



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


November-December 1985



LEADERS IN ACTION

Field Artillery Journal



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Number 6

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INTRODUCING LEADERS IN ACTION

In this the Army's Year of Leadership, it behooves every Redleg to reflect on the state of leadership in the Field Artillery and on his own abilities to lead. Each of us should consider how well we stack up when compared and contrasted with the legendary gunners of the past. Whether we look to the Gallant Pelham or Captain Reilly or any of a hundred others, such an exercise in humility is well worth the effort.

A particularly lucrative tool for conducting such a self-appraisal would be the tidy, little volume, *As Ever, John*—a recently published compilation of Major John McNally's letters home from the 82d Airborne Division Artillery during World War II. Virtually every page of this captivating volume recounting the Division Artillery's trek across North Africa and Europe brims with lessons on leadership. Time and again McNally reflects on the skill, the elan, and the selflessness which combined to produce truly remarkable combat leaders. Time and again, the reader realizes that leadership is the tie that binds men; it's the single thread that most affects the course of battle.

This issue of your *Journal* contains articles and features which provide every Redleg not only an opportunity to assess his leadership skills but also to better them. It provides a thought-provoking look at what leadership in today's Army really means.

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
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On the Move Commitment to Leadership

MG EUGENE S. KORPAL



Competent, committed, and caring leadership has been the hallmark of the American Field Artillery for over 2 centuries. Through their individual and collective efforts, today's Redlegs must perpetuate that invaluable legacy.

For over 210 years the United States Field Artillery has produced a steady stream of extraordinarily effective leaders. In peace and in war, Redleg leaders—from Knox to Wood to Vessey—have blazed a trail of unflinching professionalism across American military history. To perpetuate that tradition; today's field artillery "green tabbers" must commit themselves to accomplishing the quintessential task of command—the development of future leaders. Specifically, today's commanders must continue to create competent, committed, and caring Redleg leaders.

Competence

Above all else, professional artillerymen must be technically and tactically proficient. The stresses of battle and the growing

complexity of modern warfare provide insufficient time for a leader to gain competence as the bullets fly. Three groups share the responsibility for achieving such professional competence: individual field artillerymen, the Field Artillery School, and commanders in the field.

The history of the artillery literally overflows with highly successful soldiers who have demonstrated that leaders are by and large self-made. Henry Knox, America's first Chief of Artillery, educated himself on the artillery tactics and techniques of his day; and John S. "P" Wood, by dint of his unflinching devotion to self-improvement, became not only one of the Army's finest artillerymen but also one of its most capable division commanders during World War II.

Knox and Wood demonstrated the tremendous potential of self-development, but most "would-be" leaders in the modern era will need at least some help. They can count on the Field Artillery School as well as other US Army Training and Doctrine Command organizations for that assistance. Today's institutional training team is not only producing capable, self-confident graduates who possess an excellent understanding of the technical and tactical dimensions of AirLand Battle but also extension training materials to continue the process at posts, camps, and stations worldwide.

Of course, the emerging leader's time at Fort Sill is limited; responsibility for continuing his professional development thus falls mainly on him and on his commander in the field. The latter individual plays a particularly critical role. Through a consciously formulated, professionally executed development program supported by Field Artillery School training aids, field commanders can become the mentors they ought to be. Exploiting training activities ranging from footlocker counselling sessions to train-the-trainer sessions to staff rides, "green tabbers" can increase the competence of their subordinates. It's demanding, time-consuming work. But if the field artillery is to continue to grow a quality crop of capable leaders, our commanders must take the time to sow the seeds.

Commitment

In addition to being technically and tactically capable, the leaders of today's Redleg team must be committed to accomplishing the fire support mission and in doing so attaining standards of excellence. In fact, field artillery units can be likened to a football team, and unit leaders to player-coaches. A successful gridiron squad

not only possesses a good grasp of the tactics and techniques of the game, it also has the motivated and disciplined leadership necessary to see those skills applied. Such a team emphasizes attention to detail and takes tremendous pride in the precision of its performance.

Our high-tech, field artillery team's disciplined leaders must be steeped in the branch's traditional commitment to unflinching, precise, and timely operations—be they in survey, gunnery, maintenance, or movement. They must possess the integrity to exact the highest levels of performance from themselves and their subordinates. Through relentless attention to detail, they must achieve sustained performance to standards of excellence.


Moreover, they must consistently reward those who realize lofty standards and judiciously retrain or eliminate those who cannot achieve excellence. Military history provides many cogent reminders that careless execution and faulty supervision exact a terrible price on the battlefield—a price magnified by the technological complexity of modern warfare.

Caring

Good leaders are not heartless martinets. They care about their uniformed and civilian subordinates as well as their subordinates' families. Today's good Redleg leaders demonstrate that they care by creating a command climate that recognizes the needs and desires of individuals and families. Specifically, our green tabbers achieve a good climate by decentralizing mission execution, delegating authority commensurate with responsibility, and focusing on the quality of life both on and off post.

As the proponent for field artillery. I care about every member of the Redleg Community. By developing innovative personnel policies, producing human engineered equipment, promoting the Army's Family Action Plan, and executing demanding training programs, branch leaders at Fort Sill will continue our proud tradition of caring. They will see that the field artillery lives up to its reputation for "taking care of its own."

The Challenge

Competent, committed, and caring leadership has been the hallmark of the American Field Artillery for over 2 centuries. Through their individual and collective efforts, today's Redlegs must perpetuate that invaluable legacy. Only then can we make good the claim that Field Artillery leaders are the very best the Army has to offer. 

Incoming

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Leadership

The Officer Team

The development of officer leadership skills is the key to enhancing the effectiveness of the commissioned-noncommissioned officer (NCO) team. Today's junior and senior officers exhibit shortcomings in leadership that degrade the economy and efficiency of unit operations. They need to learn how to design systems and set standards to be achieved; they need to leave the job of meeting those standards to NCOs.

A commissioned officer's job is planning—planning the use of available time for essential tasks and determining whether additional missions can be accepted. All too frequently, unit commanders accept missions which overtax their capabilities and resources. They also habitually develop incomplete plans. A good plan is like a road map—not only does it show the planned route, but it also indicates alternative routes to reach the same objective. Good planning requires common sense, knowledge, dedication, and patience.

The noncommissioned officer's job is the day-to-day organization and supervision of the soldiers who will accomplish the missions and implied tasks. For the NCO to do his job, the commissioned officer must first have developed and communicated the plan. All

too frequently, officers do not plan well and attribute faulty mission accomplishment to either noncommissioned officer or soldier incompetence. Moreover, the officer oversupervises or does many of the tasks himself. Because it always takes more time to *do* a job than to *supervise* it, such overly zealous officers simply are not using their time efficiently.

Here are some common symptoms of inadequate planning.

- Noncommissioned officers are hard-pressed to get everything done because their daily plans are superseded by other missions.

- A routine duty must be done right away rather than when planned.

- Noncommissioned officers are not allowed to solve routine personal problems of their soldiers.

- Fast and sloppy work is tolerated and accepted even though it does not meet established standards.

- Noncommissioned officers are not held accountable because they are not allowed time to organize and coordinate their resources.

Senior officers are responsible for the development of junior officers and for the leadership environment of the command. Such senior leaders must encourage their juniors to let noncommissioned officers run the show. Junior officers must

understand and apply the principles of good leadership and management. After all, because of their close relationship with the Army's frontline manpower, these junior officers are singularly responsible for creating favorable working environments. Today's artilleryman cannot afford to forget the significance of a viable commissioned-noncommissioned officer team.

Gary E. Jewett
MAJ, IN
Fort Sill, OK

US Army Field Artillery School experts on leadership and training echo your exhortations regarding the need to develop leadership and management skills within the officer corps. Doctrinal literature such as FM 22-100, Military Leadership; FM 22-600-2, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide; and FM 25-2(TEST), How to Manage Training in Units, provides soldiers of all ranks the tools they need to foster their own development. Our experts do, however, caution that both commissioned and noncommissioned officers must perform the full range of management functions including planning and execution as they address their doctrinally mandated areas of responsibility—Ed.

Words—A Leader's Critical Tools

From my own experience I can tell you that more has been screwed up on the battlefield and misunderstood in the Pentagon because of a lack of understanding of the English language than any other single factor.

General Vessey as quoted in the 15 July 1984 issue of *The New York Times Magazine*

A common language . . . is necessary so instructions can be communicated rapidly and with minimum risk of misunderstanding.

FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols*

The importance of words has been recognized throughout history. The story of the Tower of Babel for example appears at

the beginning of the *Bible* at the eleventh chapter of Genesis. In this story God caused men to speak many languages in order to destroy their unity of action. In the spirit of that Biblical tale, the purpose of this letter is to remind field artillery leaders that unity of action and success on the battlefield depend on knowing the military lexicon. If today's Redlegs use words with little regard for their meaning, those who receive their instructions will at best be uncertain as to what is expected of them. At worst, the recipients will attach their own meanings to the words used and set about doing something other than what the originator of the instructions intend.

The failure to recognize the importance of words is puzzling. Everyone in the military—takes great pains to use words correctly in most circumstances. One of these instances is when marching troops. Leaders everywhere take great

pride in their ability to give proper commands, and they view with disdain those who give wrong commands. These Redlegs recognize the importance of using the correct terminology when drilling troops; a precise command gets a precise response with little chance of error. "Right face" has one and *only* one meaning, and when a leader gives that command every trained soldier knows what is meant.

We Redlegs also use words when observing, thinking, and giving instructions. In fact, it is difficult to see something or think about something for which one does not have a word.

Obviously, some words are better than others, and the precision of the words employed varies according to the competence of their users. Someone who does not know the terminology of combat sees a battle as a vulgar

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brawl and is hard-pressed to describe it or give directions. The competent military leader sees attackers and defenders and can direct maneuver and fire support. He can penetrate, envelop, and attack in the flank. He can provide deep fires, close fires, final protective fires, and fires intended to destroy or neutralize. The leader who does not know terminology is left literally speechless.

Here are some terms cited in the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. I found their definitions surprising; I suspect many of the *Journal's* readers will as well.

- *Direct fire*—Gunfire delivered on a target, using the target itself as a point of aim for either the gun or the director. (I once thought that direct fire was any fire fired by weapons when the target could be seen from the weapon.)

- *Envelopment*—An offensive maneuver in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy's rear.

- *Flanking attack*—An offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an

enemy. (I once thought that an envelopment and a flanking attack were synonymous.)

- *Neutralization fire*—Fire that is delivered to render the target ineffective or unusable.

- *Harassing fire*—Fire designed to disturb the rest of enemy troops, to curtail movement, and, by threat of losses, to lower morale. (I once thought that neutralization fires included the curtailing of movement by the enemy.)

Professional language is something to which leaders must pay great attention. After all, it is their link with the world. In recent years manuals have sometimes included terms that were ill-defined or used incorrectly. In fact, many terms are defined differently in different manuals.

The challenge is a daunting one, but the drive to achieve a more professional language is too important to be left undone. If leaders misuse words, they will likely misuse their forces in battle.

Peter Morosoff
LTC, USMC
Quantico, VA

Redlegs Must Be Competent

As a Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course tactics instructor, I feel that Major Charles W. Clements' representation of what the infantry needs from its fire support personnel is quite accurate ("An Infantry Perspective," July-August 1985 *Field Artillery Journal*). The points Major Clements makes in his discussion of the four general areas—training, manning, equipment, and doctrine—can be summed up in one sentence: "We field artillerymen must be *competent*."

Redleg commanders must train their fire support personnel and ensure that their fire support sections are manned at the appropriate levels. Moreover, we artillerymen here at Fort Sill not only must ensure the necessary equipment is authorized but also must provide the doctrine that allows the fire support sections to advise properly and support completely the maneuver commander.

However, there are two points on which I disagree with Major Clements. The first deals with our training of the maneuver battalions mortars. Although we can assist in mortar training,

the mortars belong to the infantry commander. If the infantry commander is unwilling to devote his resources to training his only organic, indirect fire support system, he is abrogating his responsibilities.

The other point with which I take issue is the desire to assign the fire support sections to the maneuver units. This action would result in the degradation of long-term professional development and training. However, this position regarding assignment does not weaken my support for stabilizing personnel in the fire support positions.

In summary, I concur with the basic tenets of Major Clements' presentation. We must provide competent, properly equipped fire support personnel to the maneuver forces. Also, we must ensure those personnel remain in fire support positions for at least 12 consecutive months if we really desire to ensure that fires are always considered and employed to their utmost by the combined arms force.

Robert W. Williams, Jr.
MAJ, FA
Instructor, ATB
Fort Sill, OK

Training

The Critical Thread

The article "Training the Winners" by Major Terrence R. Redding (July-August 1985 *Field Artillery Journal*) accurately describes the realistic, tough, and demanding training being conducted daily by the soldiers of the Field Artillery Training Center at Fort Sill. The "Tactical Week" exercise the author describes not only transitions the initial entry training soldiers from the somewhat sterile environment of training conducted during their first 11 weeks in the Army, but it also exposes the soldiers to the less than perfect world of training they will encounter upon their final assignment to an actual unit.

But more significantly, the exercise continues to exploit the critical thread that binds all training conducted in the Field Artillery Training Center. That thread is the demand communicated by skilled noncommissioned officers (NCO) to perform to standards of excellence. Beginning with the uploading of equipment in the howitzer park and terminating with the completion of the direct fire shoot, the new soldiers are assigned to, trained, and critiqued by the howitzer chief of section. These chiefs impart a lasting basic knowledge of howitzer section operations.

Perhaps the most important responsibility of the chiefs is to critique their sections' activities at the completion of each occupation of position. Such critiques play an essential role in impressing upon each soldier the relationship between the standards to which he has been trained during previous weeks and the demands of an actual combat situation.

The tactical week exercise is only one example of how the Artillery Training Center is attempting to meet the needs of units in the field by producing cannoners who have experienced as much of the "real world" as possible. Under the watchful eye of the NCOs who weave the critical thread of excellence, this exercise will continue to improve; but the end result will always be a more disciplined, better trained, and more physically fit field artillery soldier.

David L. Ingle
LTC, FA
Fort Sill, OK

Today We Can Go Beyond the Basics

Sergeant First Class James J. McDonough's exhortation to "Stick to the Basics" (May-June 1985 *Field Artillery Journal*) largely derives from his belief that reduced emphasis on essential skills training results from the fielding of sophisticated systems. He contends that repetitive manual training is the only way that soldiers can acquire and retain the skills necessary to perform in combat. I take a different view.

The fielding of automated systems has given today's artilleryman the capability to perform complex tasks routinely. Sergeant First Class McDonough is correct in his assessment that heretofore many tasks required extensive, repetitive training and that much of that training emphasized rote memorization. However, he misses a critical point about today's artillery: The introduction of what he calls "gimmicks"—laser rangefinders and battery computer systems—allows for levels of responsiveness, accuracy, and skill retention previously unattainable. Moreover, such innovations actually prompt extremely consistent performance among operators. This narrows the gap between the most highly trained individuals and the remainder of unit personnel. Furthermore, new systems normally decrease not only the amount of training time required to obtain appropriate levels of task performance but also the demands for rote memorization.

The evolution of field artillery systems has not reduced the requirement to conduct repetitive, quality training. As any unit that has fielded automated systems can verify, the emphasis on training has simply shifted toward more sophisticated operator skills. Training time previously devoted to repetitive training on many manual skills may now be used to provide increased training on the theory of operation. The end result is a far superior soldier. He knows more, does it faster, and achieves greater effect.

We ought not confuse the advent of labor saving devices with the elimination of the requirement to train. The need to train is still there, and the opportunity to produce better soldiers is tremendous.

James S. Wojczynski
LTC, FA
Gunnery Department
Fort Sill, OK

Combat Developments

Commenting on A Redleg Potpourri

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Zawilski's article, "A Redleg Potpourri" (September-October 1985 *Field Artillery Journal*) was an interesting and thought provoking piece. While much of the article derived from studies done by the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) at Fort Lewis, in many instances the ideas apply to all types of artillery. I do however, have some reservations and comments that I believe warrant reflection.

- My first observation is on automated command and control (C²). In this area, Lieutenant Colonel Zawilski is right on target. We must be smarter in developing new C² systems. Units equipped with the tactical fire direction system (TACFIRE) often spend up to 25 hours per week of total system training in order to maintain proficiency. We must do better. Fortunately, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) will help alleviate this problem. In the interim, a lightweight version of TACFIRE, or some sort of automated C², is definitely needed.

Another issue closely tied to automated C² is electronic communications. I think Lieutenant Colonel Zawilski's proposal to move the field artillery unit that loses communications rapidly forward to establish visual contact with the supported maneuver force is unrealistic. Time, distance, and terrain are all factors to be considered. Depending on the terrain and the current location of the supporting unit, such moves may be in excess of 10 kilometers. Moreover, there is also no real guarantee that even after such repositioning visual communications can be established. A good standing operating procedure discussing alternative frequencies may prove just as effective.

- My second concern is targeting. Without some way of prioritizing targets, the fire support system will rapidly become overwhelmed with missions. Automated C² and improved target acquisition systems may inundate available batteries with missions. Target value analysis as discussed in FC 6-20-10, Joint FC 6-34-10/34-118, and the fire support mission area analysis will permit the maneuver commander, in concert with his fire support coordinator, to determine

which targets are crucial to the accomplishment of the mission and must be engaged.

- Survivability is yet another crucial issue. We must survive to perform our mission. Towed howitzers and their crews are particularly vulnerable. The use of the palletized loading system containers for protection is an interesting thought, but how do you move them? Linked to the survivability issue is Lieutenant Colonel Zawilski's discussion of the trailing arm drive (TAD) vehicle. The ability to displace, move, occupy, shoot rapidly, and then to displace again should increase our survivability. But I am not sure the contractor's times for emplacing, shooting, displacing, and emplacing again are all that meaningful. In some cases speed and mobility are necessary, but how long can a crew keep up that pace? When a unit is moving, for any reason, it is out of action and cannot provide support. A series of hipshoots is not the answer. Moreover, a unit is often more vulnerable to acquisition by moving target locating radars, ground observers, and air observers while it is moving than it is by sound ranging and counterbattery radar while it is firing.

Movement, of course, is just one facet of surviving. Hardening and dispersion must also be considered. The use of the small emplacement excavator (SEE) is fine for the 9th Division, but engineer assets for the rest of the artillery are going to be awfully scarce. The idea of a buggy bow camouflage net system is outstanding. That should be pursued. Our current system is too unwieldy.

- Perhaps the most intriguing issue Lieutenant Colonel Zawilski discusses is the ballasted howitzer. My question is: How do you haul the water and sand if you are not in an area where they are plentiful? Availability of such resources rather than mission accomplishment could become the deciding factor in selecting a position. Also the time factor involved to "fill 'er up" would need to be considered as well as crew fatigue.

Lieutenant Colonel Zawilski has done a great job, but some of the issues he raises need to be pursued further.

Kenny W. Hendrix
MAJ, FA
Fort Sill, OK

Can't Believe It!

The letter to the editor by Lieutenant Colonels Herrick and Boucher and Majors Cerami and Traynham (January-February 1985 *Field Artillery Journal*) has caused me to respond in some amazement. That the improved M109 is the most cost-effective way to provide fire support is truly difficult to comprehend. The artillery now has available to it: new armor; new propulsion systems; stealth technology; new recoil systems; automation; computerization; and a host of other state-of-the-art techniques, processes, and materials which are far superior to those used to generate the M109 capabilities.

It is difficult to rationalize an improved M109 as the best way to provide fire support in either the near or long term. Cost really should not be the deciding factor. It must, of course, be considered; but when effectiveness of fire support is what we are discussing, cost must not be permitted to be decisive.

The M109, no matter how many times it is HELPed, HIPed, and so on cannot range counterpart Soviet weapons. Although modern technology would permit the

M109's operation with a smaller crew, it still will have a large and distinctive signature. Moreover, it can't keep up (even by fire) with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Abrams tank; it is even too slow for the armored launch bridge, and it has no integral protection against chemical agents.

The list of shortcomings is so long it is painful. Think of the Soviet 122-mm D30; the M1974 self-propelled 122-mm; the M1973 152-mm; the 220-mm; the 203-mm self-propelled guns; the M1976 152-mm howitzer; plus the mortars, SCUDs, and Scaleboards that US forces must defeat if we are to prevail on a future battlefield.

Let me conclude with the thought that I have served with the M109 for many years. It has been a most effective artillery piece. Moreover, it deserves study, praise, and perhaps a quiet retirement. Continuing attempts to revise that venerable artillery piece and to turn it into a contemporary artillery weapon used to support the ground gaining arms in their state-of-the-art main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles would be a laughing matter if the probable results did not have the possibility of being so

disastrous.

It is time for a new family of artillery weapons, and that requirement will not go away until it is met by new weapons which include all of the applicable state-of-the-art technologies. The Soviet drive for military predominance and their reverence for what they call "the God of War" (artillery) behooves us to cease our endless analysis to determine whether it is more cost effective to add another series of improvements to old weapons or to proceed with development of new ones. Let's leave cost to people who understand it better than we do.

Let's organize a big parade in honor of the M109 and the truly great service it has provided. This ceremony could be followed by its relegation to a Field Artillery Museum and a concerted effort to develop a US artillery piece which is the most operationally (not cost) effective howitzer in the world.

Seymour Kravitz
COL, FA
USA (Retired)
Great Falls, VA

Response to "Can't Believe It!"

We sent Colonel Kravitz's letter to the experts in the office of the TRADOC System Manager—Cannon (TSM-Cannon) This is how they reacted.-Ed.

The most appropriate response to Colonel Kravitz's comments is a simple "you're right!" We still maintain, however, that in the near term the M109 howitzer, when equipped with the improvements contained in the HIP package, will be the most effective fire support system ever made available to the field artillery. But we recognize that even these significant steps to upgrade the M109 will fail to address totally some of the system deficiencies identified in the 1980 Mission Element Needs Statement. Simply stated the Threat's technological advances and our envisioned fire support needs in the twenty-first century will generate requirements that the M109 cannot fulfill.

Moreover, we concur with Colonel Kravitz's assessment that the M109 is a venerable artillery piece which is nearing its limit of technological potential. There will still be the potential, however, even after the application of the Howitzer

Improvement Program (HIP), for further improvement to the M109, particularly in its ammunition handling capability.

For this reason, the TSM-Cannon Office has undertaken the mission of initiating the acquisition process for the follow-on weapon to the M109—the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS).

The thrust of the AFAS program will capitalize on new and emerging technological advances in a number of critical areas. The future system should not only correct current M109 deficiencies but also leap ahead of the rapid qualitative advances being made by the Threat's forces. Some of these critical areas include new propulsion system options, robotics and automation, artificial intelligence, and composite materials.

The AFAS program has made swift progress since its start on 1 November 1984. Joint working groups have met to discuss the Threat and system requirements. Fort Sill agencies have drafted and staffed two basic program documents—the Justification for Major System New Start and the Operational and Organizational Plan. Both these essential, first steps have been approved by the Commanding General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC). Moreover, action officers acquired funding for tech base efforts in a number of subsystem component areas including liquid and electromagnetic propulsion systems and robotics. In fact, detailed research and development work has already begun. The Department of the Army also established a funding line for AFAS, and formal program initiation is expected no later than fiscal year 1988.

We agree with Colonel Kravitz; the M109 system is hard-pressed to meet future fire support requirements. Why then don't we proceed directly from the M109A2/A3 to AFAS and bypass the HIP program? The primary reasons for pursuing the current course of action are money and time. The near-term M109 HIP program will be the most cost-effective method of improving fire support during the time period from planned fielding in 1988 through the late 1990s.

At present the total monetary requirement for AFAS is difficult to estimate because of the lack of system definition. However, if the goal is a true leap-ahead system that exploits advanced technology, the funding commitments will certainly be significant

both in the tech base effort as well as in eventual system procurement.

Perhaps even more important than the monetary dimension is the fact that many of the desired technologies are still maturing. The plan of action over the next few years is to examine all applicable technological efforts with the intent of identifying and accelerating those that provide the greatest possible payoff for integration into a system defined by fiscal year 1989.

The current goal for fielding the initial

AFAS is 1996. By the year 2000 viable force levels in the field should be achieved. In the meantime the modernized M109 will play a critical role in fulfilling our fire support requirements.

So, to Colonel Kravitz and others who are asking when the field artillery will begin to take advantage of technological advances in building a new weapon system, the answer is *now*. We are using modern technology to make significant improvements in the HIP program and will use them even more in the exciting AFAS

program. AFAS will be a weapon system that provides a quantum improvement in fire support responsiveness, terminal effectiveness, survivability, and operational availability. I suspect that is what both Colonel Kravitz and every other concerned Redleg really want.


Christopher Q. Herrick
LTC, FA
TSM-Cannon
Fort Sill, OK

The International Turret Revisited

We were most intrigued by your succinctly written and comprehensive summary of BMY's International Turret program (January-February 1985 *Field Artillery Journal*).

To supplement your understanding of the International Turret program, here is a picture of the new turret mounted on a conventional M109 chassis. This illustrates both the practical interchangeability of the turret and our continuing developmental effort.

Herbert R. McIlvaine
Manager, Marketing and
Promotional Services
BMY



International Turret (IT) development continues at BMY's production facility. A completed turret prototype was recently mounted on a conventional M109 chassis. Tests indicate that the IT upgrade has no negative effect upon the maneuverability or general automotive performance of the M109.

New Thoughts on Old Issues

An NCO on Fire Support Problems

At 0300 hours someday in the future, Allied Forces across Western Europe go on alert. Elements of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) "Always—Ready—Second to None" move out. Rumor has it that the Soviets are coming. The 2d ACR's combined arms team feel ready to meet them. But is anybody really ready? Engineers stand ready with mines and barrier materials. The logisticians are poised with beans and bullets. The fire support officer has his hand on the radio volume control. But are they *really* ready?

At 0530 hours lead elements of the Soviet army cross the border; World War III has begun. Projectiles fall on preplanned targets, and engineers do their thing; but where is the tactical air control party (TACP)? The TACP was killed in the

first indirect engagement; and the squadron commander turns to his fire support officer to get close air support. The fire support officer calls regiment to talk to the air liaison officer. The air liaison officer indicates that aircraft are on-station, but there is no air forward air controller available and TACP is no more. The regimental air liaison officer tells the squadron fire support officer, "Sorry, but with no communications or control, you get no close air support." How do you tell a squadron commander or any other commander on "the day of decision" that he can't have what is needed, when it is needed? Are we ready?

You say, "It won't happen!" But, it did. Just read Major Scott R. McMichael's article "Urgent Fury: Looking Back and Looking Forward" (March-April 1985 *Field Artillery Journal*). These problems occurred during the invasion of Grenada; they are real and they have been around far

too long.

Major McMichael's article just touched on some of the problems associated with fire support planning and coordination at all levels. Lack of coordination, lack of knowledge of different systems, and how to put these systems together on the battlefield has been a problem for years.

- Problem 1—Fire support officers often lack knowledge regarding the fire support planning, coordination, and integration of different systems. They do not understand different munitions and systems of other armed forces. This problem is not due to the ignorance or indifference of the officers; it's due to the *system*.

When the brand new field artillery lieutenant reports to his first duty assignment, where does he go? To the fire support team of course. He spends 6 months to a year gaining a rudimentary

knowledge of field artillery and mortars capabilities and how to implement the basics of fire support planning. If he shows that he is a go-getter (they all are) he will end up being a safety officer for another unit or pulling additional duties as ammunition officer for his battery. He will soon leave the fire support team to become a fire direction officer or take one of any number of the other jobs available in his battalion. The little bit of fire support knowledge he has acquired quickly decays or is superseded by modernization initiatives. When this hardworking officer eventually gets back into a fire support job, he'll have to start with the raw basics once again.

Moreover, a field artillery battalion commander is not rated on the number of air sorties his fire support team or fire support officer has called in or how well his fire support officer supported the 1st Brigade in their Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). He is concerned with how well the artillery and mortars were used and not with any interservice fire support planning or coordination.

How can we remedy all this? It's easy, but it will take time and effort. Fire support coordinators are specialists who have to stay abreast of tactics, munitions, and systems. They have to stay within the fire support coordination field for maximum effectiveness. One solution would be to use warrant officers whose field would be fire support and nothing else.

Problem 2—Human interoperability

between services and systems is poor. Ironically, victory on tomorrow's battlefield depends on that very interoperability. Interservice schools for fire support officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) should be mandatory for all personnel involved in fire support. Schools like the air-ground operations system are good, but unfortunately they cannot give the fire support officer and his NCO the one thing that is actually needed—practice in controlling close air sorties.

Moreover, joint service schools need to cover all facets of fire support, be it naval gunfire; battlefield air interdiction or close air support; or command, control, and communications (C³). As a fire support coordinator, I shouldn't have to rely on an Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) or air liaison officer to do my job. I might well end up like that poor fire support officer in the vignette that introduced this letter. I must be aware of their coordination measures and weapons capabilities. This also goes for the TACPs and ANGLICO personnel. If the TACP and ANGLICO coordinators do not understand the Army commander's objectives or scheme of maneuver, how are they going to provide the best available fire support?

Problem 3—Communications interoperability is virtually nonexistent. What does it take? We have been fooling around with this problem too long. What's going to happen if we have to fight a real battle? Technology has come a long way since World War II. The Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy all have unilateral

communications systems and different communications-electronics operation instructions and procedures for requesting support, but we all have one goal—to win. Let's standardize our communications systems, support procedures, and authentication procedures.

Problem 4—Maneuver commanders do not practice with everything that they will need on a future battlefield. Therefore, too many training exercises are wasted. ARTEPS should integrate Air Force training missions. Major training areas such as Grafenwoehr which serve all services should be used for all they are worth. Grafenwoehr closes down certain hours almost every day to give A-10s and fast movers a chance to practice. The air is usually controlled by an Air Force forward controller. Why not have the fire support team control the air and also use an artillery battery to mark the target?

The realization that interservice fire support coordination is important didn't result exclusively from Urgent Fury, but we can hope that that operation was a turning point. We've come a long way in the last 10 years. But we haven't come far enough nor fast enough. Let's not wait for a major crisis to occur before we confront our problems. The battlefield is a lonely place for any commander. If I can't give him all I can when he needs it, it's going to be even lonelier.

Preston L. Saunders
SFC, FA
Kirkland AFB, NM

Let's Continue the Survivability Survey

Many thanks to Major Christopher A. Cortez for his comments on 17th Field Artillery Brigade Action Group's survivability article (May-June 1985 *Field Artillery Journal*). I know the other members of the team will be as pleased as I was that other Redlegs are taking the time to study and use the data we compiled.

Major Cortez is on target with his review. Had the *Journal* 30 more pages to devote to such articles, we would have probably satisfied the questions he rightfully raised. For example, the definition of survivability we used was designed to underscore the principle that

our task is to support the maneuver force—not to survive to fight another day.

Regarding our assumptions projecting likely detection times, we had documents available that indicated we were pessimistic. However, we had to consider other expert sources who indicated we were overly optimistic. Ultimately, we chose the middle ground for study purposes. Our objective was to avoid bias.

Major Cortez is on the right track in his advocacy of offensive actions such as counterfire and deep attack as survival techniques. Unfortunately, all these facts could not be covered in a single article. I understand that the January-February 1986 *Journal* will focus on the deep battle. This should give Major Cortez and other insightful Redlegs an opportunity to broaden the debate on this important

dimension of survivability. Together we can create a better, more survivable King of Battle.

Robert Adair
COL, FA
Fort Sill, OK

Speak Out


The *Journal* welcomes and encouraged letters from our readers. Of particular interest are opinions, ideas, and innovations pertinent to the betterment of the Field Artillery and the total force. Also welcomed are thoughts on how to improve the magazine.—*Ed.*

Leadership: A State of Mind

by First Lieutenant Greg Miller

Ours is an Army with a problem. Somewhere between the beaches of Normandy and Inchon and where we are today, we lost to a considerable extent the ability to inspire and to afflict our subordinates with that calculated insanity that separates the winners from the losers on the battlefield. In short, many of us have forgotten how to lead.

Where did we lose our way? It's impossible to say for sure. Many opinions exist, most of them blaming everyone from Robert McNamara to Jane Fonda, but few of them offer solutions that can be implemented by anything short of a miracle. This article does not advance yet another impractical panacea. Rather it offers some ideas that should prove helpful in understanding this complex issue and provides some suggestions for solving our problem.



Jill Ponto

"Leadership is thinking of yourself as just another cog in the wheel while thinking of those who work with you as individuals."

Leadership Redefined

What is leadership? Most of us have a pretty good idea, but we have a hard time articulating a precise definition. We know it has something to do with getting people to do what we want. But beyond that, our understanding grows a little vague.

Many excellent books cover the subject. They give good advice to leaders at all levels, but few of them offer any useful insights about the meaning of leadership. Some quote the definition from FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*; or they leave it to the reader to infer a meaning of his own.

A large part of today's problem derives from our inability to define leadership in a *usable* way. Most of the ineffective leaders I have known could spit out an academically phrased, theoretical definition while they proceeded to violate every time-honored principle of leadership.

After considerable research and rumination, I believe that I have formulated one particularly *usable* definition of leadership that mitigates against the gap between theory and practice:

"Leadership is thinking of yourself

as just another cog in the wheel while thinking of those who work with you as individuals."

By this definition, leadership becomes a state of mind. Using this definition as a guide, one can understand why a private working within a group of his peers can be a good leader, while an officer in command may or may not be a leader at all. Leadership is an attitude about yourself, your soldiers, and the Army as a whole.

How does one develop this state of mind that is coincident with good leadership? First one must see himself as just another player on the team. He can have personal pride, but he cannot allow that pride to interfere with how he deals with the mission and his subordinates. Next, he has to have enough understanding of others to be able to see his comrades as individuals—people with their own needs, goals, and desires—and not as simply names on a manning chart. Finally, he must have enough selflessness to maintain this frame of mind day-in and day-out.

The Traits of Leadership

A list of leadership traits no longer appears in FM 22-100, but almost every

leader in the Army has been exposed to them in some form. From the foregoing definition and explanation the reader can conclude that there are three traits essential to the leader: humility, human understanding, and selflessness.

Other traits commonly attributed to leaders are many and varied. The more commonly mentioned traits are:

- Bearing
- Courage
- Decisiveness
- Dependability
- Endurance
- Enthusiasm
- Humor
- Initiative
- Integrity
- Judgment
- Justice
- Loyalty
- Tact

Many of these traits are simply logical extensions of the definition and its three essential traits. For instance, humor—including the ability to laugh at yourself and the foibles of mankind—is nothing more than an active demonstration of humility. Justice is a natural consequence of possessing understanding and selflessness. Of course, a good leader will naturally develop other traits, such as dependability and loyalty, because he understands that those with whom he works naturally expect such behavior.



For those who have incorporated the leader's frame of mind into their character, the act of influencing others becomes a relatively easy task; all the subsidiary traits commonly associated with good leaders come naturally. But those who do not see fit to put duty to others before their own personal gain will always have an uphill struggle when it comes to motivating others for a living.

Paradoxically, there are those among us who are able to get a job done despite the fact that they care little about the welfare of their subordinates. I call these people pure "managers." They do not lead; they do not motivate; they do not inspire. They merely manage. As we shall see, this group does well in peacetime, but they are doomed to failure when the bullets begin to fly.

A second look at the list of the common traits—bearing, courage, and so on—will disclose that this group is in reality a better enumeration of management traits. Certainly, they may serve to reinforce an already strong altruistic attitude, but they do not by themselves generate leadership. Our Army's problem is that we have never decided which is the more important list.

Leadership versus Management

In fact, the debate whether our commissioned and noncommissioned officers (NCO) should be taught management as opposed to leadership skills has been raging for years. During the McNamara years, the advocates of management exerted tremendous influence; but lately those who favor an academically inclined leadership approach seem to be running the show.

For all the energy spent discussing this issue, it may come as a surprise that there really is no problem at all. Nothing is wrong with teaching a leader—one who possesses the leader's frame of mind—to be a good manager. The ability to juggle resources efficiently should only enhance the leader's skills, provided he has the proper attitude from the outset. But if a solid, altruistic foundation of selfless dedication to duty and his soldiers does not exist within the leader's mind, all the management training in the world will be wasted.

The difference between leadership and management is that leadership is an *attitude* while management is an *activity*. Leadership is what inspires others to give that extra little bit that makes the difference in battle. You cannot *manage* to win; winners must

The difference between leadership and management is that leadership is an attitude while management is an activity.



be led. Leaders need to demonstrate to their soldiers that they are worthy of the trust that goes along with being a leader.

The Problem

At the beginning of this article, I stated that as an Army we had forgotten how to lead. This is not entirely true. Some of us never learned how to lead in the first place. Of course, this is not to say that there are not truly outstanding leaders in our Army. If several recent studies provide a valid picture of our situation, we are blessed with many good leaders. Unfortunately, the way we do business in the Army today often does not allow them to exercise their talents.

Why is this? The *Results of the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) Survey*, released in April 1985, indicates some problem areas. The most publicized of these was the fact that our senior officers are not acting as effective mentors to their juniors. The study also aired the widely held belief that the quality of instruction given in the officers' basic and advanced courses is lacking. These conclusions can be debated on their own merits, but they alone cannot account for our leadership failures. The problem is more structural in nature; many

of us have forgotten that the ultimate purpose is to do battle.

If you don't believe me, take a look at your unit's training schedule. How much of it is devoted to what we euphemistically call "training distractors"? How much time is spent walking over cigarette butts on police call or checking oil levels in vehicles that haven't been moved? How much time do you actually spend training on your wartime mission?

In the highly sophisticated environment of the modern battlefield, individual initiative can no longer carry the day. Training to handle our complicated equipment and pragmatic leadership have become all the more important. Ironically, we spend more and more of our time performing tasks that have little or no value on the modern battlefield.

Even activities that seem on the surface to have something to do with combat, such as the meticulous preparations that go into an annual general inspection, often prove otherwise under close scrutiny. How many times can a soldier clean his mask or rifle before it stops having any training value to him? Not very many, but still many units plan their training schedules around preparation for inspections and not actually training for

combined arms combat in the field.

It is not surprising that officers at all levels feel undertrained to perform their combat missions. The reason for this is simple. Fail to meet the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) standard for a hipshoot, and you'll get a chance to retest. But tube an area of concern on an inspection, and you'll be looking for a new job. When the "balloon of war" goes up nobody is going to care how many commendables your unit received on your last inspection. The only thing that is going to matter is how quickly and accurately you can put steel on the target. If you fail to do that, more is going to be lost than your career.

The Consequences

In the short term such a managerial rather than a leadership attitude generates the problem described in the PDOS survey. Junior officers are not being properly developed by their seniors because their superiors spend too much time managing their careers. But this is not a new problem for our Army. The *Study on Professionalism*, released in 1970, reported that the "present climate" in the Army is

conducive to self-deception because it fosters production of inaccurate information; it impacts on the long-term ability of the Army to fight and win because it frustrates young, idealistic, energetic officers who leave the service and are replaced by those who will tolerate if not condone ethical imperfection . . . ; it lowers the credibility of top military leaders because it demands perfection at every turn; [and] it downgrades technical competence by rewarding instead trivial, measurable, quota-filling accomplishments. . . .

Although much has changed since 1970, it is interesting to note that the pursuit of "trivial, measurable, quota-filling accomplishments" still consumes a great deal of our time.

Not only does the pursuit of managerial objectives undermine the ideal mentor-student relationship between commander and lieutenant, but it thwarts the development of the bonds that should grow between the lieutenant and his noncommissioned officers. Gone are the days when an officer can expect 6 or 7 years of platoon time before he becomes a commander. Every precious day the lieutenant can spend with the troops learning how the job actually gets done will benefit him throughout his career. But all too often the novice officer spends his time hidden

Like leadership, careerism is a state of mind. But unlike leadership, it emphasizes manipulating others in order to further one's own career.

away in an office pursuing piles of paper and various additional duties while the troops forget that he is even part of their chain-of-command.

In the PDOS survey 87 percent of the officers polled indicated that NCOs have made significant contributions to their careers, but the management trends today seem to be tearing this bond apart. In fact the survey itself, rather than suggesting that the junior officer-NCO relationship should be strengthened, looks in the other direction and lays the onus on the superior for not playing the role of mentor. Evidently, the conclusion of the survey is that a greater emphasis should be placed on development from above than from below.

Ultimately, if the officer makes a habit of isolating himself from the troops, he will develop a self-satisfied attitude. The lion's share of his time will be spent generating papers to be filed away for inspections. Ironically, the papers will do the job, and the officer will be rewarded. Left to descend this path of twisted logic, the officer will come to embrace a set of beliefs often labelled "careerism."

It is easy to tell when careerists have infiltrated your organization. Careerists are more concerned with taking credit and assessing blame than they are with getting the job done. This leads to a unit that lives on excuses and caters to mediocrity. If you are working for a careerist, you'll often spend more energy trying to hide problems than would have been required to correct them in the first place. Anything is justifiable, according to the careerists, as long as the paperwork can be generated to cover the trail. If this does not describe your unit, the chances are you have a healthy leadership environment.

Like leadership, careerism is a state of mind. But unlike leadership, it emphasizes manipulating others in order


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to further one's own career. Rather than building units the way that leadership does, careerism tears them apart. Put enough careerists together in a unit, and it will cease to be an effective fighting force. Soldiers will fight and die for leaders, but they will not fight to generate another statistic on some officer's efficiency rating. Accounts of the first few months of the Civil War and both World Wars enumerate the problems associated with having an officer corps filled with careerists instead of leaders.

The PDOS survey suggests that the percentage of careerists among us is relatively small. This is a significant departure from tradition. Historically, peacetime armies tend to breed careerists and the endless mountains of paper they use to justify their existence. Decisions in the normal peacetime Army environment stop being made and start being staffed and restaffed. Retention rates and safety records become the measures of leadership, not combat readiness. Once a peacetime mentality descends onto an army, the tail not only wags the dog, it forgets that the dog even exists.

For our sake as a professional fighting force, we can hope that the conclusions of the PDOS survey are correct and that our Army is pursuing a positive course in regard to leadership. Maybe we have been able to defeat the scourge of careerism. Maybe we have kept "warrior" leaders from becoming "managerial" pariahs in their own Army. Whether or not the conclusions of the survey are totally correct, we certainly have room to improve our war-fighting capabilities and our ability to lead under combat conditions.

The Future

As officers and leaders we must all be careful to guard against the easy, self-serving course that careerism offers and strive instead to develop a leader's state of mind in ourselves and in our subordinates. Also, we need to hone our combat skills so that our units can be effective fighting forces. We may not have the luxury in the next war of developing leaders and training units once the shooting starts. We need to think and live the leadership attitude every day if we wish to emerge victorious from the next war. 



The ABCs of Leadership for NCOs

by Command Sergeant Major D. R. Hamilton

This noncommissioned officer (NCO) guide is not an attempt to rehash everything you've read about "sergeant's business." It is my personal communication with you about what NCOs ought to be and do.

Remember, a corps of highly motivated, professional noncommissioned officers is vital to the success of the US Army. In fact our corps is the *backbone* of the Army. That's *not* just a catchy phrase; it happens

to be true. Think of the Army as being a human body consisting of the brain, nerves, and muscle. Sever the backbone and what happens? The body collapses and becomes paralyzed; although the brain remains, the power is gone from the nerves and muscles. The backbone keeps the body strong and upright. The corps keeps the Army strong and upright. This is the relationship between the NCO and our Army.

It is time we all get with the program as *professional* NCOs. Our ultimate goal is total success on tomorrow's battlefield. The way we attain that goal is to create an Army where officers are *proud of* their NCOs, where NCOs are *proud to be* NCOs, and where troops *want to be* NCOs.

Read these ABCs of leadership, think about them, and then act. In doing so, you will be contributing to our important goals.

The ABCs

Authority

As an NCO you possess enormous authority. Your soldiers are required to *obey all* of your lawful orders. Because your authority is so great, you must use it responsibly. Only insecure NCOs who don't understand the basics throw their rank around. We have no room in our Army for "chicken" NCOs. Your orders must always be lawful and have a purpose behind them. Those NCOs that say, "I don't have any authority" are really saying, "I have not learned how to use my authority."

NCOs that know their authority and have learned how to use it are "squared-away" professionals in the eyes of the troops. On the other hand, NCOs who haven't learned how to use their authority and who always have to be prodded are usually *owned* by the troops.

Our nation expects you to give orders that point toward mission accomplishment both in garrison and in the field. Make on-the-spot corrections on any soldier, anywhere, anytime both on and off post. A sloppy soldier should never get by an NCO.

Never get in a shouting match with a soldier—you will lose prestige and authority. Don't get down on his level, and *make sure you follow orders in the same manner you expect troops to follow yours.*

Basics

If an NCO doesn't know anything about basic soldiering I don't have any *need* for him. Being technically proficient in your specialty is an absolute must, but it will never replace basic soldiering skills.

The NCO who is the absolute genius in his military occupational specialty and knows little or nothing about how to march soldiers, inspect weapons, supervise and inspect TA50 layouts, supervise and inspect maintenance, counsel soldiers, and form and inspect a guard mount is not a complete leader—he's just doing part of his professional duty.

Corporals

The transition from soldier to noncommissioned officer is the roughest jump in rank in our Army. In the field artillery, there is no break-in period. Our soldiers immediately hold the new NCO accountable for proper leadership. Senior NCOs must quickly integrate the new

NCO into the corps.

The new NCO must clearly understand that he is no longer just a common soldier. He is now a *professional*. He must realize that he is no longer just one of the troops; he now has as much authority as a command sergeant major. The junior NCO must demand as rapid a response to his orders as a colonel. In brief, the new NCO must *take charge!*

Discipline

As NCOs we must set high standards of integrity, trust, and personal conduct. When an NCO tells me something, I believe him. Our soldiers have no place for an untrustworthy leader. Our conduct must be above reproach both on and off duty. We must avoid at all costs:

- Alcohol abuse.
- Overweight and poor physical fitness.
- Failure to pay just debts.
- Nonsupport of family members.
- Domestic disturbances.
- Fraternalizing with enlisted personnel.

Fraternization

As noncommissioned officers we must issue orders that may well endanger our troops. We cannot do this effectively if we pal around with the troops. It simply does not work. Soldiers do not give instant obedience to NCOs who socialize with them. NCOs socialize with NCOs. Here are some guidelines:

- Don't joke around with the troops.
- Don't horseplay with the troops.
- Don't drink with the troops.
- Don't loan money to the troops.

You can't be his "running-buddy" and his boss.

Can we ever associate with soldiers in a social environment? Yes, under controlled situations such as section, platoon, battery, or battalion parties. We should have a good time, but we must watch ourselves carefully. Remember, *set the example at all times.*

Initiative

Initiative is getting the job done in the absence of orders. All NCOs should be able to work with minimum guidance and supervision. When given a mission, NCOs should accomplish it.

Why should a young 22-year-old second lieutenant have to explain everything in

detail to an NCO with 14 years in the Army? One would think it would be the other way around. Take the initiative! Check your soldier's equipment and rooms without being told. Inventory your section's equipment without being told. Conduct maintenance without being told. Figure out better ways of getting your mission accomplished without being told.



The ABCs



Job or Sacred Trust?

The combat arms officers in the Army, both commissioned and noncommissioned, are partners in the noblest profession known to man. Soldiering is a profession; not just a job. The difference between a profession and a job is like day and night. A profession is a calling embodying a sacred trust. Jobs are a dime-a-dozen. Start thinking in professional terms and reach out for the great challenges and opportunities in leading and teaching your soldiers.

Most of you are section chiefs. This makes you just about the most important green-tabbers in our Army. There are many people in the Army who have more responsibility than you do, but I cannot think of any rank that has more direct authority than the section chief. That title has leadership written all over it. The generals and colonels may position us for battle, but NCOs fight the other guys on the ground.

Loyalty

Loyalty is supporting your leaders and your followers even though sometimes

you may not totally agree with them. It is not passing the buck. Loyalty is never complaining in front of your troops. It is positive thinking. Loyalty is going the extra mile in looking out for the mission and your men.

Sometimes junior NCOs see a conflict between accomplishing their mission and looking after their troops. Remember, mission accomplishment must always come first because it involves loyalty to the greatest good—the welfare of all. True conflicts between the two are extremely rare.

Maintenance

A soldier expects his equipment to work and to save his life in combat. He is smart enough to know that equipment and vehicles which are not properly maintained will not work. NCOs are responsible for M109A2 howitzers, M113A2s, machine guns, 2½-ton trucks, and a list of equipment that goes on and on. NCOs must not be afraid to get their hands dirty. They must understand that the conditions of their equipment and vehicles reflects on them.

Mistakes

Can you make a mistake? You certainly can. I will always underwrite an honest mistake, and so will your soldiers. There is a difference between honest mistakes and dereliction of duty. Misreading a grid coordinate and ending up at the wrong spot on the ground can be embarrassing, but it's a *learning* mistake. Forgetting about a broken-down vehicle and a crew without chow is dereliction. You and I know the difference between the two and so do your soldiers. Mistakes corrected in peace-time training won't happen in combat. Work on your mistakes; don't make the same one twice. *Don't ever be guilty of dereliction.*

Officership

In Army units we usually speak of leadership in terms of officers and NCOs. What we are really saying is "officers and officers." When we took the sacred oath of enlistment we swore to "obey the orders of officers appointed over me." Think about that for a minute. The *word* officer includes *you*. There are three types of officers in the Army: commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned. In the leading and fighting business the difference is not so much in what we do, but rather in the *size* of the force involved. The word officer denotes three things—leadership, authority, and responsibility.

Orders

The manner in which we give orders has a great deal to do with the manner in which they are carried out. Orders hesitantly given will be hesitantly carried out. Orders issued with threats and curses are very likely not to be carried out at all. *Orders from your superiors must be issued as if they were your own.* The following order: "Men, I don't like this anymore than you do, but the battery commander said we are going to do it" is a disloyal statement rather than an order. It is disloyal to the battery commander. This sort of statement would be made by a gutless, insecure NCO.

Should you disagree with an order, question it. Disagreement is not disobedience, but once the final decision is made execute it to the best of your ability.

Professionalism

As an NCO, you are a *professional* soldier. What does this mean?

- Professional soldiers study their calling. Professionals always try to improve themselves. They read their professional journals. They study soldier's manuals, maintenance manuals, and the Army Training and Evaluation Program manual.

- Professional soldiers discuss training, tactics, and leadership. They share ideas with each other concerning mission accomplishment.

- Professional soldiers recommend ways of getting the job done both smarter and better.

- Professional soldiers police their own ranks. They ensure that soldiers are led exclusively by competent, committed, and caring leaders.

Responsibilities

You must ensure soldiers get the best training possible and that their equipment is serviceable and accounted for. You must ensure that soldiers present a good appearance everyday. You must ensure that your soldiers are treated with dignity and respect and that their problems are solved. You must pat them on the back when they try hard and do a good job. You must counsel them and help them when they fall short. You are also responsible for being fair and impartial when recommending extra training and disciplinary action.

These are heavy responsibilities, but they come with the title of NCO. It is the degree of experience and responsibility that separates you from your soldiers.

Soldiers

The security of our nation rests in the hands of the American soldier. Such soldiers must always be the center of the NCO's attention. The NCO's sacred responsibility for taking care of soldiers is total. This responsibility cannot be cast off at the end of the day. It must be constant. When you take care of soldiers; the mission takes care of itself.

Support Channel

The NCO support channel is a "channel of concern." Some of our troops are going to have personal problems. Some of their problems will be



minor, others will be mind-boggling. Getting the problem solved starts at the NCO level. If the soldier's problem is beyond your scope seek assistance from the chain of command and then stay with the problem. An NCO keeps close to *the situation until the soldier's problem is solved. An ignored problem does not go away; it gets worse.*

Training

Training is the most important thing NCOs do. We take care of our soldiers by providing tough training. Training is the NCO's principal duty and responsibility. NCOs are primarily responsible for the individual training of soldiers. They must be as good or better in basic skills and military occupational specialty skills than any of their soldiers. NCOs understand training

objectives in terms of tasks, conditions, and standards.

A Final Word

Soldiering is a noble profession. Our great nation depends on NCOs to preserve our freedom. Getting the job done demands perfection from imperfect people. NCO professionals must spare no effort in striving for perfection.

In his small corner of this big Army, every NCO must do his very best to meet the following expectations:

The NCO wearing the Chevron is supposed to be the best soldier in the platoon, and he is supposed to know how to perform all the duties expected of him. The American soldier expects his sergeant to be able to teach him more than his officers. ☒

Command Sergeant Major D. R. Hamilton, FA, is assigned to the 6th Battalion, 14th Field Artillery. He is a graduate of the 7th Army Noncommissioned Officers Academy, Motor Sergeant's Course, Combat Operations and Intelligence NCO Course, and the Sergeants Major Academy. His past assignments include mechanic, motor sergeant, howitzer section chief, chief of firing battery, operations sergeant, and first sergeant. He has served in Vietnam, Korea, and Alaska; and he is on his fourth tour in Germany. Sergeant Major Hamilton is a recipient of the Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, and Good Conduct Medal.

Mentoring — More Than Just Another Trendy Concept

by Captain John C. Krysa



In his White Paper on Leadership, General John Wickham, the Army's Chief of Staff, presents a number of challenges to all Army leaders. The first of these exhortations is to "be a teacher and mentor to the commissioned and noncommissioned officers and soldiers and civilians entrusted to you." In other words, the quintessential task of the Army's leaders—be they commissioned, noncommissioned, or warrant officer, civilian, or Active or Reserve Component—is to fulfill the basic responsibility to develop their subordinates.

The word mentor means different things. Its etymology derives from Greek mythology where Mentor was a father figure, trusted counselor, advisor, and teacher. In the business community, mentoring means these things plus sponsorship and protection. A recent periodical described mentoring as consisting of "several roles including teacher, coach, positive role model, developer of talent, opener of doors, protector, sponsor, and successful leader."

Military Mentors

The essence of mentoring in the military is caring. A mentor is a concerned, personally involved, and trustworthy leader dedicated to the long-term development of less-experienced professionals. Coaching, teaching, counseling, and advising are the hallmarks of a mentoring relationship.

Perhaps the following explanation developed by members of the Professional Development of Officers Study Group (PDOS) offers the best short explanation of the nature of and need for mentoring. The Army has essentially redefined the term mentor to mean a leader who uses a mentorship style of leading and developing subordinates. A mentorship style of leadership is characterized by open communication with subordinates, role modeling of appropriate values, effective use of counseling for subordinate development, and sharing of the leaders frame of reference with subordinate leaders.

The professional development and growth of a fellow soldier are central features of mentoring in the Army. Although favoritism, godfathering, or daddy-rabbits are often associated with mentoring, they are inappropriate to the military's application of the term. Career advancement because of personal relationships and being the "general's fair-haired boy" rather than demonstrated ability is nepotism and should not be associated with mentoring. Nor is reliance solely on the advice and guidance of the mentor rather than learning how to think and assess a valid component of mentoring. Such negative aspects of sponsorship are simply inconsistent with what our nation expects of Army leaders.

Mentors need not be superiors in the chain of command. Mentoring relationships can exist between seasoned and less-experienced soldiers who serve in different organizations and can continue even when the mentor retires. Mentoring relationships can also be established between instructors and students. The nature of the relationship is what counts—not the rank or position of the participants.

Of course the most likely mentoring relationship will occur between a senior and a promising subordinate. One example might be the battalion commander who assigns a promising staff officer a special study beyond the scope of the latter's normal duties and then guides the staff officer through the research process. Task accomplishment is of secondary importance to the subordinates's development. The mentor's goal is to broaden the subordinate's perspective and to develop his ability to perform at a higher level of responsibility. When the student takes a wrong turn, the mentor guides him toward a proper approach. Such patient, corrective coaching goes beyond the developmental training given to all immediate subordinates, and the mentoring relationship goes beyond developing skills required for improving the unit's immediate performance. Its sole aim is preparing a subordinate for future responsibilities. Once established, such relationships are likely to last for years.

Institutionalizing Mentoring

The Army has tried a variety of approaches to encourage mentoring. Some of these efforts have proven more effective than others. The recent experience of III Corps at Fort Hood as the leadership test bed is one example. The efforts to "power down" and place decision authority and responsibility for mission accomplishment at the lowest level possible made the development of subordinate leaders crucial for success. Coaching, teaching, and caring were in abundance as the command climate fostered mentoring relationships between seniors and subordinates.

The US Army Training and Doctrine Command provides other examples. Many service schools have a faculty member assigned to monitor a group of students. Such involvement by senior officers sometimes leads to mentoring relationships. One branch school assigns a faculty "big brother" to each officer basic course student. The big brother doesn't evaluate. Rather he coaches, orients, and assists the newly commissioned officer. The Command and General Staff College assigns an Academic Counselor and Evaluator (ACE) to each 16 person staff group. An ACE not only participates in major events of the curriculum with his group but also coaches and evaluates students as individuals.

A major effort is currently underway to establish a mentoring strategy in TRADOC schools. Plans call for a pilot test of a mentoring school model with selected officer advanced courses. The concept seeks to capitalize on the success of the design of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School better known as CAS3 (See *Field Artillery Journal* July–August 1985, "CAS3 Anyone?"). Under this model, most advanced course instruction will take place in small groups under the tutelage of a faculty mentor. The mentor will be an experienced officer of the branch. He will be senior in rank to the students and will act as a role model for desired values, behaviors, and skills. Such experienced faculty mentors will then develop officers of their branch as well as write doctrine and prepare resident and nonresident instructional materials.


To execute this strategy, most schools will need to reorganize their departments. As the TRADOC test agency

for the strategy, the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir has partially implemented some of the mentoring concepts in its officer advanced course. If the Belvoir test is successful, and it most likely will be, soldiers can expect to see the mentoring concept applied to all Army service schools for other commissioned, noncommissioned, and warrant officer courses.

Obstacles to Mentoring

Mentoring is easy to encourage yet difficult to implement. Senior leaders in units and staff organizations face constant demands for short-range mission accomplishment. These immediate requirements frequently undercut long-range developmental efforts. The same problems appear in the schoolhouse. In fact, reassigning priorities and resources to enable schoolhouse mentoring to occur will demand some difficult decisions. Maintaining a cadre of quality leaders as schoolhouse mentors will be an arduous task. But if the Army's leadership is serious about mentorship, this task must be accomplished.

To overcome the obstacles to mentoring, the Army must carefully change its procedures, education system, and the overall climate. Dr. Kathy Kram of the Boston University School of Management has done considerable study on the mentoring process in organizations. She counsels those who would charge into a formal program to be prudent and realistic: "Rather than introduce a formal mentoring program, [those in authority] should establish a sequence of programs and organization changes that support rather than force the mentoring process. . . . An organizational approach to mentoring affects the whole organization and requires time, patience, and effort. This is certainly more useful than a formal program with little relevance for the individuals and the organizations involved."

Despite the costs and other obstacles, mentoring is good for the Army. It not only builds trust and fosters cohesion with units but also fosters a sense of professionalism. It is a way to improve the technical competence and leadership skills of commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Mentoring is a way to establish and affirm the values necessary to maintain a corps of dedicated and confident leaders. Mentoring is indeed more than a trendy concept; it's a professional development scheme our Army can't do without. 

Captain John C. Krysa, IN, is a training developer and integrator at the Center for Army Leadership, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His previous Infantry assignments include platoon leader, executive officer, and battalion staff officer in the Berlin Brigade, and company commander at Fort Benning, Georgia. Captain Krysa holds a bachelor of science degree in management from the University of Illinois-Chicago and a master's degree in communication from the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. He is a graduate of the US Army Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He wrote FM 22-101, *Leadership Counseling*, and is authoring TC 22-10, *The Commander's Guide to Leader Development*.

View from the Blockhouse

FROM THE SCHOOL

BATTLEKING Projects

• *BK 14-85, Transporting Camouflage Screens on 5-Ton Trucks (Source: 9th Infantry Division Artillery).*

This proposal seeks to correct a hazardous situation that has already resulted in a fatality in the 9th Infantry Division Artillery. Four M198 crewmen were seated on the bench seats in the rear of their 5-ton prime mover. The section's exposed camouflage net rested on the canvas bows overhead and dropped into the back of the truck. During a movement the bundled netting came loose and fell off the truck. It adhered to the road surface, and the remaining netting rushed out of the truck dragging the four soldiers along with it. One of the soldiers fell under the howitzer wheels and died.

After an extensive accident review, the leadership of the 9th Infantry Division Artillery recommended a new system composed of three components: a camouflage net container, reinforced vehicle canvas bows, and a full canvas covering from the truck cab to the tailgate. On 9 May, the Division Commander approved the prototype system for testing. From 13–18 May the 1st Battalion, 11th Field Artillery used the

system during an Army Training and Evaluation Program Based Qualification Test at Yakima Firing Center. The results were impressive.


During numerous road marches over demanding terrain, only once did a net fall to the ground. This resulted from two howitzer section errors. The crew had secured the net using only one tiedown strap and had also failed to thread that strap through the case loops.

The system provides two distinct safety advantages over transporting an uncased but secured rolled net. First, the case loops provide a secure attachment for the net. This markedly decreases the possibility of the net falling from the vehicle. Second, in the event the tiedown straps become detached, the net will fall in one encased bundle which will pose an insignificant risk to passengers provided they are seated and the cargo canvas is fully extended over the bed of the truck.

In addition to its primary purpose of enhancing troop safety, this method offers the additional advantages of being relatively inexpensive and of requiring minimum training. Local fabrication of this system will enable crews in M198 howitzer units to continue training safely. (COL Stanley Kwieciak, Jr.)




The new safety system for securing the camouflage net consists of a camouflage net container, reinforced vehicle canvas bows, and a full canvas covering from the truck cab to the tailgate.



The case loops provide a secure attachment for the net markedly decreasing the possibility of the net falling from the vehicle.

- BK 36-84, L-Shelf for M548 (Source: 17th Field Artillery Brigade). Rocket assisted projectile (RAP) rounds do not fit under the transverse equipment shelf in the front of the M548 cargo compartment. The unit recommends installing a hinged longitudinal metal storage shelf in the M548 which can be raised when RAP rounds are loaded in the forward end of the vehicle. The unit feels that the shelf will increase the



PEC Carmen Davidson

The hinged longitudinal metal storage shelf increases the capacity to store section equipment, provides room for maintenance operations, and provides easy access to engine components. As shown on the right, the shelf can be raised.

capacity to store section equipment, provide room for maintenance operations, and provide easy access to engine components. Extreme cargo carrying requirements have been placed on the M548 as a result of varying the mix and increasing the size of the unit's basic load of ammunition. The volume of available storage space for section equipment has, therefore, decreased. Many units in the field are using locally fabricated shelves of varied designs to ease the problem of storing section equipment. The 17th Field Artillery Brigade's proposal could in time standardize the cargo compartment configuration of the M548.

A New Detachment Course

As one of eight modular follow-on courses to the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, the Nuclear Warhead Detachment Course will prepare selected officers to command warhead detachments and to fill other detachment positions. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has initially approved the course for four cycles annually at the United States Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS).

The course curriculum not only focuses on the mission-essential operations of detachments and other custodial units regardless of major command or associated weapon systems, but it also covers the duties and functions of assigned personnel. Although Fort Sill's leaders have tailored the course to support an assignment to one of the battalion-sized organizations located in the US European Command, the vast majority of the information presented is applicable to operations performed by the single support unit in Korea.

Specifically, the 3-week program of instruction consists of 22 separate blocks of training concentrating on those unique responsibilities and functions of detachments as well as on a review of the supervisor's job during technical operations performed on artillery projectiles and on both Lance and Pershing warhead sections.

The Tactics and Combined Arms Department has proponenty for the course and provides the first 51 hours of instruction. The Weapons Department presents another 51 periods concentrating on the technical operations associated with particular weapon systems. The Communications and Electronics Department provides 10 hours of instruction related to communications security procedures.


The US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) and the 1st Personnel Command in US Army Europe project an average student population of 8 to 12 students per course. Moreover, any company grade officer earmarked for detachment assignments is eligible to attend.

Notice to All 8-Inch Cannoneers

The United States Army Armament, Munition, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) at Rock Island, Illinois, has devised the "Dummy Drill Round—M845" for use by 8-inch howitzer cannoneers during drills. Chiefs of section can also use this dummy projectile to check their loader-rammers and practice the extraction of nuclear projectiles. Pages 3-149, 3-150, and 3-151 from Change 13 to TM 43-0001-28 outline the procedures required for using the M845 projectile when exercising the loader-rammer.

Commanders should obtain M845 projectiles through their supporting ammunition supply point (ASP).

For further information, contact Mr. Doug Converse or Mr. Clay Turpin, Weapons Department, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, at AUTOVON 639-6590/5523.



Attention: Field Artillery Cannoneers in Separate Loading Units!

STOP!

LOOK!

BE AWARE!

**BEFORE PUTTING
THAT FUZE IN YOUR
PROJECTILE**

**IS IT THE RIGHT
FUZE FOR THAT
PROJECTILE?**

**TOO MANY
CANNONEERS DO
NOT KNOW THE
CORRECT
FUZE-PROJECTILE
COMBINATIONS**

Today all fuze bodies and fuze wells feature a standardized 2-inch diameter. This means that careless cannoneers can place the wrong fuze on the wrong projectile. Such errors lead to the wrong results in the target area.

There is only one way to avoid this problem. *YOU MUST KNOW YOUR AMMUNITION COMPONENTS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE RIGHT FUZE GETS ON THE RIGHT PROJECTILE AND PRODUCES THE RIGHT RESULTS!*

All the fuzes listed below are point detonating fuzes because they are located on the point of the projectile. They function at some point in time—during impact (superquick, delay); at a specific time; or in a specific proximity (variable time [VT]).

Steps you should take to avoid errors—






- Step 1—Determine the type of projectile to be fired. It's either a *burster* or *base ejection* round.

- Step 2—Determine the type of fuze you need. They either have a booster for burster shells or have no booster for base ejection projectiles.
- Step 3—Install and set the right fuze in the right projectile for the right action in the target area.



The following figures should help. Use figure 1 to accomplish step 1 and figure 2 to do step 2. Then mate the two components.

PROJECTILES	
BURSTER TYPE	BASE EJECTIONS
Uses fuzes with boosters	Uses fuzes without boosters
High Explosive (HE) M107/155-mm M106/203-mm	Illumination M485 series 155-mm
HE Rocket Assisted M549 series 155-mm M650 203-mm	White Phosphorous (WP) M825 155-mm
White Phosphorous (WP) M110 series 155-mm	Smoke M116 series 155-mm
Gas Projectiles M110H/HD 155-mm M121GB/VX 155-mm M426GB 203-mm	Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) M449 series 155-mm M404 series 203-mm
Practice M804LITR 155-mm	Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) M483 series 155-mm M509 series 203-mm
	Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM) M692/M731 ADAMS 155-mm M718/741 RAAM 155-mm

Figure 1

	CURRENT	FUZE TYPE	REPLACEMENT
BURSTER	M557  M572 1390 00 187 5392-N335 16 FUZE PD M557	SQ/D SQ/D Impact Fuzes	M739  M739 1390 00 574 7705-N349 16 FUZE PD M739
	M564  1390 01 032 6130-N278 16 FUZE MTSQ M564	Mechanical Time And Superquick	M582**  1390 00 169 5864-N286 16 FUZE MTSQ M582
	M728***  1390-00-102 -3132-N463		Proximity Variable Time

All of the above fuzes are issued complete with boosters for use in burster type projectiles only.

BASE EJECTION	M565*  1390-00-993 5691 N240 16 FUZE MT M565 LOT 18-91 0005-00	Mechanical Time	M577**  1390 00 804 0692-N285 16-FUZE MTSQ-M577
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These two fuzes are issued without boosters for use in base ejection shells.

*M565 fuze issued without booster for use in base-ejection projectiles only. The M548 mechanical time and superquick fuze is being issued as a replacement for the M565 until stocks are exhausted. See TM 43-0001-28, pages 7-31 and 7-32 for additional details on the M548.

**M577 fuze is issued without booster for use in base-ejection projectiles. M582 fuze is issued with booster for use in burster projectiles. The M577 or M582 can be set for either mechanical time or superquick (impact) action but not for both. No impact point detonating (PD) action back-up on these fuzes.

***For earlier models of VT fuzes (513/514 series) see TM-10 series for each weapon.

Figure 2

For questions, contact Mr. Clay Turpin, Weapons Department, USAFAS, AUTOVON 639-6590/5523 or commercial (405) 351-6590/5523

The Army's Leadership Proponent

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL), established at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1983, is the Army's focal point for all leadership activities.

The Center serves as the proponent for Army leadership and ethics doctrine, training, and integration. The establishment of CAL and its prominent role during the Year of Leadership reflects the Army's commitment to provide the direction necessary to coordinate the Army's many leadership activities and to standardize Army leadership doctrine and training.

Specifically, the Center for Army Leadership discharges several missions:

- Designs and delivers sequential and progressive leadership training to the service schools and the Army in the field.

- Coordinates and monitors leadership research efforts.
- Acts as an integrating center for leadership and ethics.

As an integrating center, the Center ensures unity of effort among the tremendous diversity of organizations involved in Army leadership. By exchanging information, sharing ideas, and collectively solving problems, the Army can begin to speak with one voice about leadership. The Center's communications take the form of computer teleconferencing, briefings, meetings, quarterly update letters, and an annual Army-wide conference. The Center routinely responds to requests for leadership material and information.

Anyone interested in the Center's programs should write:

Center for Army Leadership
Integration Branch, ATTN: CPT John Krysa
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66048-6900

or call CPT John Krysa at AUTOVON 552-2384/2793 or commercial (912) 684-2384/2793.



The Orders of Saint Barbara and Artillery Order of Molly Pitcher

The gala season of field artillery balls and Saint Barbara's celebrations is fast approaching. Commanders who intend to present the Orders of Saint Barbara to the "very best of stonehurlers, archers, catapulters, rocketeers, gunners, and their military and civilian supporters" should act soon to request appropriate certificates and accouterments from the United States Field Artillery Association. The Association's address is P.O. Box 33027, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503; its commercial telephone number is 405-355-4677. Requests should conform to the format outlined in the "Order of Saint Barbara and Artillery Order of Molly Pitcher User's Packet" mailed 14 August 1985 to all appropriate field artillery commanders. All requests must be accompanied by a fully completed order form and advance payment.

FOLLOW THE LEADERS . . . READ THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL



Name (Last, First, MI) Rank, Title
Address SSAN
City State

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| <input type="checkbox"/> US Marine Corps | US Field Artillery Association |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Active Component | Local Chapter The name of my |
| <input type="checkbox"/> US Army Reserve | local chapter is |
| <input type="checkbox"/> US Marine Corps Reserve | _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> National Guard | Name |
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It's Guaranteed!

... situational leadership theory can become a natural tool for commanders and other leaders.

by Captain Brian M. Ludera


Since the early 1900s there have been many attempts to describe the process of leadership and to identify a "best style of leading." Most of the resulting models—Tannebaum & Schmidt's Continuum of Leader Behavior, Blake & Mouton's Managerial Grid, Fiedler's Leadership Contingency Model, and the Ohio State Leadership Studies, to name but a few, have been *descriptive*. They merely describe the observed behavior of leaders.

Dr. Paul Hersey and Dr. Ken Blanchard used all these descriptive models as a foundation for their situational leadership theory. However, the Hersey and Blanchard model makes a quantum leap forward; it is *prescriptive* as opposed to merely descriptive. It not only tells us what leaders do but what they *ought* to do. When properly used, this model purportedly guarantees a high rate of success in leadership.

The situational leadership theory centers on the leader's recognition of his subordinates' maturity level and the corresponding amounts of direction and socio-emotional support the leader must provide. The accompanying figure graphically portrays the model, but a number of the terms require explanation if the portrayal is to make sense.

- *Task Behavior*—The extent to which a leader engages in *one-way communication* by *directing* and explaining what the subordinate is to do as well as when, where, and how tasks are to be accomplished.

It's Guaranteed!



- *Relationship Behavior*—The extent to which a leader engages in *two-way communication* by providing socio-emotional support through listening and clarifying.

- *Maturity*—The amalgam of the capacity to set high but attainable goals, the individual's or group's willingness and ability, and the education and experience of an individual or group. These variables obviously change in relation to each specific task to be performed. Thus, a battery commander may have very high maturity when administering nonjudicial punishment but a much lower maturity level when going through a field training exercise. The four maturity levels range from low maturity (M1) to high maturity (M4). An M1 soldier is usually unable to perform a task but is willing, motivated, and confident. He needs to receive detailed directions to perform even simple tasks. High relationship behavior should help the M2 soldier to overcome his moderate inability by filling an information deficiency through two-way communications. An M3 soldier is usually able but unwilling or insecure. A good example here is the newly appointed gun chief. He is probably *able* to perform his tasks; his abilities earned him his gun. However, he is likely to be insecure due to his new leadership position. A senior leader can help the M3 by allowing him to continue practicing his technical skills and by encouraging him to take charge of his section. An M4 subordinate is able, willing, confident, and motivated. M4s can be given the ball and told to run with it.

The combination of task and relationship behaviors in varying degrees make up the four basic leader behavior styles.



Jill Ponto

It's Guaranteed!



Telling—High direction and low support. The drill sergeant who tells a trainee—"Place your heels together, feet forming a 45° angle, chin in, fists along the seams of your trousers, thumbs down . . ."—is *telling*.


Selling—High direction and high support. The captain who directs his executive officer as follows—"Sergeant Jones is leaving soon, write up a recommendation for an ARCOM for him. Do you know how? Do you have any questions?"—is *selling*.

Participating—High support and low direction. A battalion commander who informs his staff—"I would like you to formulate a solution to our problem. I will participate in the process, but due to your track record I'll go with the group's methodology and solution . . ."—is *participating*.

Delegating—Low support and low direction. The battalion commander who tasks his S4 to—"Come up with our budget needs for fiscal year 1984 and prepare the paperwork for my signature . . ."—is *delegating*.

The model suggests that M1 subordinates require *telling* (S1 style of leadership), M2s require *selling* (S2 style of leadership), M3s require *participating* (S3 style of leadership), and M4s require *delegating* (S4 style of leadership). Thus the style continuum describes the varying mix of relationship and task behaviors in which a leader must engage to be successful.

M1s, who require tasks to be spelled out and who must be closely supervised, eat up a lot of a leader's time. Units need as few M1s as possible, but wishing isn't good enough! A leader can develop soldiers with low maturity by his mix of task and relationship behaviors. As the leader adjusts the mix and moves along the style continuum, he develops his maturing subordinates. Each positive move along the continuum warrants reward. If negative results occur, the leader must appropriately counsel the soldier. Conversely, leaders with high maturity levels subordinates who are not performing need to adjust their leadership styles incrementally back to the next lower level. When positive performance is achieved, the leader may reverse the process to restore the subordinate to the original maturity level. However, Hersey and Blanchard caution leaders to be wary; do not move too fast along the continuum and do not skip any styles.

The situational leadership theory can become a natural tool for commanders and other leaders. It takes practice and a conscious effort. Its application will cost the leader a little time in analyzing maturity levels. But in the long run it may well save time and effort. In fact, the theory will allow the leader to become more effective. It's guaranteed! 

Captain Brian M. Ludera, FA, is the brigade fire support officer for the 25th Infantry Division (Light) and recently completed command of the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery. He received his commission from the United States Military Academy and has served in Germany as a section commander, detachment executive officer, and detachment commander with a Lance missile battalion.



Major Gene

Redleg Co

Leader Su

by Major Jerry D. Morelock

An enthusiastic and innovative artilleryman for most of his Army career, Major General John Shirley Wood established himself as one of the premier division commanders in the European Theater when he drove his 4th Armored Division faster and farther than anyone had thought possible. This physically imposing and intellectually dynamic leader whose enthusiasm and drive seemed almost limitless, spearheaded Patton's legendary breakout from the Normandy beachhead and its subsequent race across France. The Division's official history described his bold style as "daring, hardriding, and fast shooting." Moreover, it characterized the effect of his fast-moving columns on the enemy by noting that they, "broke the enemy or plowed about them, cutting the German lines of communication and splitting apart the units."

Intensely loyal to his subordinates, Wood inspired a devotion from those he led. His leadership style permeated the entire division and helped infuse an esprit de corps which made the 4th Armored Division not only highly respected throughout the Allied Armies but also greatly feared by the Germans. In fact, Wood's reputation as a great battle leader of armored forces grew so large that it inspired the famous British military critic and theorist, Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, to describe Wood as, "the Rommel of the American armored forces . . . one of the most dynamic commanders of armor in World War II."

In the end, however, it was this very loyalty, enthusiasm, and devotion which precipitated Wood's removal from active campaigning. In early December 1944, physically exhausted and frustrated by mud and mounting casualties, Wood reluctantly went

General John S. Wood:

Combined Arms preme

home to rest, never again to command in battle. But his accomplishments remained undimmed by this ending. In fact, there are few men who knew Wood who would disagree with General Troy Middleton's assessment that, "the Lord never produced a better combat leader than John Shirley Wood."

Early Life

Born in 1888, the son of an Arkansas circuit judge, Wood grew into a strapping, athletic youth whose parents brought him up to read the classics and appreciate simple, traditional values. His intellect developed as rapidly as his physique, and at the age of 16 Wood entered the University of Arkansas where he studied the sciences. In three years he graduated with a degree in chemistry. Along the way he led the football team and studied briefly at Stanford University. After serving for a brief time during 1907 as an assistant state chemist, Wood applied for admission to West Point. His roommate at Arkansas had been accepted and subsequently convinced the ever-competitive Wood to continue his college football career at the Academy. Although he was nearly sent home due to myopia, Wood entered with the Class of 1912. His football reputation evidently caused the examining surgeon to ignore this physical deficiency. Even in those days, West Point needed a good quarterback.

Wood often tutored his less gifted classmates. This resulted in the acquisition of his lifelong nickname of "P" (for Professor) Wood. The 1912 Howitzer characterized "P" as a "savant, linguist, seeker after knowledge . . . athlete, singer [and] hail fellow-well-met." It sums up his impact on his fellow cadets by contending that "Contact with our 'P' will make you, as does he, find life worth living."

Wood graduated 12th in his class and received a commission in the Coast Artillery. He returned to West Point three times over his years of service: as an assistant football coach later in 1912; a chemistry instructor in 1916; and the Deputy Commandant of Cadets in 1931.

Wood accompanied the 3d Infantry Division to France in 1918 as a major and division staff officer. Along with his friend, George Patton, he attended the Staff College at Langres, France. Wood then transferred to the 90th Division, serving as a staff officer during Saint Mihiel Battle. Immediately prior to the Armistice, Wood returned to the United States to help prepare a new division for the expected Allied offensives in 1919. When the rapid German collapse made this job unnecessary, Wood's plans changed. In fact, he even changed branches by becoming a Field Artilleryman.

Growth of a Professional: 1919-1942

Wood's experiences between the World Wars focused on the study of his profession and on an examination of the nature of warfare. Such investigations established the theoretical foundation for his leadership on the battlefields of France. Wood characterized this period as one of study, reflection, and debate over the future of warfare. In his biography of Wood, Hanson Baldwin recalls Wood's description of the interwar years:

My next 20 years or more of Army life were those of the usual peacetime assignments for a field officer of Field Artillery (in the comradeship of many close and wonderful, and sometimes inspiring friends). . . . Those were . . . years in which there was time for study and quiet reflection on the nature of war and the shape of wars to come. George Patton, with whom I served at Leavenworth and Hawaii, possessed a splendid library of military works, and we read everything from the maxims of Sun Tzu and


Confucius to the latest articles in our own and foreign military publications. We often sat, glass in hand, arguing loud and long on war, ancient and modern, with its battles and commanders.

Wood read widely during this period and communicated his thoughts on tactics and the use of artillery to his many friends. He pored over the works of Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, and Charles de Gaulle. He became convinced that the next war would be characterized by maneuver, mobility, and Liddell Hart's "indirect approach."

In addition to his teaching assignments at West Point, Wood attended the General Staff College and the French Ecole Supérieur de Guerre. He also served 10 years of ROTC duty at the Culver Military Academy and the University of Wisconsin. But his artillery assignments remained his favorites. As a commander of a horse-drawn unit in the early 1920s, Wood was enthusiastic. In his memoirs he recalled:

There was nothing more delightful than to move out at the head of my battalion of 75s in the cool of a frosty morning, guns and caissons rolling, horses snorting, and trace-chains rattling as we trotted along the sandy roads, preceded by a cloud of battery dogs ranging like scouts far and wide ahead. When T-Bone and Hamfat, the short-legged terriers of B Battery tired of this, they would wait for their battery at the side of the road where they were picked up and installed on the saddles of the wheel-drivers.

In 1936 Wood eagerly accepted command of the Army's only truck drawn howitzer unit—the 80th Field Artillery Regiment, Motorized, at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. This extraordinary opportunity allowed him to apply in a field environment those theories of maneuver and mobility he had assimilated and developed. The 80th travelled extensively to firing points in different parts of the country, and Wood continued to use every sounding board he could find to promote his views on weapons and tactics. Specifically, he sent reports to the Chief of Field Artillery, gave recommendations to the



Caliber Board, and wrote articles in the *Field Artillery Journal*.

Because Wood understood four foreign languages—French, German, Spanish and Russian—many of these *Journal* articles were translations of manuscripts he read in European publications. This fact serves to emphasize that he was interested in worldwide developments affecting his profession and was concerned enough to share these discoveries with his contemporaries.

In September 1939, Lieutenant Colonel Wood became Chief of Staff of the Third Army in Atlanta. He remained there until 1941 when he was promoted to colonel and appointed Patton's 2d Armored Division Artillery Commander at Fort Benning. Wood soon transferred to the new First

Armored Corps as its Chief of Staff. Then in October 1941 he became brigadier general and took command of Combat Command A of the 5th Armored Division in California. In June 1942, General Wood received his second star and joined 4th Armored Division, the unit which he would lead to victory in combat.

General Wood and the 4th Armored Division: 1942–1944

Few leaders in history have been as successful as General Wood in instilling their spirits and ideas in their units. From the moment he assumed command, Wood exerted an immediate

and profound influence upon the 4th. This intellectual and physical control never faltered throughout months of hard training and intense combat.

Under Wood, the 4th Armored Division trained long and hard from the snows of Pine Camp, New York, to the blistering Desert Training Center in the Mojave. The division's soldiers developed tactical and technical expertise, but of particular significance was the formation of a bond between leader and unit. The results of Wood's loyalty, warmth, and genuine concern for his soldiers were readiness and elan. S.L.A. Marshall in *Men Against Fire*, describes the quality of loyalty Wood inspired:

No man ever wins the loyalty of troops by preaching loyalty. It is given him by them as he proves his possession of the other virtues. The doctrine of a blind loyalty to leadership is a selfish and futile military dogma except insofar as it is ennobled by a higher loyalty in all ranks to truth and decency.

Wood and the 4th Armored Division reached England in December 1943. There they continued to train for the impending battle in France. Their day came on D plus 36 when the division became part of General Middleton's VIII Corps, struggling to break out of the Cotentin Peninsula. For the week prior to the COBRA breakthrough, Middleton had the 4th Armored Division hold a static section of the defensive line on the Carentan-Periers isthmus. Whether this gradual initiation



United States M7 105-mm self-propelled howitzers near Luxembourg.



Photos courtesy Fort Sill Museum Archives

A United States M7 105-mm self-propelled howitzer fires on German positions

to combat helped or not, the fact remains that the 4th Armored Division performed brilliantly in its first offensive role a few days later.

On 27 July, First Army and Middleton decided to put Wood's unit in the lead of the VIII Corps drive south to Monthuchon. The 4th Armored would also coordinate with the neighboring VII Corps concerning a further advance through Coutances and prepare to continue attacking southward. The advance was spectacular. Wood's soldiers broke through to Avranches and completely routed German resistance.

Wood was superbly suited and trained on this highly mobile combat, and he began to drive his columns forward as fast as the road network and his superiors would permit. His years of study and thought about the potential of mobile warfare began to pay great dividends.

However, just as Wood and his division were hitting their stride against weakening German resistance, a change in the Allied plans derailed Wood's speeding train. Higher headquarters informed Wood that continued offensive action against the main German forces to the east must wait until the important port objectives of Brest and Saint Malo were secured. This forced inaction was anathema to Wood. In a letter to British military critic and mobile war theorist Liddell Hart, he railed against this conservatism and lack of imagination on the

part of the plodding infantrymen who made up the senior Allied planners.

Of course, Wood and his division could not be restrained indefinitely, and an opportunity to race east soon presented itself. When told by Middleton to send forces east to Nantes to relieve another VIII Corps unit there, Wood exploited the situation to move the bulk of his division. Once Wood had his foot in the door, Patton and Middleton acquiesced. The official Army study described what followed:

The way was opened for the 4th Armored Division, led by Combat Command A, to break clear of organized German resistance and embark on an exploitative advance unequalled in history. In but a month, the 4th Armored Division swept over 1,000 miles before grinding to a halt on the banks of the Moselle River. . . . One can only speculate how much farther the division may have gone toward the German Fatherland had not the American supply lines collapsed from strain and overextension.

The division's legendary drive across France provided a stunning testament to Wood's theories of mobile warfare, and it assured Wood's reputation as the premier American armored division commander of the war and the leader of "Patton's Best." Moving

faster and farther than any other unit, the 4th Armored Division spearheaded the Allied dash across France.

The sweep across France had been a spectacular success, but the offensive sputtered to a halt as the fragile, overextended supply system broke down at the end of August 1944. However, by early September the system was functioning well enough to allow the 4th to continue its advance. Now part of XII Corps, Wood's Division prepared to cross the Moselle and to attempt the envelopment of the German forces at Nancy. With Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abram's tank battalion leading the way, Colonel Bruce C. Clarke pushed his Combat Command A across the Moselle, attacked southward, and enveloped the German stronghold of Nancy from the north, while a second task force, including Combat Command B, attacked from the west. The results were reminiscent of the earlier successes during the great drive across France. In fact, students at the US Army Command and General Staff College still study this action as a brilliant example of mobile warfare.

Although the Division's operations in September were extremely successful, the going became more difficult. Even though Wood and his division were thoroughly battlewise and highly confident of their abilities, stiffening German resistance and miserable weather in October and November

combined to produce the toughest fighting the Division would face during the entire war. In the US Army's official history of this Lorraine Campaign, Hugh Cole noted that this unfortunate mixture of terrain and weather "promised very bad tank going and . . . would inevitably restrict the mobility that had distinguished American armored formations in preceding months."

Although the November campaign provided the Division with its first opportunity since early October to fight as a unit, the action became a series of bitter, frustrating, grinding frontal assaults against a well-prepared enemy. Casualties mounted. The 4th Armored Division had lost, from all causes, close to 1,500 soldiers by September. But in November alone the unit suffered a staggering 2,200 total casualties; and most infantry units averaged only half strength. Wood's magnificent machine of mobile warfare was bleeding to death in the mud of Lorraine. It had become restricted to a "one tank front."

Physically exhausted by the previous 5 months of combat, Wood grew increasingly pessimistic and depressed by the damnable weather and a constant flow of casualties. This was not the kind of war at which he excelled, and his frayed nerves were unable to prevent his temper from boiling over with increasing frequency. Reluctantly, Patton sent his good friend home to rest and recuperate—Wood was no longer physically fit to hold his command. The 4th would continue its outstanding achievements until the end of the war, but it would do so without its spiritual father.

Anatomy of a Leader: General Wood's Personal Leadership

Wood was a dynamic, demanding, ingenious, innovative, and dashing leader whose enthusiasm was tempered by qualities of compassion, humility, and a fierce loyalty to subordinates. His personal leadership style was his single most outstanding feature. Wood's biographer, Hanson Baldwin, captured the essence of the general's style when he wrote:

"[Wood] was in many ways a military iconoclast, with ideas of his own and the moral courage to express them. But they were not ideas forged in a vacuum; they burgeoned from long study. He was a natural leader born and bred, outstanding in any company, physically strong, with

enormous vitality and energy, and a physical and mental restlessness which could be slacked only by vigorous bodily activity, sports of all types, and by study or discussion.

Ironically, Wood's strengths also contained the seeds of his future difficulties with his superior and subordinates. His aggressive dynamism gave him little tolerance and not much patience for seniors who could not fully grasp the demands of modern mobile war. In fact, Wood dissented vigorously if he felt his unit was foolishly used.

Fortunately Baldwin has recorded Wood's views on the "Characteristics of Combat Leadership."

- Disregard of fear (passes for bravery).
- Constant endeavor to spare men unnecessary hardship and useless losses.
- Willingness to share hardships and face the same dangers as the troops.
- Quality of sympathy and understanding that inspires confidence and trust and a willing effort and initiative among troops.

Wood obviously practiced all of these characteristics. For example, a more prudent man might have realized the long-term harmful effects of a 56-year-old man constantly sharing all the hardships of his much younger soldiers. Vowing to remain under canvas as long as his men, Wood steadfastly refused to live in a comfortable, dry, warm trailer given to him by General Tooev Spaatz. Although admirable in its motives, this refusal to take proper care of himself had to have contributed to his physical exhaustion in late November 1944.

Predictably, Wood led his Division from "up front." He put his troops on notice early that he intended the 4th Armored Division to attack constantly, and he was usually found close to the heads of his advancing columns. Although Wood liked to be in the thick of the fight, he was not there to garner personal publicity or gather a chest full of decorations. He sought out the action because he genuinely believed that as the division commander it was his duty to be there.

Major Jerry D. Morelock, FA, is assigned to the Leadership Division, Human Resources Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and has a master's degree from Purdue University. A graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Major Morelock has commanded artillery batteries at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and in Vietnam; taught at the US Army Field Artillery School; served as a company tactical officer at West Point; and led as S3 and executive officer of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization artillery group in US Army, Europe.


Of all the traits which formed Wood's leadership style, however, the single most significant was his loyalty. Baldwin writes that, "the personal bond between General Wood and the men he commanded was compounded of many things—most of all loyalty . . . and human warmth."

Wood paid the price for his dynamic yet loyal leadership as the exhilarating experiences of August gave way to November's depressing, uninspired slugfest in the mud of Lorraine.

Eisenhower himself recognized the demands of division command in combat as the war's supreme challenge to professional stature and physical stamina. Shortly after he sent Wood back to the United States he wrote that:

. . . the abnormal strains always borne by an active division commander are really more than any one man should be called upon to bear . . . corps, Army and Army group commanders stand up well. They are in the more fortunate middle area where their problems involve tactics and local maintenance, . . . while they are spared the more direct battle strains of a division commander.

Reflection

It is appropriate that we pause and reflect upon the demands, qualities, and characteristics of leadership. On some future battlefield, success or failure may hinge upon them. Over the years, the Field Artillery has been fortunate to have outstanding leaders who, like John S. Wood, have combined an understanding of combined arms warfare in all its many facets with an ability to lead men. The King of Battle must continue to breed such leaders. Moreover, we must ensure that our tactical units as well as our professional military education system continues to operate in a progressive, innovative manner. But we should always recognize that without effective leaders like "P" Wood to give direction, motivation, and purpose to our soldiers, even the best tactics and most advanced weapon systems will not produce victory. 

Fragments

FROM COMRADES IN ARMS


Bridges, Bridges, Bridges

During the next 18 months the Combat Systems Test Activity (CSTA), a subordinate unit of the US Army Test and Evaluation Command, will test a variety of new bridging systems being developed by the Belvoir Research and Development Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia to support Army and Marine Corps modernization programs.

According to Nancy Troccoli, the CSTA test director assigned to evaluate the bridging systems, test plans are being developed for an Army heavy assault bridge (HAB), Army light assault bridge (LAB), and a Marine Corps trailer-launched bridge (TLB).

Both the heavy assault bridge and the trailer-launched bridge are in the military load class (MLC) 70 category. This means they each should be capable of supporting the heaviest tank in the Army inventory—the 63-ton M1A1 Abrams.


The heavy assault bridges under consideration will both be capable of spanning 100-foot obstacles. The bridge can be emplaced in 5 minutes while the crew remains protected in the carrying vehicle.




The heavy assault bridge will be deployed on modified M1 or M60 tank chassis.

The trailer-launched bridge will have an effective span of up to 70 feet. It can be launched from within the towing vehicle and be emplaced in 5 minutes or recovered in 10 minutes. The Marines' TLB launcher can use its own bridge as well as the Army's AVLB and HAB systems.

The LAB is intended for use by engineer units assigned to the Army's new light divisions, which are not equipped with heavy tanks. The LAB is rated at MLC 30 making it capable of handling all vehicles assigned to light divisions. It is a double-fold scissors bridge designed to be transported and launched from a dedicated trailer. Portions of the bridge will be fabricated from high-strength aluminum alloys, and aluminum honeycombs also will be employed to reduce



The trailer-launched bridge has an effective span of 70 feet.



The light bridge will support loads up to 30 tons.

weight. The bridge will have an effective span of about 75 feet. It is air transportable on C130 and larger aircraft. The LAB can be emplaced in 5 minutes and recovered in 10 minutes. As with the heavier bridges, the LAB can be launched from within the enclosure of the towing vehicle. All necessary power to launch and recover the bridge is contained on the trailer-launcher.

For the Army HAB program, CSTA will study two methods of transporting the bridge. The first involves towing the HAB on a trailer-launcher unit; the second will mount the HAB directly on the hull of a turretless M1 tank chassis. Using the second approach, CSTA will study two specific methods of launching the bridge. The first will involve using a scissors-like system similar to the current armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) in which the bridge extends as it is deployed. The second method will entail unfolding

Illustrations courtesy of US Army Belvoir Research and Development Center

the bridge prior to extending it across an obstacle.

Once contractor testing is completed, the Army will receive two TLBs, three HABs, and three LABs at Aberdeen Proving Ground for its own tests. "For human safety reasons, the first series of tests will involve instrumenting the bridges and then loading the structures with weights," Troccoli said. "In the MLC 70 bridges, we'll use up to 125-ton static loads—essentially a 50 percent increase over the bridges' ratings."

"When the static tests are completed," Troccoli explained, "we'll begin testing the dynamic loading of the bridges. In the case of the two larger bridges, we will be using human operators to drive overloaded tanks over them."

Along with the bridging equipment, a tactical bridge access and egress system is also under development. This

consists of an aluminum extrusion mat and dispenser. Once emplaced, the mat will provide access lanes for bridge-laying equipment to the bridge launch site, then it will provide access and egress lanes for vehicles using the heavy assault bridge and trailer-launcher bridge. The mats should enable tanks and other vehicles to climb river banks more easily and traverse marshy soils commonly found near combat bridging sites. A single, 4-meter-wide lane more than 150 meters long can be laid in 45 to 60 minutes using the system.

Coupled with the new bridging systems, the mat will give battlefield commanders greater freedom of movement, the ability to disperse assault forces better, as well as the security of being able to repair and maintain lines of transportation quickly.

F/A-18 Hornet Displayed

Australia's newest strike fighter, the F/A-18 Hornet, made its first public appearance before several hundred Australian and American guests at the McDonnell Douglas Corporation facility in St. Louis, Missouri.

The F/A-18 flies both air-to-air (fighter) or air-to-ground (attack) missions, depending on the ordnance a squadron commander chooses to attach to the plane for a particular mission. The Hornet has flown more than 80,000 flight hours and has demonstrated reliability two to three times better than that of the current Navy fleet aircraft. Maintenance hours on the F/A-18 are about one-half that of current Navy fleet aircraft.

The US Navy also plans to acquire 1,377 of the new aircraft in the 1990s, Canada has agreed to buy 138 Hornets, Spain has contracted to buy 72 with an option to purchase 12 more, and Australia has contracted 75 of the F/A-18s.



The first Australian F/A-18 strike fighter leaves the runway on its maiden flight at the Lambert St. Louis International Airport.



LINCOLN, NE—TSGT Janice Lentz, a disaster preparedness specialist with the 155th Tactical Reconnaissance Group of the Nebraska Air National Guard, practices decontaminating aircraft. In war, ground support personnel like TSGT Lentz will use special chemical solutions to keep reconnaissance and close support airplanes flying. (1LT Patrick McGrane)

Right by Piece

NOTES FROM UNITS

Prepare to Rotate

NEU ULM, GERMANY—The first Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) battalion rotations should take place in less than a year. A total of eight battalions will start to rotate beginning in the summer of 1986, and two Big Red One direct support field artillery battalions will lead the way. The 4th Battalion, 5th Field Artillery Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division (Forward), now stationed in Neu Ulm, Germany, will switch locations with the 2d Battalion, 5th Field Artillery Regiment, stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. Currently both battalions are in the process of stabilizing their personnel by reenlisting, extending, or receiving new soldiers through the new manning system. In the 4th Battalion, 5th Field Artillery Regiment, over 150 soldiers either extended their tours or reenlisted to be eligible to rotate back with their battalion.

Both field artillery units will remain in an operationally ready status through their rotational period in June of 1986. The 4th Battalion will continue field exercises into April of 1986 as it supports maneuver task force Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP) at Hohenfels. Upon arrival at Fort Riley, the 4th Battalion will accomplish a full summer of support activities culminating in a battalion ARTEP in September of 1986. The 5th Regiment soldiers of both battalions are proud to have been chosen for this important Army evaluation. It's a great opportunity to excel on *both* sides of the Atlantic.

It's No Lark!

LARKHILL, ENGLAND—Artillerymen from several of the British Army's artillery regiments and various Allied units recently participated in the Larkhill Gun Run held amidst the rolling plains of Larkhill, England. In the annual Howitzer Pull Competition, soldiers matched their physical strength and endurance by forming 18-man teams that push and pull a "25-pounder" British gun over a grueling 7.8 mile course. The competition began in 1982 as an exclusively British fundraiser for local charities. In 1983, the gun run became an international competition. Since then invitations have gone out to various French, German, and American artillery units throughout Europe.

The 1st Armored Division Artillery was the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization unit to accept the challenge in both 1983 and 1984. The 1st Battalion, 22d Field Artillery won the right to represent the 1st Armored Division and the US Army by winning a preliminary race over a 10-kilometer course in 1983. That team went on to win a respectable third place at Larkhill. In 1984 the 1-22d Field Artillery repeated



Soldiers push and pull a 25-pounder over a grueling 7.8 mile course in the annual Howitzer Pull Competition at Larkhill, England.

its winning performance and once again represented the 1st Armored Division in the British competition.

Early in March the 1-22d Field Artillery team began training for the 1984 Larkhill Gun Run. With the air still crisp and the winter snows not quite melted, volunteers from the "Double Deuce" artillery began a rigorous conditioning program. The 1-22d based its winning strategy on Larkhill experience of the previous year. Rather than emphasizing only size and strength, the battalion sought 18 good endurance runners who were capable of holding an 8- to 9-minute per mile pace and staying ahead of the 105-mm howitzer over the 10 kilometer course.

After many months of training and preparation, the members of the 1-22d team took one final deep breath and set out on the demanding journey across the English countryside. Although the 1-22d shaved off 5 minutes from the previous year's time, the 18-man crew finished second. It crossed the finish line in 1 hour and 18 minutes—5 minutes behind the winning team.

For the members of the 1984 1-22d Gun Run Team, the race was over. However, the physical conditioning that these soldiers achieved in preparing for the Larkhill Gun Run provides an excellent example of the high state of physical fitness that each artilleryman should maintain. Moreover, the 1-22d Redlegs once again demonstrated the *elan* that has become the hallmark of American artillerymen.

"Thunderbolts" Conduct Demonstration of 5-ton Vehicles

FORT BRAGG, NC—The 3d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, nicknamed the Thunderbolts, recently conducted a mobility demonstration of various 5-ton vehicles and their abilities to tow the M198 howitzer. The demonstration at Fort Bragg's Holland drop zone evaluated five vehicles with differing tire configurations.

- One M923 from AM General was equipped with single Goodyear tires (1400 series) and the enhanced mobility system.

- One M923 from Aberdeen Proving Ground was equipped with single Michelin radial tires (1400 series).

- One M925 vehicle had single military issue (1400 series) bias-ply tires.

- One M925 vehicle featured regular (1100 series) dual tires.

- One M813 vehicle employed regular (1100 series) dual tires.



An M813 with dual tires.



The vehicle on the right is the M923 with single tires and the enhanced mobility system.



An M925 with dual tires.




An M923 with Michelin radials.

Each vehicle carried 72 rounds of ammunition and towed an M198. The trucks followed the same course over a variety of grades of sand, flat surfaces, and hills. The AM General vehicle with the enhanced mobility system easily negotiated the entire course. The other vehicles experienced significant difficulties at various points along the course.

The AM General vehicle could deflate its tires in order to enlarge the truck's footprint and then reinflate them to travel at highway speeds. The impressive demonstration by this vehicle clearly indicated it is well-suited to be an M198 prime mover. Specifically, the AM General M923's ability to negotiate sandy and muddy terrain even in hilly conditions proved noteworthy. Moreover, the enhanced mobility system is easy to operate. The 3d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment's drivers mastered it quickly.

The demonstration clearly showed that the M923 5-ton vehicle with the enhanced mobility system represents a leap forward in trafficability and allows towed artillery to operate cross-country. The XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery is attempting to obtain the promising vehicle as the prime mover for each of its M198 howitzer sections.



SP4 Steve Infanti

Lead by Example

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, HI—"Lead by Example." That is a principle every Redleg leader has heard. But where do young soldiers learn what examples to set and how to set them? In the 25th Infantry Division Artillery they learn them at the Division Artillery Leadership Course (DLC). This school teaches enlisted soldiers how to set the example while training, leading, and supervising subordinates and how to be better prepared for further schooling such as the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC).

The command sergeants major of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery established DLC in 1981. They believed that units were meeting the leadership development needs of sergeants and staff sergeants. But specialists and corporals were often just too junior to get to the schools they needed. The DLC gives these junior soldiers a good training opportunity. It supplements their unit's professional development programs and allows them to get a head start on the PLDC.

The 15-day course goes through 11 cycles each year with 35 to 40 soldiers participating in each cycle. Class sizes are kept small to allow more one-on-one contact between students and trainers. The students simply tend to learn more and retain information longer under this system. The course is open to all soldiers—male and female—of all division artillery units and, if there is room, it's open to soldiers of other 25th Division units.

The division artillery provides all of the support for the course. Funding, equipment, and trainers come from the organization's battalions. Division artillery noncommissioned officers plan, control, and evaluate the course. Specifically, the division artillery command sergeant major supervises the overall administration of the course. The school's commandant occupies a full-time position and is responsible to the command sergeant major for the conduct of the course and its instructors. He also acts as the liaison between the students and their units, coordinates all outside support including equal opportunity and legal

classes, and is the final authority for releasing students for disciplinary or academic reasons.

An assistant commandant, also a full-time leader, controls six part-time instructors. He coordinates all instruction, counsels students, and informs the commandant of any changes to the training schedule. Instructors are nominated by their units through noncommissioned officer channels. The division artillery command sergeant major and the school's commandant interview all nominees. Those who pass the initial interviews undergo further testing in the areas of physical fitness, drill and ceremonies, and general knowledge. The command sergeant major makes his final selection based on the test results and the recommendations of the commandant.

Students are selected by their units and recommended by their first sergeant. All students are screened for profiles to ensure that they can participate fully in the physical training program.

During the course, students rotate through several leadership positions including class first sergeant, platoon sergeant, and section leader. They receive counselling on their performance in each position so they know exactly where they stand and how they can improve. Instructors inspect students each morning for uniform serviceability, cleanliness, and general appearance. "Look like a leader to be leader" is one of the course axioms.

To graduate from the course, students must attain a 70 percent score in all tested areas; must display a positive, highly motivated attitude; and must miss no more than 2 hours of training for any reason. Course leaders release any students whose point total falls below 70 percent at any time. The commandant counsels each failing student on the reasons for release and on how he or she can improve. Moreover, the commandant sends a letter detailing the student's course performance, reasons for release, and recommended corrective action to the failing student's first sergeant. Unit-level supervisors use these letters as tools for evaluating and improving soldier performance. Soldiers may reenroll later.

Physical readiness training (PRT) is an integral part of the program. Students must participate in all PRT sessions and lead at least once. Other subjects covered in the 124-hour program of instruction include drill and ceremonies, methods of instruction, personnel management, and property accountability.

The high standards and regimented atmosphere of the DLC prepare students for the real test of their abilities—leadership back in their units. Instructors stress team work to help students throughout the course. Students quiz each other constantly and keep themselves highly motivated. As the course motto suggests, soldiers have three choices, "Lead, Follow, or Get the Hell Out of the Way!" The Division Artillery Leadership Course improves the quality of all units in the 25th Infantry Division Artillery, and it supports the Chief of Staff of the US Army's emphasis on leaving the Army a single, all-important legacy—good leaders.

A Saltspray Salvo

VIEQUES ISLAND, PUERTO RICO—From 31 March to 4 April 1985, the Fire Support Section of the 1st Ranger Battalion conducted training at the Naval Gunfire and Close Air Support Range at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico as well as on Puerto Rico's Salinas Bombing Range. During this deployment, code named Saltspray Salvo, the Ranger forward observers adjusted fires from the *USS Claude V. Ricketts* (an ADAMS class destroyer from the Atlantic Fleet), and practiced final control of Naval close air support with A-4 aircraft from the Fleet Composite Squadron 8(VC-8).

The *USS Ricketts* provided 2 full days of dedicated Naval gunfire spotter training to the Rangers. On the second day the Rangers and the Navy crew participated in a personnel exchange. On both days the *USS Ricketts* provided timely and accurate fires from its two 5/54 guns. These weapons lived up to their reputation for high rates of fire; at one point the ship put 20 rounds on target in 16 seconds.

The Rangers also accomplished 2 days of final control training using Navy aircraft. During these events the forward observers, assisted by personnel of the 2d Marine Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

(ANGLICO), gave the "fighter brief" to the pilot and then talked him onto his target for the bombing run. The VC-8 aviators provided excellent support throughout the training. Their accuracy was superb.

From 2-4 April, Rangers also worked with Puerto Rican Air National Guard A-7s. At Salinas Bombing Range they practiced voice final control and laser designation of targets using the laser target designator (LTD). There the Air Force's Pave Penny system proved its worth.

Virtually all 13F personnel assigned to the 1st Ranger Battalion have attended the Naval Gunfire Spotter Course, but the Puerto Rican live fire exercise honed their skills and gave them an appreciation of the power of Naval gunfire. Working with the Navy aircraft also gave the artillerymen an appreciation of how Naval air support tactics and briefing procedures differ from those of the Air Force. More significantly, it provided the ever-ready Rangers good, hands-on experience in talking the pilot's eyes onto the target.

All told, Exercise Saltspray Salvo was a winner. It improved the Rangers technical skills in handling the multiple dimensions of Naval firepower and gave them an appreciation of both the Navy's and Air Force's destructive capability. (CPT Andrew J. Kinney, Jr.)




CSM Raucher of VII Corps Artillery goes over the events of the day during the 2d Battalion, 28th Field Artillery partnership unit's live fire shoot at Grafenwoehr.

NCO Leaders Get the Partnership Picture

HERZOGENAURACH, GERMANY—Fertig? Feuer? These were the commands heard in the 2d Battalion, 28th Field Artillery's firing positions on the range at Grafenwoehr as the unit's Battery C enjoyed a visit from its German partnership unit—the 3d Battery, 41st Artillery Battalion from Nibelungen Kaserne in Regensburg. Mixed American and German crews fired live rounds for over 5 hours. Although the 41st Artillery Battalion uses a different weapon system than that of its American partners, they both use the same ammunition. The 210th Field Artillery Brigade Commander, Colonel Charles M. Hood, remarked of

the event, "This is an excellent opportunity for our soldiers to train in a manner which maximizes interoperability. We often get together for parades, sports activities, small arms firing, and socials; but rarely do we have the opportunity to train and fire our primary weapon systems together. I am sure that a much better understanding and appreciation of each other's skills and capabilities will be realized."



CAMP BLANDING, FL—This 8-inch howitzer is poised and ready to fire at a target as far as 8 miles away. The 7th Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, a US Army Reserve unit from Pompano Beach, Florida, was at Camp Blanding recently for 2 weeks of annual training. (MSG Art Campbell)



Captain Reilly—Inspirational Battery Commander

by Colonel (Retired) Robert M. Stegmaier

The date was 6 August 1900; the setting was the Boxer Rebellion in China. America's Fourteenth Infantry was fighting on the far side of the Pei Ho River and needed close artillery support. On the near side of the stream, Captain Henry J. Reilly, Commanding Officer of Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery Regiment received the mission and sprang into action. To Reilly's dismay, a Russian infantry unit blocked his battery's passage across the river bridge. Reilly immediately reported to the Russian commander and requested permission to pass through. The reply was a stubborn "Nyet." Calmly, the experienced American leader looked across the river, assessed the continued urgency of the situation, and turned his horse to face the waiting battery. Without hesitation, he gave the arm signal to advance. As his unit approached the bridge, he commanded, "Gallop, ho!" The Czar's men hit the ditches and bridge railings as the "artillery went rolling along." The American infantry soon

received the timely and effective fire support it needed.

To Reilly, only results counted. His well-known philosophy was: "Gentlemen, there must never be anything to explain in the battery." An artilleryman for 36 years, Reilly had risen from the ranks during the Civil War. In fact, he had received a battlefield commission for gallantry in action. His unit—Light Battery F, Fifth Regiment—had performed heroically in the bloody battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Malvern Hill, and Petersburg.

Yet despite an outstanding reputation earned in four wars—the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, the Filipino Insurrection, and the Boxer Rebellion—as well as 3 decades of remarkable service Reilly never reached the rank of major. Ironically, he may well have achieved higher rank had he sought a transfer to another branch. But like his famous mentor, Major General Henry J. Hunt, Reilly saw his life as centered on the

artillery. To him, the Fifth Regiment was home, and there were only three field grade positions in that outfit. Furthermore, promotion was possible only within the assigned regiment; and there was no mandatory retirement age. As the song "Benny Havens, Oh!" so dolefully lamented: "Promotion's very slow."


Reilly, like so many other long-term soldiers, was something of a fatalist not only about promotion but also about life in general. He often contended, "There's no use dodging, you will be hit when your body and the bullets are at the same place at the same time, and that's the only rule there is to [my] 18 or 20 engagements without being wounded."

But Reilly's fatalism did not make him complacent. From subordinates, officers, and enlisted men alike, he demanded excellence. When his men performed outstanding services, he was the first to give official commendation. When they did not deliver, he let them know in the clearest of terms.

"No gun of Reilly's would ever be lost as long as there was a squad of the Fourteenth left, and the Fourteenth would never go under as long as Reilly had a gun and a round of ammunition left." Reilly's tactical perspective was quite simple: "These guns can go wherever infantry or cavalry can go."

Reilly's quest for excellence also extended to his relationship with the supported maneuver unit. To him close coordination between the supported infantry and Battery F was critical, and the infantry reciprocated. In the Fourteenth Infantry there was a boast that "no gun of Reilly's would ever be lost as long as there was a squad of the Fourteenth left, and the Fourteenth would never go under as long as Reilly had a gun and a round of ammunition left." Reilly's tactical perspective was quite simple: "These guns can go wherever infantry or cavalry can go."


When senior leaders cited Battery F for its actions in the Philippines, Reilly shared credit for the honors with his lieutenants: First Lieutenant Charles P. Summerall (later Chief of Staff, US Army), First Lieutenant Louis R. Burgess (later Commanding General, 31st Artillery Brigade during World War I), and Second Lieutenant Manus McCloskey (later Commanding General, 12th Field Artillery in World War I). As a result of such honors accorded Battery F, the Army gave Battery F the Boxer Rebellion



Battery F in action at the Tung-Pien Gate at the junction of the Chinese and Tartar cities.



LT C.P. Summerall's platoon firing through the gate of the first wall of the imperial city of Peking.



Guns of Reilly's Battery F on the wall above the Chien-Men Gate, enfilading the wall between the Chinese and the Tartar cities.

mission. The objective of this international effort was the relief of the besieged Legation Row in Peking. Troops from Russia, France, England, Japan, and the United States were allied in the rescue effort.

After Reilly's crossing of the Pei Ho River, the international forces moved rapidly toward Peking. In a subsequent council of war, the combined leaders planned to mount a final assault on the Chinese defenses on 15 August. But, hoping to garner the glory of being first into Peking, the Russians attacked prematurely on 14 August. The Chinese resistance to the unilateral Muscovite action was bitter; the attack was stopped cold.

The other allied forces including Battery F soon joined the attack. Burgess's platoon went into action about 3,200 yards from the Imperial City walls. Its supporting firepower enabled the Fourteenth Infantry to plant the "Stars and Stripes" upon the wall. Summerall's cannoneers knocked down a pagoda filled with Chinese defenders, and other elements of the Battery blasted open a city gate for the Fourteenth Infantrymen. Legation Row was freed—and none too soon. As one inhabitant stated: "We were down to our last meal of pony meat. . . ."


The battle, however, did not end with the rescue of the legations. The Chinese retreated to the inner walls of the Forbidden City and mounted another defense. On 15 August, four guns of Battery F stood atop a wall commanding the Shun-chun gate, 1 mile away. Characteristically, Captain Reilly was in the forefront of the battle. He continuously directed fire adjustments; and under the impact of the battering shells, the walls of the Forbidden City began to tumble.



Reilly's Battery F, 5th US Artillery in action against Chinese troops at Pei-Tsang, China.

Word came that the American infantry was about to assault the walls. In response, two guns under the command of Lieutenant Summerall raced forward to provide close support.

Captain Reilly would have been proud to see those guns dashing along. He would have been prouder still to see Lieutenant Summerall calmly walk up to the City's gate amidst concentrated Chinese rifle fire and mark in chalk an "X" as the target for his guns. But fate interrupted, and Battery F's victory proved bitter. A Chinese bullet

and Captain Reilly had arrived at the same place, at the same time. Mortally wounded, Reilly fell unconscious; the gallant captain soon died in his first sergeant's arms. But he died as he would have chosen—with every section of his splendid battery in action and accomplishing their assigned tasks. Captain Reilly, a proud and dedicated battery commander, passed into history—a legend forever to be remembered and a courageous figure to serve as an example for all future Redleg leaders. 

Colonel (Retired) Robert M. Stegmaier received his commission in the Quartermaster branch upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1937. During his tenure as a quartermaster officer, he served in Germany, Korea, Peru, and the United States. He also served with the G3 Section at the Pentagon and commanded the 32d and 2d Quartermaster Groups. Upon his retirement at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1965, Colonel Stegmaier adopted the Field Artillery. He has published many articles on famous field artillerymen. Currently, he resides in Sun City, Arizona.

Photos courtesy Fort Sill Museum Archives

Redleg News

ITEMS OF GENERAL INTEREST

Q & A the Personnel Way

Question: Do computers make assignments?

Answer: No, assignments are not made by a computer. Officer assignments are made by an assignment officer only after considering the Army's requirements, the qualifications of available officers, and officer preferences.

For enlisted assignments, an automated system called CAP III (centralized assignment procedures III) is used to nominate a soldier for a specific assignment against an incoming, validated requisition. The system is really an automated tool for an assignment manager and a professional development noncommissioned officer. Once the assignment has been verified and approved, instructions are transmitted to the servicing military personnel office through the CAP system.

These automated systems save time and apply Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of the Army (DA) assignment criteria uniformly to all soldiers. For example, the automated system screens for soldiers with the right military occupational specialty (MOS), pay grade, security clearance, and special qualifications and additional skills identifiers. When no soldier matches the requirements of a requisition, the system applies substitution rules authorized by DOD and DA directives. The automated process not only considers soldier preferences recorded on the enlisted master file but also applies standard rules for determining the most eligible Continental United States-based soldier for an overseas assignment.

Question: I'm an NCO with a profile, and I must appear before an MOS and Medical Retention Board (MMRB). Can the board kick me out of the Army?

Answer: No, the MMRB does not kick soldiers out of the Army. The board is made up of local officers and enlisted members who evaluate a medically profiled soldier's ability to perform in his or her primary military occupational specialty (PMOS). The board has four options:

- It can retain the soldier's current PMOS.
- Give the soldier a probation period in the PMOS and reevaluate him or her later.
- Refer the soldier to the Army Disability System for evaluation.
- Recommend to the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) that the soldier be reclassified.

If the board recommends reclassification, processing takes about 30 to 45 days after the recommendation reaches MILPERCEN. If MILPERCEN does not reclassify the

soldier, he or she may be referred to the disability system for evaluation. Based on past MMRB cases, MILPERCEN reclassifies about 60 percent of the cases it receives. It refers the others for disability evaluation. Here are some of the reasons MILPERCEN may refer a soldier to the disability system:

- Profile limitations may be too restrictive.
- Profile limitations coupled with Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores may not qualify a soldier for any MOS.
- The soldier's grade and years of service may not allow for retraining in a new career field.
- Judicial or nonjudicial actions during the soldier's current enlistment may make the soldier unacceptable or ineligible.

Question: My Officer Record Brief has a lot of errors. How can I get them corrected?

Answer: The Officer Record Brief is produced from data stored on the Officer Master File (OMF) at MILPERCEN. Although military personnel officer audits may result in some corrections, they cannot change some selected data on the Officer Record Brief. Most changes are reported by the MILPO and sent to MILPERCEN via the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) to the Officer Master File. Examples of items which officers must report to the MILPO for SIDPERS input are: changes in number of dependents and new mailing addresses. However, other data are input to the file by MILPERCEN's Officer Personnel Management Directorate, career managers and other Department of the Army level offices. Examples are security clearances, date of last photograph, and officer specialties. Still other data can be entered by either the MILPO or MILPERCEN career managers. DA Pamphlet 640-1, dated 15 January 1985, *Officer Guide to the Officer Record Brief*, recently went out to all active Army officers. Any questions not answered in the pamphlet should be directed to your MILPO. MILPOs or officers requiring additional copies of DA Pamphlet 640-1 should write to Headquarters, Department of the Army (DAPC-EPZ-MP) Alexandria, VA 22332-0400, or call AUTOVON 221-9006/9007.

Question: Is it useless to submit a preference statement? I hear assignment managers at MILPERCEN do not use them.

Answer: The assignment manager follows a process which incorporates the individual preference statement.

The manager attempts to match the Army's requirements with the individual's needs.

If the soldier's file contains an outdated preference statement, the assignment is completed without benefit of the individual's input.

A current preference statement—9 months prior to anticipated reassignment—is an important part of any soldier's personal file. It does not assure a soldier of his or her next assignment, but it does allow the soldier to participate in the assignment process.

A telephone call or a letter to your assignment manager is often as effective, but the preference statement is preferred.

Question: What is the current Enlisted Evaluation Report Weighted Average (EERWA)?

Answer: EERWA was eliminated on 1 January 1984. It is no longer published or maintained. It was misleading and a major contributor to numerical inflation.

Question: Why does MILPERCEN hold promotion lists long after the boards end?

Answer: Once the board adjourns, MILPERCEN carries out several screening procedures. Specifically, MILPERCEN action officers check to ensure that all soldiers are properly considered and that flagged individuals are identified and their names are removed from the published list. For officers, those twice not selected for promotion are identified, their options determined, and notification letters prepared for dispatch.

Nomination lists and staffing documents are prepared for most boards. Only when the results are approved (usually by the Secretary of the Army) can the published list be printed and mailed to those general officers designated to receive a prepositioned list. Once all commands have received the list, MILPERCEN sends a message to announce the date and time of a simultaneous worldwide release.

The entire process takes approximately 70 days from the board's adjournment. These procedures safeguard the credibility of the promotion system.

Question: Why was my MOS taken off the selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) list?

Answer: SRBs give soldiers in certain understrength MOSs an incentive to reenlist and remain in service. When the number of soldiers in an MOS meets the Army's needs, the MOS is dropped from the SRB list.

Question: What happens if my specialty gets on the

space imbalanced MOS (SIMOS) list?

Answer: When an MOS is listed as space imbalanced, 55 percent or more of the Army's authorizations for that MOS are located overseas. If your MOS is space imbalanced, you will be given incentives to extend your overseas tour. There are three incentives:

- Fifty dollars per month for each month you extend.
- A nonchargeable 30-day leave prior to the start of your extension.
- A nonchargeable 15-day leave with travel to and from the Continental United States prior to the start of your extension.

To receive these benefits you must extend for 12 months or more.

Question: How are soldiers deleted or deferred from overseas assignments?

Answer: Soldiers can be deleted or deferred from assignments for operational, regulatory, or personal reasons. Commanders may request deferment or deletion of soldiers who are considered critical to the unit. In addition, soldiers sometimes fail to meet the special qualifications for the position or become unqualified prior to movement.

Soldiers may be deferred from overseas assignment when:

- A family member becomes seriously ill or dies.
- The soldier becomes pregnant.
- There is a domestic hardship involving the immediate family.
- The soldier is selected for a basic or advanced noncommissioned officer education system course, provided attendance will not delay overseas travel more than 90 days.

Soldiers may also be deleted from overseas assignments when:

- A family member is terminally ill, and death is anticipated within 1 year.
- The soldier's spouse or child dies after the soldier receives assignment instructions.
- A family member is hospitalized or placed in an institution for more than 90 days, and the soldier's presence is needed to resolve associated problems.
- A soldier's pregnancy or related complications exceed 90 days.

Command Update

NEW REDLEG COMMANDERS

COL Joseph Simino Field Artillery School Brigade	MAJ Frederick S. Berry 2d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery	LTC Ralph R. Ripley 2d Battalion, 28th Field Artillery
COL Robert D. Offer, Jr. 528th Field Artillery Group		LTC Jerry D. Ford 4th Battalion, 77th Field Artillery



Leading the Soviet Way

by Captain George T. Norris

“Leadership is the crucial element of combat power While leadership requirements differ from squads to echelons above corps . . . leaders must be men of character; they must know and understand soldiers and the physical tools of battle; and they must act with courage and conviction Throughout the history of war, victory has gone to the leader who understood and used the means at his disposal to the best advantage.” FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1982.

In recognition of leadership's special role on any future battlefield, agencies throughout the US Army have devoted the past year to an examination of *how* to lead. One aspect that has yet to receive sufficient attention in this broad-ranging review is the role of leaders in other armies, particularly the army of our most intractable antagonist—the Soviet Union. Such a study recommends itself for two reasons. The Soviets may have leadership

strengths that warrant our evaluation and weaknesses that invite our exploitation.

The citizens of the West expect US leaders to be able to wrest the initiative from their Soviet counterparts. But how can that be done if we do not understand how the Soviet leadership system works? Are Soviet officers really nothing more than living, breathing cogs in a military machine which is rigidly managed from the top to the bottom? Are Soviet officers unable to make decisions for themselves without continual guidance from their superiors? Will they sit idle on the battlefield and await instructions rather than take a chance and find themselves literally "under the gun" of the KGB officer assigned to monitor their actions?

If we devote even a brief amount of time to the study of Soviet leaders we will find that each of these questions should be answered with a resounding

"No!" The Soviets invest a good deal of time in training their leaders, and they expect these men to accomplish many of the same things we expect of our leaders. Although the manifestations of their leadership policies and the traits they espouse may seem unusual to us, they should not be dismissed as vagaries. After all, the Soviet leadership philosophy has stood the test of combat. It outlines exactly what the Soviets want their leaders to accomplish and in many cases specifies how.

The leader in the Soviet system is in a very different position than his Western counterpart. He is the product of a state built on the revised teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as well as on the cumulative effects of both Russian and Soviet history. The modern Soviet leader knows the principles of party and military operations. This knowledge guides his every effort.

The first principle of the socialist state is adherence to authority. Friedrich Engels described the subordination of personal desires to the scientifically rooted will of the party as the most critical aspect of socialist life. Anyone who fails to follow orders violates the laws of society. Willful violations constitute adventurism, a dangerous tendency, because the scientifically substantiated decision—the party's decision—is always the "right" answer. In fact, Soviet logic runs something like this: Any choice other than the "right," scientific one is almost certainly doomed to produce failure. Anyone who willingly undertakes a course of action which he knows will fail is working against the good of society; he is an enemy of the state—a counter-revolutionary. On the other hand, those who adhere to authority, who make decisions based on the scientific laws of the party, lead the way to correct solutions and success.

This philosophy is the foundation of Soviet military leadership. The proper Soviet leader builds upon this bedrock by nurturing in himself a number of personal traits. In this effort, he receives considerable help. In fact, the development of desirable personal traits is a matter of profound concern on the part of the entire state.

According to revisionist historians, the emergence of great prerevolutionary Russian leaders was possible only because they lived in simpler times. The modern era, however, requires much greater political awareness and talents. From the Soviet perspective, unless the state nurtures these leadership skills, the world must wait for the emergence of a native genius. The only such genius in recent times was Lenin,



Control of units is important if the commander's decision is to be implemented.

and so his example and teaching serve as logical models for the development of all future leaders.

Lenin believed in competence. It follows that a military leader must naturally be tactically proficient. The development of such proficiency is a function of the elaborate Soviet military school system. The military skill of the Soviet officer is the product of many years of education and practice. Courses of instruction emphasize scientific decision-making. Officers become well-versed in the scientific method and are able to understand how to apply the latest technological advancements to battlefield situations.



The commander's personal presence ensures control and correct decision-making.



The moral-political education of the soldier ensures compliance with orders.

According to the Soviet rhetoric, as the officer develops his scientific ability, his views of the world and battle sharpen. He gains flexibility of thought, organizational ability, foresight, and the capacity to be a calculated risk taker. Many of these capabilities are universally desirable skills, but the Soviets interpret them a little differently than do Westerners. For example, the Soviets define foresight as the ability to anticipate future events based on a thorough understanding of the laws of science and the tendencies of the battle to develop in line with these laws. The Soviets reject the idea

of intuition as understood in the West. To the Soviet, decisions made on "gut reactions" are sheer folly; they are the manifestations of mysticism. According to the Soviets, intuition is the scientific ability to foresee logical developments. It is not in the least bit associated with arcane inspirations.

History and science also dictate that Soviet leaders develop the traits of valor, resoluteness, strength of will, trust in subordinates, willingness to take responsibility, and caring for their soldiers. This list of traits sounds quite familiar to US leaders, but there are some subtle differences in their manifestations in behavior. The caring relationship of a leader to his subordinates offers a case in point.

The Soviets, particularly Stalin during the Great Patriotic War (World War II), invoked the memory of the Czarist genius, General Alexander Suvorov when they sought to underscore the significance of caring. Significantly, the title Stalin bestowed on himself, Generalissimo, had been used only once before—referring to Suvorov. Today, there are still many military high schools which bear his name.

There are many reasons for the modern Soviet state to continue using the example of a devoutly religious and caring Czarist officer. Foremost among these is the fact that he *never* lost. Although detractors will claim that he never had to fight anyone of consequence, the fact remains that from 1768 to 1800, he repeatedly defeated the Poles, Turks, and French. He accomplished these feats while developing in his soldiers a true love for him and an almost absolute faith in his abilities as a leader—no mean achievement when one remembers that soldiers of his era were serfs with no particular love for the aristocracy.

In his biography of Suvorov, Phillip Longworth recounts how Suvorov developed a set of regulations for the administration of his regiment. The foundation of his success was obedience. Suvorov believed that, "All constancy of military discipline is based on obedience, which must be preserved religiously. . . . From obedience comes the careful and easy carrying out of a man's every responsibility and his pride in its perfection; and in this there lies the whole essence of military order." Suvorov enforced this obedience with stern measures for soldiers and officers alike.

But harsh treatment was not the sole means of bringing about military success. Suvorov believed that obedience had to be supported with a true caring for the soldier's welfare, especially his



Based in science, the commander's intuition allows rapid prediction of battlefield events.

cleanliness and health. Moreover, the Generalissimo believed that leaders must make every effort to ensure that the soldier understood the purpose behind the rules and regulations, and through intense training, he was able to carry out his duties in any circumstance.

In carrying out this scheme, Suvorov was exceptionally successful. The basic manual of arms was reportedly so impressed upon his men that their muskets became extensions of their limb responding reflexively to commands. Wherever a platoon or battalion or whole regiment turned, every man in the formation knew his place. Suvorov also identified a need for the religious education of soldiers. The soldier's faith gave him a reason for his efforts on a higher plane. It also provided a means of inspiring him in battle. In fact, one of Suvorov's regimental chaplains is said to have led the final assault on the Fortress of Ismail during one of the wars with the Turks.

Through the application of these principles and guidelines, Suvorov was able to accomplish remarkable feats in combat against diverse enemies. His armies performed well on

the most demanding battlefields to include the Swiss Alps in winter.

Today's Soviet leader learns to emulate Suvorov. Just like the Generalissimo, he relies on obedience and discipline. Orders are obeyed because they are orders. Although it pales in contrast to the importance of discipline, caring still counts not because of the value of the individual but because it promotes absolute confidence in orders. The Communist Party and its political officers have replaced religion and Suvorov's chaplains. Responsible for the "spiritual" and moral development of the soldier, today's Zampolit serves as a further example to Soviet soldiers of what they can and should be. Political officers must prove themselves in their particular arm before they become members of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces. More than the mere party functionary of the Great Patriotic War, the Zampolit is now a capable officer as well as a proven party member.

Perhaps most significant is Suvorov's example regarding the importance of *initiative*. One of the operational concepts of AirLand Battle doctrine is initiative—subordinates



Battle drill speeds decision-making by simplifying choices.

acting independently within the context of the overall plan. The Soviets see nothing wrong in principle with this notion. But they do see it as a luxury which cannot be allowed.


They practice initiative more narrowly. It is the ability of a subordinate to recognize which of the previously ordered alternatives applies in a given tactical situation, rather than the ability to develop his own courses of action. The reason for this rests in Soviet doctrinal preference for high-speed offensive action. The Soviets reason that if every commander made his own tactical decisions, time would be lost as he gathered the necessary data and then weighed the alternatives. However, in the offensive, time is a resource which cannot be squandered. The result is heavy reliance on the initial plan which, of course, represents the scientifically correct solution.

Any deviation from the correct solution is patently wrong. If the situation changes, then the subordinate is able to recognize this fact and communicate that to his commander. That commander can then consider whether or not a change to the original orders is warranted. In fact, unity of command requires that the commander who issued the original order issue any necessary changes.

The Soviets see this arrangement as tantamount to the reflex action demanded by Suvorov of his soldiers. Battalions do not need good tacticians; all they need practice is battle drill.

Drills are automatic, and units are mindless limbs of the regimental and divisional brains. Moreover, at the lowest levels, the implementation of commands requires no understanding of the Russian language, merely a reflex action to a given command.

Scientific leadership resting on the bedrock of authority ultimately results in a series of almost reflex actions. The discipline and obedience required by the scheme are the inevitable products of societal pressures. Logically, the uncertainties of motivation and morale need not be considered if a unit has the proper socialist climate where each leader and soldier performs in accord with the will of the leadership of the party.

Does the leader described constitute an automaton? Probably not, but he isn't far removed. However, the point is—it doesn't matter. When commanders at battalion level and below execute almost instinctive drills, it is possible for the timetable of their superiors to be met. The commander who formulated and approved the correct plan at the outset of the battle makes changes when the situation changes. According to their literature, the Soviets eventually intend to prompt greater "initiative" in their junior leaders. But until that time comes, Marshall Zhukov's view is still predominant, "If you don't know, we'll teach you; if you don't want to, we'll make you." 

Captain George T. Norris, FA, is a threat/military intelligence instructor in the Tactics and Combined Arms Department at the US Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He received his commission through the United States Military Academy. Captain Norris' field artillery assignments include battery commander, warhead detachment commander, and brigade operations and intelligence officer.

More than Meets the Eye



by Major Mark D. Studer

The detachment commander settles into his seat to enjoy a cup of coffee after his unit's morning run. His reflections on the day's activities soon evaporate as his first sergeant reports that the Standortverwaltung (German equivalent of the Directorate of Engineering and Housing) just called. According to the German official, the housing agreement between the US and the host nation was about to change. United States personnel would now be charged their full quarters allowance plus costs for utilities. Utterly dismayed, the field artillery captain immediately calls

his group executive officer and asks him to check on the reported change. Both officers are anxious to see if their soldiers will be affected.

The commander then tells the first sergeant to hold off putting anything out until the executive officer calls back. In the same breath, the commander reminds the first sergeant to have platoon sergeants review the group's Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) planning letter as they prepare their input for the next training meeting.

Half an hour later the detachment executive officer announces the arrival of

a team from the US Army Europe (USAREUR) inspector general's office. They have arrived at the detachment's isolated headquarters to conduct an unannounced site physical security inspection. After a muffled curse, the commander instructs his lieutenant to notify the guards at the site and the group S3, and then to show the inspectors to his office.

Later that morning after going to the site with the inspectors and checking on scheduled technical operations and communications training, the commander walks into his dining facility

to speak with the manager. He wants to know how preparations for the upcoming family night dinner are progressing. Their conversation leads into a discussion of plans for the renovation of the dining facility. The staff sergeant also informs the commander that three of five German civilian kitchen workers will be leaving the dining facility within 2 weeks because of a cut in funds.

After lunch the commander speaks with the cryptography facility officer, who is also the detachment's security manager, about a recent compromise at another unit. He doesn't want to have a similar problem in his outfit. Their discussion centers on the reasons the incident occurred and on the need to ensure that local procedures for controlling large quantities of communications security (COMSEC) material and classified documents are adequate. He also mentions his conversation with the dining facility manager and instructs the lieutenant, who is also the unit's mess officer, to get a readout from the German support battalion S4 on the matter of the kitchen workers.

Before the commander can depart, the lieutenant drops another bombshell. He suspects one of his post exchange (PX) employees of using PX money to cover debts until payday. The lieutenant will be conducting an unannounced PX inventory that Saturday.

Afterwards the commander meets with the division special weapons officer and the German security battery commander to plan joint training for the following quarter. All this and it's only 1400 hours. Who is this captain with multinational responsibilities and a parcel full of subordinates and challenges? He's the commander of a field artillery detachment.

Wherever sensitive US weapons are stored outside the Continental United States, such field artillery units maintain constant custody and accountability of these munitions. Field artillery detachments led by *bona fide* Redlegs provide this service for selected weapons earmarked for use by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) units. This article captures the everyday life, the organization, and the functions of such detachments. In doing so, it seeks to promote a better understanding of the many challenging responsibilities associated with these extraordinary commands.



Operating the cryptography facility is just one of the many missions a detachment must perform.

Organization

Field artillery detachments vary in size from under 40 to over 300 persons, and they support NATO units ranging in size from a battalion to an Air Force missile wing. Captains command most detachments. They normally have three or four lieutenants authorized by their modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE). Depending on the size detachment, units normally have sergeants first class or master sergeants as their first sergeants. Although the organization of each unit depends largely on the supported NATO outfit's deployment and operations plans, detachments are generally composed of a headquarters platoon and one or more maintenance and assembly (M&A) platoons. As shown in figure 1, the headquarter's platoon normally contains mess, supply, administrative, and communications teams. Maintenance and assembly platoons consist of two or more M&A teams. Many commanders also organize a training element from their own resources to handle the detachment's requirements in that critical area.

Several detachments and an ordnance company comprise a US Army Artillery Group. The group headquarters

exercises command and control of the detachments and during peacetime provides support similar to that provided by a battalion headquarters.

Detachments are normally collocated with their supported NATO units on host nation post. As indicated in figure 2, a field artillery group normally supports a NATO corps. Consequently, detachments frequently reside at great distances from each other and from the group headquarters. An 80- to 120- kilometers separation is not uncommon.

Functions

Because of the great distances between units and the uniqueness of each detachment's mission, field artillery detachments perform many functions normally handled at the battalion or higher levels.

For example, geographic dispersal of units often results in the detachments being supported by more than one regional personnel center (RPC). This requires performance of battalion-level Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) transactions.




Figure 1. Typical field artillery detachment.




Figure 2. Field artillery group support configuration.

The nature of a detachment's mission also dictates that the unit maintain classified documents and COMSEC accounts which are generally larger than those of a regular artillery battalion. Each detachment maintains a 24-hour capability to receive and process emergency action messages (EAM). The majority of unit personnel have clearances and participate in the demanding personnel reliability program (PRP).


Because each detachment supports a different NATO unit and has its own tailored mission, the detachment commander normally plays a greater role than a cannon, rocket, or missile battery commander in the management of his training program. Detachments prepare short- and long-range training plans in conjunction with the parent group's and the supported NATO unit's plans. Planning, scheduling, coordinating, executing, and evaluating the detachment and combined training as well as major exercises are largely the detachment commander's responsibility. Full-scale detachment-level field training normally coincides with the supported NATO unit exercises. Group-level ARTEPS occur annually in conjunction with the supported corps' exercises. Moreover, every 15 to 18 months each detachment and its NATO counterpart unit undergo a USAREUR or higher-level surety inspection which certifies the units in the performance of both their peacetime and wartime missions.

Such exercises and inspections place a premium on training. In addition to overseeing combined, collective training the detachment commander must also manage his organization's individual training to ensure that his soldiers remain proficient on basic and military occupational specialty (MOS)-related tasks. In this regard, commanders often coordinate with other US units in the local military community for the use of personnel and equipment not authorized or available at the detachment or the parent group. Reference publication libraries and individual learning centers exist in most detachments.

In the logistics arena, detachments run classified and unclassified property-book level supply operations and deal routinely with their parent group, their military community, and their NATO counterparts regarding logistical matters. Commanders prepare monthly unit status reports in accordance with AR 220-1, *Unit Status*



Detachments maintain small PX and dining facilities for soldiers and their dependents.



Reporting, and forward them to the parent group headquarters.

Each detachment maintains and operates its own dining facility. Detachment MTOEs authorize mess personnel; however, vehicles, equipment, and cleaning assistance comes for the most part from the supported NATO unit. Units pick up rations at regular intervals at the nearest US community providing ration support.

Because detachments are often located miles from a major US military community, the detachment commander is frequently the *de facto* community commander. He deals with local military and civilian leaders in both a professional and social capacity and he makes sure the needs of his soldiers and their dependents are met. Married personnel, bachelor officers, and senior noncommissioned officers (NCO) usually live in quarters in the city or town where the detachment is stationed. The supported NATO unit is normally responsible for the procurement and partial furnishing of these quarters.

Detachments maintain small PX facilities. In fact, detachment soldiers or their dependents frequently run these stores. Many detachments also have mini-TV circuits or are on a 16-mm movie circuit. They maintain their own mailroom operations, handle their own unit funds, and often operate unit lounges.

Lieutenants and NCOs invariably emerge from their tours at detachments well versed in numerous areas of responsibility often totally unknown to their peers in normal delivery units. The experience gained in supervising site physical security, cryptography facility, training, mail room, and property book-level supply operations, as well as coordinating and working with host nation forces in combined operations serves these detachment officers well in future, higher level assignments.

Support

Support for detachments differs significantly from most US units. With few exceptions a detachment receives vehicle support from an associated NATO unit. In accordance with established NATO and host nation agreements, NATO organizations also provide communications, billets, family housing, dining facility equipment, facilities maintenance, office and storage space, recreational facilities, medical care, and wartime rations. The



United States and German soldiers work together on combined field training exercises.

detachment commander is often the lynchpin in obtaining needed host nation support.

Conclusion

A brief review of a few hours in the life of a field artillery detachment commander and a description of the makeup and functions of his organization clearly establishes that this commander confronts unusual challenges and has significant responsibilities. He functions in each of the four primary staff areas. He oversees accomplishment of battalion-level SIDPERS and other personnel functions, the storage and handling of much classified material, the development and

implementation of his own training program, and the maintenance of his own property books and dining facility. Moreover, he often wears the hat of community commander. Finally, as a senior military official, he represents the United States Army in the local host nation and military communities.

Add the complexities of a classified mission and mix well. What results is a command that offers a highly varied and challenging experience. Detachment command hones a leader's ability not only to plan, delegate, and supervise, but also to cultivate strong relationships with host nation civilian and military personnel. This command is certainly more than

meets the eye.



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The following is a list of articles, "On the Move" columns, and "View from the Blockhouse" (VB) items appearing in the Journal during calendar year 1985. The Journal staff has categorized the entries by subject and lists these by title and issue.

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