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MAY-JUNE 1949

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Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.	**Col. Ralph Hospital (PMS&T)**
St. Bonaventure College, St. Bonaventure, N. Y.	**Col. George A. Grayeb (PMS&T)**

SECOND ARMY

Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Penna.	**Col. Thomas S. Gunby (PMS&T)**
Valley Forge Military Academy, Wayne, Penna.	**Maj. Wm. W. McWhinney**
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.	**Col. Giles R. Carpenter (PMS&T)**
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West Virginia State College, Institute, W. Va.	**Lt. Col. Charlie Wesner (PMS&T)**
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio	**Col. Carlos Brewer (PMS&T)**
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Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio	**Col. Wm. C. Lucas (PMS&T)**
Eastern Kentucky State College, Richmond, Ky.	**Col. Wm. B. Paschall (PMS&T)**

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Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Ala.	**Col. Geo. M. Williamson, Jr. (PMS&T)**
Jacksonville State Teachers College, Jacksonville, Ala.	**Col. Thomas B. Whitted, Jr. (PMS&T)**
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University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.	**Col. Jerome J. Waters, Jr. (PMS&T)**
St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas	**Lt. Col. Joseph H. Stangle (PMS&T)**
Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, College Station, Texas	**Lt. Col. John V. Roddy**

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PRO and CON

The Journal has recently received (and appreciated) a number of letters of constructive criticism. From among the recommendations the following contradictory ones are extracted.

★ ★ ★ ★

"Concentrate entirely on matters pertaining strictly to Artillery. The big picture is adequately covered elsewhere."

"I have noticed in your recent issues that you are evidently not trying to have all your articles deal with only artillery. I think this is a good idea, as you can milk a cow of just so much until it runs dry of anything worth while."

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★ ★ ★ ★

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"Maintain your Book Department and allied things pertaining to it. It is the best I've run across and of real service to members."

★ ★ ★ ★

We would like to receive further expressions of opinion from our readers on the above as well as any general comments on the contents of the Journal.

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PUBLISHED BIMONTHLY BY THE UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN 1910 WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTS—AS WORTHY NOW AS THEN

The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

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The Field Artillery Journal is not a medium for the dissemination of Department of the Army doctrine or administrative directives. Contributors alone are responsible for opinions expressed and conclusions reached in published articles. Consistent with the objects of our Association, however. The Field Artillery Journal seeks to provide a meeting ground for the free expression of artillery ideas in the changing present.

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The FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

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● Cover: An L-17 of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery

ARTICLES

ARTILLERY NOTES

OTHER FEATURES

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BEHIND THE SCENE WITH THE TARGET GRID

Prepared in the Department of Gunnery, The Artillery School

By Major Robert S. Stafford, FA

PART I

A STUDY into the background of conduct of observed fire reveals that war experience indicated the desirability of simplifying the procedure as much as possible. Primarily, it was desired that this simplification reduce the mental calculations and arithmetical computations required of the observer, yet permit him to obtain rapid and timely adjustments of fire. The result is the new observed-fire procedure using the target grid. This method has reduced the observer's problem by enabling him to fire every mission as if he were on the gun-target line. However, in reducing the observer problem, it was necessary to devise a means whereby the former mental gymnastics (namely, those caused by the observer's offset from the gun-target line) of the observer could be solved elsewhere. The target grid was devised as the means for graphically converting the observer's corrections into fire commands. The target grid is operated by the fire-direction center. Thus, the observer-fire-direction center team has become more inseparable than heretofore.

The articles on "Shooting Without Factors" which have been published previously in the FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL (Sept-Oct, 1948; Nov-Dec, 1948) have dealt principally with what the observer does. They have not explained in detail exactly what happens in the fire-direction center and at the battery. There are many approaches to an explanation of this matter, but generally the method of using examples excels in clarity. For this reason, this article, and the two which are to follow in subsequent issues of the FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, will contain examples of fire missions. Each one of these missions will cover in detail the operation of the observation post, the fire-direction center, and the battery position.

Example. Target, base point; mission, precision registration (no previous firing in this area). Adjustment to be conducted starting from any round in the impact area visible to the observer. The battery is in position and has been laid on a compass. Aiming posts have been set out at deflection 2800.

OBSERVER: FIRE MISSION, AZIMUTH 420, MARK CENTER OF SECTOR, BASE POINT, PRECISION REGISTRATION. WILL ADJUST.

FDC: The S3 selects a battery to fire this precision registration. He then supervises the determination of approximate data which will be surely safe. The first round is fired so as to come fairly close to the center of the sector of fire. After this data is determined and checked by the S3, it is sent to the battery in the form of fire commands. (The target grid has not yet come into the picture.)

BATTERY: The battery, upon receiving the initial commands, follows them in the prescribed manner, and fires.

OBSERVER: The observer sees the burst, measures the deviation, and estimates its position with respect to the target for range along the OT line. He decides to send RIGHT 600, ADD 400.

FDC: Meanwhile, the HCO has placed the target grid over the location on the chart used to obtain data for the initial fire commands. The target grid is then oriented on the azimuth received in the initial fire request. The *first subsequent* correction by the observer is now plotted by moving from the center of the target grid, RIGHT 600 (perpendicular to the arrow on the grid) and ADD 400 (parallel to and in the same direction as the arrow). The HCO uses the range-deflection fan to determine the deflection and range to the new plot. He announces, *Baker, deflection (so much), Range (so much)*. The computer announces the new deflection to the battery, and upon determining the elevation corresponding to the new range, sends it to the battery.

BATTERY: Now that the target grid is being used, the first change now

takes place in the method of receiving data at the battery. Instead of making a shift as was done when range-bracketing and deflection-bracketing procedures were employed, the gunner merely sets off a new deflection and the No 1 sets off the elevation. The round is fired.

OBSERVER: The observer notes the location of the burst and sends the correction DROP 200.

FDC: The HCO plots this correction on the target grid in the same manner as the first subsequent correction was plotted, and again determines the data. He announces this as *deflection (so much), range (so much)* to the computer. The computer repeats the deflection to the battery, and upon determining the elevation corresponding to the new range, sends it to the battery.

BATTERY: The new data is set off and the round is fired.

OBSERVER: The observer notes the location of the burst and sends the correction ADD 100.

FDC: The HCO plots this correction on the target grid and follows the same procedure as before. The computer sends down the appropriate fire commands.

BATTERY: The battery fires.

OBSERVER: The observer notes the location of the burst, and sends DROP 50, FIRE FOR EFFECT.

At this point in the fire mission, the control passes to the fire-direction center. The S3, or whoever is designated by him, actually conducts the mission during fire for effect. During the adjustment phase of this mission, the S3 (or the person designated) has been keeping a record of the deflections fired which resulted in line shots for the observer. (Line shots give a deflection sensing, and are recognized because the observer made no correction for deviation.) The last correction sent by the observer is acted on in the usual fashion, that is, data is taken from the target grid, given to the computer, and sent to the battery. The first round in fire for effect is then fired at deflection 2850. The observer, having given fire for effect, knows that during the rest of the mission, he will merely sense the rounds. They will be sensed for range on the OT line as OVER or SHORT; for deviation, as LEFT or RIGHT. The S3 will convert the sensings to the *GT* line.

OBSERVER: The observer notes the first round in fire for effect and senses it SHORT, LINE. This sensing is sent to the FDC.

S3: The S3, knowing the position of the battery as well as the angle *T*, can readily see that, from the battery, this round is short and the deflection is right. He then looks at the record of deflections fired in adjustments and sees that the last line shot giving a deflection left in adjustment was fired at deflection 2860. This establishes an existing deflection bracket of 10 mils (first round in fire for effect fired at 2850). From the record, the round in adjustment at deflection 2860 was fired at 50 yards greater range on the *OT* line than the first tound in fire for effect. Therefore the deflection bracket is equal to ½ *S*. The S3 splits this bracket progressively until deflection is correct. His commands: DEFLECTION 2855, ELEVATION 216 (the elevation at which fire for effect was entered). The computer sends this to the guns.

BATTERY: The battery complies with the computer's command.

OBSERVER: The observer notes the location of the burst and senses it as DOUBTFUL, LEFT.

S3: The angle *T* in this case is 400 mils. The S3 senses this round by rule as SHORT, DEFLECTION DOUBTFUL. His command: *216*. The computer sends this elevation to the battery.

BATTERY: The battery fires.

OBSERVER: The observer senses OVER, LINE.

S3: The S3 senses this round with respect to the *GT* line as OVER, DEFLECTION LEFT. He will now split the existing deflection bracket (deflection 2855 - 2850). His command: *DEFLECTION 2853, 216* (having received both overs and shorts for range at this elevation, the second group of three is fired without changing elevation). The computer sends these commands to the battery.

BATTERY: The battery fires.

OBSERVER: The observer senses DOUBTFUL, RIGHT.

S3: The S3 senses this with respect to the *GT* line as OVER, DEFLECTION DOUBTFUL. His command: *216*. The computer sends this command to the battery.

BATTERY: The battery fires.

OBSERVER: OVER, RIGHT.

S3: The S3 constructs this round as being a forced OVER, DEFLECTION DOUBTFUL. His command: *216*. The computer sends this command to the battery.

BATTERY: The battery fires.

OBSERVER: SHORT, LINE.

S3: This round is sensed by the S3 as SHORT, DEFLECTION RIGHT. He splits the deflection bracket (deflection 2855 - 2853). The adjusted deflection is 2854 and the deflection is correct. The range sensings are 3 overs and 3 shorts, so the adjusted elevation is *216* (there is no change in the method of computing the adjusted elevation). The S3 sends to the observer, *CEASE FIRING, END OF MISSION*.

If it is desired to determine an adjusted time, the S3 begins firing time fuze at the adjusted elevation. The projectile being used must be the same as the one used in the percussion registration. The observer merely senses graze or air. The S3 changes the time 0.4 second in the appropriate direction so as to establish a 0.4-second time bracket and fires 3 rounds. Depending upon the sensings he receives, he fires 3 more rounds at this time, or returns to one limit of the bracket and fires 2 rounds. Upon obtaining 6 sensings in his fire for effect, he can compute the time correction using the formula —

$$\frac{\text{diff. in no. of airs and grazes}}{2 \times \text{no. of rds. fired}} \times 0.4 \text{ sec.}$$

The observer is then sent CEASE FIRING, END OF MISSION.

These operations provide for determination of an adjusted elevation and time. With appropriate minor changes they will fit any situation, i.e., determining several adjusted elevations and times for various ammunition lots, etc.

PART II

The close relationship between the observer and the fire-direction center presents the problem of a proper sequence of gunnery instruction. In order to insure the maximum benefit from instruction in the conduct of observed fires, an integrated course of instruction in observed fires (OF), unobserved fires (UF), and fire direction (FD) should be presented. The unobserved-fire and fire-direction phases of this instruction need include only the basic techniques of each. This type of instruction insures a logical sequence whereby observer techniques are taught concurrently with the supporting fire-direction techniques.

The following is an outline of a course of instruction in conduct of observed fires with necessary supporting instruction in unobserved fires and fire-direction procedure. Each period is numbered to show the sequence of instruction within each subcourse. This suggested course includes basic instruction in each subject. If it is desired to reduce this basic instruction, appropriate periods may be eliminated.

The texts referred to as references are:

Field Manual 6-40, "Field Artillery Gunnery", 1 June 1945 w/C2, 20 February 1947.

Training Memorandum, The Artillery School, "Observed-Fire Procedure Using Target Grid", 1 November 1948.

Technical Manual 6-220, "Field Artillery Fire - Control Instruments", 26 February 1941.

Technical Manual 9-524, "12-inch Graphical Firing Tables", 8 November 1944.

			Scope	*References*
1.	OF	1	Fundamentals and principles of conduct of observed fires. Use and definition of terms; use of mil relation. Selection of projectiles and fuze. Attack of targets.	FM 6-40, pars 1-5, 14-20, 39, 81; Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 1-5, 7-8.
2.	OF	2	Elementary ballistics and dispersion.	FM 6-40, pars 7-13, 21-28.
3.	UF	1	Use of plotting equipment; construction of firing charts, general.	FM 6-40, pars 170b, 181-188, 190, 356d (1), (a), (3). TM 6-220, pars 63, 65-68.
4.	UF	2	Determination of map data from firing charts; use of tabular firing tables.	FM 6-40, pars 308, 309, 253, 356d. Fig. 112; Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 72d, e, h (1) (b & c), Fig. 16, 17; FT 105-H-3, par 7.
5.	OF	3	Basic concepts and functions of the target grid. Computation of initial data; the initial fire request; S3 message to observer.	FM 6-40, par 79a. Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 2-5, 7-21.
6.	OF	4	Use of observing instruments, field glasses and BC Scope. Measurements of azimuth with aiming circle and M2 compass. Range estimation and computation of initial data. (Practical field period.)	TM 6-220, Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 12 - 13. FM 6 - 40, Appendix IV.
7.	UF	3	Explanation and use of the GFT in computation of firing data.	TM 9-524, pars 1-8, 10-14, 16, 20-22.
8.	OF	5	Conduct of precision fire. Initial data and initial fire request; subsequent corrections; terminology; adjustment; fire for effect; sensings; time registration; and destruction missions.	Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 5a, 6-30, 35, 36.
9.	FD	1	Duties of S3 and HCO in battalion fire-direction center. Orientation of Target grid; marking of range-deflection fan.	FM 6-40, pars 355, 356a, c; Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 21, 41, 42a-d.
10.	FD	2	Duties of HCO in handling fire missions.	Training Memorandum, TAS, par 42; FM 6-40, par 357c.
11.	FD	3	Duties of VCO in handling fire missions.	Training Memorandum, TAS, par 43; FM 6-40, pars 356e, 357c.
12.	FD	4	Duties of computer, general, and in area fire.	Training Memorandum, TAS, par 44.
13.	FD	5	Duties of fire - direction-center personnel in handling precision fire and time registration.	Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 42e-h, 43, 44, 47.
14.	OF	6	Conduct of precision fire. Practical, terrain board.	Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 5a, 6-30, 35, 36.
15.	OF	7	Conduct of precision fire. Service practice.	Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 5a, 6-30, 35, 36.
16.	UF	4	Determination and application of registration corrections. Construction of deflection index; deflection-correction scale; and GFT settings. Transfers of fire.	FM 6-40, pars 317, 320, 321; Training Memorandum, TAS, par 42e-f; TM 9-524, par 22.
17.	OF	8	Conduct of area fire; percussion, time, and VT fuze. Initial fire request, subsequent corrections; adjustment and fire for effect.	Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 5b, 6-25, 31-35, 37.
18.	FD	6	Battalion fire - direction-center team drill on surveyed firing chart; percussion fire.	Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 38-44, 46-48.
19.	OF	9	Conduct of area fire. Practical, terrain board.	Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 5b, 6-25, 31-35, 37.
20.	OF	10	Conduct of area fire. Service practice.	Training Memorandum, TAS, pars 5b, 6-25, 31-35, 37.

The more advanced techniques of fire direction and unobserved fires not covered herein follow in logical sequence after completion of this course, and are based solely on principles developed and applied in the course of study shown above.

Keynote: Realism

By 1st Lt. Robert B. Bowen, FA

. . ."Repeat range, fire for effect." The infantry company commander, a South Pacific veteran, and the F O anxiously wait for the obstructing machine guns to be silenced. There it is! The time fire detonates beautifully 20 yards above the enemy position. The remnants of the green-uniformed enemy detachment retreat hurriedly, and the infantry takes up its advance. An old story in combat, yet this is the Atlantic Command Field Exercise held on Vieques Island, March 1949.

The general plan was to attack with the 65th RCT on the left, the 2d Marines on the right, and the 1st Provisional Marine Battalion to land by air, once the strip was secured.

Normally the 65th RCT consists of 2 infantry battalions, the 504th FA Battalion, and the 531st Engineer Combat Company. It is stationed in Puerto Rico and is composed entirely of Puerto Rican troops. To bring the team to full strength, the 1st Provisional Infantry Battalion, a continental unit from Panama, was assigned as the 3rd Infantry Battalion in the RCT.

The Vieques games this year brought out some relatively new ideas and some refinements of old practices. For the 504th FA Battalion of Fort Bundy, Puerto Rico, the refinements began with the early preparation. Officers and enlisted men were sent to Little Creek, Virginia, to attend a Naval Gunfire Liaison course conducted by the Navy. Upon their return, they formed NGL sections on the same basis as regular liaison sections, one per infantry battalion. Their mission: controlling Naval Gunfire support as an FO handles artillery.

Since the operation was to be amphibious, it was deemed necessary to train a Transport Quartermaster Officer from the unit. In the planning phase of the exercise it was necessary at various times to make on-the-spot decisions and commitments concerning loading, troop-shipment, and allied matters which, once made, became irrevocable. Moreover, such decisions not only influenced unit efficiency but affected the unit tactically. Seen in this light, the unit TQM becomes a very important staff member and must be an officer well grounded in artillery tactics and technique.

With early training commitments thus satisfied, the 504th underwent a week of intensive amphibious training conducted by the Troop Training Unit. Better known as TTU, this unit is composed mainly of Marine Corps officers and enlisted men, together with a few Army personnel. Their function is primarily to train troops for amphibious operation.

TTU set out to fulfill its function by emphasizing realistic, practical instruction. Troops learned to descend cargo nets into LCVPs (Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel) by doing just that—from a dry-land wooden tower. Proper exit from LCVPs was developed by repeated dry-land practice. At the completion of the instruction and practical work, the unit undergoing training embarked on transports and repeated the exercises on the water. To conclude the training, two practice landings were made, to include the initial set-up of artillery. TTU thus trained all army troops taking part in the maneuver.

The 504th Artillery Battalion became the proud, if temporary, possessor of eighteen dukws to enable early landing of guns and essential equipment prior to the beaching of their LST. The dukw is, in the opinion of many, one of the outstanding amphibious developments of the last war. As regards the artillery, a dukw will carry a jeep or 105mm howitzer from an LST to the beach, onto and over the beach, unload by means of an A-frame dukw, and then act as prime-mover until the LST can beach with the rest of the battalion transportation. An obvious advantage of the dukw over the LCVP is its ability to travel over the beach to the designated unloading point, while the loads

105mm howitzer of the 504th FA Battalion (Puerto Rican)

504th FA Bn dukw coming ashore with howitzer. Shore Party Officer in foreground directing the dukw

of non-amphibious carriers must be unloaded on the beach and reloaded to be sent to inland dump or supply point.

The dukws assigned to the 504th trained with the battalion for a month prior to D-Day. Continual cooperative training built up a feeling of confidence between transporter and transported that was absolutely necessary to a finely planned operation. It was found that the M2A2 howitzer could not be lowered fully into a dukw without modification of the dukw. The overall hub-to-hub width of the howitzer was too great to allow the hubs and flange bolts to fit inside the coaming of the cargo space of the dukw, nor was the overall width of the howitzer diminished by replacement of combat wheels with 2½-ton GMC wheels. However, use of the smaller wheels, plus removal of the shields, lightened each howitzer approximately 900 pounds.

On 19 February the afloat phase of training which preceded the D-Day landing began. In keeping with the previous emphasis on realism, the entire convoy rendezvoused and, with naval and air escort, remained tactically at sea for three days prior to D-Day.

On D— 1 the landing beaches and inland targets were subjected to a full-scale aerial and naval pounding. The battleship *Missouri* lent the authority of her 16-inch guns to the preparation. The Navy and Marines received credit for a high percentage of targets destroyed by the bombardment. That the targets were destroyed there remained little doubt, as the preparation was not simulated.

H-Hour was 0900, 2 March 1949. The infantry debarked into LCVPs at 0600 and began circling in Battalion Landing Team groups. The artillery LST lay 6000 yards offshore in the Inner Tractor Area. At H+30 minutes the reconnaissance dukws were launched from the LST. Each firing battery was allotted one dukw in this group, Hq and Hq Btry two. The reconnaissance party landed at H+90 minutes and when ready radioed for the howitzers of the battalion which were in the remaining dukws. The formation for landing was staggered column, which permitted waves of faster LCVPs to bypass the dukws easily. Further, it facilitated exit from the beach, since all dukws used only two exits. During this critical period, operations were unhampered by communication breakdown, and by H + 3 hours the battalion was ashore, registered on a previously chosen base point, and prepared to render close support to the Regimental Combat Team.

Map reconnaissance prior to D-Day and confirmation secured ashore indicated that the 504th could initially support the infantry from the vicinity of the beach, hence the initial position was not far off the beach, but in a position which offered excellent concealment. The LST beached and unloaded the remainder of the trucks and supplies so that by H+6 the artillery was in full possession of its men and equipment. At H+5, lateral communications were in to Marine Division Artillery, which made possible full and flexible coverage of any target.

Material aid in accomplishing the landing with little wasted effort and time came from the shore party. The 2d Engineer Special Brigade handled their beach in such a superior manner that at no time was there either confusion or a pile-up of equipment. At all times the shore party knew exactly which unit and what material was crossing the beach. As the operation progressed, it became clear that they had been minutely drilled in all details of efficient landing operation.

Once the infantry secured the high ground beyond the airstrip on D+1, the 1st Provisional Marine Battalion commenced their air landing. Artillery liaison planes used the field as a base as well. In view of the heavy air traffic, the artillery displaced beyond the airstrip in order to avoid severe restrictions on their fire.

In all, the 504th simulated the fire of a total of 126 missions (in close support of the infantry) in the three-day operation. Through a system of excellent umpiring, there was an extremely high percentage of fires actually marked. The artillery umpire in the 504th FDC maintained radio contact with his field assistants. When a mission had been correctly and actually completed, he radioed the coordinates of the adjusted fire. The field umpires not only assessed casualties but fired special explosives into the air to denote time fire, and used small charges of explosive for impact bursts. In this manner it soon became apparent that the artillery was actually to influence the course of the maneuver. In more than one counterattack mission, the artillery fell squarely on the advancing enemy. The supported infantry was quick to realize this point and placed more and more reliance on the FOs. Company commanders were able also to get a true picture of the time involved in bringing in artillery, as well as to grasp some of the problems.

A significant addition has been made to peacetime maneuver with the introduction of an "Aggressor" opponent. Prior to World War II, most maneuvers were conducted with lack of realism as to opposition. During the war, in a few cases, German or Japanese uniforms were utilized by opposing forces. Since peacetime training cannot be directed at any nation, a fictitious enemy has been formed complete with history, language, government, and Order of Battle, all of which are unique in the

annals of war. It is labeled "Aggressor".

The "Aggressor" fights with every means at the disposal of a real enemy barring only bullets. Propaganda loudspeakers keep friendly forces awake at night by blaring information intended to undermine morale. Use of actual names and backgrounds of the US troops give the broadcasts an all-too-true aspect. In this particular case, Spanish programs were directed to Spanish-speaking troops. Nor did the flood stop there, as pamphlets and leaflets showered down depicting the fine care the "Aggressor" gave to prisoners.

The "Aggressor" uses actual wire entanglements complete with booby traps. Guns and tanks are simulated realistically by means of pneumatic, life-size models. Artillery fire is placed on US troops exactly as described above. Radio frequencies of friendly forces are fair game for "Aggressor" experts. Be it infantry with SCR 536 or artillery with SCR 619, all had the dubious pleasure of chatting or at least listening to the enemy, to the exclusion of normal operation.

It has long been true that intelligence sections are not thoroughly tested in a maneuver. Here again, "Aggressor" has come up with an improvement over the old system of simply handing a slip of paper to the unit S-2. "Aggressor" personnel who are captured by invading forces deliberately carry information valuable to US forces. Since the "Aggressor" has distinctive uniforms, insignia, order of battle, and even language, the S-2 is required to "know the enemy" to even begin his task. Prisoners reveal their information only after proper processing and at a pre-designated level, in order to insure carry-through on prisoner handling by the US force.

Naval and Air support were controlled in each infantry battalion by their respective liaison sections. Most air missions were flown by F4F and F6F fighters, and consisted of simulated strafing, rockets, and light bombing, with assessed results being closely umpired. The terrific punch of the air strike must be used advisedly, as the resupply of fuel and ammunition is responsible for the average time of 30 minutes required to complete a mission.

The 504th FA Battalion, composed of Puerto Rican troops, rounded out its second year of requiring English to be spoken 100% during duty hours. The importance of requiring all insular troops to use English in all phases of army activity cannot be overestimated. Failure to enforce such a requirement results in a breakdown of liaison with supported troops as well as with external communications. The accuracy of radio and telephone messages cannot be depended upon if either party concerned is not fully conversant with English. The success of the 504th campaign has been recognized, and other troops in the Antilles Command are being trained utilizing this principle.

An improvement was noted in the performance of FOs and LOs over the 1948 maneuver. It was attributed largely to the pre-maneuver training, which sent them through the training cycle with the infantry unit to which they were to be assigned. They were able to meet, and come to know over a 30-day period, the officers with whom they worked. In that time they became integrated into the local infantry battalion SOP to the benefit of efficient close support.

It was found that the SCR 619 was not suited to this type of operation. The FO team, landing with the infantry, initially may be required to advance rapidly. The weight of the set, together with the fragility of the storage batteries, make rapid movement difficult. Moreover, absence of a loudspeaker often deprives the FO of the opportunity of keeping abreast of the situation whenever he is not actually operating the set. The FO's vehicle, which might alleviate some of the above difficulties, may not reach him for one or two days after the landing.

It is believed that vehicles which disembark from the LST directly to the beach should not be waterproofed. With modern methods of determining depth of water offshore, it can readily be determined whether or not an LST can beach. In case of emergency, pontons are used from LST to shore. De-waterproofing requires tools, personnel, and approximately 45 minutes, during which time the vehicle is immobilized.

For the second consecutive year the 504th remained on Vieques with the 10th Marine Artillery, after completion of the exercises, to conduct service practice. For a period of a week, OPs and gun positions were shifted daily to provide the widest possible range of experience for the battalion. In addition, officers of the 504th witnessed demonstrations of Marine rocket batteries, support aircraft, and Naval Gunfire. This period was further used by the staffs of both units for close liaison in the training at hand, as well as to prepare continued close cooperation in future exercises.

In all, if we may apply the yardstick of advance made from Vieques 1948 to Vieques 1949, to the coming year, the "Aggressor" will need all his wiles to withstand the assault in 1950.

Pneumatic model of Sherman tank used by "Aggressor"

Speech Instruction at West Point

By Col. William J. Thompson, FA

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Instruction in speech has been an integral part of the curriculum at the United States Military Academy for many years. The necessity for an officer of the United States Army or Air Force to be able to communicate his ideas orally needs no detailed justification. A large part of an officer's time is devoted to training and instructing troops, duties which require a firsthand, detailed knowledge of the informational and teaching techniques of speech. In war the development of a citizen's army and air force demands officers who can influence through speech the minds of citizen soldiers and airmen towards the goals imposed by war. Both in peace and in war the Army officer must be able to speak effectively in presenting his view to his superiors and to the general public.

At West Point the cadet receives his first public speaking instruction in the Fourth Class (first year) course conducted by the Department of English. The teaching of oral and written communication is carried on concurrently, with roughly fifty percent of the available time devoted to each. Clarity, correctness, logic, and forcefulness are established as standards for both mediums. In the speech course Colonel George R. Stephens, Professor of English and Head of the Department, has set the keynotes by the title of the course, "Speech-Making," and by the definition, "Extended conversation with a purpose." Speech-Making is stressed as a title because from the very beginning of the speech course emphasis is placed not only upon effective delivery, but also, more important, upon making—that is, *constructing*—a speech with a definite purpose and a particular audience always in mind. The cadet is taught that the triangular relationship between the speaker, audience (occasion), and subject must be resolved to achieve an integration toward a definite, specific purpose.

The keynote, "Extended conversation with a purpose," places twin stress upon purpose, or motive, and upon dignified informality of delivery—the ease, directness, naturalness, and sincerity of effective conversation extended to a particular audience. The distinctive West Point system of small groups of students — twelve to fifteen for each instructor — furthers this aim and permits frequent speeches by each cadet.

During the year each cadet prepares, and delivers to his class group, speeches of all the various types—to inform, to stimulate, to convince, to actuate, to entertain. All these speeches are prepared outside of class for delivery extemporaneously; that is, the cadet is required to have the structure and the material of his speech firmly in mind and to practice his delivery so that he can speak without references other than brief notes. As he progresses, the use of notes is discouraged and finally prohibited in short speeches. From time to time without previous warning cadets are assigned impromptu speeches upon subjects with which they have ample acquaintance, to give experience in speaking without advance preparation.

Subject matter for extemporaneous speeches prepared outside of class is never assigned. Each cadet selects his own topic from his experience or his knowledge. The only general requirements are that the topic must lend itself to the assigned general end for that particular speech—informative, persuasive, etc.—and that the cadet must be capable of adapting it to the actual cadet audience, or to an assumed audience and occasion which the class will represent. In this way the cadet is encouraged and aided to meet the most demanding requirements of an effective speech—a specific purpose with a particular audience and occasion.

The group discussion receives emphasis as a part of speech instruction. Here, again, the small cadet sections permit numerous panel discussions by three to five cadets with a group leader and a small audience. In a course segment of five group discussion lessons, for example, each cadet acts as discussion leader once during the five lessons and participates in one panel discussion at each lesson.

Time does not permit any formal debate instruction for all cadets. The group discussion periods, of course, approach debate in the same requirements of finding the issues—logical "proof" and sound reasoning—are essential. During the closing periods of the spring term, however, while the remainder of the class is reviewing the work of the term, a special course in debate is given to the upper half of the class. This debate course of about seven lessons presents briefly the principles of formal debate and permits each cadet to participate as a member of a debating team in preparing and delivering a debate upon a topic of current interest. The West Point Debate Council, which sponsors extensive cadet participation in intercollegiate debating as well as a program of intramural debating, is under the supervision of the Department of Social Sciences. The Department of English assists the Debate Council by providing assistant officers-in-charge who are specialists in speech instruction and debate. A recent development is the presentation, by these officers, of a special course in speech and debate, designed for beginning debaters and building on the Fourth Class Speech-Making instruction. The course is given on a voluntary basis during cadet off-duty time. More than one hundred cadets participate each term. The Department of English also assists the Debate Council by bringing gifted cadet speakers to the attention of the Council and by critiquing delivery at cadet debate practice.

With the close of the cadet's first year his formal course in Speech-Making under the Department of English is suspended for a period. Third Class (second year) English is a course in world literature designed to widen the cadet's horizon and to increase his sense of cultural values. Of course, in this period of instruction as in all others, the cadet

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is frequently required to give oral presentations in which the methods and the techniques of Speech-Making play an important part. Many departments make special assignments requiring speech technique. The Department of Social Sciences, for example, in its history courses frequently designates special topics for outside reading and study, on which the cadet makes a fifteen-minute oral presentation in the classroom.

Toward the end of the cadet's third year at the Military Academy, just before he assumes the responsibilities of leadership of the Corps of Cadets as a First Classman (senior), the Department of English conducts a course in Military Instructor Training. This course of ten weeks covers those specific and practical applications of oral communication which a cadet must later employ as an officer-instructor. It is designed to develop the personal and professional qualifications of the cadet as an efficient military instructor by a review of Speech-Making, by a study of the psychology and the technique of teaching, and by supervision of his work as he plans, presents, and critiques lessons on military topics. Here the cadet becomes an instructor; he selects lesson topics from approved lists; he prepares detailed lesson plans and visual-training aids; and finally he presents his lessons to a class group which acts as students for his presentation. Each such lesson is thoroughly critiqued by the class group and by the regular instructor.

Concurrently with this series of lessons, group discussions on topics of current interest—military, political, and social—prepare the cadet to lead such discussions after he becomes an officer.

In summary, the Military Academy firmly believes that effective oral communication, Speech-Making, is a vital part of the equipment of each officer in the Army and Air Force of a modern democracy. Its courses are designed to give detailed knowledge of the best modern methods and techniques, together with frequent practice in speaking with a specific purpose to a particular audience. In the words of Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, who, when Superintendent of the Military Academy, demonstrated his interests in the Speech-Making course by addressing each new class as it began its study of the subject: "We intend that each cadet, as he rises to speak to any audience, military or civilian, shall have a background of knowledge and experience that will permit him to feel 'Accustomed as I am to public speaking . . .'"

* * * *

(As an interesting corollary to the above article, the following short item, prepared by the same author, on the selection, training, and qualifications of members of the Department of English, USMA, is appended.—Ed.)

ENGLISH INSTRUCTORS, USMA

It is a truism that, no matter how well a course is conceived, planned, and worked out in detailed assignments, it will fail of maximum effect unless it is presented by competent instructors. The matter of instructor selection and training is an increasing concern of the Department.

Initially, instructor selection and training was conducted on a mass-production basis, of necessity. It was decided, late in 1945, to add the Third Class English course in the academic year 1946-1947, and, furthermore, to present the same course simultaneously to the new Second Class, for that year only, since that class would be the first postwar class to have a four-year course at West Point. With the impending relief of many emergency officers who had been teaching Fourth Class English and Military Instructor Training during the war years, and with the tripling of the principal courses to be taught during the coming year, some thirty new instructors were needed. Officers of the USMA classes of 1938 to 1943 were selected on their cadet records and ordered to Columbia University for the Spring Session beginning in January of 1946. There they were given a common course in writing, public speaking, and English and American literature, especially drawn up by the University with the new West Point courses in mind. Beginning in the academic year 1946-1947, then, these officers served as the first instructors to put the new English courses into effect at the Military Academy.

Postwar policies now permit an extensive program of instructor selection and education. New instructors are selected about a year and a half before they will be needed for teaching. They are then sent to Columbia University for a full year's work in English and comparative literature, writing, and public speaking. This work gives them the residence requirement for the Master of Arts degree. Following the training at Columbia, they are assigned to the Department for three years' duty as instructors. Four officers are now taking the year's work at Columbia, and a fifth officer joined them for the Spring Session beginning in January. With a normal Department instructor strength of twenty-three officers, it is planned in future years to send eight new officers to the year's course at Columbia each September.

In the meantime, owing to the ever-present unanticipated losses in personnel, it has been necessary to bring in officers to teach without the year's graduate training. These officers are given a summer session of graduate work at a civilian school before teaching and are encouraged to take additional graduate work on a part-time basis during the academic year and in subsequent summers. Last summer instructors attended summer school at Columbia University, New York University, Harvard, and the University of California at Berkeley and at Los Angeles. During the academic year nine officers are attending part-time (late afternoon or Saturday) classes at Columbia or New York University. The government provides tuition funds and per diem for graduate work.

The Department is particularly interested in obtaining information on officers integrated into the Regular Army during the postwar period who have special qualifications or interests in teaching English. Progressive steps are planned for obtaining a certain number of such officers as instructors, in addition to drawing on specially qualified USMA graduates. Officers are normally considered eligible for a tour of duty with the Department during their fourth to tenth year of commissioned service. The Department is interested in having Regular Army officers, both graduates of the Academy and others, who have an interest in a tour of duty as an instructor in English, make their names known, so that their qualifications and availability can be considered.

GUNS BEFORE CHAPULTEPEC

By Maj. John B. B. Trussell, Jr., CAC

BRAVE in braid and epaulets, General Scott held a reception to celebrate the victory of his army. There was reason to celebrate, for this was the first decisively successful war in which the United States had participated. Now, only seventeen months after the first shots were fired on the banks of the Rio Grande, an army which had never totaled as many as 15,000 men had pitched its tents in the capital city of the prostrate enemy nation. The enemy army was scattered and broken and the civil authorities were suing for peace. Whatever the right and wrong of the Mexican War, it must stand out as a fine example of a generally well executed military campaign.

Among the lieutenants and captains who were present that day in Mexico City were men who, less than twenty years later, were to be world famous. Two of them — perhaps three — have joined the ranks of the Great Captains. There were Robert E. Lee, Joseph Hooker, J. B. Magruder, Irvin McDowell, A. P. Hill, G. B. McClellan, U. S. Grant, P. G. T. Beauregard, James Longstreet, George Pickett, J. E. Johnston, Gustavus Smith, all of whom had distinguished themselves during the campaign.

Second in reputation only to Captain Lee, and by far the most outstanding of the younger officers, was Thomas J. Jackson, lieutenant of artillery, just fifteen months out of the Military Academy. He and the other subalterns at the reception must have felt a little uneasy, after the manner of junior officers in the company of their elders and betters. Winfield Scott was something of a stickler for form. "Old Fuss and Feathers" was his name throughout the army, and in his presence a young man did well to be punctilious about his manners. One by one, the officers came forward to pay their respects. As Jackson went up to be presented to the General, he was met by a forbidding look. To add to the young man's confusion, General Scott put his hands behind his back and, in a voice toughened by more than thirty years of bellowing orders, announced in a tone that was heard throughout the hall: "I don't know that I shall shake hands with Mr. Jackson!"

There was a hush. Everyone stared. The lieutenant stammered and blushed, aghast at this development for which there seemed to be no reason. Suddenly the General smiled and held out his hand.

"If you can forgive yourself for the way in which you slaughtered those poor Mexicans with your guns, I am sure that I can." It was the most pointed compliment made to any officer during the campaign.

At the time that Jackson left West Point as a member of the Class of 1846, the United States had been at war with Mexico for something over two months. The entire Regular Army, consisting of some 3,500 officers and men organized in five "regiments" of infantry, four of artillery and one of cavalry, was stationed near the mouth of the Rio Grande, under the command of Colonel Zachary Taylor. This force had fought and won two battles—Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma—but for lack of transport had bogged down, unable to exploit its successes. The situation was thus stalemated when Brevet Second Lieutenant Jackson joined his regiment, the 1st Artillery, which was protecting Taylor's supply depot, Point Isabel. The young officer expressed in his letters the fear that the fighting was over and that he would never see a battle.

In Washington, the decision had been reached that, so far as conclusive action in northern Mexico was concerned, the fighting indeed was over, and that the strategic plan should be changed. Since the navy was unopposed, it would be far easier, surer, and more economical to land an army at the port nearest Mexico City than to advance overland toward the enemy capital from the north. Almost five hundred miles of mountain and desert country lay between Taylor's advance guard and Mexico City, whereas the distance from Vera Cruz was hardly half so great. Accordingly, a new force was formed under Major General Winfield Scott, the senior officer of the army. It was new only in terms of a new objective and a new commander, for it was formed by the simple expedient of stripping Taylor of more than half his troops. Among the units so transferred was the 1st Artillery.

Not until March of 1847 did the expeditionary force arrive before Vera Cruz. Their landing unopposed, the Americans immediately laid siege to the city. Emplacing the artillery took two weeks, but four days after bombardment was commenced the garrison surrendered. No sortie had been attempted, and the total casualties in the besieging army were 64. Jackson, engaged throughout the siege, behaved himself under fire in a manner to earn recommendation for promotion to first lieutenant "for gallant and meritorious conduct."

Scott was spurred by the necessity of moving his army out of the coastal plain before the fever season set in. He lost no time, therefore, in pushing inland. On April 18 the Americans defeated the Mexicans at Cerro Gordo. Here the 1st Artillery (less Company K, of which Jackson was a member) was employed as infantry. The reason was not so much a greater need for infantry than for artillery as it was the acute shortage of animals to draw the guns. Jackson did not participate in the battle, but on that day there occurred an event which had considerable effect upon his future.

Captain John B. Magruder—"Prince John," the army called him—of Jackson's

regiment, had captured a Mexican field battery at Cerro Gordo and in reward he was named its commander. Personnel for the new unit were to be furnished from the 1st Artillery. Difficulty in obtaining officer volunteers occurred at this point, for Magruder was known throughout the regiment as a strict, impatient, and irascible officer. Besides, some of the young officers, with the laurels of infantrymen freshly won at Cerro Gordo, rather fancied themselves in their new character.

Not so Jackson. He was an artilleryman. His "... partiality to his own arm was as marked as was Napoleon's, and the decisive effect of a well-placed battery appealed to his instincts with greater force than the wild rush of a charge of infantry. Skilful manoeuvering was more to his taste than the mere bludgeon work of fighting at close quarters." Furthermore, with all his bad temper, Magruder was a brave and imaginative officer, and Jackson knew that "... if any fighting was to be done, Magruder would be 'on hand'."

The Americans moved on from Cerro Gordo to Puebla, eighty miles by road from Mexico City. But here they were halted for three months: the one-year volunteers, whose enlistments expired, had returned to the United States. Their departure left so great a gap that Scott was forced to wait for reinforcements before advancing further. Studying his problem in detail during this lengthy halt, the General decided that his best approach to Mexico City was generally from the southeast. The city itself lay in a valley and was surrounded by marshes. However, much of the country between Puebla and the capital was mountainous, part of it (the "Pedregal") an extremely rugged area of dried lava. Between the mountains were lakes. Mexican artillery was emplaced to cover the approaches, and an army of 20,000 was mustered to oppose the American force of barely 10,000 effectives.

Scott organized his army into four divisions—two regular divisions under Generals Worth and Twiggs and two Volunteer divisions under Generals Pillow and Quitman—and, undaunted by the hazards before him, took up the march on August 7. By the 12th he had crossed over the last great ridge barring the way and without opposition had entered the Valley of Mexico.

The first important barrier to be passed was the fortified hacienda of San Antonio, which blocked the road to the capital. To the east of San Antonio was marshland stretching to the banks of Lake Xochimilco; to the west was the Pedregal, apparently crossed only by tortuous footpaths. In a daring reconnaissance from San Augustin, however, Captain Robert E. Lee of the Engineers found a mule trail leading across the Pedregal to a road approaching the capital from the southwest, via San Angel. He promptly began to supervise improvement of the trail sufficiently for use by artillery. By early afternoon of August 19 the troops had pushed forward to a point within range of the enemy entrenchments northwest of Padierna, which were held by a force of some 6,000 Mexicans under General Valencia and defended by twenty-two guns, most of which were heavy.

Obviously, no further progress could be made in this direction until Valencia's force was driven from its commanding position. Pillow's and Worth's divisions, with Magruder's battery in support, were ordered up to dislodge the Mexicans. Between the Mexican and American positions ran a ravine with a stream which, under enemy fire, was impassable to troops. Artillery cover would have to be supplied. With great difficulty because of the rugged terrain, the American artillery was put into position atop a hill at a range of hardly a thousand yards from the enemy's line. Some foot soldiers did manage to force their way into the village of Contreras, to the southwest, but, although Magruder's battery shelled the main enemy position for three hours, no progress was made in silencing the Mexican guns, much less in driving the enemy infantry out of their trenches. Meanwhile, the Mexican artillery was playing on the lone American battery. Bursting shells killed fifteen of the gunners. One casualty was one of the battery's three officers, Lieutenant Preston Johnston, nephew of Joseph E. Johnston, who was to become a Confederate general and who marched that day with the main force which the battery was supporting.

In this action Jackson commanded a section of three guns, in position on the battery's right. "... Hearing our fire still further in front," Magruder wrote in his official report, "he advanced in handsome style, and kept up the fire with equal briskness and effect. His conduct was equally conspicuous during the whole day, and I cannot too highly commend him. ..."

During the night, Magruder was ordered to evacuate his position. While the gunners labored in a pelting rain to move their guns down the muddy, boulder-strewn hill, troops were sent around the northern flank of the Mexican position to attack it from the rear. With a holding attack taking place on the front, the Mexicans were completely surprised and routed. That was the battle of Contreras.

An attempt to halt the American advance was made at Churubusco on the 20th, but it did not succeed. In this action, Magruder's battery was held in reserve.

Pushing on to the outskirts of the capital, General Scott agreed to an armistice. For two weeks the hostile armies rested on their arms, awaiting the results of fruitless political discussions.

The chief obstacle to entry into the city was the citadel of Chapultepec. This stronghold consisted of a ridge some 600 yards long and almost 200 feet high whose northern and eastern sides were sheer drops, enclosed on all sides except the west by a high brick wall. On the west, beyond a parapet, a deep ditch, a cypress-filled marsh, and an open field, stood the buildings of Molino del Rey, an arsenal. The heart of the position was the Mexican Military Academy, a strong stone building standing on the crest of the ridge. The only approach which might seem to offer any possibilities was from the south, where a ramp was cut into the rock. However, halfway up the ramp was a sharp turn, sandbagged and covered by artillery and small arms.

Scott's first move was an attack, on September 8, on Molino del Rey. Here again Jackson took no part. This position occupied, the Americans set about the massing of troops for an assault and the emplacement of heavy artillery for their support. Captain Lee selected the battery positions, of which there

were four, mounting three sixteen-pounders, three eight-inch howitzers, a ten-inch mortar and a twenty-four pounder. Troops were marched into assault positions on the southern side of Chapultepec during daylight, then moved to the western side at night. On September 11 the American artillery commenced a preparation which continued for two days. On the morning of September 13, while a detachment made a demonstration before the San Antonio Gate, the cannonade was stopped. With this as its signal, Pillow's division attacked the western face of the citadel, issuing from the buildings of Molino del Rey; at the same time Quitman's division attacked from the south. Worth's division, in reserve for the moment, was in position on the north, to be used to support Pillow or to carry out the pursuit, as the situation developed.

Jackson began the battle with his battery, in support of Pillow's division. Before the assault was well under way, however, trouble developed on the north where the 14th Infantry, of Worth's division, was trying to move in toward the citadel to reinforce Pillow's infantry. The 14th, under fire from a Mexican field piece which swept the regiment's approach, as well as from the heavy artillery on the ramparts of Chapultepec, was being decimated. A courier on a lathered horse galloped up to Magruder, who listened for a moment, then called hurriedly to his lieutenant, shouting to make himself heard above the roar of cannon and the angry rattle of small-arms fire. Mr. Jackson would take his section and move to support the 14th. Smartly, now!

Jackson needed no urging. Waving his arm in signal to his gunners, he clapped spurs to his horse and galloped forward. In short order he had reached the position of the infantry, a road running along the base of the ridge of Chapultepec. Like all the roads in the Valley of Mexico, this one was built on a causeway, with marshlands on either side. Jackson saw at once that the guns could not be deployed, for once off the hard surface they would sink hub-deep in mud.

There was no delay in locating the enemy gun—it began to register on the American artillerymen as soon as they came into range. Behind a breastwork on the flank, it was completely protected, Jackson saw, unless he could get far enough along the road to be beyond the wall of sandbags. But before he could reach a point where his guns could bear on the enemy piece he must run a gauntlet of fire and move his section across a deep ditch which cut the causeway.

Immediately he reached his decision and, with men and horses already dropping, he led the survivors on through terrific fire. At the ditch the gunners jumped to the ground and manhandled one gun across. Without waiting for the others, Jackson slewed it around and opened on the enemy piece.

Jackson's action seemed hopelessly foolhardy. Although he set an example of coolness, walking up and down the road, ignoring the fire, such of his men as were not casualties ran for cover in the ditch. One sergeant stood fast. Jackson rushed to the gun and, with his sergeant helping him to serve it, carried on the fire against the Mexicans. Alone except for a small detachment of infantry, the two powder-stained artillerymen and their little cannon became the focal point for all the fire the enemy could pour upon them. The division commander, General Worth, sent an order to Jackson to withdraw; the lieutenant's answer was, his compliments to the General, and if General Worth would give him fifty men he would capture the breastwork.

Just then, Magruder galloped up, the rest of the battery swinging behind him. As soon as he reached Jackson's position his horse was shot under him. Jumping clear, in an instant he ordered up another gun and, driving the men on furiously, had it lifted across the ditch. In a moment its roar was seconding that of Jackson's piece. Seeing this, the men in the ditch rallied to their cannon. The increased fire they brought to bear soon beat down the Mexican artillery to a point that the infantry could rush the breastwork and smother all resistance.

All along the line the defenses had been breached and American troops of Quitman's and Pillow's divisions swarmed over the citadel. Worth's troops, held back for this very eventuality, started in close pursuit as the enemy, shattered now, withdrew toward the San Cosme Gate.

Jackson's guns, their horses dead, were immobilized. Not having time to cut the carcasses away from the gun limbers and hitch up the still living horses from his caissons, he attached the guns to the caissons and rode forward at the gallop to support the infantry.

At the San Cosme Gate the Mexicans made a final stand. Here a Lieutenant U. S. Grant of the infantry hoisted a mountain howitzer into a church tower to shell the defenders at a range of fifty yards. Jackson's guns, blowing down walls and ripping gaps in masonry, worked immediately behind the infantry until, about eight in the evening, the suburb was finally cleared and all formal resistance ceased.

For his behavior at Chapultepec, Jackson received a third brevet—his first had been at Vera Cruz, his second at Contreras—making him a brevet major, twenty-two years of age and fifteen months out of the Military Academy. Even for that war, such a record was outstanding, and Jackson was, in fact, promoted higher and faster than any of his classmates.

"Stonewall" Jackson's military reputation rests, quite properly, upon the history he wrote with his sword upon the fields of Virginia — far bloodier than the fields of Mexico. First and Second Manassas, the Seven Days, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the classic Valley Campaign — these are names that thunder, while Contreras and Chapultepec are half forgotten. But the first signs of greatness of this man, destined to become perhaps the foremost of American generals, were in the artillery tradition of fighting his guns, disdaining the odds, in the very teeth of the enemy.

The Third Annual Convention of the 4th Armored Division Association is being held on 23, 24, and 25 June 1949 at the Benjamin Franklin Hotel in Philadelphia. Included among the prominent military guests are Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, Maj. Gen. John S. Wood, and Brig. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke.

STATION DATA

The JOURNAL is endeavoring to obtain, from the headquarters of the six ZI armies and the overseas commands, information on various stations at which artillerymen are apt to serve. The data will be published in our pages from time to time, as received, in the belief that it will be of interest or value to officers due for, or under orders for, change of station.

FIRST ARMY

Fort Jay, New York. Situated on Governors Island in New York Harbor. The site of Headquarters First Army. Reached by government ferry from southern tip of Manhattan Island. Climate is variable and subject to sudden changes. A limited number of quarters are available on the island. Additional quarters are available to Headquarters First Army personnel at Miller Field and Ft. Wadsworth on Staten Island and at Camp Shanks, N. Y., all at least one hour's traveling time from Governors Island. Apartments in New York are hard to find and very expensive. There are a commissary, a post exchange with all the usual branches, QM laundry, PO, hospital, officers club, library, and Protestant and Catholic chapels. Cost of living is considered high. For recreation there are a golf course, tennis courts, theater, swimming pool, and gymnasium, and the "bright lights of the big city" are readily reached. Post schools are from kindergarten through eighth grade; high schools are available in the city.

Fort Devens, Mass. Located near the town of Ayer, Mass., 35 miles from Boston and from Worcester. It is the station of the 10th FA Battalion, a part of the 7th RCT. The climate is variable and subject to sudden changes: The housing situation is critical, though some relief is expected in 1950. There is a scarcity of houses for rent in the nearby communities and rents are high. Probably well over 100 officers will have to house their dependents elsewhere for some time. There are a commissary, post exchange, officers' club, NCO club, and several chapels. Medical and dental facilities are excellent. Cost of living is considered high. For recreation there are a golf course, tennis courts, bowling alleys, lakes suitable for swimming, a sports arena, and theater. Boston and various Atlantic Ocean resorts are about an hour's drive away. School facilities are adequate in Ayer, with military buses in operation to transport post children.

Fort Dix, New Jersey. Located near Wrightstown, N. J., 15 miles from Trenton and about 30 from Philadelphia. It is the station of the 9th Infantry Division. The climate is in general temperate, with cold winters and warm summers. The housing situation is critical. Only 15% of officers with dependents are quartered on the post. Rental property in the vicinity is scarce, in poor condition, and expensive. Many officers live in Trenton and Camden. There are a commissary, post exchanges, QM laundry, library, officers' club, NCO club, and several chapels. Cost of living is considered high. For recreation there are a golf course, swimming facilities, a sports arena, theater, and water sports. Trenton, Philadelphia and New Jersey coastal resorts are within easy drive. Post school facilities go through the third grade. Grades through high school are available in nearby towns, with bus service provided.

SECOND ARMY

Ft. George G. Meade, Md. Located approximately midway between Washington and Baltimore. The site of Headquarters Second Army. Climate is average temperate. Quarters on the post are limited, but adequate housing of the 2- and 3- bedroom type is available nearby at moderate rentals. There are the usual commissary and post exchange facilities, and the markers and shops of Washington and Baltimore are in easy reach. The school at Odenton, Md., 1½ miles from the post, has elementary grades 1 to 6; junior high (grades 7 to 9) is on the post; senior high (grades 10 to 12) is at Glen Burnie, Md., about 9 miles from the post. Government transportation is provided for children living on the post. There are ample recreational facilities.

Carlisle Barracks, Penna. One of the oldest military installations in the U.S., adjacent to Carlisle, Penna., and 19 miles west of Harrisburg. The home of the Armed Forces Information School, the Chaplain School, and The Army Security Agency School. The number of quarters on the post is very limited and the housing situation in the city is critical. Rental units, when available, are moderately expensive. There are usual commissary and post exchange facilities, and Carlisle is an excellent shopping center. Carlisle has complete school facilities, and also Carlisle Commercial College and Dickinson College. Recreational facilities are ample.

Ft. Knox, Ky. Located on U.S. Highway 31 W, 35 miles south of Louisville and 18 miles north of Elizabethtown, Ky. Site of the Armored Center, and home of the Armored School, AFF Board No. 2, the 3rd Armored Division, and Brry A, 76th Armored FA Bn. There are 600 sets of quarters occupied by officers, and houses usually can be found for rent in nearby communities. There is also a trailer camp for officers. The post has excellent commissary, post exchange, book shop, and banking facilities. Post schools provide grades 1 through 12, for children of military personnel living both on and off the post. Bus service is provided. The post also has nursery school and kindergarten facilities at a minimum charge.

Camp Campbell, Ky. Located about 15 miles south of Hopkinsville, Ky. and 8 miles north of Clarksville, Tenn. The station of the 544th FA Bn and of the 11th A Bn Division, whose division artillery consists of the 457th Parachute FA Bn and the 472nd and 675th Glider FA Battalions. The climate is temperate. There are sufficient quarters available for the majority of the officers. The housing situation in the nearby communities is critical. There are the usual commissary and post exchange facilities, and markets are available in Hopkinsville and Clarksville. Nashville is 53 miles from the post. Cost of living is not excessive. Schools through high school are available in Clarksville. Commencing September 1949, grade school will be available on the post.

Guided Missiles—the Artilleryman's Answer

By Capt. Nels A. Parson, Jr., FA

Recently a student officer remarked to an instructor at the Guided Missile School at Fort Bliss, "Say, you're a Field Artilleryman; how did you happen to get into this guided - missiles work?" He might as well have asked, "You're a Field Artilleryman; how did you happen to get into a 240-mm howitzer outfit?" Guided missiles are guided artillery shells and the artilleryman will simply include them as another weapon to support ground combat troops.

NEED FOR LONG-RANGE FIELD ARTILLERY

As the speed of warfare and the mobility of military forces has increased, the urgent need for effective long-range artillery has likewise increased. Many targets once considered strategic because of their distance behind the enemy lines are actually tactical. The dividing line between tactical and strategic targets is that line on the battlefield beyond which no activity normally has an immediate or direct bearing on the battle. This line is progressively moving farther from the front as weapons improve. Indeed, the concept of dividing strategic and tactical employment by a measurement of distance from the front lines is an erroneous one. If troops or materiel that can be moved into battle within a few days are tactical targets, then is not an airborne division assembling a thousand miles away for a combat mission a tactical target?

Efforts to provide long-range artillery are not without precedent. The history of artillery shows continuous effort to improve range, accuracy, and lethality of the weapon. Today, range is the most important limiting factor. Within its range, "surface-to-surface" artillery is a weapon unsurpassed for lethality and flexibility. However, even the largest shells, because of their heavy casings, carry a small load of high explosives compared to the total weight. At extreme artillery ranges the comparatively small explosive charges are made even less effective by dispersion. Also the weight of the larger artillery pieces restricts their usefulness in tactical situations. For example, a 16-inch gun can fire a projectile weighing 2340 pounds about 45,000 yards. But this gun weighs 190 tons and must be placed in a fixed position. Even if modern metallurgy and advancements in recoil systems permit good mobility of the 16-inch gun, it still has a useful range of only 26 miles.

The Germans attempted to solve the problems during World War I by introducing the "Paris Gun". It fired a 260-pound shell, at a fixed angle of 54 degrees, a maximum distance of 80 miles. The extreme muzzle velocity of 5000 feet per second was so erosive on the gun that each shell had to be made slightly larger than the preceding one. When fired against Paris at a range of 70 miles, the circular probable error was about two miles. Although this gun could be reproduced today and slightly improved, such small improvement would not justify the effort.

During World War II the Germans experimented with fin-stabilized artillery shells fired from a smooth-bore gun. A shell 180-mm in diameter, fired from a 280-mm gun barrel with a muzzle velocity of 3670 feet per second, had a range of 54.4 miles. A disk behind the fins provided a seal for the propellant gases and transmitted the pressure to the projectile. The range was increased still more by converting the rear end of the shell into a rocket which fired when the projectile was high in the air. Fortunately for Germany's enemies, the trajectory was excessively erratic and the weapon was never used tactically. Conventional artillery, as we know it now or with foreseeable improvements, cannot be considered a practical tactical weapon at ranges in excess of 15 or 20 miles.

Does the use of tactical aircraft answer the need for long-range artillery? Ground targets may be attacked by high- or medium-level bombardment, by dive bombing, or by air-to-surface gunnery. The accuracy of conventional high- or medium-level bombardment is limited. Air Force surveys in Europe after the war indicated that only three per cent of bombs delivered in this manner reached the targets for which they were intended. The relatively low speed of bombardment aircraft gives the enemy advance warning of the attack, and enables him to take measures to prevent its successful completion. The enemy may defend a target with anti - aircraft artillery, surface - to - air guided missiles, and intercepting aircraft so effectively that continued attack will prove prohibitively costly. Dive bombing is almost suicidal against a target defended by antiaircraft automatic weapons.

Air-to-surface gunnery will include the use of aircraft cannon, rockets, and air-to-surface guided missiles. These weapons provide the best long-range artillery discovered thus far. But aircraft using them also have important limitations. The employment of aircraft guns or rockets against tactical targets forces the pilot to place himself in an extremely vulnerable position. Air-to-surface guided missiles may partially overcome this vulnerability, but the problem of launching a guided missile from a moving plane, so that it will strike a tactical target which may be difficult to distinguish, must first be solved. At very low altitudes a plane is not nearly so vulnerable to antiaircraft fire, but a pilot cannot distinguish his target and fire upon it in level flight at speeds in excess of 300 miles per hour.

Air-to-surface gunnery is quite effective if continually available. Aircraft often will not be available owing to adverse weather, enemy air superiority, or assignments on other missions from higher headquarters. We cannot expect air superiority in the opening phase of another war. The primary mission of tactical aircraft is to achieve and maintain local air superiority. To act as long-range

artillery is logically a secondary role. For this reason, tactical aircraft units are not under the command of ground commanders. The ground commander can only request airborne artillery support from a weapon which is not primarily artillery.

Tactical aircraft do provide the artilleryman a partial answer to the need for long-range artillery, but a supplementary weapon, not subject to the limitations of aircraft nor to the limitations of conventional artillery, is needed. This supplementary tactical weapon should have the following characteristics:

1. An unlimited range.
2. Of such a nature that the ground commander who needs its supporting fire may have it under his command.
3. A high order of accuracy and lethality.
4. Unaffected by adverse weather or enemy countermeasures.
5. Expose its user to a minimum of danger.
6. Logistically possible and profitable.

THE ARTILLERYMAN'S ANSWER

The surface-to-surface guided missile (SSM) is the artilleryman's answer. It more nearly satisfies the requirements listed above than any other weapon. No effective countermeasure has been developed to prevent the attack of supersonic SSM. The artilleryman can obtain as much range as desired, by firing missiles from launchers which weigh less than one tenth as much as the projectiles themselves. In bombarding distant targets no lives are risked, as when aircraft are used. Darkness, adverse weather, or enemy air superiority does not prevent bombardment. (German V-2 firings on London were not stopped by Allied air power but were halted only when ground troops overran the launching sites.) Little or no advance warning is given to the enemy, for the guided artillery missile approaches the target with supersonic velocity. Also of utmost importance to the ground commander is the fact that the weapon is directly under his command, available for attacking at his discretion any enemy target within range at a fraction of the time required by any other means.

The SSM is not without disadvantages. Of foremost concern is the present limited accuracy of the weapon. A circular probable error of about 2% of the range was obtained by the Germans with the V-2 rocket. However, it is certain that this limited accuracy will be improved. Because of construction costs and the supply problem involved, the number of missiles available for firing will always be limited. A fueled SSM ready to fire may weigh up to ten times the weight of its own warhead. This means that, for every ton of high explosive delivered on the enemy, up to ten tons of materiel must be shipped to the launching area. Accurate target location and reliable damage analysis of the target will sometimes be difficult to obtain. Missiles on the ground, like aircraft, are extremely vulnerable Another obvious disadvantage of employing SSM's is that since complicated equipment is being handled there will be a demand for higher skilled technicians in the combat unit.

TYPES OF MISSILES

The artilleryman may choose one of the two types of missiles for his weapon. Both are propelled by jet motors. The first is the rocket, which carries its own fuel and oxidizer, is not limited to the atmosphere, is supersonic, and has a trajectory parabolic in shape. The German V-2 is an example of this type. The other is the winged missile which carried its fuel but uses atmospheric oxygen for burning the fuel. The German V-1 (Buzz Bomb) is an example of this type. The atmospheric-jet missile is limited to flight in the atmosphere, is generally slower than the rocket, and is more vulnerable to enemy countermeasures. On the other hand, since it resembles aircraft in many respects, conventional airframes, propulsion systems, and fuels may be used in construction of the missile. This is an important advantage of the atmospheric-jet missile. Although it may not always be true, at present the rocket is generally considered the better artillery missile.

SUITABLE TARGETS

Since the accuracy of the SSM is limited, two restrictions are automatically placed on the selection of suitable targets; they must be area targets, and they must be of unusual importance. Therefore targets that may be considered appropriate for SSM attack are:

1. Major defiles (railyards, ports, beachheads, terrain defiles, etc.)
2. Large supply depots.
3. Important command centers.
4. Tactical air fields.
5. Major troop concentrations.
6. Strategic targets (industry, raw materials, dams, power sources, etc.)

METHODS OF FIRE

What type of fire is the most effective, considering economy of effort and the effect produced, for SSM? The types of field artillery fires are registration, destruction, harassing, interdiction, and neutralization. How applicable are these to SSM fire?

Registration fire, besides being too costly, probably has no application in SSM fire.

Destructive fire, though very expensive, can be effective with SSM's if the target is large enough. A warhead of 500 to 2000 pounds, delivered at 2000 to 5000 feet per second, is certain to be effective unless the target is heavily protected. The critical factor is the area of the target as compared to the missile accuracy. If the area is large enough to expect a high percentage of destructive hits, the mission can be accomplished. Detailed observation of results is essential to insure economy in the use of missiles.

The probable effect of harassing fire on the enemy must be carefully considered. It is also an expensive use of SSMs. If actual damage to well-trained troops in the field is small, the morale of the troops may be sufficient to nullify the effectiveness of the harassing fire. The use of anti-personnel proximity-fuzed warheads which would throw out a shower of fragmentation grenades over a wide assembly or bivouac area may prove effective for harassing.

Interdiction fire against road junctions, bridges, etc., is unsuitable for the SSM. Interdiction targets are usually too small for this weapon. If such an area is of sufficient size and importance to justify missile attack, the volume of

fire should be sufficient to neutralize or destroy the target.

Neutralization fire against large-area targets is the most effective type of SSM fire. The most efficient use that can be made of the tactical SSM is to destroy the combat efficiency of enemy personnel by causing severe losses and interrupting their normal activities.

EMPLOYMENT OF SSM

Many attacks on the targets listed above would be for the purpose of isolating the battlefield. The artilleryman is making excellent use of his SSM if the neutralization of the target being attacked will contribute to isolation of the battlefield. Some tactical and strategic targets will also be attacked by SSM for their direct effect upon the target itself.

The SSM must have sufficient range to attack targets whose existence may have immediate or direct effect upon the action of friendly troops. No specific distance can satisfy such a requirement. Therefore a family of missiles is needed, beginning at the maximum effective range of conventional field artillery and extending without limit.* However, missiles with ranges up to about 150 miles will probably be adequate for most tactical targets.

Good observation of the target area is essential to the successful employment of SSM's. Although a large proportion of firing may be unobserved, damage analysis of targets must be obtained. Also new targets should be discovered and accurately located. Visual, photo, and radar reconnaissance must be utilized to the fullest extent. In addition to piloted or pilotless visual and photo reconnaissance planes, it is likely that a radar observation unit will exist at corps or army level. By radar observation, enemy missile-launching sites and artillery positions will be accurately located.

SSM's are best employed in mass, both for fire control and for effect on the enemy. Six to twelve SSM launching crews will be organized into a battalion. It is doubtful if a battalion can efficiently control more than twelve firing units with the missiles presently contemplated.

Shall SSM battalions be employed at division, corps, army, or army group level? At every level the commander needs supporting fire commensurate with his zone of interest. Conventional field artillery, while adequately covering the zone of interest of the division commander, falls short at corps level and beyond. If an SSM has a 25- to 150-mile range, it presumably will reach target areas beyond the realm of responsibility of the division or corps commander. A 10- to 15-mile missile, employed at corps level, would probably not exceed this zone of interest of the corps commander, but it is most commonly supposed that missile units will normally be attached to the army for general support, under the command of the army artillery commander. The SSM, being an artillery weapon, very properly belongs under the artillery commander.

Some SSM battalions may be employed at army group or theater level for attacking targets which influence the campaign as a whole. However, battalions attached to individual armies may be given fire missions by the army group or theater commander, and still be available to the army artillery commander. Just as medium division artillery can be in general support of the division, reinforce the support of a regiment, or be massed on corps targets, SSM battalions at army level can be in general support of the army, reinforce the support of a corps, or be massed on army group or theater targets. Visualize the devastating effect of a dozen or more SSM battalions massing on a port area, beachhead, or important rail center With no more than a few seconds warning, if any, to the enemy by means of his long-range radar, 50 to 100 tons of high explosive would strike the target simultaneously with accuracy and velocity not possible by any other means.

THE FUTURE OF GUIDED MISSILES

On the subject of future warfare there are two extremes of thought. The more common is the "push-button" concept which holds that future wars will be won or lost solely by intercontinental battles, with atomic-loaded guided missiles. The other contention is that the atomic bomb is merely a bigger bomb and does not alter the fact that war must be won on the ground; and that all weapons of war exist to help the ground soldier advance. Both of these concepts are erroneous. Even if the weight of decisive military action shifts entirely to air weapons, ground troops, supported by surface-to-surface artillery and missiles, must repel enemy invasion attempts, seize bases needed for launching air operations, and physically occupy critical territory to prevent the resumption of hostilities. In any of these operations, there will always be ground targets that aircraft and artillery cannot attack because of the inherent limitations of those weapons. The alert artilleryman has long recognized the need for a weapon to supplement the long-range support of heavy artillery and aircraft; the guided missile in the tactical role is the answer.

*It is theoretically possible to build a missile with a range equal to or greater than half the circumference of the earth.

BUTTON YOUR LIP

BY FRANCIS L. FUGATE

EARLY in 1943 Lieutenant General Ben Lear was inspecting the troops that were stationed around Fort Brady, Michigan, for the purpose of protecting the vitally important locks at Sault Ste. Marie.

General Lear and his inspecting retinue came to one of the barrage-balloon sites of the 399th Barrage Balloon Battalion. A soldier was cleaning his M-1 rifle. At that time the Garand was not too widely distributed within the United States, and consequently was unfamiliar to many in the Army.

An immaculately natty young officer in the general's following spotted the strange rifle in passing, and paused for a second look.

"Is that one of the new Garand rifles?" he asked.

"Don't tell him," cautioned a laconic voice from inside the hut where the balloon crew lived. "He may be one of them enemy agents!"

Leadership in the Making

By Maj. Robert B. McBane, AGD

Republished by courtesy of the Army Information Digest

THIS clear-eyed, well-built young soldier is 18½ years old and has been in the Army only ten weeks. Three months ago, all he knew about the Army was what an older brother had told him, or what he had seen in the movies. Today he is confidently giving a half-hour lecture on the assembly of a .30-cal. machine gun; or is leading a platoon in attack under simulated combat conditions; or is participating in a seminar on leader-subordinate relations. With an Army General Classification Test score of 90 or more, and rated among the top five per cent in his basic training company, he is a typical student in the 3d Armored Division Leaders' Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

The results achieved by the Leaders' Course have surprised even the most optimistic of the founders. "They just don't come too young, if they've got the right stuff," said one experienced training officer as he watched an enlisted instructor give a demonstration-lecture on close combat tactics. This corporal, aged 18, had been in the Army less than a year. His voice was strong and clear; his movements were sure; he carried himself with superb poise. He had entered the Leaders' Course immediately after completing his eight weeks of basic training, had graduated at the top of his class, and had been retained as an instructor. "But we're losing him soon," continued the officer. "They've just selected him for West Point."

Meanwhile, at headquarters, letter and telephone inquiries reiterate a central theme: where can we get more Leaders' School graduates for cadres? "I've got to have leaders who know how to instruct," declared one major, "and your boys are good."

Although relatively new, the Leaders' Course is one of Army Field Forces' most promising projects. The program was set up by Army Ground Forces in May 1947 on the premise that, to assure a continuing flow of able leadership, the Army not only must detect its potential leaders early, but also must train and develop them early. The 3d Armored Division School at Fort Knox is one of the four original leadership schools. The others are at the 9th Infantry Division, Fort Dix, New Jersey; the 5th Infantry Division, Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, California. Identical schools are being established at the following new training divisions: 101st Airborne, Camp Breckenridge, Kentucky; 17th Airborne, Camp Pickett, Virginia; 5th Armored, Camp Chaffee, Arkansas; and 10th (Mountain) Infantry, Fort Riley, Kansas.

The 3d Armored Division school is typical. It contributed materially in the early days of the program to the development of techniques now standardized for all Army Leaders' Courses. The regular course lasts six weeks, but the instruction is so valuable that every officer and noncommissioned officer reporting for troop training duty with the 3d Armored Division is required to take a short course, unless he has had the equivalent elsewhere. During the summer of 1948, a group of West Point Cadets took a short course which stressed instructional techniques. And every officer candidate school nominee in the Second Army must complete the regular six-week course before attending OCS.

The Fort Knox school is staffed by 24 officers and 85 enlisted men, all carefully chosen. Many have wartime combat experience. A new class of 93 students is enrolled each Monday for the six-week course. Out of this overall student body of 558, only 372 receive instruction in the School at any one time; for students are farmed out during their last two weeks to serve as assistant platoon sergeants with one of the training companies of the Division.

The school is a self-contained unit, operating in its own area of the reservation. It operates its own mess, supply, and barracks; and maintains its own schedules and ground rules. Students wear helmet liners bearing the distinctive school insignia. As further identification, a name plate and "L" patch are worn on the left shirt pocket. Barracks are named after enlisted men who won the Congressional Medal of Honor in World War II, and the hero's picture and citation are displayed in the barracks day room. Classrooms are named after general officers who died in service. Signs throughout the area remind the students that a high standard of personal appearance and conduct is required. Above the door of each classroom is inscribed: "Through These Portals Pass the Future Leaders of the United States Army."

Although the immediate goal of the Leaders' Course program is to develop highly qualified junior leaders for combat units, the student continually is reminded that there is no limit to his future in the Army. "More than 1,000 men have been graduated already," stated the executive officer, "and some of them are going to be generals some day. We never forget that; and we don't let the students forget it."

Each student is selected with care. He must have completed basic training or had wartime military service. He must have an AGCT score of 90 or more, pass a rigid physical fitness test, and volunteer for the course. Finally, he must be recommended for the course as an outstanding soldier by his training company commander. In rare cases, one of the first-named conditions may be waived; but in such case the recommending officer "must stake his reputation on the man's qualifications for the course." Basic training units are not given specific quotas for the

course. The commander may recommend as many outstanding, qualified recruits as he may have; or he may recommend none.

About five per cent of the recruits passing through Fort Knox during the past year were selected for the Leaders' Course. Considerably less than that number were graduated; for the mortality rate during the first year was high. Today, however, the thoroughgoing method of selection and the high prerequisites have helped to level off the failure rate to a lower percentage.

Eighty-five per cent of the students are recruits, with only eight weeks of basic training behind them. Fifteen per cent are reenlistees, of all grades. There is no prerogative of rank among the students, and a 17-year-old recruit serving as platoon leader may be giving orders to a master sergeant fellow student with World War II combat service. By and large, the reenlistees are at the top of the class, however; and most of the graduates retained as instructors have World War II experience.

Registration is on Friday, and school begins in earnest with reveille at 0510 Monday. By 1600, the students have participated in six conferences—including Introduction to Leadership, the Lecture Method, Psychological Aspects of Leadership, and Military Training—and have had an hour of dismounted drill. Tuesday night, after another intensive day of classroom and field instruction, the class is assembled for an informal exchange of views. This helps to develop in the student a conviction that the cadre personnel are sincerely interested in his welfare.

Demerits may be given by instructors or by student upperclassmen for offenses ranging from having a rusty rifle (5 demerits) to the use of profanity or obscenity (1 demerit). The demerit must be given at the time of the offense and described on a printed slip which the offender must initial. If he admits the offense, he initials accordingly; but if he desires to contest the demerit, he so indicates, and the case is heard before the commanding officer.

Each student is assigned a staff counselor, with whom he becomes well acquainted. In addition, all staff members are available at any time to discuss student problems. Each barracks has a noncommissioned officer in residence, to give immmediate aid or advice. The commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Kent, whose door is always open, has many letters of appreciation from students, thanking him for the personal encouragement that enabled them to finish the course creditably.

An Academic Board meets during the second week to consider borderline or failing students. Every effort is made to help or encourage such students; but if this fails, they are dropped from the course. It is during this week that most of the mortality occurs.

The academic work of the first three weeks is presented in three sections: (1) Leadership, (2) Methods of Instruction, and (3) Combat Training. The Leadership Section provides instruction in: Roles of the Army Leader; Objectives of the Leader; Leader-Subordinate Relations; Combat and Non-Combat Leadership; and Selection, Evaluation, and Promotion of the Army Leader. This section also covers: Military Courtesy; Customs of the Service; Military Justice and Courts-Martial; Troop Information and Education; and Dismounted Drill and Physical Training, for a total of 28 hours. The Methods of Instruction Section conducts 29 hours of class work in such subjects as: Principles of Learning; the Lecture, Conference, and Demonstration Methods; Use of Reference Material; Preparation and Use of Training Aids; Class Management; and Methods of Testing.

The Combat Training Section, in 40 hours, covers: Training of Small Units; Small Job Management (practical problems in foremanship); Methods of Instruction in Marksmanship and Basic Weapons; Leading Small Units in Combat; Leadership and Health; and the like. As part of the combat training program, field problems are carefully set up in difficult terrain, with dynamite charges and blanks providing battlefield realism. The class, organized into a platoon, is given the problem of advancing over 800 yards of hilly terrain and taking an enemy machine gun nest. Dynamite charges are set off from a master switchboard, simulating enemy mortar fire. Snipers are encountered, and a hidden machine gun opens up from the left flank. The students are on their own throughout the exercise and determine their own tactics on the spot. Instructors keep the situation fluid; and if the students fail to consolidate a position after taking it, a counterattack hits them. Enemy troops are represented by holdover graduates of the School, garbed in the standard Aggressor uniforms.

The Leaders' Reaction Course, during the third week, amounts virtually to a final examination. The course consists of 20 mock situations or "stations" set up in tortuous terrain. Formed into four-man patrols, students encounter realistic combat situations as they move through the successive stations.

Each student is designated as the patrol leader for four of the situations and as a patrol member (or follower) in sixteen others. There are four leaderless situations, in which a natural leader invariably asserts himself and assumes command of the group. Instructors observe and evaluate the students' reactions and immediate decisions, the accuracy and promptness of their orders, and the consideration shown for the safety of other members of the patrol. In the four leaderless situations, it is assumed that the patrol leader has been killed. In one instance, the leaderless patrol must devise a hasty bridge over a 15-foot stream, to be completed in 15 minutes, before an enemy patrol returns. Other problems involve enemy ambushes, snipers, and patrols; discovery of wounded enemy soldiers; handling of enemy soldiers who surrender; and booby traps, with realism provided by Aggressor troops and blank ammunition.

Students gain further practice in leadership and command during the fourth week, when the class is organized into a company headquarters, with a student company commander, executive officer, platoon leaders, sergeants, and corporals. Insignia of rank consist of one to four solid colored cords (effectively devised from shoe laces) worn on the shoulder straps. These

men, appointed according to class standing, command the three junior classes in the area for the entire fourth week. They keep company records, maintain duty rosters, assess merits and demerits, and generally run the student detachment "company," under the watchful eye of school instructors.

The last two weeks are spent in practical work as assistant platoon sergeants with 3d Armored Division training units, elsewhere on the post.

Throughout the course, student critiques, discussion groups, and seminars are widely used. No formal examinations are given. Grading is based on observation and evaluation by instructors—and by fellow students. Of the 1000-point possible score for the course, 200 points are based on ratings which the students give each other. Around 520 is considered a passing grade for the course; and the highest score made to date is 898.6. Upon completion of the course, a notation is entered on each man's Soldier's Qualification Card. Both his Service Record and his diploma carry the adjectival rating of his school performance, scaled from Satisfactory to Superior.

A check of graduates from early courses who had been assigned to various units at Fort Knox showed that 97 per cent had received promotions within six months. However, a recent survey of graduates scattered throughout the Army revealed that little more than half of those responding had been assigned as duty noncommissioned officers. The others—more than 40 per cent—were on clerical and administrative jobs; and most of them deplored this fact in their remarks. Sixty-four per cent considered the Methods of Instruction course as being the most helpful to them, with Dismounted Drill and Physical Training rated next in value. All praised the course highly. "It has helped me in handling men under all conditions," one man wrote. Several of the graduates have since been commissioned.

One man's answer summed up the feeling of the school perhaps better than any other. In answer to the question: "Have you placed your leadership training to any practical use?" he wrote: "Yes, for there is use for that in every job." He was a mail clerk.

1949 ASSOCIATION MEDAL WINNERS

St. Bonaventure College. Cadet Lt. Col. Robert E. Bartell won the award. He was an honor student in Military Science III and IV and was unit battalion commander. During W. W. II he served with the 413th Inf Regt, 104th Inf Div, seeing action in Northern France, the Rhineland, and Central Europe.

University of Florida. Cadet Charles W. Wofford won the award. Prior to entering the university he served eighteen months in the 82nd Airborne Division. He now is a member of the enlisted reserve.

Princeton University. Cadet Lt. Col. Alvin M. Owsley, Jr., won the award. He is the senior cadet officer of the unit. During W. W. II he served with the 428th FA Group and the 3195th Signal Service Co. in the Mediterranean Theater, seeing action in Italy. (Photo Orren Jack Turner.)

University of Utah. Cadet Col. Lawrence R. Tassie won the award. He is the 1948-49 Cadel Colonel of the ROTC Regiment and was selected as a Distinguished Military Student. During W. W. II he served with the 170th Engineer Combat Battalion in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater, participating in the Levte and Okinawa campaigns.

University of Oklahoma. Cadet Colonel Charles S. Brantley won the award. During W. W. II he served with the 327th Glider Inf. 101st A Bn Div, earning battle stars for Normandy (with arrowhead), Central Europe, Ardennes, and Rhineland. He now is also a sergeant in the 45th Div, Okla. NG.

The Changing Military Obligation of the Citizen

By Lt. Col. Bryce F. Denno, Inf

IN THE harsh winter of early 1778, the enthusiasm which, in 1775, had inspired some companies of volunteers to march 800 miles to help besiege Boston, had completely disappeared. At Valley Forge, General Washington made plans for the spring campaign—plans based hopefully on the assumption that he would receive reinforcements for his dispirited Continental Army of 9,000 men.

The prospects were not encouraging. Two years previously, each of the states had agreed to furnish a specified number of "line" regiments composed of long-term enlistees. Despite the offer of lucrative enlistment bounties, however, volunteers for these regiments were pitifully inadequate. Acting on the recommendation of a desperate Congress, Massachusetts and Virginia drafted men to fill their troop quotas. Other states, in an effort to avoid such an extreme measure, redoubled their efforts to obtain volunteers by bounty. Unmindful of the quality of men procured—as long as quotas were filled—at least one state went so far as to recruit deserters from the British army.

Supplementing the line regiments—often dubbed the "regulars" of the Revolution—were the state militia units. These were composed of part-time soldiers, in the sense that they served usually for specified periods of short duration near their homes. With few exceptions, the performance in battle of the poorly-trained and undisciplined militia was discouraging. "To place any dependence upon militia," wrote Washington after his defeat at Long Island, "is assuredly resting on a broken staff."

Eventually, of course, Washington received enough men to finish the war with French help. As the newly-formed United States laid the foundations of its government, Washington—with the memory of our haphazard prosecution of the Revolutionary War fresh in his mind—outlined, in his *Sentiments on a Peace Establishment*, the requirements necessary to insure future national security.

A large regular army would be prohibitively expensive, said Washington. Besides, such an establishment was universally repugnant to Americans. An army composed of citizen soldiers, Washington reasoned, was the only acceptable solution to the problem.

Yet the experiences of the Revolutionary War had shown with unmistaken clarity that citizen soldiers must be trained and disciplined to function efficiently in battle. Moreover, their terms of enlistment had to be long enough to enable an army commander to employ them in sustained campaigns.

These were the military requirements. How could they be met while making minimum demands on those personal liberties of the citizen we had just fought a war to protect? Throughout our history, the answer to this question has been an issue of chronic dispute. And the answer has varied considerably in the preparation for and the waging of our six major wars which followed the Revolutionary War.

To Washington, all citizens were liable for wartime service. "Every citizen," he asserted, "who enjoys the protection of a free Government owes not only a portion of his property, but even of his personal services, to the defence of it. . . ."

It was Washington's proposed plan to organize the nation's military manpower into three components: a small regular army, a national force composed of all able-bodied citizens from 18 to 50 years of age, and a ". . . sufficient proportion of able-bodied young men between the ages of 18 and 25, who . . . might easily be enlisted or drafted to form a corps in every State, capable of resisting any sudden impression which might be attempted by a foreign enemy, while the remainder of the National forces would have time to Assemble and make preparations for the Field. . . ."

A detailed plan worked out by General Steuben, which provided for three-year enlistments and thirty days of field training each year for the young men in the State corps, received Washington's hearty endorsement. But a Congress suspicious of peacetime military preparation, and preoccupied with the internal problems of welding the thirteen states into a nation, gave scant heed to Washington's proposals. Under the Militia Act of 1792, the War of 1812 found the United States placing its dependence once again on the untrained volunteers comprising the militia units of most of the states.

Hampered anew by the policy of short enlistments, the recruiting of inferior personnel by bounty, and the mutinies and desertions of an undisciplined citizen soldiery, our armies in the War of 1812 fared poorly. Several attempts to invade an almost undefended Canada failed miserably and a humiliated nation saw its capital burned by the enemy. Even during the winning of the brilliant victory at New Orleans—where better-than-average militia units, supported by experienced artillery batteries, broke the British attack against their defensive positions—it was significant that a division of militia on General Jackson's left flank fled from the field.

The discouraging performance of our inexperienced armies convinced even that traditional champion of individual rights, Thomas Jefferson, that some sort of peacetime training was necessary to prepare our citizens for wartime service. While governor of Virginia during the War of 1812, he voiced, in a letter to James Monroe, sentiments remarkably similar to those expressed by today's exponents of Universal Military Training.

"It proves more forcibly [he wrote] the necessity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier. This was the case with the Greeks and the Romans, and must be that of every free state. . . . We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe until this is done."

But the period between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War saw no effort to improve the peacetime training of citizen soldiers. Instead, the planners of a tiny professional army, convinced

that no dependence could be placed on militia, developed the doctrine of the "expansible regular army." Under this system, the regular army maintained skeleton units which were to be filled to combat strength by volunteers in wartime.

In the small-scale war with Mexico this doctrine produced success. The modest armies of Generals Taylor and Scott, composed of regulars and volunteers, achieved an unbroken series of spectacular victories against numerically superior Mexican forces. After the war, President Polk reaffirmed the soundness of dependence on the volunteer citizen soldier. In a message to Congress he said:

"The events of these few months afford a gratifying proof that our country can, under any emergency, confidently rely for the maintenance of her honor and the defense of her rights on an effective force ready at all times voluntarily to relinquish the comforts of home for the perils and privations of the camp. . . ."

In the enthusiasm for the praiseworthy performance of our troops, however, several pertinent factors were overlooked. Although our armies had been composed mainly of volunteers, they had been heavily leavened with trained and disciplined regulars. Moreover, there had been time for the regulars, and a substantial number of nonregulars who had been seasoned by service against the Seminoles in the Florida War, to instruct the raw volunteers prior to combat. In spite of the brevity of the Mexican War, short enlistments again disrupted operations. The volunteers had enlisted with the option to "serve twelve months" or to the end of the war. In the summer of 1847, General Scott lost almost half his army, about 4,000 men, when the enlistment time of his volunteers expired. For three months, the American forces sat in the heart of enemy country, three days' march from the City of Mexico, waiting for reinforcements. When they again resumed the offensive, they were obliged, in the final campaign of the war, to fight a Mexican army five times the size of their own, which the enemy had raised during the period of enforced inactivity.

It was the Civil War, with its insatiable demands for manpower to fill large armies, that forced the first significant departure from the system of voluntary recruiting. Amidst military reverses early in 1862, the South faced the loss of 148 regiments of battle-hardened volunteers who had enlisted for twelve months' service at the beginning of the war. Even if the rate of voluntary enlistments could have furnished sufficient replacements for these men—which was not the case—the Confederacy could have ill-afforded to exchange seasoned veterans for inexperienced recruits at such a critical time. Accordingly, on April 16, 1862, the Confederate Congress passed, by a vote of more than two to one, a law drafting for three years' service all able-bodied white men between the ages of 18 and 35 who were not legally exempted.

Public reaction in the South to this unprecedented action of the Confederate Congress was surprisingly passive, both soldiers and civilians accepting the law stoically, if not enthusiastically.

In the North, when Congress passed the Enrollment Act in March, 1863, to draft men from 20 to 45 for Union armies, outraged public opinion expressed itself in more violent form. Enrolling officers were attacked and killed. In New York City, Federal troops were required to quell a murderous three-day riot that cost hundreds of lives. A similar outbreak in Boston was quickly suppressed.

Although evasion of the draft was widespread on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line, it spurred voluntary enlisting. Many men volunteered to escape the stigma attached to the draft. In the North, where volunteers received substantial enlistment bounties, there were many who preferred being paid for "volunteering" to being drafted without remuneration.

An urgent demand for troops as soon as they were enlisted precluded any effective training prior to combat. The troops learned in the hard school of the battlefield, and ". . . it was not until 1863 [comments one historian] that the armies confronted each other as complete and effective military teams."

Unlike the Civil War, the Spanish-American War produced no strains on the nation's manpower. When President McKiniley called for 125,000 volunteers on April 23, 1898, an enthusiastic nation produced 124,704 enlistees by the end of May—without recourse to the bounties offered in past wars. A small army of regulars and volunteers, similar in composition to the forces which had performed so well in the Mexican War, quickly smashed Spanish resistance. It was only 109 days after the war's declaration that the United States signed the peace protocol.

It remained for World War I to inspire an abrupt departure in the historic pattern of recruiting. Shortly after the war's declaration in April, the Congress, supported by strong public sentiment, passed the Selective Draft Act on May 18, 1917. Under the provisions of this law, all able-bodied men 21 to 30 years of age inclusive were subject to registration. Once drafted, the citizen soldier served for the war's duration.

For the first time in its history, the United States was an integrated "nation in arms," and a new philosophy of the citizen's wartime responsibility toward his government prevailed. No longer was the nation obliged to entice its citizens to volunteer for wartime military service with offers of short-term enlistments and bounties of money and land. No longer would it be forced to resort to a makeshift conscription in the middle of a war when the volunteer system failed to provide sufficient manpower. Aware of the full import of a draft implemented at the outset of hostilities, Wilson, the historian President, observed: "The significance of this [The Selective Draft] cannot be overstated. It is a new thing in our history and a landmark in our progress."

What had caused such a radical change in the attitude of the American people toward wartime conscription, which had encountered such widespread resistance 54 years previously in the Civil War? Public awareness of the developments during three years of the war in Europe may be given a major share of the credit. The impressive performance of the huge German military machine, backed by a nation fully mobilized for war, made it clear to most Americans that final victory would require the utilization of our total manpower.

Despite the hardships and inconveniences caused by conscription, the draft

successfully withstood the vagaries of public opinion. "Resistance to the enforcement of the Selective Service Law," reported the Provost Marshal General at the end of the war, ". . . was from the national point of view negligible in amount; and it never obstructed or retarded in the slightest degree the raising of new armies."

But most Americans were not ready to recognize an additional obligation which more militant exponents of preparedness had propounded in the year just preceding the war—compulsory military training in peacetime.

The major impetus for such a program came from the Military Training Camps Association of the United States, an organization formed in 1916 by the alumni of voluntary civilian training camps for officers throughout the nation. Called National Service, the recommended compulsory training was to consist of six months' intensive instruction in the field for 19- or 20-year-old men.

The tempo of modern war, argued those favoring National Service, necessitated the rapid employment of armies trained and organized prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Since the armies of the United States were to be composed essentially of citizen soldiers, it was imperative that men eligible for wartime service be trained for war in peacetime. Moreover, it would improve the chances of survival of the individual in combat, maintained these advocators of peacetime training for youths, to have received adequate training in the intricacies of modern warfare—training which the experiences of past wars indicated was usually neglected in the urgency of getting troops speedily to the battlefield.

Led by such influential public personages as former President Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood, the movement for National Service was gaining considerable strength when war intervened and the Selective Draft went into effect.

Under the wartime draft law, men deferred because they held key jobs in war industries could still enlist voluntarily for military service. Motivated by patriotism, many did enlist, causing shortages of skilled labor in some essential industries. Before the war ended, reported the Provost Marshal General, "the time was rapidly approaching when we would have been compelled . . . to have denied absolutely, to the registrants deferred upon industrial grounds, all rights to military service."

In other words, the demands of modern war had come to threaten even the traditional "privilege" of some American citizens to volunteer for wartime service in the armed forces.

At the end of World War I, supporters of peacetime military training—now called Universal Military Training—encountered overwhelming public opposition to their efforts to include the program in the National Defense Act of 1920. Quietly, their pleas died, as the United States, in a world lacking foreseeable future enemies, turned to a peacetime policy of military reliance on a small regular army and a National Guard and Organized Reserve manned by volunteers.

But the germ of Universal Military Training was dormant, not dead. In the summer of 1940, when German armies were overrunning Europe with terrifying case, such groups as the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Military Training Camps Association, proposed the immediate adoption of a compulsory training program for the nation's youth.

Public opposition, however, was not the only drawback to the adoption of such a program at this time.

"The training of young men in large training camps on the basis of compulsory training is something that we cannot manage at the present time," said General George Marshall, before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 1940. The strength of the regular army and the National Guard, which had dwindled greatly between wars, was dangerously low, explained the Chief of Staff, "in view of the present international situation as the War Department estimates it." The integrity of already understrength units must not be destroyed by furnishing the personnel required to turn large masses of civilians into soldiers, he emphasized. Instead, the general recommended a selective draft as the fastest means of bringing up to strength the National Guard and a regular army now authorized 375,000 men.

The bill for selective service in peacetime aroused formidable opposition. Many congressmen agreed with Senator Vandenburg that a system of voluntary enlistments to bring the army up to strength should at least be given a try. Another senator was more emphatic in his views toward the draft. Declaring that there were 50 million men in the country "ready to leave their plows . . . in defense of their flag," he voiced a typical objection to conscription held by many Americans. "The volunteer soldier," this senator asserted, "makes the best soldier on the face of the earth. We destroy patriotism . . . when we sear the volunteer soldier with a conscription brand."

But Congress did pass the Selective Service Act of September 16, 1940. For the first time in our nation's peacetime history, citizens were drafted to fill the expanding ranks of the National Guard and Regular Army.

After two years of World War II, the necessity for rigid national control of manpower in both the armed forces and essential industry became apparent. Accordingly, on December 5, 1943, by Presidential order, volunteering was stopped for all persons in the age bracket liable for service under the Selective Service Law. The decision to enlist or wait to be drafted was no longer a matter of individual choice.

In 1944, while still striving for final victory, the War Department calculated the requirements of a post-war military establishment. The results of these studies were mirrored in General Marshall's biennial report to the Secretary of War for the years 1943-1945. Pointing out that World War II had "made it clear that the security of the Nation, when challenged by an armed enemy, requires the services of virtually all able-bodied male citizens within the effective military age group," the Chief of Staff unequivocally recommended the adoption of Universal Military Training. Said General Marshall:

"In another national emergency, the existence of a substantial portion of the Nation's young manpower already trained or in the process of training, would make it possible to fill our immediately the peactime ranks of the Navy, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. As a result our Armed Forces would be

ready for almost immediate deployment to counter initial hostile moves, ready to prevent an enemy from gaining footholds from which he could launch destructive attacks against our industries and our homes."

With the appearance of the atom bomb came the immediate assertion from some opponents of the army's recommendations that the bomb, by eliminating forever the need for large armies, had sounded the death knell of Universal Military Training. A less impulsive appraisal of the long-range problem of national security by a civilian Advisory Commission on Universal Training, appointed by President Truman, found oversimplification in this argument. After a six-month study of the ". . . possible types and risks of future wars . . . and the various requirements of military strategy to avoid these risks if possible and to overcome them if necessary," this group unanimously agreed that Universal Military Training in the atom age was even more essential in a national security program than before.

Meanwhile, what do the American people think?

Since the fall of 1940, all national polls have indicated consistently that between three and four of every five adult Americans favor a Universal Military Training Program.

At this writing, it appears doubtful that any immediate Congressional action will be taken on Universal Military Training, Rather, the pattern of national action for preparedness is remarkably similar to that which we followed just prior to World War II. While shelving the issue of training of all youths—as we did in 1940—we have re-instituted a peacetime selective draft to bring our armed forces up to authorized strength after a highly-advertised campaign for voluntary enlistments failed to recruit sufficient men.

Considering our past history, the lack of current opposition to the draft is significant. Not so long ago, we were debating the government's right to draft the citizen in wartime. Today, there is little opposition to drafting men for peacetime service in the regular establishment, and formidable sentiment for the involuntary training of all able-bodied young citizens.

We have come a long ways from the days when indifference or angry opposition greeted General Washington's thesis that ". . . every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government owes not only a portion of his property, but even of his personal services, to the defence of it."

Shelby's Expedition to Mexico

By Capt. William W. Barnett, Jr.

SHELBY'S expedition to Mexico is an almost unwritten page in American history. Yet it furnishes us with several might-have-beens in connection with the ill-fated attempt by Napoleon III to found an empire in Mexico. Of this period in the 1860's we are inclined to remember Maximilian, Carlotta, Juarez, Seward, Napoleon. General Jo Shelby is not so remembered, though his story has the romance to be found in any fight for a lost cause.

Joseph Orville Shelby was a Confederate cavalry leader of some renown in the Trans-Mississippi Department during the Civil War. His war exploits in themselves make good reading. But here we are interested in what happened after the surrender of the major part of the Confederate army.

With the capitulation of General Lee and the imminent surrender of Shelby's superior, General Buckner, it was evident that further resistance to the North was futile. Yet Shelby's brigade of cavalry, then in Texas, was not ready to quit. Jo Shelby advised his men to follow him to Mexico, there to join one or the other of the groups vying for control of the country. (There is some evidence that indirectly President Lincoln suggested the move to Shelby, for some think the President had in mind an expeditionary force of both Confederate and Federal troops to be used to restore order in Mexico, once the American Civil War was over.)

One thousand men threw in with General Shelby, and the group made its way south to the Rio Grande. Just inside Mexico at Piedras Niegras the little force made its choice of sides. Though Shelby himself seems to have favored the cause of the Liberals under Juarez, a council of officers showed that an overwhelming majority wished to join the Imperialists defending Maximilian. Upon finding out the desires of his men, General Shelby made the fateful decision to decline a Liberal offer of command of all forces in the states of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila. Instead, his band started for Mexico City, hoping to be accepted by the Imperialists.

The journey was not without such incidents as skirmishes with bandits. Having declined to side with the Liberals and not having been accepted by the Imperialists at the time, Shelby's men could not depend on the friendship of either side. Too, as soon as they had crossed the border they had disposed of some of their arms, including their artillery. In Monterey, the men of Jo Shelby were received in friendly fashion by General Jeanningros. The Frenchman was frank in telling General Shelby that there was no chance that France would fight the United States over the Mexican throne—no doubt a disappointment to those who had chosen the side of the Imperialists in the hope that a war between France and the United States would give the South another chance. Shelby's expedition left Monterey soon afterwards, with the permission of General Jeanningros for continuing their march.

In Mexico City, the Emperor Maximilian received General Shelby and allowed him to present his plan, which briefly was the recruiting of a force of 40,000 Confederate soldiers. This body of men could maintain Maximilian on the throne, said Shelby. But almost at

once General Shelby sensed that his proposal would be declined. The Emperor, no soldier himself, still hoped diplomacy would succeed for him. He did not realize, as did Shelby who had just come through the country, that the Mexican people were for Juarez. He did not think the American Secretary of State, Seward, was really unfavorable to him. Shelby came away, after the Emperor declined to accept his offer, feeling that the Emperor exemplified faith without enthusiasm.

It is impossible to conjecture what might have happened had Shelby been told to carry out his plan. Certainly the Emperor was not inconsistent in refusing the offer, for he had shown himself, and was to continue almost to the last, to be the idealist rather than the practical ruler. It is not certain that Shelby could have helped. True, one thousand men had followed him that far, but one thousand is not 40,000. Shelby himself had seen the hold that Juarez had on the people in the areas not actually occupied by the French or Imperialist troops, so may have had his doubts as to even 40,000 men being enough. Too, the United States had troops on the border. It is almost certain these would have taken positive action to defend the Monroe Doctrine; certain military leaders definitely sought action. As it was, the men of Juarez received aid from these troops.

The story of Shelby's expedition did not quite end at Maximilian's refusal of assistance. The news sent some of the men back to the United States, caused some to sail for foreign lands, and even brought some to enlist with the French forces. But Shelby and a number of others were given land near Cordova, and there they founded the colony of Carlotta, named after the Empress. Fortunes of the colony rose and fell with the Emperor. Maximilian's capture and death, following the French withdrawal in 1867, finally brought the end of the Civil War for Shelby and the men who had remained with him. In small groups they made their way back to the United States, exiles no more, willing now to live in peace.

"All That Glitters . . ."

By Rosalee G. Porter

THE scrap-metal piles of Japan have afforded the personnel of the occupation as much pleasure and satisfaction as any other one thing in the Islands. For my husband and me, when we were in Takamatsu on Shikoku, our own private dump over by the railroad tracks beside the waterfront furnished us all the drama of the theater; the ancient culture of the museums; the fun of the circus. It also gave us something to do on Saturday afternoons and Sundays.

The pull of the Golden Fleece for Jason was small compared to what we thought we might find if we just dug deep enough and long enough in the scrap piles. The stuff was heaped in long windrows covering several acres and the uniform color was gray. It had been collected from all over Japan by the Japanese Government during the war years.

By the time the antique-conscious wives of the occupation had arrived, all the steel scrap, the aluminum, and the lead had been used for the war effort. What was left was bronze and brass, statues from 2 inches to 40 feet tall, hibachis, cooking utensils, ornaments, decorations from shrines, and vases of all sizes and shapes. The Japanese people were supposed to give up everything they had which was made of metal.

After the collection the stuff was hauled, dumped, and battered to such an extent that 90% of it was unrecognizable. Of the 10% left, half of that was beyond repair. It was that last 5% that we searched for—articles with only small holes or with only one leg missing.

The scrap piles were owned by the Japanese Government and when sold the money was turned over to the Ministry of Education. In some cases the whole pile had been sold outright by the government to an individual. For that reason prices varied in different areas. We liked our Takamatsu dump and we were enamored with the signs:

"SCLAP BLASS—13.75 yen per kilo

"SCLAP BLONZE—16.75 yen per kilo."

Buying in Tokyo's dumps was even better. There the stuff was weighed out regardless of metal or condition and sold at 10 yen per kilo. A kilo being equal to 2 1/5 pounds and the yen rate at 50 to the dollar, it was cheap enough. However, brass and bronze are so heavy. After picking up and throwing away several hundred pounds of the broken, dented, and tarnished stuff, the aching backs, shoulders, and arms vouched for the weight of it. When the promising pieces got to the scales, then we knew it was both heavy and costly.

It was April before we found our dump in Takamatsu and we worked it assiduously until we moved to Yokohama in September of 1947. We went often and dug long; sometimes we failed to find even one piece worth keeping. On other days we would both have treasures we just couldn't bear to put down, much less leave to "ripen" in the office.

Our routine was to park the most promising pieces in the office until the next trip. Then if it still looked good, we'd weigh it and buy it. Often, though, the candlestick, vase, or mirror looked so good in its greened and battered state that we'd dash home, soak it in vinegar and salt, and polish it just to see what we really had. Sometimes it was all we'd hoped for—often it was pitted and worthless. With our greater experience and knowledge, how we have wished for some of the things we threw back on the pile!

Because after cleaning we were so often disappointed, we have left most



of our bronze pieces dark—just rubbed with shoe polish or, appropriately enough, mineral oil, to make them look clean. The polished pieces will be difficult to keep shining when we do get them back to "the Old Country," that being the affectionate way we have come to refer to the United States or, as the Department of the Army has it, the Zone of the Interior. In passing, my dearest loves are the little things that didn't weigh very much—the tiny mirrors, incense burners, dogs from sides or tops of things, and 19 bronze vases all less than 8 inches tall. The ones over that height belong to my husband; he was extravagant.

In our search for dumps we have seen much of Japan. During the winter of 1947-48, we worked over the two big ones in Tokyo, the one at 25th and W, and the other at 30th and R; the former was pretty well picked over before we got to it, as was the once good one in Yokohama. We have never been to the one in Nagoya and it has always fascinated me. All the things the generals wives found there were not only perfectly mended but they were also nicely polished.

In February we went to Osaka to dig in the muchly publicized Kobe dump. We found some wonderful fluffy-tailed cranes and a good brass tray. I was intrigued by some big round things about 40 inches in diameter. I climbed around over them looking for openings or something. After we were home we heard that the place had to be closed because the "scrapped" floating mines were not duds. The day it was considered safe and reopened, more than a hundred diggers were waiting at the gate to see what the bulldozers had turned over. After that rush the Kobe dump was exhausted.

In May we went to Toyama on the Western side of Honshu to visit a "virgin" dump—one in which the hand of man had not set foot. We left Yokohama in the morning at 10 o'clock, arrived in Kyoto at 7 in the evening, left on a local sleeper at 9:40 that night, arrived in Kanazawa at 6 next morning, but we were awakened at 5. Then we had a hair-raising bus ride straight up a mountain road to the Hakuunro Hotel. We just rested around all day visiting the Kutani potteries, and the gift shops, and having another bus trip out to see the Sea of Japan.

Then at 4 o'clock the next morning we were up, waiting in vain for breakfast before we had the bus trip down the mountain to get the 6 o'clock train out of Kanazawa for Toyama. There we were met by the Military Government Team Commander who gave us breakfast and transportation to the dump.

In a lot of ways it was disappointing, as there was so much of what we already had and it cost 39 yen a kilo. We spent the day trying to match candlesticks, incense-burner tops, cranes and turtles, and resisting a lotus flower. It was at least 20 inches in diameter, solid brass, and would have made a marvellous punch bowl, but it weighed more kilos than we had yen.



Japan's Occupationaires, like army personnel in the good old Indian days at frontier outposts, are a social lot. There was a cocktail party, to which we were invited, for the Regional Commander, who with his wife and party were at Toyama on an inspection trip. Dump digging is a dirty business, and though I was not garbed in the traditional slacks and head scarf, I was uncurled, broken finger-nailed, and dusty ground-grippered. I was not dressed for a party but I went. It was alright, though, as none of the guests looked at anything but the hosts' brass collection—all from the dump.

We do have some interesting and beautiful things, but when we start speculating about their value, we are faced with the hard fact that the stuff was all thrown away once. All Japanese are thrifty and they do not ever discard anything valuable.

The search for our collection has given us some of our happiest hours; the soldering and mending some of our greatest satisfaction; the cleaning and polishing our biggest thrills. It does glitter but it is not gold. However, the adventure of collecting is something that much fine gold could not buy.



Magnificent Mud

By William Brindley

Enlisted men's barracks. One story and attic in height a colonnaded porch the full

WHETHER you call it Fort Mud or Fort Mifflin, a glorious page of history was written on the lower half-acre of Mud Island.

"The post with which you are now entrusted is of utmost importance to America," wrote George Washington to the garrison at Fort Mud, "and demands every exertion of which you are capable for its security and defense."

On November 16, 1777, after every exertion had been given, along with 300 lives, Major Simeon Thayer ordered the fort evacuated. British cannon had pounded it pitilessly for six days. The 40 survivors were surrounded by earthworks riddled by shot, guns torn from their mountings, blockhouses leveled. Their supplies were nearly exhausted. British ships were so close to them in the back channel that the crews could bombard them with hand grenades from the topmasts.

Fort Mud occupied a strategic position in the Delaware River near its junction with the Schuylkill. The fort's batteries commanded the water approaches to Philadelphia. Although conceived by the British Colonial Administration in 1762, construction was not begun until 1773. The outbreak of the Revolutionary War found it still in an unfinished condition.

Officers' quarters

The fort was hastily completed by the Committee of Safety and the Continental Congress while Sir William Howe was pushing Washington back across New Jersey. At the time it seemed likely that the Colonials would be able to turn back the British and set up winter quarters in Philadelphia.

Sir William thought otherwise. He defeated Washington at the outskirts of the city, and while the King's men lived comfortably in a town with strong Tory sentiments, Washington was obliged to go elsewhere.

Howe's victory was not quite so easily won. The garrison at Fort Mud, together with the garrison at Fort Mercer at Red Bank, N. J., severed his supply line. Although the British made every effort to keep their situation secret, reports leaked out of short rations for both the civilians and the military. Fort Mud's blockade of the Delaware was so effective that Howe was considering abandonment of the city if the river could not be opened.

A British fleet bombarded Fort Mud for several hours on October 23 with little effect. At the same time, a battery was constructed on Province Island at almost point-blank range. This artillery could be trained on the fort's weak flank from a distance of 400 yards.

Reinforced by cannon on ships and floating emplacements, the land battery began the final assault November 10, 1777. The defenders were subjected to a withering crossfire from more than 250 artillery pieces. Six days later the fort was abandoned.

British shot had reduced the fort to



One of the gates which funnel beneath the remparts. This gate is the one currently in use and is approached by a bridge across the moat. This photograph illustrates the thickness of the walls of the fort.

a pile of rubble. Of the original fort, constructed of vertical timber palisades and blockhouses, only the moat was undamaged.

Partial restoration was undertaken both by the British during their occupation of Philadelphia and by the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1793. However, it was not until 1798, after the fort had been ceded to the Federal government and renamed, that work was begun in earnest. The entire installation was rebuilt of stone on plans drawn up by Major Pierre L'Enfant, the architect who laid out Washington, D. C. Irregular walls enclosed an area 600 ft. by 50 ft. The original group of buildings inside the fort consisted of a headquarters, officers' quarters, and enlisted men's barracks.



The southeast ramparts, showing gun emplacements

Fort Mud did not close out its page in history when Major Thayer's 40 survivors evacuated to Fort Mercer. It has figured, though not so prominently, in several of the country's later wars. The fort was occupied during the War of 1812 by Philadelphia troops after the regular garrison had been withdrawn. A "Junior Artillerists' Company" was formed by the Young Men's Democratic Association when British ships were reported anchored off the Capes of the Delaware, during the early months of 1813. Together with a company of Independent Blues from the state militia, they manned the guns until relieved by United States troops in April.

Later in the war, when news of the burning of Washington caused a near-panic in Philadelphia, Fort Mud (then Mifflin) returned to the spotlight as a key position. However, the fort took part in no action.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, the fort's armament was substantially strengthened as a precautionary measure. Wood rampart facings were replaced with brickwork. Several buildings were added. The artillery pieces were rearranged, and ones of heavier caliber added, so that both the river and land approaches were better protected. In Fort Mifflin's five subterranean dungeons, some of Colonel John Mosby's celebrated guerrillas were imprisoned.

In 1915, after a decade of decline, the fort was declared a national monument by executive order. Since then thorough restoration has been accomplished. Buildings have been renovated, grounds cleared, and walls repaired. Today it closely resembles the reconstructed fort of 1798.

Yes, restoration has healed Fort Mifflin's battle scars, but today its armament is gone. Its gun emplacements are empty. Its buildings are full of file cases. Its "garrison" is composed of but a few civilians from the adjoining supply depot. It bears only a superficial resemblance to ill-fated Fort Mud.

But it stands proudly as a memorial to the courageous defenders of 1777—to the handful of survivors as well as to the nameless heroes who "gave the last full measure of devotion."

PERIMETERS in PARAGRAPHS

By Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Ret.

THE COLD WAR

Prepared by a widely-known military scholar and writer, PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS is a recurring feature dealing with the military, political and economic realities in world affairs. Whereas an understanding of these realities is deemed essential to the American soldier, it is emphasized that PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS reflects the opinions of the author, alone. This installment covers the period 1 March — 30 April, 1949.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

On 15 March, the Foreign Ministers of the Brussels Treaty Powers—Great Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg—completed a conference at London. They had agreed to the proposed North Atlantic Alliance and would sign it. They had also approved a strategical plan for ground and air forces for defense of West Europe, which remains secret.

In view of the foregoing action the text of the North Atlantic Alliance in treaty form was released on 18 March. Countries who were to be charter members were invited to have their Foreign Ministers at Washington by 4 April. All invited accepted and on the designated date signed the Treaty. Before doing so they had jointly rejected a Russian protest (see next section). The charter members of this treaty, which is very important, were Canada, Great Britain, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Portugal, Italy, and the United States.

The treaty proclaims that its mission is collective defense and preservation of peace and security. It then prescribes:

Art. 1. International disputes to be settled peacefully, refraining from "threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

2. Economic collaborations between members and other countries to be encouraged.

3. Members "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

4. Provides for mutual consultations.

5. "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Art 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually or in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." The foregoing action is to be suspended, when and if the Security Council restores and maintains peace and security.

6. The areas covered by the Treaty are:

a. Territory of any party in Europe, North America, or Algeria.

b. Territory in Europe held by occupation forces of any signatory.

c. Islands in the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer which are under the jurisdiction of any signatory.

d. Vessels or aircraft of any signatory in same areas.

7. Treaty in no way affects rights under the United Nations Charter or the responsibility of the Security Council.

8. Each party certifies that it has no engagements in conflict with this Treaty and that it will not enter into such an engagement.

9. Provides for a Council, on which each party shall be represented, to meet promptly as necessary. Council to set up a Defense Committee to recommend measures required to carry out pars. 3 and 5.

10. New states may be admitted to membership by unanimous agreement.

11. Provides for ratification.

12. After 10 years Treaty shall be open for revision.

13. After 20 years any party may withdraw upon giving one year's notice.

14. Treaty shall be deposited in Washington. United States to notify all concerned as to ratifications, new members, etc.

Immediately after signing, the Foreign Ministers met and set up the Defense Council provided by Art. 9. That Council promptly organized and determined upon important secret measures.

On 5 April the Brussels Treaty Powers delivered a letter requesting American aid to include military supplies, to enable them to equip their forces and to provide for the common defense. Presumably having been prearranged, the United States' reply came the same day. It requested that requisitions be submitted with as little delay as practicable for what was needed. Similar letters were sent to Norway, Denmark, and Italy.

RUSSIAN REACTION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Prior to the signing of the Treaty, Russia lost no opportunity to express its disapproval and to protest. After the Treaty was signed, the Russian policy suddenly changed to a policy of appeasement.

Russian Protests. After the text of the Treaty became known, violent press campaigns started against Finland. They threatened that small state with dire disaster if she turned toward the

Western Powers. The main Russian protest was handed on 31 March to each of the Powers proposing to sign the Treaty. It is very important as it describes Russia's estimate of the situation. It reads (slightly edited to make it clearer):

"The statements in the North Atlantic Treaty that it is for defense, and that it recognizes the principles of the United Nations, serve aims which have nothing in common either with self-defense or with the aims and principles of the United Nations.

"Such great Powers as the United States, Great Britain, and France are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus the Treaty is not directed against the USA, Great Britain, or France. Of the great Powers only the Soviet Union is excluded from among the parties to this treaty, which can only be explained by the fact that it is directed against the Soviet Union. The fact that the North Atlantic Treaty is directed against the USSR as well as against the countries of people's democracies was definitely pointed out also by the official representatives of the USA, Great Britain, and France.

". . . the North Atlantic Treaty is a multilateral treaty, which creates a closed group of states and what is particularly important, absolutely ignores the possibility of German aggression. Consequently its aim is not prevention of German aggression. . . . the North Atlantic Treaty must be regarded as directed against one of the [former] chief allies of the USA, Great Britain, and France during the late war—viz., it is against the USSR.

"Parties in the North Atlantic Treaty are undertaking extensive military measures which can in no way be justified as self defense. The extensive military measures carried out by the United States in co-operation with Great Britain and France under present peace conditions, including increases of all types of armed forces, the drafting of a plan for utilization of the atomic weapon, the stock piling of atom bombs which are purely an offensive weapon, together with numerous other military preparations, contribute to intensifying anxiety and alarm, and to whipping up of war hysteria, for which war all kinds of instigators are so interested.

"The North Atlantic Treaty is designed to daunt the states which do not agree to obey the dictates of the Anglo-American group of Powers who claim world domination. . . ."

The protest ends with a Summary which charges that:

1. The North Atlantic Treaty has an obviously aggressive character.

2. It is counter to the principles of the United Nations.

3. It violates the treaties made by Russia with Great Britain in 1942, and with France in 1944, which forbade alliances directed against one of the contracting Powers.

4. It is counter to the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, which provided that signatories would co-operate for a general peace and consolidation of the United Nations.

Russian Propaganda. This has been continuous and violent. Two arguments are constantly being expounded:

1. The Western Powers are preparing to attack Russia, and consequently elaborate defense measures are needed in Russia and within its satellites.

2. The US Government is controlled by wicked Wall Street imperialists. However, the American people are about to revolt, exterminate those imperialists, overthrow the present Fascist government, and establish friendly relations with Russia.

The foregoing arguments are inconsistent with each other, which fact doesn't seem to disturb Propaganda Headquarters.

Recent Russian Reaction. The propaganda continues, but a policy of appeasement has developed. Whether this is camouflage, or an indication that Russia is too weak to attack West Europe before that area is rearmed, is unknown.

Russian actions since 4 April include: An offer to lift the Berlin blockade; reduction of pressure on Iran as to alleged unsatisfactory frontier conditions; an offer to confer with the Western Powers regarding the German problem.

RUSSIAN INTENTIONS

Russian major policies are determined by its Polit Bureau. This organization is very secret, and it is unknown what it plans to do. It has undergone a reorganization, which has been extended downwards to even minor subordinate offices. Tendency has been to relieve members of the Polit Bureau from details, enabling them to concentrate more on policies.

Military movements noted are limited to the Balkans. Russian officers have been detailed to key positions in Romania, Hungary, and Albania. Increased barrack space on a large scale is reported from Hungary, but the troops to occupy these had not arrived up to 30 April. Strong field fortifications, including numerous pill boxes, are being constructed in Hungary along both the north (Austrian) and south (Yugoslav) borders. That part of Hungary north and west of Lake Balaton is an excellent assembly area for large forces. From there they would be in good position for an advance towards either south Germany or Italy.

New air fields are appearing along that part of Romania close to the Hungary border. As noted elsewhere under *Greece,* Russian activity has increased in Albania.

All these activities are consistent with preparations for trouble with Yugoslavia; but they could be for other reasons.

Reports indicating that no action of importance will be taken by Russia during 1949 include much evidence that difficulty is being experienced among the satellites. Opposition to communism and to religious persecutions is increasing, and the people are sullen and discontented. The same antagonism to Moscow exists in some parts of Russia, but the extent of this can not be determined. Russians are listening to the *Voice of America*, which is being broadcast on an increasing scale. It is having its intended effect in convincing Russians that the United States is not seeking war, and that democracy as a government is greatly superior to the Russian brand of communism. (The recent extensive "jamming" efforts would appear to confirm this. Ed.)

Russia is having trouble in its industrial production. This has increased, but in certain lines it is deficient. Imports of electrical machinery, oil products, and railroad materiel seem to be badly needed. To secure these and other articles may explain Russia's offer to lift the Berlin blockade contingent on the Western Powers permitting free trade from West Germany to Russian territory.

Best information indicates that Russia may have solved the problem of the atomic bomb, but that production of atom bombs has not yet commenced.

In case of war with the Western

Powers, the latter would have at their disposal air bases on all islands in the North Atlantic from Spitzbergen to the Azores, and a long line of bases along the Mediterranean and on through south Asia. Russia has nothing in view to offset that advantage.

During March, announcement was made that the Russian war budget for 1949 had been fixed at 79 billion rubles, as against 66 billions for the preceding year. These figures are inconclusive as many expenditures for the military services are charged to other appropriations. For example: new planes are paid for out of Funds for Aviation. The budget labeled military is generally believed to represent about one third of the total expenditures for the military services. What the total may be isn't known.

THE DEFENSE OF WEST EUROPE

Military plans for the Allies are limited to defense; no offensive is contemplated. If an attack should come it would presumably be launched by surprise. It might be directed westwards, north and/or south of Switzerland.

A line of defense, or MLR, regardless of its location, would be likely to be leap-frogged by complete airborne divisions, which might land far to the rear unless control of the air were complete. That it would be complete in initial operations is doubtful. Enemy landing in rear areas might attack the MLR from the rear, and/or proceed to the capture of principal cities, depots, and lines of communication.

The MLR needs to be strong enough to stop, or delay if its function be no more than that, a combined air and ground attack from the front, supplemented by at least a partial attack from the rear. It must be able to continue to fight, notwithstanding that its communications may be temporarily severed.

To prevent enemy airborne troops landed in rear areas from having a decisive effect on a campaign, the defense needs large units in positions of readiness to counterattack with as little delay as possible.

West Europe needs two considerable major forces, independent of each other but in close liaison. One to hold the MLR, and the other to operate in rear areas; each to be strong, with reasonable probability that it can overcome any probable enemy. Such forces do not now exist. It will take some years to provide, train, and equip them, even if the United States furnishes all the aid it is capable of. Until that task approaches fulfillment, the situation of west Europe will remain critical.

The MLR north of Switzerland most commonly considered is along the Rhine. It might follow that river to the sea, or turn northwards along the Yssel River, following that to the sea. Decision as to the exact line to be defended will depend upon the date of attack and as to how many divisions the Allies may have available at that time.

South of Switzerland, opinions, supported by many French writers, favor holding the line of the Po River. That is a very difficult line to defend, regardless of which bank is attacked. The number of campaigns fought in the Po Valley is so great that there are precedents for any maneuver that could be attempted. Defending the south bank of the Po just simply isn't promising. A better line would be from La Spezia to near Rimini. It is only necessary to go back to World War II to find that that mountain line can be defended by inferior forces. Defense of Italy is complicated by the fact that Italian troops are numerically small, and that for centuries past, including both World Wars, have shown themselves of poor morale. To defend Italy, foreign troops would be necessary, and a sufficient number of these is not in view.

It is reported that the Italian Foreign Minister, while in Washington in the first week of April, advised against the United States arming west Europe. In his opinion, if Russia attacked she could not be stopped, and in this case would capture all American arms and munitions in that area. This possibility is a factor in the situation. It will be a danger until the rearming of west Europe has progressed to a point where a successful resistance can be offered.

Until that time arives, the Pyrenees Mountains must be considered as a possible MLR. This is an excellent line, if properly prepared and held. It differs from most mountains in that stream lines on both sides are parellel to, instead of normal to, the axis of the chain. Passes are few, and all offer good positions for defense. The disadvantage of the Pyrenees is poor communications on the south side—few roads and railroads. Back of the mountains is a large plateau where there is ample room for air bases. However, these would have to be constructed.

Much is necessary to complete preparations for the defense of west Europe. How long this will take will depend upon what west Europe does for itself, and how large appropriations may be made by the United States during the next few years. Whether there will be time to go through with present intentions nobody knows. In the meantime, caution and extreme watchfulness are indicated.

In case an attack should come before west Europe is rearmed, the North Atlantic Treaty offers Algeria. In all probability that could be defended. It could, as in 1943, be once more a base for operations against south Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty does not mention Tunisia or Morocco. It may be assumed that if the Allies should, as before, need those countries that there will be no difficulty about it.

COMMENTS

A century and a half has passed since General Washington made his recommendation as to avoiding "entangling alliances" with European countries. Just when the General would have considered a treaty to be *entangling* isn't known, as he didn't explain. It wasn't, in his time, necessary to do so. It was then improbable that a European country would try to invade the United States, and even less probable that it would succeed in such a project. In these days, present air forces, with guided missiles shortly to come, offer a certain possibility that hostile airborne troops in large units might be landed well inside the United States. This situation has forced defense provisions to an extent never before known.

The country is now strategically in a situation similar to that of the European countries during the past 400 years. They were all threatened by surprise ground attacks, and had to maintain substantial forces to protect themselves. At this date airborne attacks seem more probable, and more likely to succeed, than efforts to penetrate a prepared ground line of resistance. All

nations, including the United States, need powerful air forces to deprive an enemy of use of the air, and substantial ground forces to overcome airborne attackers should control of the air be lost temporarily. Major importance now lies in depriving a probable enemy of bases from where he could launch air, and/or airborne, offensives. From the American point of view it is essential that west Europe be held by friendly Powers. This is the essence of the North Atlantic Treaty. In return for holding west Europe to the best of their ability, the United States has contracted to aid west Europe in making the defense effective.

This is indeed a departure from previous policies. Never before has the United States made an alliance during peace time. Times have changed; other things have changed; it has now been found necessary to materially alter American strategical plans.

Russia has understood the changed situation. Temporarily she is seeking to appease the North Atlantic Powers, apparently fearing war at an early date. What Russia really thinks is set forth at length in her letter of 31 March, already quoted. That sums up to accusing the United States of desiring a war, and alleges that the North Atlantic Treaty was contracted only to hide offensive preparations.

Perhaps Russia is incapable of doing anything but protest during 1949. It would be an error to assume that no positive action will be taken later. The note of 31 March meant what it said. It is a warning which should not be disregarded.

GERMANY

INTRODUCTION

In the January-February 1949 number of this JOURNAL *Perimeters* referred to the German problem. It is of major importance, yet four years after the end of the war no solution is in view. Principal suggestions offered are:

1. Be severe. Keep Germany disarmed and restrict industrial production. France has favored this solution, admitting that if adopted Germany will be incapable of furnishing military aid. Thinks that will be unnecessary in view of the North Atlantic Alliance guaranteeing other aid, particularly that from the United States.
2. Be less severe, and friendly. In this case Germany might join the Western Powers in case of war. This solution has advocates in the United States and in Great Britain. Some British views desire to curtail German production so as to protect own trade. American advocates believe this solution would save the United States annually vast sums now required to keep Germans from starving.
3. Grant Germany independence, less right to rearm. Occupying troops to withdraw. Russia favors this. Allies believe that if this solution is agreed to there is great risk that Germany will find a way to rearm, and then might join Russia in case of war. It would be very difficult to defend west Europe against such an alliance.

RUSSIAN MOVES

About the end of January, the Russian ambassador Andrei Y. Vishinsky was sick in hospital at Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia. He had been designated to become Foreign Minister effective upon his return to duty, although this was not known to the public at the time. At the date indicated, communist leaders from East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia had a conference with Mr. Vishinsky as to the return to Germany of a part of Silesia containing rich industries and mines. In return Poland was to receive valuable territory from Czechoslovakia in exchange for a less valuable area. This conference appears to have been exploratory, with no decision arrived at. Purpose was to secure German co-operation with Russia.

The head of the German communists in the Russian zone is Wilhelm Pieck. On 7 March in a speech at Leipzig he announced organization of a Cold War against West Germany, where he charged the Western Powers were preparing a new German state as part of the preparations for a war against Russia. Russia has followed the same line of propaganda, alleging that the Western Powers are preparing to attack Russia.

ACTION BY THE WESTERN POWERS

On 26 March, the Western Powers in a communiqué announced 31 minor adjustments of the west German boundary in favor of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, totalling 52 square miles and 13,500 inhabitants. The latter were assured of all their rights, including that of remaining German citizens should they so desire. On 4 April, Russia filed an official protest on the ground that the boundary changes had been made in violation of the Allied Declaration of 5 June 1945, which stated that the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, *and Russia* would *jointly* determine the status of all German territorial changes. Disregarding the protest, the designated areas were occupied by the new owners on 23 April. Germans expressed great indignation, claiming that the changes were a violation of the Atlantic Charter and other Allied declarations.

On 8 April, the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, and the United States, being all in Washington, issued a joint communiqué approving a new Occupation Statute for west Germany. This was to replace an earlier one proposed in June, 1948, directing the organization of a central German state covering the three Western Military Zones. Germans had objected to some provisions of the earlier statute, and the three Allies had not heretofore agreed among themselves.

The new Occupation Statute provides for the replacement of the present three Military Governments by a central Germany supervising the constituent states. Germans have already elected representatives to write a Constitution complying with the Occupation Statute. The latter provides for discontinuing the Military Governments, but not the Occupation. Each Ally is to be represented by a High Commissioner. The three of them will have authority to disapprove any law or act of the Germans, provided they do so within 21 days. The Western Powers also reserved to themselves the right to act on matters relating to: disarmament;

scientific research; industrial production; aviation; the Ruhr; foreign interests; protection, prestige, and security of Allied forces; displaced persons; basic laws; foreign trade and exchange; interior control of funds, food, and supplies, so as to reduce to a minimum the necessity for imports; prisoners held by Allied courts, or serving sentence thereunder; and all other matters required by Allied interests. The Occupation Statute prescribes that German action thereunder would be deemed to be the act of the Occupying Powers. This was because Germans, fearing possible Russian occupation later, did not want to risk being tried as collaborators. The Germans have shown no enthusiasm for this Occupation Statute; claim that everything important has been reserved for the Allies to decide.

On 12 April, the Western Powers lifted further restrictions on German production by removing 159 plants from the list to be dismantled. Germans charged that the plants designated were minor ones. They pointed out that plants for manufacturing synthetic rubber were still marked for destruction; claimed this was for the benefit of rubber interests in the United States and Great Britain.

On 25 April, General Lucius D. Clay, US Military Governor in Berlin, in a message to the Associated Press Convention in New York, explained the German situation as follows:

"While the Western Allies were united to prevent further communist penetration and had agreed in principle in June, 1948, to establish this West German Government, they could not agree as to how these principles were to be placed into effect. Security fears still prevailed.

"Slowly security measures were agreed to. These establish prohibitions and restrictions on industries deemed to have special war potential and security agencies, such as the Ruhr Authority and the Military Security Board, to enforce these measures. Finally the broader questions of security were resolved by the North Atlantic Pact, which produced an atmosphere conducive to settlement of the German problem among the three Western Occupying Powers.

"Under the able leadership of Secretary of State Acheson, the three Foreign Ministers agreed [on 8 April] to the establishment of a West German Government under a more liberal occupation statute to the German Parliamentary Council, in a spirit of goodwill and in the expressed hope that it would lead to the better understanding necessary to draw west Germany into close association with the nations of West Europe.

"Unfortunately, during the many months in which the Allies had been unable to work in full accord, political discord had developed in Germany. This discord was exploited by naive German politicians, who still saw Germany playing a compromise role between the East and the West, and by communist representatives eager to prevent the formation of a West German Government.

". . . . The time for punitive measures has ended. . . . The forming of an association of the free nations of West Europe, with Germany integrated therein, will create lasting stability in Europe and will not only end the threat of communist expansion but will make it difficult for the communist front to keep intact It is the only sure way to peace."

The Germans are hesitating.

West offers limited independence under *prohibitions and restrictions* for West Germany only (but open to East Germany if that can be arranged) under continued occupation.

East offers some territorial restitutions and no occupation; no statement yet as to prohibitions and restrictions.

Up to 1 May, when this account closed, the Germans had made no decision.

GREECE

THE GENERAL SITUATION

Politically, economically, and militarily, Greece is in bad condition.

The present population is estimated as 7,500,000. The vast majority are poor and unable to maintain a decent living. The people want peace and a chance to rehabilitate their country and earn an honest living. Best evidence indicates that not over 15% are communists, but many others are so tired of the war and its attendant miseries that they would accept a communist regime if it brought peace and order.

The Government is wholly occupied with the suppression of communist invasions from adjacent Balkan states. At present Albania is the main communist base. The communist mission has been to wreck Greece economically in order to prove to all Balkan nations that following the United States and its Marshall plan leads to death and destruction. Greeks have been invited to repulse American aid and join the family of communist states east of the Iron Curtain, where it is alleged peace and prosperity reign.

After three years the foregoing argument hasn't gone over. So, about 1 March, the Cominform, which has an operation section supervising the war in Greece, issued new instructions and a new mission. Only a part of the new orders are yet known. These provide for the organization of a new state of *Macedonia*, to be formed from territory taken from north Greece, south Yugoslavia, and southwest Bulgaria, which areas are in fact occupied largely by Macedonians.

This scheme is old. It was seriously considered prior to World War II, when the plan was to unite the proposed new state of Macedonia with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria into a greater Balkan state. Owing to the rivalry between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as to which of them was to be the head of the new arrangement, nothing came of this.

At this date Yugoslavia is in the communist "doghouse," and its interests need no longer be protected. What arguments were made to obtain Bulgaria to agree has not been ascertained. So far as Greece is concerned, the new mission is now to conquer Greek Macedonia. With this idea in view, a conference was held at communist GHQ near Mt. Vitsi on 30 March, to provide a provisional organization. On 5 April a general order was broadcast announcing that Dimitrice Partsalides had been elected President, and that General Niklos Zachariades had assumed command as C-in-C.

Refugees. As of 1 March these exceeded 650,000. This is a terrific drain on a small state. Refugee ration is ¼ lb. of bread, plus the equivalent of 10c US. Even such an amount is difficult to finance and requires extensive administration.

Naturally the refugees contribute nothing to the economy of the country.

Relations with the United States. On 14 March the military situation was considered so satisfactory that Greek GHQ issued a statement to that effect. The American head of the Military Mission, Lieut. General James A. Van Fleet, added:

"Communism has lost the battle of Greece. It is no more a question of will we win? We will win. Communism will be stamped out."

Three days later President Truman reported to Congress that the tide of battle had been running against the communists. Since 1 October, 1948, the communists, out of an estimated combat strength of 22,000, had lost 6,000 through battle casualties. However, the communists had received 7,000 replacements during the same period.

Notwithstanding this favorable picture, the Greek Prime Minister on 24 March appealed for American troops to aid in closing the north frontier.

Great Britain submitted a memorandum on 6 April to the effect that the Greek appeal for troops be complied with by furnishing means for raising one additional division, plus American reinforcements to the Greek Air Force. The British believed that victory during 1949 was unlikely unless a substantial increase of Greek forces was had. Greek training and morale had improved but was not high, and unless reinforcements were promptly provided morale would presumably deteriorate. Total Greek combat strength was 147,000 Regulars and 50,000 National Guards. This proposal was disapproved in Washington on the ground that with all the other calls on the United States for troops, munitions, funds, etc., throughout the world an increase of the commitment for Greece was impracticable.

Albania. Reports from Italian sources are that Russians have taken over Saseno Island (north of Corfu). In rear of that island Russian transports have unloaded weapons and ammunition for infantry and light artillery. Russian officers have been flown in from Bulgaria and have been assigned to key positions. The objects of these movements are unknown, but careful watch on developments is indicated. Colonel-General Enver Hoxha, who is Chief of State and C-in-C in Albania, arrived in Moscow on 22 March for consultations.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

South Sector. The major Government force has been concentrated in Peloponnesus and has engaged since the beginning of the year in concentric operations against a communist force estimated as about 3,900 men on 1 January. Since that date the communists are believed to have received about 1,000 replacements.

Numerous minor engagements have resulted. The Greek divisions operated in small patrols which used dogs to track the enemy. Sulphur bombs were employed to clear caves. The campaign has cleared the enemy out of a substantial area. Roads and railroads have been reopened, and the population is feeling more secure. Details of operations have not been revealed. Latest report is dated 10 March, at which time 4,500 communists were claimed to have been killed or captured, leaving about 500 still at large.

On the same date, the Greek Navy reported sinking a blockade runner. That ship had on board 100 machine guns, 1,500 rifles, and ammunition for the communists. The size of the shipment may indicate that the communists have more men than reported.

North Sector. The Greek Government had elected to remain on the defensive in this area during the winter season. On 1 March the communist force which in January had captured Karpenision and had later withdrawn was attacked by Government troops north of Lamia. The communists were identified as their 138th Brigade, with about 1,500 men, based upon Albania. This brigade probably had detachments elsewhere, for, on 6 March, their combat patrols were in action east of Karpenision. On 21 March, the 138th Brigade, apparently endeavoring to reach Albania, attacked the Government forces along the Akheloos River (in mountains east of Arta). Fighting lasted until the 27th, during which the communists were reported to have lost 242 killed and 447 POWs. The balance of their force seems to have teached Albania.

On the night 2/3 April a communist force, estimated as a brigade of 4,000 men, launched an attack from Albania against the Mt. Grammos area (between Kastoria and Konitsa). This was a surprise and an initial penetration of 12 miles was made. The advance then slowed down. Against heavy resistance from Government troops, who converged from all directions, the penetration was stopped on the 7th at 15 miles from the border, partly by the effective intervention of the Greek Air Force. Government counterattacks on the 8th failed. This engagement has resulted in the communists regaining practically the same area from which they were expelled after two months' heavy fighting last summer. Losses in this engagement have not been disclosed.

Communist raids have occurred in March near Sérrai (20 miles northeast of Salonika) and in April near Phlorina. Both were reported as having been repulsed.

CHINA

GENERAL SITUATION

At the beginning of the period, the National (Kuomintang) Government, with capital at Nanking, had an armistice with the communists. The Yangtze River in general was the boundary between the hostile forces. The Acting President of the National Government was General Li Tsung-jen; chief of state for communists was Mao Tzetung.

The President of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was at his home in Chekiang on indefinite leave. He had not entirely withdrawn from political matters. Some commanding generals looked to him for orders rather than to the Nanking Government, while VIPs frequently consulted him. Among his faithful followers was the Finance Minister, who kept the money reserve of real gold and silver under his direct control and deprived the Nanking Government of that valuable resource.

The National Government was advised on 7 March that the United States Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) would complete delivery of promised supplies by 30 April. This set up demands on the Government to abandon the United States and establish liaison with Russia. On the 12th to meet the new situation General Ho Ying-chin assumed command as Premier, vice Dr. Sun Fo, resigned.

The American position toward China was explained by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a memorandum submitted on the 15th to the US Senate. Since the end of the war with Japan over $2 billions had been given to China by the United States. Notwith-standing that, they had lost every campaign and the enemy was now on the north bank of the Yangtze. In his opinion

"There is no evidence that furnishing additional military materiel would alter the pattern of current developments in China."

On 26 March the Government appointed a delegation, which shortly afterwards proceeded to Peiping to negotiate a peace. No progress was made, as the communists demanded unconditional surrender and punishment of war criminals. This was refused by Acting-President Li on 19 April. Next day the communists launched an attack across the Yangtze. For reasons not yet known, the acting-President thereupon fled from Nanking and ceased to exercise command. His government similarly fled to Canton, which was announced as the new capital. This left that part of China not under communist control practically without a central government.

The Communists. The Chinese Polit Bureau held a conference between 15 and 23 March at Shihkiachwang. According to its communiqué it submitted to, and had its acts since 1945 approved by, the Central Communist Committee, and received the orders of the latter. This directed allegiance to Moscow, and designated Peiping as the capital of China effective immediately. In compliance with this decision the communist CP under Mao Tze-tung on 25 March opened in Peiping. Mao is now 55 years old. He had started his career in Peiping as an obscure library employee.

First act of the new communist government came on 2 April, when Mao wired Nanking:

"The Nanking Government's civil war is completely wrong. That government must bear the responsibility for the colossal calamities suffered by the Chinese people for several years because of the civil war. As for Kuomintang officials, civil or military, they will be welcomed by us no matter who they are, provided they differentiate clearly between right and wrong, earnestly repent, and prove this with deeds favoring the cause of The People."

Next day a communiqué was issued regarding the North Atlantic Treaty, reading:

"China makes the following solemn pronouncement in the name of the Chinese People:

"If the aggressive imperialist bloe dares to provoke a reactionary war, endangering the peoples of the world, we will unite the people throughout the country, observe the immortal behest of Sun Yat-sen, adopt necessary measures, and march forward hand in hand with China's ally — the SOVIET UNION . . . to overthrow the entire imperialist system, liberate all mankind, and establish permanent peace. If war breaks out, the imperialist aggressors are sure to be defeated, while the invaded countries opposing imperialism are sure to win."

A telegram addressed to acting-President Li at Nanking followed, demanding that he break with US imperialism and with Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek. Speeches were made in Peiping promising support to Moscow and denouncing the United States.

Sinkiang. In an apparent effort to establish closer relations with Russia, the National Government had sent a delegation to Urumchi, capital of Sinkiang, where on 4 March contact was made with a Russian delegation. The Russians were willing to discuss the continuance of Russian commercial air lines from Siberia into Sinkiang, but nothing was done toward Russian support for the National Government. The United States has a consulate in Urumchi which is very active — distributes American literature and posters, shows American films, and watches what goes on.

MILITARY OPERATION

As of 1 March, the National Government reported its troops under arms as 4,200,000, which were to be reduced to an even 4,000,000. The enemy was estimated as having a combat force of 3,950,000, without air or naval forces, but exclusive of 3,800,000 men in rear areas.

The National Government has an Air Force and a Navy. The Air Force on 22 January had abandoned the war and flown to Formosa, where it has since been engaged in making itself comfortable. A very few planes remained at Shanghai and Nanking to assure liaison and opportunities for VIPs to reach Formosa.

The China Air Force is locally referred to as the *Toothless Dragon* in view of its inefficiency. Since arriving at Formosa only one combat mission has been reported. This was on 11 March when a plane flew to Hulutao and sank by bombing the cruiser *Chungking*, which had deserted to the enemy on 26 February. The cruiser is the former British *Aurora*, 6,000 tons with 12 6-inch guns, and had been presented to China as a gift in May, 1948.

The Air Force declined to continue the air lift to besieged Taiyuan as much too dangerous. The air lift was taken over by commercial planes, which continued it from Nanking as a base until that place was abandoned on 23 April. The commercial planes reported no losses.

At Formosa about 100 new combat planes have been received since January from either the United States or Canada. They have remained unboxed at the port of debarkation — Takao. Chinese explain that they haven't any tools to assemble these planes, as in the move from the mainland the tools somehow got lost in the shuffle. Besides, the planes are not needed, as troops are engaged in building quarters for themselves and have no time for training, and no combat operations are contemplated.

Early in March the right flank of the communists, which, north of the Yangtze, has been well beyond the Yellow River, launched an offensive southwards toward Sikiang. (Sian on some maps). A National force at Sikiang counterattacked and by the 15th had driven the communists more than 40 miles beyond the Yellow River. This is the only case where the National troops have attacked.

The Crossing of the Yangtze River. This was planned by the communists well in advance and appears to have been carefully arranged. There was no secrecy. It was announced more than a month ahead that the crossing would be made on 20 April by the 3rd Army Group, 300,000 men, under Lieut. General Chen Yi. Crossing would be made both above and below Nanking, and the advance thereafter would be on both sides of Tai Lake on Hangchow. The 4th Army Group, of same strength, would be held in reserve under General Lin Piao in rear of the 3rd.

The National Government had the foregoing information in the first week in March. Their own forces consisted of an Army Group under General Tang En-po. According to his reports his troops were:

Along the Yangtze, above Nanking	60,000
Along the Yangtze, below Nanking	100,000
At Shanghai	60,000
North of Tai Lake	100,000
Total	320,000

There were also 19 gunboats from the Navy. Application to the *Toothless Dragon* for air support was not favorably considered. Neither side had air support.

Orders were issued for construction of field fortifications to defend Shanghai. Money allotted for this purpose was used to build a 10-foot-high wood palisade along a 20-mile perimeter, reinforced by over 2,000 pill boxes. The contractor used so little cement in the pill boxes that observers reported they could be kicked to pieces by a strong man with a heavy boot.

On 11 April the communists commenced to occupy islands in the Yangtze to support their crossing. No resistance was made. Exactly on schedule the crossing was launched before day-break on the 20th. The National Government offered no resistance. The reason for this is unknown. According to a report not yet confirmed, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was responsible for the no-resistance order and a general withdrawal to the South.

The one engagement that did occur was accidental. About 9:00 A.M. on the 20th the British destroyer-escort *Amethyst* en route to Nanking for station, and under permit from the National Government, was fired upon by communist artillery about 55 miles below Nanking. The communist fire (US AT guns) was effective and disabled the ship, which ran aground. Summoned by radio, the British destroyer *Consort* at Nanking, and the heavy cruiser *London* and destroyer *Black Swan*, both at Shanghai, hastened to the rescue. Chinese artillery, this time US 105mm howitzers, drove all these ships back more or less disabled and with a loss of 123 killed and wounded. The AT guns appear to have disabled the *London's* 8-inch battery, whose guns could not be depressed to reach the enemy. Communists lost 252 killed and wounded.

In view of the foregoing action the American naval commander at Shanghai considered it unsafe to remain longer in the river, and gave orders withdrawing his ships to the mouth of the Yangtze. The British followed suit.

In the meantime, the communist crossing continued. Few reliable reports are available, but they indicate that, both above and below Nanking, total men crossed per day did not exceed 10,000. They did not advance beyond the south bank until the 24th, on which date they marched into Nanking, which by that time had been evacuated. On the 26th, still according to plan, the communists advanced southeastwardly from Nanking on both sides of Tai Lake. This lake is a serious obstacle and the division of forces between the two sides, so that they were beyond supporting distance of each other, offered an excellent chance for a National counterattack. However, there was no attack.

On the 27th Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek arrived by air in Shanghai. The purpose of this visit and the orders he issued are unknown. From statements attributed to him his plan was to avoid combat and withdraw southwards, with the expectation that World War III would soon break. He would then have his armies intact, and in a good position to counterattack.

By 30 April the leading elements of the communist advance had reached the line Hangchow (excl) - Kashing (?) - Kunshan (excl). Their strength was stated to be about 50,000, or much below the local Nationalist forces. Yet the latter continued to withdraw, less 20,000 who had surrendered. The air lift to Taiyuan having been discontinued, that place surrendered.

On 30 April, communist GHQ at Peiping by broadcast denounced the naval engagement on the Yangtze as an unwarranted "invasion" and demanded an apology and indemnities. It continued:

"The People's Liberation Army demands that Great Britain, the United States, and France quickly withdraw their armed forces, warships, military aircraft, and marines in the Yangtze River and the Whangpoo River, and in other places in China, from the waters, seas, land, and air of China and not aid the Chinese People's enemy in waging civil war."

COMMENTS

In the past 20 years the National (Kuomintang) Government under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has fought campaigns against the communists with forces respectively about as follows:

Year	Kuomintang		Communist
1930	100,000		30,000
1931	200,000	1st campaign	40,000
1931	300,000	2nd campaign	30,000
1933	900,000		90,000
1936	170,000		40,000
1946	3,000,000		600,000
1947	4,900,000		800,000
1948	5,000,000		2,260,000

The Kuomintang lost every campaign except that of 1933. In that year the communists avoided combat by withdrawing in their famous march to northwest China. Two temporary armistices occurred during that period — first declared on 22 September 1937; and the second (under General Marshall) on 10 January 1946. Both sides gradually violated the terms of the armistices until they just lapsed.

In view of the foregoing record, admitting that Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek may be honest, his efficiency as a general appears to warrant a rating of Below Inferior. His latest scheme, if correctly reported — to withdraw from the Yangtze River without fighting, pending World War III—seems to be about as impractical as his previous plans for earlier campaigns, none of which have ever succeeded, notwithstanding continuous large numerical superiority.

The evidence is overwhelming that the communists are in close liaison with Russia, and bitterly hostile to the United States.

The Russians had previously attempted to draw China into the communist circle. This failed in 1927 when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ran the communists out of the country. Russia thereupon made a close study of the reasons for this. As a result of that study, it was decided that Chinese temperament objects to any kind of foreign control. Consequently, Russian missions to China were discontinued. In lieu thereof Chinese missions were brought to Moscow, there trained in communism, military tactics, and other subjects, and then returned to China to lead their own people. This method has had substantial success.

The defeat of the Kuomintang, or National Government, in nearly 20 years of warfare with the communists, may be summed up as due to:

1. Mass of Chinese are uninterested as to who wins the war. They are illiterate, do not know the difference between democracy and communism, and don't care. Will favor any party which promises to bring peace.
2. Military leadership of the Kuomintang or National Party has been atrocious, and contrary to the most elementary principles of war. Communist leadership has been sound.
3. Morale on Kuomintang side has been low. An enormous part of the supplies and munitions furnished by the United States has been corruptly disposed of. Senior generals have avoided fighting; have shown a desire to hold their positions with the pay and allowances granted. Now the Kuomintang is bankrupt, and the United States is no longer furnishing funds. Generals see no sense in continuing the war; are therefore withdrawing with possibility of installing themselves in some area where funds for pay, etc., can be extracted from the local inhabitants. Patriotism for their country seems to be almost completely absent.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

BURMA

General Situation. The complicated war between several parties, each fighting the others, continues. Combat groups in the field are:

1. The *Government,* which holds the capital — Rangoon — with seacoast and ports and most of the delta country. May have some 30,000 troops, well equipped, plus a small air force and a river navy.
2. The *Karens*, with capital at Toungoo, and holding much of the country between Rangoon and Mandalay. Forces are approximately equal to those of the Government, but without air or naval forces. Are seeking autonomy.
3. *Red Communists,* of uncertain strength, neither well equipped nor led. Desire the government to nationalize industry without compensation to owners, while the Government is committed to provide reasonable compensation.
4. *White Communists,* also of uncertain strength, claim to be the true representatives of Moscow with same program as the Reds. This group has liaison with communists in Yunnan, China, and Indo-China.
5. *Yellow Volunteers* is a smaller group which has seized the oil country about Yenang-yaung.
6. *White Volunteers,* another smaller group, which for the moment is friendly to the Government.

Main area of fighting is in the valleys and deltas of the Irrawaddy, Sittang, and Salween valleys. Due to the comparatively small forces employed, large sections are uninvolved in the war. However, as troops move around villages frequently pass under control of various combatants. Lines of communication are generally interrupted, and trade greatly interfered with. So far this year exports of rice have averaged about 100,000 tons a month, which is roughly one-half the usual amount.

Military Operations. At the beginning of March the Karens were besieging a Government force of about a brigade in Mandalay. Government relief forces coming from north reached Thazi on the 7th, with an advance guard 7 miles south of Mandalay. They were unable to proceed further. Joined by a detachment of Red Communists, the Karens captured Mandalay by a night attack 12/13 March. The Government garrison appears to have escaped and joined the relief column.

The Karens turned over Mandalay to the Red Communists, who thoroughly looted that city. The Karens themselves withdrew for other operations. The Government relief force had little opposition when they moved early in April, and, on the 5th, Mandalay was reoccupied. The Red Communists seemed to have moved east where, on 10 April, an invading force of 2,000 Chinese communists arrived at Kengtung, interrupting the line of communication between Burma and Indo-China.

Further south the Government has continued to besiege Insein. This is a town of 12,000, ¾ of whom are Karens. The garrison is 1,500 men and the attackers double that. Both sides have artillery and some armor; Government also has planes. Fighting at times has been severe, with moderate gains by the Government but with no decision. At the end of April a Karen relief force was moving south down the Sittang valley. At the end of the month, the leading elements had captured Nyaunglebin.

Political. Burma Premier Thakin Nu on 12 April arrived at New Delhi, India. He asked the Indian Premier Pandit Nehru to use his good offices to secure from the British a sizable loan and arms. Bait for the British is that the industries in Burma that are to be nationalized are nearly all British owned. Their only chance of compensation lies in the Government winning the war. Bait for India is that if the Burma Government wins, India will receive the rice she greatly needs to avert a famine.

MALAYA

There has been no change in the situation. A desultory guerrilla war continues.

INDO-CHINA

The stalemate in the war continues. French, with some 100,000 troops which

are needed in Europe, hold principal cities and the Chinese border. The Viet Nam, under the communist Ho Chi Minh, holds most of the interior of Tonkin, Anam, and Cochin-China.

On 8 March France issued a communiqué in Paris announcing that a treaty had been signed with Prince Bao Dai. This individual had been Emperor of Anam and had resigned shortly after the surrender of Japan. The terms of the treaty were not released, except that it provided that Bao Dai reassume command as Emperor of all three provinces in revolt, and that he then establish a democratic government within the French Empire. The Viet Nam immediately proclaimed that it would not accept Bao Dai. However, the latter proceeded to Indo-China, arriving on 26 April. What success he will have is anyone's guess.

INDONESIA

There has been considerable minor fighting in Java and Sumatra, with the Dutch having clearly the upper hand. On 1 March the United Nations Commission in Java cabled a report blaming the Netherlands for a deadlock in negotiations with the native Republicans, and claiming "a progressive deterioration of the situation." On the 10th the United States representative in the United Nations severely blamed the Dutch for non-compliance with previously issued United Nations directives as to cease firing and release of political prisoners.

Dutch explanation is that the Republican leaders in general had been collaborators with the Japanese, were communists, and were incompetent to maintain order among their own people. Consequently it had been impracticable to carry out UN directives. However, the Dutch were working on the problem, and expected shortly to reach an agreement by which the Republican political prisoners would be released and allowed to reassume control of their government, with the understanding that negotiations for a permanent peace would take place at The Hague, and would be attended by the aforementioned Republican leaders.

CROSS A RIVER AND GAIN AN EMPIRE!

By Jerome Kearful

BECAUSE Mexico refused to give up her claim to a small part of what is now southern Texas, the United States gained nearly 1,000,000 square miles of territory from her southern neighbor. This dispute over who owned the strip of barren land between the Rio Grande and the Nueces Rivers was the direct cause of the Mexican War, that gave us a quarter of a continent!

When the Texans under Sam Houston gained their independence from Mexico and set up the Republic of Texas, they claimed that the southern boundary of their territory was the Rio Grande. President Santa Ana of Mexico, while a prisoner of Texas, had negotiated the conclusion of his war with Texas on that basis. However, during the years of the Texas Republic, Mexico pushed her claim some miles northward to the Nueces.

The amount of land area involved was not large, and amounted to only a tiny fraction of the total area of Texas. But Texas would not think of giving up her sovereignty to any portion of the land that had been won by the heroes of the Alamo and the intrepid fighters of San Jacinto. Consequently, when, after many delays and political maneuvers, Texas finally became a state of the Union by annexation in 1845, the Rio Grande was claimed as the southern boundary by the Lone Star State.

Bad feeling between the United States and Mexico had been growing for some years, Although settlers from the States had voluntarily placed themselves under Mexican sovereignty when they moved to Texas, they retained their original kinship of blood and customs. Oppression and mistreatment of the Texans aroused the sympathy of many in the United States. The United States government had recognized the independence of Texas won at San Jacinto, an act which provoked the hostility of Mexico, that nation hoping, perhaps, to win back the lost province some day. Annexation widened the breach.

Nevertheless, cause for open war was lacking. But Mexico refused to recede from her claim that the Nueces River marked the southern boundary of Texas. Thereupon, President James K. Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor and an armed force to occupy the area between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. General Taylor encountered no opposition. Then, the Mexicans assembled their forces and attacked him. This fatal move eventually cost Mexico the entire Southwest and California as well, for President Polk now declared that war had begun by act of Mexico!

From the American viewpoint, the Mexican War was a series of brilliant victories by forces under Taylor and the distinguished General Winfield Scott. When the war was over, Mexico lost not only the disputed strip between the two Texas rivers, but also New Mexico, Arizona, and California. A river started a war that cost Mexico a huge price and won the United States a great prize!

ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

(If not listed, unsigned illustrations are from authors, by the Journal staff, or from special sources. Reference numbers are pages.)

U. S. Army, Cover, 103, 104, 105
Photo Sec., Dept. of Air Training, TAC. 100

Of making many books there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh.

— OLD TESTAMENT

But let not faith or purchases falter.

—[ED.]

Britain's Military Testament

THEIR FINEST HOUR (The Second World War, Volume II). By Winston S. Churchill. 751 pp. Houghton Mifflin Company. $6.00.

By Dr. R. A. Winnacker

"There was a white glow, overpowering, sublime, which ran through our island from end to end." "The nation was as sound as the sea is salt." "The factories poured out their weapons. . . . The whole trained professional British Army and its Territorial comrades drilled . . . and longed to meet the foe. The Home Guard overtopped the million mark, and when rifles were lacking grasped lustily the shotgun, the sporting rifle, the private pistol, or, when there was no firearm, the pike and the club." "Far out on the grey waters of the North Sea and the Channel . . . faithful eager flotillas peering through the night. High in the air soared the fighter pilots . . . This was a time when it was equally good to live or die."

Such is the story that Winston Churchill relates in the second volume of his World War II memoirs. It is the phase of the war and of his life of which he will always be proudest. The situation created by the fall of France and the threatened invasion of the British Isles was particularly suited to his genius and personality. To face the dangers ahead required unlimited courage, impatience and perseverance, unreasonable hope and unending drive. It was a time when his unique gift of speech with its apt and incisive phrase represented not merely great oratory but a powerful factor in the world struggle, as real and decisive as armies and navies. He could speak for the entire British people and at times for most that remained of the free world. Even more important, history proved him to be right.

Winston Churchill has every right to tell his story with justifiable pride, but to the reviewer this pride too frequently oversteps proper bounds. Despite occasional references to the British people, the book leaves the impression that the defense of Great Britain was a one-man job. The Prime Minister's colleagues appear as passive puppets, obediently following the master's directives. Military advisers seem generally dull and over-conservative and the civil service represents merely a hurdle to be jumped. Events and men are usually judged by the extent of their agreement with the Prime Minister's opinions rather than by the intrinsic merit of the case or person. The hundreds of memoranda penned by Churchill to his subordinates — filling nearly half of the book—reveal a blatant confidence in the writer's own judgment and a constant, irritating suspicion that the assigned tasks were inadequately administered. "Ambition, not so much for vulgar ends, but for fame, glints in every mind," says Churchill of others, but it applies to him as well.

And still, Winston Churchill was bound to dominate wherever he was. His frailties and his strength were and are inseparable. Moreover, despite and probably because of the author's shortcomings in generosity, the book is what we want it to be—a truthful and realistic account of how Churchill guided the British nation through the critical days from May until December 1940, when, as he says, "the British people held the fort alone till those who hitherto had been half blind were half ready."

Their Finest Hour is not intended to be a definitive history of the period. It is the personal record of one of the principal actors in the drama, but, because Winston Churchill wrote it, future authors will have to cite chapter and verse before contrary interpretations and opinions will be widely accepted. Such is the privilege of greatness.

The author was never noted for his reticence and in this volume he taunts his opponents and future historians with the same abandonment with which he defied the enemy. Already other participants have sharply challenged the Prime Minister's interpretation of the fall of France, and greater emphasis will undoubtedly be given to the inescapable fact that France's defeat in 1940 was in essence not a moral collapse, but a military disaster wrought by a superior military machine—a disaster which would have been suffered by the British Army as well. Similarly, the effect on the British evacuation of Hitler's order of May 24 to stop the German tank advance will remain as controversial as the question whether or not Hitler ever seriously intended to cross the Channel.

The book abounds with tantalizing problems of this type: The attack on the French fleet, that "hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful in which I have ever been concerned." The ill-starred Dakar expedition, in which Churchill, contrary to his usual practice, left the decision and much of the blame with the field commanders. The feasibility of Mediterranean convoys in 1940, one of the few issues on which the Prime Minister could not make his will prevail.

To the reader on this side of the Atlantic the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence will probably prove of greatest interest. Only Churchill's cables are given; Roosevelt's answers can only be surmised. Many of the letters

are truly inspired, though some of the wooing and the frequent warnings about the dire consequences of a British disaster seem out of character, especially when written by a man who prides himself on his knowledge of the American scene and people. In the final analysis, this correspondence will probably be accepted as one of the major elements in the winning of the war. "The chief business between our two countries was virtually conducted by these personal interchanges between him and me." Still, few students of government will assert that this novel procedure in foreign relations contributed to orderly administration.

A critical reading of this brilliant book is essential because both the theme and the style conspire to make the reader an unthinking, fervent disciple. And then again, why not? The miracle of Dunkerque did happen; 338,000 men were rescued in nine days. The back of Goering's air force was broken as "the few" took a two to one toll of the enemy. By the end of the year, this nation, only a few months ago on the verge of ruin, took the offensive as the Desert Rats outwitted the enemy in Egypt. "We had not flinched or wavered. We had not failed. The soul of the British people and race had proved invincible. The citadel of the Commonwealth and Empire could not be stormed. Alone, but upborne by every generous heartbeat of mankind, we had defied the tyrant in the height of his triumph." No one can deny that it was England's finest hour.

Our Opportunity in Asia

THE SITUATION IN ASIA. By Owen Lattimore. Little Brown. 238 pages plus index. $2.75.

By Alan L. Otten

"Asia is out of control," reads the opening sentence. For the next 238 brilliant, cogent, important pages, Owen Lattimore tells what this means to the U.S. and what the U.S. must do to turn this situation to our own advantage and the advantage of world peace and progress.

Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins, Lattimore has an outstanding reputation as an authority on the Far East and Asia. He spent much of his early life in the Orient as a businessman, reporter, and researcher. In 1933 he became editor of *Pacific Affairs*. He was for a time personal political advisor to Chiang Kai-shek, Deputy Director of OWI in charge of Pacific operations, and a member of the first American post-war mission to Japan to study reparations.

In 1945, he wrote another small, fine book—*Solution in Asia*. In it he said, among other things, that we would be sorry if our fear of change led us to support governments in Asia that did not have popular support. The current volume takes up where the 1945 volume left off.

The fact that Asia is out of control means simply that we can't lay down the law there any more (Mr. Lattimore says). Revolution and nationalism are the two key forces there now, with nationalism far and away the most potent — the need for complete independence, independence of Russia as well as of the U.S. If we can't make Asia do what we want, we must make her strong enough to follow her nationalistic bent and refuse to do what Russia wants.

This will be an immediate advance because, in large areas of Asia, Russia now has the upper hand, due to geographic and other advantages. It also will be the start of a vital new long-term policy of building "third countries" which are neither in the American camp nor the Soviet camp but which form rather a third quotient of power, maintaining the peace and awakening similar movements in Africa, Latin America, and even Western Europe.

We put too much stress on Japan, Mr. Lattimore believes. Asia no longer will go as Japan does, but rather Japan will go as Asia does. Mr. Lattimore doubts that the victory of the Chinese Communists means the Kremlin will take over China—he banks on Chinese nationalism to prevent this. We must not, however, repeat previous errors, he warns, and attempt to punish the Chinese for having a Communist government. Rather we must accept the Communist government as the official government and permit Chinese nationalism to assert itself as the antidote to Communism.

"Nationalism is the only bedrock on

which a political structure can be built in China—or anywhere else in Asia—today," he declares. "If we are as quick as the Russians and the Communists of Asia are to build on that bedrock, then the new political structures that are being built in China and all over Asia will incorporate many features of capitalism, private enterprise and political democracy in their "third country" architectural design. If the Russians and the Communists continue to keep ahead of us in accepting Asia on its own terms, there will be more socialism in the superstructure."

Mr. Lattimore cautions on the need to work through the United Nations. Among other things, he recommends that we suggest that Marshall Plan countries stop using our money for military purposes in Asia and start using it for economic development there. He supports the Truman program for helping underdeveloped areas, but warns that we must not make our aid to any country contingent on its being hostile to Russia, because such a policy will only create resentment. He believes that we should expand American private business activities in Asia, but without special favors or guarantees against risk, and that we should build up the independent businesses of Asia by permitting Asiatic countries to use protective tariffs. Finally, we must abandon Japan and South Korea, which cannot be of any lasting military value, and retire to our natural defenses of the various Pacific Islands and Alaska.

If any recent volume on Asia is required reading for expert and casual reader alike, this is it.

Military Estimate of Russia

SOVIET ARMS AND SOVIET POWER. By General Augustin Guillaume, French Army. 212 pp. Infantry Journal Press. $3.50.

By Colonel Conrad H. Lanza

As a noted leader of Free French troops during World War II, former Military Attache of the French Embassy to the Soviet Union and present commander of French troops in Germany, General Guillaume is well qualified to do an analysis of the Soviet military machine. He first presents a brief and general account of the war in Russia during World War II. The German plan to attack, and the Russian plan to withdraw for later counterattack, are described. Hitler and Stalin are credited as dominant leaders for their respective countries. Then comes a description of the war which does not go below the army level. This is one of the best short accounts of the terrific campaigns which occurred from 1941 to 1945.

An analysis is given of Russian war production. Russia is reported as having increased her output of motor vehicles from 189,000 in 1941 to 500,000 in 1945, exclusive of 385,883 trucks received during the 4-year period from Lend-Lease. The average artillery production during the war was annually 120,000 guns and 100,000 mortars. Since Russian population was about three times that of Germany, Russia by 1943 had twice as many divisions as her enemy. This proportion increased in favor of Russia during succeeding years. Such figures go far to show how Russia overcame Germany.

Tactics of ground, air and naval forces are discussed in separate chapters. There were marked differences compared with American practice. Marshal Stalin, who directed about everything, considered the artillery as the main arm. His artillery divisions contained over 300 guns. These were under control of army groups or armies for use at the decisive moment and place, where they had a powerful and sometimes decisive effect. The major mission of the air force was support of ground troops by reconnaissance, direct fire and bombing. Assigning planes for strategic bombing was exceptional. A partial reason for this was certainly the British - American strategic bombing, which was so thorough that no aid from Russia was required.

General Guillaume discusses the Russian claim that the Allies failed to create a front in West Europe during 1942 and 1943, when Russia desperately needed it. As a French officer, General Guillaume counters with the question: why did Russia fail to open a front in the east during 1940 when France desperately needed it?

The Allies were not inactive during the years 1942 and 1943. They created fronts in North Africa and in Italy, which engaged a sizable number of German divisions and resources. The

incessant bombing of Germany forced that country to withdraw from the Russian front a large part of her air force, so that control of the air passed to Russia. Russia has admitted this aid but has consistently belittled it.

Excepting the chapter on pre-war preparations and planning, there is little documentation. Russian sources seem to have been consulted as well as German sources to a limited extent. The book is packed with information. It will be most valuable for a general orientation of nearly four years of incessant fighting.

Curtain Raiser

PROWLING RUSSIA'S FORBIDDEN ZONE. By Werner Knop. 200 pages. Knopf. $2.75.

By Alan L. Otten

Werner Knop, German-born British citizen and economist, and writer on foreign affairs, smuggled himself into the Russian zone in Germany, traveled around there for several weeks, then came back to America to write a series of articles for the *Saturday Evening Post* and rewrite them into this book. The book's jacket describes it as "the first eyewitness testimony on what the Russians are doing with Soviet Germany—a reporter's scoop obtained at the risk of his life." Unfortunately, the material in the book is hardly worth Mr. Knop risking his life to get. Mr. Knop tells us little we did not already know from correspondents who made official "guided" tours of the Soviet zone, and from the many refugees who flee into the Anglo-Saxon zone from eastern Germany.

The book reports that the people in the Russian zone are poorly clad, fed, and serviced and are terrified of the authorities, that industrial plants have been stripped for the benefit of Russia, that the Russians are carrying on powerful anti-American propaganda, that they are enlisting the support of practically anyone, even former Nazis, that they are shipping large quantities of pitchblende to Russia from the Erzgebirge uranium mines. But we knew all this. And the book suffers badly from the obvious extreme anti-Soviet bias of the author. Are things really so much better in the Anglo-American zone? Are the virtues of Bizonia currency reform as great as Mr. Knop claims? Is our record on denazification or the British record on reparations so much better? Is the ignorance of the Russian GI about America so much greater than that of the American GI about Russia?

The most valuable part of the book is undoubtedly the conclusion, but here again, everything has been said before. Mr. Knop says the Soviet Union will undoubtedly attempt to induce the U. S. and Britain to withdraw from Germany, but that it would be a tragic mistake for us to do so. Soviet efforts to gain this end will be intensified now that the Soviet zone has ceased being a land of milk and honey for the Russians and has instead become a burden to support and administer. But the Soviets are well aware that control of Germany is control of Europe, will keep up the battle, and will never get out unless they are sure a Communist regime will take over united Germany. We must also realize the strategic importance of Germany, Mr. Knop states, and must keep our frontier on the Elbe.

Air Power and Ground Forces

STRATEGIC AIR POWER. By Stefan T. Possony. 308 pages. Index. Infantry Journal Press. $5.00.

By Robert F. Cocklin

Strategic Air Power is a thoroughgoing study of the role of air power within the general framework of national defense. It is written by a well-qualified author who is now a professor at Georgetown University. This volume in no way qualifies for classification as entertainment reading. It is a serious discussion of the capabilities and limitations in the strategic use of air power, and as such appears to be top-notch.

Professor Possony has handled his subject matter in such a manner as to preclude much argument. His facts are logically arranged and the questions which are presented are completely answered. The book abounds in footnote references and the index enhances its value as a text or reference.

As a ground soldier, this reviewer was instantly attracted to a chapter entitled, "Should the Army Be Abolished?" With breathless anticipation we hurried through it and were much relieved to find that his answer was a definite NO—and the Air Force would

have a difficult time refuting his reasons why.

This is not the sort of thing that one can handily read in the accepted sense. The author is in a good position, for few lay readers, including this reviewer, are sufficiently well-versed in the strategical strata in which he travels, to contest his conclusions.

Official Combat History

OKINAW A: THE LAST BATTLE. By Historical Division, Department of the Army. Illustrated, 529 pages. U. S. Government Printing Office, $6.00.

By Brig Gen. William S. Lawton

Okinawa: The Last Battle is the third volume to be published in the series *The United States Army in World War II,* and is the first operational account. It concerns one of the most costly and bitterly fought campaigns of the entire Pacific war, in which the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Navy all played a highly vital part. The Army has done anything but soft-pedal the contributions of the other services, and, in attempting to make its discussion of the campaign as objective as possible, has treated the actions of the Marine Corps units attached to Tenth Army in considerable detail, at the same time giving the Navy the considerable credit it deserves.

This series is not an attempt at definitive history, but rather a setting forth in detail of the problems faced and their solutions, the mistakes made and successes achieved. The object is a work of reference for soldier and citizen alike, as well as a record of achievement.

A distinct characteristic of this volume, as of other works on Pacific campaigns, is that tactical action is treated on a much lower level than is possible in the broad sweep of great distances and large forces in the European theaters. Here, the action becomes so compressed as to bring into sharp focus actions of units down to and including platoons. In this aspect, it gives a truly personal viewpoint, as only war can be personal.

Okinawa was written by four U. S. Army historians who took part in the campaign, writing as the fighting progressed, thus detailing important particulars, often the "WHY" behind the tactical decision that is seldom to be found in the documentary record. Many otherwise unknown details of small - unit actions were recorded through personal interview with key participants before time could dull their memories. Thus history has gained much.

This volume reaches the same high level of achievement as its predecessors. As the initial volume dealing with operations—the first two were organizational—it presages a realistic and objective presentation of warfare in World War II to follow from the expert pens of the professional chroniclers of the Department of the Army.

Bitter Lessons of Bataan

BATAAN UNCENSORED. By Col. E. B. Miller (Long Prairie, Minn., 1949), 403 pp.

By Dr Louis Morton

Bataan Uncensored is a book full of anger and pride, anger against the American people, the Army "brass," and the Japanese; pride in the author's outfit and pride in the American and Philippine soldier. Perhaps no man who has not served through four months of the hell of Bataan and almost four years of starvation and humiliation as a Japanese prisoner of war has the right to question such anger. It is a sincere and honest anger, and although it is misdirected at times, the total effect is a strong argument for the cause of preparedness.

Col. E. B. Miller, of Brainerd, Minnesota, was a major, with service in Mexico and World War I, commanding a National Guard tank unit, when he entered federal service in February 1941. He soon became commanding officer of the 194th Tank Battalion when it organized at Fort Lewis, and in September 1941 his outfit reached the Philippines. The struggles of the 194th Tank Battalion to secure supplies and to make ready for the coming emergency is dramatically told. Colonel Miller's account of his unit's participation in the withdrawal to Bataan, the action at Calumpit Bridge, and the battle of Bataan, is a testimony to that organization, and is, in many ways, the most valuable portion of the book.

The last half of the book deals with life in a prison camp. This story has been told before, but it is worth retelling

by so eloquent a writer. The reader becomes vividly aware of the importance of many things he has always taken for granted,—freedom, privacy, personal dignity, tobacco. But above everything else, Colonel Miller stresses the importance of food to the Japanese prisoner of war, and the terror of starvation. And he wants the American people to appreciate what they have.

This book asks many questions and raises more: Why did MacArthur believe there would be no war until April 1, 1942? Why were the American planes lined up at Clark Field on December 8? Why wasn't the *Orange* plan put into effect until December 23d when it was too late to get all the food and supplies over to Bataan? Why were not the necessary reinforcements sent to the Philippines? Colonel Miller essays answers to some of these questions; others, the historian who searches the files and talks to survivors can answer. But the answers to all of them will probably never be known. It is books such as this that will make it possible to tell the full story of America's greatest military defeat.

Bataan Uncensored is recommended reading for "tankers," for regular Army officers (who want to know how a National Guard officer thinks and feels), for the "brass" who are so bitterly (and frequently unjustly) accused, but, most of all, for the American people whose apathy and shortsightedness made this book possible.

Outstanding Military Leaders

ELEVEN GENERALS. Studies in American Command. By Fletcher Pratt, 355 pages. William Sloane Associates, $5.00.

By Robert F. Cocklin

Fletcher Pratt has brought together a highly entertaining and interesting series of sketches of eleven American military leaders. Their periods of service run the gamut of American history from the Revolutionary War through World War II. We are relatively well acquainted with a few of these figures: i.e., Bradley and Vander-grift of World War II; Buford and Sheridan from the Civil War; and Nathaniel Greene and Anthony Wayne of the Revolutionary period. The other five are almost unknowns in the field of military history, although one of them, George H. Thomas, the "Rock of Chickamauga," was accorded the unique honor of having two of his biographies published simultaneously last year, some 80 years after his service. But how many of us are familiar with the exploits of Jacob Brown, Richard Mentor Johnson, James Harrison Wilson, or Charles Pelot Summerall? Students of military history may have uncovered some information concerning them, but by and large, they have been sadly neglected until these portraits by Pratt.

While no attempt is made to weld these sketches into the framework of a single story, the presentation of them between the covers of the same book automatically invites comparison of personalities, tactics and techniques. They are similar in some respects. All of them were actual battle-leaders. What is more, they were "doers" with an aggressive approach to their problems. In his preface, Author Pratt contends that there are other similarities in their basic strategies and tactics. However, some of these are open to argument. For example, Pratt attributes a degree of "amateurism" to all of these commanders, pointing out that even those among them who were professional soldiers were skyrocketed to their high commands in the press of war, without a great deal of previous experience in handling large bodies of troops. Quite true, but the same thing applies to almost every commander in our military history, not just to these few selected for these sketches. Likewise, he attributes to these eleven generals a firm and unshaken belief in the value of aimed fire or, if you will, the doughboy sighting and shooting his rifle. Again, this has been true of most of our military commanders with the possible exception of George Patton and some of the other Armored or Cavalry enthusiasts, and, of course, the "air can do it alone" boys who gained some following, particularly during the last war. But by and large, the infantry has never had its title of "Queen of Battle" seriously challenged when the chips were down. To pursue this particular point one step further, Mr. Pratt finds himself at odds with some of us artillerymen who want to go on believing that George H. Thomas and Charles P. Summerall regarded the artillery as of equal importance

with the infantry; as a matter of fact, their sketches seem to bear this out.

These differences of opinion are confined only to the author's preface, and are in no sense to be construed as reflecting in any way on the excellence of the sketches themselves. Fletcher Pratt is one of our foremost military historians. What is more, he imparts his history in a style that is vividly clear and highly readable. These sketches, which were originally published in various service journals over a period of ten years, rank high among his other numerous works and do not need any prefacing apologies or justification for bringing them together in one volume.

Readers will vary in their choices for the best of these sketches. This reviewer leaned towards those on Jacob Brown and "Little Phil" Sheridan. While professing a genuine admiration for George Thomas and the skill with which Pratt has handled him, a recent reading of a fuller biography took the edge off this one. There's really not much to choose between them, for as this is written, it is difficult to pass over the story of Richard Mentor Johnson, the man who took short leaves from Congress two different times to organize mounted units that were outstandingly successful in defeating Tecumseh and lifting the siege of Fort Wayne. Bradley and Vandergrift are well-drawn, but again their sketches suffer, not from the handling, but from the relative familiarity of present-day readers with their careers and campaigns.

These studies in American command belong in the library of every military man and, for that matter, of anyone who is interested in history.

Hypothetical World War III

IF RUSSIA STRIKES. By George Fielding Eliot. 252 pps. Bobbs-Merrill Co. $2.75.

By Colonel Conrad H. Lanza

Major Eliot believes that Russia may well strike during 1949. If she does not attack, her chances of success in aggressive warfare will decrease, at least until 1952. The author assumes that Russia will launch simultaneous offensives, against:

a. West Europe north of Switzerland (no attack to the south);
b. Turkey, from both Bulgaria and the Caucasus;
c. Persian Gulf oil fields;
d. North Norway, to secure ports;
e. Alaska.

He feels that Russia could gain all these objectives within a few weeks.

American counterattack, acording to Eliot, should be an atomic bombing. The United States has sufficient long-range bombers to destroy all Russian great cities and war industries within 30 to 90 days. The author does not think that Russia could interdict our bombers flying at altitudes of 30,000 to 35,000 feet. Attack and counterattack are discussed at length.

If no war occurs until 1952, and if by that time Russia is about to have atomic bombs, the author recommends that an ultimatum be delivered to require that Russia place her atomic bomb production under control of the United Nations—the United States presumably to do the same—with the alternative of an immediate all - out atomic bomb attack against Russia. No general offensive against Russia is believed necessary. Under atomic bombing the author thinks Russia will disintegrate due to annihilation of her government, destruction of war supplies with impossibility of replacing them, and extraordinary loss of life—the latter considered deplorable but necessary. Russian armies in the field may hold out until their ammunition is exhausted and will then succumb.

This account is highly hypothetical. Perhaps from the Russian point of view some year later than 1949 might be preferable for war, if that move is intended. Neither is it certain that atomic bombing from high altitudes is sure to succeed against modern defense.

Whether we accept the conclusions presented, this book gives much interesting information. It outlines what World War III might be like. It is well worth reading.

Fraud on Fraud

TITO: THE HISTORY OF A FRAUD. By David Martin. 360 pages. Prentice-Hall, $2.00.

by Alan Otten

In 1946, David Martin, a Canadian-American journalist, published "Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich." Martin was

(*Continued on page* 144)

BOOKS IN COLUMN

By MAJOR N. L. DRUMMOND, JR., FA

Several effective books have recently analyzed scientific, political and economic aspects of the atomic bomb: David Bradley's *No Place to Hide*, P. M. S. Blackett's *Fear, War and the Bomb*, Fritz Sternberg's *Living With Crisis*; now Dr. R. E. Lapp. American authority on atomic energy, presents a short, readable volume which concentrates on military angles of the atom—*Must We Hide* (Addison-Wesley — $3.00). His book casts a great deal of cogent common sense over an area frequently fogged with fantasy. He succinctly clarifies the present potency and the less-publicized limitations of atomic blast effect and radiation. as established by theory and by application in Japan and the Bikini-Eniwetok tests. These factors he effectively applies to the United States' current and immediate future problems in view of possible war and people's confused pessimism concerning atomic unknowns. Lapp's basic thesis is threefold — our people need more information on atomic matters in order to react with courage rather than apathy or panic: atomic bombs and guided missiles have simply modified World War II warfare; although we are strong offensively, our concentrated industry and skyscraper cities leave us dangerously vulnerable in defense. His arguments are objective and convincing, with reasonably hopeful solutions advanced. He believes we have sufficient years to correct gradually our exposed concentrations of population and industry, if we begin now a voluntary but government-subsidized dispersal of urban centers. Cost would be moderate compared to presently necessary military expenditures and would bring an immediate return in healthier living conditions for our growing population. Dr. Lapp has selected and organized his material well, to form a stimulating and important book.

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Two recent war novels are extremely minor and remarkably blind adherents of the "goddam Army" school. *The Freebooters* by Robert Wernick (Scribners—$3.00) traces the malfunctioning of a small special and superfluous intelligence unit through rear areas of the E.T.O.: *They Never Had It So Good* by Joseph Gies (Harper—$2.75) is a sad rather than snappy saga of the black market—also E.T.O. Both books contain all the carping and none of the power of Norman Mailer's *The Naked and The Dead*. Their unrelieved stuff of incompetent, power-mad commanders, selfish. cowardly junior officers, brutal sergeants and MP's, soliders who are either shrewdly crooked operators or just dumb, all seems pretty shop-worn by now. In such a monotone it becomes caricature rather than characterization — naive and tiresome to boot. Most of us long ago made the great discovery that the Army has its share of human frailties; Wernick and Gies are fortunate in that our citizen-army which fought its splendid share of World War II had no general resemblance to their fictional attempts, otherwise Hitler would now be using the White House for weekend jaunts and the authors would probably not be writing for a living.

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Along with the crop of California centenary beards, 1949 has produced a group of handsome and interesting volumes to commemorate the days of the '49-ers. Since Gold Rush fever reached nearly every community of the United States 100 years ago and now forms a national tradition, current citizens of California should hardly monopolize interest in these books. Best pictorially and in text is *Gold Rush Album*, edited by Joseph Henry Jackson (Scribner's—$10.00), a panorama of the entire westward surge presented through 230 pages of contemporary illustrations with interwoven narrative. The epic quality of the gold trek over snow-clogged mountain passes and across apparently limitless deserts, boisterous life of the camps, human courage, humor, bitterness and tragedy are all caught dramatically. *Sea Routes to the Gold Fields* by Oscar Lewis (Knopf—$4.00) concentrates on those thousands who migrated via the tiny, slow and incredibly crowded sailing vessels or early steamers, which meant months of torturous travel around South America or a fever-ridden isthmian crossing at Panama or Nicaragua. Even the holds of World War II Pacific troop transports seem luxurious by comparison. Excerpts from diaries and interconnecting narrative form often exciting, usually humorous, sometimes tragic tales of the greatest single American exodus. A third book is *Gold Rush* (Columbia University Press—$10.00), more suited to the Americana enthusiast, for whom G. W. Reed and Ruth Gaines have effectively edited and arranged the journals and drawings of J. Golds, borough Bruff, noted leader of overland gold seekers from '49 to '51.

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For desultory but enjoyable and stimulating summer reading it would be

hard to conceive a better book than Louis Biancolli's *Great Conversations* (Simon & Schuster—$5.00). A striking assembly of the western world's greatest historical figures is presented in authentically recorded dialogues of high interest and drama. Biographical sketches accompany each of the well selected scenes, most of which are informal and intimate. Good talk ranks high among life's pleasures and here the reader, guided by a first-rate index, can wander from age to age, joining one group after another of history's most outstanding conversationalists.

• •

Ex-Senator Hiram Bingham's *Lost City of the Incas* (Duell. Sloan & Pearce —$5.00) is a story of fascination for any who value the ancient traditions of our western hemisphere. The book combines narrative drama of exploration with archeological scientific lore and the nostalgia of long crumbled glory. An effective summary of Peru's Inca history combines with a recent day tale of challenge and discovery; Bingham's practical saga of trekking over 15,000-foot-high mountain passes and the next day through tropical jungles, finally discovering magnificent remnants of a great city long unknown to civilized man, is a scientific adventure tale of the highest order.

The Incas had created unsurpassed examples of stone architecture on a narrow mountain ridge above sheer cliffs of more than 5,000 feet. This citadel the Spanish Conquistadors, avid for gold and blood, never reached. Illustrated with striking photographs which display the unforgettable splendor of a once-vital American dynasty.

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File Closers

Briton Hadden by Noel F. Busch (Farrar-Straus—$3.00), a highly-paced, deft, though surface treatment of the meteoric career of *Time* magazine's cofounder. Hadden died at 31, after having established what is now a $130 million corporation and a revolutionary step in journalism.

Fishing in Troubled Waters by W. *M. Chapman* (Lippincott—$3.00), the tale of a unique wartime assignment during which the author and several fellow scientists cruised the Solomon Islands under government orders to test the practicality of establishing fisheries there. Independent cruising, fishing, ocean exploration and varied native life, combined under constant danger of being sunk by friend or foe.

The Affairs of Dame Rumor by D. J. *Jacobson* (Rinchart—$5.00), a thorough and effective analysis of rumors and their psychological effects upon human beings, with engrossing narrative survey of various types of idle or malicious rumormongering in the past few decades — influencing Presidential campaigns, promoting inferior merchandise and worthless stock, sparking prejudice and mass hysteria — and a treatment of rumor methods applied to directed military and political propaganda.

Hound Dog Man by Fred Gipson (Harper Bros—$2.50), a fine flavor of Mark Twain in this short deft novel of two boys on a Texas coon hunt with their hero, a footloose woodsman and trapper who fashions an irresistible set for coons or women. Fine back-country tale for men or boys.

Stewart H. Holbrook ably explores the field of unusual Americana again in *Little Annie Oakley and Other Rugged People* (Macmillan — $3.50). Interesting and usually amusing facts to recreate forgotten legends, or the startling truth about events and personalities which today are remembered well but definitely not wisely.

Federal Prose (U. of N. Carolina Press—$1.25) is a small, heavily booby-trapped booklet set up by James R. Masterson and Wendell B. Phillips to blast one of the most deeply ingrained tendencies of Washington bureaucracy. The thousands who have suffered through long-winded government directives should gain as much release reading this as did the authors in writing it.

Homer Croy, in *What Grandpa Laughed At* (Duell, Sloan & Pearce—$2.75), traces the development of basic American humor from 1890 to World War I. The interwoven history is better than the humor.

Gamesmanship by Stephen Potter (Holt—$2.50) is an eminently practical bit of British whimsy on "The art of winning games without actually cheating"—but without any other psychological or physical holds barred.

American Sporting Dogs (Van Nostrand—$7.50), a masterful and handsome volume edited by Eugene V. Connett, features an impressive list of expert contributors who emphasize breeding and field trial work. Fine illustrations.

Islands to Windward by Carleton Mitchell (Van Nostrand—$12.50) presents an interesting account of a leisurely sailing cruise through the Caribbean islands. Splendid illustrations in color and black and white help make an unusually attractive volume for all who sail on sea or lake or simply in imagination from a fireside chair.

(*Continued from page* 142)

secretary of the Committee for a Fair Trial for Mihailovich, and his book was a burning indictment of the Tito regime and how it came to power. In well-documented detail, Martin developed his thesis that Mihailovich was the defender of a free, peasant Yugoslavia, in the democratic orbit, while Tito was a Soviet-stooge dictator. He charged that America and Britain had sold out their natural ally, Mihailovich, and had installed Tito for the Russians chiefly out of a mistaken fear that any opposition to the Soviet plans for the Balkans might lead Stalin to a separate peace with Germany. Now, he said, we would pay for selling out our ally.

Planning to capitalize on Tito's recent fall from Kremlin grace, the publishers have slapped a new jacket on the book, with the title: "Tito: The History of a Fraud," and have started to plug it all over again. The inside of the book is not changed one whit. As in 1946, it is still valuable in setting the record right between Mihailovich and Tito. But, claims of the publishers to the contrary, it certainly does not give much background for understanding the present crisis. In fact, quite the opposite—for Martin's entire point is that Tito was a Soviet stooge and we were foolish to support him.

Revision of "Company Bible"

COMPANY ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL RECORDS. By Colonel C. M. Virtue. The Military Service Publishing Company. Sixteenth Edition. 374 pages. $2.50.

By Richard Corgon McCloskey

Virtue's *Company Administration* is a hardened old campaigner in the military book business. Published originally in the middle thirties (I believe), it has kept on selling and selling and selling, and being used by countless thousands of company clerks and company officers. Like a dictionary, it is dull and accurate, and of great value.

This short notice is designed to bring to our readers' attention the fact that a recently revised edition presents in clear and complete detail all changes in company administrative proceedure in effect by September 1948.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

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