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JULY-AUGUST 1949

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The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

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The
UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

Orgamized June 7, 1910

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The Field Artillery Journal is not a medium for the dissemination of Department of the Army doctrine or administrative directives. Contributors alone are responsible for opinions expressed and conclusions reached in published articles. Consistent with the objects of our Association, however, The Field Artillery Journal seeks to provide a meeting ground for the free expression of artillery ideas in the changing present.

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The FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

VOL. 39 **JULY-AUGUST, 1949** **No. 4**

- Cover: The rugged Andean terrain of Chile's Norte Chico.

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CHILEAN ARTILLERY

By Major O. M. Doerflinger, FA

CHILEAN Artillerymen are professional virtuosos. They and their methods have been evolved as products of Chilean land and geography, which are among the most diversified on earth. The Republic of Chile, extending down the west coast of South America for some 2,600 miles, with an average width of approximately 120 miles, includes great deserts in the north more arid than the Sahara, the highest mountain range in the western hemisphere, rising abruptly from sea level to 23,000 feet, an austral region of forests, fiords, and glaciers, and a coastline of more than 6,000 miles. If superimposed upon the map of North America, parallel for parallel, Chile would extend from Ketchican, Alaska, to south of Mexico City. This presents the artilleryman with something of a terrain problem. It requires a maximum versatility in tactics and technique, superior physical conditioning, and unusual ingenuity. Though the Chilean gunner knows, admires, and employs the truck-drawn 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers, he still cannot forget the horse-drawn 75 or the mule-borne pack howitzer. In the high Andes the mountain battery is still a going concern.

The artilleryman of northern Chile, living, training, and maneuvering in that desolate but nitrate- and copper-rich region which comprises the provinces of Tarapaca, Antofagasta, and Atacama, is faced with problems common to desert troops throughout the world. He contends with heat, aridity, and sparse, intermittent springs and watercourses so charged with saline content as to be normally unfit for drinking. Natural fodder for draught animals is virtually nonexistent. Roads are scarce and semi-improved but of uniform year-around serviceability, since rainfalls in the northern desert may be separated by four-year intervals. Two

The intensely cultivated Contral Valley lies between the Andes and the Coast Range



The south contral region is characterized by lakes, rich farmland, and wooded hills

railroad lines climb northeastward into the Bolivian altiplano, but these serve only for arterial transportation. The desert surface itself is characterized by dunes, shifting sand, dry lakes, and, most commonly, by mile upon mile of packed sand covered with gravel and sharp rocks. Although these surfaces are extremely hard upon tires, basic trafficability depends upon contour rather than upon surface materials. Grades present major obstacles, since the desert drops into the Pacific in sheer cliffs and escarpments while the entire coastal plain sweeps upward to Andean peaks and a great plateau averaging 13,000 feet in elevation.

Despite the forbidding natural qualities of these and adjoining regions of Peru and Bolivia, they are no novelty to Chilean campaigners. Here, in the wars of independence, forces under the command of O'Higgins, Cochrane, and San Martin operated overland and in amphibious operations against the Spaniards and loyalists, while in the War of the Pacific, 1879-83, Chilean forces defeated the combined arms of Peru and Bolivia, finally terminating the struggle with the capture of Lima itself. Today the ports of Arica, Iquique, and Antofagasta and the oasis city of Calama all include artillery units as permanent elements of the garrison. That garrison is prepared to defend an area which during World War II produced approximately 20% of the Allies' copper.

South of the great desert and between the valleys of the Turbio and La Ligua Rivers lies a rugged area cut by transverse valleys and, from the air, suggestive of a choppy sea tossed irregularly by conflicting winds and currents. Here vegetation increases proportionately with the greater frequency of watercourses, but the progress of wheeled traffic is largely canalized to established routes which wind tortuously through deep defiles and over misty mountain ridges. Road marching requires the greatest skill on the part of drivers, and selection of position demands specialized training in terrain appreciation. None the less this so-called Norte Chico is garrisoned by gunners of the 2nd Field Artillery, a regiment of proud tradition which numbers among its assigned reserve officers Captain Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, dynamic President of the Republic.

Central Chile with its rich acres of vineyard, grain, orchards, garden produce, and grazing land stretches to north and south of Santiago and Valparaiso and presents less of a problem to the tactician. Operations may be conducted on what appears to the North American a more normal basis, with horse- and truck-drawn units supporting infantry in a standard triangular organization. Even here, however, the towering Andes stand as a barrier to the east, traversed by passes, all of which reach an altitude of at least 12,000 feet. Units operating in the area must not only be thoroughly familiar with the requirements of mountain warfare but also are expected to have the support of Andean Scouts, "baqueanos," raised in the Cordillera, who know trails, moraines, and snowfields virtually by instinct and are said to smell a change in the weather.

Chile's Field Artillery School is situated in the town of Linares, south of Santiago, where the Central Valley begins

to assume the characteristics of a damp, forested region, whose mountain lakes give rise to streams unsurpassed for their fighting stock of brown, rainbow, and salmon trout. Colonel Ernesto Medina Parker, Director of the Artillery School, served during 1946-7 as Military Attaché in the United States and is intimately familiar with American artillery doctrine and technique. The school is rigorously conducted on high professional standards, and developments evolved during World War II, as well as those since proven at Fort Sill, are stressed in the curricula as far as the limitations of Chilean equipment permit. The efforts of Colonel Medina, backed by Brigadier General Milciades Contreras, who succeeded him in Washington and now holds the post of Inspector of Artillery and Armored Units, has given a strong impulse to American training doctrine in Chile. All graduates of the Chilean Military Academy selected for artillery must complete the advanced course before promotion to field grade. In addition, enlisted men's courses prepare key personnel for specialists' assignments.

The Central Valley vanishes into the sea at Puerto Montt, where the Gulf of Ancud indents the west coast of South America. South of that point Austral Chile stretches for more than a thousand miles of imperfectly known terrain, made up of uncounted islands, fiords cut deep by wind and sea into the descending Andean slopes, glaciers sliding imperceptibly into cold antarctic currents, windswept reaches of Patagonian Pampa and, finally, the barren wastes and rocky headlands of Tierra del Fuego. Chile is keenly conscious that should some future conflict interrupt passage through the Panama Canal, maritime traffic between Atlantic and Pacific must again seek the old established routes around Cape Horn, through the Beagle Channel or via the Straits of Magellan. Control of the latter two passages may be strengthened by field guns emplaced along the narrows, a coast artillery mission which Chilean gunners visualize as part of their contribution to coordinated hemisphere defense. As motorized, horse-drawn, horse, pack, mountain, desert, and coast artillerymen, Chile's redlegs fill a respected role in the nation's plan for peace, integrity, and security.



Dry washes in typical northern Chile terrain

EXERCISE TARHEEL

By Capt. Harry H. Pritchett, GSC

EXERCISE TARHEEL was conducted on the Fort Bragg-Camp Mackall reservations under the direction of Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge from 18 April to 18 May and consisted of a series of training exercises. Major units participating were the 82nd Airborne Division, 3d Cavalry Regiment, 758th Heavy Tank Battalion, 73d Heavy Tank Battalion, Hq. V Corps, and Air Task Force Eagle. The exercise was conducted in two phases with the first phase, lasting three weeks, devoted to regimental and battalion problems; the second phase consisted of a one-week task-force exercise by Task Force Victor. Task Force Victor consisted of the above units less the 3d Cavalry Regiment. Troops assembled at Camp Mackall to participate in intensive unit training away from post administration and exterior commitments, with supplies based at Camp Mackall, thus giving service personnel the opportunity to break away from their normal routine at Bragg and to operate field installations.

The three weeks of small-unit training were organized so that each battalion participated in one battalion combat team in the approach-march problem, one battalion combat team in the day-light-attack problem, one battalion combat team in the night-attack problem, and two battalion combat team defense problems. Each regiment conducted four regimental combat team attack problems, including one three-day exercise. The Aggressor details for these problems were furnished by A, B, C, E, and F companies of the 3d Cavalry Regiment, who performed their tasks in an excellent manner despite difficult maintenance problems. These battalion and regimental problems were among the most realistic ever conducted, and incorporated the lessons learned in last year's Exercise Assembly.

An officer umpire was assigned to each rifle and tank platoon for all problems, thus insuring adequate umpire control in most situations. The umpire group consisted of reserve officers on active duty, who received a three-week course in umpiring and infantry tactics prior to the troops' departure for Camp Mackall. Battlefield coordination with Aggressor was effected by placing the assistant battalion umpire with Aggressor, so that the US battalion umpire was always in contact by radio with the the exact situation. Of course, tactical commanders were not given the benefit of the umpires' knowledge of the enemy situation. Artillery and mortar fires were realistically presented by umpire fire-marking details marking both HE and smoke fires. When a fire mission was called for by either side, the request was processed through the fire-direction center to the umpire fire-marking center, where a fire marker was dispatched by radio to the impact area and fires were marked on the ground by demolitions and smoke. Each fire marker rode in a radio jeep whose exact location was kept plotted on a map in the fire-marking center. Fires marked in this manner were not forthcoming as quickly as would be normal under combat conditions; however, the normal twenty-minute delay was not too unrealistic. Fire markers carried cards giving the number and type of rounds received in the impact area and the direction of fire, so that front-line troops could submit shell reports. These cards were given only when specifically requested, thus requiring at least some effort on the part of the troops to secure shell-rep data, but unfortunately for the Div Arty S-2 this effort was not often expended.

Throughout the three-week small-unit training period reports were disseminated, by Hq Task Force Victor, of increasing indications of an Aggressor invasion of the SE coast of the US by the Aggressor 4th Army, which was stationed in the Caribbean area centering on Cuba. Among the latest of the



Interior of a briefing fent of the 82d ABn Div

Aggressor's new developments was a glider capable of carrying a 35-ton tank, so that the establishment of an airhead supported by armor was within the Aggressor's capabilities. Hostile agents were detected, reports of aerial and submarine reconnaissance were increasing, and troop-carrier aircraft and ships were observed to be marshalling in Cuba. On the night of 10 May, large Aggressor convoys were observed to be steaming NE off the coast of Florida and troop-carrier formations were spotted approaching our coast. At 2130 hours a report was received that an estimated two battalions had dropped in the vicinity of Pope Air Force Base at Fort Bragg and had taken over the post. Simultaneously other drops were reported throughout the reservation. These drops were simulated; however, the Aggressor physically dropped one company in the vicinity of the 82nd Division CP the following morning. This company was quickly rounded up, although three men actually succeeded in entering the gas dump and placing demolition charges therein. The Aggressor force began operations at the time of the first drop at Bragg and was composed of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 505 Airborne Infantry Regiment. The 82nd Recon Co was immediately dispatched from Mackall to Bragg to determine the extent of the enemy airhead perimeter, and was closely followed by the 505 and 325 Regimental Combat Teams plus the 758 Heavy Tank Battalion, leaving the 504 AIR, less one battalion, and Task Force Delmar in reserve. Task Force Delmar consisted of the 73rd Heavy Tank Battalion, commanded by Lt Col Delmar, and the 1st Battalion 504 AIR. From this point on action was heavy, with the Aggressor slowly being forced back toward Pope Field.

During this phase of the exercise the FSCC or Fire Support Coordination Center was put into operation for the first time by a ground-force division. This installation coordinated field artillery and aircraft fires, planned artillery smoke to mark tactical aircraft targets, and arranged the cessation of artillery fire during the air strike. The FSCC was manned by personnel from Task Force Eagle, Division Arty, and the 82nd Div G-3 Section and operated directly with the Div Arty FDC and Task Force Eagle JOC. Results were highly satisfactory, with a period of twenty minutes not being unusual from time of air-strike request to time-over-target for on-call air missions. In the event that the division were also supported by naval gunfire, these fires would also be handled through the FSCC. As a result of this experiment it appears likely that the FSCC is here to stay.

Combat Intelligence Agencies received good training from several sources. Col. C. C. (SAM) Sloan's forces, representing the Aggressor 15th Airborne Division with attachments, were organized and uniformed in conformance with FM 30-120, Aggressor Order of Battle. Many units were represented by PW plants and skeleton forces, all carefully planned to give a plausible intelligence picture. One defect of this method, however, is that ground and aerial reconnaissance could not always verify or refute the Order of Battle findings, since some units existed only on paper. Five trained IPW teams were attached to the division and broken down to battalion level, where they took a very considerable burden from the S-2's shoulders. These teams were composed primarily of Greek and Russian linguists who are permanently assigned to Hq V Corps. Most of the interrogation was done in English, but these teams gained a wealth of experience in interrogation technique. Aggressor did provide a few planted PWs who spoke Russian or Greek, thus making it mandatory that these individuals be interrogated by IPW personnel.



The airborne artillery drops . . .

. . . and goes into action.

Div Arty light aircraft were used to good advantage for the purpose of taking oblique photographs of enemy-held terrain, with time of request to time of delivery to the using unit by light aircraft drop being between three and four hours. The Sonne or S-7 continuous-strip camera was tried by the Air Force with excellent results. This camera has no shutter but moves the film past the lens at a speed synchronized with that of the aircraft, thereby yielding a continuous negative. These photos are taken at altitudes of 750 to 1000 feet by F-80s and yield great detail. By employing two lenses a double strip is obtained and stereo vision is made possible.

A two-battalion parachute drop by the 504 Airborne Infantry Regiment was planned for 17 May in an attempt to more quickly rout the Aggressor, with Task Force Delmar spearheading the forces breaking through to the airhead. Two days prior to the drop, two pathfinder and FO patrols were dropped at night to keep the Drop Zones under surveillance and to report movements of hostile forces. The FOs were to observe fires in support of the drop, if necessary. After initial communication difficulties, reports began to come in and this source of information proved quite valuable.

At 0630 on 17 May the drop was executed successfully and on 18 May the Aggressor position became hopeless as the result of the tactical situation and the loss of Aggressor aerial and naval superiority, thus ending Exercise Tarheel.

It was the consensus of all commanders present from Gen Hodge down that Tarheel was the best training exercise ever conducted by the US Army.

OPINIONS ON THE TARGET-GRID METHOD

The target-grid method of conducting fire was prescribed in Training Circular No. 1, Department of the Army, 31 Jan 1949. It is expected that those officers who have an opportunity to use this method will form their own opinions. For those who do not have such opportunity, the results of a questionnaire prepared by Major James B. Goodwin, Department of Gunnery, may be of interest.

C. C. Blanchard, Colonel, FA
Director, Dept. of Gunnery, TAS

A QUESTIONNAIRE was prepared for the purpose of comparing the value of the target-grid method of conducting fire to the methods previously used and to determine data for use in the preparation of programs of instruction.

This questionnaire was submitted to the members of the 1948-49 Advanced Artillery Officers' Course and to the instructors of the Department of Gunnery. Those questioned may be divided into several categories, as follows:

1. Thirty-five instructors in the Department of Gunnery.

2. One hundred and sixty-four Field Artillery officers of the Advanced Class. These officers began their instruction at Fort Sill in October 1948 and were taught only the target grid method. Their opinions are based on a comparison of the target-grid method with whatever method they used during their last duty with troops.

3. Forty-seven Coast Artillery officers in the Advanced Class. These officers were trained first in the methods prescribed in Change 2 to Field Manual 6-40 and then in the use of the target-grid method. Their comparisons are between these two methods.

4. Six Marine Corps officers in the Advanced Class.

5. Five Allied officers in the Advanced Class. This group, being small, affects the average of the answers very little.

The questions and answers are covered in detail below, and are tabulated briefly at the end of the discussion.

QUESTION 1. What is your estimate of the number of hours required to train an NCO who is a high school graduate, or a field artillery officer candidate, to be a competent forward observer, using:

The target-grid method? Answer: 20 hours.
The old method? Answer: 54 hours.

While this question is subject to different interpretations, it is believed the answers represent about the time required for theoretical instruction and terrain-board practice, but would not include time for service practices in classes of 20 to 25 officers. It should be noted here that the average answers for each of the five groups enumerated above were very nearly the same for all questions, giving some measure of reliability to the answers quoted. Given in the order of groups referred to above, the average hours for the target-grid method were, 21, 15, 21, 23, and 12; for the old method 57, 53, 54, 54, and 18. Regardless of the reliability of the average hours for the two methods, there is a strong indication that the target-grid method can be taught to an observer in about one third of the time required to teach the old method.

QUESTION 2. For area missions, what is the average number of salvos required for adjusting, using:

The target-grid method? Answer: 5 salvos
The old method? Answer: 8 salvos

These answers indicate not only a saving in ammunition under the target-grid system, but also a reduction in time required for adjustment.

QUESTION 3. Under combat conditions, what is your estimtate of the percentage of satisfactory solutions using:

The target-grid method? Answer: 90%
The old method? Answer: 78%

To answer this question required a rather vivid imagination, but it was hoped that the number of answers submitted and the varied background of the officers questioned would give a fair estimate of what might be expected in combat. The average answers for the various groups of officers questioned were 90, 90, 91, 88, and 96, for the target-grid method, and 75, 79, 74, 82, and 80, for the old method. It is believed that it can be inferred from these opinions that an adjustment, using the target-grid method, is more positive than with the older methods. Experience with the Advanced Class confirms this belief. As a matter of fact it has become extremely difficult for a student to fire an unsatisfactory problem here at the School. Out of the 885 problems fired by the current Advanced Class, using the target-grid method, only 43, or about 5 percent, were unsatisfactory, as compared with the 10 percent which the questionnaire indicated should be expected during combat. It is still possible to make a mis-sensing, or even to move in the wrong direction, but there is now very little excuse for such errors.

QUESTION 4. Under combat conditions, with observers who are not field artillerymen, what percentage of adjustments will be satisfactory, using fuze quick and:

The target-grid method? Answer: 72%
The old method? Answer: 40%

The purpose of this question was to secure an opinion on the feasibility of adjusting artillery fire with infantrymen, tankers, or other front-line troops. The question was restricted to the use of fuze quick to avoid the complications of time fire, the use of VT fuze, or the use of ricochet adjustments, which it is believed should be reserved for use by observers with a little more field artillery background.

QUESTION 5. During training to be an observer, how many problems should

a student fire to become proficient, using:
The target-grid method? Answer: 12
The old method? Answer: 26

These answers appear rather high and are beyond what is actually given to students at The Artillery School at the present time. In the old days, officers fired from 20 to 25 problems during the 9-months battery officer's course. More recently, the Advanced Course students fire about 3 precision and 3 area problems. Other classes at the School fire even fewer problems.

QUESTION 6. As a comparison of the accuracy of initial data to be expected, in what percentage of combat missions would you expect a range sensing on the initial round, using:
The target-grid method? Answer: 72%
The old method? Answer: 49%

With proper stress on accurate initial data, it is believed that 72 percent can be raised. It should be noted that the estimate of range to the taregt has nothing to do with whether the initial rounds land on the observer-target line. A poor estimate of observer-target range will increase the number of observer range bounds required to bracket the target in this method, as in any other presently known method.

QUESTION 7. An officer candidate or NCO is trained as an observer. Following this training he is assigned for one year to duty which requires no use of his observer training. At the end of the year, he will be able to fire a better problem (as an observer) if he was originally trained using the:
Target-grid method? Answer: 244
The old method? Answer: 5

The answers are very much in favor of the target-grid method. It is not known who the five are who preferred the old method, but certainly under some of the old procedures an officer or NCO would not fire a satisfactory problem if he were out of practice for a year. In the old field artillery units, it was routine to have service practice weekly to keep up on firing. Certainly an officer had to fire rather frequently to retain any facility in handling problems at the OP. Service practice at regular intervals is still essential, but an officer will retain facility (as an observer) better with the target-grid method.

QUESTION 8. Does the target-grid method complicate the operation of the fire-direction center to the extent that fewer missions can be fired?

Answer: 182 No, 69 Yes. The opinion of those who stated "yes" is based on the fact that more time is required for the fire-direction center to convert the observer's corrections or sensings into commands under the target-grid method. However, the 182 apparently believed that this will be balanced by the increased speed of the observer and in the fact that fewer salvos or rounds will be required for the adjustment.

QUESTION 9. Does the target-grid method complicate the operation of the fire-direction center to the extent that more errors are made?

Answer: 194 No, 44 Yes. It is believed that the 44 officers who answered "yes" were influenced somewhat by the fact that the fire-direction center methods at The Artillery School this year were in a slight state of flux, owing to the change to the target-grid method. This defect will be overcome.

QUESTION 10. How many simultaneous missions can the average FDC handle, using:
The target-grid method? Answer: 2.7
The old method? Answer: 3.0

The answer is slightly in favor of the old method. Again this is a result of the additional burden which has been placed on the FDC for converting corrections and sensings to commands, but it is believed that three missions can be handled simultaneously by developing a routine for use in the FDC. Of course, it is always possible to transfer battery missions to a battery FDC. This makes possible the handling of six simultaneous missions, one by each battery FDC and three by the battalion FDC.

QUESTION 11. Should the HCO, VCO, or computer be able to handle the conversion of observers' sensings into fire-direction center sensings in precision fire?

ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

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U. S. Army: 146, 151, 152

Answer: 232 Yes, 17 No. The answer indicates that this procedure should not be beyond the mental capacity of the average personnel in a fire-direction center. With the "Sensing Card" which is now in use at The Artillery School, these conversions are very simple.

QUESTION 12. Is a deflection index the best method of handling the major part of deflection correction?

Answer: 202 Yes, 42 No. It is interesting to note that the greatest variance in answers to this question was among the Gunnery Department instructors, although a majority favored the deflection index. Comments were asked of those officers who indicated "no" in their answers. Many different suggestions were received. A number recommended the use of a sight with a movable index so that the sight could be zeroed after an adjustment on a base point. The modification of the present sight to include a movable index offers a practicable solution.

QUESTION 13. Does the sending of a new deflection, instead of a deflection shift, to the firing battery:
Reduce errors
in firing? Answer: 237 Yes, 10 No
Increase speed
in firing? Answer: 200 Yes, 35 No

These answers indicate that the firing battery will operate faster and with fewer errors when settings instead of changes are transmitted.

TABULATION OF ANSWERS

Question	Target Grid	Old
1. Observer training hours	20	54
2. Salvos for adjustment	5	8
3. Satisfactory solutions, FA observers	90%	78%
4. Satisfactory solutions, other observers	72%	40%
5. Problems per student	12	26
6. Sensing on initial round	72%	49%
7. Easier to retain	244	5
8. FDC: Reduce number of missions	182 No	69 Yes
9. FDC: Increase number of errors	194 No	44 Yes
10. FDC: Simultaneous missions	2.7	3.0
11. Can EM of FDC handle precision	232 Yes	17 No
12. Use of deflection index	202 Yes	42 No
13. Deflection instead of shift: Reduce errors	237 Yes	10 No
Increase speed	200 Yes	35 No

From the Seine to Germany . . .

Armored and Infantry Cooperation in the Pursuit

By Lt. Col. Hugh Exton, FA

INTRODUCTION

THERE has been much discussion among officers of the Army to the effect that the day of the armored division has passed and that what is needed now is an all-purpose division. Such a division would contain both tank and infantry elements in such proportion and strength that it would be capable of engaging in any type of operation, whether it be defense, attack of a fortified position, or pursuit. The author feels that the proponents of this all-purpose division have neglected the importance of the exploitation. What type force is best suited for an exploitation role? The answer is a force possessing great fire power, shock action, and mobility—in other words, a force heavy in tanks.

The next question is what infantry support must tanks have in order to be able properly to perform an exploitation mission. Some opinions are to the effect that the proportion of infantry strength to tank strength in the armored division should be about two to one. It is felt that such opinions are based on the fact that during World War II, because of an insufficient number of infantry divisions, many armored divisions were required to participate in essentially infantry-type operations, where their organic infantry components had to be augmented by the attachment to the division of infantry regiments. These were not typical armored missions. Therefore, should the organization of the armored division be based on a history of its occasional employment on such unsuitable missions? Also, with an infantry-tank proportion of two to one, do we not have what amounts to an infantry division rather than an armored division?

Another opinion is that proposing a ratio of infantry to tanks of one to one. General Guderian, the German tank expert, has advocated such a ratio. The present armored division is so organized. However, by adopting such a proportion, are we not approaching the so-called all-purpose division?

Everyone agrees that tanks cannot operate properly alone. They must have infantry support. In an exploitation deep into the enemy rear, however, this infantry support becomes an intermittent requirement. The aim is to reach a deep objective as rapidly as possible. The tanks make the rapid advance. Centers of resistance are by-passed if they cannot be easily over-run. The immediately necessary infantry support, therefore, is that required for containing such by-passed centers of resistance, assisting the tanks in seizing intermediate objectives, and providing security forces at critical road centers or bottlenecks. Thus, the infantry component of the armored division should be that sufficient for continuous employment. There should not be an organic infantry component so large that it cannot be advantageously employed nor so great that it overly increases the administrative burden of the division commander. Cannot the protection of the lines of communication and the providing of strong infantry support if needed be obtained better from infantry divisions directed to follow closely and support the armored division? This permits the armored division commander to request additional support as the various situations demand and provides for obtaining infantry assistance in greater strength than that which can be provided by organic infantry elements.

Some exponents of the large organic infantry strength in the armored division claim that tank-supporting infantry must be mounted in armored carriers in order to be able to cross fire-swept areas more easily. The infantry of infantry divisions is not mounted in such carriers and hence is said to be more vulnerable to enemy fire. It is true that the infantry providing the immediate support of tanks should be so mounted as to be able to move quickly to the assistance of the tanks in their carriers rather than having to dismount and proceed on foot. However, the protection afforded in armored personnel carriers is generally limited to small-arms fire and scattered shell fragments. Experience during the World War II showed that in most cases calling for the employment of armored infantry in areas covered by a reasonable amount of enemy fire, it was necessary to dismount the personnel under cover and move them forward by foot. If a situation demands the commitment of a large force of infantry, the area is likely to be swept by more than small-arms fire. Hence, a vehicle of any type other than a heavily armored tank has to remain under cover. Furthermore, the employment of armored personnel-carriers involves limitations due to weight and presents considerable maintenance problems. Finally, the production of such vehicles is exceedingly costly. We cannot afford to equip large numbers of infantry with costly vehicles simply because such vehicles *might* occasionally be advantageously used.

The following historical example is presented to show the great success which can be achieved by close teamwork between a spearheading armored division and supporting infantry divisions.

GENERAL SITUATION

The sun was slowly setting in the direction of home as the leading vehicles

of the 3rd US Armored Division started crossing the ponton bridge over the Seine River at Tilly, a few miles southeast of Paris. It was the 25th of August, 1944.

Almost a month before, the VII US Corps had broken through the German lines near St. Lo in Normandy and the Third US Army had started its rapid advance out to Brittany and on to the east. Then had come the juncture of the Canadian and American armies at Falaise, trapping the major elements of the German Seventh Army. The remainder of the German forces now streamed eastward, hoping to be able to make a stand on one of the river lines in northern France. The Allied armies pushed after them, determined that the Germans would not be permitted to organize this defensive stand.

So it was that the VII Corps, which had begun the German debacle in Normandy, had now reached the Seine. It appeared to everyone that the end was approaching and the cry was "On to Berlin!" The only organized German resistance along the Allied front was opposite the British and Canadian armies to the north, where the German forces which had not been involved in the Battle of Normandy were trying to protect the flying-bomb launching sites in the Pas de Calais area.

The VII Corps at this time consisted of the 3rd Armored Division, the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, and the 4th Cavalry Group. Its mission was to cut off Paris and advance to the northeast to cut off German columns attempting to withdraw to the east. The VII Corps was the right corps of the First Army, the other corps of the army being the V Corps, advancing through Paris, and the XIX Corps, crossing the Seine northwest of Paris and marching adjacent to the Second British Army. To the right of the VII Corps was the XX Corps of the Third Army, and everyone knew there would be a great friendly rivalry between these elements of the two armies to see which could get to Germany first. The VII Corps was commanded by General J. Lawton Collins, today the Army Vice Chief of Staff. The 3rd Armored Division and the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions were commanded respectively by Generals Maurice Rose, Clarence Huebner, and Louis Craig.

The plan of the VII Corps was to have the 3rd Armored Division lead the advance by using the entire corps zone and by-passing all centers of resistance. It was to be followed and supported by the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, echeloned to the left and right rear respectively. A boundary was designated between the two infantry divisions. The first mission assigned to the 3rd Armored Division was to seize crossings over the Marne River. The 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions were given a series of march objectives so designated as to ensure close support of the 3rd Armored Division.

As the leading elements of the 3rd Armored Division were crossing the Seine and as the infantry divisions were preparing to move up to the west bank of the river, to be ready to follow the armored division across, the order was received by all units from VII Corps: "The advance will be rapid and aggressive. Small pockets of resistance will not be permitted to delay the advance."

At this stage of our narrative, it is well to pause momentarily to look at the organization of the 3rd Armored Division as it existed at that time. It was known as a "heavy" armored division, containing the organization set up in 1942. This consisted of two armored regiments, each of two medium tank battalions and one light tank battalion, one infantry regiment of three rifle battalions, three light artillery battalions, and other arms and services somewhat similar to those in the present division. A tank-destroyer battalion was a normal attachment. This type unit is no longer in existence and has been replaced in the present division by the organic heavy tank battalion. An antiaircraft battalion was also a normal attachment. This unit is now organic to the present division. There were only two combat command headquarters in the heavy division, Combat Command A and Combat Command B. These combat comands were usually organized for combat with one of the armored regiments as the nucleus, supplemented by an infantry battalion, an artillery battalion, and other supporting arms and services as required. The division reserve was commanded by the headquarters of the infantry regiment and usually consisted of the third infantry battalion and other units as necessary.

From this brief description of the heavy armored division it can be seen that the proportion of tank strength to infantry strength was about two to one. As previously mentioned, in the present division this proportion is approximately equal. The designers of the heavy armored division evidently appreciated the value of the employment of large numbers of massed tanks immediately supported by smaller numbers of infantry. The designers of the present division, on the other hand, must have felt that tanks cannot be employed effectively without equal forces of infantry immediately available.

THE PURSUIT

All during the night of 25-26 August the armored vehicles streamed across the river, assembling on the east side and preparing to start the advance to



the northeast. In order to take full advantage of the road net and to gain speed, the advance began with the two combat commands abreast in three columns about equally spaced across the corps zone. The entire division had crossed the Seine by mid-afternoon of the 26th. Now the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions prepared to cross—the 1st in the vicinity of Corbeil and the 9th near Melun—in order to furnish the necessary infantry support to the armor.

The next day, the 3rd Armored Division continued its rapid advance, overrunning or by-passing small centers of resistance, and crossed the Marne River at two widely separated points.

After the capture of its initial objective, the 3rd Armored Division was given the mission of seizing a line through Rethel, 75 miles to the northeast. Could any force other than one strong in fire power and with great mobility be expected to accomplish successfully such a mission? The designation of such deep objectives is characteristic of the pursuit. The armored division is the ideal force for spearheading an advance to a deep objective. However, for protection of its line of communication and for the reduction of bypassed pockets of resistance, additional infantry support must be provided. Here is the reason for the following supporting infantry divisions.

The 3rd Armored Division maintained its rapid advance on 28 August in four columns. CCA passed through Chateau Thierry early in the afternoon. Units of the XX Corps also passed through the town that day, and even today arguments still rage as to just which unit actually first reached this famous World War I battlefield. Again the resistance consisted of only small pockets of enemy which served merely to harass the advance of the armored elements. These enemy troops were either eliminated or contained by the two infantry divisions, which moved up to the south bank of the Marne River. The bulk of the enemy forces continued to withdraw to the north and northeast, evidently hoping to reach the Siegfried Line as soon as possible. On several occasions the armored columns cut into the rear of retreating enemy units, causing considerable damage. Near one town, CCA destroyed a German troop train headed northeast from Paris. One of the principal factors in the destruction of this train was one antiaircraft halftrack which fired its quadruple .50-caliber guns into the train, causing the locomotive to blow up. This in turn stopped another train also moving troops from Paris. It can be seen that the rapidity of the 3rd Armored Division's advance was not expected by the Germans.

Continuing to the northeast, the 3rd Armored Division crossed the Aisne River and captured Laon. Security detachments had to be left to protect the river crossings. These security elements were then relieved by the 1st Infantry Division, which also sent an infantry battalion to occupy Laon upon its capture by the 3rd Armored Division. Further to the east, the 9th Infantry Division also reached the Aisne and sent a regimental combat team to reinforce other 3rd Armored Division units engaged with some Germans a bit more stubborn than usual. So, here we see examples of tank-infantry cooperation permitting the armored division to obtain additional infantry support in varying degrees and for different purposes, depending on each situation. The armored division units themselves are then freed to continue pushing the pursuit.

The next orders received by the 3rd Armored Division were to proceed to the east and seize crossings over the Meuse River at Sedan. The 9th Infantry Division was directed to follow the 3rd Armored Division and be prepared to reinforce the armor with one regimental combat team. This switch in the direction of the corps' advance would expose the left flank. So, the 1st Infantry Division was given the mission of protecting this flank and of maintaining contact with the V Corps units to the west.

These missions were well on the way toward accomplishment when VII Corps received orders from First Army to change its direction of advance to the north instead of to the east. This change for VII Corps was designed to cut off large enemy forces reported withdrawing to the east. At this time—about noon on the 31st of August—the 3rd Armored Division had reached the vicinity of Rethel. It was now ordered to Mons. So, employing its great flexibility, it made almost a 90-degree turn and advanced 25 miles north that same day. The 9th Infantry Division also turned to follow the armor and was given the additional mission of protecting the corps east flank. To take care of this change in direction of advance, the boundary between V Corps and VII Corps was amended as shown on Map 2.

With the close of August, the VII Corps had come 500 miles since the Normandy breakthrough. It was rapidly approaching the German border. The Germans were in headlong retreat, which at times was more like a rout than an orderly withdrawal. It now appeared that the Germans wanted only to reach the refuge of their fortified border.

In order to gain still more speed, the 3rd Armored Division was now advancing in six columns with the two combat commands and the reserve all abreast. While the 1st Infantry Division continued to protect the corps left flank, the 9th Infantry Division followed the armor, meeting constant opposition from small enemy groups which had been by-passed by the armored division columns. In several instances, when the armored columns were held up by mines and antitank fire, infantry units of the 9th Infantry Division came up and assisted in eliminating the resistance and enabling the armor to continue. There was the closest teamwork in these operations, the idea being all the time to keep springing the armor loose so that it could keep going. Speed, speed, and more speed was the goal.

CCA of the 3rd Armored Division crossed into Belgium on the 2nd of September at 1600 and entered Mons at 1900. CCB was delayed in starting its advance that day because its trains had been cut off during the night and were unable to deliver fuel to the combat elements. This is one of the risks taken by a spearheading force and is one of the reasons why it must be followed and supported by infantry divisions. The division reserve, advancing in the center, struck the heaviest resistance during the day. At about 2000, being considerably delayed, it was ordered to disengage from the enemy and move over into the zone of CCA to the right. This plan was followed and the

reserve continued to Mons. This shows the feasibility of disengaging a small armored force from an enemy which is not particularly aggressive. The great mobility and fire power of the tanks make this possible.

First Army now ordered the VII Corps to attack to seize crossings over the Meuse River between Namur and Givet. VII Corps ordered the 3rd Armored Division to attack to the east early on 3 September to seize crossings at Namur. The 1st Infantry Division was directed to relieve the armored elements in Mons and then proceed to the east in the zone of the 3rd Armored Division. The 9th Infantry Division was given the mission of seizing crossings over the Meuse between Namur and Givet.

However, these plans could not be executed. At 0630, 3 September, an enemy column moving east ran into the flank of the 3rd Armored Division southwest of Mons. Then a second column ran into a 3rd Armored Division road block just west of Mons. Elements of the 1st Infantry Division moving north to relieve the armor in Mons ran into these German columns. Soon it developed that approximately 30,000 German troops, remnants of twenty divisions, were attempting to escape to the east. The 3rd Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions spent the rest of the day in repulsing the German attacks. Thousands of prisoners were rounded up. The eventual result of this engagement was one of the costliest defeats suffered by the German army during this phase of the European campaign. The 9th Infantry Division, in the meanwhile, continued its advance toward the Meuse River, as it was considered more important by the VII Corps to seize crossings over the river than to divert the division to assist in the fighting at Mons.

Because of these events, the VII Corps orders had to be changed. The 3rd Armored Division would not attack to the east on 4 September upon completing the elimination of the enemy in the Mons area. In the meantime, new boundaries were designated by First Army. The V Corps had been squeezed out by the rapid advance of the VII and XIX Corps. It was, therefore, moved to the right of the VII Corps, which became the center corps of the army.

The 3rd Armored Division began its advance to the cast at 1400, on the 4th, after the major resistance in the Mons area had been eliminated. From the 1st Infantry Division point of view, *all* the resistance definitely had *not* been eliminated. It was engaged all day cleaning up pockets of enemy and clearing



Mons of sniper fire. There were several sharp engagements south and southwest of Mons with more German columns. Here is an example of the advantageous use of an infantry division to clear the line of communication, thus freeing the entire armored division to concentrate on its advance to the final objective and on maintaining continuous pressure on a retreating enemy.

While the 3rd Armored Division reached Namur late on 4 September and spent the 5th preparing to cross the Meuse River, the 1st Infantry Division continued to mop up enemy pockets and again there were several battalion-size engagements, particularly to the southwest of Mons. The division also prepared to follow the armored division. To the south, the 9th Infantry Division commenced crossing the Meuse early on the morning of the 5th. Against heavy opposition, two crossings were successfully made. The German resistance had definitely stiffened with the rejuvenated 2nd SS "Das Reich" Panzer Division opposing the crossings.

The 3rd Armored Division completed crossing the river at Namur and continued to the east. In a different type of tank-infantry cooperation, it sent one tank battalion down the east bank of the river to assist the 9th Infantry Division in securing its bridgehead. Behind the 3rd Armored Division came the 1st Infantry Division, leaving one regimental combat team in the Mons area to clear it completely of the enemy.

At Huy, the 83rd Reconnaissance Battalion of the 3rd Armored Division dashed ahead and, disregarding all enemy forces, seized the Liege bridges before the Germans could do anything about destroying them. The division followed right behind its audacious cavalry and reached Liege later the same day. To protect the line of communications, the 1st Infantry Division dropped off security detachments at important bridges and road centers. The 9th Infantry Division, now well established across the Meuse, sent a regimental combat team to assist the 3rd Armored Division in the capture of Liege.

With the capture of Liege, it became evident that the rate of advance would decrease. The enemy seemed to be organizing his forces more cohesively. His opposition to the VII Corps became more stubborn. A serious shortage of fuel was being felt by all the Allied armies. Nevertheless, the corps advance was pushed to the limit of the available fuel supply. The 3rd Armored Divition moved forward to the German border. The 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions moved to positions to the left and right, respectively, of the armored division.

On the 11th of September, the VII Corps divisions were generally abreast facing the famed Siegfried Line. All units were ordered to commence immediately reconnaissances in force within their zones to prepare for a coordinated attack on the German fortifications.

CONCLUSION

Thus ended the VII Corps' pursuit and now was to come the slow fighting to penetrate the Siegfried Line. Since the crossing of the Seine River, the VII Corps had come almost 300 miles in two weeks, cutting off and destroying thousands of enemy troops, never permitting the enemy to organize a defensive line, and forcing him to withdraw in a rout to the protection of his fortified line. This rapid advance was largely due to the fact that the tanks were able to maintain the momentum of the pursuit, leaving the clearing up of the axis of advance to the following infantry.

The review of this operation has concentrated on the divisions of the corps but it must not be forgotten that the air played a very important role. The IX Tactical Air Command provided continuous support to the corps units by column cover, destroying enemy airplanes, destroying ground targets interfering with the progress of the divisions, and continually harassing the retreating German columns.

This operation illustrates the proper employment of teamwork between armored and infantry divisions. The mobility, shock action, and fire power of the armored division make it the ideal weapon for leading exploitation missions such as the pursuit. With its mobility it can by-pass centers of resistance. With its shock action it overruns enemy rear installations. With its great fire power it destroys disorganized retreating enemy forces. The infantry divisions then consolidate the gains made. Very few battles or campaigns are won without destroying the enemy forces. Seldom is an enemy force destroyed except after a rapid pursuit which encircles it and prevents further organized resistance.

It is believed that the armored division should be reorganized so as to contain its former relative strength in tanks. Thus it would regain the necessary power to enable it to be a decisive exploitation force. The necessary infantry support should be provided by infantry divisions, so that the armored division is not burdened by the additional mission of protecting its line of communications. It does not need to carry along infantry elements which cannot be advantageously employed. When strong infantry support for the armor is required, the infantry divisions are available and ready to provide such support. This was well demonstrated by the support given by the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions to the 3rd Armored Division in the VII Corps operations just described.

Finally, in spite of opinions to the contrary, the day of the armored division is far from passed. The prospect of developing lighter-weight but still powerfully armed tanks and of building tank-carrying planes forecasts the air-transported armored division as one of the decisive weapons of the future; even more so than was the armored division of World War II.

STATION DATA (continued)

THIRD ARMY

Ft. McPherson, Georgia. Located four miles from the center of Atlanta. The site of Headquarters Third Army. The climate is moderately warm, winter uniform being necessary from November to March, inclusive. On the post there are quarters for only 35% of the assigned officers, and in nearby residential areas the available housing is expensive. The post has normal commissary and post exchange facilities, and the city's excellent markets and stores are conveniently near. Cost of living is reported as below the average for cities of comparable size. For recreation there are a golf course, tennis courts, swimming pool, skeet ranges, theater, and officers club. City and county elementary and high schools are near the post and army bus service is provided.

Ft. Jackson, South Carolina. Located about six miles east of Columbia, S. C. The home of the 5th Inf Div, which includes the 19th, 21st, 46th, and 50th FA Battalions. The climate is mild, the average temperature for January being 46° and for July 81°. The 180-odd quarters are insufficient for assigned officers, but housing facilities in Columbia are available at moderate rentals. There are normal commissary and post exchange facilities, and nearby market prices are moderate. Cost of living is about the average for communities of comparable size. The post has kindergarten and elementary schools, and high schools and colleges are available in Columbia, to which army bus transportation from the post is provided.

Camp Gordon, Georgia. Located twelve miles southwest of Augusta, Ga. The home of The Military Police School, The Signal Corps Training Center, and The Engineer Aviation Unit Training Center, with small-arms and artillery ranges. The climate is "deep south," with long, hot summers, short, mild winters, and rarely any snow. Oliver General Hospital is eight miles distant. There are eighty-five sets of quarters (mostly converted barracks) on the post, and housing nearby is scarce; this will shortly be improved as a result of a current building program. There are the usual commissary and post exchange facilities and Augusta markets are excellent. Cost of living is reasonable. Recreational facilities include golf, swimming, four theaters, hunting and fishing in season, and the post is approximately a four-hour drive from Atlanta or various Atlantic beaches. Children's schools in Augusta, to which army busses take post children, are good but overcrowded.

Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Located about eleven miles northwest of Fayetteville, N. C., and thirty miles east of the Pinehurst resort area. The home of Headquarters V Corps, AFF Board No. 1, the 82nd A Bn Div (which includes the 376th, 456th, and 319th A Bn FA Battalions), and the 98th FA Bn. The climate is moderate and generally pleasant, though summers are humid. There are about seven hundred sets of quarters on the post, most of them of the temporary converted type, which can accommodate officers down to include a few senior captains. There is usually a wait of three to six months, and the housing situation in the vicinity is critical. Facilities are scarce and rates are high. There are excellent commissary and post exchange facilities, but nearby merchandise centers are rather inadequate. Raleigh (55 miles north) and Durham (65 miles northwest) offer good shopping facilities. Cost of living is about average. The recreational facilities are excellent, with three golf courses, tennis courts, several swimming pools and theaters, hunting and fishing in season, skeet range, good picnic facilities, and about a three-hour drive from various Atlantic beaches. Post schools go through eighth grade, transportation is furnished to Fayetteville, which has a high school and a parochial school, and in addition there are various private educational facilities at Pinehurst and elsewhere in the vicinity.

Ft. Benning, Georgia. Located nine miles southeast of Columbus, Ga. Site of The Infantry Center and home of The Infantry School, AFF Board No. 3, the 3rd Inf Div (which includes the 9th, 39th, and 41st FA Battalions), and the 999th FA Bn (a School Troops unit). The climate is moderate with mild winters and rather humid summers. The quarters on the post are insufficient for all assigned officers and the nearby housing situation is somewhat critical, though relief is anticipated shortly as a result of off-post civilian construction and some additional post conversion and new construction. Rents are moderate. There are extensive commissary and post exchange facilities and Columbus has adequate shopping facilities. Cost of living is average. Athletic and recreational facilities are exceptionally complete and extensive. The post school goes through the seventh grade and Columbus schools are adequate.

FOURTH ARMY

Ft. Sam Houston, Texas. Located in the northeast part of San Antonio, about 3 miles from the heart of the city. The site of Headquarters Fourth Army and Brooke Army Medical Center. The climate is temperate, but liable to sudden changes in winter. Summer days are hot but the Gulf breeze, coming up about 9 p.m., makes the nights pleasant. Quarters on the post are quite limited and city accommodations are difficult to find and rather expensive. Commissary and post exchange facilities are adequate and San Antonio shopping facilities are excellent. Cost of living is moderate. Recreational facilities include golf, tennis, bowling, hunting, fishing, swimming, and several theaters and clubs. The post has kindergarten and nursery school, but beginning with 1st grade post children must attend city schools, which are ample and to which bus transportation is furnished.

Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Located on U. S. Highway 277, five miles north of Lawton, Okla. Oklahoma City is 100 miles to the northeast and Wichita Falls, Texas, is 55 miles to the south. The site of The Artillery Center and The Artillery School. The home of the 1st FA Obsn Bn, Btry A of the 2nd Rkt FA Bn, the 5th and 17th FA groups, and the 6th Armd, 17th, 18th, and 96th FA Battalions. The climate is subject to sudden changes and extremes of temperature. Northerly winds

prevail in winter; summer is semi-arid with southerly winds prevailing. Spring is marked by extreme variability; autumn by drizzle and fog. Severe dust storms occasionally occur. Low humidity makes high temperatures relatively bearable and evaporation-type air conditioners possible. There are insufficient quarters for all assigned personnel and none for married student officers. Housing facilities in Lawton are inadequate and expensive. Commissary and post exchange facilities are excellent, and shopping facilities are available in Lawton. The cost of living is average. Recreational facilities include golf, tennis, swimming, bowling, some hunting and fishing, clubs and theaters, and picnicking in the nearby Wichita Mountains. Post schools include from nursery through 6th grade, and Lawton has a complete school system, to which transportation is furnished post children. Cameron Junior College is 1 mile west of Lawton.

Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. Located 9 miles east of Ft. Smith, Arkansas. The home of the 5th Armd Div, which includes the 47th, 71st, and 95th Armd FA Battalions. The climate is temperate, with very warm summers, and winters with greatly varying temperatures and frequent rain. There are no married quarters on the post. The housing situation in Ft. Smith is fair, with rents not abnormally high. The Army operates a housing office. There are the usual commissary and post exchange facilities, and Ft. Smith stores are adequate for a city of something over 50,000 population. Post recreation facilities are adequate, but off-post facilities are only fair. There are no post schools. Ft. Smith schools are good and include a junior college; University of Arkansas is 50 miles distant.

Camp Hood, Texas. Located on U. S. Highway 190, two miles west of Killeen, Texas. The home of the 2nd Armd Div, which includes the 14th, 78th, and 92nd Armd FA Battalions. The climate is temperate, with mild winters and hot, dry summers. The housing situation is critical for personnel with dependents. Occasionally quarters can be found in Killeen, but mostly accommodations must be found in Temple (28 miles), Balton (20), Lampasos (26), or Gatesville (28). Commissary and post exchange facilities are adequate; no other shopping facilities exist nearby. Cost of living is average. Recreational facilities on the post are excellent, including golf, tennis, skeet, horseback riding, swimming, theaters, and a good officers' club. Post schools are from kindergarten through 2nd year high, with the last two years of high school available in Killeen.

Ft. Bliss, Texas. Just outside the city limits of El Paso. The site of the Antiaircraft Artillery and Guided Missile Center. The home of the AA and GM Branch of The Artillery School and AFF Board No. 4. Units on the post include the 2nd Rkt FA Bn (less Btry A), three AAA Brigades, and 8 AAA Groups. The region is arid and the climate has hot summers and mild winters, with occasional cold periods. Housing is a definite problem, with a long waiting list for the insufficient quarters, and facilities in El Paso scarce and expensive. There are adequate commissary and post exchange facilities and El Paso is an excellent shopping center. Just across the Rio Grande River is Juarez, Mexico, a shopping and entertainment mecca. Post recreational facilities are limited. Schools on the post include third grade; for higher grades post children attend school in El Paso.

FIFTH ARMY

Chicago, Illinois. The site of Headquarters Fifth Army, whose address is 160 E. Hyde Park Boulevard, Chicago 15. The climate is temperate and windy, with extreme temperature ranges and occasional sudden changes. Summer uniform is prescribed for June through August only. There are a few sets of quarters at Ft. Sheridan (36 miles north of Headquarters), for which there is a long waiting list. Housing in and near Chicago is scarce and expensive; Headquarters maintains a Billeting Office to assist in locating facilities. Ft. Sheridan has adequate commissary and post exchange facilities, and the Naval Training Center Commissary Store is available to military personnel. There are messing and post exchange facilities in the Headquarters Building.

Ft. Riley, Kansas. Four miles east of Junction City, Kansas. The site of the Ground General School. The home of "Aggressor" GHQ and of the 10th Inf Div, which includes the 25th, 35th, 40th, and 85th FA Bns. The climate is temperate, with extremes of temperature and occasional sudden changes in winter and spring. There are insufficient quarters on the post for assigned personnel, and many families live in Junction City and Manhattan (14 miles east of the post); rents are not excessive. There are excellent commissary and post exchange facilities; cost of living is moderate. Recreational facilities include golf, tennis, swimming, skeet, and theaters. There is a grade school on the post, and transportation is furnished to higher schools in Junction City. Kansas State College is located in Manhattan.

Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Located on the west bank of the Missouri River, 3 miles north of Leavenworth, Kansas, and about 35 miles northwest of Kansas City, Missouri. The site of the Command and General Staff College. The climate is humid with high temperatures in summer, and is variable in winter, with much freezing rain. There are quarters available for all bachelor officers and for almost all married officers assigned. There are an excellent commissary and post exchange, and in Leavenworth there are numerous "chain" and independent markets. Kansas City is an excellent all-around shopping center. The cost of living is average. Recreational facilities include golf, tennis, bowling, hunting and fishing, swimming, and squash. Post schools include junior high, and bus service is available to senior high schools in Leavenworth.

Camp Carson, Colorado. Located seven miles south of Colorado Springs. The home of the 4th FA Bn and the 14th RCT, which includes the 537th FA Bn. The climate is delightful, mild in winter and cool in summer. The quarters on the post, mostly of the converted barracks type, are insufficient, and housing in Colorado Springs is scarce and costly. There are a commissary and post exchange, and good markets in town. Cost of living is average, or lower, for that section of the country. Recreational facilities are adequate and, for outdoor sports, the weather permits almost year-round participation. Transportation is furnished for post children to Colorado Springs schools.

Redlegs vs. Redskins . . .

ARTILLERY ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER

By Lt. Col. Philip R. Willmarth, FA-Res.

ON the 9th of April, 1865, Generals Grant and Lee agreed upon the terms of surrender which put an end to four years of bloody civil war. But while the ceremony at Appomattox brought peace to a war-weary nation, it spelled neither rest nor relief for the Regular Army.

Cessation of hostilities between the North and South brought the army face to face with other important problems. Troops of the French imperialist, Napoleon III, were occupying Mexican territory in open defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. There was a still sullen South to be "reconstructed" and policed. But far more compelling and urgent was the task of answering the desperate cries for help arising from a ravaged West.

The Indians of the western mountains, plains, and deserts—largely unrestrained during the war years and subjected to ever-increasing pressure by the rising tide of migration from the East—were striking back, with all the savage fury of desperation, against the white invaders who despoiled their hunting grounds and threatened their very existence. From Texas to Canada and from the Mississippi to California, the red man struck, slipped away, and struck again in a widespread orgy of murder and outrage. Westward against him marched blue-clad Regulars, to begin a series of campaigns destined to last for a quarter of a century—campaigns which would include countless minor engagements, over 200 pitched battles, and eleven full-fledged wars of sufficient importance to merit battle honors for the units who fought in them.

The army that faced the task of subjugating the hostile tribesmen of the West was but the merest skeleton of the victorious host which had so lately fought to preserve the Union. A little over 54,000 Regulars—officers and men—in 1866 were scattered in scores of small posts and stations throughout thirteen departments, with large numbers concentrated in the South and on the Mexican border. Fairfax Downey, in *Indian-Fighting Army*, has painted an unforgettable picture of that part of this small force which carried the fight to Comanche and Kiowa, Apache, Cheyenne, and Sioux. "Hard-riding cavalry, mounted on sturdy Western mustangs: sorrels, blacks, bays, and grays, leaving the gaudy pinto or calico ponies to the Indians. Staunch infantry, more dreaded by the savages, who preferred to match their own fine horsemanship against riders in blue rather than launch a charge against the steady foot. Perhaps a howitzer carted in a six-mule wagon, or a field gun, but all too rarely, for though they slowed the pace of a march, nothing routed the red man as quickly as a salvo of bursting shells."

Yes, there was artillery with this Indian-fighting army—but only infrequently, as Downey indicates. Extremely difficult terrain, the limitations of available materiel, and the fast-moving nature of most campaigns made the employment of artillery against Indians a difficult problem and often of questionable value. However, when served by well-trained crews and handled by a commander who understood its capabilities, artillery proved its effectiveness against the red man time after time.

One such commander was Colonel Nelson A. Miles, who later rose to the rank of Major-General and to command of the army in the war with Spain. He used artillery effectively in many actions against the Indians, and at least twice his guns saved him from possible disaster.

The first instance occurred in October of 1876. Miles was hot on the trail of a band of hostiles led by the celebrated Sitting Bull. On the 22d of that month, he ran his quarry to earth and met with the wily chief to parley. Miles wasted little time on conversation. With characteristic decision, he gave Sitting Bull just fifteen minutes to make up his mind whether to fight or run. Although outnumbered perhaps as much as three to one, Miles attacked promptly when the fifteen minutes expired.

It was no easy fight. Speaking of it in his autobiography, Miles admits that "At one time the command was entirely surrounded by Indians, and the troops were formed in a large hollow square ... with all the reserves brought into action..." Miles' troops held firm, however, while his artillery opened on the savages. The Indians broke under shell fire, and cavalry soon turned the victory into a rout.

On another occasion, Miles employed what might be termed surprise fire to turn a ticklish situation into a decisive victory. In January of 1877, he led a sizable column against Crazy Horse, leader of a powerful band of northern Cheyennes and Sioux. His force consisted of some 400 men from the 5th Infantry and the 22d Infantry, plus two pieces of artillery — most likely twelve-pounder field guns. The guns were fitted with wagon bows and covered with canvas, which made it possible for them to march with the wagon train undetected by even the most keen-eyed hostile scout. On 7 January, Miles made contact and captured several members of Crazy Horse's party—evidently persons of some importance, for the column was forced to beat off an attempted rescue raid staged that night by some 300 warriors. The next morning the command awoke to find itself facing a pitched battle, with roughly 1,000 Indians occupying positions on high ground dominating the valley in which the troops had spent the night.

The key position held by the savages was a high bluff, and Miles unhesitatingly

sent his force down the valley toward it. Meanwhile, the two artillery pieces were hurriedly brought up from the wagon park. Bows and canvas cast aside, they went into position to support the attack. Charges were rammed home, carriages bucked under recoil, and salvo after salvo sped screaming across the valley to burst among the hostiles on the heights. Miles described the effect as follows, "... The two Napoleon guns exploded shells within their lines, creating great consternation, and the reechoing of the guns through the valley, while it gave the troops much confidence, undoubtedly multiplied the number of our guns in the estimation of the Indians themselves." Under continued artillery support, the infantry charged the bluff and drove Crazy Horse's warriors before them in defeat.

However, artillery was not always so successful when engaging the red man, and its mere presence with a fighting force by no means guaranteed victory. The Modoc War of 1872 is an excellent case in point—here no more than a hundred warriors, encumbered by perhaps twice as many women and children, withstood for months a force of as many as 1,000 soldiers supported by howitzers and mortars. The Modocs, led by the infamous Captain Jack, took up positions in the California lava beds near the Oregon border. Infantry attacks failed to dislodge them from these seemingly impregnable natural fortifications and were repulsed with losses. Mountain howitzers, served by crews put together on the spot from whatever personnel was available, shelled the Modocs without appreciable effect, and Cohorn mortars manned by regular artillerymen did little better. The Modoc affair was definitely not the artillery's fight—and to make matters worse, a composite force of artillery and infantry on reconnaissance for new mortar positions was surprised by the watchful Modocs, and lost almost half its number killed or wounded. Eventually, the troops succeeded in cutting off the Modocs' water supply, and they were slowly driven out of their stone fortress and taken.

Artillery got the worst of it again when Col. John Gibbon led a small force into battle against the redoubtable Chief Joseph, leader of the Nez Percés, in 1877. At the head of a detachment of his 7th Infantry, Gibbon attacked Joseph's camp and took it. His success was short lived, however, for Joseph turned on his attackers and forced them to withdraw from the village and dig in on a nearby rise. In the fighting which followed, Gibbon ordered up a howitzer, which went into position on high ground not far from the village. Joseph sported the maneuver, and sent a party of warriors to take the guns. The crew got off a few rounds before the Nez Percés closed in; then threw the piece off its carriage and retreated, losing one NCO killed and two wounded. The savages overran the position and removed the wheels from the carriage and hid them, thus effectively putting the piece out of action for the remainder of the fight, which ended when a larger command under General O. O. Howard appeared on the scene, putting the Indians to flight.

However, Joseph and his Nez Percés were not always so fortunate when faced by artillery. In the same campaign, Miles used a breech-loading Hotchkiss and a twelve-pounder Napoleon gun against them with good effect, finally securing Joseph's surrender in October, 1877. It is interesting to note that both of Miles' pieces were commanded and served by infantry enlisted personnel trained as artillery.

It was by no means unusual to find infantry (or cavalry) doubling in brass as artillery in this frontier warfare, nor was it any more unusual to find artillerymen doing the job of doughfeet. After the famous fight on the Little Bighorn which ended in the death of Custer and that part of the 7th cavalry under his immediate command, coast artillery troops equipped as infantry were used to relieve garrisons throughout the Division of the Missouri for field service. During Gen. George Crook's winter campaign of 1876, the column commanded by Col. R. I. Dodge included Batteries C, F, H, and K of the 4th artillery, all acting as infantry; and in his autobiography Crook mentions artillery used as infantry as early as 1854, and again in 1856 speaks of using men of the 3d Artillery on scouts against the Indians.

Gen. Crook, called by Sherman the greatest Indian fighter and manager the army ever had, apparently had little use for artillery as a weapon against the savages. Again, in his autobiography, Crook tells of engaging a band of Indians who took refuge in an impenetrable thicket of willows, defying all attempts to dislodge them. He cites the incident as the single occasion in all of his campaigns against Indians where he could have used artillery to advantage.

That seems to be a rather strong statement, and perhaps not too well considered. While a large part of Crook's campaigning was carried on against the Apaches in Arizona under conditions and on terrain which largely precluded the use of artillery, there appear to be other instances where Crook might have found artillery of great advantage. Chief among them is the Battle of the Rosebud, 17 June 1876—generally conceded to be the only defeat ever suffered by Crook at the hands of the Indians. Outwardly, the affair on the Rosebud would seem to be mainly a moral victory for the tribesmen, for Crook apparently took fewer casualties and remained in possession of the field. Actually, however, Crook narrowly missed the same fate which overtook Custer and his command five days later—the savages seeking to divide his force and destroy it in detail. He was unable to crush his foe, who slipped away to fight another day, and he was prevented from joining Terry's command as planned, which perhaps had a bearing on the tragedy on the Little Bighorn.

Crook places the blame for his lack of success in this engagement on the failure of part of his command to execute his orders promptly, thus preventing him from delivering a charge against the Indians which, he believed, would have carried the day. However, Martin E. Schmitt, who has edited Gen. Crook's autobiography, states that "The Rosebud was lost not because of poor tactics or negligence on the part of any of the participants, but because of overwhelming superiority of manpower and firepower on the side of the Indians. They outnumbered the soldiers three to one, and were armed with the latest-model repeating rifles."

It seems entirely possible that a large

part of this inferiority in numbers and firepower might have been offset by a few pieces of light artillery. It also seems quite likely that Crook could have delivered his charge had artillery support been available. Moreover, the terrain appears to have been quite well suited to the employment of artillery. Add to this the Indians' proved aversion to artillery fire, and it would surely seem that Crook could have used guns to good advantage here, had they but been available.

It is interesting to note that artillery played an important part in the last serious Indian uprising in the West, which began with the so-called Wounded Knee Massacre in December of 1890. Troops of the 7th Cavalry, supported by Lt. Allyn Capron's Battery "E," 1st Artillery, had rounded up a good-sized band of Sioux led by Chief Big Foot. The cavalry surrounded the Indians' camp, and an attempt was made to disarm the warriors. During the process, the Indians were harangued by a medicine man, who incited them to resistance. Fighting broke out in the camp, the Indians penetrated the encircling line of the cavalry, and a full-scale battle was underway. Capron's battery opened fire on the camp with its 1.65-in. Hotchkiss guns, and soon the situation was again in hand. One party of Sioux, however, had taken up a strong position in a deep ravine, from which repeated attacks failed to dislodge them. One of Capron's guns was placed in position to fire into the ravine, but before it could be brought into action, the officer commanding the piece was wounded. The gunner took command and, assisted by a single cannoneer, opened on the Indians in the ravine, maintaining effective fire although exposed to a hail of Sioux bullets. The corporal and his one-man crew kept their piece in action until the Sioux were finally driven out, and the former was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his heroism under fire. Lt. Capron, under whose leadership Battery "E" gave such an excellent account of itself that day, appears again in the annals of military history as one of the officers placed in charge of the Apache war leader Geronimo during his confinement at Ft. Sill. Still later, this same officer—now a captain—acquired the unhappy and unfortunate distinction of being the first American officer to fall killed in action in the Spanish-American War.

Judging from the record, it is clear that artillery—although used sparingly—did its part and did it well whenever and wherever it was committed against the savage raiders of the West. This becomes increasingly true as improved light materiel and more ambitious campaigns during the later years of the period provide more opportunities for the employment of artillery, and the red guidon takes its place more frequently among the blue and yellow of the infantry and the cavalry in the dusty columns which wind over deserts and prairies on the ever-diminishing trail of the last hostiles. And present-day artillerymen may reflect with pride upon the fact that guns, whether served by infantry or cannoneers, helped put the fear of God and the US Army into many a red marauder, and hastened the day when white men might travel and dwell unmolested throughout a vast and thriving empire in the West.

Military Government—A Principle of Modern Warfare

By Major Robert H. Slover, FA

NUMEROUS field exercises have been played during the past 3 years to demonstrate new tactics and weapons. However, one problem which is almost as old as warfare itself has been almost completely ignored in all of these field maneuvers and exercises. The problem of the control and use of civilians and civilian resources in the combat areas has not been considered. Probably more service personnel witnessed the Combine II exercises than any other. The Combine II theater was the southeastern part of the United States. The theater of operations for the exercise included such cities as Pensacola, Tallahassee, and Atlanta, yet in all of the planning and in the actual operations there was not one word mentioned of the civilian inhabitants or the civilian economy of these areas.

We seem to be training our armed forces to fight in completely uninhabited areas. This is not realistic planning. The modern concept of war demands that everything and everyone come directly within the scope of operations. This means that the inhabitants of a city or a country and all of the civilian facilities will play a strategic role in any future war. Campaigns may very well be directed toward the citizens of a nation, rather than at that nation's armies.

We need only look at what the results of civilian control, or lack of it, has meant to tactical operations. In the early stages of World War II, when Germany invaded France and the French armies began to crumble, there was very little control of the civilian population. Panic was widespread and the civilians took to the roads in droves on foot and in all sorts of vehicles. We are all familiar with the long lines of refugees fleeing before the advancing enemy. Main roads were blocked and the movements of the French army seriously impeded. The German army was quick to capitalize on this situation.

In the light of present day studies, it is seen that the German policies with many of the countries they overran and occupied helped bring about their defeat. The policy of bleeding a country for the Fatherland did not pay off. Recent writings of former German generals point out that the Germans made the mistake of replacing during combat the military administration with a civilian administration under Party direction. These former generals have in their writings set forth the principle that the military commander of an occupied area must have unrestricted command authority over all military and civilian agencies within his area.

Although the Germans were initially able to use Ukranian nationalism they

ultimately failed in this region of Russia because of (1) denial by Nazi theories of the Ukranian national or cultural autonomy, (2) bad treatment of civil population, and (3) hindrance of cultural, educational, and church activities.

On the other hand, examples may be pointed out how civilian control and use of civilian resources has been used to aid in accomplishing the military mission. During the Ardennes breakthrough, on the US First Army front, military government staffs and units took immediate steps to control civilian circulation, traffic, and security, and to handle civilian casualties and evacuees. One report states "during the first hectic and confused days, when chaos was the normal order of the day, security became the number one priority of business — keeping main supply roads from becoming hopelessly clogged with frantic civilians moving to the rear, establishing check points and military blocks for interrogation of civilians who might have been enemy agents, and quieting the feeling of terror and despair possessed by the civilian population of the Ardennes, which found itself panic stricken by the speed and surprise of the German breakthrough. From the outset of the campaign the purpose of the G-5 (Mil. Govt.) section was to take the civilian burden from the military and exploit its possibilities to the possible aid of the campaign."

Besides strategical considerations there is a further obligation imposed upon the Armed Forces by International Law. The Rules of Land Warfare obligate the commander occupying belligerent territory to assume responsibility for the care and control of the civilians of the area. The rights of man have been acquired and assumed legal stature over a period of hundreds of years. If they are denied, a basic tenet of our civilization has met with failure. It has always been a policy of the United States to recognize such individual rights and to fulfill all international obligations.

During World War II, US military government became a highly organized and efficient part of our armed forces. As our campaigns progressed, military government operations became an integrated part of the team that led us to victory. Then came the long-drawn-out occupation stages and there was a tendency to minimize and forget the part that military government played during the combat period.

Now our National Military Establishment is faced with the problem of being prepared to give adequate protection once again to our country and its interests. The lessons we learned, the progress we made in developing the use of military-government control in the scheme of modern warfare, must be heeded. We must realize today that wars will not be fought in uninhabited wastelands. It would be a fine thing if we could follow the practice of the days of King Arthur and place our best warriors in an open field to fight it out, but such is not the way of modern devastation. The more inhabited and highly industrialized an area the more likely it is to be a theater of war.

At the Department of Army level the top planners have begun to realize more and more that commanders must have, as an integral part of their staffs and forces, military government personnel and units if they are to be successful in accomplishing their mission. Control, use, and care of civilians and civilian economy during and immediately after combat is a principle of modern warfare that all elements of our National Military Establishment must accept and understand. It is as essential in the prosecution of war today as the well-proved principles of combat. It is an additional principle of modern warfare.

Military Government has been recognized by the Department of the Army as one of the essential elements in mobilization planning. The doctrine of employment of military government staffs and units in the planning and operational phases is carefully studied and written into plans at the Department of the Army level. The Plans and Operations Division of the General Staff has on its staff a number of highly trained and experienced military government officers whose primary functions are preparation and coordination of all military government strategic planning and general supervision over the execution of military-government policies at all levels.

Until recently all Department of the Army military-government functions were centered in the Civil Affairs Division. With the redistribution of functions of the Civil Affairs Division, the duties pertaining to military-government operations and training have been given to the Office of the Provost Marshal General. Within the Provost Marshal General's Office there has been created a Military Government Division whose functions are: (1) preparation of civil affairs/military government aspects of mobilization plans, (2) preparation of tables of organization, equipment, and distribution for civil affairs/military government units, and (3) preparation of training doctrine and literature. In order to perform these functions the Military Government Division is divided into a Training Branch and a Requirements Branch.

Just what progress has been made in the military government field to meet the requirements of mobilization planning? To answer this the fact should be noted that operational plans as they are now proposed by the top Army planners include military government annexes. This assures that the essential factor of military government integration has been considered. Troop-basis tables include military government staffs and units on a large enough scale to effectively control, care for, and use the civilian economy of any area of possible operations. On the logistical side, plans take into account the supplies that must be secured and delivered in order to properly care for the civilians, and more especially to see that they are given the necessary minimum ration to prevent hunger riots. The almost complete rewriting or revision of all staff and operational field manuals since the end of World War II has worked to the advantage of military government. Formerly these manuals almost completely ignored the military-government problem. The new editions will now contain military - government sections and drive home the necessity for military-government integration into all phases of staff planning and operations. Two operational field manuals on military government are now in the planning stage.

For the first time, other than during actual combat periods, there are Regular Army military-government units

and staff sections. One Military Government Group and two Military Government Companies have been activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, under the control of the G-5 section of V Corps. Besides being the laboratory for military government, these units will now be able to furnish military-government troops for maneuvers and missions.

Every officer in the Army must be indoctrinated on the integration of military government with all other phases of planning and operation. To accomplish this the officers must be reached through the educational program for the Army officer. Every branch school of the Arms and of the Technical and Administrative Services now include in their advanced courses 10 to 15 hours of instruction on military government. Some of these courses need to be strengthened and brought up to date if the student is to be familiarized with the present plans, organization, and doctrine of employment of military-government units. The Command and General Staff College has recognized the need for their students to understand military-government staff operations; consequently, there has been developed at the College an excellent course of instruction in military government. The interest in military government and related fields at the civilian universities has grown by leaps and bounds since the end of World War II. Such schools as Syracuse University, Georgetown University, and Harvard have incorporated military-government courses or seminars in their curricula. It must be stressed that no Army officer's education will be complete until he knows how to employ military-government units and individuals and understands what military government can do in assisting the tactical commander in reaching the military objective.

T/O&E 41-500 for the military-government service organizations was approved and printed by the Department of the Army in June 1948. This cellular type T/O&E permits the organization of military - government groups, companies, and platoons of any size or composition desired. A standard composition for groups and companies is prescribed, but this can be varied to fit any situation. Here then is the basis for the military-government unit for the combat and post-combat phases of operations. Military Government staff sections are being included in the new tables of organization and equipment now being prepared for Army Groups, Army, Corps, and Division headquarters.

T/O&E 41-500 has formed the basis for the organization of military-government units in the ORC program. It is possible in the Regular Army to maintain only a bare nucleus of officers who will function as military-government officers in case of mobilization. As is true in all other services, we must look to the reserve program to furnish the bulk of military-government officers and enlisted men that would be needed for operation in time of war. Especially is it true that the functional specialists needed by military government must come from the Reserve Corps. There are hundreds of former military-government officers, and other reserve officers interested in military-government work, who are available for membership in ORC Military Government units. At the present time, seventy such units based on T/O&E 41-500 have been authorized for organization and operation in the six Army Areas. There are fourteen groups, each containing 66 officers and 166 enlisted men, and fifty-six companies, each containing 50 officers and 152 enlisted men, authorized. Over three-fourths of these units have been organized and are now carrying out regularly scheduled training programs. In addition to the T/O&E units, special staff units and training units are being organized in several of the Army areas to carry on a special type of mission. National Guard divisions and the ORC divisions have been authorized inclusion of a military-government section in their headquarters.

Obviously it is impossible to reach all reserve officers interested in military-government training through unit organization; therefore the Department of the Army will assign a limited number of projects to individual reserve officers. Working through normal Army Area procedures, the Department of the Army is able to designate and control the type of project the individual reserve officer will perform. For these individual projects the reserve officer will be given inactive-duty training credit and points for retirement in accordance with the existing regulations.

To supplement the unit and individual training, the civilian-component officer will find several extension courses on military government or on subjects closely related to it. In the 40 series every branch of the service now includes a common subcourse on military government. The Command and General Staff College is including military-government problems in the 50 and 60 series courses now being prepared.

The objective of the civilian components training program in military government is to prepare the officer and enlisted man for the first or combat phase of operation. Besides a grounding in military-government principles and operations, each individual must have a thorough knowledge of Army organization and operation and of staff procedures.

It can be said that military government has been established as an integral part of Army planning and operation, yet there is much that remains to be accomplished. A career plan with a school program is needed for a limited number of officers; more training literature and manuals should be prepared; the training program, including the extension courses for civilian-component officers, needs strengthening; and the doctrine of joint and combined operations should be worked out.

The goal is three-fold: (1) To indoctrinate every Army officer with the knowledge of what military government is, its principles, how it is employed, and the necessity for it; (2) to have a number of officers in the Regular Establishment trained in military-government operations to form the nucleus of military-government staffs and units; and (3) to have in the ORC individuals and units in such a state of organization and training that they will be capable of employment to fill the military-government needs upon mobilization. Achievement of these goals will assure that adequate consideration is given to the maxim of modern warfare that control, use, and care of civilians and civilian economy is necessary for successful accomplishment of the military mission.

1949 ASSOCIATION MEDAL WINNERS

Texas A and M College. Cadet Lt. Col. Donald E. Jarvis won the award. He is a vice-president of his class, Corps adjutant, winner of the DAR award, and President of Tau Beta Pi, and has been a Distinguished Student each year.



St. Mary's University. Cadet Joseph B. Aycock won the award. He was in the Navy from October 1941 to December 1946, serving in multiengined seaplanes engaged in patrol and air-sea rescue work in the Carribean and the Far East.



Yale University. Cadet Lt. Col. Kurt F. Pantzer, Jr., won the award. He is a member of Calhoun College and of Cannon and Castle, a Dean's list student, and commander of the Artillery Battalion of the ROTC Composite Regiment. (Photo New Haven Register.)

Iowa State College. Cadet Lt. Col. Jack A. Templeton won the award. He served in WW II with the 5th Infantry Division, earning the Combat Infantry Badge, three battle stars, and the Bronze Star Medal, and is a battalion commander in the Cadet Corps.

University of Nebraska. Cadet 2nd Lt. Glen W. Elliott won the award.

Ohio State University. Cadet Major Mardis R. Warner won the award.



West Virginia State College. Cadet James E. Ramsey won the award. He served for three years in the USAAF during WW II and expects to accept a Regular Army commission on graduation.

Colorado A and M College. Cadet Staff Sergeant Paul G. Milbee won the award. During WW II he had two and one-half years' service in the Army as a sergeant, and is now a junior in college.

Armored Artillery in the Team

By Major Ralph M. Click, FA

Republished (slightly condensed) by courtesy of the Armored Cavalry Journal

GENERAL George S. Patton, while describing a particular action at the outset of World War II, is credited with having remarked that "by methods known only to God and the artillery, fire was placed on the target." This mystery surrounding field artillery techniques at the beginning of the war caused many commanders at all levels to fail to fully realize the tremendous fire potential of their supporting artillery. They let the mystery of its techniques also build into a mystery of its employment and the full utilization of its fire power. The effect of the artillery's fire power was not integrated into their planning except in the most general terms. However, by the end of the war, most combat officers realized how much artillery fire had contributed to success on the battlefield and had picked up a basic understanding of the employment of artillery. By means of a simplified procedure for adjusting fire, many tankers and infantrymen had called for and adjusted fire in emergencies. However, fire planning, and the employment of forward observers and liaison officers by the supported units, frequently did not make full use of the capabilities of the artillery.

Artillerymen also learned, as a result of wartime experience, that their procedure for the adjustment of fire had to be simplified until a soldier of any combat arm could grasp the fundamentals with a minimum of training, and bring effective artillery fire to aid the accomplishment of his mission. Since the end of hostilities, much work has been done to this end. Obviously a more intimate knowledge of the principles of artillery employment and technique, beyond a simple request for fire, must be a part of the equipment of commanders of all combat echelons in the armored division. Intimate association must exist between tank, armored infantry, armored engineers, and armored artillery if co-operation—the combined arms teamwork—is to be achieved. This cooperation must be based upon an understanding of the employment and capabilities of each by the other.

It must be fully realized that an armored field artillery battalion is a fighting unit. Here lies its principal difference from the artillery of the infantry division and other towed artillery. You will find no outstanding differences from other artillery in a search of Tables of Organization, training procedures, or written doctrine on its employment. Rather it might be said that armored artillery is a "state of mind." Its aggressive spirit for forward movement and contact with the enemy make it an almost different arm, for it must exhibit the same characteristics of fire power, mobility, and shock action expected of other members of the combined-arms team. Its commanders must be progressive and ingenious. No rigid set of operating procedures are applicable to its functioning, for it must be able to deliver fire with the utmost speed under all conditions and situations, and be able to defend itself from hostile attack while in firing position or on the march. It may be called upon to accompany tanks without supporting infantry. These capabilities are not the result of special equipment alone but must be the result of aggressive thought and action on the part of its commanders.

NEW ORGANIZATION

The fire power of the armored artillery in the armored division has been greatly increased under the Tables of Organization of 8 October 1948. The addition of an armored field artillery battalion (155 mm self-propelled howitzers) and a self-propelled antiaircraft artillery (automatic weapons) battalion provides missing parts that were necessary for the self-sufficiency of the division. The antiaircraft battalion is equipped with full-tracked gun carriages, mounting twin 40mm guns, and the familiar quadruple caliber .50, mounted on a half-tracked vehicle. This latter vehicle is being replaced with a full-track mount which will enable the antiaircraft artillery to accompany tanks over any terrain. The medium field artillery battalion furnishes added depth of fire and punch lacking under the old organization. To make up for this shortage during the past war, towed 155mm howitzer battalions were normally attached to the division, but they sometimes lacked the mobility and organization necessary most effectively to take their place in the combined arms team.

The most important changes in armored field artillery organization from a tank or armored infantry battalion commander's standpoint are the increases in the number of forward observers and liaison officers available in the artillery of the armored division for assignment to supported units.

	Old T/O	*New T/O*
Liaison Officers	3	14
Forward Observers	9	29

This means that the reinforced-battalion commander can now rely on having a forward observer present with each line company and a liaison officer with the battalion command group. The new Tables of Organization have taken the forward observer tanks away from the artillery battalions and have designated a tank in each line tank company to be used for this purpose. The tank supplied the forward observer in each company will have its crew and maintenance furnished by the company. Its radio must be aligned with the fire-direction channels of the artillery. This method of furnishing transportation for the forward observer will relieve the field artillery battalion of training tank crews, although it places an added responsibility upon the tank unit. However, the presence of a forward observer with the tank unit is no longer dependent upon the supply of forward observer tanks from the artillery battalion. The forward observer with an infantry company will continue to supply his own transportation.

EMPLOYMENT

The employment of the armored artillery of the armored division must follow

the requirement that the tremendous fire power of the division is always forward where it can be concentrated at a decisive point to effect the desired knock-out punch to the enemy. This clearly requires that the artillery be kept forward, particularly in the attack, and that its communications and liaison with the units it supports be broad and flexible to secure the necessary co-operation and co-ordination. The broad nature of the communications system of the artillery, with forward observers and liaison officers with all combat units, offers a great aid to the flexibility of assignment and to operations of the armored division.

To the reinforced-battalion commander, the important fact in armored artillery organization and employment is that he can rely on having a light armored field artillery battalion working with him. Whether this artillery is in direct support of his battalion, or of the combat command as a whole, the planning of operations and the fire support he will receive will not change. In considering the artillery support available to the reinforced battalion, it must be emphasized that this support is not limited to the fire power of the 18 howitzers of this direct-support battalion, but includes the fire power of all artillery within range. This available fire power can include the other artillery battalions of the armored division, artillery of adjacent divisions, and corps artillery.

In the attack, the armored artillery of the division is normally assigned to combat commands with direct-support roles, but kept under division artillery control for the massing of fires. This arrangement is continued during the initial phases of an attack. When a penetration has been effected, field artillery battalions in support of the leading combat command are then attached directly to the combat command. When and if the second combat command is committed, its supporting artillery battalions are attached also. During the exploitation phase of an attack, direct-support artillery must be kept well forward in the march column in order that its fire power may at all times be available to the forward elements. An armored field artillery battery normally marches with the advance tank-armored infantry team, with the remainder of the direct-support artillery battalion following the second tank-infantry team. The advance battery can furnish fire support for the leading team and if resistance is encountered which will require the employment of the remainder of the reinforced battalion, the entire artillery battalion will go into firing position near the advance battery. By having the artillery forward, it can cover the deployment of the reinforced battalion and furnish immediate fire support in any direction.

In defensive situations, the armored artillery is normally kept under division artillery control, but is assigned direct-support roles to combat commands. Under division artillery control, the massing of all artillery fire is more quickly and effectively accomplished. In a mobile defense, the armored artillery of the division, like the other members of the combined arms team, fights as it would in the attack. In a delaying action or withdrawal, the armored artillery plays an even more important role in the operations of the division. It is one of the last units to be displaced to the rear, covering with its fire the withdrawal or disengagement of the other members of the combined arms team.

Special operations such as river crossings or night attacks do not alter or greatly affect the employment of the armored artillery or the effectiveness of its fire support. In such situations, its fire support must be very carefully planned so that it may be of the greatest assistance to the combined arms team. Tanks may attack without infantry, or infantry without tanks, but artillery support should be present in either case.

The armored division fights with combined arms teams of tanks, armored infantry, armored engineers, and armored artillery. Each element complements and supplements the other to aid in the forward movement of the team through the employment of its own capabilities. A tank battalion and an armored infantry battalion are normally joined and two teams, with both tanks and armored infantry, are formed. One team is commanded by the tank battalion commander and the other by the infantry commander. These combined arms teams are termed reinforced battalions, and their composition may have an equal or different tank-armored infantry ratio. This intermarriage of the two arms is carried down through the smaller combat units. A light armored field artillery battalion is normally assigned a direct-support mission to one of these reinforced battalions. Because of the supporting nature of the artillery in this team, its commander must be continually informed of the plans and progress of every operation of the team, to ensure that artillery support will be available when needed. For this reason, the commander of the direct-support artillery battalion should be present with the reinforced-battalion commander during both the planning and execution phases of any operation.

Since it is impossible for the commander of the direct-support artillery battalion to be always present at the headquarters of the reinforced battalion, a liaison officer from the artillery battalion is furnished the supported unit. This officer is a well qualified artilleryman and a specialist in his duties of providing artillery "know-how" and support to the battalion. He must be regarded in this light by its commander and staff, and his aid must be used in the formation and execution of plans. His place is with the commander of the reinforced battalion and his duties are those of a special staff officer. The liaison officer must keep his own unit continually informed of the plans of the reinforced battalion and exercise general supervision over the assignment and functioning of the artillery forward observers attached to it.

As mentioned previously, forward observers from the direct-support artillery battalion will normally be sent to each line company of the reinforced battalion. These officers are the seeing-eye dogs of the artillery, by which its fire power is most effectively brought to the aid of the combined arms team. The most advantageous position for the forward observer is with the reinforced-company commander, for he must keep continually informed as to the plans and progress of the company mission. Every effort will be made by the artillery battalion to supply the best officer available to perform the mission as forward observer. Close association during training of these officers with those

of the tank and armored infantry battalions will pay big dividends on the field of battle.

The reinforced battalion has a definite responsibility for the reception and considerate treatment of these officers from the artillery. They are the tangible evidence of the artillery in the forward combat elements of the team, and their value to the supported units depends upon the manner in which they are treated and used. The tank and crew furnished the observer should be as good as any in the tank company if he is to function effectively. This intangible support is largely the responsibility of the individual officers of the reinforced unit.

DEVELOPING THE FIRE PLAN

The employment of the artillery of the armored division, like that of the tank and infantry units, must be characterized by deliberate planning followed by violent execution. In furtherance of this principle, the fire support of the artillery must be carefully planned and co-ordinated with the efforts of the other members of the combined arms team. This plan for the employment of the artillery's fire power is developed by the reinforced-battalion commander and the commander of the direct-support artillery battalion. Integrated into the plan must be tactical air support when available and the supporting weapons of the reinforced battalion itself. It should be mentioned that the technique of planning for the utilization of the fire power of artillery is the same, regardless of whether the artillery is from the armored division or is towed artillery. However, the details of its execution by armored artillery may be different.

An effective fire plan for an attack should be planned so that artillery fire will:

a. Deny effective observation to the enemy.
b. Neutralize the objective and thereby reduce losses by assaulting troops.
c. Isolate the objective to facilitate its capture and hinder the enemy from reinforcing or counter-attacking the position.

In defense, the avenues of approach by the enemy must be anticipated and fires planned that will delay or blunt his attack until a counterattack by our forces can be launched. Important to the reinforced-battalion commander in formulating this fire plan are the capabilities and limitations of the artillery support available, insofar as the number and types of artillery battalions available, ammunition restrictions, if any, and the effective ranges of the supporting battalions. The firing of an artillery preparation prior to attack is considered desirable if ammunition is available. The resulting loss in secrecy is not normally considered as important as the devastation and confusion created in the enemy position.

For his planning, the artillery battalion commander or his liaison officer will need to be briefed on the following by the reinforced battalion:

a. Detailed information of the enemy.
b. Location of forward elements, assembly areas, and attack positions of the supported units.
c. Areas from which difficulties are expected.
d. General location, time, duration, and priority of fires on known targets, the objective, and protective fires.
e. Method of calling for, lifting, and shifting of fires.
f. Special requirements, such as smoke or illumination.

The fire plan when developed will normally consist of a number of concentrations which can be fired on call from the reinforced battalion as the engagement progresses. Upon completion of the fire plan by the commanders, its details must be distributed to all supported units. It must be emphasized that this plan is flexible and can be changed easily as the operation progresses.

EXECUTING THE PLAN

Because of the uncontrollable factors and uncertainties always present in armored warfare, it is preferable for details of the fire plan to be set in action on call from the reinforced-battalion commanders and lifted by a forward observer, rather than to have the fire plan executed on a prearranged time schedule. Like the plans of the reinforced battalion, the fire plan for the artillery must be reviewed and changed if necessary as the action progresses. It is of vital importance that the artillery battalion commander be kept up to date on the plans and progress of supported units by his liaison officer so that he may plan for the displacement of his artillery to keep within range.

The forward observer with the reinforced company must always be alert for resistance that is encountered at points where no prearranged fires have been planned. His action might be compared to a defensive back in a football game. He places the weight of his fires on targets and areas that become important as the action progresses. His fires must be co-ordinated with the reinforced company and must be ones which will aid the advance of the team. This means that he must not fritter ammunition and time away on a few infantry on a flank, but on the other hand should request heavy volumes of fire when he finally gets a good target or suspected area. The reinforced-company commander should carefully consider these last statements, for his forward observer will normally fire all missions requested by the supported unit.

Almost every tank radio in the armored division has one of its channels aligned to the division artillery fire-direction net. In event the forward observer becomes a casualty or no observer is present when needed, almost everyone has communications with the artillery and can call for and adjust artillery fire. If tankers and infantrymen can send the WHAT and WHERE with respect to a target and adjust the fire in the same manner as for their tank guns, mortars, or assault guns, effective artillery fire can be brought to aid the unit if there is artillery within range.

It is hardly necessary to review the importance of the artillery liaison airplane to the forward movement of the armored division. Under the new Tables of Organization their numbers have been more than doubled in the division as a whole. Combat units can rely on the presence of these "air eyes" at the front of the attacking column or keeping up a constant surveillance of the enemy in a defensive position.

Because of the supporting nature of artillery, many commanders unconsciously relegate to it the position of a nonfighting arm, one that must always be protected by infantry cover and by distance from the scene of action, and one not expected to take the normal risks of other combat units. This does not hold for armored artillery—it is a fighting arm. Its organization and equipment permit it to accompany the other members of the combined arms team, and its personnel must have the same aggressive spirit for contact with the enemy which characterizes the tanker or the armored infantryman. Armored artillery can be expected to clear its own position areas of enemy resistance and to aid in the close-in defense of the entire team. The time-consuming selection and occupation of position by towed artillery is practically nonexistent in the operation of armored artillery in the attack. An armored artillery battery should be able to begin delivery of fire in less than five minutes after receiving a call for support, even though the battery be in column on the road at the time the call is received. At times an armored artillery battalion can be effectively used as a holding force and base of fire, while the entire remainder of the combined team maneuvers to a flank. By so doing, the commander of the reinforced battalion may increase his "effective fighting strength" and defeat an enemy superior in numbers.

Of particular importance to the reinforced-battalion commander is the part which the artillery battalion commander and his liaison officer should play in the planning of a successful attack or defense. The deliberate planning which characterizes armored action must include the best fire plan possible for the utilization of supporting artillery. The violent execution of the operation must employ the full effect of the tremendous fire power available.

Particular emphasis must be placed upon teaching the comanders of small units what artillery can do for them. They must realize that the forward observer with them carries a big stick and the chance of success in their fight may be greatly increased by their intelligent use of his support.

EXTRACTS FROM THE FIRST ARMY ARTILLERY INFORMATION SERVICE (WWII)

By Brigadier General Chas. E. Hart, USA

EARLY in December of 1943 the Artillery Section, Headquarters First Army, published the first of a series of eight editions, plus an addendum, of an Artillery Information Service (AIS). The underlying purpose of this project was to collect, collate, and disseminate lessons learned during combat, as well as information obtained from the War Department, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Schools, of interest and value to artillerymen.

Much of the information published by this means during the two-year period December 1943-December 1945 is still current. For this reason it is thought that it would be of benefit to republish from each edition extracts of particular interest, so as to permit a more leisurely and considered perusal by artillerymen than was possible during the war years.

The material contained herein is not to be considered as approved Department of the Army doctrine. However, it is felt that the information included and combat lessons learned, if applied with judgment and due consideration of the situation at hand, will be of value in the training of individuals and units for combat.

EXTRACTS FROM AIS NO. 1, PUBLISHED IN DECEMBER 1943

Interdependence of Artillery and Infantry Plans

All artillery plans must be based on the infantry plans, and the two must be fully coordinated and interdependent.

Reports received of early operations of the Italian Campaign brought out that there were indications that some commanders did not understand the capabilities and limitations of artillery, i.e. an infantry commander ordered a battalion to displace forward to a designated position because it was "too far back." The position *from* which the battalion was ordered to displace gave an effective range of 7,000 yards in front of their front line. The position *to* which the battalion was ordered was so masked by high ground and dead space that there were few remunerative targets on which it could fire. Missions assigned by infantry commanders should specify *what* is desired, not how or from where they are to be executed. Infantry should follow artillery fire at a distance not in excess of 200 yards.

Counterbattery Fire

It is a mistake to assume that, because a hostile battery has been silenced by our own artillery concentrations, the guns have been destroyed. The probability factor in the range table shows how difficult this is to do. Our own concentrations certainly cause heavy casualties, and make the enemy most reluctant to open fire again from the same position, but the chances of actually hitting and destroying the enemy's guns must remain small. Experience shows that the best way of neutralizing hostile artillery is by a really heavy concentration of fire, but for destruction, the fire of a single battery is better; it is only effective if it can be observed from the air or the ground and the center of impact of the shells kept exactly on the enemy guns. Even then a big expenditure of ammunition is necessary, and it is for this reason and on account of the difficulties of observation that we usually resort to neutralizing the enemy with concentrations. The time to neutralize hostile batteries is when our own infantry are about to advance.

When an enemy battery has been silenced it is for the counterbattery staff to discover if the battery has moved, and if so, where.

Self-propelled versus truck-drawn artillery

While it has been proved that the

motor carriage M-7 possesses ability to negotiate rough terrain, it has been found that truck-drawn artillery has been able to negotiate successfully any terrain required of the M-7 (with the exception of deep sand). Self-propelled artillery weapons are well suited for employment in direct support of amphibious assaults executed over beaches of a sandy nature. The increased maintenance and fuel consumption, together with speed limitations and concealment difficulties, are disadvantages of self-propelled artillery which should be considered when making comparisons.

Ammunition Supply

Extract from Report on Employment of the II Corps Artillery in the Gafsa-El Guettar - Maknassy Operation — 1 May 1943

To operate on an ammunition allocation of credit basis during combat is not practicable because of the unforeseen sudden changes in the situation and the regrouping of forces.

To permit units to draw against the corps depot stocks as a whole to meet expenditures, rather than against periodic credits, simplifies supply procedure both for the Corps Ammunition Officer and the unit itself. This system worked well during the entire operation. However, it necessitates not only close supervision by Corps Ammunition Officer in conjunction with the Corps Artillery Officer, but also it requires cooperation on the part of the unit not to build up stocks in excess of requirements. Free drawing is conducive to units establishing dumps with resultant overstocking in case of a move. Corps order should and did provide that when the situation calls for dumping ammunition on the ground in anticipation of expenditures, the division or separate unit will be responsible for the protection and evacuation of the ammunition authorized to be dumped, and a report will be made to the Corps Ordnance Officer within 24 hours, giving the location of the dump.

The stocking of the corps depot on the basis of our One Day Average Combat Expenditure Table proved to be a far better yardstick than the unit of fire used heretofore, which for most weapons was considerably too high. Unit expenditure reports must be as complete and accurate as possible. The experience table is passed on through channels to the Theater Commander, who utilizes the information as a basis for recommendation to the War Department in connection with changes that may be necessary in the way of supply (as to percentage of types, etc.), and also as a guide for the establishment of a unit of fire to meet the conditions prevalent in the particular theater.

Extract from Report on Employment of the II Corps Artillery in Northern Tunisian Campaign—21 June 1943

Corps continued its policy of establishing ammunition supply points under corps control within 25 to 30 miles of front line operations. During the first part of the final northern TUNISIAN operation, the maximum turnaround was about 46 miles.

When a flank mission moved forward, away from the axis of supply, with distance and a bad road net making ammunition haulage from corps depots unreasonably difficult, the unit, upon request to Corps, was authorized to establish its own dump, stocked with not in excess of a one-day level. The coordinates of the division dump and the amount of ammunition in the dump were reported each day to the Corps Ammunition Officer on the daily ammunition status of Class V Supplies and Expenditure Report.

The Corps pushed its ASP's forward as soon as the situation permitted. It is felt that it is more desirable that ammunition trains from all units within a division come directly to the ammunition supply point for their requirements, merely clearing their authority to draw through the division ammunition officer. Thus, when the ammunition leaves the supply point, it goes direct to the front-line unit without rehandling. Also, the accumulation of ammunition in dumps not under corps control, in a rapidly moving tactical situation which might demand unexpected shifts of the supply axis for one or more divisions, is not believed to be good practice.

Prior to "D" Day, battalion ammunition trains of units which were in bivouac areas, awaiting orders to move into the line, were used by Corps for the initial stockage of corps ASP's. Battalion trains, plus battery 5th-section vehicles, dumped their basic loads at a designated corps ASP and refilled at a rear base depot. The artillery trains were able to make several trips between rear depots and corps ASP's.

In this, as in several previous operations, the contribution of artillery trucks to haul ammunition for Corps was a factor in making it possible to reach the prescribed tonnage prior to "D" Day. It is felt that the use of the artillery ammunition trucks to supplement corps transportation facilities, prior to an operation, at a time when the demand for trucks is heavy, is an economic employment of otherwise idle vehicles.

Enemy Time Fire Ruse (*13th FA Brig*)

It appears that the Germans make the most of their limited amount of artillery available for counterbattery. During the operation in northern TUNISIA, time fire was employed for a most unusual purpose. Artillery in support of our infantry was engaged in a time-fire mission on enemy personnel in the close proximity of our own troops. Enemy artillery countered with a few rounds of time shell on our own front-line elements, thereby giving the impression that our own fire was falling short. The desired result was obtained, as the infantry demanded that their supporting artillery "cease firing" on present mission for the reason cited.

Miscellaneous

A field artillery officer from the Corps Artillery Section, who observed the action of 16 February in the vicinity of MADJENE BEL ABBES, reports the following with reference to the German technique of 88mm gun fire:

The gun is moved forward fully set up, dug-in, and one round fired for registration, probably using bi-lateral observation. An appreciable length of time elapses—sometimes as much as an hour—before firing is resumed, then it becomes virtually continuous.

If one such initial round is observed, every possible means should be utilized to locate this gun, as it will probably not fire again, so as to permit detection, until its targets are accurately located and effective fire delivered.

(*To be continued*)

THUNDER BY THE RIVER

By Major John B. B. Trussell Jr., CAC

AS FAR as the outcome of a war is concerned, the Battle of New Orleans was as insignificant as any military engagement on record. Yet, it has been described as "one of the most remarkable in all history." From the standpoint of a courageous resistance against heavy odds, it must always rank high in the annals of American arms. This is particularly true in the light of the sorry record of our land forces during the War of 1812. Blunder and disaster and failure had finally been crowned with the loss and destruction of Washington. Although the Battle of New Orleans was fought two weeks after the signing of the peace treaty, it nonetheless does much to counteract the shame and exasperation which Americans who study the War of 1812 must inevitably feel.

Probably no more heterogeneous force was ever gathered together under the American flag than that which Andrew Jackson commanded along the Rodriquez Canal. Tennessee and Mississippi squirrel-hunters stood shoulder to shoulder with Creole militiamen, who in turn were flanked by free "men of color." One battery of artillery was manned by Jean Lafitte's Baratarians—smugglers, if you are inclined to be generous; pirates, by some accounts. Another battery was commanded by a French major general who had led a division under Bonaparte. A group of Choctaw Indians held the left flank.

To the artilleryman, the battle offers points of particular interest and pride. And to military men in general, the campaign highlights at least one lesson of specific application today.

For a quarter of a century wars which changed the course of human events had been going on constantly in Europe, but peace seemed to have come at last. Napoleon, exiled to the tiny island of Elba, was brooding over past triumphs, and if he was plotting another blow, his conquerors did not know it. For them, the time had come to tie up the loose ends. One of these loose ends was the petty little war in America which had been stinging the British lion like a gadfly for almost three years. Only a small force, relatively speaking, had been committed on land, but the ravages of the American privateers and the successes of the tiny United States Navy in single-ship actions were affronts to British pride and a serious economic annoyance to a maritime power. With the "monster" Bonaparte disposed of, a concerted effort should now be made to settle the Americans.

The force which had put Washington to the torch was, therefore, ordered to Jamaica. There it could refit and be reinforced by additional troops, freed from their long campaigning in Europe. Sent out from England to take command was Major General Sir Edward Pakenham, brother-in-law of the Iron Duke himself. This was no case of nepotism, however, for although he was young — thirty-eight — Pakenham was rated as one of Britain's better generals. He ". . . had learned the art of war from Wellington, in the best school in Europe." His promotions he ". . . had justified by valor and ability. . . ."

Pakenham's mission was to seize control of the Mississippi in concert with forces operating from Canada, splitting the West (as yet largely unsettled) from the seaboard and effectively preventing the further expansion of the United States. New Orleans was the key to the Mississippi, and so it was that the capture of that city headed Sir Edward's priority list.

On 10 December 1814, with a fleet of more than fifty vessels bearing some 8,000 troops, Pakenham landed on the shores of that arm of the Gulf of Mexico known as Lake Borgne. As the crow flies, it was nine miles from where the British fleet rode at anchor to the banks of the Mississippi; but by way of the road which the troops must follow, twisting beside bayous and canals through cypress swamps, the distance was almost half again as great. New Orleans itself lay some ten miles, more or less, farther up the river.

Numerically, the American force for defense was approximately equal to the five thousand British troops ultimately committed, but it was composed mainly of raw militia. The Regular elements were two "regiments" of infantry, the 7th and 44th, and a detachment of artillerymen manning two six-pounders—altogether, 818 officers and men. Few if any of these had previously seen a battle larger than an Indian skirmish. Jackson's land forces were supplemented by two small naval vessels, the *Carolina* and the *Louisiana*.

Pakenham's command consisted of the four regiments which had been on the expedition against Washington—the 21st (the Royal North British Fusiliers), the 85th, the 44th (the East Essex) and the 4th (the King's Own); a Highland regiment — the 93rd — brought from the Cape of Good Hope; and a brigade of infantry just come from their defeat of the French in Wellington's Peninsular campaigns. These were proud, old regiments, and the names on their regimental colors—Bothwell Bridge, Steenkerke, Blenheim, Malplaquet, Sheriffmuir, Dettingen, Fontenoy, Culloden, Ticonderoga, Niagara, Saratoga, Aboukir Bay, Long Island, White Plains, Tarragona, Corunna, Salamanca, Vittoria, San Sebastian, Torres Vedras — names that smelled of gunsmoke and echoed with the rumble of cannon on distant fields, were enough to strike fear into the green recruits who faced them.

There were also two regiments of West Indian Negroes and a full complement of supporting troops. These included a brigade of rocketeers, a type of unit with which, at the instance of Sir William Congreve, the British Army was then experimenting. The Congreve rocket units deserve some parenthetical attention. Under the direction of the Royal Horse Artillery, they were organized for mounted transport, but both the rockets and their launchers were light enough to be readily carried by men on foot. The launchers, known by the French name, *bouche à feu*, were long tubes supported by two bipods. The forward bipod was longer than the one in the rear, thus establishing a fixed elevation for the muzzle of the launcher. Each troop consisted of eighty officers and men; the men were organized into teams of three, firing a total of twenty-four launchers. The rate of fire

per launcher was four six-pound rockets per minute. In action, the launcher was set up with its bipods firmly in the ground. When one member of the team had pushed his rocket into the rear of the launcher, another lit the protruding fuze. The weapons were very inaccurate. ". . . They have been known to turn in mid-air and plunge down on the troops who discharged them." But the sight of their flaming trails would terrify even thoroughly disciplined soldiers. Moreover, ranges of three thousand yards or better could be developed with twelve-pound rockets; and these, according to the officer in charge of the rocketeers, would penetrate a solid earthwork for twenty to twenty-two feet before exploding. Earthworks twelve feet thick were considered fully adequate protection against conventional projectiles of equivalent weight.

The British expeditionary force was directed by ". . . an efficient staff and a military system as perfect as experience and expenditure could make it, and . . . [was] as fine an army as England could produce. . . ." What wonder, then, that British hopes and morale ran high?

The Battle of New Orleans actually resolves itself into four distinct and separate engagements, spread in time over a period of more than two weeks. The first of these engagements followed shortly upon the initial British thrust into the interior.

One brigade, consisting of a little under 1,700 troops, supported by two light field-pieces (three-pounders), was sent ashore with orders to push to the Mississippi. Learning of the enemy's approach on 24 December, Jackson marched with slightly less than half of his command to meet them on the banks of the river. In a well planned and, considering the training of his men, surprisingly well executed maneuver, he caught them in their front with his main body, on their right flank with his brigade of mounted Tennessee riflemen, and on their left flank with the fire of the *Carolina*.

A sharp little fight followed, but after an hour and a half the Americans on the front were driven off. The commander of the landing force, however, sent a message to the fleet posthaste, calling on the main body to come up. In the meantime, he would hold his ground with traditional British tenacity, although the *Carolina* continued to harass his camp with fire from her twelve-pounders.

Andrew Jackson anticipated precisely this action. When he broke off the engagement with the British brigade he withdrew about three miles up the river, choosing to defend a position behind a ditch called the Rodriquez Canal. With his right flank protected by the river, he anchored his left on the cypress swamp; he began erecting earthworks along a thousand-yard front, facing an open plain. While the canal, which was dry, was deepened, a parapet was thrown up behind it. Gun emplacements were built, with cotton bales augmenting the protection furnished by the earth walls. Commodore Patterson, the senior American naval officer, removed from his ships one twenty-four-pounder and two twelve-pounders, to be emplaced later.

Pakenham himself arrived in the British camp on the morning following the engagement. For Christmas Day there was little enough of peace, he must have thought. One look at the *Carolina* blazing away from the river and at the *Louisiana* a mile upstream convinced him that with his left flank so exposed he could not hope to advance farther. Heavier guns must be brought from the fleet, and the American ships sunk or driven back.

During all that day and the next, then, British sailors pulled at their oars to bring guns ashore, gunners hauled the pieces through the swamps, and sappers plied pick and spade to build emplacements. During the night of 26/27 December the last of the pieces—altogether there were five of them—was made ready. At daybreak on the 27th they opened a sudden and effective fire upon the *Carolina*. In a few minutes she was flaming, and soon after the last of her crew went over the side she blew up. The gunners traversed their pieces to bring their fire to bear upon the *Louisiana,* but they were late, for she had been towed upstream, out of range.

The next day, under the cover of artillery and rocket fire, Pakenham put his force in motion. It was formed in two columns, the left marching along the road which bordered the river and the right far enough inland to permit the entire command to maneuver into line to the right. Pakenham would have preferred to wait for additional artillery to come up, but he was driven into what he considered a premature attack by the open scorn of the British naval commander, Vice Admiral Cochrane.

As the column on the British left flank came into range it was taken under fire by the *Louisiana*. Red-coated soldiers began to fall. Shouting above the noise of explosions, British officers ordered their sweating men to double into line, to form a smaller target. With hot iron fragments singing angrily through the air, the next command was to take cover. The advance on the left was halted, pinned to the ground.

On the right, no such difficulty was being encountered. The levee masked the column from the *Louisiana's* guns, and American rifle fire, while deadly at shorter ranges, was ineffective beyond four hundred yards. There was as yet an insufficient number of guns in Jackson's line to cause serious trouble: the two six-pounders stood at the extreme right of the American line; one twenty-four-pound gun and a twelve-pound howitzer—which was practically useless from age and disrepair—were scattered along the rest of the parapet.

But, to the amazement of the Americans, the scarlet column halted just beyond rifle range. Aides had been galloping from Pakenham's command post. The right column would halt and await further instructions. To the commander on the left went Sir Edward's compliments and orders to move forward. The alignment must be rectified, else there was serious danger of a defeat in detail. Helplessly, the British commander pointed to the *Louisiana* and to the bright-colored heaps on the ground which testified to the accuracy of her gunners. Two field-pieces were hurried forward to provide cover for an advance, but they were hardly unlimbered when shells from the *Louisiana* wrecked them.

Pakenham was a man who could look reality in the face. Cochrane and the Senior Service notwithstanding, the earthwork could not be stormed without a much heavier artillery preparation. There was nothing to do but fall back until still more guns could be brought overland from Lake Borgne.

While the sailors once more labored with heavy ordnance, the Americans were busy as well. Commodore Patterson's

guns were dug in on the other side of the Mississippi. The number of battery positions along the canal was increased to eight. Number One Battery, on Jackson's right flank, was commanded by a Regular, a Captain Humphrey; next came Number Two Battery, under Lieutenant Norris, formerly of the *Carolina;* Battery Number Three, manned by the Baratarians, was directed by Dominique You, Lafitte's lieutenant, who some say had once been one of Napoleon's gunners; more sailors from the *Carolina,* led by Lieutenant Crawley, comprised Battery Number Four; Number Five was under Colonel Perry, and Lieutenant Spots headed Number Six, manned by Regulars; Battery Number Seven was General Garriques Flaugeac's; Number Eight, which was only one piece, was served by Tennessee militiamen who took their orders from a corporal of the Regular Army. All told, by New Year's Eve the Americans mounted fifteen effective pieces, including Commodore Patterson's three guns across the river. There were four twenty-four-pounders, one thirty-two-pounder and one eighteen-pounder (all of which were heavy-caliber, long-range pieces); and five twelve-pounders, three six-pounders, and one six-inch howitzer.

The British emplaced twenty-four pieces — ten eighteen-pounders, four twenty-four-pound carronades, and ten lighter field guns. While the American pieces were in some cases heavier than the British, Henry Adams states that the weight of metal was three hundred and fifty pounds for the British as opposed to the Americans' two hundred and twenty-four. He also says: "The attack had every advantage over the defence. The British could concentrate their fire to effect a breach for their troops to enter; the Americans were obliged to disperse their fire on eight points. The American platforms, being elevated, offered a better target than . . . the low British batteries, and certainly were no better protected." At that, Pakenham could not but have been aware of the Americans' reputation for fine gunnery. It may have been a normal sense of caution or it may have been with this fact in mind that the British strengthened their clay parapets with ". . . barrels filled with sugar, under the impression that sugar would prove as effectual as sand in checking the progress of cannon-balls." In any case, hope ran high that the evening would find the army in the city.

At sunrise on New Year's Day, the field was cloaked in a heavy mist. Not until about eight in the morning was enough of the fog burnt off for the opposing armies to be visible to each other. Rockets swished through the air to signal the opening of the bombardment. Immediately the British guns commenced to fire. As the gun crews settled into the rhythm of their drill, the cadence of the fire picked up until it became a steady drumming. The first few rounds threw up dirt and smoke that shrouded the American lines, so that soon the British could not see specific targets.

Bit by bit, the gray cloud began to be broken by stabs of flame as the American batteries started to answer. They were slow at first, but soon the volume of their fire almost equalled that of the British. They were accurate, too, for hot balls ripped into the British positions, smashing through the sugar barrels as if they were paper. Although some of the guns were blown up, their gunners tossed into the air, the British kept up their cannonade. At length, the sound of a tremendous explosion from behind the canal seemed to indicate some particularly well-placed shot, and the British paused to cheer. But their cheer was drowned in the rising crescendo of the American guns. The tempo of the bursts soon exceeded anything the British had attained, and all attempts to answer it were smothered. At one o'clock, the survivors abandoned the last of the British pieces.

Within the American lines, men paused to count the cost of the fight. Although much of the enemy's shot had gone too high, bursting harmlessly to the rear of the earthwork, the royal gunners had taken their toll. The thirty-two-pounder and two other guns were damaged, two caissons had been exploded by rockets—it was this noise which had set the British to cheering—and thirty-four men were dead or wounded.

British losses cannot be established exactly: the casualty report (seventy-six killed or wounded) covers the period 1-5 January 1815, though it is likely that most of these were incurred on New Year's Day. As no sortie was made by the Americans, the British were able to recover the guns which they had abandoned under fire. Thus no figure can be cited on the amount of ordnance which was destroyed; however, at least one authority states that their losses included several guns.

Their reaction to this defeat was one of surprised anger, for they had confidently expected their artillery to blast the American guns out of action in short order. The result of this engagement was clearly due to the superiority of American artillery, which decisively defeated an opponent excelling both in numbers and in weight of metal.

Jackson recognized the achievement of his gunners in orders: "The Major General tenders to the troops . . . his good wishes for a happy new year, and especially to those officers & men at the pieces of Artillery. . . . The Contractor will issue half a gill of whiskey round." The men of the command had more than one reason to be grateful to the artillery that day!

The rest is well known. Nagged by the Royal Navy, as personified in Admiral Cochrane, and bullied out of his plan to advance by some other route, Pakenham on January 8 committed the bulk of his command in a frontal assault upon the American lines. Shot to bits by the cannon and the deadly accuracy of the Tennessee and Mississippi riflemen (two-thirds of the Americans, armed for the most part with muskets, did not fire a shot), only a pathetic fragment of the proud British army reached the canal. The only ones to cross the earthwork did so as prisoners. The gallant general himself died on the field, and some two thousand others of the flower of the British army were killed or wounded that day.

Jackson permitted the enemy to withdraw undisturbed. Although his total casualties numbered only thirteen, his troops were too poorly trained to offer hope of carrying out a successful pursuit.

Thus ended the last serious conflict between Britain and the United States. While there is little to boast about in the previous history of that war, we may take a just pride in the achievement of the raw farmers and backwoodsmen and the handful of American Regulars in defeating the finest troops of their day.

PERIMETERS in PARAGRAPHS

By Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Ret.

THE COLD WAR

Prepared by a widely-known military scholar and writer, PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS is a recurring feature dealing with the military, political and economic realities in world affairs. Whereas an understanding of these realities is deemed essential to the American soldier, it is emphasized that PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS reflects the opinions of the author, alone. This installment covers the period 1 May — 30 June, 1949.

SHORT-RANGE STRATEGICAL PLANS

Russian Plan. Speeches of Sovier officials and current events indicate this to be:

Start no war with the Western Powers. The West will collapse anyway from economic causes. When that occurs it will afford the opportunity to initiate revolutions through 5th Column activities, which if necessary may be supported by Russian arms. In the meantime, Russia will increase its military strength and remain in readiness to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities, sure that during this period the military strength of the Western Powers will decline as the inevitable economic collapse approaches. Time favors Russia.

Western Powers Plan. Official statements indicate this to be:

Start no war with any nation. Russia is admittedly preparing for war with the West, and precautions must be taken. It is quite possible that discontent among the Russian people and the satellite states may lead to uprisings involving an overthrow of the present form of Russian government in favor of a democratic one. That would almost certainly result in a friendly feeling by Russian peoples towards the Western Powers. The latter will favor such a political change by enlightening propaganda, including broadcasts direct to the Russian nations. Time favors the Western Powers.

RUSSIA'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGICAL PLAN

This is much more important than the short-range plan. Unfortunately there is absolutely no information as to what the Polit Bureau proposes to do. Estimates as to what it may be vary widely. They include the following possibilities, with reasons therefor.

Plan 1. The strategical offensive in the Far East, and the strategical defensive in Europe.

Argument is that West Europe is impoverished, has a population which can not be assimilated by Russia. To occupy it would require a fierce war which would present innumerable difficulties

In the Far East, conquest of China is well advanced and can be expected to be completed by 1951. An offensive can be pushed down into Southeast Asia and into India. This need not necessarily await consolidation of China. It may commence any time. The Far East, with its teeming manpower and its extraordinarily rich resources, is a strategical prize greatly surpassing West Europe as a primary objective. In all probability it can be secured without provoking a World War III.

Should, however, war come before the Far East is consolidated, Russia will remain on the tactical defensive in Europe with the satellite states as the foreground for delaying actions. This explains why industrial establishments are being moved out of the satellites and out of West Russia to east of the Ural Mountains.

French opinion largely favors the above plan as the probable one.

Plan 2. The strategical and tactical offensive against West Europe.

Argument points our that current Russian war production, particularly in armor, artillery, airplanes, and submarines, is enormous, and at present greater than that of the Western Powers combined. As long as this condition lasts it will be advantageous to postpone a major war. West Europe under the Marshall Plan is increasing its war production, and so is the United States. Eventually they will overtake Russian war production. This can be expected about 1952. After that year it would be dangerous to allow the Western Powers to continue rearming at a rate superior to that of Russia and its satellites.

Plan 3. Continue the Short-range Plan. By exploiting economic controversies within the Western states revolutions may be brought about. It is not specially desirable that this occur simultaneously throughout the West. Better to detach one state at a time from the remaining Western Powers, and bring it in to behind the Iron Curtain. In this way the West may be beaten in detail without a new World War.

Plan 4. (This is Spain's Estimate of the Situation.) Avoid war. Russia's own forces, especially the infantry, are unreliable. It is now known that in September, 1942, when the Germans arrived at Stalingrad, the Stalin regime almost collapsed. Russian generals, believing everything lost, were about to assassinate Stalin and demand terms from Germany. The heroic resistance of Stalingrad restored Russian morale.

Such an event can not be counted upon to restore the present weak morale.

In 1945, the Russian armies arrived at Berlin as a result of American aid in materiel and supplies. It is very doubtful whether a new major war, based solely on Russia's own resources, could progress for long. Leaders are not desirous to accept the risk.

Discontent among the satellites requires Russian garrisons. This is another weakness. Once war were declared, Undergrounds would cut lines of communication, destroy depots, etc. That is what happened throughout German-occupied Russia from 1942 to 1945. The guerrillas were effective, and Russia hasn't forgotten it.

The foregoing reasons are ample to justify a decision to avoid war. Much more so than fear of atomic bomb attacks, which in fact are not particularly feared in Russia.

THE COMINFORM

A secret meeting was held in Czechoslovakia between 25 and 30 May. Besides representatives from Russia and its satellites there were others from Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. Major subject of discussion appears to have been Germany. Rudolf Slansky, an original member of the new Cominform and Secretary General of Communists in Czechoslovakia, strongly objected to unification of Germany, as contrary to the interests of both Czechoslovakia and Poland, who fear a strong Germany. Notwithstanding, the Cominform Bulletin for 1 June stated that it had been decided to work for a unified Germany on a National Front basis, said Front to include all Germans regardless of whether Nazis or not.

It is not clear what a National Front Government is. Russia publishes periodically *Soviet State and Laws*. In issue No. 1, c.s., two kinds of civil government are authorized. The first is Socialism as now found in Russia, as a transition stage to Communism. The other is the People's Democracies, as organized in the satellites as a transition stage to Socialism. It is presumed, but not known, that National Front is a lower-type government than that of the satellites, considered inappropriate for Germans. Motive is to obtain German support, and if possible an alliance to offset the North Atlantic Alliance. Secondary motive is to open a way to receive badly needed supplies from the West.

A new Section of the Cominform was announced. It is the Mis-Information Service. Duties are to originate and distribute misleading information through the Western states in order to disorient Western opinion. Training schools for agents are at Sigulda, Latvia, for Protestant Europe; in the Crimea, for Catholic Europe; near Moscow, for Canada and the United States. Graduates are to proceed to destinations disguised as political refugees, displaced persons, fake priests, etc. In each Western country, 5th Columns are to aid.

It will take at least several years to go through with the Cominform's plan. Russia apparently expects to have this much time available.

PROPAGANDA

Russian propaganda is ably directed towards indoctrinating the Russian citizens with the idea that the Government (but not the people) of the United States is seeking war. The American people are represented as in a really deplorable state, struggling for freedom from under a fascist state and hoping for the day when Communism will liberate them. This line has displaced the former one of raging against bourgeois societies and capitalism in general. It is now offensively aimed at developing hate against the United States.

Most of this propaganda, which appears daily, looks laughable to Americans. Examples:

> "In Washington — F Street is lined with luxurious residences having magnificent gardens for capitalists. Workers live in outskirts of city in slums without heat or light. Dresses for working women are of such poor quality that if caught in the rain they shrink so that not even a child can wear them.
>
> "In New York—Starvation is prevalent. Workers line the streets waiting for garbage cans to be set out, and then in hordes surround each can and eat the contents on the spot. People in the streets resemble walking corpses. Subways have nice cars for capitalists, but workers ride in dismal and filthy cars."

Items similar to these are numerous and are signed, with authors alleging that conditions described were personally observed by them in recent travels.

Russian efforts to jam the British broadcasts and the Voice of America have succeeded to the extent that by 8 June it was estimated that only 30% of broadcasts were getting through. This had been accomplished by not less than 205 identified jamming stations.

RUSSIA'S MILITARY STRENGTH

Deployment of Ground Forces is, as of 1 May, approximately as tabulated below.

Reserve divisions are believed to equal the number of active divisions shown above. Owing to limited rail facilities, it might take 6 months to mobilize the reserves.

The foregoing figures do not include 25 divisions of MPs or Secret Police. These are supposed to guard lines of communication, but in the past have occasionally appeared in line.

The strength of the Air Force, which is not a separate branch of the service, is doubtful. Excluding old models, there may be 14,000 modern combat planes, besides 1,500 or more 4-engine long-range bombers. Russians claim that some of these are superior to ours. Production of such bombers is believed to be about 1,000 per annum. Russia has

Army Group	*Marshal Commanding*	*Divisions*		*Location*
1st	Klement E. Voroshilov	26	opposite	Finland
2nd	Konstantin Rokossovsky	45	”	Germany and Austria
3rd	Georgi K. Zhukov	45	”	Balkans
4th	Fedor I. Tolbukhin	20(?)	in	Caucasia
5th	Simyon Timoshenko	24(?)	in	Turkestan
6th	(Rodion Y. Malinovsky)	20	in	Far East
	(Tshaibolsan)	——		
		180		

jet fighters which they claim are the fastest in the world. Their number is unknown.

The Polish Underground reports that there is unusual military activity in West Poland in rebuilding and refitting former German airfields. New Air Forces have arrived in Silesia and along the Oder River. New ordnance and commissary depots have been established. During April, bridges over the Vistula were inspected by Russian engineers for loads equivalent to the heaviest tanks. Railroads west of Warsaw were also inspected.

Unusual maritime activity is reported from Danzig, Stettin, and Rostock, with sailing of transports with war materiel ostensibly for Albania. These included planes, tanks, and spare parts for motor vehicles.

Nowhere has any report been noted as to defensive positions. It must be presumed that Russia has no present idea that she will need any.

On 6 June, Russia embargoed shipments of chrome ore to the United States, as being a war material. Manganese ore had been previously embargoed for same reason.

(NOTE: The US can obtain chrome and manganese ores from friendly countries. It is not dependent on Russia for these materials.)

The Atomic Bomb. Since 1945, development has been directed by Deputy Prime Minister Laurenti P. Beria. His original instructions were to develop a better atomic bomb than the United States used in that year, not duplicate it. Beria is an influential member of the Polit Bureau. It is not usual in Russia to retain in office officials who do not make good. While there is no reliable information as to Russian progress with the atomic bomb, it should be presumed that Beria has made at least satisfactory progress. It would be an error to underestimate Russian possibilities in this direction. She may be more advanced than public opinion in this country believes.

THE SATELLITES

Reports agree that there is dissatisfaction everywhere, and there are no reports to the contrary. Russia is having a major task seeking to consolidate these unwilling states. Main effort is directed against religions, on the ground that they are incompatible with Communist theory. Russia is succeeding in eliminating religious organizations. Ministers and priests are being jailed, on the usual charge of collaborating with the United States and/or failure to express enthusiasm for Communism. Precedents of previous religious persecutions indicate that the present one will antagonize the people and will not succeed, except that religious services will go underground.

The Satellites, less Albania, have organizations in the United States. The Baltic states have diplomatic recognition; recognized by the United States, but of course not by Russia. The other satellites have unrecognized CPs, which in all cases are headed by former high-ranking officials now in exile. The latest to be established was that of Romania, which opened at New York on 9 May, headed by General Nicolas Radescue, ex-Prime Minister. This officially represents King Michael and his Government-in-Exile.

Notes concerning particular states follow.

Albania. Economic conditions are bad, and near starvation is reported. Strikes against the Government have occurred.

Bulgaria. The 5-Year Plan isn't working. Agricultural production is down 20% to 50%. Farmers claim that there is no sense in raising food in excess of their own needs, as the Government then takes it at ruinous prices. Work on five large hydro-electric projects, initiated by the Germans and much needed for power purposes, has been stopped, on Russian objections. The Russian strategical plan calls for having all possible industries deep inside Russia. Establishment of new industries and power plants in satellite countries is forbidden. Plan calls for Bulgaria to become an agricultural state, with no objection to changing the hydro-electric dams into dams for irrigation. That doesn't please the Bulgars.

Czechoslovakia. Persecution of the Catholic Church, which represents about 2/3 of the people, has been intensified. Protestants are supporting the Catholics, feeling that their turn will come next. Religious publications have been stopped and numerous members of the clergy arrested, on general charges alleging anti-democratic actions or aiding the United States to launch a war against Russia. No specifications, nor any dates, papers, or witnesses to the alleged charges, have yet been presented.

Hungary. The Communist Prime Minister Matyas Rakosi, in a speech, charged the workers and peasants with failing to show appreciation of communism. Patience is required. Time is necessary for everything. In due course the benefits of communism will appear. Workers showed no enthusiasm about this explanation.

Latvia. Refugees reaching Sweden report that the Russian MPs have seized 70,000 Balts for transportation to islands off East Asia. Persons are arrested after midnight, and taken at once to railheads and shipped off before daylight. Destinations were reported to be the Kuriles, with the possibility that labor is required during the current summer on former Japanese air and naval bases.

Lithuania. Nearly one quarter of the population has disappeared; 7% transported to Siberia; 5% to other places; and 12% unaccounted for and presumed liquidated. Responsible civil positions are filled by Russians. Farms have been nationalized with indifferent results, 40% of the land being untilled. Production of peat is down 75% and imports of coal are small, resulting in low industrial production. People are sullen and resentful. Town libraries are stocked with communist literature, which is not read. Western books have been purged. Communism is an obligatory subject in all schools and colleges. Children of former military or civil officials, and of farmers who owned 40 or more acres, are not admitted to colleges. Notwithstanding these conditions, at Kaunas University only 13 out of about 2000 students were communists. At three high schools checked, only 2 to 3% of students were communists.

The number of clergy has decreased from over 3,000 to about 400. Publication of the Bible and all other religious papers is prohibited. Seminaries for teaching the ministry are closed.

Romania. Schools open with children announcing "There is no God." Teachers respond with "Indeed there is no

God and there never has been one." Religious persecution is mainly against the Romanian Orthodox Church, which was forcibly annexed, against the wishes of the people, to the Russian Orthodox Church. Secondary persecution is against Catholics. Licenses to marry are issued only to individuals sponsored as good communists. Russian is an obligatory subject in all schools and colleges, except in 1st and 2nd grades.

Excepting the Supreme Court, *assessors* have been added to all courts in numbers superior to the numbers of judges. Assessors are selected communists who by their votes insure the verdict desired by the Communist Party.

Government has issued a General Order stating that while in Fascist countries unions are justified in opposing employers, nothing like that can be permitted when the state is the employer. In this case, the duty of unions is to obey state orders, and not raise objections or present demands.

Turkestan. Refugees escaped to Moslem countries report severe persecution of the Mohammedan church, which is the predominant one in this area. Turkestan newspapers of May contain editorials deploring continued belief in Moslem religions. They call for a vigorous drive to end the "myths" of religion and any idea that the inhabitants are allied to foreign Moslems, such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, etc. The Moslem schools are being suppressed. In some sections the entire Moslem population has been liquidated or deported.

THE BERLIN BLOCKADE AND THE PARIS CONFERENCE

Upon initiative of Russia, and following some informal meetings, a New York Agreement was arrived at, at Lake Success, on 4 May. Russia agreed that on and after 12 May it would remove all restrictions on communications, transportation, and trade between the Allied zones in Berlin and West Germany, and between East and West Germany. In return, the Western Powers—Great Britain, France, and the United States—assented to a conference of their Foreign Ministers with the Russian Foreign Minister at Paris on 23 May.

On 12 May, Russia announced the end of the 328-day rail and truck blockade on Berlin. Some traffic then moved in—but not much. On 18 May the Russians closed the roads, and although this was lifted next day, it has been intermittently renewed since. On 25 May the railroad ceased to function as a result of a strike. Whether this was provoked by Russia is not known, but the strike was not settled until the last days of June. Even then, on various pretexts, there has been little rail traffic. In view of this situation, so far as Russia was concerned the New York Agreement has not brought about much improvement in the situation at Berlin. It has been necessary to continue the incomparable British - American Air Lift.

The Conference at Paris duly opened on 23 May. Mr. Andrei Y. Vishinsky, representing Russia, opened with a plea for a later meeting to discuss peace with Japan, to which the Western Powers refused to commit themselves. They did agree to the next proposition, to discussing peace with Austria at the present conference. Mr. Vishinsky next presented a proposal for a Unified Germany, to operate under an Allied Control Council as previously established and requiring unanimous vote. He did not mention a National Front for Germany such as was being discussed at the same time by the Cominform. The Western Powers rejected Mr. Vishinsky's plan for Germany on the ground that it was a return to the old practice, which experience had demonstrated wouldn't work.

On 28 May the Western Powers presented their view of a Unified Germany. This was for Russian Occupied Germany (East Zone) to join the new German state set up by the Bonn Basic Law (see section on Germany), provided that Russia would guarantee freedom of speech, religion, press, radio, etc., independence of the judiciary, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. The Bonn Basic Law as to the three Western Powers maintaining certain controls over Germany would be changed to read four Powers, thus admitting Russia.

On the 30th Russia rejected the Western plan. She charged that the Bonn Basic Law had been practically dictated by the Allies and did not represent the wishes of the Germans; that thereunder all worth-while administrative powers were reserved to the Occupying Powers, who besides had a veto over everything; that it was undemocratic; and that it violated the Potsdam Agreement.

After futile meetings, Mr. Vishinsky on 10 June proposed that measures be adopted to draft a peace treaty with Germany, which should provide for all occupying forces withdrawing within one year from the signing of the treaty. This was rejected by the Western Powers on the ground that the current conference, after three weeks, had not agreed to a single thing regarding Germany, and that it was hopeless to expect to agree on such a complicated matter as peace with Germany. The subject of Germany was thereupon abandoned.

The Conference did agree on certain matters re a peace treaty with Austria. It was decided that the boundaries would be the same as they had been in 1938; that Austria pay an indemnity of $150,000,000 to Russia within 6 years; that Yugoslavia could seize without compensation all Austrian assets within her territory; and that Russia should receive certain property concessions within Austria.

After deciding to continue the New York Agreement, the conference closed on 20 June. The Russian press has charged that the Western Powers never intended to unify Germany and had intentionally submitted a plan which they knew would be unacceptable. Further, that the United States was primarily interested in not permitting free trade between East and West Germany. The final plea at the conference was from Mr. Vishinsky—make peace with Japan.

COMMENTS

Since April, when the North Atlantic Alliance was formed, Russia has ceased to threaten. She obviously does not want war at this time, but does expect it later. In the meantime she seeks means to strengthen her strategical position. The most satisfactory solution would be an alliance with a new Germany. However, Russia holds only the East Zone with 17,000,000 people as against the West Zones with 45,000,000 people. To secure an alliance, the following

steps would be necessary, in the order given:

1. Unite all Germany.
2. Free Germany of occupation forces.
3. Convince Germans that it was desirable to ally themselves with Russia.

At Paris, Russia sought to prove to Germans that she was seeking freedom for them by demanding steps 1 and 2. It is improbable that she will abandon presenting that ideal before Germany. The decision of the Cominform, adopted during the Paris Conference, to agitate for a unified German National Front Government, and the instructions issued to 5th Columns to aid in this, point to an attempt to change public opinion in the West in order to bring about steps 1 and 2. As to step 3, ever since 1943 Russia has had a German contingent, headed by high-ranking generals, preparing for the day when they can be turned loose on Germany as soon as it is united, in order to swing opinion towards Russia.

The new Mis-Information Service seems to be already functioning. American Communist publications follow a new line of mis-information regarding an approaching economic depression, which seems to be intended to lower morale and increase discontent among workers.

Russia is worried over Japan. It was the subject of the first and last proposal the submitted at Paris. If the Americans withdrew from Japan and Okinawa, that would greatly facilitate communist infiltration throughout the Far East, which is now a major mission.

GERMANY

In the preceding installment, *Perimeters* explained that the Western Powers had offered a Federal Government to Germany. This was subject to the Western Powers retaining the exclusive right to legislate on certain important matters, such as foreign relations and industrial production, and the further right of veto over laws passed by the Germans. After hesitating, the Germans on 8 May accepted this proposal by enacting a Basic Law. This was approved by 8 out of 11 constituent German states. This being more than 2/3, official announcement was made on the 23rd, at Bonn, designated as the new capital for Germany, of the proposed new Republic. The West Zones of Berlin have petitioned to be admitted as a 12th state.

The Basic Law contains 147 articles concerning the restricted duties which Germany is permitted to exercise. The preamble describes Germany as a federal republic; but article 20 states it is a democratic social state. The German people probably desire a socialist state and care little about the federal republic part.

The military powers of the new state are not clearly defined. *Aggressive* wars are prohibited by art. 26, but nothing is said about other types of wars. There is no provision for an army, but art. 4 exempts conscientious objectors from military service. There is no prohibition as to manufacturing war materiel; however, as the Allies retain the right to control industrial productions, war materiel could not be manufactured without Allied approval. A penalty of confinement of from 10 years to life is prescribed for anyone who by force succeeds in everthrowing the state (art. 144). It would seem that anyone who was strong enough to overthrow the government would be very unlikely to present himself for trial under this article. General impression of the Basic Law is that it is rather complicated with workability doubtful.

On 20 June, the Western Powers signed at Paris a Charter for an Allied High Commission for Germany to exercise Allied authority in the new Federal Republic of Germany. This transfers to the High Commission, effective at a date to be anounced later, all authority theretofore exercised by the Commanding Generals. While each of three High Commissioners will look after the German Zone occupied by his nation, each of the Commissioners will have a liaison officer at the capital of each constituent state.

The East (Russian) Zone. On 15 and 16 May an "election" was held for a People's Congress. Only a single-list ticket was presented to voters. According to Russian reports 12 million votes were cast, which seems unusually high for the population of 17 million. It was acknowledged that over 4 million votes were against the ticket, which was elected by 66.1% of the votes. For Russia, which usually receives over 99% of the votes for its "elections," the new figure is very low.

On 30 May the People's Congress, thus "elected," convened. Its leader is the German Communist Wilhelm Pieck. The Congress rejected the invitation of the Western Powers that the East Zone associate itself with the Western Zones under the Bonn Basic Law, and instead adopted its own Constitution. This describes Germany as an indivisible democratic republic. There is only one legislative body, whose members are to be elected exclusively from "democratic" parties. To date the only party within Russian-controlled territory classified as *democratic* is the Communist Party. The rule therefore insures a solid Communist legislature and government. The judiciary may be removed by vote of the legislature, and is not therefore independent. Boycotting a democratic institution is declared a crime. This seems to make churches or individuals who criticize the communist administration as liable to punishment. The aims of the Constitution are announced to be: A unified Germany; uniform German currency; a peace conference in which Germany would participate; and withdrawal of occupation troops within 1 year of signing of the peace treaty. These are all Russian objectives.

GREECE

POLITICAL

On 26 April, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko, advised that Russia was ready to discuss the Greek problem. A week later Greek Communist GHQ broadcast a suggestion that peace be arranged by a UN mediator, as had been done in Palestine. On 4 May, Mr. Gromyko declared that the Greek Communists desired an armistice, a general amnesty, and new elections in which the communist armed forces would participate. On the 14th Mr. Gromyko stated that Russia's conditions were:

1. Russia to participate with the other Great Powers in supervising Greek elections.
2. Russia to participate in an International Commission to control the Greek north frontier.
3. Withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and materiel from Greece.

No serious attention was given to Mr. Gromyko's proposals and further conversations were discontinued. Russia's third proposition would seem to imply disarming the Greek army, which is equipped with British and American materiel. Presumably the Greek communists were not to be disarmed.

The UN has had the Greek problem before it since 1946. It at that time appointed a Balkan Committee of which Russia and Poland were members. Those two states have refused to take their seats and have blocked any settlement.

American aid to Greece during the past two years has rebuilt 1000 miles of good roads; reopened and improved the ports of Piraeus, Volos, and Salonika; built over 2 miles of railroad tunnels and bridges; reopened the Corinth Canal; and opened 7 modern airfields. American aid for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1949 will amount to about $150,000,000, and the same amount will be needed for the ensuing fiscal year.

MILITARY

On 15 May, the Greek C-in-C, General Papagos, stated that he wished he had 50,000 more troops to add to the 147,000 Regulars and 50,000 National Guard on active duty. However, he was winning anyway and would finish the war, provided no unexpected change in the situation occurred. On 23 June, the head of the US Mission in Greece, Lieut. General James A. Van Fleet, gave as his opinion that if the US pulled out of Greece at this time, Greece would be lost.

United Nations' reports, as of 15 June, stated that Yugoslavia had ceased to aid the communists in Greece, but that Albania and Bulgaria continued their support, the latter with a "great quantity and diversity of materiel." Yugoslavia has confirmed its cessation of aid to Greek Communists.

Military Operations. On 7 May, Greek troops north of Sérrai drove a communist raiding party back into Bulgarian territory. The raiders then took post in field fortifications about ¾ mile inside Bulgaria. The Greeks attacked and captured these, suffering only slight losses. After destroying the fortifications the Greeks withdrew to their side of the frontier.

The next day the Greek G-2 report showed communist gatherings in Albania, opposite Kastoria, presumed to be preparing an offensive. Reconnaissances launched on the 15th, westward and northward from Kastoria, showed only weak communist forces, who retreated, losing 59 killed and 5 POWs against a loss of 108 killed, wounded, and missing for the Greeks. Orders were immediately issued for a general mopping of the area, starting the 16th, which was continued until the 25th. Greeks reported their loss as 286, against 643 killed and 943 POWs for the communists.

On the night 29/30 May, the communists made a major attack from an Albanian base, near Patoma, which is close to Mt. Grammos. Greek G-2 estimated the enemy as having 15,000 troops, men and boys, and an additional 10,000 women troops. The latter appeared to be good fighters but insufficiently trained, as they failed to take cover properly, and apparently suffered unnecessary losses. There was an increased quantity of communist artillery, including new 105mm howitzer batteries, which are difficult to handle in mountains. The communist offensive made a considerable penetration but it was not at the time pushed. From captured papers, the communist mission appears now to be the establishment of a Macedonia state, or province, which is to be united to Bulgaria. The idea of a Macedonia state is old, but joining it to Bulgaria is a new idea, probably caused by a desire to enlist Bulgaria in a joint offensive against Yugoslavia.

On 6 June, the Greeks started a counteroffensive about halfway between Phlorina and Kastoria, which made some progress against considerable resistance. The communist C-in-C, General Zachariades, ordered an all-out effort to resist the Greeks. This was launched on the night 8/9 near Patoma and Mt. Grammos. This succeeded in pushing the Greeks back and securing for the communists the entire Mt. Grammos area.

On 23 June, the Greek General Staff announced that Epirus and central Greece was nearly clear of communists, whose 1st and 2nd Divisions were claimed to have been all but destroyed. This area is probably clear of communists, who seem to have concentrated near Mt. Grammos, but there has been no confirmation of the loss of the two divisions.

Comments. The neutrality of Yugoslavia separates the communist bases in Albania and Bulgaria from each other. This has forced a change in military operations, which for the communists have materially slowed down. The possibility that the communist forces in Greece may later be directed to join in an attack against Yugoslavia, with a view to overthrowing the government of Marshal Tito, should not be overlooked. The Balkans are famous for sudden changes in military situations.

CHINA

GENERAL SITUATION

War between the Kuomintang (Nationalists) and the communists continues with a minimum of fighting. The present war started 22 years ago. Its long duration is partly due to the Chinese custom of not fighting battles to a conclusion. Combat is broken off to enable the enemy to retire. He then reorganizes and reappears later. This keeps the war going, and insures lucrative jobs for many who profit by the war. There just has to be an enemy.

Keeping this peculiar custom in mind will make it easier to understand the military situation.

On 1 May the Kuomintang was confronted with the decision of the United States to withdraw the financial support of loans, gifts, and lease/lend, which it had been granting for 18 years. These were originally supposed to be used for opposing the Japanese invasion; since Japan's surrender, to oppose the communists.

The Kuomintang has had from 1 to 4 million troops on its pay rolls; claims to have one million now. It has never won a campaign, and seldom a battle. American arms and munitions have been corruptly transferred to the enemy, so that the communist armies are at present largely equipped with American weapons and transportation.

Kuomintang China has not ceased to argue and plead for a renewal of American support. Their main ground is that it is the only organization in Asia which is in the field against the communists. If the Kuomintang would fight, American support might well be justified, but long experience has shown that this is unlikely to happen.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

On 1 May the communist 3rd Army, 300,000 strong, having crossed the Yangtze River and taken Nanking, was operating against Shanghai. The latter was defended by a Kuomintang force which had had 320,000 men in April, operating under General Tang En-po. As usual in China, orders were issued and announcements made that Shanghai would be defended to the bitter end. However, following the pattern established in April, when the communists first crossed the Yangtze, the Kuomintang surrendered its forces successively after only token fighting, or no fighting at all. In this way the 4th, 20th, 28th, 45th, 51st, 66th, 88th, and 99th Armies, largely equipped with American weapons and supplies, passed over to the communists. The remnants, estimated as about 20,000 men, withdrew from Shanghai and embarked on transports and sailed away, after abandoning their artillery, heavy weapons, and transportation, some of which was destroyed. On 25 May the communists occupied Shanghai.

On the 13th Hankow had been occupied, the Kuomintang troops withdrawing to the south; while on 3 June the Kuomintang evacuated Tsingtao, which had been previously abandoned as an American air and naval base. Thus with practically no opposition the communists secured the Yangtze valley. On their part they did not interfere with such Kuomintang troops as desired to withdraw.

The Kuomintang has now two bases—on Formosa and at Canton. It still has practically all of the Chinese Navy and Air Forces, while the communists have neither sea nor air forces. Taking advantage of this, the Kuomintang on 19 June announced that all Chinese ports from Foochow (incl) to Manchuria would be closed to foreign trade effective 25 June. Ports would thereafter be bombed until the mission desired (which was not stated) had been achieved. Bombing of Shanghai commenced on 20 June, and continued intermittently thereafter. It has been indiscriminate, has killed and wounded many, and has done no military damage as yet.

On 28 June the United States advised that she declined to recognize the legality of the closure of ports. This objection was rejected by the Kuomintang on the 30th. The bombing has scared off foreign ships, and communist territory is in fact practically without foreign trade.

Communist Armies. Observers agree that these are well disciplined, and well equipped with US materiel. Leadership is an unknown quantity. Communists have demonstrated that they can organize and maintain disciplined armies. Who exercises the real command is not yet known. There are reports that Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, commanding the 6th Russian Army Group with CP at Chita, advises the Chinese communists. The Chinese communist leader, Mao Tze-tung, was stated to have gone to Chita during May, but what, if anything, was there decided has not been ascertained. The Chinese communist armies have so far met little real resistance and what they could do against efficient troops, properly led, is uncertain. In the meantime they must be rated as a powerful force.

The China Communist State. This dates from 1922, when it was organized as a branch of the 3rd International. In 1927 the Russian Comintern at its 8th meeting ordered a reorganization of the Chinese communists, to be carried out by the Russian General Borodin. It is to the credit of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who had himself just graduated from the Moscow school, that he arrested the communist leaders and shipped them back to Russia. Chiang had learned too well what Marxian Communism means.

The Chinese communists promptly declared hostilities against the Kuomintang (People's) Party, of which Chiang Kai-shek was the leader. The declaration appears in their GO dated Hankow, 7 August 1927. This was confirmed in July 1928, at the 6th Reunion of Chinese Communists, held that year in Moscow.

The China Communist Polit Bureau in its GO of October 1937 stated **"in China politics armed force is the determing factor."**

On 30 June of this year Mao Tze-tung declared

"experience of several decades by the Chinese peoples tells us to carry out the peoples' democratic dictatorship."

History substantiates the communist claim that a dictatorship is the government for the Chinese. They have never had any other kind of government, and have shown no desire to change. From time immemorial, Chinese governments

have depended upon force. It seems time wasted to attempt to force democracy or communism upon the Chinese by argument. The Chinese are a docile people and have accepted any kind of government which leaves them in peace. Besides, they are completely unable to overthrow the dictatorial government of the communists, now supported by large and well-armed forces, however much they may dislike it. That they do dislike it is shown by a steady increase of demonstrations and riots against the communists.

There has been no change in China's communist leaders since 1927. The leader, Mao Tze-tung, was born in 1893. He was a poor boy, and is self educated—started life working in the Peiping Library for $8 a month. The C-in-C is Chu Teh, born about 1889. He is well educated, partly in Germany, and graduated from Moscow in 1931.

The doctrines of these two men which they have imposed in China resemble the Russian anti-World War II doctrines. This indicates incomplete liaison with Russia. Examples: Only the same type of clothes or uniforms is permitted, and these are usually slovenly. Only one class is permitted in trains and boats. Salaries are supposed to be the same for all, and in general the standard of life has gone down to a common level. Fine hotels and homes are now assigned as "offices" to high officials.

In theory, land is the property of the occupying farmers, and industrial establishments that of the workers. For a time this developed some enthusiasm for communism, but it hasn't worked and the enthusiasm has disappeared. Increased wages, heavy taxes, and lack of raw materials have made it impracticable to keep many industries working. The Communist Government tells the workers that they own the industries and ought to be satisfied. Workers have replied that "ownership" of industries doesn't mean a thing when they lack food.

There is poverty generally throughout Communist territory. The press, radio, movies, etc., are controlled. Freedom of speech is authorized for communists; freedom of speech for "reactionaries" is a criminal offense. American films are banned, but Russian films are shown.

Hostility of China's Communists against the United States first appeared in 1940. In that year Mao Tze-tung published his book *New Democracy*, in which he states,

"The contest between the USSR and imperialist England and America is being sharpened step by step."

This was years before Americans perceived the truth of that statement. Mao Tze-tung's latest pronouncement was on 30 June of this year, when he broadcast:

"We belong to the anti-imperialist front, headed by the USSR, and we can only look for genuine friendly aid from that front."

It would be an error to disregard Chinese communist hostility towards the United States, and its liaison, including military liaison, with Russia.

The American press has discussed the opening of trade relations with Communist China, under an assumption that Chinese communists will behave in a decent way. There is a lack of evidence that Communist China wants trade with foreign states, other than Russia, and some evidence that they do not want it. The communists have been in Mukden since September 1948, in Peking since January 1949, and since then in Nanking, Hankow, and Shanghai. At all these places there have been American consuls, and at Nanking an embassy. The communists have ignored them. They have not sought to do business with foreign firms.

The Chinese aim seems to be to make China self-supporting and completely independent of the Western Powers. If war then comes, China will be able to function wtihout change of economy. For example: the sale of American kerosene for the lamps of China has been stopped, on the ground that no foreign product should be imported which is not a necessity. Chinese candles are to be substituted. This plan is probably part of a more general Russian plan, about which little is yet known. It will undoubtedly develop, but may do so at a slow rate.

Chinese dislike having foreigners in their country telling them what to do. They resent "advisers" and lose face with their own people when they openly accept foreign advice. This is rarely accepted unless it is forced. The experiences of our Generals Stilwell and Marshall illustrate this situation.

Russia discovered this Chinese peculiarity as the result of a study as to why their General Borodin was expelled from China in 1927, when he was simply trying to give advice. Russia has since refrained from sending missions to China. Instead Chinese officials go to Russia, and the results have been highly satisfactory.

When outside of his own country, where there is no "face" to lose, Chinese can be taught communism, military tactics, and any other subject required. They are good and receptive students, provided patience is exercised in dealing with their Oriental minds. Russians are good at that.

Some American papers have urged sending officers to advise as to the Kuomintang's war against the communists. However reasonable such a project may seem, it has been tried already and it just doesn't work. The Russian method, at vastly less cost, has had better results than the American method.

JAPAN

Excepting India, Japan is the most important country in the Far East. For the United States it is the most important from a military point of view. It is doing very well under American guidance. According to a report by General MacArthur, published in *Fortune* for June, Japan has made a greater postwar economic come-back, and largely by her own efforts, than Great Britain, France, Poland, and other European nations.

The population, as of 1 October, 1947, was 78,626,720. During 1948 there was an increase of 1,750,000. This was a much larger increment than usual, explained in part by a reduction of 180,000 in the death rate, and was due mostly to American health and sanitary measures.

On 2 May General MacArthur, as Supreme Allied Commander, congratulated Japan in having faithfully discharged its surrender commitments. He

announced that the military occupation was now changing from operation to friendly guidance.

On 12 May the United States ordered a halt in dismantling Japanese industrial plants as reparations, in order to build up Japan's industrial production at a more rapid rate, and thereby diminish the necessity of the United States balancing the budget to enable food importations to be paid for. China and the Philippines have protested this action.

On the same day, Japanese MPs were authorized, as a symbol of friendliness, to take over the guard at the Imperial Palace at Tokyo from the Americans.

On 13 June, General MacArthur, by letter to Lieut. General K. N. Derevyanko, Russian member of the Allied Council for Japan, accused Russia of inciting disorder and violence in an otherwise orderly Japanese society, with a view to disorderly resistance against Japan's government. Confirmation of this charge came later in the month with the repatriation from Russia of some 2,000 POWs who arrived in Japan after a thorough course of instruction in communism and with instructions to spread that ideology throughout their native land. Evidence is strong that Russia has been attempting to create a strong Communist Party in Japan, hostile to the United States.

Comments. The passing of China to communist control makes it most important that Japan be preserved as a friend for the Western Powers. The change in the situation which has occurred in the Far East since 1945—advance of communism, and faithfulness of Japan to its surrender pledges—makes it advisable to reconsider the final disposition of Formosa and other minor islands adjacent to Japan. It is important that they do not pass to the control of Powers hostile to the United States.

KOREA

American occupation of South Korea (below 38° North Latitude) is over. The last of the garrison sailed away on 29 June. All of Korea is now free of foreign troops, with the north half organized as a communist state under Russian guidance, and the south half as an anti-communist state under American guidance.

Under Japanese occupation a unified Korea had become a reasonably self-sufficient economic area. Divided into two states as at present, both states are economically unbalanced. North Korea contains the hydro-electric plants, coal mines, metal, and fertilizer industries. South Korea has the textile plants and produces the food. Liaison between the two states is bad.

On 7 June President Truman advised Congress that the withdrawal of American troops did not include about 500 officers and men assigned to South Korea as a group for advisory purposes and for training. He requested an appropriation of $150,000,000 for erecting power and industrial establishments to offset those lost to North Korea.

Friction exists between North and South Korea, and incidents are constantly occurring along the frontier. Examples:

1. On 5 May, the 2nd Battalion, 8th S Korea Infantry, deserted to the north by crossing the frontier. This appears to have been the scheme of the commander. Most of the battalion seemingly knew nothing about the intent to desert to the communists. When they found this out, a fight occurred between them and communist troops. About half of the battalion fought its way back; the other half has disappeared as casualties, deserters, or POWs.

2. On 26 June, a communist force of all arms raided into the South near Ongjin. The invaders were intercepted and are alleged to have been driven back with a loss of 2,436 in all. As only 27 POWs and 23 rifles are reported as having been taken, the figures for enemy losses may be exaggerated. South Koreans reported their own loss as 84 killed, 293 wounded, and 8 missing—total 385. United Nations observers who arrived just after the fighting report that it was severe and involved the destruction of several villages.

South Korea has a sizable communist party, and North Korea an anti-communist party. Desertions from one side to the other are not infrequent. Those from the North report that religious persecution, same as in other satellite countries, is in full progress.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

BURMA

This country is split by warring factions. Efforts to maintain a going independent state for its 17,000,000 people are not going well. On 11 May the British Commonwealth ambassadors of Great Britain, India, Pakistan and Ceylon established themselves as a committee to advise and support the Burmese Government.

Main military operation has been the Government attack against Insein, only 10 miles from Rangoon, the capital city. This had been captured by the Karens on 31 January, and blocked the railroad and the main road leading north to Mandalay. In this fight each side had a combat group of about 5,000 men, both with artillery, some armor, and a few planes. The Karens elected to withdraw, and their C-in-C, Saw Ba *U* Gyi, marched away on the 20th. Minor actions have occurred near Toungoo (Karen) and Moulmein (Govt.).

At the end of May information was received that Chinese communists in Yunnan were preparing to invade Burma. Chinese raiders had been seen at Maingdaw, 90 miles inside the border. The Chinese advance guard, stated to be 4,000 strong, was reported as at Tengchung, Yunnan, with the main body, strength not ascertained, at Paoshan. From those positions the Chinese would have a choice of invasion routes over three roads leading respectively to Myitkyina, Bhamo, and Lashio. Most of this border region is inhabited by Kachins, who are good fighters and very anti-Chinese. Up until the end of June no military operations had developed in this area.

INDO-CHINA

Military Operations. At the beginning of May, hostilities between France and the communist-led Viet Minh were static. The French have over 100,000 troops, including an armored division and 5 battalions of para-troops, but exclusive of a growing number of native troops now amounting to some 50,000 men. C-in-C is General Blaizot. Viet Minh (communist) strength is uncertain but is estimated as 80,000. Its C-in-C is Ho Chi-minh.

With a view to securing a peaceful settlement of the war, the French have refrained from offensive operations, while the Viet Minh has been unable to assume a real offensive. The French native troops have been used in Cochin China and have done good work in ridding that very valuable colony of guerrillas. It is now possible to travel with relative security in that country, and business is functioning.

At the end of June, the French occupied, in Tonking, the Hanoi-Haiphong delta, which is the most important sector, and detached posts (road blocks) at Laokay and Langson on the China border. Supply of the detached posts is possible only by air or by convoys which operate at regular intervals. During May the French Chief of Staff, General Revers, reconnoitered the detached posts to determine whether they were worth holding. Laokay had been attacked during March by Chinese communists, who had been defeated only with difficulty. The decision was to hold the road blocks.

In Annam the French hold the coast from Cape Mui Duong south to Faifo (both incl.), and from Binh Dinh (incl.) south to Cochin China. Communists hold all the rest of the state. Cochin China is practically free of communists, and Laos and Cambodia are entirely free.

Political. Under a treaty signed at Paris on 8 March, 1949, a native state of Viet Nam (not to be confused with Viet Nimh) was set up, to consist of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China. The head of the proposed new state was former Emperor of Annam Bao Dai, who had resigned at the end of the Japanese Occupation. Bao Dai returned to Indo-China on 26 April, where he proceeded to familiarize himself with the situation. Having completed this he assumed command of the new state on 13 June with CP at Saigon. He chose the title Chief of State.

Laos and Cambodia are not included in the new state. Under the treaty the French yield special rights which they had heretofore held. Viet Nam is to manage its own affairs as a member of the French Empire. It will have its own diplomatic representatives at Asiatic states and at the Vatican. Its army will be independent but in close liaison with French forces. Its customs union and currency will cover Laos and Cambodia.

France hopes that this will result in establishing peace in this war-torn country, which has been the most valuable colony which France has ever had. If it succeeds, the withdrawal of a substantial part of the French forces, much needed in Europe, should follow.

THAILAND

Formerly known as Siam, the old name has been readopted. Ninety percent of the people are Thais and they now feel strong enough to be on their own. They have renounced the name of Siam, nothwithstanding the surrender agreement of 1945 which required them to make Siam the official name.

There are minor political disturbances, but in general the country is tranquil. Its capital, Bangkok, is the main Russian headquarters for Southeast Asia.

INDONESIA

The Dutch are making progress in establishing a series of Indonesian states as part of a Federal Indonesia, which is to remain within the Dutch Empire. At the end of June the Dutch evacuated Jogjakarta and restored it to the Republicans, whose leaders were to be released to reassume command of their state, which originally included all of Java and Sumatra. How much will remain under the Jogjakarta Government under the new arrangement is unknown. There has been no recent fighting.

PHILIPPINES

The Hukbalahap insurrection, which is communist-inspired, continues. It has spread. Operations at the beginning of May to capture the band which had killed the widow of former President Quezon on 26 April led to an engagement on 2 May in which the Huks are reported to have lost 12 killed and 28 POWs. However, the next day a Huk counterattack by a battalion successfully raided Cabanatuan and secured clothing and commissary supplies.

Hukbalahap bands have extended their operations to Batangas Province, their first appearance south of the Pasig River.

COMMENTS

Southeast Asia forms a single strategical region. It has its own definite characteristics. Its population is about 160,000,000 and its resources are enormous. Some of them, such as rubber, tin, and hemp, are obtainable in sufficient quantities nowhere else. Others, such as oil, sugar, tea, etc., are available elsewhere but are more conveniently obtained from this area.

Southeast Asia is in ferment. Prior to World War II it had been dependent on the Western Powers. From the West, the various colonies which had composed Southeast Asia had received civilization with law and order, education, and the raising of the standard of life. That is now mostly forgotten. Gratitude is no longer felt for what the West has done. Each of the former colonies wants its own separate independence, and is, in mind, balancing the relative advantages of adopting a democratic government as against a communist one.

Communist victories in China have been a powerful stimulant for spreading that ideology. It is needless to report that Russian propaganda is aiding as much as it can. If Communism engulfs Southeast Asia, the Western Powers will lose valuable resources to which they now have free access, while the communist world will secure the same resources with a large increase of man power and prestige.

THE BEST WEAPON

By Francis Head Hacker

WHAT is the most effective weapon—under any and all battle conditions?

Perhaps the answer is less of a riddle than might be supposed. To a student of the records of our wars, it would seem that the one most effective weapon under any imaginable conditions of fighting—the one without which all the others might be valueless—is the ingenuity of the individual.

Consider the campaigns of the "Swamp Fox." General Francis Marion had earned this sobriquet in his seemingly forlorn struggles against the British — notably Cornwallis and "Bloody" Tarleton. After the disasters at Savannah and Charleston, his "Brigade" was for a time the only organized American force in South Carolina capable of any resistance worthy of the name.

Those were dark days. British agents were everywhere, preparing the ground for the next blows of the uniformed enemy forces.

Guile had to be met with guile. Not every blow for freedom was struck in open battle. There were "collaborationists" who did not collaborate any too well with the British, or rather who collaborated only too well with Marion.

The result of all this was that the Swamp Fox dealt blow after damaging blow. British reconnoitering parties were inexplicably surprised and captured. The enemy communication lines were disrupted at the most critically inconvenient times and in the most unexpected ways. Many of the Redcoats' agents fell into the hands of the Brigade, whose members often appeared to be only peaceable farmers until the rallying order went around. Under the guidance of the Swamp Fox, these peaceable farmers, in the words of Cornwallis, "carried terror to the gates of Charleston."

Marion sometimes joined forces with other leaders to engage in larger operations, and it was especially in one of these that the most effective of all weapons proved its value. Among those with whom he at times cooperated was the famous cavalry commander, Colonel Henry Lee of Virginia, the heroic "Light Horse Harry" Lee. This Virginia officer was later the father of Robert E. Lee, Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate Armies.

For important strategic reasons, it was necessary that Fort Watson, a British stronghold, be destroyed. This was a substantial stockade fortress built on an ancient Indian mound forty feet high on the Santee River, near Scott's Lake, only a few miles below the junction of the Congaree and Wateree. The combined forces of Marion and Lee advanced, and called upon Lieutenant McKay, the commanding officer, to surrender.

He refused. Embarrassing. The attackers had no artillery.

The garrison was of course cut off from Scott's Lake, its source of water, but counteracted this by sinking a well. Direct assault seemed out of the question. True, the Britons were likewise lacking in artillery. But the Americans would have had to charge uphill, against a deadly small-arms fire, only to come up against a sturdy stockade defended by the rifles of well-protected troops. A protracted siege was equally out of the question. There was no telling how soon Colonel Watson might arrive for the relief of the fort bearing his name.

Yet it was necessary that the fort be taken. Such was the dilemma.

The weapon that finally saved the situation was the ingenuity of Major Maham, of Marion's Brigade. It was brought into action without further loss of time.

There was a small wood not too far from the fort. During the night, the troops of Marion and Lee became wood cutters and haulers. It is *not* known whether Major Maham was a student of ancient Roman siege tactics, but his idea certainly was reminiscent of some of the triumphs of the legions. The British awoke to a most disagreeable surprise — American rifle bullets!

The result of the Americans' labor was a very fair equivalent—considering the time and equipment at their disposal—of the movable-tower method of attack. Logs had been placed in alternate layers until a structure was formed high enough to overlook the fort. From the top of this, the Americans could fire upon the defenders.

Marion's official report to General Greene follows:

Fort Watson (Scott's Lake)
April 23, 1781.

Sir:

Lieut. Col. Lee made a junction with me at Santee, the 14th inst., after a rapid march from Ramsay's mill, on Deep River, which he performed in eight days. The 15th we marched to this place and invested it. Our hope was to cut off their water. Some riflemen and Continentals immediately took post between the fort and the lake. The fort is situated on a small hill, forty feet high, stockaded, and with three rows of abbatis round it. No trees near enough to cover our men from their fire. The third day after we had invested it, we found the enemy had sunk a well near the stockade which we could not prevent them from; as we had no entrenching tools to make our approach, we immediately determined to erect a work equal in height to the fort. This arduous work was completed this morning by Major Maham, who undertook it. We then made a lodgment on the side of the mound, near the stockade. This was performed with great spirit and address by Ensign Johnson, and Mr. Lee, a volunteer in Col. Lee's legion, who with difficulty ascended the hill and pulled away the abbatis, which induced the commandant to hoist a flag. Col. Lee and myself agreed to the enclosed capitulation, which I hope may be approved by you. Our loss on this occasion is two killed and three Continentals and three militia wounded. I am particularly indebted to Col. Lee for his advice and indefatigable diligence in every part of these tedious operations, against as strong a little post as could well be made, and on the most advantageous spot that could be wished for. The officers and men of the legion and militia performed everything that could be expected; and Major Maham of my brigade had, in a particular manner, a great share of this success by his unwearied diligence in erecting the tower which principally occasioned the reduction of the fort. In short, sir, I have had the greatest assistance from every one under my command. Enclosed is a list of the prisoners and stores taken, and I shall, without loss of time, proceed to demolish the fort; after which I shall march to the high hills of Santee, encamp at Capt. Richardson's, and await your orders.

Francis Marion.

There is no book so bad but something good may be found in it.
—CERVANTES

Analysis of Our Citizen-Soldier

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER. Vol. I, Adjustment during Army Life; by Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams; 599 pages. Vol. II, Combat and Its Aftermath; by Stouffer, Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star, and Cottrell; 644 pages, Princeton University Press, 1949. $13.50.

By Colonel W. S. Nye

These studies, the first of a series of four, were produced by former members of the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, U. S. Army. They consist of tabulated results of surveys of soldier attitudes during the war, together with analyses thereof, and discussions of methodology employed. Until the volumes are briefed, the material probably is not yet in a form usable by senior officers charged with making and implementing high-level decisions. Furthermore, the flow of professional jargon in the opening chapter is apt to frighten away the casual lay reader, despite the appeal which the topic has for one interested in personnel management. However, I do not suppose that the authors intended to compile a report for popular consumption.

Surveys of soldier opinion conducted during World War II, and the actions taken as a result, doubtless constitute an advance from personnel measures used during the previous war in which only soldier aptitudes were considered. Since VE day there has been an increasing tendency to defer to the desires of the individual in the Service which has led, in some quarters, to the semi-facetious observation that the Army is being run by a system of concurrences and appeasements. On the other side of the ledger is a deep and sincere desire to practice, in the Army, the best principles of democratic human relationship in managing the affairs of both officers and enlisted persons. Attitude surveys, if made with skill and objectivity and used with understanding, can contribute to such a program. Hence, the value to the Armed Forces of a work such as that under review here.

The samplings of opinion described in Vol. I often have a negative, as well as positive, worth. An example cited was the nonfraternization policy — accurately predicted by the surveys as a howling failure—which many now regard as a serious mistake, at least in the rigorous form in which it was directed. A lesson might be derived for today, wherein the widespread unfavorable reaction to Form 67-1 (Efficiency Report) might, if explored, point the way to an improved attitude if not a better form.

Volume I has considerable to say concerning the wartime attitude of the GI toward officers and NCOs, by now fairly well publicized through the Doolittle Report. Although it is too early to say whether the remedial measures which have been undertaken will effect desired improvements, one can at least repeat the cliche that in knowledge lies power. Anything which can contribute to better leadership is worth exploring.

The final chapter of Vol. I spotlights the Negro soldier's protest against racial discrimination. This element colored most of his attitudes which otherwise did not appear to differ materially from those of the white soldier. One previous misconception was dispelled convincingly; it now appears that the Negro soldier prefers Negro officers, or if he must have white leaders he desires that they be from the North, not South.

Volume II is perhaps the more valuable of the two because it points to the possibility of enabling a leader to predict which of his units will do best in combat. Apparently those units which showed (in attitude surveys) the highest rate of unwillingness for combat, even though they were veteran companies, were most apt to do poorly. Further, the most potent combat incentives were carefully analyzed with the not surprising result that "desire to get the job done" was by far the most powerful. Officers and men attached little importance to idealistic motives. Findings of this type can serve as an indication that an indoctrination based on realistic concepts can carry more weight than some of the guff put out during the war.

In controlling fear nothing seemed to help much except the thought—not too well developed—that by increasing a soldier's confidence in his skill with his weapons you assist him to face battle with more steadiness. In training, however, soldiers felt that there was considerable lost motion and waste of time. The desirability of receiving more training under live ammunition was stressed.

Over half the men interviewed thought that the German "88" was the most frightening weapon used by the enemy, though a large portion considered that the mortar actually caused more casualties. It is doubtful if all such soldiers really came under fire from the high-velocity 88, for they spoke of "hearing the shell coming." Many of these probably heard 105mm howitzer shells instead.

The point system used in redeployment was inaugurated as a result of the attitude surveys. The authors evince pride in this achievement, and claim

that the B-bag type demonstrations would have been much worse had some other system been employed. This reviewer feels some skepticism concerning the spontaneity of those demonstrations, and questions whether history will support the theory that national interest was well served by the pattern which redeployment took. A thing is not necessarily right nor does it contribute to the common welfare simply because it is called for in a poll of popular opinion.

In exploring soldier attitude during the period following VE day, two significant and important findings were made: There was almost no evidence of a general desire for a drastic overhauling of American social, economic, or political life; and there *was* strong support for keeping America's defenses strong.

Battle of The Bulge

ST. VITH: LION IN THE WAY. By Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy. Infantry Journal Press. Illustrated. $5.00.

By Colonel Malin Craig, Jr.

The General's face showed concern as he alighted in St. Vith. "There isn't much behind us, is there? The whole way from Rouen, I don't think we have seen a hundred soldiers."

The 106th Division's advance party arived in St. Vith on the 7th of December 1944. Its first elements began to roll in on the 9th, and at noon of the 12th it took over the lines from a battle-wise division that had remained for the most part disposed for the attack during its two months' occupation of this defensive sector. Time had been too short for adequate preparation—the Artillerymen were assembling their new machine-gun mounts to the trucks on the hurried march to the lines, and arrived in position with not one round of ammunition.

Of much comfort and aid to the German General Sepp Dietrich was the disposition of the 106th, ill adapted to the defense and occupied under protests from both the Division Commander and Division Artillery Commander at the express orders of corps to take over the lines "man for man and gun for gun." Right dearly were these violations of the laws of war paid for by the untried but gallant members of the new division.

The hurricane broke at 5:30 on the morning of December 16th. Artillery concentrations and infiltrators disrupted communications. Heavy infantry and tank formations crashed through the cavalry screens to the left and right, united in the rear, and isolated the left and center regiments. The southern combat team held for two white-hot days, and finally managed to withdraw intact, after intensive fighting and consequent heavy losses. By noon of the 17th, Division had lost wire communication with all combat teams, half of the Artillery had been destroyed or surrounded, enemy tanks were threatening the approaches to St. Vith, vague reports were arriving of enemy action twenty miles to the rear on the left and thirty miles to the rear on the right, and the location and condition of the 99th Division to the north and of the 28th Division to the south were unknown. But the German timetable was already badly upset by the stand of this untried division.

Colonel Dupuy's account of these trying times is a refreshing departure from the souvenir brochure school of unit history compilation. He has written a contribution to military history—not a whitewashing, or an old grad's fond recollection. Errors as well as successes are covered. Heroes are lauded but the failures of others are also recorded. The picture of the stragglers blocking the roads to the rear is framed beside those of the steadfast stands of the Engineers at St. Vith and the Artillerymen at the Crossroads. And the brother units that shared the travail have their exploits in the bloody fighting around St. Vith all faithfully recounted as part of the history of the 106th Division.

Lion in the Way may well be described as a fitting complement to Colonel S. L. A. Marshall's *Bastogne—the First Eight Days*. As Marshall's fine book describes the immortal defense of the south shoulder of the Bulge by the 101st Airborne Division and part of the 10th Armored, so does Dupuy bring out the hitherto unsung, but equally vital and desperate battle for the integrity

of the north shoulder. And as Marshall strives for accuracy, revealing the good with the bad, the success with the failure, the brave with the craven; so does Dupuy call all things by their true names, making neither invalid excuses nor excessive claims, and giving due credit to all units involved.

The conventional unit history has less appeal to the military reader than should be, owing largely to its slanted point of view—its tendency to exaggerate merit and ignore shortcoming or failure, and to disregard and occasionally to belittle the related activities of neighboring units. Usually the historian is influenced by the fact that he has been a member of the organization. No such fault mars this work. Colonel Dupuy was never a member of the Division; he writes from the records. Interest in it then is not confined to the men who have worn the Golden Lion, but to all who are interested in gathering together and accurately appraising the scattered and tangled threads that make up the story of the last great surge of the German Army, and its initial repulse, in the fog and the rain and the snow of the dismal Ardennes, by groups of Americans who didn't know when they were through.

Artillery, Ahoy!

THE NAVY OF BRITAIN. By Michael Lewis. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 660 pages, photographs. $7.50.

By Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy

Whoever thrills to tales of tall ships, or reacts to the tang of brine sweeping across wet decks will read this book with pleasure and interest. It is the story of the men and ships of England, written not in history-book style but rather in the careening sweep of broad Atlantic rollers.

The author, Professor of History at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, has taken, as he says in his introduction, neither the naval history of Britain nor the Royal Navy *per se* as his subject, but the British Navy, "... a composite thing ... built up of two components, Ships and Men." He tells of the beginnings of that navy, of its parents and relatives from the Middle Ages, when soldiers were put in ships—merchantmen—to fight on the water, down to the navy of today with its specialization and conglomeration of vessels, weapons and men.

A far cry, this latter navy, with tactics, techniques and strategy of its own, from the days of the "Cinque Ports"—Sandwich, Dover, Hythe, Romney and Hastings—and their feudal agreement with the Kings of England to provide so many ships, all found, for fifteen days each year. Here was, if you will, the original naval militia. It was Henry V who first, it seems, considered that the Crown should have its own warships—really transports for the army. But it was a beginning. It was Henry VIII who first built a fighting fleet for England. Not yet the Royal Navy, though, for the sea rovers of Elizabeth's day, your Drakes, your Hawkins and your Grenvilles who fought England's battles on the sea, were gentlemen-adventurers, militiamen, with one eye cocked on trade while they "singed the King of Spain's beard."

Charles I forced on Britain her first nationally owned and paid-for naval force. Cromwell and the Commonwealth Government elaborated what later, in the reign of Charles II, became for the first time officially the "Royal Navy." Incidentally, Prince Rupert and George Monk, soldiers both, first sparked that navy. The growth of the ship herself, from galley and "roundship," to the great first-rates of Nelson's time, heyday of wooden ships and iron men, is most entertainingly set forth; as is the later transition from wood to iron, from sail to steam.

But the artilleryman, perhaps, is most interested in his handling of the development of the gun, "*the* weapon of sea-warfare par excellence." The author traces the gun from the discovery of powder, from breech-loader to muzzle-loader and back again. And with the gun came sea tactics changing from the old idea of closing and boarding to playing the game of long-bowls—from killing men to killing ships.

Professor Lewis handles his ships and men without gloves. His love for the Royal Navy is intense, yet not so fervent that he is blind to its shortcomings. He is particularly impressive to the professional soldier when he points out

the damage the dead hand of an Admiralty prating stringent regulations could do to the living man on the quarterdeck, confronted with the problems of leadership in action. On the sea as well as on the land the absentee landlord has no business.

This reviewer, for one, was vastly intrigued by this well-written and superbly published portrait. All American artillerymen can learn something from it. Learn about the navy? Why not? Didn't Brevet Major Samuel B. Archer and his Company H, Southern Military Division, Corps of Artillery, U.S.A., handle the quarter-deck guns of Stephen Decatur's U.S.S. *Macedonian* and *Guerriere* in his 1815 cruise against the Algerine pirates? Wasn't 2nd Lieut. James Monroe wounded and one soldier killed in action against the Algerine frigate *Mashouda* off Cabo de Gato, June 19, 1815? Didn't Sgt. Thomas Racey and five artillery privates—all of that same outfit—make part of the prize crew the *Guerriere* put aboard the *Mashouda?* And didn't all 46 of Company H's officers and men on board the former share in the prize money?

Why, shiver my timbers, soldier! Climb off that caisson.

Analysis of the Kremlin

STALIN & CO., THE POLITBURO: THE MEN WHO RUN RUSSIA. By Walter Duranty. 261 pages. Photographs. William Sloane Associates. $3.00.

By Alan Otten

President Truman is on record as believing that Stalin is a prisoner of the Politburo—the 13 men who form the top group in the Russian Communist Party. Other American leaders try to distinguish between the Russian leaders and the Russian people. Still others play up discord within the Politburo, and hope for a full-scale battle when Stalin dies. All these views about the Soviet Union, and many others widely held in the U. S., are now disputed by Walter Duranty, veteran foreign correspondent and authority on the Soviet Union.

Says Duranty: The Politburo is a group of hard-boiled, determined men, all proven adherents of Stalin, all handpicked by Stalin. Through them, Stalin wields about 90% of the power in Russia, and with them he shares the other 10%. The Politburo and Stalin are Russia—there are no other views. Talk about discord within the Politburo and Stalin's loss of power is wishful thinking—a long analysis of the growth of the Politburo and its present set-up lead to the conclusion that its two chief characteristics are unity and loyalty to Stalin. Barring war, no one person will succeed Stalin and there'll be no fight. His mantle of power will be divided among the members of the Politburo, and together they will continue to rule Russia, smoothly and efficiently. Finally, war with the U. S. is not a point in present Politburo policy.

A minor criticism—the book is repetitive and wandering. A major criticism—Duranty's long-standing and obvious friendliness to Russia often leads him to adopt too quickly Russian statements and claims which might be more closely examined. For instance, if, as he claims, the Politburo is so loyal to Stalin, might it not be that very loyalty which is holding it together now, and might not violent discord follow his death? Duranty just says, "no." He gives no real reasons for this answer. Despite these criticisms, however, we must be grateful to him for presenting his points, even if we take them with a grain of salt. And in any event, the book is extremely valuable for its thumbnail biographies of the little-known Politburo members.

Russian Plans

COMMUNISM: ITS PLANS AND TACTICS. By Six Members of Congress. Infantry Journal Press. 98 pages. $2.00.

By Alan L. Otten

The Infantry Journal has reprinted between hard covers a study of Communism made by a special subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the 80th Congress. The subcommittee was made up of four Republicans and two Democrats and was headed by the Hon. Frances P. Bolton of Ohio. Now, a year later, the report is somewhat dated, but still a handy enough volume.

The members of Congress, in their

study of Communism, came up with several conclusions on what Communist goals and policies are: The Communists have had consistently only one goal—world revolution—and they believe this revolution must be violent. Communists firmly believe that there can be no peace and firmly expect one more catastrophic war. The Soviet Union is regarded as the mainspring of the world revolution, and the universal fear is of a coalition against the Soviet Union. To prevent this, the Communists attempt to prevent the reconstruction or federation of the non-Communist world, using the most modern and effective means of cold war—political, economic, intellectual — to strengthen their own forces and weaken all others. Communist parties outside the Soviet Union are strictly junior partners or auxiliaries in the major scheme. All Communist tactics are based on definite theories and the central propositions of those theories do not change.

So far, so good. The sections of the study dealing with Communist tactics and aims are up to the high levels set by two other Congressional groups in earlier studies of Communism—by the Library of Congress in its "Communism in Action" and by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff in "Trends in Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I." The weakest part of the Bolton committee report is exactly where the report should have been the strongest—in recommending a U.S. policy to cope with the problem. The suggestions here, while well-intentioned and even well-directed, are so vague and general as to be virtually worthless.

Revolution on Manhattan

FATHER KNICKERBOCKER REBELS. Thomas J. Wertenbaker. 308 pages. 80 illustrations. Charles Scribner's Sons. $4.50.

By George C. Groce

This is in a sense a social history of New York City during the Revolutionary War. The story is engagingly told by a master raconteur. Few historical writers are better qualified to depict the city's dramatic contrasts of opulence and squalor, gallantry and treachery, hope and despair than Dr. Wertenbaker.

The story begins by setting the scene for the dramatic events which transpired after the Stamp Act of 1765 and ends with the passage into exile of the forlorn Loyalists at the close of the war. The military reader will enjoy the broad strokes with which the author portrays the changing issues and the main engagements of the Revolution. He will be surprised at the wholesale theft of the king's monies by barrack masters, quartermasters, commissaries and odd-lot jobbers or hangers-on. He may be somewhat nonplussed to view the bizarre assortment of female campaigners bedded down with lords and lowlifes.

There were soaring prices, black markets and half-hearted attempts at price control. There were theatres and suppers as well as brilliant social gatherings while the luckless poor were without heat. There were those who grew rich on privateering and those who grew prosperous by shopkeeping. All this life was controlled by martial law and corrupt martial law at that.

There is an interesting treatment of American army prisoners who starved in cold jails and a graphic portrayal of the unspeakable condition of American sailors in the prison ships. One regrets the omission of a comparably vivid discussion of the fate of New York Loyalists in the dank and horrible prisons in Connecticut.

There are about 80 illustrations in the book for those who enjoy pictures for pictures' sake; these will afford added enjoyment to the volume. For those who prefer pictures which are at the same time contemporary historical documents, it will be disappointing to discover that most of the illustrations are done by artists, not of the Revolutionary period, but of our own.

There is no bibliography, but there are 870 citations of sources. About 120 of these are from manuscripts at the William L. Clements Library, 60 from Williamsburg, but there is no indication that the largest body of Loyalist transcripts in the United States (that at the New York Public Library) was consulted at all. The index is unsatisfactory for serious use.

BOOKS IN COLUMN

By MAJOR N. L. DRUMMOND, JR., FA

George Orwell's novel *Nineteen* Eighty-Four (Harcourt-Brace—$3.00) is a grimly up-to-date, more politically conscious and more powerful successor to Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*. Orwell's world of 1984 is a frighteningly logical projection of many forces now in evidence. The chaos of a World War III has allowed ruthless power-mad leaders to exploit modern regimentation of the individual and develop it to super-anthill proportions. Three great sectors of the world, equally dominated by the thought-police of a grinding, all-powerful national party, contend in warfare which is maneuvered and perpetuated for party-power ends. Propaganda has completely superseded education. The party has systematically destroyed or altered all records of the past. Eighty-five percent of the new generation is contemptuously debauched by cheap liquor, lotteries, and a state-furnished bare maintenance of life; 15 percent are party members and under constant two-way television surveillance which makes a death crime of mere thinking against the discipline of the state. Orwell interprets the terrible impact of this upon human life through the story of one man and woman who rebel against the system. There is humor of a grim graveyard variety and the book is of deadly fascination from first page to last. Its fearful future is not inevitable but so realistic as to compel readers to take stock of present-day forces and possibilities, then resolve to fight against them. Perhaps enough of them actually will.

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In *Day Without End* (Sloane—$3.00) Van Van Praag furnishes most of the war novel which thousands of combat men have awaited. Without the scope or quite the power of Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead*, Van Praag's book lacks also the former's verbosity, digressions and false elements. In about 250 pages of concise, unlabored prose, varied in mood but with no flashbacks to interrupt the strongly sustained flow of action, the author tells the story of all combat soldiers—particularly the infantryman—through effective focus on one infantry platoon leader and his men during a day of Normandy action. The author's experience as platoon leader, wounded in European action, is revealed by sure handling of infantry-artillery combat work, along with the human elements of battle. Characters and action are completely believable and the narrative spins out its successive climaxes in mounting intensity, without a dull page or a false note.

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As one of our foremost foreign correspondents and international commentators, Leland Stowe bids strongly for all Americans' thoughtful consideration of current dangers to our basically free way of life, from both left and right political extremists, in his recent book *Target: You* (Knopf—$3.00). Of late there has been much investigation of communist or merely leftwing activity; Congress and the American people have not been much concerned with Fascistic menaces from the right—Ku Klux Klan, other racial prejudice groups and strong-arm special interest outfits. Stowe's thesis is that the great United States middle class is the world's last hope for preserving individual integrity and justice from assaults by power groups of each extreme. He pleads for cooperation now between our middle class, which might be termed grass-roots capitalists, and similar classes of people in Europe, who are already nearly broken by two World Wars and have turned toward socialistic forms in desperate effort to overcome feudalistic capitalism. Without such help, Europe's middle men will be forced to extreme right, as under Hitler and Franco, or to communism—and under the great pressure of isolationism and economic distress, large elements in our own society may well succumb to seduction from the right. The book deserves wide though cautious reading.

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To accompany the summer sports season come several good collections of tales of outstanding figures and events in the field. *Twelve Sport Immortals* by Ernest V. Heyn (Bartholomew House—$3.00) is somewhat mistitled since ten of its short readable biographies are of baseball greats and only Joe Louis and Jack Dempsey impinge from other sports. *Best Sports Stories—1949* (Dutton—$3.00), fifth annual selection by Irving T. Marsh and Edward Ehre of the preceding year's best magazine or news stories and photos, covers every major sport and most minor ones. Both text and photos are excellent. For effective reference, the volume includes summaries of the year's events and winners, plus 1948 Olympic results. On the lighter side is *Low and Inside* (Doubleday—$2.50) by Ira L. Smith and H. Allen Smith, a gathering of anecdotes dealing with the most amazing and outlandish events in baseball from its earliest days to 1918. (Door thus left open to sequel, probably *High and Outside*.) They have the dead player who scored a run, the baby born in a grandstand, the Arctic Circle Mitten League—composed of crews from whaling vessels—and a couple of hundred other aberrations.

Several recent "how to" books are noted as of value to the self-improver. *How to Speak Better English* by Norman Lewis (Crowell—$3.00) is somewhat a modern, streamlined version of Fowler's classic on English usage—sections devoted variously to a practical treatment of tricky spots in grammar, clever achievement tests, and discussions by recognized authorities of most points in modern usage. *How to Train and Improve Your Memory* by Allan L. Fletcher (Halcyon House—$1.49) is a sound, thorough approach to a problem which sooner or later strikes most of us. Steps in technique for various phases are rounded out by a good chapter on methods for public speaking, by entertaining tests, and by striking illustrations of famous minds and memory feats. For those too busy to attend language schools but anxious to acquire a workable knowledge of French and Spanish, *Language Through Pictures* by George and Louise Pfeiffer (Garden City — $2.50) seems an effective and relatively painless way to do it. Over 2,900 pictures with captions in three languages are organized into logical and interesting groups.

St. Vith: Lion in the Way

BY COL. R. ERNEST DUPUY

The detailed story of St. Vith—focal point of the Battle of the Bulge, where the 106th Infantry Division caught the brunt of von Runstedt's early drive. Falling back, but fighting desperate confused actions, the 106th delayed the German onslaught three crucial days. Early censorship concealed the true picture of this critical action.

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