPMENT |            |          |          |
|--|------------|----------|----------|
| YEAR   | ACTIVE EOH | ARNG EOH | USAR EOH |
| 2001   | 85%        | 81%      | 75%      |
| 2012   | 91%        | 89%      | 86%      |

Figure 4. Equipment on Hand Percentages from CY 2001 to 2012



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the Decision Support Tool, through LOGSA, provides all Major End Item distribution plans to the Army Equipping Enterprise System. This coordination allows the SSO to conduct allocations in one system and provides the means for Army G-8 to perform its oversight functions, submit mandated reports requirements, and establishes a baseline assessment for subsequent POM development.

**Focus on Readiness:** Given scarce funding and limited time, commands will prioritize the redistribution of those pieces of equipment that affect unit readiness the most. Working with the Lead Materiel Integrator, commands will work with HQDA G4 and Army Sustainment Command to establish a “troubled LIN” process that identifies from unit readiness reports those pieces of equipment that are causing the greatest readiness shortages. The process will also determine if the LIN is excess elsewhere in the Army. We will not have all the equipment we need at all times for every formation. LMI efforts such as the “troubled LIN” process provide the Army the flexibility to maintain a high state of equipment-on-hand for formations based on their mission, while simultaneously meeting a reduced equipment-on-hand training requirement for organizations that are not prioritized in the Force Generation model.

**Distributing Shortages:** As stated in the Army Equipment Modernization Strategy, we will not be able to afford to procure equipment for every unit, thereby forcing prioritization of equipment allocations between operational units, force generation organizations, operational readiness and repair cycle floats, Army Prepositioned Stocks, operational projects, Army War Reserve Stock, and War Reserves Supporting Allies. We will establish a management process to prescribe minimum essential quantities to manage equipment-on-hand shortages to support home station training and to prescribe

authorizations for pooled equipment. Over the past several years, we used the Force Feasibility Review (FFR), a strategy which establishes interim resourcing levels of selected line item numbers (LINs). The FFR resourcing levels were prioritized by DARPL and by unit type. Current plans consider eliminating the use of FFR not later than the 1st Quarter of Fiscal Year 2015. If the FFR is eliminated, shortage LINs will be distributed in accordance with the DARPL and force generation progressive readiness requirements. Alternate processes, such as Basis of Issue Plan adjustments, may also be used to mitigate the shortfall.

**Be Innovative with Retrograde:** As we depart Afghanistan and prepare for operations in other parts of the world, our equipment is likely to be in the wrong place. We must strive to find innovative solutions, such as the Forces Command’s (FORSCOM) Theater Provided Equipment-to-Organization (TPE-to-ORG) concept where units bring back excess equipment that is needed for redistribution to other units on their installations. We must carefully balance the benefits of aggressively retrograding equipment with the challenge of stranding unneeded equipment at the wrong installations.

**Force Modernization and MTOE Updates:** The Army is considering changing the MTOE effective date from 15 October to a date that coincides with the start of a unit’s reset phase. This would facilitate synchronization of new equipment training and fielding and limit active component units’ comprehensive MTOE changes to one every 24 months, allowing materiel managers to more effectively and efficiently maximize readiness. More information on this will be provided should this occur.

**Paybacks to Reserve Components (RC):** DoDI 1225.06, Equipping the Reserve Forces, dated 16



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May 2012, states that, the Secretary of Defense must approve all proposals to withdraw, reduce, or loan any equipment from the reserve components and it requires that equipment be replaced. This DoDI requirement includes withdrawals that will last longer than ninety days; transfers to other components and countries; equipment directed to remain in theater beyond the original owning unit's rotation; and diversions of equipment funded through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation. At a minimum, all DoDI 1225.06 proposals will include a replacement plan and a memorandum of agreement that

originates in HQDA G8-FD signed by both the losing and gaining components. The instructions further outline reporting requirements in an effort to improve the transparency and traceability of equipment transfers. The instruction also provides for accountability of reserve component equipment inducted into depot maintenance as part of the Automatic Reset Induction program. To date, the Army has reconciled over 80,000 of the 85,000 pieces of equipment transferred out of the reserve components since 2003. (see Annex C, Addendum 1)





## SAVE MONEY

In the foreseeable future, equipment decisions must be both affordable and cost-effective, supported by the overall budget, and address known capability gaps. The opportunity cost of “overspending” to close a specific gap is that we will not be able to afford closing other gaps. We will make cost-informed decisions to manage equipment risk across the force. The sequester in 2013, higher than expected war costs in Afghanistan, and reductions in 2014 and beyond have reduced the operations, maintenance, and procurement funding needed to meet equipment readiness.

**Second Destination Transportation:** Every decision to move equipment must be informed by actual cost-estimates that include transportation and maintenance. These costs, if not carefully managed, can dramatically reduce the readiness of our Army. Getting equipment distribution right at the lowest levels and fixing shortages through internal redistribution is a priority. We will minimize or eliminate some second destination transportation costs by leveraging the TPE-to-ORG process (an HQDA Execution Order has been published). This process will provide TPE excess to theater operational requirements to redeploying units to fill their MTOE shortages or as excess to their authorizations to fill shortages for other units or activities at or near their home station. Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units will ensure lateral transfers are complete during the reset phase to take advantage of OCO funding.

**Property Accountability:** Property accountability impacts combat readiness. Accountability of equipment must be established and maintained through accurately and rapidly documenting inventories to enable 100 percent visibility (see Annex E). Accountability promotes timely decision making and supports meeting the

Congressionally mandated January 2014 deadline for audit-ability of Existence and Completeness of Military Equipment, General Equipment, and all Operating Materiel and Supplies.

**Reduce Excess:** All units will identify equipment excess to MTOE and Table of Distribution and Allowances requirements. The LMI DST can be used to identify the equipment and can inform command decisions regarding possible redistribution or divestiture solutions. Then Army Commands, Army Service Support Commands, and Direct Reporting Units will redistribute excess within their respective commands to fill shortages of authorized equipment. Units will report excess equipment in accordance with processes outlined in AR 710-2, AR 710-1, or HQDA Execution Orders. Units must identify equipment that is excess to requirements and use the LMI DST to inform redistribution or divestiture solutions.

**Divest to Reduce Costs to Preserve Purchasing Power:** To conserve scarce resources we will accept risk by divesting older systems and niche capabilities to decrease operating and operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and sustainment costs. When planning platform replacements and upgrades, we will assess the economically sustainable life of the current platforms to determine cost and risk of continuing to sustain, upgrade, or replace the platform. Our focus is to preserve as much of the Army’s budget as possible to focus scarce dollars on modernizing the force (across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities model) to achieve and sustain future capabilities. To achieve that end state the acquisition, sustainment, equipping, and materiel management community will conduct a forward-looking review of the Army’s equipping and modernization activities to identify when equipment will either cascade within

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the formations or be eligible for divestiture. By making the retain or divest decisions in advance of when the equipment becomes excess to unit mission requirements the Army sets conditions to ensure divestiture through Foreign Military Sales, Excess Defense Articles, or disposal processes. The forward-looking review also provides the opportunity to determine if the equipment can be divested in advance of modernization without undue risk to war fighting capabilities, thereby saving additional resources.

**Manage Authorization Documents:** We define the equipment-on-hand readiness of our units as the difference between what they have and what they are authorized. We must maintain flexibility in our documentation processes to adjust quickly requirements and authorizations resulting from senior Army leadership decisions. The Army has made good progress in correcting authorization issues. All commands will continue to work with

Headquarters, Department of the Army to ensure authorization documents are correct.

**Carefully Manage Variants:** As we incrementally upgrade equipment, we must closely monitor the distribution of multiple variants of equipment in order to minimize training and sustainment costs within organizations and installations.

**Equipment Software Controls:** At the unit level, we must identify multiple network operating environments that are duplicate and financially unsustainable. Our goal is to minimize the number of software baselines and support those upgrade cycles that retain required capabilities and sustain software upgrades while limiting redundancies and minimizing costs. Where there are inefficiencies, work with HQDA, AMC, and ASA(ALT) to simplify and reduce these costs, to include reductions in contractors and field service support personnel.



# RISK ASSESSMENT



*Toward Regionally Aligned and Mission Tailored Forces*

## RISK ASSESSMENT

All strategies assume a level of risk. In this case the Army assumes risk in several areas: in the generating force, training, strategic depth, Homeland Defense, and non-standard equipment.

**Generating Force Risk:** Equipping the generating force to no less than eighty percent assumes risk in training the force. The return of equipment from Afghanistan, should over time, mitigate this risk by enabling higher equipping levels. Where equipment shortfalls require additional attention, HQDA can authorize exceptions.


**Training Risk:** For certain equipment, we simply will not have enough for every unit's training requirements. To mitigate this risk, the Army is examining the establishment of training sets, whose locations and size will vary, and enhancing the use of network enabled training methodologies (e.g. distributed learning).

**Strategic Depth:** The premise of the current ARFORGEN model and the Future Force Generation model is that the Army will surge forces from the

Train-Ready phases when operational demands outpace forces in the Available phase. The challenge is ensuring that the surge forces are sufficiently trained and equipped in time to meet the demands.

**Homeland Defense:** Reserve component units in the Operational Sustainment Force Pool progressing through the Reset and Train-Ready phases may be equipped to less than S-1. This equipping level represents risk in the ability to respond to Defense Support to Civilian Authorities requirements. We will mitigate this risk by maintaining their critical dual use equipment to a minimum of eighty percent.

**Non-Standard Equipment:** For certain equipment used during the past decade of war, we will not seek full materiel release to make them programs of record. We may use the equipment as a bridge until newer capabilities are fielded or put into training and pre-deployment sets.







## CONCLUSION

The Army spent the last decade fighting two wars. We are changing our equipping guidance from one that solely met the requirements of those wars (theater provided equipment, left behind equipment, training sets, heavy contractor support, equipping to mission, no funding constraints) to new guidance that supports the Future Force Generation Model. However, from now until 2016, we are in-between those two models (having to send units to combat, facing severe funding shortfalls, conducting retrograde and reset, changing authorization documents) making the transition very difficult.

If we utilize the Lead Materiel Integrator concept, exercise the tenets of Mission Command, ensure all decisions are cost-effective and are in line with Army priorities, we will successfully make this transition and accomplish the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, guidance to “get the right equipment, to the right units, on the right installations, at the absolute least possible cost.”





# ANNEXES

## *Annex A - References*

- a. The Army Equipment Modernization Strategy (4 March 2014)  
[http://www.g8.army.mil/PDF/AEMS\\_04March2013\\_lq.pdf](http://www.g8.army.mil/PDF/AEMS_04March2013_lq.pdf)
- b. The 2014 Army Equipment Modernization Plan (22 May 2013)  
[http://www.g8.army.mil/pdf/AEMP2014\\_lq.pdf](http://www.g8.army.mil/pdf/AEMP2014_lq.pdf)
- c. Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force
- d. Department of Defense Instruction 1225.06, Equipping the Reserve Forces, Defense Planning Guidance
- e. Defense Transportation Regulation, Army Transportation Account Codes (TACS), Part II, Appendix V-6, 3 August 2012
- f. Army Regulation 71-32, dated 3 March 1997, Force Development and Documentation
- g. Army Regulation 220-1, dated 15 April 2010 Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration - Consolidated Policies
- h. Army Regulation 525-29, dated 22 February 2012, Army Force Generation
- i. (Draft) Army Regulation 525-29, (DRAFT), Army Force Generation
- j. Army Regulation 710-1, dated 20 September 2007, Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System
- k. Army Regulation 710-2, dated 28 March 2008, Supply Policy Below the National Level
- l. Army Regulation 735-5, (DRAFT), Policy and Procedures for Property Accountability  
<http://ako.us.army.mil/suite/page/670916>
- m. The Army Plan, Sections I, II, and III
- n. Army Directive 2011-06, Designation of the US Army Materiel Command as the Army's Lead Materiel Integrator (LMI)
- o. ALARACT 035/2012, The Army Equipping Roles, Responsibilities, Procedures, and Authorities (RRPA)
- p. Army Directive 2013-02, dated 11 March 2013, Network 2020 and Beyond: The Way Ahead
- q. ALARACT 210/2010 - EXORD 259-10, Campaign on Property Accountability
- r. ALARACT 152/2012, Revised Metrics for EXORD 259-10

## *Annex B – Terms of Reference*

**Allocations:** There are two phases to allocations. The first phase is the allocation of new and modified equipment procurements to each Army component. The process is embedded in the Program Objective Memorandum which is normally two years in advance of prospective availability for delivery to units. These allocations are based on component shortages and modernization levels that are measured against requirements. The second phase involves the allocation of adjustments based on procured and available equipment over a 21 month period. The allocations are adjusted to meet ARFORGEN-driven requirements.

**Capability Set Fielding:** An affordable, synchronized vehicle and network equipping modernization plan that prioritizes capabilities for deployed forces, mitigates risk by delivering the latest capabilities in accordance with Force Generation requirements, and mitigates operational risk in non-permissive environments via installing network infrastructure. It provides an unprecedented, integrated network solution supporting mission command requirements for the full range of Army operations.

**Common Operating Environment:** An approved set of computing technologies and standards which enable secure and interoperable applications to be developed and deployed rapidly across seven defined Computing Environments. Each computing environment has a minimum standard configuration that supports the Army's ability to produce and deploy high quality applications, and to reduce the complexities of configuration, support and training associated with the computing environment.

**Critical Dual Use List:** Those equipment items that support both the operational requirements of Army units (COMPOs 1, 2, and 3) and that are necessary to enable Army units and personnel to assist civil authorities in response to natural and man-made disasters, and acts of terrorism.

**Decision Support Tool:** An application that provides visibility of all equipment, all materiel requirements via the Materiel Demand Module, and priorities to enable decision making. The LMI uses HQDA determined priorities codified in the Dynamic Army Requirements Priority List to synchronize equipment distribution and redistribution.

**Deployer Equipment Bundles:** An equipping concept in draft form designed to ensure that the latest operational (Flame Resistant) uniforms, clothing and individual equipment are immediately available to field to deploying Soldiers, meeting the capability currently provided by Program Executive Office Soldier's Rapid Fielding Initiative using Overseas Contingency Operation funds.

**Equipment On-Hand (EOH):** In accordance with Army Regulation 220-1, dated 16 November 2011, EOH includes accountable and available items. Accountable EOH indicates a unit's fill of assigned and reportable equipment based on property book records. Assigned EOH indicates the equipment items available to the unit for mission accomplishment. Both include authorized substitutes, in-lieu of items and non-type classified items if they are filling an MTOE equipment classification code P (pacing) or TDA requirements. Accountable MTOE EOH is used for the purposes of this document when discussing Army overall percent fill of equipment.

**Force Feasibility Review:** Determinations of interim resourcing levels of selected Line Item Numbers below the Modified Table of Organization requirement.

**Generating Force:** That part of the Army whose primary purpose is generating and sustaining operational units by performing functions specified and implied by law. As a consequence of performing those

## *Annex B – Terms of Reference*

functions, the generating force also has capabilities that are useful in supporting operations in the current operational environment.

**Mission Command:** A leadership concept that is divided into three areas:

- 1) Philosophy: the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations;
- 2) System: the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes, procedures, facilities, and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations; and
- 3) Warfighting Function: the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control to integrate the other warfighting functions.

**Non-Standard Equipment:** Commercially acquired or non-developmental equipment that is rapidly acquired and fielded outside the normal Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System and acquisition processes to bridge capability gaps and meet urgent Warfighter requirements. These items are typically cataloged in the Army Enterprise System Integration Program materiel master catalog.

**Operating Force:** That part of the Army that consists of units whose primary purpose is to conduct or support the full range of military operations.

**Second Destination Transportation Charges:** The cost of movement of property from the first destination point to subsequent points. It includes transportation costs incurred with the lateral distribution of equipment between commands.

**S-levels:** Unit equipment-on-hand percentages that are reported in accordance with AR 220-1 and which reflect how much MTOE required equipment a unit possesses. The S-level is calculated by comparing the total mission essential equipment in the unit's possession, under its control, or available to it within 72 hours with the corresponding quantities of mission essential equipment items required in accordance with the unit's formal requirements and authorization document.

**Theater Provided Equipment:** Equipment provided to deploying units in theater and which will remain in the Area of Responsibility following the unit's redeployment.

## *Annex C - Reserve Component Equipment Transparency*

**Background:** During the build up to and conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn the Army lost the ability to track equipment deliveries to the reserve components. The equipment distributed to the reserves could not be traced to a particular sourcing document. There was no oversight process to ensure that specific funding appropriated by Congress for the purpose of procuring equipment for the reserve component ultimately made it to them.

**The Challenge:** The challenge is tracing procurement-funded equipment from the President's Budget request to delivery at the unit level.

- Source of Funds: Neither the reserve units, nor the Army equipping community, had visibility of the funding source of any equipment going to ARNG or USAR units.
- Rationale for Transfer of Equipment: The Army equipping community could not determine if the equipment they received was a result of a Department of Defense Instruction 1225.06 (Equipping the Reserve Component) payback, equipment distributed as part of an ARFORGEN-based distribution or redistribution, or an item purchased using National Guard and Reserve Appropriations (NGREA) funds.

**Congressional Direction:** On 26 September 2008, Congress mandated that the Department of Defense create department-wide processes, policies and directives that ensure transparency and financial accountability by requiring that funds intended for the reserve component get to the reserve component in accordance with Sections 351 and 1826 of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act.

- Army Implementing Guidance: In 2009 the Army issued a charter for the creation of a General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) to provide Headquarters, Department of the Army oversight to include the review, approval, or recommendation for approval, of analyses, policies, and procedures related to transparency.
- Definition of Transparency: In this context, "transparency" refers to the visibility, traceability, and tracking of requirements, programming, funding, contracting, production, and delivery of Army procurement items.

**What Has Been Done:** Starting in fiscal year 2009, the Army began making significant improvements in transparency that resulted in increased clarity between programmed and appropriated funding data by component, to directly link the procurement and delivery of equipment. The system provides improved guidance to the acquisition community that provides component funding data at Line Item Number-level detail that is traceable, auditable, and reportable to Army Leadership and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). It also enhances tracking procedures that enable the Army to link delivered items back to an appropriation vehicle, e.g., base or other contingency operations budgets.

- Initial Capability: The Army achieved an initial capability in transparency through a collaborative automated collection tool in the Army Equipping Enterprise System (AE2S). The Army will continue to improve data collection methods through web-based capability improvements, and intends to achieve full transparency through the incorporation of Item Unique Identification (IUID) as part of Global Combat Support System-Army, which is projected to reach full operational capability in 2017.



# ARMY EQUIPPING GUIDANCE

## *Annex C - Reserve Component Equipment Transparency*

- Certification: In accordance with the FY 2008 NDAA, Section 1826, Chief of the National Guard Bureau provides an inventory, for the preceding fiscal year, of each item of equipment for which funds were appropriated; which was due to be procured for the National Guard during that fiscal year; and which has not been received by a National Guard unit as of the close of that fiscal year.

**End State Goal:** The Army will achieve transparency when it can systemically track and trace the source of funding of and the quantities of new equipment procured for the reserve components and when the reserve components can track and trace the source of the equipment they receive in an auditable manner. This includes the ability to track changes to and capture the reasons and justifications for additions or decrements to component level allocations and distributions. To this end the Army will continue to evaluate, review, and approve solutions designed to harmonize processes and procedures, as well as close data gaps that relate to the component level visibility, traceability, and tracking of equipment funding, production, delivery, and fielding.

**Current Tracking Status:** The Army currently tracks 129 programs for FY 09 to FY 13 reserve component equipment procurements, provides RC funding and procurement data for annual budget exhibits, and submits semi-annual Equipment Transparency Reports to OSD Reserve Affairs that track and trace equipment by the year in which it was funded.

**Conclusion:** Transparency efforts are in their 5th year and are manpower intensive. Although the Army is in compliance with DoD instructions it has not yet been able to establish an automated transparency process. It has made progress toward developing software solutions and continues toward full implementation of IUID technology to enhance the tracking of individual pieces of equipment.



*Addendum 1 to Annex C - Reserve Component Equipment Transparency  
Department of Defense Instruction 1225.06*

**Background:** Under the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1225.06 process, the Secretary of Defense approves the replacement plans submitted by joint agreement of the reserve component (USAR or ARNG) and HQDA. Replacement plans contain an estimate of the quarter and fiscal year equipment is expected to be replaced. Within the Army, the DoDI 1225.06 process is directed by HQDA EXORD 182-12, Army Internal Process for Department of Defense Instructions (DODI) 1225.06 Actions, dated 1 August 2012.

**Scope the Issue:** The Army has reconciled over 80,000 of the original 85,000 pieces of equipment transferred out of the reserve components since 2003. Army replacement plans are on track and the effort to return Theater Provided Equipment items during OEF drawdown is underway. The Army will replace approximately 4,000 items from new production and 1,000 items from equipment currently in the inventory over the next three to four years.

**Replacing Equipment:** The replacement of equipment transferred out of the reserve components during Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn and OEF will be fulfilled by equipment allocations from three sources: new production, returning theater equipment during OEF drawdown, or excess redistribution.

- Managing New Production: For new production, an HQDA G-8, System Synchronization Officer manages the equipment allocation. Equipment distributions and delivery receipt confirmation is managed by the Army Materiel Command (AMC) as the Lead Materiel Integrator.
- Equipment in the Inventory: For equipment currently in the Army inventory (e.g., returned Theater Provided Equipment or excess redistribution), AMC manages and coordinates equipment redistribution and delivery receipt confirmation.

**Reporting:** Army Sustainment Command (AMC's executive agent for the LMI mission) will report all delivery receipt confirmation to HQDA G-8 for close out of DoDI 1225.06 replacement plans.



# ARMY EQUIPPING GUIDANCE

## *Annex D – Lead Materiel Integrator*

**Background:** On 15 February 2012, the Commander, Army Materiel Command (AMC) was designated as the Army's Lead Materiel Integrator (LMI) with the mission to synchronize the distribution and redistribution of materiel in accordance with DoD and Army directives and priorities.

- **Decision Support Tool:** Army Sustainment Command is AMC's agent for the LMI, and the Logistics Support Activity has developed the LMI Decision Support Tool (DST) to assist with this mission. The LMI DST gives the Army visibility of all equipment, all materiel requirements via the Materiel Demand Module under the ARFORGEN Synchronization Tool, and priorities that enable decision making. The LMI DST uses HQDA determined priorities codified in the Department of the Army Requirements Priority List to distribute and redistribute equipment.
- **Collaborative, Mission Command, Bottoms-Up Process:** The LMI process is transparent, collaborative, and adaptable. Under the LMI concept, users of the LMI DST have the ability to see equipment on hand, prioritized requirements for the equipment, and excess that may exist. To achieve the full benefits of the LMI initiative, materiel stakeholders at all echelons need to participate in the LMI process using the DST. Users from HQDA all the way to brigade level, are given permission (commensurate with their authority) to redistribute and optimize equipment distributions at any time. Designed as a bottom-up approach, the LMI process encourages units to redistribute at the lowest level possible. When commands have exhausted all means of redistributing internally to improve readiness, the LMI process will assist with filling shortages and redistributing excess from other units.

**Vetting Decisions for Rapid Approval:** Users at all levels must collaborate for the LMI process to achieve the desired results. The DST has a vetting module that allows all materiel stakeholders to comment and recommend approval or disapproval of potential sourcing solutions. The vetting module is the key to transparency and collaboration. All users are able to see recommended distributions of new equipment and depot recap/reset based upon Army priorities and directives, lateral transfers, and sourcing from all other supply pools such as depot stocks.

- **Disapprovals:** If a user recommends disapproval of a potential sourcing solution, the vetting module allows all users to see the reasoning behind the recommended disapproval. The organization executing the redistribution resolves disputes raised during the vetting process and upon completion of the vetting, issues a directive for the equipment to be redistributed. Disputes involving equipment transfers across Army Commands, Army Service Support Commands, and DRUs will be adjudicated by HQDA. Component-to-component equipment transfers will be conducted in accordance with DODI 1225.06.

**Accurate Information:** The LMI process relies on accurate data to achieve a truly optimal distribution of equipment across the Army.

- **Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW):** The LIW is the Army's single authoritative materiel data repository. LIW uses authoritative data sources such as PBUSE to produce a strategic level view of supply. The Army requires units to ensure property books in PBUSE reflect all equipment on hand to ensure 100 percent visibility. Supply data is provided to the DST from LIW, and requirements and priorities are provided by HQDA through Force Management Support Web (FMSWeb) and the Dynamic Army Resourcing Priority List. Additional requirements approved by HQDA such as Operational Needs Statements, Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement, and operational projects will be consolidated with the MTOE and Table of Distributions and Allowances requirements in the Materiel Demand Module developed by FORSCOM.

### *Annex D – Lead Materiel Integrator*

- Data Sharing: Data sharing between HQDA and the LMI is critical for building future budgets, executing legislated transparency requirements, and allocating new equipment by Army Component. HQDA and the LMI share data according to established data sharing agreements. AMC provides HQDA with depot reset/recap delivery schedule data, and HQDA combines that with new equipment delivery schedule data to produce new equipment and depot reset/recap allocations by Army Component. The LMI provides distribution of the new equipment and depot reset/recap based on those allocations. Upon completion of an Army-wide distribution and redistribution plan, the LMI provides HQDA with the distribution information along with confirmation of receipt of delivery to assist with equipment transparency requirements.



# ARMY EQUIPPING GUIDANCE

## *Annex E - Property Accountability Actions for Leaders*

**Vice Chief of Staff, Army:** “As I travel across our Army, I get a sense that we’ve created something of a ‘Throw-away Mentality’ in the force...A decade of conflict, marked by an unprecedented level of modernization, and property churn as we cycled forces into and out of combat, has weakened our Command Supply Discipline Program (CSDP)... [Now], we must ‘squeeze’ the most out of every dollar we are allocated, we must take care of every piece of equipment; it is likely what we will have to fight the next battle. We must all be responsible stewards of the resources entrusted to our care in order to remain the decisive land force in the world.”<sup>1</sup>

**Path Ahead:** The following will be used to reestablish Property Accountability:

- Stewardship: Property Accountability is leader business; it’s about combat readiness. Leaders will:
  - Evaluate subordinate leaders’ maintenance and accountability of property
  - Include property accountability in leader development plans and support forms
  - Personally take, and direct subordinate leaders to take, the certificate producing courses on property accountability and CSDP available on the Army Learning Management System
- Mentor, Train and Utilize your Property Experts: Property Book Officers (PBO) and Supply Sergeants are the bedrock of the Army’s CSDP. Leaders will:
  - Value and make use of their expertise in property accountability operations
  - Make sure supply specialists (Military Occupational Specialty 92Y) are serving in unit supply missions and see to their continued professional development
  - Use PBO Warrants to provide oversight and guidance to your CSDP, Financial Liability Investigations for Property Loss and Change of Command Inventories
  - Ensure junior PBOs are aligned to Senior Chief Warrant Officers for mentorship, technical guidance, and professional development
- Property Book Maintenance: Administrative corrections to property books can produce immediate readiness improvements. Leaders will:
  - Correct Property Records by conducting annual authorization reviews to verify property is aligned to the current authorization documents
  - Correct substitution and In Lieu Of errors
  - Ensure all stock funded items are on hand or on order
  - Get rid of excess by conducting wall-to-wall inventories to identify all excess and laterally transfer or turn-in your excess to your supporting Supply Support Activity
- Use the Available Property Accountability (PA) Tools:
  - <https://ako.us.army.mil/suite/page/670916> is a resource center for training, use it
  - Monthly PA Newsletter for guidance and lessons learned
  - New PA and CSDP certificate-producing courses for Commanders and Soldiers are available on the Army Learning Management System

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<sup>1</sup> VCSA Sends, “Property Accountability”, 25 April 2013





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