The FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

JULY-AUGUST 1948

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The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

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The FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

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- Cover: A 240mm howitzer, self-propelled, firing at Ft. Bragg.
- Frontispiece: Secretary of the Army Royall visits the Xavier University ROTC.

ARTICLES

ARTILLERY NOTES

OTHER FEATURES

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The Fire-Support Coordination Center

By Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Shafer, FA

★

God fights on the side with the best artillery.—Napoleon Bonaparte.

★

Success favors the side with the best fire support — artillery, antiaircraft, guided missiles, naval gunfire, and air support. The maximum efficiency of available fire support can be attained only when the employment of the available supporting arms is coordinated to the maximum degree at all echelons. This condition is essential to success in combat. Lack of it contributes heavily towards defeat.

During World War II, division and corps artillery commanders frequently functioned as coordinators of the fire-support means supporting the operation, by virtue of necessity. Discussions on fire-support coordination in post-war joint exercises emphasize the need for a wider distribution of knowledge on this subject. The purpose of this article is to present the author's opinion, based on participation in and study of recent joint exercises, and to stimulate further thought in the armed forces on fire-support coordination. That there will be many divergent opinions is fully realised. Here is one that can be examined critically, and we hope, constructively.

FIRE-SUPPORT COORDINATION

Fire-support coordination is not and should not be restricted to any one type of operation, such as amphibious. It is necessary wherever and whenever the army, navy, and air force, or any two of these components, are involved in joint operations. It is a command function.

Operations on a continental land mass are the primary role of the army. They involve the cooperation of the ground forces and the air force, under a single commander at top level, in operations within the objective area to accomplish the assigned task.

Amphibious operations are the normal role of the navy and the marine corps; but for the army they are considered special operations. When the three components—army, navy, and air force—are involved in an amphibious campaign under a single commander it is essential that a common language and technique be used. This is particularly applicable to target designation. Based on years of experimentation, training tests, and World War II campaigns, the navy has developed its amphibious doctrine and technique of fire-support coordination. For the most part, this technique is used by all components participating in joint amphibious exercises.

The underlying principles in the technique of fire-support coordination may be briefly stated as follows:

1. Coordination between the supportting components must always be effected at the lowest practicable level, beginning with the liaison officers at the infantry battalion. When a higher echelon is affected, the higher echelon effects the coordination.

2. Targets should be attacked in relation to the capabilities of the available supporting means in the priority of artillery, naval gunfire, and air strike.

3. Some targets may justify the simultaneous or scheduled attack by all three components; but the coordination of fire-support must *eliminate unwarranted duplication* of fire-support effort.

4. Preplanning is essential; but once the operation has commenced, a large proportion of supporting fires must be directed at targets of opportunity.

5. Speed of attack is frequently the controlling factor in considering a target of opportunity. This may require the attack on the target immediately by whatever means is available, disregarding, for the moment, its relative suitability and coordination procedures. Flexibility must be maintained at all echelons to take the action required by the urgency of the situation.

6. Safety measures must be employed when the attack of a target involves the safety of a supporting component or the troops.

7. A common technique and language must be understood and employed by the components participating in the operation.

THE FIRE-SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER

(Note: the term "commander," as used in the following discussion, refers to the over-all commander at the appropriate level, as distinguished from the "artillery commander.")

Fire-support coordination is attained through the agency known as the Fire-Support Coordination Center (FSCC). This agency provides advice and recommendations concerning fire support to the commander in order to insure the most effective employment of the supporting weapons during the operation. The FSCC is *not* another echelon of command interposed between the commander and the troops. An FSCC functions at every echelon of command from infantry battalion to army. At division and higher level it is organized on a formal basis while at lower levels it functions in a more informal manner. The FSCC is the place where representatives of the components supporting the joint operation are assembled to consider target information, plan the most effective means of attacking targets, and make recommendations to the commander for implementing plans for fire support. The preplanning of supporting fires in accordance with the mission, the plan of maneuver, the terrain, the tactical situation, and the available fire-support means is a responsibility of the FSCC. This preplanning is concurrent in all echelons.

Because of his close proximity to the supported troops and knowledge of their fire-support requirements, and the dominant role of artillery in fire support, it is logical that the *artillery commander* should be the fire-support coordinator

and should organize the FSCC within his command post. In carrying out his functions he must work closely with the operations section and the intelligence section on the staff of the commander. Within the scope of the authority delegated by the commander to his artillery commander, the FSCC makes decisions and transforms them into action in the form of orders or requests for fire support by the available means.

A primary function of FSCC at all levels is the collection, analysis, and evaluation of target information. This is accomplished by the artillery S-2, except at the infantry battalion, where the liaison officers of the supporting components and the S-2 of the infantry battalion do so jointly and informally. Above the infantry battalion level, the technique used in developing counter-battery files is applicable. Each target is listed on a target card, and is given a number taken from the Target List published by the FSCC designated by the commander of the operation. This facilitates target identification by all components involved. Target cards are kept in a Target File for quick reference. Targets are plotted on a Target Overlay to the S-2 map.

In amphibious operations, while the command is being transported on naval vessels and prior to landing, FSCC functions are limited to advising appropriate naval commanders on the attack of targets from the ground force viewpoint, and to gathering target information. When the landing force goes ashore, the senior echelon FSCC leaves an artillery liaison officer on board the command ship, who works with the naval gunnery officer. He keeps the FSCC ashore advised on matters pertaining to naval gunfire, and advises naval personnel concerning the ground force viewpoint on the attack of targets by naval gunfire.

The FSCC is not a separate T/O&E organization, hence the army personnel involved are provided by the artillery headquarters, as directed by the artillery commander. The representatives of the other components are provided in accordance with directives of the overall commander.

THE FSCC AT DIVISION AND HIGHER LEVELS (See Fig. 1)

The FSCC at division and higher



Figure 1

AALO = Antiaircraft Artillery Liaison Officer
NGO = Naval Gunfire Officer
NGLO = Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer
ALO = Air Liaison Officer
FAC = Forward Air Controller (from tactical air control party)

*At corps artillery and higher levels
**At division artillery and higher levels
***At direct-support artillery battalion

levels functions at the artillery command post, with *the artillery commander,* or his representative, as the coordinator. It consists of the Fire-Direction Center (FDC), the S-2, and the coordinating representatives (liaison officers) of the supporting components. At corps and army levels an AAA liaison officer is included. Enlisted personnel of the operations section assist in the FSCC.

The *primary duties* of key personnel in the FSCC are as follows:

The artillery commander, or his representative, as the coordinator, has the following duties:

1. He advises the commander and acts in his name in matters pertaining to fire-support coordination.
2. He makes decisions involving coordination of artillery, naval gunfire, and air support within the scope of the authority delegated to him by the commander.
3. He supervises the planning of the coordinated fire support prior to and during the operation, conferring with the representatives of the other components for this purpose.
4. He is responsible for selecting the appropriate means for attacking the target.
5. He is responsible for the dissemination of the applicable plan for safety during the execution of an air strike.
6. He determines the safety factors involved, in coordination with support agencies, when attacking a target when the trajectory passes over the heads of our own troops, or when the target is in the proximity of our troops.
7. He issues orders for the execution of artillery missions, and initiates requests to the other components for air or naval gunfire missions.
8. He keeps informed of his echelon's operation plans; and cooperates with his echelon's G-3.

The S-3 has the following functions in FSCC in addition to his other duties:

1. He advises the coordinator on the capabilities and availability for missions of the artillery with his echelon.
2. He has the situation map kept up to date with information pertaining to the front lines, the No-Fire-Line, and the Bomb Line.
3. He assists the coordinator in the formulation of fire-support plans, orders, and reports.
4. He confers with the S-2 on the priority of targets.

The S-2 has the following functions in FSCC in addition to his other duties:

1. He maintains a comprehensive record of targets confronting his echelon, with an analysis of their characteristics, estimate of the most effective means of attacking them, and record of damage assessment.
2. He requests through channels photographic coverage of his echelon's zone of action.
3. He maintains constant liaison with his echelon's G-2.
4. He keeps the fire-support representatives of all components informed on the status of targets.

In amphibious operations, the Naval Gunfire Officer in FSCC is an artillery officer especially trained in the technique of naval gunfire. His duties are as follows:

1. He keeps informed of available naval gunfire support, fire-support areas, and sectors of responsibility.
2. He advises the coordinator on the suitability of naval gunfire for any mission or target, including appropriate ammunition.
3. He keeps informed of the naval ammunition situation.
4. He advises concerning naval gunfire trajectories when air strikes are arranged and when VT fuzes are used.
5. He informs fire-support units concerning location of friendly troops, the enemy situation, and results obtained by naval gunfire.
6. He assists in preparation of coordinated plans, by a specified time each night, for naval gunfire support required during the night and the next day.
7. He handles requests for additional naval support for particular situations, such as: general-support ships for special missions or support of a specified unit.
8. He furnishes the S-2 with intelligence derived from naval sources.

The Assistant Naval Gunfire Officer, a naval officer, has the following duties in FSCC:

1. He assists the naval gunfire officer with advice on technique of naval gunfire and communications.
2. He monitors the naval gunfire communications nets.

The Air Force Liaison Officer, or the Forward Air Controller from the Tactical Air Control Party working with the echelon:

1. Advises the coordinator on the availability, capability, and limitations of air support operating in the objective area, and makes recommendations for the employment of air strikes on targets.
2. Recommends the safety plan to be used during the execution of an air strike.
3. Coordinates the obtaining of high-performance airplanes for adjustment of artillery or naval gunfire.
4. Maintains contact with the appropriate air force installation in arranging for air missions and obtaining air intelligence.
5. Directs air strikes on to the target, when appropriate.

The antiaircraft liaison officer assists the coordinator in:

1. Coordination of antiaircraft fires with close-support air strikes and echelon light aviation.
2. Planning and coordination of air defense.
3. Advising on capabilities of AAA in primary and secondary roles.

The *enlisted personnel* of the operations section assist in FSCC in continuation of their normal duties as follows:

a. Sergeant Major:

1. Supervises plotting of targets on the Target Overlay, and keeping Situation Map up to date.
2. Supervises keeping Target Information File and Cross Index File.

b. Operations Sergeant:

1. Plots targets on Target Overlay.
2. Keeps situation map up to date.
3. Makes overlays as needed.
4. Relief for sergeant major.

c. Target File Clerk:

1. Records data on Target Cards.
2. Maintains Target Information File.
3. Maintains Target Cross Index File.

d. Journal Clerk:

1. Keeps journal up to date.
2. Maintains journal file.
3. Maintains contact with message center.
4. Stenographer.

FSCC AT INFANTRY REGIMENTAL OR COMBAT-COMMAND LEVEL

The FSCC at regimental or combat-command level functions at the CP of the direct-support field artillery battalion, with the *artillery battalion commander,* or his representative, as the coordinator. The personnel and their functions are, in general and so far as facilities and the situation permit, the same as those outlined above, except that the staff officer coordinating the naval gunfire of the assigned direct-fire support ships in amphibious operations is called the *Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer* and is a naval officer.

THE FSCC AT INFANTRY BATTALION LEVEL

The FSCC at infantry battalion level functions at the command post of the infantry battalion, with the *artillery liaison officer* as the coordinator. It consists of the artillery liaison officer, naval gunfire liaison officer, and forward air controller from the TACP working with the battalion. The situation, facilities, and personnel at this level require a very informal type of operation; but the principles governing the technique of fire-support coordination are the same as at higher levels. The FSCC works closely with the operations section of the infantry battalion, and with the infantry battalion commander. (See Figure 2.) The naval gunfire liaison officer has the following duties in addition to those listed for higher echelons:

1. He coordinates the activities of the Shore Fire-Control Party working with the battalion.

2. He trains the Shore Fire-Control Party in the use and procedure of radio communications.

An FSCC is not set up in units in general support or in reinforcing artillery units, as their supporting fires are controlled by another headquarters.

THE FSCC COMPARED TO THE FDC

To visualize the FSCC more clearly, let us compare it with the agency with which we are familiar — the artillery battalion FDC. When the S-3 in FDC receives a target he plots it on the firing chart and analyzes it. Is the target within the capabilities of his batteries? Does it endanger our troops? Will its destruction or neutralization facilitate the progress of the operation? Will our own or adjacent troops be endangered if the target becomes an assigned fire mission? Who will observe? How much ammunition should be expended on it? If the answer to these questions indicate that the target should be attacked, he assigns the mission and gives the command to fire.—Now let us take a similar example through FSCC: A target is received and is immediately plotted on the target map (overlay) and analyzed. Is the target within the capabilities of the available fire-support means, considered in the order of artillery, naval gunfire, air? Does it endanger our troops, vessels, or installations? Will its destruction or neutralization contribute to the accomplishment of the mission? Will our own or adjacent troops be endangered by the attack on the target? What safety plan must be employed, and for what duration? What arrangements must be made for observation? The selection is made by the coordinator of FSCC as to means of attack to be employed. If the means selected is artillery, FDC directs the execution; if it is naval gunfire, the naval gunfire officer requests the fire over the naval gunfire control net; if it is an air strike, the mission is requested through channels to the Joint Operations Center. After attack an assessment of damage report is received and recorded. The same procedure is used if simultaneous or scheduled attack by two or more means is employed. If the FSCC at an echelon determines the attack of the target to be beyond the capabilities of its available fire-support means, the mission is requested from the next higher echelon FSCC, which procedure conforms to that of FDC.



Figure 2

COMMUNICATION

Communication for the control of naval gunfire and air support is provided for, based on the requirements of the situation, and is beyond the scope of this article.

TRAINING

It is essential that time be allowed in the training program for joint exercises or combat for the training of the FSCC to result in the development of an efficient team. This training should include CPXs and problems in which all means of communication to be used in the exercise or operation are employed, including shore-to-ship and ground-to-air.

DISTORTION IN CPXs AND JOINT EXERCISES

Joint exercises involving fire support and the FSCC have resulted in a distorted concept of the functions and operation of the FSCC when such agencies have not been actually represented at each echelon during the exercise. Failure to have the FSCC actually operate at each echelon increases beyond normal the activities of higher echelon FSCCs represented in the exercise. The distortion results from higher echelon FSCCs coordinating matters which normally would be taken care of by fire-support means available at subordinate echelons. FSCCs of each echelon should exploit their own fire-support means to the extent of their capabilities before requesting additional fire support from higher echelons.

The Artillery Report on "Exercise Mesquite"

By Capt. Geo. W. Watkins, FA

"EXERCISE MESQUITE" was designed and planned to perfect the close coordination of high-performance aircraft and armor. Certain phases of the exercise were designed to cover every point in the technique of close-support bombing by high-speed fighter craft and the task force of an armored combat command.

The artillery phase of the exercise was carried out in a satisfactory manner despite hindrances due to variations necessary for safety reasons.

One squadron of jet-propelled P-80's from the 12th Air Force, based at March Field, California, was sent to Bergstrom Field, Texas, for the exercise, and Combat Command "A" of the Second Armored Division furnished the Armored Task Forces. The entire exercise took place on the Camp Hood reservation during 6-15 May.

At this time, only the artillery phase will be discussed. Planning artillery support for the excercise presented considerable difficulty, owing to the present safety restrictions which prohibit firing over troops. Of the several solutions discussed in the planning phase, it was decided finally to emplace the artillery at some distance to the flank so that the left safety limit would pass approximately parallel to the front. Although this sacrificed tactical realism for the artillery, it afforded freedom of movement to the Task Force commanders by eliminating danger areas in rear of front lines, and permitted the impact area to be altered to conform to the actual location of troops during the exercise.

It was agreed that, prior to firing, the artillery would obtain a safety clearance from each of the Task Forces through its liaison officers and forward observers. To accomplish this, the observers were to be furnished with the location of the battery firing and the coordinates of the target. In addition, the observers, working closely with the respective TACP's, woud be responsible that the danger area was kept clear of aircraft while artillery was firing. It was decided that there would be no artillery support of ground operations other than to mark targets for bombing and the adjustment of artillery by high-performance aircraft.

During the initial conference between Air Force and artillery officers to discuss high-performance adjustment of artillery, it was found that both arms were completely in accord as to methods and procedure to be used. As the pilots to fly these missions had attended a special course at The Artillery School, it was not necessary to conduct any briefing of the pilot-observers, and it was decided that targets would be assigned after arrival of the plane over the target area. The procedure prescribed in FM 6-40 was adopted without change.

Seeking complete flexibility in marking air targets by artillery, it was proposed that every conceivable method be used, based on the assumption that the mission could be handled efficiently through organic artillery communications regardless of the location with respect to each other of the commander requesting the mission, the observer adjusting the artillery, and the TACP handling the bombing. The attached tabulation shows the combinations that were to be used.

Two additional tests were to be made. Forward observers were instructed to pass assigned mark missions to the artillery air observers, who would then complete necessary adjustment and mark, coordinating the air strike through the forward observer, who would in turn work with any available ground TACP. The air TACP was instructed to accept or select bomb targets and endeavor to "talk" the bombers onto the target without the aid of an artillery-smoke mark. Targets were to be "passed" to the TACP "Rooster" by ground commanders or the artillery air observers, again using normal artillery communications.

There were no actual artillery operations prior to D-day, 10 May. However, reconnaissance planes had been active for four days and targets had been spotted, and planned fire missions were made from the results of these reconnaissance flights.

One common radio channel (Battalion Command Channel) was provided and guarded by all observers, the liaison officer with Combat Command Headquarters, and the fire-direction center. This channel also was provided as the alternate in liaison planes of the air observers and the TACP. This provided close contact between all artillery installations and TACP's, inasmuch as the observers and liaison officers remained habitually in the vicinity of the TACP operating at their level.

Owing to the abnormal artillery dispositions, it was necessary to establish relay stations. Delay from the time a mark mission was requested until finally completed ranged from an average of about 12 minutes on the first day of the exercise to about 3 minutes on the final day. Reduction of the time lag was attributed primarily to improvement of communications and the personnel's gaining more familiarity with the procedure involved. It must be emphasized that had the artillery enjoyed normal

TF-Task Force.
TACP-Tactical Air Control Party.
CC-Combat Command.

Bomb Mission Requested by	Observer Marking Target	TACP Controlling Air Located At
TF Comdr	Fwd Obsr w/TF	TACP w/TF
TF Comdr	Fwd Obsr w/TF	TACP w/CC
TF Comdr	Fwd Obsr w/TF	Air TACP
TF Comdr	Arty Air Obsr	TACP w/TF
TF Comdr	Arty Air Obsr	TACP w/CC
TF Comdr	Air TACP	Air TACP
Arty Air Obsr	Arty Air Obsr	Any Ground TACP
Arty Air Obsr	Arty Air Obsr	Air TACP
Air TACP	Air TACP	Air TACP

combat dispositions, these time delays would have been practically eliminated, as most of the time was consumed in obtaining safety clearances.

The command to fire smoke to mark the target was given by the TACP when the fighter-bombers were ready, and passed to the artillery FDC by the artillery officer (observer or liasion officer) present with the TACP. When the TACP used was distant from the observer conducting the adjustment, the artillery officer with the TACP "listened" to the mission and assumed control when the adjustment was complete.

Aggressive efforts were made to test each of the observer-TACP combinations, and each combination was worked with success.

For the exercise, the photomap was adopted as the firing chart, survey was by inspection from the chart, and corrections obtained by registration. Weather data was not available. Where the target to be marked was clearly identified on the chart, and available registration permitted, smoke was fired without prior adjustment from chart data, and results were entirely satisfactory.

The time consumed by ground observers, as compared to air observers, in completing adjustment prior to marking was notable, while the ease with which ground observers passed the mission to air observers appeared to justify the latter method. In addition, the air observer was able to furnish accurate information as to the result of the actual bombing on the target. The TACP reported inability to "talk" bombers onto a small point target without a smoke mark.

Artillery adjustment by high-performance aircraft proceeded without difficulty. An Air Force VHF radio was stationed in the artillery FDC (this radio actually was furnished from one of the TACP's). Pilots experienced no difficulty in finding the small point targets assigned, and displayed a complete knowledge of the artillery technique involved. Flying at over 2,000 feet, and at speeds exceeding 250 mph, they were able to find and sense the HE bursts of the 105mm howitzer with comparative ease.

Upon completion of the exercise, the following conclusions were reached and recommendations made concerning the artillery phase:

1. Although proximity of the TACP to the artillery observer marking the target is desirable, it is not of vital importance as long as adequate communications exist. The artillery radio net is adequate, and a single TACP with the Combat Command can handle missions marked by all ground and air observers.

2. Marking the target with smoke on command of the TACP handling the air afforded the best coordination.

3. Thought must be given constantly to marking the target with smoke without destroying the element of surprise. When possible, the target should be marked without prior adjustment; when adjustment is necessary, the observer should endeavor to adjust on a nearby point and transfer.

4. Ground observers should consider the possibility of passing target marks to an air observer to gain speed and accuracy in adjustment and transfer to the target. This will also furnish the ground commander with excellent information as to the effect of the bombing.

5. At its present stage of development, the TACP appears to require an investment of personnel and equipment not warranted by the results obtained. If it is to be used, improvement of the physical set-up is necessary. As the pilot and the air officer are each in a separate radio net, some means of effective intercommunication should be devised.

6. The procedure prescribed in FM 6-40 for adjustment of artillery by high-performance aircraft is entirely effective. In addition to other information, the pilot should be furnished with the maximum ordinate in feet, as this influences the manner in which he flies the mission. If the pilot has attended appropriate instruction in this type of work, no prior briefing is necessary.

"Exercise Mesquite" served its purpose well. It proved conclusively that high-performance fighter-bombers can work effectively with armored forces in an attack, and that the principles and doctrines of the technique of such coordination, as laid down by our current field manuals, are sound and should be followed.

Pigs and War

BY HAROLD HELFER

Any number of books, essays, and theses have been written on the cause of World War I—but, in a literal and actual sense, what caused it were pigs.

The Serbs were an active people, but what they seemed to do best was raise pigs. They were proud of their larders and they shipped them far and wide. This was a big factor in the economic life of Serbia. Now in order to get their pigs to the big European markets the Serbs had to send them across Austria. The Serbs and Austrians got along fairly well until one day the Austrians raised a forbidding hand. You can't send any more pigs across our lands, they said. They gave a good reason for this. They said some of the Serbian pigs were infected. But all the Serbs knew was that the Austrian edict was playing havoc with a customary part of their wherewithal.

Anyway, on that summer day in 1914 when the Austrian crown prince, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, the Countess of Hohenberg, chose to visit Sarajevo, feeling was running pretty high between the Austrians and the Serbs. Then from out of the shadows stepped a youth named Gavrilo Prinzip, a Serb, who fired a gun into the royal carriage. His bullets found their mark, the Archduke and the countess were fatally wounded—and World War I, which was to suck in much of the civilized world and cause millions of deaths, was on. Gavrilo Prinzip had a lot of bitter things to say against Austria but the bitterest of all seemed to be that they were unfair to Serbian pigs.

From Morocco to Berlin

An Armored Artillery Battalion in Action

By Lt. Col. Hugh M. Exton, FA

Part II

OPERATION "COBRA"

Following a heavy saturation bombing, the VII Corps breakthrough forces, the 4th, 9th, and 30th Infantry Divisions, launched their attacks at about noon, 25 July. On Corps order, the 2d Armored Division would attack and commence the exploitation phase in conjunction with the 1st Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Division.

The morning of 26 July, Combat Command A started the attack of the 2d Armored Division. Progress was initially slow because of the difficult terrain and the condition of the roads. For this reason, the attack of Combat Command B, of which the 78th was a part, was delayed until the next morning. On the 27th, as soon as the bombed area had been passed, the advance was rapid and the leading elements of Combat Command B reached Notre Dame de Cenily by midnight. (See Map No. 3.)

The following day, the combat command pushed on and one task force, consisting of a company from the 67th Armored Regiment and a company of the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment and accompanied by Lieutenant Richard Moses, an observer from the 78th, reached Cambernon. Also, during the day, the Germans launched several attacks attempting to break out from the pocket being formed by the advance of Combat Command B. These were repulsed, though it was necessary to commit the division reserve to do so. To support the advance of the leading elements and also to support the counterattacks against the German thrusts, the 78th had two batteries in position in the vicinity of a crossroad just west of Notre Dame and one battery east of the town. To accomplish these two missions, it was necessary to fire at targets sometimes 180 degrees apart in direction. Such shifts in deflection frequently had to be made very rapidly because of the fast-moving situation. Here is demonstrated the mobility and flexibility of armored artillery.

During the early morning of 29 July, elements of the 4th Infantry Division, which had been following the 2d Armored



Map No. 3

Division, consolidating the gains made, occupied positions protecting the right flank of Combat Command B north of the crossroad west of Notre Dame. Shortly after these elements had occupied their positions, the Germans launched an attack with a force of paratroopers and tanks, evidently intending to break through to the south along the road passing through the crossroad. It can be seen that this crossroad was of great importance to the combat command as through it passed the main avenue of advance to the west and also the main route south for an enemy breakthrough attempt.

Meanwhile, the task force which had reached Cambernon the day before had been cut off by German forces advancing south, west of the 78th's positions. The battalion was firing missions for Lieutenant Moses, the forward observer, at German troops attempting to eliminate this small force. Another task force, advancing west, had reached a point about 2,500 yards southwest of the 78th area the morning of the 29th. With this force was Lieutenant Bennett as forward observer and the battalion had already fired about 500 rounds to break up German attacks against his task force.

The elements of the 4th Infantry Division which had occupied the position protecting the combat command's right flank consisted of a company of infantry reinforced by four self-propelled tank destroyers. Their position was astride the road, about two hedgerows or 200 yards north of the position of Battery B. (See Map No. 4.)

At about 0800, the small-arms firing from the area north of Battery B seemed to grow much more intense. The battalion commander sent the battalion reconnaissance officer, Captain Beauchamp, to find out the cause. He soon reported that some enemy infantry was attacking the 4th Division outpost but that the position seemed well in hand. However, the intensity of the fire became still greater and then it was reported that a force of about 200 infantry and 15 tanks was now attacking. Shortly, mortar shells began to fall in the battalion area. Then it was reported that the 4th Division outpost was withdrawing. It was later learned that all the officers of the outpost had been either killed or wounded.

Upon seeing the 4th Division elements withdrawing into the area of Battery B, the battalion commander ordered the M-7s of the battery out of their indirect-fire positions and into direct-fire positions. The combat command was notified of the situation. Lieutenant Morris, the battery executive, personally led these howitzers into their positions. The battalion commander then went over to the battery to learn just what the situation actually was. He found that the 4th Division troops were somewhat disorganized owing to the loss of their officers and their withdrawal. Thus, he ordered Lieutenant Davis, the battery assistant executive, to organize the men of Battery B less the crews of the howitzers so as to fight as infantry and cover the M-7s and block the advance of the Germans toward the crossroad. Lieutenant Davis promptly deployed his men and emplaced machine guns along a hedgerow. A small force under Lieutenant Burke, the battery reconnaissance officer, took up positions across the road to protect the battery left flank.

In the meantime, the battalion executive, Major Maynard, had ordered Battery C to move from its exposed positions right at the crossroad to positions from which it could cover with direct fire the crossroad itself and the western approaches to the battalion area.

The Battery B M-7s had moved to the second hedgerow north of that along which were deployed the dismounted men. Several enemy managed to sneak up close to the vehicles, somehow escaping the direct 105mm fire, and started trying to toss grenades into them. Lieutenant Morris decided that it was time to move back to new positions from which the 105s could be used more effectively, so he moved the M-7s back to the line of infantry. Then, firing all available weapons, the 78th finally stopped the enemy advance. At about this time, a reserve force of tanks and infantry from the combat command started to advance through the 78th area and proceeded to drive the enemy back to the north.

After the action was over, 7 knocked-out German tanks and 126 dead paratroopers were found on the road and along the last hergerow which they had reached. One tank had even reached the crosroads only to be knocked out by an M-7 from Battery C.

This action effectively illustrates the fact that artillerymen will have to fight as infantry on occasion and that they can give a good account of themselves if they have been properly trained. The necessity for a certain amount of infantry training of artillery units is obvious.



Map No. 4

(*Continued on page* 188)

NOTES FROM FA-CMG

Readers are invited to address inquiries to *The Field Artillery Journal* concerning matters of career guidance and assignment. Specific questions regarding schooling and assignment will be referred to the appropriate agency, and where the resulting explanation is deemed of general interest, it will be printed in this magazine. Names of those making such inquiries will not be published if the individual so requests.—*Editor*.

PROBABLY the problem most frequently presented to FA-CMG is that contained in the following, received almost daily, from various officers: "I am very much interested in how this here (sic) Career Management affects me personally. Please tell me what you have planned for me during the next fifteen to twenty years."

When faced with this poser, officers working in FA-CMG privately confess to a sensation of bafflement and frustration. Earnestly as they would like to be able to grasp the unfathomable future, experience based on past uncertainties has convinced them that only the most brash would attempt to predict accurately the course of an officer's career beyond one year.

Career Management, stripped of its glamor and mystery, consists essentially of a system of planned, judicious assignments. Or so it is hoped. How the officer performs while on these assignments, and how he is rated, is up to him. FA-CMG doesn't *make* efficiency reports; it only analyzes and files them. It doesn't produce officers; it only moves them. Thus, so far as FA-CMG is concerned, Career Management is a matter of getting the individual into an appropriate job. Doubtless there will often be a difference of opinion as to what constitutes a suitable assignment. What is good from the point of view of the individual, or from a career guidance standpoint, does not always satisfy the immediate needs of the service. An army headquarters might like to obtain as G-2 an officer who had had a long and uninterrupted career in military intelligence, but the subject officer might be badly in need of troop duty to round out his background. In ordinary times, Career Management will attempt some long-range planning, with a view to producing properly trained leaders for our armies of tomorrow; but when an "emergency" strikes, career guidance is usually subordinated to the needs of the hour.

FA-CMG has learned that in making assignments three factors generally govern: (1) *Availability* of the individual,

ARTILLERY CAREER PATTERN



The types of duties listed in the Career Pattern are considered desirable for all Artillery Officers. All officers will necessarily receive many other types of assignments, but every effort will be made within the limits of operational necessity to assign officers to the duties listed during the indicated service periods. If an officer is not given the opportunity to serve in the type of positions indicated during a particular period, it is intended that his assignment at a later date will be such as to correct this deficiency.

(2) *requirement* or vacancy, and (3) *suitability* (of the available individual for the vacancy in question) as based on past record. Added to these are, of course, the desires of the individual, which FA-CMG seriously attempts to satisfy if humanly possible.

Of the foregoing, *availability* is usually the most important from a practical standpoint. We might have, for example, a very fine vacancy with no one at hand to fill it; or a splendid officer unassigned, with no suitable opening at the moment. In the first case, FA-CMG commences to cast about desperately for someone who, though not due to move, would like to do so. In the second case, FA-CMG offers the candidate to agencies which it has learned, from experience, are generally in need of extra help. All this failure to match (chronologically) availability with requirements doubtless results in some imperfect assignments. However, officers can't be kept cooling their heels indefinitely while FA-CMG finds jobs for them. Neither will agencies who have urgent requirements be satisfied (not often, anyway) with the bland, "No one available."

FA-CMG would love to foresee accurately all vacancies and all availabilities. It would be pleased beyond measure if officers only returned from overseas when forecast, if T/O's and Tables of Distribution remained fixed through the ages, if no one ever retired, died, went to a hospital, or needed a compassionate deferment. But the Golden Age has not arrived, and until it does, there will always be exigencies of the service to prevent the operation of a completely orderly, planned system of assignments.

It may not be generally appreciated that the sudden and unexpected change in status of a single officer, requiring someone to be moved who is not due to move, frequently sets up a chain reaction. Thus: Lt. Colonel A in Washington, D. C., wants to transfer to Fort Bliss because of his wife's health. Lt. Colonel B is acceptable to the losing agency in place of A, but he was slated to be PMS&T at Podunk University. Hence C, who is at Podunk, must stay another year, which gyps his assistant, D, out of a chance to go to Leaven-worth and requires FA-CMG to get another candidate in place of D which, in turn, sets up a secondary chain reaction. This case is not at all unusual—it is typical.

FA-CMG wants to help you. But before you write in to get your orders changed, stop to think for a moment: Is the need urgent? Will the proposed change work a hardship on others? Do I really know what is good for me and for the service?

Another event which sometimes affects the career of the individual in a manner which he may not suspect is the sudden and substantial change in the allocation of officer personnel to a major agency. If the agency is powerful and important enough, the resulting drive for officer assignments is of sufficient magnitude to set up a whole series of chain reactions. By the time the last quivering vibration has died out, the career pattern of you, too, may be hanging in shreds. Exigencies of the service!

Despite minor annoyances in the daily life of the Career Guidance operator, that plodder continues doggedly in his endeavor to make officer assignments in accordance with approved policies. He honestly tries to place the right man in the right job at the right time. He is fully sold on the idea that the up-and-coming young officer should be rotated through a pattern which will insure that he arrive at the senior field grades equipped to become a major-unit commander or high-level staff assistant. He is enthusiastic over the idea that everyone should have a fair share of attractive as well as humdrum assignments, and that each should perform his proper proportion of foreign service. He is anxious that all good and deserving Field Artillerymen attain National War College or comparable degree of sanctity before doddering old age (45) overtakes them.

But FA-CMG is not Master of Destiny.

Into the welter of everyday assignment is thrust the vast linkage of the Army School Program. Every Field Artilleryman must attend his Basic and Advanced Courses. At least half of all officers will, it is hoped, go to Leaven-worth to be converted into general staff officers (some day there should be no lack of these). Finally, a chosen few, the number depending on how many slots are handed down from above, will pass on to the higher schools to learn about galaxial strategy and logistics.

But this is not all. A very tasty menu of side dishes has been prepared: Civilian schools; foreign schools; schools of other arms, services, and the other armed forces; special schools for intelligence and counterintelligence personnel, for PIO's, and the like. If there is a hiatus somewhere, please call it to our attention.

All this must, perforce, be folded into the career of the guided Field Artillery officer in addition to his overseas service, a trick with the civilian components, some troop duty, and a tour on the general or special staff. Life seems too short. It is hoped that somewhere along the line, the officer will learn something concerning the technique of his arm. A grave suspicion lingers that in the next war someone, somehow, may still have to fire a gun.

It is said that numerous officers are managing their own careers and are entering actively into the manipulation of planned assignments. Certain cynics have even suggested that dependents (a new and scurrilous word invented during the late war) are taking a hand. . . .

However, if you are an average officer (which, of course, you are not) and expect to follow an average career for an average length of time under average circumstances, the accompanying chart will give you all the answers.

—"You've Never Had It So Good"—

By Rosalee G. Porter

"YOU'VE never had it so good!" Theme song of the Japanese occupation, purr of satisfaction when all is well; sarcastic wail of frustration when things go wrong.

For the many months we lived in Tamamo Castle, which is in Takamatsu, on the Island of Shikoku, each day I thought that the tomorrow would bring the conviction that I had never had it so good — and each tomorrow failed to convince me. Now looking back to that story-book existence, I think perhaps that that was it; as our British Allies would say, "I've had it!"

What I had was a castle for my home, but the castle was a series of wings and corridors built around five patios and a cycad forest. The floors were covered with tatami (straw) mats in all but two of the rooms; the floors of the miles of corridors were lacquered. To preserve these floors we should have taken off our shoes, and in true mountaineer fashion sat around in our stocking feet. Because of the cold we wore shoe covers, which were oblong sacks made of salvaged Japanese woolen blankets with elastic around the tops. They were ugly and bulky but they kept our shoes off the fragile mats and they kept our feet warm.

The rooms I mentioned as not having mats were the drawing room and the dining room. These two rooms with their glassed-in corridors around them constituted one wing. Their floors were covered with pale green axminster rugs, moth-eaten, decorated with pink roses, and room size, which was 21 by 28 feet. There were eighteen stiff, green satin chairs, four small mahogany tables, and a little desk with the drawer pulls bearing the 16-petal Imperial chrysanthemum. There was also a dining-room table just big enough for six people—no extension possibilities—and an imitation sideboard. All these things had been sent to the Matsudarias, who owned the place, by the Emperor, when the then Prince of Wales had been a guest on the island about twenty years ago.

With good midwest efficiency I borrowed an upholstered davenport and two overstuffed chairs from my husband's office, bought two $2.98 white lamps from the Post Exchange in Yokohama for $10.95, and took some of the bleakness from the rooms. The kitchen was so far from the dining room that, until I was oriented, I followed the chalk arrows I put on the floor to find it. It was the same size and temperature as a skating rink. There was a sink in it 14 feet long, 14 inches wide, and 4 inches deep. We boarded at the Military Government mess. . . .

There were no doors, no windows, no walls, only sliding paper panels. Some of them which separated the rooms were beautiful in design, white and gold, or painted with intricate and lovely pictures, but to slide they all had to be loose, and being loose the wind blew through, and as it went through it carried out the precious and puny heat we had from our electric heaters. The paper panels failed to keep out the cold but they succeeded very well in keeping out the light. Until summer came and we could have all the panels pushed back, we had no daylight.

In the summer we had more than daylight. Our castle was surrounded by twelve acres of exquisite Japanese gardens, made beautiful by twisted ancient trees, huge stone lanterns most intricately

A corridor in the castle



Bridge over moat at entrance to castle

carved, and an artificial river. In the river there were four wells, and in the olden days, when the Imperial family visited at the castle, the river was filled by hand-drawn buckets of water. Needless to say they didn't visit us and none of our guests rated the compliment. However, we were always so happy to have company in that out-of-the-way place that had they demanded it we would have hauled the water and filled the river for them.

In addition to the main garden there was a formal rose garden, the stone-edged beds being shaped like the hollyhock leaves that formed the crest of the Tokogawa family. There was also a cutting-flower garden, an enormous kitchen garden (though we could never taste the vegetables from it as it was fertilized in the orthodox Japanese way), and a grove of big trees. Each of these gardens was inclosed in its own stone wall, as were the areas inside the estate in which two dependent housing groups were built.

The stone walls of the areas and the walls of the double moats which surrounded the whole were unbelievably old and beautiful. They were dry-laid gray stones well over four hundred years old, having been built when Hideoshi was conquering Japan. The height and width of the walls varied in different places; in some places they were 18 feet thick, and the huge stone pyramidal base in one part of the moat was at least 50 feet high.

On this big base the original castle had been built, and stayed for nearly four hundred years during the time the feudal lords were flourishing. Only two towers still stand on the portion of the wall that fronts the Inland Sea. The moats are filled with water from the sea through a series of water gates, and so the level rises and falls with the tide.

On the big truncated pyramid now stands the ruin of the shrine that was built on it about eighty years ago, when our castle was built and the family came down to earth. However, the Count Matsudaria told us in all seriousness that the Deity was no longer in the shrine. "He moved to Yashima," another shrine on the mountain nearby by that name.

We moved to Yokohama and ended a phase of our Japanese adventure, the like of which comes to few people, even over here where they have never had it so good. Now that winter is here and we have glass windows, doors that swing open and lock, a furnace, and a fireplace, I really feel that I have attained some sort of conviction about the theme song.

Just looking at the fire burning on the hearth and out the window at the fifteen other houses and their stateside gardens, I might as well be on any small army post at home.

Our quarters are stucco outside with bay windows. Downstairs there are living room, dining room, butler's pantry, kitchen, and sun porch. Upstairs there are three bedrooms, bath, trunk room, and glassed-in sleeping porch. Our neighbors are the people we've known and been stationed with on other posts for the past twenty-seven years, and very nice it is to have them here. When we leave our Sun Ray Oil Compound

Front door of the castle

and drive down off the bluff, we lose all illusion about being at home.

Yokohama harbor is busy, but among the transports, freighters, and occasional liners, there are partly submerged and rusting hulls of battleships. On the skyline there are a few tall buildings, monuments of triumph over fire bombs and earthquakes, but for miles in all directions is the mushroom growth of little buildings, for business purposes and for homes. These little boxlike structures are made of split bamboo stuck together with mud and straw.

The tons of rubble have been cleaned from the streets and once more the pattern of parks is clear. Street cars, crowded in defiance of safety to life and limb, run their regular routes. The Japanese people and their children are everywhere, the women bright and colorful in their kimonas; worn five or six layers deep, they are so much warmer than anything our own wardrobes boast.

Little islands of familiarity loom here and there in this alien town—the Grand Hotel, the Helm House, 8th Army Headquarters, the Post Exchange, and the Commissary. Here we queue up for hours in lines filled with soldiers and with the hundreds of women who are over here, most of them in slacks with scarfs around their heads. If the title of my story is the theme song over here, surely these mouldy slacks and soiled head-rags are the uniform of the dependent.

In the commissary we take our long-awaited turns at our daily bread, butter at 80 cents a pound and eggs for the same a dozen. Meat is frozen and expensive and, from what we hear, the same prices as at home. Vegetables are good, but frozen stateside ones. Occasionally some radishes and precious little lettuce leaves do escape the messes and get to us from the hydroponic farms. There have also been rumors of a mechanical cow, but so far none of us has heard her moo nor have we been offered any of her lacteal fluid. The thing most missed here, the thing that most of the occupationaires are waiting to go home for, is a tall glass of ice-cold milk.

The commissary lines are long, but the ones at the PX are longer! On Sunday mornings, when silk, pearls, jade earrings, and other treasures of the orient are advertised, when the supply is inadequate to the demand, the lines start forming at 6 o'clock in the morning, and by 10, when the door opens, a bargain-basement sale is the only thing comparable to what goes on. Shouting, snatching, insults about fair play—it is really better to sit down quietly at home with a Sears' or Ward's catalogue, order the necessities, and let the novelties go to those who will fight for them.

No story about Japan at this time can be complete without mention of those five servants everyone is supposed to have. Well, they aren't servants and everyone doesn't have them. They are usually two or three, rarely five, strange little slant-eyed people in the home. They do not speak or understand English, they know nothing at all about our houses, our habits and ways, and least of all about our American food. Never having seen it or tasted it, they have no idea what it should look or taste like. With the closest supervision and guidance it takes about five of them to do in all day what one American maid would do in half a day.

In the few houses in our compound where there are five, they function as a unit and reign supreme. Bathrooms, kitchens, and porches are not washed or mopped, they are sluiced out with buckets of cold water, with everything left dripping afterward. That expensive Commissary food, that has come so far, finishes its last mile to the table boiled without salt and served stone cold. At one word of reproof or correction from the Okusan (their quaint way of referring to the mistress of the house), the cook will get angry and quit, taking the other four with him in most cases.

In our house we have the two we brought with us from Takamatsu, who are still completely ignorant of our ways—every day everything has to be started all over again. They are willing, devoted, and industrious, but if it weren't for the dish washing, we wouldn't have them cluttering up our house. Now I can hear Dear Reader snort, "No dish washing, why she's never had it so good!"

When I am in the States, and look back to this Compound, as I now look back on the Castle, I know that I'll still be wondering. The answer as to whether I have or have not ever had it so good will probably never be any clearer to me than it is to the other Okusans in the Occupation.

The old shrine

Artillery in Air-Ground Cooperation

By Lt. Col. Edward S. Berry, FA

"THE effectiveness of air-ground cooperation is still in its infancy. Air and ground commanders must be constantly on the alert to devise, and use, new methods of cooperation." These words, written by General George S. Patton, Jr., in 1945 and published in his book, "War As I Knew It," are still well worth our concentrated attention.

The use of Fire-Support Coordination Centers at every echelon of ground command engaged in combined operations using air power, or both air power and naval support, from the army right down through the direct-support artillery to supported infantry and tank battalion headquarters, appears to be one of the more evident available methods that we are now engaged in developing. It is in particular proposed that the FSCC for the infantry regiment or armored combat command be located at the fire-direction center of the direct-support field artillery battalion or in a forward-echelon location under the supervision of the artillery commander. At the infantry or tank battalion headquarters a considerably less formal FSCC should be organized, with the artillery liaison officer as the coordinator. This would be done *only* when a forward air controller, or a naval gunfire officer, or both, is available to operate at this level. Although intimately connected with the operation of all FSCC's in amphibious operations, the technique of naval gunfire support is beyond the scope of this article.

It is the thesis of this discussion that the observation and communication facilities of the artillery, particularly at the division and lower levels, are especially adapted to the task of coordination in air-ground cooperation. The direct-support battalion has many observers and liaison officers well distributed over the front. These observers can furnish the description and location of any target. They usually can accurately mark the target at the instant required with either white or colored base-ejection smoke. They are not restricted to firing their own light 105mm howitzers, but daily are in the habit of calling for and adjusting fire for any of the artillery with the corps. The artillery furnishes well-timed counterflak protection for the air strikes either just prior to or during bomb runs. It furnishes cooperative AAA protection against enemy aircraft.

FIRE SUPPORT WITHOUT COORDINATION

Bad examples of air-ground cooperation during World War II are legion. It is only necessary to thumb through a few combat reports and the writings of prominent general officers on any campaign you might choose to cite some of them. Let us now consider a few of these experiences and see why they turned out badly.

In the fighting in Italy, which was for the most part stabilized warfare, one ground commander stated:

"Difficulties of air support were mainly due to lack of marking of the target. Use of smoke to show front lines usually brought artillery fire from the enemy; panels were considered most effective. The ideal distance for air support is 600 yards in front of friendly troops, if possible. Dive bombing was judged to be the most accurate and, therefore, the most effective."

Another commander stated:

"As the infantry advances from its bomb safety line, have the artillery lift on call or time. Forward observers must adjust and lift fires so as to enable infantry to advance to where they can rout the enemy with bayonet and grenade. Marking of targets for the air by the artillery with smoke is good."

We learned a great deal from the early mistakes of our British Allies, who may be credited with preventing us from duplicating their errors. Improper air-ground liaison and faulty communications accounted for many of their mistakes.

The failure of the British to combat Rommel's tank forces and long lines of supply successfully, even though possessing superior air power during the 1941 Libyan Campaign, was one of the few examples on record of the loss of a campaign by the side having complete air superiority. This defeat in 15 days would probably not have occurred had the separate British Army and Air Force developed any reasonable degree of close-support cooperation prior to this time.

In the same year the loss of Crete was probably chargeable to this same deficiency. The landing fields were not used by the RAF fighters, who preferred to give air cover from bases in Egypt. The air fields on Crete were not properly protected by the British ground forces and fell easily into the hands of the attacking German airborne forces. Air-ground communications on the side of the British were faulty or nonexistent.

An example of bad coordination occurred during the fighting on Saipan. When a front-line battalion or regiment called for air support, it was necessary to halt all corps artillery fires. These air missions often required from 30 minutes to 1½ hours to complete and left all ground troops unsupported by corps artillery during these periods. This could easily have been avoided by the use of a FSCC ashore. The air was based on carriers, and close contact with the corps artillery fire-direction center was not maintained.

During the attack of the 3rd Armored Division on the town of Fromentel, France, during the battle of the Falaise Gap on the 17th of August, 1944, the following peculiar incident occurred. I was in command of a direct-support artillery group supporting Combat Command A, but there was no liaison between the artillery and the forward air controllers with the division, and no communication with them had been arranged to take advantage of the observation available to the artillery. We were called on frequently during this action to provide counterflak fires. A pincers attack was being executed with Combat Command A on the right and Combat Command B on the left. Leading tank and infantry elements of CCA were in the town, which extended for about a mile

along a single main highway perpendicular to the direction of advance. CCB had failed up to this time to reach their objectives in Fromentel. The town was not marked for air, but a heavy attack of P-38's descended on CCA, whose forces were plainly visible since they were attacking. CCA's force was obliged to withdraw with severe casualties. Two hours later the whole performance was repeated by another flight of P-38's, which again drove our troops back out of town. The forward air controllers were unable to halt the attacks of these planes on our own forces. The town was not recaptured until the following day. All of this might well have been avoided if division artillery and the direct-support battalions had been charged with supervision of the entire problem of fire-support coordination.

The results of colored-smoke marking for dive bombers may not always be perfect in the hands of inexperienced artillerymen, as may be noted from the following example, also taken from personal experience.

A relatively new and untried division had taken over a portion of our front in the Stolberg area in Germany in an effort to increase the bridgehead through the Siegfried Line between the city of Aachen and the Hürtgen Forest. We had held this sector defensively from the middle of September until the 16th of November, 1944. At 1500 on the 18th of November, I was observing the infantry attack taking place in this sector from an OP, when I was amazed to see a quantity of red smoke fall exactly on our most advanced positions. This was followed by bombing and strafing of the front by our own fighter planes, and the friendly infantry was driven back from its advanced position. Although I made radio and telephone reports immediately, there was nothing similar to an FSCC in operation and no action could have been taken in time to prevent the bombing. Our troops withdrawing must have appeared to our fighter-bomber pilots to be enemy troops attacking. Their accuracy and persistency were devastating. It was determined that the marking smoke had been fired without the proper corrections. A large constant must always be applied in switching from HE to base-ejection smoke. This must be redetermined from time to time as new lots of both types are received. If time permits, a switch from white BE smoke to a color is excellent insurance against errors in adjustment.

Well-trained troops are not squeamish about close air support if they are accompanied by an air-support party and have worked in partnership with the same fighter group or squadron in the past. They do not fear that the accuracy of the fighter bombers will be bad, only that an error in identification may occur.

GOOD FIRE-SUPPORT COORDINATION

It was claimed by the anonymous author of "The Diary of a Staff Officer," and by Major General J. F. C. Fuller, British Army, retired, that: "It is the cooperation between the dive bombers and the armored divisions that is winning this war for Germany," in describing the 1940 campaign in France.

General Patton, in his book, "War As I Knew It," is frequently enthusiastic about the fine fighter-bomber support supplied his forces by the XIX Tactical Air Command.

On the 24th of September, 1944, a small force of the 4th Armored Division was defending a bridgehead over the Moselle against a counterattack by a force containing 25 German tanks. Only five American tanks were present. Air support was requested and although the weather was "unflyable according to all standards," two squadrons took off and were vectored into position to attack by radar. They flew at treetop height and skipbombed and strafed the enemy armor, saving the bridgehead. Upon their return the ships were unable to land until a break in the clouds was found far back in France.

Again from "War As I Knew It," we quote General Patton as follows:

"Just east of Le Mans was one of the best examples of armor and air cooperation I have ever seen. For about two miles the road was full of enemy motor transport and armor, many of which bore the unmistakable calling-card of a P-47 fighter-bomber—namely a group of fifty-caliber holes in the concrete.* Whenever armor and air can work together in this way, the results are sure to be excellent. Armor can move fast enough to prevent the enemy having time to deploy off the roads, and so long as he stays on the roads the fighter-bomber is one of his most deadly opponents. To accomplish this happy teamwork two things are necessary: first, intimate confidence and friendship between air and ground; second, incessant and apparently ruthless driving on the part of the ground commander. A pint of sweat saves a gallon of blood."

In Europe in 1944-5 it was not uncommon to find an entire fighter group assigned the mission of covering the advance of an armored division during exploitation. Both armed reconnaissance and column cover were performed. The speed of the advance usually made marking any sort of useful bomb line impracticable. There was no regular front. As opposition was uncovered by the ground troops, air officers among the leading tank elements used their radios to talk the fighters in to their targets.

Major Walter A. Smith, USAF, Instructor, Command and General Staff College, writing in the April 1947 Military Review, stated the situation as follows:

"Although it was visualized by the planners that the fighter cover would be able to discover and destroy pockets of resistance, it was later discovered that the speed of the aircraft made observation difficult, and, in fact, it was the armored force that more often than not originally discovered the resistance."

Two examples of good air-ground cooperation, from my own experience with the 3rd Armored Division in the fighting in Europe, follow.

A task force was formed to carry out a local operation near Eschweiler, Germany, to capture the Hucheln-Wilhelmshohe-Frenzerburg area during the period 24-26 November, 1944. It included a battalion of tanks from CCA, the Third Battalion 32nd Armored Regiment; the 2nd Battalion 47th Infantry, from the 9th Infantry Division; and a number of smaller attachments. My direct-support artillery

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*It is unknown whether General Patton was referring to bullet marks on the paved roadway or on the green-colored cement and wire mesh that the Germans used on the front and sides of many of their armored vehicles for camouflage purposes.

group, composed of two light battalions, was reinforced by the 84th FA Battalion of the 9th Division. Two batteries of AAA automatic weapons were attached to the direct-support battalions. The action is best described by extracts from my after-action report, which is quoted:

"The attack was continued at 0830 on November 25th, preceded by a five-minute preparation by the three available battalions of light artillery. Much additional artillery support from VII Corps and the 1st Division was obtained to neutralize the area under attack in depth. We marked one mission for dive bombers. Our tanks pushed on through Wilhelmshohe with a company of infantry operating on each flank. Most of the high ground was in our hands by 1200. Progress was slow owing to heavy artillery and mortar fire.

"At 0800 on November 26th the action was resumed preceded by a ten-minute preparation. Our hold on the high ground at Wilhelmshohe was extended along both flanks. A number of red-smoke missions were fired to mark targets for dive bombers. More tanks were moved up with our leading elements to support the infantry, which was still operating on the flanks. Because of antitank fire, the tanks could be moved safely only under cover of our smoke screens. At 1040 our preparation was repeated, but our infantry was still unable to advance toward the objective.

"At 1400 a coordinated attack was launched on the left of the sector by K Company 47th Infantry, supported by the tanks, our artillery, and air support. * * * * Chateau Frenzerburg was occupied by K Company at 1500 but fighting there continued. 1st Battalion 47th Infantry was committed on the extreme right of the sector and attacked toward Langerwehe. They also occupied and held a position dominating the final objective."

At this time the method of bringing in close air support was to have an air-support party mounted in one of our tanks and equipped with a VHF set. They were supposed to operate from ground OP's from which the front could be observed, and also see and talk to the dive bombers as they approached from the rear to identify the target and execute the mission. As fronts were often wide and we usually had only two air-support parties for an armored division, it was extremely difficult to handle all requests needed by the division in this fashion. For example, in the mission referred to above on the 25th of November, 1944, the pilot with our task force was frantically trying to get up to an OP and stopped beside my halftrack, which was operating as a forward fire-direction center. His planes were overhead and he was still some distance from any possible OP. I immediately relayed the description of the target to him from one of my forward observers, who adjusted first with white smoke on the enemy strongpoint. The leader of the flight in the air picked this up and asked us not to switch to red smoke. The mission was then carried out to completion. This is a perfect demonstration of what can be done at any direct-support battalion fire-direction center, and brings out one of the points of this article, that the FSCC of an infantry regiment or armored combat command should be located at or near the fire-direction center of its direct-support artillery battalion. It is unnecessary to have air-support parties scrambling around over the front trying to do work that the artillery observers are thoroughly trained for and in perfect position to execute without exposure to any additional hazards. The pilot assigned to work with the ground troops can then act as an air representative at the FSCC and also as a forward air controller. The pilot in the VHF tank referred to above was wounded the following day while operating from the vicinity of my OP. He was especially unfortunate in that he was in his tank turret with only his helmet and right arm exposed when his arm was pierced by a shell splinter.

At Ranes, France, on the 14th of August, 1944, CCA of the 3rd Armored Division was attacking to the north in the battle to close the Falaise Gap. German tanks and infantry had closed in behind one of our task forces. Just before dusk one of my observers with this force worked back to the rear within 100 yards of the German position, which was in a heavily wooded area, and adjusted red smoke for our fighter-bombers to mark the enemy tank position. The extremely accurate and heavy bombing that followed destroyed a number of enemy tanks and softened up the position so that our force was able to clean it out quickly, thus restoring our lines of communication. Yet we still find persons in both the army and the air force who claim that fighter-bombers should only seek out targets that are beyond the range of friendly artillery. In the mission just described, several hundred rounds of accurately adjusted medium or heavy artillery fire would have been required to accomplish the same result with less efficiency in a much longer time. However, only light artillery was within range and ammunition was limited.

Fire-Support Coordination Centers for large commands, operated and organized by artillery commanders, have been used successfully on several postwar maneuvers, the most notable of which was "Exercise Seminole."*

WHERE CLOSE-SUPPORT TARGETS ARE FOUND

Targets most dangerous to the supported ground troops are usually undisclosed until the ground troops are in contact with them. Except for armor and guns with enemy reserves, we are likely to discover dangerous direct-fire high-velocity guns and enemy tanks only when we are attacking them or they are attacking us. We are then locked in a death struggle from which there may be no withdrawal, particularly if we are faced with a superior enemy force. Present-day artillery has not as yet solved the problem of rapid destruction of multiple point targets. Except for a few of our heavier weapons, not organic to either infantry or armored divisions, our artillery is unlikely to destroy an enemy tank except by massing an enormous volume of fire in its vicinity. To do this requires too much time and often the ammunition will not be available. The answer to this problem is close air support, until such time as we get improved artillery or new point-target weapons such as *short-range guided missiles*.

Identification of targets from present fighter planes is extremely difficult, if not impossible, without special marking and description by the ground troops' observation facilities. Rivers, canals, roadways, and seacoasts make

*Described in the Jan. Feb. Journal.

good bomb lines, but such guides can be used only when the attack is moving slowly. When conveniently located they are excellent for preplanned missions. They are usually of little value in solving problems of close support, whether preplanned or not.

OFFENSIVE vs DEFENSIVE ACTION

When our own forces are on the offense, enemy armor and antitank weapons are usually well protected and concealed. As they are located they can often be destroyed economically by air attack. If the German 88's had been self-propelled and armored vehicles, our advances in France would have been much slower, since they could have been used in a series of delaying actions instead of being sacrificed one or two at a time. If the Germans had also been able to maintain air parity, our armor would have been able to advance only by moving cross-country and being supported by masses of infantry, such as were used in the fighting in Russia.

When defending, or fighting a delaying action, multiple targets suitable for friendly air forces to attack are common and relatively easy to locate. Great economy of force in use of ground troops can be effected if the mission is defense and local air parity or superiority can be retained, and fighter-bombers are available. Enemy attacks at night and during bad weather must be expected under these conditions.

NEED FOR NEW WEAPON DEVELOPMENT

There is a definite need for better tactical weapons both in the air and on the ground for the purpose of close-support point-target destruction. Improved rocket-firing aircraft, or short-range guided missiles launched from either the air or the ground, may furnish the answer. In using such weapons we must insure a degree of safety for the supported troops when they are in close contact.

CONCLUSIONS

The artillery of divisions has many facilities readily available for use in problems involving air-ground cooperation. Some of these are: its extensive system of observation and trained observers; its fine and flexible communication nets, both radio and wire; its fire-direction technique and highly trained personnel who are used in fire-support coordination; its ability to mark any target within range of the artillery with varicolored smoke, timed to the approach of friendly aircraft; and its ability to furnish counterflak and AAA protection.

Our technique must be improved and standardized in the matter of air-ground communication. This can be assisted by the use of better-trained personnel in liaison work. Improved radios, radars, and better visual communication means are needed.

There is a definite need for new weapons for use against point targets.

Our concept of fire-support coordination must be extended downward to take in echelons at the direct-support artillery battalion and also, often, at the position of the artillery liaison officer with the front-line infantry and tank battalions.

The 80-Year Hangover

BY HAROLD HELFER

The Civil War may be over and done with as far as the country as a whole is concerned — but to the town of Frederick, Md., it's still a most painful reality. Every year the citizens of this community have to shell out $1,500 as the result of an incident of that war—an incident that already has cost them almost $600,000.

It occurred on July 9, 1864. Lt. Gen. Jubal Early, of the Confederate States of America, rode into the town at the head of a grey-coated cavalry of 28,000 and promptly issued an order that the city's five banks turn over to him and his cause $200,000. Or else, he let it be known, the town would be put to the torch. The general didn't sound like he was kidding—and the banks complied.

The town was grateful that it had been saved and it felt that the banks should be compensated for the ransom they had paid into the Confederate coffers. It made repeated efforts to have Congress do the reimbursing, but for some reason Congress always declined, and so the town has been burdened with the task of paying back this money ever since. Gradually, though, although the interest has brought the total amount to approximately $600,000, the town has whittled the debt down and hopes to at last be free of its Civil War hangover in 1951.

For years past, the town repaid its debt to the banks by a system of canceling out their taxes. Later that was changed to cash payments through a city bonding issue. The $1,500 a year the town now pays to the banks is the lowest annual amount it has turned back to the financial institutions since Gen. Early rode into the town 83 years ago.

Gen. Early collected his money in the morning and in the afternoon he was engaged by a Union force east of the town. Early's men emerged victorious and, cockily holding on to their $200,000 worth of moneybags, they headed straight for the Nation's Capital. They actually got into the District of Columbia before being driven back, and legend has it that they might have continued their triumphant march into the heart of Washington if Early and his officers hadn't stopped at a house in Silver Spring, Md., and decided to sample the whisky they found there.

Had Early taken Washington, his fame, of course, would be resting today on the highest of pedestals. As it is, the folks of Frederick, Md., have the satisfaction of knowing that the fame of the man who has kept them in debt for more than eight decades has been eclipsed by the leader of the Union band who fought him near Frederick and lost. This Union general, ironically enough, has become immortal not because of military deeds but because of a book he wrote. He was Gen. Lew Wallace and the book was "Ben Hur."

Details With the National Guard

By Lt. Col. R. C. Williams, Jr., Inf.

ACCORDING to the present plan, every officer and many non-commissioned officers of the Field Artillery will, at some time or other, be given a detail with one of the civilian components. And, since most of those so detailed will go to National Guard units, some knowledge regarding such a detail should be of value to everyone.

In the first place, the degree of success which a Regular Army instructor enjoys depends to a great extent upon his ability to adapt himself to the conditions surrounding his new activities. He must realize that his rank, his combat record, and his service school diplomas are not too important. His personality and attitude, however, are all-important.

The War Department has delegated to the various Armies the responsibility for the supervision of training of all National Guard units. This supervision is exercised on the spot by the Regular Army instructor. Since the role assigned to the National Guard is that of an "M" Day force, the instructor must render maximum aid and assistance to maintain the training of the Guard comparable to the Regular Army.

The Regular Army instructor must appreciate the dual status and mission of the National Guard. As a reserve component it has the mission of attaining that state of training which will permit immediate expansion to war strength and field service anywhere in the world. Secondly, as a State force, the mission of the National Guard is to be ready for emergency duty under State orders. Except when it is ordered into Federal service, the National Guard of the United States is under the command of the Governor of that State through his Adjutant General.

A second fact which the Regular Army instructor must bear in mind is that the National Guard made a splendid record for itself in World War II. Having proven its worth in combat, the Guard established itself as an integral part of the postwar military organization. It has a quota of 25 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, 21 separate regimental combat teams, and numerous types of non-divisional troops to furnish to the Army in the event of another emergency.

The third point of importance is that it is the duty of the instructor to study and understand the conditions and limitations surrounding the National Guard and the difficulties in its training and development, as seen by its members. The instructor must appreciate the fact that the military training of Guardsmen is incidental to the other pursuits of life—an avocation rather than a vocation. The National Guard Regulation No. 40, as well as Army Regulations, states that the primary duty of an instructor is to advise and assist, discreetly and tactfully, for he is powerless to enforce compliance with what he may consider the correct or desired action. Yet, as will be pointed out later, the Regular Army instructor will find that he will have to render active assistance if the Army Plan for the National Guard is to be accomplished within the period allotted.

The instructor occupies a neutral position of trust and importance and will be required to point out the laws and regulations governing the activities of the National Guard, advise the officers as to the best methods for compliance with the provisions of the regulations, and in every possible way assist the units under his supervision to attain a high degree of efficiency.

The fourth point of importance concerns the personal conduct of the instructor. It should always be above reproach. As the representative of the Regular Army in that particular community, the instructor will be under constant observation and will be accepted as a typical example of the Regular establishment. His appearance and bearing, particularly when he is with National Guard troops, must be correct in every way.

The fifth point which the instructor must appreciate concerns the community. He must get acquainted with and associate with the people of the community. He should become associated with local fraternal or social organizations. He should maintain friendly and cooperative relations with veterans' organizations, reserve officers' chapters, and other military and semi-military associations. But he must avoid being drawn into politics or into any disputes between cliques or factions.

The sixth important factor worthy of consideration by the Regular Army instructor has to do with training. He has various guides in his efforts to assist in this training. First, he has "The Army Field Forces Plan and Implementing Instructions for the National Guard of the United States." Second, he has the local Army commander's implementing instructions. It is his task to guide the local Guard commanders in the proper means of executing these training programs and to assist their battery commanders and staff officers in the preparation of training schedules. Further, he must see to it that the best and latest training methods are used in executing the training. He therefore must continually keep abreast of the latest developments. But the instructor cannot expect a National Guard unit to attain the same standards of proficiency as exist in the Regular Army, inasmuch as the time devoted to training will not permit this to be accomplished. In addition, the instructor, in supervising training, should make all his comments constructive rather than destructive and must be careful to avoid injuring, in any way, the prestige of National Guard commanders with their subordinates.

With these points in mind, let us turn to a specific example wherein a lieutenant colonel was assigned as instructor to a field artillery battalion which was part of a separate regimental combat team.

The Regular Army instructor, whom we will refer to simply as Colonel Smith, found considerable civic pride in the community, as well as pride in the field artillery battalion and its accomplishments. He encouraged and stimulated this and found that his action broadened the pride to include the

entire National Guard units of the area.

Colonel Smith was concerned over the feeling of close friendship and equality which existed between the officers and enlisted men of the various batteries. This condition was only natural, inasmuch as the officers and men lived in the same little town. The colonel saw that it would be very difficult to build and maintain a high state of discipline under these conditions. Undiscouraged, he sought to develop in the officers and non-coms that quality of leadership which inspires confidence and willingness to follow, and in that way he developed discipline.

Colonel Smith had no disciplinary power. This was a challenge to his ability to obtain efficiency through leadership and example. He solved the problem by being tactful, by using intelligent methods of training which maintained interest, and by proving his own professional qualifications.

For example, instruction of the various elements of the National Guard by officers and non-coms of the Guard was, in general, well below current Army Standards. Smith convinced the Guard commander of the necessity for a school on how to instruct properly. The commander issued a written order to the effect that every officer and non-com would attend the school which, incidentally, was held on a night other than the regular drill night. At the first session, despite the written order, only about ten percent of the men showed up. At the second session more than fifty percent attended. After that, most of those ordered attended the class. The secret of the improvement in attendance was simple. Smith presented his instruction in such a manner that the National Guardsmen *wanted* to receive it.

Colonel Smith soon discovered that the natural desire of many of the officers and enlisted men in the batteries was to take things easy during the evening drill period after completion of their normal working day. He eliminated this defect by setting the proper example himself, by exercising patience, and by efficiently selling the importance of responsibility of the leader to the men.

The Colonel was soon confronted by a situation in one battery where the desire to train and to obey orders was noticeably absent. He continually stressed the importance of training and of obedience to orders, not only in his instruction periods but also in his informal conversations, by citing specific examples of combat actions wherein deficiencies in these two respects cost lives. His method worked out splendidly.

He also came up against local controversies concerning the State staff, appropriations for maintenance of the National Guard, and in disputes of a factional nature. By remaining neutral while giving possible reasons for the causes of the situations, he erased the feeling of bitterness toward the higher authorities. He stressed the importance of loyalty. He kept out of the local factional friction. He kept his position as a neutral who was there to help everyone in the National Guard. And by so doing, he kept the friendship and respect of all.

Colonel Smith was careful to be impartial in helping the various units of the battalion. Although several of the batteries were located at towns other than the one in which he lived, he made it a rule to devote an equal amount of time to each unit. He let it be known that he was available and willing to render assistance, but he never forced his services upon any person or unit.

The Colonel had difficulty in getting the National Guard to render their weekly drill report (NG Form 107) and their monthly report (NG Form 100) on time. He removed the difficulty by working closely with every battery clerk and battery commander, by checking all the general and special orders issued by the battalion (with the consent of the battalion commander), and holding schools in administration for all units. He issued no orders to the National Guard. They could not, by regulations, issue orders to him. Yet his recommendations were always accepted by the battalion commander and, whenever necessary, were written into orders. This accomplishment was due to the tactfulness of the instructor and to his ability to sell himself to the Guard commander.

Colonel Smith read that part of NGR 40 which declares that the State will provide the men and the armories, while the Federal Government will provide the instructors, equipment, pay, weapons, ammunition, etc., for the National Guard. Yet Smith actively recruited for the Guard battalion to which he was assigned as instructor. He spoke about the National Guard to every civic, fraternal, and social organization in every town in his area. He organized the publicity for the battalion by writing a suggested SOP, which the battalion commander approved and issued to the units. He pushed the publicity. He wrote a staff SOP which would be applicable to the particular staff with which he had to work. That, too, was approved. He started a monthly newspaper by writing the complete first issue himself. He organized and actively coached athletic teams. He found himself drawn into the problems of lands for armories, as well as into problems concerning the armories themselves.

Yes, Colonel Smith had to *actively* assist his units. He had to work hard. But the detail has provided him with some lessons which those of you who are yet to receive a similar detail might do well to remember. First, he appreciated the fact that the National Guard does have a lot of important problems which are not capable of solution overnight. He knew enough mathematics to be able to divide the 96 armory drill hours by 8 and arrive at 12—which is the total number of drill days per year that the National Guard has in which to do what Regular Army units do over a space of an entire year. These 12 eight-hour working days, plus the 15 at camp, gives the National Guard less than a full month's training per year. Therefore the Colonel could see how difficult it is for a Guardsman to overcome obstacles and disappointments. He saw them trying to accomplish their assigned mission with insufficient time, money, and equipment. He learned how to live among civilians, how to practice tact and diplomacy. And finally, he saw the field artillery battalion grow and the training improve, and he could see the results of his own work. He will tell you that the detail is a fine experience for any officer or non-com in the Field Artillery.

Speak Up!

by MAJOR JOSEPH H. BANKS, Inf.

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"ALL officers who are qualified must be ready to accept, as a duty, an assignment to make a public address," wrote the Chief of Staff to his commanding generals in March 1946. "I am personally interested in the development of an adequate Army-wide speakers' program."

In the new Army, officers and enlisted personnel of all grades may be called upon to speak in public, or to talk to troops as part of the Troop Information Program. Only through articulate leadership can the Army tell its story and interpret its mission.

Without warning, any officer may be tapped. Here are a few elementary rules for the inexperienced:

Proper platform manner is of utmost importance. A good first impression helps create a receptive atttitude in an audience. A neat appearance is requisite. No officer or enlisted man needs reminding that he must be meticulously groomed for such an occasion. Your approach to the audience should be in keeping with the subject. Walk to your position on the platform with assurance. A slovenly manner or shuffling gait is neither dignified nor inspiring.

Pause for five to seven seconds before beginning your talk. This gives you an opportunity to overcome any initial nervousness and to measure your audience. Throughout your speech, a pause can be employed to change the mood or to emphasize an important point; but it should be used only at the end of a sentence, phrase, or logical break in the speech. When distractions such as passing trucks, trains, or unusual noises interrupt, wait for them to stop. Never compete with them.

Establish eye contact with your audience immediately. Divide the audience into sections and subsections. Then look at them in turn throughout the talk. Avoid looking out the window, at the floor or ceiling, or gazing over the heads of the audience. Eyes express the character of the speaker. As in conversation, speakers must look the audience in the eye, not passively but intently.

Bombast has no place in an Army speech. The days of thunderous roars and grotesque gesticulation are over. Address your audience as though you were engaged in conversation with them.

Action in speaking — the way the speaker carries himself, the way he stands, the inflection of his voice, the enthusiasm with which he expresses himself — should be studied. The speaker need not feel rooted to any spot. Movement is acceptable if it does not distract the audience. Every motion should have a purpose. Each should aid in directing and focusing audience attention on a particular point.

Gestures are valuable in adding emphasis to speech. Stand easily and relaxed, with your hands in a normal position at your side; but use them spontaneously and naturally, if you are so inclined. Avoid putting your hands unconsciously on nearby objects; and, as a representative of the Army, never plunge them into your pockets. Refrain from clasping your hands in front of you or behind your back.

The body position should be comfortable, neither at rigid attention nor at parade rest. Placing the feet two to four inches apart, with one foot slightly in front of the other, is an easy stance. Either foot may be advanced and you can shift weight from one foot to the other without attracting attention. Your shoulders should be straight, to allow full breathing.

A pleasant voice is the most important factor in making an effective speech. Correct posture will help to give your voice freedom, fullness, and resonance. Breathe deeply and provide the power for the voice from the diaphragm. Don't be afraid to open your mouth. Many good words often get no further than a speaker's tongue.

Speak distinctly. The proper rate of speech is between 100 and 150 words a minute, depending on relative emphasis of words or phrases. Important points can be stressed by slowing down the rate of speech. Less important material usually is delivered at a faster rate. Vary the rate and pitch so as to avoid monotony. Pronounce clearly all sounds and syllables of words, if they are to reach your audience. Frequent use will make difficult words familiar and easier to pronounce.

Don't apologize for being a poor speaker. As confidence on the part of the speaker inspires confidence from the audience, so apology inspires uneasiness. Army officers and men must always instill confidence. Proper preparation of the talk or address will make an apology unnecessary.

Don't ramble. This is a sure way to bore your hearers. Have your material well organized, have your say, and sit down.

Meaningless repetition of ideas usually indicates that the speaker has no goal, no point to put over. Army officers have so much to tell the public about the Army that there is no excuse for aimless repetition. An unending store of varied material can be drawn upon.

Limited vocabulary, careless articulation, and improper enunciation are common faults which can be improved by study and practice. The speaker who connects his words and ideas with "Ah-er-ah" shows poor preparation and lack of confidence in himself. Pausing at the proper time, especially at the end of sentences, will help overcome this habit.

Extreme loudness or softness of voice is annoying. Monotony of tone lulls the audience to sleep. A change in inflection or pitch maintains attention. A friendly smile in the right place will win almost any audience. Without it, no audience will warm up. Such seemingly trivial matters may mean the difference between success or failure, and may determine whether or not you will be invited to return.

Positions of leadership and high rank in the Army, with few exceptions, are coupled with the ability to speak well. The opportunity is one which falls to every officer. Self-expression is likewise of importance in the promotion of enlisted men. But apart from personal gain, an easy stage presence and a well-organized flow of words enables the Army speaker to contribute to his profession by interpreting it to the civilian audience.

Your Tools are the Reserves

By 1st Lt. Hugh Cort, FA-Res.

THE reserve elements of this country are the brawn of our Armed Forces in any forthcoming military emergency. The professional soldier as the nerve center of such a force must be familiar with such reserve units. Most regular army personnel are familiar with the paper organization of the various types of reserves. In the town of Columbia, Missouri, geographic center of the United States, it is possible to see what reality does to those paper organizations.

Columbia lies halfway between St. Louis and Kansas City on Highway 40. The nearest military establishments of any size are Ft. Leonard Wood, Scott Field, and Fairfax Field, all over a hundred miles away. The town has a population of approximately forty-two thousand. Since, however, Columbia contains the state university and two finishing schools for girls, about fifteen thousand of the forty-two thousand are out-of-town students. The town is large enough to support two daily papers and a radio station. The airfield is municipally owned and is large enough to handle large commercial planes without difficulty. There are no large industries in Columbia.

Having been born into the decadent aristocracy of the South and thereby automatically a states-rights man of the old school my sympathies are with the National Guard. Also it was the National Guard that received priority on recruiting in this area and which is best established in Columbia. The Missouri National Guard owns here what is perhaps the finest small armory in the state. It has sufficient office space, sufficient storage space, pleasant dayrooms, and a full-size basketball court. The Missouri National Guard maintains two organizations in Columbia.

Battery B of the 128th Field Artillery is the oldest and best established of the postwar units here. The 128th Field Artillery is a 105mm howitzer unit and is an organic part of the 35th Infantry Division. This unit was given first enlistment rights in Columbia, and all other units were soft-pedaled until this battery should be completely organized. Battalion headquarters for this unit is at Mexico, Missouri, roughly an hour's drive from Columbia. Battery B was federally recognized on the 28th of October, 1946.

Battery B has an assigned strength of one officer and thirty-six men. Those of you who served with line outfits in Japan in 1946 will remember only too well that higher headquarters considered this sufficient strength for a unit to function at maximum efficiency. Two other officers have applied for National Guard commissions and assignment with this unit.

The battery draws its equipment from Ft. Leonard Wood. At present the battery has one howitzer and one .50-caliber HB machine gun. The supply sergeant has on hand fifty per cent of his carbines and all T/A pistols. The unit has almost all of its QM equipment. Signal equipment is practically complete except for radios, of which the battery has none. The battery is lucky in that it has two trained radio operators. That was more than many regular army battalions could claim during those two lean years following the war. Chemical property is about twenty-five per cent complete.

The two supply problems facing the battery are a shortage of office supplies and a lack of transportation. The supply sergeant has no idea when he may receive any vehicles.

Sharing the armory with Battery B is Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment of the 175th Military Police Battalion. The 175th has received word that they have been federally recognized retroactive to the 16th of February. The 175th consists at present of seven officers and twelve men. A master sergeant of the regular army is attached to this unit and stationed in Columbia as an instructor. This unit has been issued no equipment to date.

The Organized Reserve Corps, stepchild of the regular army, is also functioning in Columbia. Renting two rooms in the National Guard armory, the ORC maintains a permanent office with a staff of two regular army master sergeants. At present this office handles distribution and some records for four units, a composite group of unassigned enlisted reservists, and the local Air Force reserve unit.

Organized Reserve activities at present are based primarily around the 816th Field Artillery Battalion. The 816th is an eight-inch howitzer outfit, tractor drawn. It received its Class B status the 23d of March. Those of you up on your reserve organization will remember that reserve units have one of three classifications. Class A units have eighty per cent of their officer strength and forty per cent of their enlisted strength. Class B units must meet the same officer requirements but are required to have only twenty per cent of their enlisted cadre. Class C units operate mostly on paper and consist of officers only. Under the pending legislation on inactive duty pay for reservists,

only members of Class A and Class B units will receive compensation for inactive duty training.

Columbia is the home station of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Service Battery and Battery C of the 816th. Officer strength for Class B status was easily achieved. An extensive campaign was necessary, however, to achieve the enlisted personnel requirements. Owing to the priority given National Guard units this battalion was not able to accept enlistments until the first of this year. Filling personnel requirements is still one of the major problems facing the 816th at present, and the unit is still conducting a concentrated enlistment program.

Other problems have presented themselves as the 816th achieved Class B status. The Organized Reserve units have no permanent quarters of their own. All units meet in the two rooms rented from the Missouri National Guard. The Guard expects to need those rooms in the very near future. Now that the 816th has reached its Class B status it will start receiving equipment. This means that permanent quarters and storage space must be found for the battalion. A problem common to heavy artillery will be finding a gun shed for an eight-inch howitzer. You can't just put one of those in someone's garage. Moving that howitzer around may also turn into quite a problem. Being an infantryman has some definite advantages.

The 816th now meets twice a month. It is expected that meetings will be increased to four a month as soon as equipment arrives.

In addition to the 816th Field Artillery Battalion, there are three other units of the ORC operating in Columbia. These units are not, however, scheduled for Class B status. The 315th Station Hospital consists of fourteen officers. The 834th Quartermaster Base Petrol Supply Group has five officers assigned. The 471st Engineer Maintenance Company also has a commissioned strength of five officers.

Correction: On page 124 of the May-June 1948 Journal, the maximum age for the AFSC should read "41".

Working under a different type of organization is the 261st Composite Squadron of the Air Force reserve. Air Force requirements are different, the training depending more upon the individual performance of its members than on that of its units. Two flights of this squadron, Flights A and B, are stationed here. The 261st has an assigned strength in Columbia of sixty-four officers and four enlisted men. The nearest fields at which the members of the 261st may fly are Scott Field in St. Louis and Fairfax Field in Kansas City. This unit has no equipment. It maintains a file in the ORC office and sends out its distribution from there.

Early last fall the Navy attempted to organize a reserve unit in Columbia. Despite extensive recruiting they were unable to obtain enough men to fill their requirements.

The fact that Columbia is a college town poses special problems to all units of either the National Guard or the Organized Reserves. It also to some extent provides compensations. The largest problem in a college town is the multitude of entertainment available. Columbia has five theaters and seven pool halls. Two of the colleges are girls' schools. The three colleges are constantly providing outstanding entertainment of one sort or another. Evening meetings of all units reflected the fortunes of the state university basketball squad, which finally placed second in the Big Seven Conference. In Columbia a man doesn't join a reserve unit to kill time. If he is sufficiently interested he makes time to attend meetings.

The university maintains both Naval and Army officer training programs, both of which are extremely active and well organized. Many potential members of National Guard or Organized Reserve units believe that all military units function as part of the university. Not being connected with the school they do not believe themselves eligible for membership in these units which need them.

Having an active ROTC program helps the reserve units provide materials for classroom instruction. Colonel Hinton, Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the university, has been more than generous in offering the facilities of his organization to reserve units.

Another advantage of being in a college town at present is that the influx of veterans has caused the entire town to be well aware of the necessity of maintaining an adequate reserve force for our Armed Forces. Although few students have time for participation in military units other than the training provided by the university ROTC, they do stimulate thought on all subjects pertaining to national defense. As those of you who served in the middle-west during the thirties may remember, the influence of the university may easily become a detriment instead of an asset. By that time, however, almost all the units in Columbia should be well established and able to stand on their own feet.

That is the picture of the reserve elements in the town of Columbia, Missouri. Each unit has its problems; each unit has its advantages. All are waiting to see what role Universal Military Training will play in their existence. There is a certain amount of duplication in the parts played by the two major units in Columbia, the 128 Field Artillery and the 816th Field Artillery. Is this desirable? The existence of both of these similar outfits provides for more complete military training than one unit could provide even though it had the resources available if the two units were combined. Does this compensate for the duplication of effort? All of these problems are not facing the national guardsman and the reservist alone. They face you as a member of the regular army. For these units are the tools with which you must work if history repeats itself. You must keep these tools sharp.

ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

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U. S. Army: Cover

Xavier Univ.: Frontispiece

PERIMETERS in PARAGRAPHS

By Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Ret.

RUSSIA, INCLUDING RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

Prepared by a widely-known military scholar and writer, PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS is a recurring feature dealing with the military, political and economic realities in world affairs. Whereas an understanding of these realities is deemed essential to the American soldier, it is emphasized that PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS reflects the opinions of the author, alone. This installment covers the period 1 May-30 June 1948.—Editor.

RUSSIAN INTENTIONS

HE latest strategical plan noted is that of 1 November, 1947. That was distributed confidentially to the satellite states for their information and guidance. It provides:

1st phase: Consolidation within satellite states.

2nd phase: Establishment of communist governments in Germany, Italy, and France, the latter probably first. Troubles to appear in Greece, China, and Palestine, as chaos will create favorable conditions.

3rd phase: Conquest of Great Britian, which has ceased to be a major Power, and without a war. British Left parties are growing and will eventually become the government.

4th phase: The United States is the ultimate objective. It is no longer isolationist, but imperialistic. American plutocracy is an all-out enemy of Russia. However "Americans do not want war. . . . The economic crisis, already begun, is sure to become worse. Communists will then be able to control the labor unions."

Phases are presumed to be completed according to circumstances, as neither dates nor time limits are given. Events indicate that the 1st and 2nd phases overlap. At this date the 3rd and 4th phases are in stage of planning and preparation.

REACTION OF THE WESTERN POWERS

The Marshall Plan is now in force. It provides for American financial aid to 16 West European nations for the next several years. Russia and its satellites, having refused to go along, receive nothing. This has increased the prestige of the United States while that of Russia has declined.

Efforts to establish communist governments in France by violence and in Italy through elections, respectively in November and April last, failed. Local governments supported and advised by the United States broke the communist plans.

On 17 March, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed. It provides for an economic and military alliance between Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Our State Department has announced that negotiations to aid these nations are in progress. Russia has declared that this alliance is against her, and was instigated by the United States. These allies have established a GHQ, which became operational in London on 5 May.

CHAOS IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES

In Greece, China, and Palestine, mentioned in the Russian Plan, there has been chaos. (For details, see separate sections under those headings.) The Russian intent appears to have been to induce the United States to send substantial military forces to those theaters of operation, where they would be unavailable should a major war in Europe arise. That has not happened.

Not mentioned in the Russian Plan, perhaps on account of secrecy desired, is a determined effort to create chaos in southeast Asia. This has so far succeeded that military operations have been required by the French in Indo-China; by the Dutch in Indonesia, and by the British in Malaya. Other communist movements have appeared in Burma, Siam, and the Philippines. Their mission is to stop the supply of tin, rubber, oil, hemp, and other products to the United States and Great Britain. Coupled with the communist gains in China a dangerous situation is developing.

CONSOLIDATION OF RUSSIAN SATELLITES

Various progress is being made against mounting opposition. None of the satellite populations want to be absorbed into the Marxian communist system.

In February an effort by Russia to draw Finland behind the Iron Curtain failed. Finland agreed to aid Russia should the latter be attacked by Germany. She preserved her own independence and refused to permit Russian garrisons within her territory. The Communist Party has declined in strength.

In Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia consolidation has made large progress. Those states are small. About half of the native population is reported as having been liquidated or forcibly moved to distant concentration camps. Their places have been taken by Russians, many being from Asia. An armed Underground operates and prevents the Russians from having effective control outside of the cities.

Poland never previously had a Communist Party. It has been, and still is, anti-communist. Nevertheless the communist government is in full control. It is gradually liquidating its opponents. The only open resistance left is the Catholic Church; this is strong. To obviate too much conflict, Russians on duty in Poland have been instructed to

omit references to religion's being "the opium of the people." Russian officers on duty with troops are required to attend church services with their men. Nevertheless the influence of the Church is being gradually hampered by liquidation of leading members. There is an Underground, but it is not very efficient.

In Czechoslovakia the communist government installed last February is in control. It is now known that the overthrow of the preceding democratic government was accidental, and had not been specially planned in advance. A local ministerial crisis was seized upon by the 5th Column CP in Prague, which suddenly called out the Armed Communist Action Parties. In a matter of hours, radio and press offices were seized. Using these for their propaganda and dissemination of false news and orders, the Communist Armed Action Parties seized the government. That action was similar to that in Bogota in April. An Underground has appeared. On account of its excellent industries, its mineral resources which include some uranium and its strategic position at the center of Europe, control of Czechoslovakia is of major importance to Russia.

In Hungary and Romania, communist governments are in control. It is more advanced in Romania, where nationalization of property has been decreed. In both states the granting of farms free to tenants, through seizure without compensation of large privately owned farms, brought many adherents to communism, as the peasants thought they were getting something for nothing. This has failed to work, as the small farms have been uneconomical. They are now being absorbed to form state collective farms, where the tenants are forced to work. The farmer now finds he owns nothing and has a harder taskmaster than before. His last condition is worse than his first, and he is turning away from communism.

RUSSIA VERSUS YUGOSLAVIA

On 5 October, 1947, the Cominform was reactivated and redesignated as the Communist Information Bureau with CP at Belgrade. Members were Russia; 5 satellites (Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland); and the Communist Parties of France, Czechoslovakia and Italy—9 members in all. Its main duty was to investigate, report upon, and coordinate the policies of all members. Each member had the right to criticize the others, but was required to give absolute obedience to decisions made and orders issued. How decisions were arrived at has not been ascertained.

On 20 March, 1948, the Cominform preferred charges against Yugoslavia. All members, less the accused and France and Italy, signed the charges. These were:

Charge: **Conduct unbecoming a Communist state and Party, in violation of the Marx-Lenin Rules for Communism.**

Specification 1. That leading persons in Yugoslavia openly extoled Russia while secretly slandering it.

Spec. 2. That same persons slandered the Russian army while the Yugoslav police placed Russian technicians and citizens under surveillance.

Spec. 3. That Yugoslav Communists are under surveillance; and that in the Communist Party military leadership is in charge, instead of democracy and free criticism.

Spec. 4. That the Yugoslav Secret Service has sought to secure favors from the imperialistic states. (Details were not given.)

Spec. 5. That the (Yugoslav Communist) Party is included within a People's Front, and is following the erroneous theory of peaceful transformation of capitalism into socialism.

Spec. 6. That an envoy of one of the big imperialistic states has undue influence.

Spec. 7. That Yugoslavia makes no distinction between the foreign policies of Russia and of an imperialist state.

Spec. 8. That leading persons in Yugoslavia do not follow the Marx-Lenin rule as to the leading role of the proletariat.

Spec. 9. That German paratroops attacked the GHQ of Yugoslavia (in September, 1944; Marshal Tito was present but escaped), thereby causing a grave crisis. Yugoslavia was then liberated by Russian armies, who installed a communist government. Yugoslavia has failed and neglected to give due credit to Russia for its existence.

Spec. 10. That Yugoslavia has boasted of its war accomplishments, but has failed and neglected to credit the deeds of our communist states.

At a meeting of the Cominform, which was duly convened at Bratislava, Romania, on 20 and 21 June, and of which Colonel General Andrei A. Zhdanov was President, Yugoslavia was arraigned on the foregoing charges. It refused to answer on the ground that the charges related to matters which it was not the business of the Cominform to consider. Thereupon on 28 June, the Cominform issued an order expelling Yugoslavia from the community of communist states for as long as its present leaders remained in control. Yugoslavia next day denied the charges in general.

The basis of the charges is that Yugoslavia has done little towards nationalization of farms into large collectives. Farms in Yugoslavia are normally small and peasant-owned. For this case, the Marx-Lenin rule is to induce owners to voluntarily surrender their farms to the state, under representation that this will ultimately result to everyone's benefit. The Yugoslavians can't see this, don't want communism, and decline to give up farms which have often been in their families for centuries. Yugoslav leaders consider it impracticable to nationalize farms. To attempt that would invite revolution. They apparently have done just what the Cominform alleges—talked about beauties of communism, but did as little as possible in that direction.

GERMANY

On 7 June, the United States, Great Britain, and France issued a joint communique relating to the 3 zones of Germany occupied by them. Decisions announced were:

1. The Benelux states of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg had joined with the Western Powers.

2. An International Authority was provided for control of the Ruhr, not involving political separation from Germany, but covering distribution of its products. The United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany would each have 3 votes, but German representatives were to be chosen by the occupying Powers. Benelux states would have 1 vote each.

3. Representatives of the German states within the 3 occupied zones are to be convened to recommend a Constitution for uniting of the 3 zones into a single German state. If approved by vote of the German people, and by the occupying Powers, such a state is to be formed.

4. A provision for minor adjustments in the German west boundary (not otherwise described).

5. No withdrawal of occupying troops until the peace of Europe is secure.

On 16 June, the People's Council of the Russian occupied zone demanded:

1. Renunciation by the Western Powers of the German state provided in their communiqué of 7 June, in favor of a single German state to include the Russian zone.

2. Establishment for Germany of a constitution, uniform currency, and a National Assembly.

3. Peace with Germany, followed by withdrawal of occupying forces and settlement of reparations.

On the same day the Russians withdrew from the 4-Power Kommandatura which had been governing Berlin as a unit since 1945.

On 18 June, the Western Powers decreed a new currency for their zones, effective on 20 June. Next day, the Commanding General of the Russian zone forbade circulation of the new currency within his jurisdiction and decreed a new currency for his zone, effective 23 June. On the latter date, the Russians halted railroad and canal traffic of all kinds from the Western zones across their territory into Berlin, and cut off electric power from their area into those parts of Berlin occupied by the Western Powers. This was interpreted by the Western Powers as a hostile act intended to force them out of Berlin by making it impossible to supply troops garrisoned there and about 2,250,000 Germans resident in their sectors. They ordered essential supplies to be flown in. The Air Transport Commands of the United States and Great Britain immediately responded and within a few days were moving 3,000 tons of supplies daily into Berlin. France had no air transport service capable of materially aiding this task.

On 24 June, the Foreign Ministers of Russia and its satellites (less Finland) met at Warsaw. This was a very important meeting. The major decisions arrived at are but partially known. There were but two meetings of 2 hours each. This indicates that whatever was arranged for had been lined up in advance, so that lengthy discussions were unnecessary. The morning meeting presumably made the decisions; at the afternoon meeting these were reduced to writing and signed. A communiqué issued that evening stated that Russia and its satellites demanded:

1. Demilitarization of Germany.

2. 4-Power control over the Ruhr.

3. 4-Power agreement on a single German state.

4. Peace treaty with Germany, and withdrawal of occupying troops within 1 year thereafter.

5. Completion of German reparations.

The communiqué discussed the Western Powers at considerable length. It charged that they were uninterested in peace with Germany and withdrawal of occupation troops, and further charged them with violating agreements with Russia regarding currency reforms.

SUMMARY

The 1st Phase of the Russian Plan as to consolidation of satellite states is far from complete. A first enthusiasm, which certainly existed in certain present satellite states, is disappearing. Promises of great benefits for nothing are forgotten before the reality of poverty, hardship, and loss of liberty.

According to a report at the end of 1947, by the Brazil ambassador, there were 30,000,000 homeless and breadless people within Russia. Misery, hunger, and slavery were normal. The same conditions existed in the satellite states. Purges to prevent the discontented from organizing are frequent and merciless. With an increase in the strength of the Secret Police this has so far succeeded.

The Polit Bureau which rules Russia as The Dictatorship of the Proletariat has a first-class home crisis and knows it. To its credit the current 5-Year Plan is working, and crops for this year are above average. Hunger is due to stocking food against a war.

Russians who have come into contact with Western civilization are now numerous. They have brought back to their homes reports as to the superiority of the west over the east. Such people are being liquidated, or transferred to distant areas. The European Russian troops on the west front, effective on 1 April last, were being replaced by Asiatics. These in general are uneducated, do not know the west, are killers, unsentimental, frugal, and tough—just the kind for forward lines.

Many Russians have positions and duties which are agreeable. There are millions of others who ardently wish the overthrow of the present Government; this is a major weakness.

In this Journal for January-February, 1948, the writer reported the Russian bid for peace with the United States and its allies. It was control of Germany and $10 billions as reparations. As Germany hasn't got $10 billions, the intent was that the United States finance that amount to pass on to Russia. From Russia's point of view these demands about balanced the gain to the United States from association with the 16 West European nations through the Marshall Plan. Nothing has arisen that indicates that Russia has altered its demands. Those listed in preceding paragraphs, the announcements of 16 and 24 June, are the same as before. The single German state desired is a Russian-controlled one; the reparations are the $10 billions.

The evidence indicates that Russia has not wanted war this year. That does not mean that she might not accept it if a favorable situation arose. Factors which would be considered are:

The allies under the Brussels Treaty are not yet organized; they will be within a year or two. The same as to Greece and Turkey.

The political conditions within the United States are interpreted by Russia (wrongly in the opinion of this writer) as about to change in favor of accepting Russian demands rather than risk a war. (See quotation under 4th Phase of Russian Plan.)

A very serious situation has arisen.

GREECE

THE GENERAL SITUATION

The Greek Army. On 1 May the Greek Army had a strength of around 130,000 men, organized into 3 corps and 8 divisions. Chief of Staff was Lieutenant General Demitros Yadzis, advised by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, USA. American officers were attached to corps and divisions as advisers. A National Defence Corps to defend towns had been formed, and the regular troops were thereby freed for field operations.

The army is British-trained. Divisions do not exceed 9,000 men each, with attached artillery. There is a deficiency of heavy artillery. Armor is organized into reconnaissance units and attached to divisions as needed. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country, armor has been of minor importance. There is an air corps using mostly British Spitfires, partly equipped with rockets and fragmentation bombs.

The Communists. Prior to this year the communists operated in detachments of usually not over battalion strength. This year a regular military organization has been formed. At least 1 division exists; this has 3 brigades of infantry (normal for Greece) and 3 batteries of artillery. A small amount of medium artillery has been noted. Small-caliber antiaircraft weapons have appeared. This army is growing in size and efficiency; the total strength is estimated by the Greek Army as 25,000 men. Their commander is "General" Markos Vafiades. The main force occupied a central redoubt whose rear rests along the border of Albania, from where it was supplied over new all-weather roads. The front line was along high ground facing Nestorion—Greveni—Métsovon—Ioánnina—Kónitsa (all excl). The CP was near Lykorrachi. There were several entrenched lines, numerous strong points, and the foreground studded with extensive mine fields. The garrison numbered perhaps 12,000 men, well armed and trained. To protect the flanks of the central redoubt, brigades were posted on each flank—north from Kastoria, based on Yugoslavia, to cover the left; and west of Ioánnina, based on south Albania, to cover the right.

The communists have had from 6 months to 2 years to prepare this position. They worked hard and have produced a first-class defensive position with possibilities for sorties. Supply is assured by the base resting on Soviet satellite states.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

American officers have been giving operational and logistical advice to the Greek Army since 1947. Since the arrival of American operational advisors the Greek Army has stepped up its activities against the guerillas and has successfully completed one major operation against their shifty, communist-backed foes in the Roumeli area of the Southern Mainland. A second major effort was directed at the guerrillas when operation "Crown" was launched against the Markos' stronghold in the Grammos area contiguous to the southeast portion of the Albanian border. This operation commenced 20 June and, as was suspected, is meeting with fanatical resistance from the defenders of the guerrilla redoubt.

The II Corps was detailed to undertake the operation. Its commander was Lieut. General Panas Kalogeropoulos, who established his advance CP at Kozáne. This officer had a good reputation for previous fighting in Thessaly. He was given 6 divisions, with usual corps troops and services. The plan was to attack both flanks of the central enemy redoubt simultaneously, with a connecting group making a frontal attack. All available artillery and the Air Force would aid. In all the attackers numbered about 18,000 troops; against an enemy estimated at the time as about 7,000 *bandits*, with little artillery and no air force. D-day was 18 June. The end of the operation was foreseen for 1 August, which would allow time for action against the remaining supposedly isolated communist forces elsewhere before the summer season ended. It seems that the Communists knew this plan from their 5th Column, and had time to prepare counter measures.

The territory to be operated over was the same as that fought over during the 1940-41 winter war with Italy. Both sides knew the terrain with its limitations and possibilities. On D-day the operation started with the 15th Division attacking southwestwardly from near Nestorion, parallel to the Albania frontier, which here lies along the crest of the Grammos Mountains. An air strike and an artillery preparation preceded the infantry assault. The 1st Division covered the rear of this attack against communists in the north wing position and the line of supply to Trikkala. Strong resistance was encountered and advance was slight. This was continued on the two following days with minor gains.

On the night of 20/21 June, it being nearly full moon, the 9th Division attacked from the vicinity of Kónitsa, going northeast directly towards the 15th division, which was 30 miles away at the opposite end of the central redoubt. The rear of the 9th was protected against the communists in the right wing position by the 8th Division near Ioánnina. By evening of the 21st, the 9th Division had gained 4 miles, which was about the same as what the 15th Division had gained in its sector. Both divisions reported that they were now confronted with what appeared to be the enemy's main line of resistance, which was very strong. In view of this, the 1st Division, less a detachment, was brought into line that day on the left of the 15th.

For the 22nd, the II Corps ordered the connecting group to attack frontally with the 2nd Division from Grevená and the 10th Division from Metsovon. The direction of advance for both was towards Lykorrachi. If successful, all attacking divisions would reach the same place. The 8th Division, less a detachment, was ordered to attack toward the same objective from Ioánnina. By evening of the 23rd all attacks had come to a standstill. The 9th Division reported it was unable to advance because of enfilade fire from its left, which appeared to come from inside Albania. As standing orders prohibited firing into adjacent states, or directing artillery fire or bombing within a belt of 5 miles along international borders, the 9th saw no way to solve this problem. The 8th Division had attacked

Mr. Mitsikeli, but had found it strongly defended and the attack had failed. In its turn the 8th defeated a counterattack by the communists. The connecting group of the 2nd and 10th Divisions had made minor advances, but were now confronted with the enemy's main line of resistance in their sectors and were unable to go further. The 1st and 15th Divisions had gained nothing of consequence.

The communists now assumed a partial offensive. On the 25th they counterattacked, apparently from a base inside Albania, against the left of the 9th Division. Next day the communists' wing north of Kastoria successfully raided the Greek line of supply north from Trikkala and interrupted it before withdrawing.

The II Corps ordered a renewal of all attacks for the 27th. Armor was attached to the 15th Division for a first appearance in line. Strong artillery and air preparations were provided. The day was rainy and cloudy and the Air Force couldn't do much. The armor found it impracticable to operate over the mountainous territory. The only advance made was by the 2nd Division near Grevená, and that was subsequently lost to a communist counterattack, after some severe fighting.

Renewing the attack the next day, the assailants were everywhere met with strong opposition and numerous counterattacks. In heavy fighting the 9th Division captured a strong point, while the 15th and 1st Divisions made slight gains. Attempts to extend these on the 29th failed.

On 30 June, the communist right wing, consisting of a division less 1 brigade, attacked eastwards from high ground, and against little opposition seized the road leading from Ioánnina about 10 to 12 miles south of that town. That road was being maintained under American supervision. The road was also the main line of supply to the 9th, 8th, and 10th Divisions. Greek Army troops drove off the attacking guerrillas and the road was restored by the night of 30 June. As this account closes at the end of June, the Greek offensive had made an average advance of perhaps 4 miles in 13 days against the communist central redoubt, which had not been seriously endangered.

Comment: Mountain positions are difficult to attack. Time is required. The Greek plan still has several weeks of contemplated operations before it.

CHINA

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Relations with the United States. There is pessimism at Nanking. The Chinese do not believe that the $463,000,000 appropriated for them by the US Congress was anywhere as large a sum as it should have been. They are not sure that they can make it last until next January, when they hope a new Congress will be generous and give them a substantially larger sum. A strong anti-American movement is growing. It is headed by the faculties and students of universities, who have directly petitioned the President of the United States. Failure to secure more money is a prime cause of the discontent, although that is rarely openly mentioned. The alleged reason is American policy in Japan. It is represented that Russia and the United States are in a race to strengthen themselves for World War III, and that with that idea in view the Americans are building up Japan to become a satellite. The Chinese want Japan reduced to a bare subsistence level, and kept there. They also want reparations for China equal to what Russia is obtaining out of Germany.

In spite of all the assistance the United States has given China, amounting so far to over $2½ billions, plus vast quantities of stores and unlimited advice, little gratitude is shown. On the contrary it is alleged that the United States is under such great obligations for aid given by China during the war with Japan that large additional grants should be regularly forthcoming for the future. This argument is much the same as that of Russia, which ever since 1945 has publicly claimed that Russia won the war with only negligible aid from the Allies.

Internal Conditions. On 20 May, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek became the first President of China under the new Constitution. As explained in a preceding article, this Constitution resembles that of the United States, for whose benefit it was largely passed. The Legislature has duly authorized the President at his discretion to suspend provisions of the Constitution and govern by decree. So everything remains as before.

War between the National (Kuomintang) Government and the communists continues, and is likely to do so indefinitely. The communists control most of China north of the Yangtze River. Where the opportunity exists, the better classes are converting their property to cash and fleeing, causing a serious refugee problem. Communism considers ownership of property to be a crime. The Chinese communists arrest and bring such persons to trial. Evidence is unnecessary; the accused are not entitled to counsel; they are not always heard in their own behalf. The spectators at the "trial" form the Peoples Court and are called on to vote whether the accused are guilty or not guilty. Spectators are too frightened to vote other than guilty, for otherwise they might themselves become the accused, charged with being anti-communist. Death sentences are carried out with cruelty.

Refugees seek to reach Shanghai, where assets can be converted in the black market into checks and drafts payable abroad, usually Hong Kong, where the British maintain law and order. This transfer of funds is reinforced by similar movements from Kuomintang territory not now threatened by communists. Entire industrial plants are being moved from the lower Yangtze valley to Hong Kong, which is becoming the new industrial center of China. Vast new plants are building, financed by the funds transmitted from war areas and escaping from the corrupt and inefficient Kuomintang government. That government is aware that industries are going south. On 11

June the Premier saw nothing unusual in that. During the war with Japan industries went west; now before the communist menace they are going south. Why not? The remedy proposed is that the United States develop a new industrial area below the Yangtze River.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

General Situation. American funds for $125,000,000 are now available for military purposes. Plan is to split this as follows: For ground troops, $87,500,000; for air forces, $28,000,000; for navy, $9,500,000. This will suffice to train and equip about 6 divisions. The US Advisory Group has a plan for 12 new divisions; this will probably remain just a plan.

According to China returns for 16 June, the total troops on the Kuomintang rolls number over 5,000,000. The combat strength is reported as 2,108,000. The G-2 estimate is that the enemy has 1,560,000 regular troops plus 700,000 local guards. This compares with a Kuomintang combat strength in August, 1945, of 3,700,000, at which date the communists were estimated as 320,000. These figures do not point to a probability of the Kuomintang's being able to win this war even with the 6 new divisions to be provided at American expense. China recognizes this situation and does not propose to use the new divisions for an offensive. They are to be used to bolster weak defensive positions.

On 9 April, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued an order to hold 7 strategic cities and concentrate other troops, heretofore spread thin garrisoning a vast number of towns, to assume an offensive against the enemy. That order was sound, and appears to have been due to American advice at a time when the Congress had not yet appropriated funds for China. Nobody has paid attention to that order. There has been neither concentration nor offensives. Orders issued by armies direct main bodies to fight hostile detachments, and avoid major actions by marching off when strong communist forces approach. This insures absence of decisive battles and the continuation of the war.

The Kuomintang has officially recognized the right of troops to seize what they need without payment therefor, charging it to taxation. The explanation is that it is wholly impracticable to provide and distribute the huge amounts of food required for their enormous command. The farmers, who are the mainstay of China, look upon Kuomintang troops as pests.

On 10 June a GHQ order directed increasing local defenses by establishing road blocks to prevent the enemy from going places.

The US Advisory Group in China is charged with giving military advice to the Kuomintang. Once in a while it gets something over. The main thing wrong is that advice given is not binding. Chinese lose face, or think they do, if they accept advice from a foreigner.

The Manchuria Theater. The Kuomingtang holds only Mukden and Changchun, both under siege and having no communication with each other, or their base in China, except by air. The commander is General Wei Lihiang with 200,000 men at Mukden and 60,000 at Changchun. A relief force of another 200,000, based on Chinhsien, has had its advance beyond Takushan with the mission of opening a land route into Mukden. Nothing has been done on that line.

Communists are under General Lin Piao. His main force of about 10 divisions was west of the South Manchuria RR about half way between Mukden and Changchun. The spring thaw being over and the dirt roads practicable, Gen Lin on 10 May sent his 6th and 7th Divisions north towards Changchun and his 9th and 11th south towards Mukden. Two other divisions were directed to proceed through Jehol and strike south of Chinhsien. The Kuomintang air force discovered these movements and reported having heavily bombed them. There is an absence of evidence that any damage was caused. Other communist forces were 2 divisions, each blocking RRs south and southeast from Mukden, and 8 divisions near Sinmim to prevent the Mukden and Chinhsien Kuomintang forces from uniting. These had nothing to do in view of the lack of initiative of the opposing forces.

On 16 May the communists coming through Jehol reached the sea near Shanhaikwan and cut the Peiping and Mukden RR. After 3 days they retired to the high ground of the west. On the 24th the 2 divisions headed for Changchun arrived at the south defenses. They promptly commenced an artillery preparation. There was much noise and smoke until 28 May when the Kuomintang troops marched away, abandoning the south airport. The communists then moved to the north where there was another airport, the sole remaining one for the Changchun defenders. This was brought under artillery fire and the field was abandoned. Supplies for the garrison were thereafter dropped. For the first time the communists have had AA artillery and brought down 1 plane at Changchun. It is charged, but not confirmed, that the guns are Japanese. Who trained the communist AA artillery is unknown.

The North Theater. General Fu Tso-yi is the Kuomintang commander, with his CP at Peiping. He has outdone the communists in land reform and taxation; has balanced his budget; pays for supplies required for his troops. This exceptional method has won friends and there has been a decline of communist bandits in north Hopeh, where a National Guard has been organized, armed, and trained to defend their own villages.

Inner Mongolia and Suiyuan are reported friendly to communists, although both provinces have large contingents serving under General Fu. The latter has declined to organize a National Guard in those provinces, fearing that arms issued might be delivered to the enemy.

On 13 May, Gen Lin Piao, commanding communists in Manchuria and in North China had concentrated 4 divisions at Lunghwa and 3 at Pingchuan for a pincer movement against the 13th Kuomintang Army (a corps of 3 divisions) near Chengteh, capital of Jehol. By 16 May the communists had arrived within 10 miles of Chengteh. Two divisions were than detached and marched around Chengteh, arriving near Kupehkow on the 19th and Yenking on the 22nd, both along the Great Wall. This cut the lines of communication

between Peiping and Inner Mongolia. General Fu ordered reinforcements north to hold the Great Wall, abandoning the area south of Tatung. By the end of the month Chengteh was encircled.

In June a new communist force advanced from near Chengteh towards Tangshan, the most important coal-producing region of China, with an average production of about 12,000 tons per day. This is normally shipped by rail, mostly to nearby ports and thence by water to all of China. This communist movement failed, but the coal production was interrupted for two weeks. On 23 June an attack on Kupehkow following an artillery preparation by the communists failed.

The Central Theater. Early in May the communist General Liu Po-cheng advanced southwest through Honan. His right reached Neisiang on the 6th, Sichwan on the 9th, and the Han River on the 10th. His center by-passed Nanyang on the 7th, and on the 18th captured Laohokow, the former air base for our 14th AF. His left, from a position near Chengyang, covered the foregoing operations. However, the Kuomintang made no particular defense. Their troops withdrew without much fighting. The communists, having seized supplies, withdrew by the 24th to beyond Neisiang.

On 27 May another communist force of about 9 divisions had assembled in Shantung, a rich province held by the communists except for the US naval base at Tsingtao, Chefoo, and a few posts along the Tientsin & Nanking RR. The communists by-passed the railroad blocks, crossed the Grand Canal, and arrived at the west boundary of Shangtung on 29 May without having met serious resistance. The Kuomintang thereupon abandoned Taian but defended Tzeyang, both RR blocks. It assumed that the communists desired to seize the arsenal city of Tungshan and concentrated there.

In spite of the road blocks, the communists by 15 June had the major part of their forces in the general area of Hotseh. They failed to attack Tungshan, but sent 2 divisions west toward Kafeng, capital of Honan; these arrived on the 19th. The local Kuomintang commander and governor reported a ferocious defense, in which he is reported to have been "killed" after the city had been largely destroyed. The communists entered the city on the 20th, and lost no time looting it. The next day President Chiang Kai-shek, leading 200 combat planes, flew over Kaifeng, which was bombed. Reports are that civilians suffered; the enemy not at all. The communists withdrew on the 24th, and the former Kuomintang commander, previously "killed," was reported as again on duty.

PALESTINE

THE GENERAL SITUATION

At the beginning of the period, Great Britain exercised a mandate over Palestine, but had announced that she would surrender it as of midnight 14/15 May. By that date her troops would be concentrated at Haifa, where a port area was reserved pending evacuation. The troops would protect themselves, but would not take part in events which might develop.

Anticipating the termination of the mandate, Jews, numbering about 1/3 of the population, and Arabs, numbering the remaining 2/3, had each desired that Palestine become an independent state. The Arabs wished for a government freely elected by the citizens; the Jews for a government selected by the Jewish Agency, which had for long represented a Zionist movement whose aim was to make Jerusalem the capital of a new Jewish state. Neither Arabs nor Jews would compromise. Thereupon the United Nations had announced as a solution a partition of Palestine into three parts—Jewish, Arab, and neutral, the latter consisting of a small area, around Jerusalem and Bethlehem, which was to be under control of the United Nations. The partition boundaries were so drawn as to award three areas each to Jews and Arabs, respectively a north, central, and south section. The two central sections, which were the principal ones, were parallel to the Mediterranean coast, the Jews being west in a 10-mile-wide strip, and the Arabs east in a 15-mile strip. The Jewish section was rich agricultural land; the Arab section contained hills, desert, and pasture. In the Jewish sector, the port of Jaffa, the worst of three in Palestine, was excepted and allotted to the Arabs, although entirely encircled by Jewish territory.

The two north sectors were Jews east around the sea of Galilee, and Arabs west at Acre and north thereof. The boundaries of these sections met the boundaries of the two main sections west of El Affule, making 45° angles, so that they came together at a point. There was therefore no practicable line of communications between either Jew or Arab north sections and their main sections.

In the south the Arabs were west, having a 6-mile strip along the Mediterranean from Isdud (incl) south, and thence prolonged along the Egyptian border as far as Mt. Maghara (excl). The remainder of south Palestine, the largest section of all, extended north from the Gulf of Aqaba, second-best port, as far as Beersheba (excl), with a corridor extending along the Arab strip's east edge to opposite Isdud, where it met an Arab corridor from their main sector to the coastal one.

The peculiar arrangement of boundaries made it impracticable to maintain communications by either road, rail, or wire, or provide for water and power lines from any section to another. The United Nations had expected that Jews and Arabs would collaborate to overcome this difficulty. They refused to do so.

The Jews did accept partition, but the Arabs refused the erection of an independent foreign state carved out of what had been Arab territory for 1300 years. The Arab League, consisting of seven independent Arab states, announced that they would support the Palestine Arabs to maintain the independence of their country by military operations. The Jews, having for long foreseen this, had secretly armed. The Jewish Agency and the Arab League agreed to begin no operations against

each other prior to 15 May. Certain Jewish terroristic organizations refused to be bound by this agreement, and there resulted a desultory minor warfare between these Jews and the Palestine Arabs.

The Jewish Agency has expended, in favor of organizing a Jewish state, nearly $50,000,000 in the past year. About $40,000,000 of this consisted of donations from the United States. Only about $1,000,000 was collected locally. The balance came from donations from Jews in other lands. The Jews have debts, $40,000,000 in excess of the foregoing receipts, for military expenses and the cost of bringing in additional Jews. For ordinary expenditures, the budget was out of balance another $40,000,000. It seems therefore that a Jewish state can not reasonably be expected to be self-maintaining. Large additional amounts of funds must be supplied from the outside, with no prospect that a Jewish state will be self-supporting for at least a long time.

The Jewish Agency is reported as largely sympathetic to communism. Best estimate is that the communists and allied left parties number about 70% of the Jewish population.

The terroristic organizations, which are well armed with automatic infantry weapons, are the Irgun Zwai Leumi and the Stern Gang. They did not recognize the authority of the Jewish Agency and at times actively fought it.

THE SITUATION AS OF 15 MAY

The British hauled down their flag and their troops concentrated at the harbor of Haifa. Simultaneously with the British surrender of power, the Jewish Agency resolved itself into the state of Israel and claimed jurisdiction over the three sections allotted by the United Nations to the Jews. The United States officially recognized the new state that same day, and Russia followed on the 17th. Other states refrained from action.

The Jews had an army known as the Haganah which became their Regular force. Its organization and strength have been secret. Best information is that they number over 30,000 combat troops, well armed with infantry weapons and equipped with motor transportation. There was next to no artillery nor any air force. There was some armor, largely improvised from trucks. The officer corps appears to have been inferior, lacking training and especially authority. Many of the men were Jewish immigrants who had served in World War II and had had battle experience. They were individually brave. These Jewish Regulars had at this date cleared the main and north Jewish sections from Arab guerrillas. They promptly occupied Jaffa, which had previously been partly cleared. They had Acre under siege in the north. The main force was east of Jaffa on the line Petah Tiqva—El Yehudiye—Rishon le Zion, all inclusive, covering Tel Aviv, the capital city. The south Jewish section appears to have been unoccupied. The Irgun Zwai Leumi, with an estimated force of over 10,000, held Jerusalem, which was surrounded by Palestinian Arabs who had for 6 weeks blockaded that city. About 5,000 more Jews belonging to either the same organization or to the Stern Gang were scattered. In all the Jews had about 45,000 troops.

The Palestinian Arabs had engaged in certain minor operations, but only one had succeeded. On 15 May they held a road block across the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem Road near Latrun. They had repulsed an attempt by the Haganah on 9 May to take a convoy to Jerusalem loaded with supplies and munitions. The Arab League had a GHQ at Amman, Trans-Jordan, but its forces were separated and operating on independent lines. In the north, Lebanon, with about 2,000 men, and Syria, with about 3,000, crossed the frontier respectively north and south of the Sea of Galilee to seize the north Jewish sector. By doing so, they uncovered the Arab sector along the coast, and the Jews already at Acre were able to bypass that place, which was being defended, and they reached the Lebanese border. The largest Arab force was a division from Trans-Jordan, named the Arab Legion, of about 12,000 men. This was a good division, concentrated just north of the Dead Sea. It had light artillery, some armor, and some planes. Its commander was Major General Glubb, retired, of the British Army. Other British retired officers were present in command of troops. The entire division was equipped with British weapons in accord with a treaty between Great Britain and Trans-Jordan. British Army Regulations permit retired officers to engage themselves in foreign armies, provided that the foreign army is not an enemy, and provided that they are not fighting a British ally nor a state where Britain has proclaimed neutrality. None of these conditions exist. North of the Trans-Jordan division, an Iraq mechanized combat team of about 2,000 men was posted. This force was also British trained and an efficient organization. On the Egyptian border was a force of that nation of about 8,000 and containing armor and artillery. It too crossed the border, and marched northwards.

Total Arab forces were about 30,000 men—5,000 in the north, 14,000 in the center, and 8,000 in the south plus 3,000 guerrillas at the Latrun road block. They were inferior to the Jews in numbers, but had superior organization and leadership. Owing to lack of roads, communication between the forces was poor.

The Strategy. The best action for the Jews, holding a central position with greater numbers against an enemy separated into three detachments not within supporting distance of each other, would have been to contain the Arab north and south detachments, and concentrate against the Trans-Jordan division. Allowing 15,000 men for containing forces and guarding lines of supply, there should have been some 30,000 available to attack 20,000 Arabs. This should have sufficed to give a probability of crushing the main Arab force before the wings could join. Nothing like this was attempted.

The Arab strategical plan appears to have been to move cautiously so as to avoid having the wings crushed before they could unite with the central body. The three forces were to close in and seek to drive the Jews into the Plain of Sharon. If properly carried out, this would result in the Jews having both flanks enveloped, with good positions for the Arabs for a decisive battle. For this type of maneuver—an excellent one—superiority is generally required.

It need not necessarily be a superiority of numbers, which the Arabs did not have. It might have been obtained by better maneuvering and leadership.

A FOUR-WEEKS WAR

On 15 May, the Lebanese and Syrian detachments advanced across their borders, seeking to occupy the Jewish area west of the Sea of Galilee. At the same time the Jews advanced north along the Mediterranean into Lebanon. Neither side was able to accomplish anything, and thereafter minor fighting occurred without material change in the situation.

The Egyptians reached Gaza on the 15th, and Isdud on the 16th, without meeting serious resistance.

The Trans-Jordan division marched west and arrived at Lydda on 17 May against minor resistance. Here it found itself faced by the main Jewish Army and halted. A detachment had been sent to Jerusalem to clear that city. The Jews with about 500 men held the Jewish southwest quarter of the Walled City and with several thousand men the New City, which lies west and northwest of the old Walled City. The first Arab efforts were against the Walled City, which was attacked from the west, north, and east sides. A house and street battle resulted. The defenders were inside stone houses and several large synagogues. Arabs advanced from house to house by demolitions and mortar fire. Progress was slow but was steady. The Jews in the New City counterattacked to relieve their besieged comrades. This failed to pierce two Arab lines—contravallation to keep the enemy inside from getting out, and circumvallation to keep the tenemy outside from getting in. British leadership was apparent.

On 19 May the Trans-Jordan division captured Er Ramle, a Jewish advanced post. Having made liaison with the guerrillas operating near Latrun, the road block was taken over and strengthened to assure separation of the Jewish main force from Jerusalem. A hastily organized Jewish counterattack failed. The Egyptian Air Force commenced a daily bombing of Tel Aviv. Planes appear to have been fighters using 50-1b. bombs. Damage and casualties followed, but nothing important. The Arab detachment at Jerusalem, using artillery, seized and held Sheik Jarrah, a suburb of the New City and north thereof. Egyptians advancing eastwards from Isdud occupied Beersheba. On 21 May they arrived at Bethlehem, only 5 miles from Jerusalem, but Jewish forces held the intervening territory. On the 23rd, the Arabs attacked southwards from Jerusalem to open a way to the Egyptians. They reached Ramat Rahel, the halfway point, against some resistance. Next day communication was made with the Egyptians without serious fighting. The Jews in the Old City were now completely encircled and being slowly compressed.

On 24 May the Jewish main army made a first offensive; south against Isdud. It by-passed Yibna, which was held by Palestinian Arab guerrillas, and may have been primarily intended to divert attention. However, the offensive reached Isdud but an attack was repulsed. Acording to Egyptian accounts, the Jews lost 500 men. Under cover of this attack, but by daylight, a large convoy started from Tel Aviv for Jerusalem. The escort rushed towards the Latrun road block. The Jews were moving out of a plain against Arabs posted on hills. The Arab OPs discovered the enemy long before they reached the road block. Artillery fire was directed on the approaching Jews, while reinforcements were drawn by trucks from Jerusalem. The Jewish attack broke down and withdrew. An effort was now made to supply the besieged troops in Old Jerusalem by dropped supplies. These fell within the Arab lines, leaving the defenders in straightened circumstances.

On the 25th the Jews again attempted to open a way through Latrun for their convoy. The Arabs, using the reinforcements which had arrived from Jerusalem, counterattacked and drove the Jews back with a reported 600 casualties and the loss of numerous automatic weapons. Next day the Jews made another attack. About 1500 picked men made an up-hill frontal attack against the Latrun RB, in broad daylight. Both sides used some armor, which fought on the south flank. The frontal attack was defeated by the Arab artillery, which suffered no hostile counterbattery, and must have had a "field day" against plainly visible targets. The Jewish losses reported by the Arabs were 800.

The ensuing night, planes flew out again to parachute supplies and ammunition to the Jews besieged in Jerusalem. This resulted as before; the Arabs got the supplies, which fell inside their lines. These failures led to the Jews in the Walled City surrendering on 28 May. There were under 400 combat troops, besides about 2,100 civilians. The Jews in the New City, which has a population of over 80,000, continued to hold. The Old City's southwest quarter had been badly damaged. On the same day the main Jewish force made a renewed attack against the Latrun road block. Some advance was made before it was stopped, partly by artillery fire and partly by air attacks by Egyptian and Iraq planes. This action resulted in the Arabs reinforcing their left with Egyptian troops brought from Jerusalem.

On the 29th the Arabs commenced regular reducing operations against the New City of Jerusalem by a slow advance from house to house. The Jewish state attempted to incorporate their irregular forces with the Regular Haganah Army. The Stern Gang on 30 May accepted, but the Irgun Zwai Leumi, with its main body at Jerusalem, refused.

On the 30th the Iraq mechanized combat team of about 2,000 men advanced to and occupied Tulkarm and sent patrols beyond to the west and south. At the same time the Trans-Jordan division sent troops 10 miles northwards from Lydda. Owing to the weakening of the Egyptian force by reason of troops sent to the road block, their troops at Isdud, leaving an outpost, withdrew to El Majdal.

The following day a Jewish force from the north, based on Haifa, concentrated at Megiddo, about 10 miles northwest from Jenin on the line of supply of the Iraq troops. There was a good road from Megiddo to Tulkarm, 20 miles to the southwest. The Iraq combat team now had its rear threatened, and suspended its movement southwards, pending developments.

Subsequent events indicate that this Jewish maneuver was a coincidence, and that they were unprepared to take advantage of their position by attacking the Iraq main body. In the meantime the Trans-Jordan division kept on and seized and held Petah Tiqva, with their advance only 6 miles from Tel Aviv. To protect their left, the Jews withdrew from before Latrun with Arabs in pursuit, who captured a number of armored cars. The Jews did not abandon their advance south. Light forces by-passed El Majdal by taking a road to Beit Tima, 3 miles to the east. Here they came under Egyptian artillery fire, and were stopped.

On 1 June the Jewish main force counterattacked, seeking to recapture Petah Tiqva by enveloping the Arab right (north) flank. This attack reached its objective at Antipatris, 3 miles northeast from Petah Tiqva. Counterattacked in turn from several directions by Arab forces and shelled by artillery, the Jews were unable to hold, and fell back. The Arabs now held the main road leading north from Tel Aviv, while their armored patrols raided to the coast.

On the 2nd, the Iraq combat team, finding that the Jewish force at Megiddo could be contained by small garrisons left at Tulkarm and Jenin, marched south to Et Tira with armored combat patrols covering the plain from the sea to the hills. The Jews at Megiddo divided their force and sent detachments towards Jenin and Tulkarm. They were stopped by the Arab containing forces several miles short of their objectives. In the south the Egyptians at El Majdal attacked eastwards. They met no resistance and reopened the road to Hebron which had been interrupted when the Jews arrived at Beit Tima. That Jewish force had withdrawn, and on the night of 2/3 June attacked the Isdud outpost from the rear. The attack failed, but the Jews had it surrounded except for communication by sea.

On 4 June, Jewish attacks against Jenin reached the suburbs of that town on the north side. On the 5th, the south Jewish force attacked the isolated Arab guerrillas at Yibna. The Arabs withdrew, apparently without much loss, toward Latrun. In this small action the Jews used artillery for the first time. A Jewish pre-dawn attack was also made in New Jerusalem, but this failed, and an Arab counterattack, supported by Egyptian artillery, gained ground.

During the night 8/9 June the Jews made a new effort to break through the Latrun road block. About 1,000 infantry made a frontal attack, while 3,000 others, escorting a motorized convoy, sought under cover of darkness and the frontal attack to pass around the Arab left (south) flank. The frontal attack was defeated with considerable loss. The turning movement reached the road in rear of the road block. However, Egyptian troops coming from Jerusalem cleared the Jews away from the road.

THE TRUCE

At 8.00 AM, 11 June, Arabs and Jews agreed to a truce for 4 weeks, or until 9 July. The conditions of the truce were:

1. Lines to remain unchanged.

2. Both sides to refrain from reinforcing their commands, or importing weapons or munitions. Immigrants entering Palestine capable of bearing arms to be interned.

3. Jews to have the right to send convoys of food sufficient for 28 days to their besieged comrades in New Jerusalem.

4. The United Nations, represented by Count Folke Bernadotte, appointed Mediator, to supervise the foregoing conditions and seek methods for peace. The United Nations started to furnish observers (mostly from the US Army), 3 destroyers (US), and some planes (also US) to report to Count Bernadotte for this duty. Count Bernadotte established his CP at Rhodes, Aegean Islands, and summoned representatives of Jews and Arabs to report to him for consultation and advice.

At this time the line between the main forces was approximately: Antipatris (Arab)—Petah Tiqva (A)—El Yehudiye (A)—Kafr Ana (Jewish)—Lydda (A)—Er. Ramle (A)—Rehovot (?)—Yibna (J).

In the north, the line of the Qishon and Jalud Rivers separted Jews (north) and Arabs (south). The Arabs held south Palestine; the Jews held the north Arab sector, including Acre, which had been surrendered by the guerrillas defending it.

Army Ground Forces Reorganized

HEADQUARTERS, Army Ground Forces, has been redesignated Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, a change involving not only name but also functions. This is designed to increase efficiency in training, eliminate duplication, and streamline the organization of the Department of the Army. Commanding Generals of the six Armies in the Continental United States now will be directly responsible to the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

The new organization will be the field operating agency of the Department of the Army, within the continental United States, for the general supervision, coordination, and inspection of all matters pertaining to the training of individuals and units utilized in a field army. It will develop the organization, composition, equipment, and training of Army combat, service, and administrative units (including those of the Organized Reserve Corps and the ROTC) utilized in a field army. It will supervise and coordinate at all service schools all aspects of training affecting the field armies, including the preparation of training literature. It will supervise the training and inspection of all Army units of the National Guard; and will supervise the training aspects of the National Security Training program (UMT), if enacted into law.

It will develop and prepare doctrine pertaining to the tactical and technical employment of individuals and units utilized in a field army, and to the materiel and equipment necessary in the performance of their missions. It will supervise research and development of items of equipment in which units assigned to a field army have a primary interest, and initiate requirements for those items.

The Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, remains at Fort Monroe, Virginia, where Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, has been located. General Jacob L. Devers continues as Chief, Army Field Forces.

FROM MOROCCO TO BERLIN

(*Continued from page* 163)

The various movements of the M-7s again demonstrate the mobility of armored artillery. Also illustrated is the M-7's advantage in having its ammunition right with the howitzer. In other words, it is an effective self-sustained fighting vehicle. Towed artillery pieces could not have maneuvered as did the pieces of Battery B. Towed artillery pieces could have fired direct fire from their already occupied positions but, if the enemy had continued to advance, they then would probably have been lost.

During all this action around the crossroad, Battery A, which was still in position east of Notre Dame, had fired almost continuously in support of the combat command elements advancing to the west. The additional support of division artillery was requested for these missions and this, of course, required that the battalion fire-direction center continue in operation. Inasmuch as the battalion command post was in just the right position to receive the ricochets and overs fired by the Germans, this continuing operation was a bit uncomfortable.

A force composed of the 1st Battalion 41st Infantry and the 1st Battalion 67th Armored Regiment continued the advance to the west and captured Lengronne by 1530. Outposts were left at St. Denis le Gast and at Hambye. The 78th displaced in the late afternoon to support this force and occupied positions between Lengronne and St. Denis le Gast at about 1900.

Meanwhile the 3d Battalion 41st Infantry and the 2d Battalion 67th Armored Regiment advanced toward Cambernon and late that night established contact with the small task force which had been holding its positions at Cambernon against repeated German attacks. The division reserve, consisting of the 3d Battalion 67th Armored Regiment and the 2d Battalion 41st Infantry, was given the mission of blocking enemy escape routes to the south.

After occupying its positions, the 78th continuously exchanged shots with enemy infantry trying to infiltrate through to the south. It also was firing intermittent missions for the observers with the two main task forces of the combat command.

At about midnight, the battalion commander, who had been trying to get a few minutes' sleep, was awakened by the Operations Sergeant, who told him that word had been received that an enemy force had broken through the outpost at St. Denis le Gast. The battalion was therefore alerted. Shortly after this, two vehicles were seen to halt on the road opposite the battalion command post, which was beside the road. Suddenly, several figures came slinking on all fours across the grass toward the fire-direction center tent. They turned out to be men from the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion who had been part of the outpost at St. Denis le Gast. Greatly excited, they said that the Germans were coming down the road toward the 78th's position. The 78th officers who heard this thought that it was probably another case of undue excitement. However, in a few minutes a column of vehicles, some of which could be identified as tanks, rolled to a halt behind the two 82d Reconnaissance Battalion vehicles. The commander of Battery A, Captain Jones, who happened to be at the command post at that moment, walked up to the road and said, "What unit is that?" At about the same time the flare of the exhaust of one of the tanks could be seen and was readily identified as not being that of an American tank. Then the voice, "Was ist das?" left no doubt. Captain Jones wasted no time getting out of the vicinity and back to his battery. (See Map No. 5.)

Everything seemed to happen at once. The battalion commander told the executive to order the batteries to fire at the column with every weapon, and for Battery A to move an M-7 out on the road so as to fire right down the column. He then ran to the several halftracks of the command post and directed the crews to fire their machine guns on the column. Captain Simard, the Battalion S-2, ran to his halftrack, which was only 15 yards from the road, and commenced firing the .50-caliber machine gun at the nearest vehicle. At almost the same moment, a burst from a German machine gun caught him full in the face. He fell mortally wounded. For this heroic action, he was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Also at about this time, the battalion commander was hit in the leg. Two vehicles of the command post were hit and started to burn. A German ammunition carrier was hit and ammunition started blowing up. Rounds from the M-7s of Battery B just across the road went crashing through the trees. The sharp blasts of German 88s and 75s could be heard. The scene turned from a pitch-black night to one as bright as though a full moon and all the stars were shining. The Battery A M-7 had moved out on the road and was methodically knocking off the German vehicles silhouetted by the flames of the burning vehicles. Then a force of German infantrymen hit the flanks of Headquarters Battery and Battery B. So again, the artillerymen, already deployed for such an eventuality, turned into infantrymen and repulsed this attack.



Map No. 5

While all this excitement was going on in the 78th's area, Lt. Moses and Lt. Bennett, the observers with the northern task force, were calling for fire. Battery C and three pieces of Battery A were placed on these indirect fire missions. In the fire-direction center, Captain Mytinger, the S-3, and Captain Hart, the Assistant S-3, plotted and transmitted these missions as though nothing were happening. When the wire line to Battery A went out, Captain Mytinger personally traced down the difficulty and directed its repair. By about 0500, the action in the battalion area had quieted down and the pieces of Battery B were relaid for indirect fire and joined the rest of the battalion in firing indirect-fire missions.

When daylight finally arrived, after a seemingly interminable period, it was discovered that a column of twenty German vehicles, including tanks and armored cars, had been completely destroyed in the direct-fire action. It was later learned that this column had overrun the command post of the division reserve and had been the force which had broken through the outpost at St. Denis le Gast. On the road along which the German column had tried to break through the positions of the 2d Battalion 67th Armored Regiment, and on which the 78th had fired its indirect-fire missions, were found 96 destroyed vehicles. In the vicinity were the bodies of almost 1,200 Germans. In the 78th area were found 50 dead and 60 wounded, and 200 prisoners were rounded up.

In this action, the 78th did not escape scot-free. Several vehicles were lost and a number of personnel killed and wounded, including the gallant Captain Simard. The battalion commander was evacuated in the morning and Major Maynard, the battalion executive, assumed command. As has been previously mentioned, this action destroyed the remnants of the German 2d SS "Das Reich" Panzer Division and marked the last concentrated attempt of any sizable enemy force to break through the pocket which had been formed by the advance of Combat Command B. For the action of the past two days, the 78th was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation and the French Croix de Guerre with silver star.

That day, 30 July, Combat Command B and the division reserve were ordered to assemble and reorganize and the sector was turned over to the 4th Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division. Thus ended Combat Command B's part in the breakthrough phase of operation COBRA. It now assembled and prepared for further operations.

ON TOWARD THE SIEGFRIED LINE

On 2 August, Combat Command B resumed its advance to exploit the breakthrough. On 7 August, the Germans launched their counterattack in the vicinity of Mortain, designed to cut the Allied supply line at Avranches. Combat Command B quickly moved to positions just north of Barenton, about five miles southeast of Mortain, and attacked north against the south flank of the German counterattacking force. During the next several days, the combat command and the 78th underwent some of the heaviest combat encountered in their experience. The 78th, in position to support the attack of the combat command, was subjected to very severe counterbattery fire, but again, thanks to the armor protection of the M-7s, casualties were quite light.

The German counterattack was completely crushed by the 12th and the 2d Armored Division then continued to assist in maintaining pressure on the German Seventh Army, whose final defeat was culminated in the closing of the Falaise Gap on the 20th. Even as the Falaise Gap was being closed, the division rapidly advanced to the east, capturing Elbeuf on 26 August, trapping large numbers of retreating Germans, and seizing many ferries and pontons on the Seine River. The town was then turned over to advancing Canadian troops for a memorandum receipt signed by the Canadian commander.

The division marched down to an assembly area near Mantes Gassicourt, crossed the Seine on the 28th, and commenced a rapid advance after the Germans, who were offering only rear-guard action, the bulk of their forces evidently trying to get back to the protection of the Siegfried Line as quickly as possible. (See Map No. 6.)

The 78th was still in support of Combat Command B, and the advance moved rapidly through the World War I battlefields, with the people of the towns greeting the Americans by waving flags, throwing fruit, giving away kisses, and generally cheering their liberation. On 1 September, the point of the advance guard had hardly passed through the town of Havrincourt when suddenly it was met by a burst of enemy machine-gun fire. At almost the same moment, three airbursts appeared in the



Map No. 6

very close vicinity of a cub plane which had been flying just ahead of the column. The advance guard deployed and reconnaissance was begun to determine the strength and disposition of the enemy force. Battery A of the 78th, marching with the advance guard, went into position and the observer in the cub plane was directed to adjust the battery on the enemy. The plane had hurriedly maneuvered out of the danger area but the observer went ahead with the adjustment. The remainder of the battalion was directed to by-pass the column and move as quickly as possible into position to support the coming attack.

The tank and infantry elements of the column deployed and commenced their advance. It was then discovered that the enemy consisted of approximately a battalion of infantry reinforced by several self-propelled guns. Civilians stated that it was a force of SS troops left to fight a rear-guard action in their positions. It developed that they were a group of fanatics. A number of them occupied deep foxholes and were equipped with bazookas, machine guns, and grenades. There was a lot of tall grass, which effectively hid these holes until one was right on top of them. It was impossible to fire directly into them, so attempts were made to move tanks so the tank commanders could drop grenades into the holes. The result of this was that several tankers were shot by Germans in other holes while attempting to do this. At this point, the battalion commander of the 78th recommended that the attack be held up for a few minutes and that, since the Germans wanted "to play rough," he had a solution for curing them. This solution was to sweep the area with low time fire. 700 rounds were fired over the many foxholes and at the personnel of the antitank gun crews for about a half hour. In the meantime the tanks fired direct fire at the German guns. The attack was then resumed and proceeded without further difficulty. Many dead were found in the holes, showing the effectiveness of time fire in such a situation. It should be mentioned that this was the powder-train fuze. The even greater effectiveness of the VT fuze in such a situation can be well imagined.

The advance continued on into Belgium, several times overrunning retreating German columns. The west bank of the Albert Canal was reached on 8 September and preparations were made for crossing the canal and the Meuse River into Holland.

Combat Command B crossed the Albert Canal near historic Fort Eben Emael on the afternoon of September 15th and continued on across the Meuse River at Maastright. It is of interest that the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was the first unit of the combat command to cross the Meuse. The crossings of the Albert Canal and the Meuse River required the combat command to march in a single column. It was felt that if the 78th was not either at or very near the head of the column the advance elements might run into resistance and be beyond the range of supporting artillery. Therefore, the 78th proceeded at the head of the column and occupied positions just north of Maastricht to cover the movement of the rest of the column through Maastricht and to the north. It is doubtful whether a towed artillery unit could be given such a mission in view of the vulnerability of its vehicles. Thus is illustrated the advantage of the heavy fire power and armor protection of armored artillery.

From the 16th to the 19th, the combat command advanced against stiffening German resistance from troops occupying prepared positions, until Germany was entered on the 18th and Sittard was captured on the 19th. During this advance, the support rendered by the 78th was greatly limited because of an acute ammunition shortage. By order of higher headquarters, the daily rate of fire was reduced to 11 rounds per gun. Therefore, it proved more efficient to fire missions by battery rather than by battalion, except in cases of emergency.

During one phase of the advance on the 17th, the situation suddenly broke loose. In order not to be left behind and be unable to properly support the advance, the 78th began a displacement along the main axis of advance. Most of the tank and infantry elements were moving cross country at this time, so the 78th had no difficulty using the road. Word had been received that the leading elements had reached a certain line; therefore, the new artillery positions were selected about 500-1,000 yards behind this line. As the batteries moved into their positions, it seemed ominously quiet and there seemed to be a sudden lack of friendly troops in the vicinity. However, nobody thought very much about it until, some time after the positions had been occupied, vigorous firing was heard just beyond the right flank of the battalion. Suddenly, American tanks appeared and it then could be seen that they were cleaning out a pocket of enemy not 300 yards from the 78th's area. The whole story did not reveal itself until later when the battalion commander went back to the combat command CP to learn more about the progress of the attack. As he walked into the CP, the combat-command commander, General White, called to him and said, "I've just received a complaint about your outfit from the 67th. It seems they were all set to overrun and clean out an area but that when they arrived at it, there was your outfit in position. They say you're violating union rules in capturing ground they are charged with taking." The battalion commander of course apologized profusely but from then on the battalion was known as the "78th Commandos."

That afternoon the advance continued to the outskirts of Sittard, so the 78th displaced after dark to occupy new positions from which the attack the next day could be supported. The reconnaissance for these positions was made almost at dusk and again, because of the fluid nature of the operations, there was no definite front line on which to base the selection of the position area. Therefore, its selection was based on reports from forward observers and on the observations of the battalion commander made from a cub plane during the late afternoon. As was customary by this time, the battalion area was organized for perimeter defense, with machine guns and antitank guns posted at what seemed to be likely avenues of approach for an enemy. The next morning, a heavy fog hung close to the ground. It slowly lifted until at about 0800 one could see about 200 yards. At about this time, the battery commander of Battery B, the forward battery, came

running into the battalion command post with the report that not 200 yards north of the battery was a line of trenches occupied by Germans. The battalion commander went down to investigate and, sure enough, practically on the front door steps of the battery, there could be faintly seen the outline of the Germans and their machine guns. The combat command was immediately called requesting instructions as to whether the 78th should move in and eliminate the enemy position or whether other troops would be sent up to do it. Instructions were received to sit tight as a force of tanks and infantry was advancing in that direction and would take care of the Germans on the way. This was done shortly. However, for a while it looked as though the 78th would have to form a task force of its own to do the job.

During the day an effective use of a cub-plane observer was illustrated. An air observer went up and entered the channel of the forward observer operating with the 3d Battalion 67th Armored Regiment. The air observer was then able to talk directly to this forward observer and also to the tank battalion commander and give them information concerning locations of enemy positions which he could easily observe in the relatively flat terrain. Also he was able to report the progress of other friendly forces. In this way the tank battalion commander obtained much more information of the situation than was ordinarily available. In addition, the air observer could protect the flanks of the tank unit by observing for enemy movements and then either reporting them so that tank elements could be dispatched to deal with them or by conducting artillery fire on them. With the addition of liaison airplanes to the equipment of tank and infantry units, the use of cub planes for such purposes should be even more widespread. Necessary assumptions, of course, are the possession of air superiority by our forces and the absence of effective antiaircraft weapons in the enemy's possession.

On the 20th, the 2d Armored Division was relieved by a reinforced cavalry group and was withdrawn into an assembly area to prepare for the assault on the Siegfried Line.

THE SIEGFRIED LINE

The plan for the breach of the Siegfried Line called for the 30th Infantry Division to force a crossing of the Wurm River at two points, and effect a penetration of the Westwall. The 2d Armored Division would then attack through the 30th Division and rapidly advance to seize the towns of Linnich and Julich on the Roer River.

On 2 October, after a preliminary bombing, the 30th Division attacked. However, there was very severe enemy resistance and the advance progressed very slowly. On 3 October, it was decided to commit the 2d Armored Division in spite of the fact that a gap in the Siegfried Line had not been created. The attack was to be in column of combat commands, Combat Command B leading. The 78th, which had been reinforcing the fires of the 30th Division artillery during that division's attack, now went back to its usual mission of supporting Combat Command B. Against heavy fire from German pill boxes and under the first really concentrated enemy artillery fire, the combat command pushed slowly through Palenberg and Ubach, reaching the eastern outskirts of the latter town.

The next morning, the 78th displaced across the river, the first artillery unit of the corps to enter the Siegfried Line. Troops of the 30th Division were still occupying fox holes in the area selected for the battery positions and were rather surprised to see an artillery unit moving into their midst. The leading elements of Combat Command B were hardly 1,000 yards beyond the battalion's positions and the German artillery was concentrating its fire from all directions on the road junctions in the town of Ubach, and the bridges over the Wurm. Overs from German antitank guns frequently fell in the area. It was a most uncomfortable period. There was a haze over the battlefield almost continuously, caused by the great amount of firing, burning buildings, and the smoke from the many coal mines in the area. Thus, it was extremely difficult to locate the enemy batteries by any means other than by the sound ranging of the corps observation battalion.

The German resistance had become almost fanatical as well as extremely effective. The advance of Combat Command B progressed very slowly. The 3d Battalion 67th Armored Regiment, which was leading the advance, suffered a loss of 63 per cent of its tanks in two days. On October 6th, a gallant charge by the light tank company of the battalion succeeded in breaking through the enemy antitank screen and overrunning an artillery battery, enabling the combat command to advance about 1,000 yards to more favorable positions. The use of this light tank company was somewhat in the old Indian-fighting style but demonstrated the effectiveness of aggressive tactics by lighter weight vehicles. The soggy ground had kept the medium tanks to a very slow rate of advance, thus making them good targets for the enemy antitank guns. The light tanks were able to stay on top of the ground rather than sinking through and hence, by moving at 25-35 miles an hour, were able to advance so rapidly that the German guns were unable to hit them.

During this heavy fighting to penetrate the Siegfried Line, the 78th fired almost continuously. In fact it was the heaviest constant rate of fire the battalion delivered during its entire time in combat. The ammunition carriers of Service Battery were kept on a steady resupply run.

On orders from higher headquarters, the 2d Armored Division was directed to maintain its positions. As has been previously stated, an armored division is not organized for defensive operations. Nevertheless it had to be done. Because of the wide sector, tanks had to be placed in the front line. Tanks were dug into the ground and infantry was placed to cover the intervals.

This position was held by the division until 16 November, when it attacked with the mission of crossing the Roer River. In the ensuing battle, the Germans counterattacked with large armored forces, including the 9th Panzer Division and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Both sides suffered heavy tank losses. The 78th was fully occupied in helping to repel these counterattacks. On November 28th the west bank of the Roer was reached and again the division assumed a defensive role, occupying a sector along the river with the 102d and 29th Infantry Division.

THE BULGE

On December 21st, the division received the order to turn over its defensive sector to the 29th Infantry Division and to prepare to move to the First Army front to the south, where the Germans had launched their now famous counterattack and were advancing toward the Meuse River and Liege. Three hours later, the leading elements of the division were on their way and twenty-two hours later the combat elements had covered almost 100 miles and were approaching contact with the enemy. On the 23d, contact was gained and an attack was immediately launched which resulted in the destruction of the 2d Panzer Division, at that time the furthest west unit of the German forces.

The division was withdrawn from the line on the 29th and then, on 3 January, in conjunction with the 84th Infantry Division, launched an attack to pinch off the western portion of the German salient. In very cold weather and over difficult terrain, the advance progressed until, on 16 January, the town of Houffalize was captured and a juncture effected with Third Army forces which had been attacking from the south. Thus the western half of the German penetration was sealed off.

During these attacks, the 78th operated in support of Combat Command B. Several times it was forced to organize small task forces of its own to eliminate pockets of enemy who tried to hide or resist in the many forests and woods in the area. By this time, the battalion had become quite proficient at such business and there was strong competition among the batteries to determine which one could capture or kill the most enemy troops.

In the latter part of January, the division assembled in the vicinity of Liege for the first real rest period since landing on the continent. Extensive rehabilitation and maintenance was conducted and members of the division were sent on leave to Paris, London, and the Riviera. Then in early February, the division moved to the vicinity of Aachen and preparations were commenced for the final push to the Rhine.

ON TO BERLIN

On 23 February, the Ninth Army attack to reach the Rhine was launched, with the infantry divisions of the army forcing a crossing over the Roer River and effecting a penetration in the enemy line. The 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, with the rest of division artillery, participated in the tremendous artillery preparation preceding the attack.

The 2d Armored Division attacked on the 28th and reached the Rhine on 2 March. Proceeding up the west bank of the river, Combat Command B almost succeeded in capturing intact the Adolph Hitler Bridge at Uerdingen the evening of 3 March. Patrols managed to advance out on the bridge but were driven back by heavy enemy fire. Shortly afterwards the bridge was destroyed by German demolition charges.

Another rehabilitation and maintenance period now began in preparation for the assault across the Rhine. The 78th remained in position and intermittently fired on enemy targets across the river.

On 24 March, the great assault to cross the last large barrier to the advance toward the heart of Germany began. On 28 March, the division started crossing the river. The cry now was "On to Berlin!"

The division, with the 78th in support of Combat Command B, rapidly advanced north of the Ruhr industrial district, finally completing the closure of the gigantic Ruhr pocket by linking up with the 3d Armored Division in the vicinity of Lippstadt on Easter Sunday, 1 April. The advance continued with Combat Command B reaching the Elbe River on 11 April. On the night of the 12th-13th, a small bridgehead of infantry was established across the river. However, the construction of a bridge-to enable the tank elements to reinforce this bridgehead was prevented by heavy enemy fire, which knocked out the pontons almost as soon as they were placed in the water. A strong German counterattack against the bridgehead forced its abandonment on the 14th. Another crossing was made further south into a bridgehead established by the 83d Infantry Division. Now everyone thought that there only remained a short run into Berlin. However, this was not to be, as higher headquarters directed the Ninth Army troops to maintain their positions.

The latter part of April, the division was relieved, assembled near Brunswick, and assumed military government duties. Then on 9 May came the event the world had been waiting for—VE Day! The 2d Armored Division was selected to be the first unit to occupy the American zone of Berlin. On 3 July, the division marched into the German capital. There it remained until 10 August when it was relieved by the 82d Airborne Division. Subsequently it returned to the United States to become the only armored division remaining in the U.S. Army.

CONCLUSION

1. This article has presented this brief history of the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion as an attempt to illustrate circumstances which may arise in the combat of any artillery unit and in particular to demonstrate the employment of armored artillery.

2. **To summarize the characteristics of armored artillery.**

a. Mobility. This is one of the principal characteristics of armored artillery as demonstrated by the ability to land on and cross beaches without undue difficulty, the ability of the M-7s to maneuver in engaging in direct-fire combat, and the ability to occupy positions in rough terrain.

b. Flexibility. This is an outstanding characteristic of all artillery in that it can quickly shift its fires from one area to another. However, it is even more evident in armored artillery because of its capability to quickly change positions or comply with changes in missions or orders. This flexibility is primarily due to the use of radio as the primary means of communication and to the fact that the weapons are self-propelled.

c. Armor protection. The fact that the howitzers of armored artillery are well armored enables the crews to man their pieces under enemy fire, thus providing continuous support to the tank and infantry elements of the division.

d. Close combat. The fluid nature of armored operations requires armored artillery always to be prepared for close combat. This article has illustrated this point and has tried to show that with its heavy fire power, an armored artillery unit can give a good account of itself if it has been trained properly and if it accepts the fact that such combat may

occur frequently rather than as an unusual incident. Thus, armored artillery batteries establish complete security arrangements whenever they occupy positions.

e. Forward positions. Also, because of the rapid pace of armored operations, armored artillery generally occupies positions much further forward than does the artillery of infantry divisions. This is necessary in order to ensure proper support of the tank and infantry elements in the attack, and to prevent the artillery unit from suddenly finding that it cannot provide the proper support because the leading elements have suddenly made a rapid advance beyond the range of the artillery pieces.

3. **Present doctrine.**

a. Organization for combat. The armored division normally will attack with two combat commands in the assault, abreast, with the reserve command following. One light armored artillery battalion will be in direct support of each of these leading combat commands with the third light battalion and the medium battalion in general support, the light battalion possibly reinforcing the fires of the battalion with one of the combat commands. In any advance deep into enemy territory, the armored division must be prepared for attack from any direction. Hence, it will be normal to place forward observers with the reserve command ahead of time so that the third light battalion can readily shift to direct support of the reserve command when necessary. Also for this reason, it will generally march on the same routes as the reserve command.

b. Attachment versus direct support. This is often the subject of raging arguments whenever artillerymen and non-artillerymen get together. Actually, it is an entirely unnecessary argument. Everyone knows that in combat it doesn't matter what you call it. The artillery battalions are going to provide the best support of which they are capable to the units with which they are operating. In the operations of the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, frequently it was not known whether the battalion was in direct support of a combat command or attached to it. Nobody cared, except on one occasion in the early days before the various commanders has been sufficiently conditioned by combat. Regardless of the term used, the armored artillery battalions always maintain a radio link with division artillery headquarters in order that the fires of all the division artillery can be massed if necessary for the accomplishment of the division mission and if the battalions are within range. Hence, a better term than either "direct support" or "attached" is "operational control." However, the doctrine can be stated that the light battalions are normally in direct support except when operating with a combat command or task force which has been sent off on an independent mission too far from the rest of the division to maintain adequate communication or to be in range for massing of fires. The medium battalion will normally be in general support and march in such a position as to be able to provide support to the division as a whole with priority to the main effort.

4. **The future.**

The future of the armored division appears to be uncertain at the present time. In the recent reorganization of the armored and infantry divisions, the two have come closer together in composition. Therefore, some officers feel that eventually there will emerge an all-purpose division containing sizable forces of both tanks and infantry. Other officers feel that the army needs some heavy armored divisions weighted predominantly with tanks for employment in exploitation and pursuit roles. Others feel that the future tank should be much smaller than the present one to enable it to be carried into battle by air. However, regardless of how these arguments turn out, it is believed that there will always be self-propelled armored artillery of some kind. True, it may be a lighter weight vehicle. It may have less armor. It may mount a rocket projector or a guided-missile projector. In any case, until the day of the pushbutton war, there will be a need for artillery, and certainly, because of its peculiar characteristics and advantages, much of it will be armored and self-propelled.

Map No. 7



"There are some books which cannot be adequately reviewed for twenty or thirty years after they come out."(!) — JOHN, VISCOUNT MORLEY.

Appeasement into War

THE GATHERING STORM. By Winston S. Churchill. 784 pp. Houghton Mifflin Co. $6.00.

By Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker

Seldom has a new book been as unanimously recommended as Winston Churchill's first volume of his memoirs of the Second World War. Seldom has such a recommendation been as justified as in this case.

The book should have universal appeal. The general reader will find it absorbing reading and done in an inimitable style, reviving for him the decisive events which molded his life during the last thirty years. Biography addicts will meet one of the most fascinating and puzzling personalities of our age, one who reveals his greatness as well as his shortcomings by the material included and omitted in this book. Historians will discover a gold mine of authentic information and will have a field day challenging the author's opinions and evaluation of events. Anglophiles as well as anglophobes will quote from these memoirs again and again—the former to demonstrate the unity of ideals and problems which binds us to Great Britain; the latter to establish the self-centered character of the power politics practiced by our ally. No reader will remain indifferent.

For this reviewer, the volume can be read most profitably with the current world situation in mind. The first 400 pages reconstruct in bold strokes the story of European diplomacy from 1919 to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. The reader may challenge Churchill's opinion about the good which would have flowed from a more active participation of the United States in European affairs; he may wonder whether the author's opposition to Indian freedom, his unhesitating identification of Spanish Loyalists with Communists, or his persistent desire to pacify Mussolini were well founded even in retrospect; but he cannot challenge the basic thesis of these pages, the "Unnecessary War." He should then ask himself to what extent we have profited by historical experience.

Does the nation as a whole know how right Churchill is, when he states: "Virtuous motives, tramelled by inertia and timidity, are no match for armed and resolute wickedness. A sincere love of peace is no excuse for muddling hundreds of millions of humble folk into total war. The cheers of weak, well-meaning assemblies soon cease to echo, and their votes cease to count. Doom marches on." (p. 190). It would be well for politicians to ponder the author's reflection on British political leadership throughout this period. Commenting on "the passionate desire for peace which animated the uninformed majority of the British people and seemed to threaten with political extinction any party or politician who dared to take any other line," Mr. Churchill continues: "This, of course, is no excuse for political leaders who fall short of their duty. It is much better for parties or politicians to be turned out of office than to imperil the life of the nation." (p. 112).

Must our diplomats be reminded that "in modern wars of great nations or alliances particular areas are not defended only by local exertions. The whole vast balance of the war front is involved. This is still more true of policy before war begins and while it may still be averted." (p. 274). A Mussolini victory in Ethiopia, for example, is inevitably more than a local setback, for Hitler "now formed a view of Great Britain's degeneracy which was only to be changed too late for peace and too late for him. In Japan, also, there were pensive spectators." (p. 177). Churchill might have added the Soviet Union and many other countries whose policy was inevitably conditioned by their interpretation of British inaction. What we do now in Palestine or Berlin, in Korea or Greece, is similarly woven into a larger pattern which gains in strength or collapses in proportion to the extent to which we adhere to our national objective. "Advantage is gained in war and also foreign policy and other things by selecting from many attractive and unpleasant alternatives the dominating point. American military thought had coined the expression 'Over-all Strategic Objective.' When our officers first heard of this, they laughed; but later on its wisdom became apparent and accepted. . . . Failure to adhere to this simple principle produces confusion and futility of action, and nearly always makes things much worse later on." (p. 225).

The second part of the volume is the story of Mr. Churchill at the Admiralty during the "Twilight War" to May 10, 1940, when Chamberlain resigned and the new National Government under Churchill was formed as a result of the fiasco of the British campaign in Norway. This account is even more instructive for the military reader than the first part, for here the author reviews the halting and cumbersome progress of a democracy changing from peace to war. Interspersed with vivid and masterful accounts of naval and military actions, such as the sinking of the *Graf Spee* and the belated efforts to salvage Norway, the story relates the difficulties of establishing unified command, the persistent and unnecessary strain between civilians and the military, the immense problem of proper coordination with allies, and the complications and delays inherent in a

Joint Chief of Staff organization ("where everything is settled for the greatest good of the greatest number by the common sense of most after consultation of all"). For Americans worried about the organization of the National Military Establishment, these pages are invaluable; few of us are impartial enough to analyse these problems with complete realism in our own World War II experience and the British problems will widen our perspective.

It is true, as Churchill says, that "in the problems which the Almighty sets his humble servants things hardly ever happen the same way twice over, or if they do so, there is some variant which stultifies undue generalizations." (p. 476). Still, in these memoirs of one of the greatest statesmen who ever lived the reader should not merely enjoy the resonant phrases and the apt characterizations of personalities, but he should fulfill the author's "earnest hope that pondering upon the past may give guidance in days to come, enable a new generation to repair some of the errors of former years and thus govern, in accordance with the needs and glory of man, the awful unfolding scene of the future." (p. V).

THE STILWELL PAPERS. Edited by Theodore H. White. 357 pages. William Sloane Assoc. $4.00.

By Riley Sunderland

With the posthumous publication of "The Stilwell Papers" following close on the appearance of Mr. Stimson's memoirs, the Army, the Congress, and the public have in the two volumes an account of the American adventure in Asia, 1941-1945, that is both authoritative and fairly complete. For an understanding of that adventure the student must read the two books; the full import of General Stilwell's message to his countrymen cannot be appreciated without some knowledge of what happened in Washington during the war years.

Of the two volumes, "The Stilwell Papers" is unique. Mr. Stimson's memoirs are in the grand tradition, and though excellently done, are very like those which appear after every great war. "The Stilwell Papers," on the other hand, is an event in the history of war, for they give many of the actual thoughts and day-to-day impressions of a man who was theater commander, brilliant tactician, and unwilling but prescient diplomat. Ex-combatants have published diaries a-plenty, but this is a collection of papers and diary extracts that was never intended for publication. This gives a rare freshness and authenticity. Here is no posing for the biographer! Instead, here are a general's doubts and hesitations; his anguished worrying over the lives committed to his charge; his attempts to see through the dust of battle; his grapplings with his allies, his superior, and his enemy. It is a warmly human figure that emerges from the pages of "The Stilwell Papers," something very different from the silly straw men who serve for general officers in so much of modern writing.

The source of this volume is the collection of General Stilwell's personal papers in the possession of his wife, Mrs. Winifred Stilwell. Access to them was given to Mr. Theodore H. White, a veteran correspondent with a long experience of China, and a friend of General Stilwell. In his introduction, Mr. White cautions that what follows is less than the half of General Stilwell's wartime writings. The *caveat* is helpful, for Mr. White's editing has focused attention on General Stilwell's relations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, with some account of his relations with the British, but very little about General Stilwell's dealings with the Chief of Staff and Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. White does, however, give us the famous Cairo incident—General Stilwell's attempt to get some sort of a directive from his commander-in-chief. The Stimson memoirs do something to remedy the omission of the papers covering the channel of command from CBI to Washington, but the reader would never realize from "The Stilwell Papers" that General Stilwell was faithfully executing the policies of his government. One would never understand from Mr. White's editing that the Stilwell Road and the North Burma campaign were undertaken in strict compliance with the orders of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This is unfortunate, because among the many myths that have grown about General Stilwell

is that he conducted the North Burma campaign as nothing more than the crotchety whim of a disgruntled old man. Mr. White's comments on pages 268-273 do nothing to dispel this. At least one reviewer has seized on this omission as the occasion to be patronizing about General Stilwell's grasp of strategy. It is not General Stilwell who is at fault, but his editor.

Generally, Mr. White is not at his best in editing those portions of "The Stilwell Papers" which deal with military affairs. For example, the identification of Chinese units is often in error, as in the Chinese order of battle for the First Burma Campaign, and in the mistaken identification of the Chinese 22d Division as the unit which began the North Burma Campaign. This lack of skill in handling military matters is unfortunate, because the North Burma Campaign is a tactical masterpiece. Given the formidable nature of the enemy (the Japanese 18th Division, veterans of Singapore, and commanded by the capable General Tanaka Shinichi), the fantastic difficulties of terrain and climate, and the nature of his command, General Stilwell's campaign in North Burma is as brilliant as Stonewall Jackson's campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley. But much of this is lost under Mr. White's editing.

Mr. White is on surer ground in editing the Stilwell papers that concern Chinese affairs, though the reader must proceed with some caution. It must be remembered that the expressions of anger and contempt in "The Stilwell Papers" are the private record of General Stilwell's bitterness over the unending frustrations of Chungking; they are not a stenographic record of his dealings with the Generalissimo. Several witnesses, including the Generalissimo himself, testify to General Stilwell's urbanity in his diplomatic negotiations. When occasion demanded General Stilwell could be as acid as his nickname, "Vinegar Joe," implied, but it would be naive to think he devoted the better part of three years to insulting his country's allies. What can be found in "The Stilwell Papers" is a faithful, accurate record of the difficulties encountered by General Stilwell in dealing with the Chinese Government. They are curiously reminiscent of those encountered by the German General Liman von Sanders in his 1914-1918 missions to Turkey. Whether any other American representative, as some reviewers have suggested, could have done better, is open to question. As General Marshall remarked on one occasion, General Stilwell was not sent to Chungking to make himself agreeable, but to get things done. In this, as Mr. Stimson makes very clear, he rarely enjoyed the support of his commander-in-chief.

Reviewers so often close their comments by labelling some quickly forgotten opus "must" reading for this, that, or the other section of the reading public that one hesitates to use the tattered cliche. Here, though, is a book meriting the sober consideration of anyone interested in, or called upon to work with, the problems of the Far East.

Years of Importance

ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR. By Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy. 698 pp. Harper and Brothers. $5.00.

By Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield

This is one of the great books of our time. It should have a special interest for artillerymen, since it was written by a man who, in World War I, after having been Secretary of War, sought and obtained command of a field artillery battalion.

Any book written by an author of Mr. Stimson's experience in the life and public affairs of our country would command the attention and interest of thoughtful Americans. But this autobiography is an exceptional book of its kind. Mr. Stimson has reconstructed his career with no false modesty, with scrupulous care and honesty, and with a full and outspoken diary to refresh and correct his recollections. In reviewing the issues and decisions of his life he is positive and candid in dealing both with himself and others. Every page is stamped with a characteristic faith in open discussion, considerate but fearless, as the life blood of a free people. The result is a great book because it is the product of a first rate mind and character.

One effect of the book will be to dispel any doubt regarding Mr. Stimson's

vigor when, between the ages of seventy-three and seventy-eight, he was Secretary of War in World War II. He took the precaution of having a young historian go over his records and reminiscences with him and write the book. But it leaves no doubt with the reader that Mr. Stimson is still in magnificient possession of his faculties. Indeed, in his autobiography he has achieved another public service comparable in force and value to those which it reviews.

Half of the volume is devoted to Mr. Stimson's role in World War II and his observations as one of the leading participants in its conduct. The revelations of fact contained in this part of the book have been widely discussed. Of even more lasting interest both to the Army and the civilian public is the authoritative picture it gives of the operation of the high command in war, and particularly of the part played by the civilian elements, including the President, which under our Constitution are in a position not only to influence but dominate that command.

Mr. Stimson's own part in the exercise of civilian control over the War Department is illustrative of its possibilities rather than typical. In the first place, he had a strong affection for the Army, though he hated "the ghastly business of war," and he was a happy man when in July 1940 he found himself "in charge of the Army which for thirty years he had known and loved and trusted." In the second place, because of his previous interest and activities in foreign affairs he brought to the office an exceptional breadth of statesmanship and, as Secretary of War, exerted all of his influence, with all of his zest for positive action, to give effect to the principles for which he had contended as Secretary of State.

Half of the book is given to World War II, but the whole book is important for the light it throws on the nature of American public life in the first half of our century. It presents a lively and broadly illuminated picture of the fight for reform in which, as Stimson freely acknowledges, the leaders were Woodrow Wilson, Al Smith, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root. Stimson was a progressive and a reformer, but his loyalties and a certain soldierly instinct kept him in the Republican party. To it he gave a devoted allegiance, although the party was repeatedly aligned against causes to which he ardently dedicated his public life: strong and responsible government, firm control of monopolistic interests, tariff reduction, and above all the positive and responsible cooperation of the United States in world affairs. I know of no more interesting account of the dilemma and outlook of this reforming element in the Republican party, presented as it is here by a man who is well aware of the dilemma and who by exceptional vigor and elasticity of spirit largely transcended it. It would be hard to imagine a subject of greater present interest to the American public.

War Uninhibited

THE NAKED AND THE DEAD. By Norman Mailer. 721 pages. Rinehart & Co. $4.00.

Of the several hundred thousand men who growled at various times during the recent war that they would come back and "write a book to show up the damn army and all the lousy war business" one has finally come through. Norman Mailer uses an over-abundance of pages to unburden himself on the harshness, futility, and horror of combat but his book is far more than an elaborately rigged dissection of the military; it presents unshaven truth, tremendous impact, and a high value as war fiction.

The book is remarkably dissimilar to the other outstanding combat novel, *Company Commander*, which presented in simple chronological fashion a small unit action account of two infantry companies in Germany, through the eyes of the inexperienced and sympathetic young officer who led them. Beyond his sound combat atmosphere and accurate surface picture of men in action, its author does not attempt to handle the complicated play of personal tensions or probe far into his characters' attitudes and actions. Mailer's scalpel, however, is deadly and goes deep; his combat narrative is mainly valuable as a thread to hold the reader's interest and dramatize human conflicts. Although the author's military values are often questionable, he knows

a great deal about the inner workings of men and lays open the linings of his characters with brutal clarity, creating an atmosphere of tough bitterness far beyond anything of Dos Passos or Hemingway on our first, short and rather light-hearted World War.

The Naked and the Dead is the story of one division's invasion and final capture of a typical Southwest Pacific island. The range of his well-selected main characters extends from commanding general down to rifleman, cohesion being obtained through the familiar device of focus upon one small unit—a regimental I and R Platoon—which he has temporarily serving alongside division headquarters in order to interweave on a small canvas the personalities of the high ranks with those of combat level. For a military man this should not only be an engrossing novel but a valuable insight to many phases of combat psychology. Many professional studies are being offered to aid the army officer in solving complex problems of leadership involved in his immediate future of handling citizen soldiers in our draft army; here are the raw materials of that human challenge presented in vivid, living terms. It is seldom that a book can combine such a high degree of entertaining reading with the searching presentation of intricate human values and effective professional learning.

Mailer's book develops its narrative about equally along two strata of combat life: the division commander and his headquarters, and the enlisted men of the regimental I & R Platoon. General Cummings is an unusual combination of frigid intellectual and ruthlessly efficient commander, cold at the core and seeking his whole outlet in the driving ambition for power. Of the various staff personalities around him, most are types (although keenly depicted types) except his reluctant aide, brilliant young Lt. Hearn, who caustically surveys the headquarters scene and longs to quit for a combat post, while being alternately fascinated and repelled by the General. On the lower level, a rough dozen men drawn from widely divergent sectors of American life clash and readjust in the close and tense confines of battle-living, under the dominant direction of a sergeant who leads by coldly efficient use of hatred and fear.

The story, which moves at a high pitch between vivid flashbacks to portray the characters' peacetime lives, begins off the invasion beach, continues through early days of combatting jungle and light Japanese resistance, then night counterattack and stalemate before the main enemy line. At this pivotal point a final flare-up causes Hearn's transfer to lead the I & R Platoon and simultaneously the General conceives a desperately daring plan (fallacies of which will immediately strike any infantry commander) which sends the I & R on a 65-mile patrol through jungle and mountain passes behind Japanese lines. Out of this tattered trek, Mailer creates a small epic.

There are minor points of military usage where the author goes astray, some of which unfortunately have quite a bearing upon the narrative and so contribute unwarrantably to the general picture of military stupidity and futility. The individuals and system portrayed could hardly have won a desperate global war against strongly emplaced enemies. Artistic selection is necessary and valid, but realism suffers in such instances as where division operations hinge on the orders of a blundering G-3 (major!) only because the inevitable existence of a chief of staff has been conveniently overlooked by the author—along with the probable presence of an assistant division commander—or where the Recon. leader accepts on hearsay a crucial patrol report although the original scout is available within a few yards. Various similar incidents are unbelievable in a combat-hardened outfit. Nor does there come to mind any case in the Pacific war where Japanese resistance disintegrated along a strong line in any way suggestive of the author's conclusion to his battle.

A more important lack is in the book's general tone. Although the justifiable obscenity, brutality, and bitter weariness is realistically handled, there is almost nothing to balance it of the easy combat camaraderie, fine leadership, cohesive purposefulness, and strong pride of unit which usually characterized veteran line outfits. The author largely avoided normal combat groups below division; perhaps with a wise choice, since this reviewer suspects his actual fighting experience was limited to service as a replacement during the mop-up stage on Leyte.

In spite of indicated shortcomings, Mailer appears to this observer as clearly heading the list of fiction writers from World War II and this one book should keep him there quite a while.

NLD

Air Patrol

FLYING MINUTE MEN. By Robert E. Neprud. 243 pages; illustrated. Duell, Sloan & Pearce. $3.00.

By John R. Cuneo

This is a breezy, informal account of the activities of the Civil Air Patrol. The author has placed his emphasis on the contributions of various individuals in the unit and has succeeded in producing a popular, easily-read history.

CAP's role in the war was varied: over-sea patrols and escort duties, courier and liaison work, cooperation in the defense program—in fact anywhere from dropping bombs on submarines

(*Continued on page* 200)

BOOKS IN COLUMN

By Major N. L. Drummond, FA

A small, extremely readable and important book to jar one out of summer somnolence is Daniel Lang's *Early Tales of the Atomic Age*. (Doubleday—$2.75). Over a period of apparently many months, this reporter for the New Yorker magazine covered personalities and events ranging from Lilienthal and the Atomic Energy Commission down through the entire vast structure of our atomic research and development organization, with illuminating side trips to take in guided missiles and the underground cave program. No trade secrets emerge, but the well-arranged collection of accounts presents an integrated picture of this newest (and perhaps final) of the great forces unleashed by man's muddled ingenuity. To this layman, technical dosage in the book is pleasantly at a minimum, though sound and challenging facts form its fabric. Emphasis is on the human elements of the atomic story and the book's terse, lucid prose condenses a remarkable number of them into 223 highly interesting pages. There is no direct moralizing, but the objective precision and sardonic humor characteristic of the New Yorker highlight the tremendous issues we face in coping with the immediate atomic future.

• •

John Steinbeck's *A Russian Journal*—with photographs by Robert Capa—(Viking—$3.75) is the result of an attempt to give us a much needed understanding of the basic community life and thought behind the Soviet boundary's secondary iron curtain. Had the two conceived an extended and thorough reconnaissance, with fairly independent facilities, rather than a short junket with an apparent eye to quick sales appeal, their book might have been of great value. Perhaps such a plan would have meant no visa—no book. Steinbeck's objectivity cannot be questioned and Russian cooperation with his limited objective is apparent, but a scattered surface picture results. Lack of any knowledge of the Russian language necessarily made Steinbeck and Capa dependent upon official interpreters; and even if government representatives had not arranged each stage of their tour, the language barrier would have been a fatal detriment. As he states, conversation which passed through imperfect interpreters, from Georgian to Russian to English and back, came out in a strange haze, even on the simplest subjects. Although both text and photographs are disappointing, the book has a hectic personalized humor and a mild but refreshing value in showing most of us, who know and doubt the tiny group of Russian political leaders, that a vast, friendly and likeable set of peoples lives under the system which those few direct.

• •

Warpath and Council Fire by Stanley Vestal (Random House—$3.50) is a fast-moving account of our diplomatic dealings (frequently double—) and wars with the western plains Indians from 1851 to 1891. It is authentic and thorough enough in its treatment for the needs of any but a professional student searching every detail of those campaigns. As indicated by the title there is little concern with the political and economic forces which propelled the white man's westward sweep against a numerically and technologically inferior people. For the opposition, Vestal clarifies the complex inter-tribal feuds of the many Indian groups and the remarkable degree to which almost uninterrupted warfare was a normal and desirable part of their individual natures, of their social and even economic structure. There is a currently valuable lesson in the account's graphic illustration that hopeless division among the tribes brought on their total defeat far more than inferior arms or tactics. Those of us who may have dismissed lightly the plains Indians' skill in organized warfare find in Vestal's dramatic battle accounts a good deal of evidence in favor of such judgments of their warriors by our then current military leaders as "the finest light cavalry in the world" or "good shots, good riders, and the best fighters the sun ever shone on."

• •

No single man could be as hilariously funny as devotees of S. J. Perelman are convinced he is; but in his new book, *Westward Ha!* (Simon & Schuster—$2.95), he comes very close. Apparently one editor grew so tired of waiting for the sedentary-model Perelman to produce more of his unique methodless madness that he took financial responsibility for turning this deadly cliché-wielder and cartoonist A. (perhaps for Adder) Hirschfeld globally loose upon an already bewildered world. With several bags full of comfortable old clichés and a daft drawing board, the pair obviously carried out this nine-month threat—traveling from a bar in upper Manhattan to one on lower Fifth Avenue by the longest possible route. The world is probably none the wiser or wider because of it, but those fortunate inhabitants who read the results will be far saner in a pleasantly inverted way.

• •

A belated report on Thornton Wilder's *Ides of March* (Harper—$2.75) is hopefully designed to make sure that no mature reader overlooks it. The most unusually inventive of our top-flight writers has again executed masterfully a new design in contemporary literature. Penetrating wit and warm understanding make this work as enjoyable as it is polished. The scene is Rome during the last months of the book's central figure, Julius Caesar. Through the remarkably realistic device of using fragments of purportedly contemporary documents—journals and letters of Caesar and those around him, plus current poetry, pamphlets, and scraps of verse—Wilder achieves a deeply moving picture of the great dictator and Roman society. Through this sly reversal of modern historical methods, the novel clothes the bones of history (exciting in their own right, for this period) with splendid and memorable warm flesh.

BOOK REVIEWS

(*Continued from page* 198)

to showering civilians with pamphlets. It even had its comic-strip side—"Smilin' Jack"—and the history acknowledges this fact by including several pages of cartoon strips.

The author's enthusiasm for his subject and the detailing of the various incidents cause him to exaggerate CAP's contribution to the war effort. His emphasis on individual exploits results in minimizing the impersonal aspects of the story. The fight to have the unit given official recognition is rather hastily told and the bitterness forgotten. There is little or nothing said about the real reason why there was a gap in our national defense which caused the CAP to be called on for anti-submarine patrols. This is probably outside the scope of the author's plan yet in my opinion it is the principal lesson to be derived from the existence of such a unit.

However, within its scope the book is worth-while reading, and interesting. CAP's work deserves to be more widely known and this history contributes towards that end.

Books for Tots and Teens

(*This short survey of the children's book field is offered now that summer has ended school and intensified the under-foot problems in the family's young sector. These volumes will furnish a degree of rainy-day control. Another children's column will be presented in the Christmas issue of the Journal.*)

More and more fine writers and artists are turning their efforts to the children's book field, and between their work and new editions of the classics, there's less and less of a problem choosing a gift for your own bookish children, nephews, and other small-fry relations, or for your friends' little ones. We'll try to run over some of the better recent offerings.

The age grouping must of necessity be very rough, and you'll have to make some guess whether the child you're giving the books to is advanced or average. In each group, we'll try to start off with the simplest books and work on up. Don't forget, too, that for older children you should try to pick out books that will appeal to their special interests.

2½ to 6 or 7:

Mr. and Mrs. Noah. By Lois Lenski. (Crowell, $1). Those familiar with Miss Lenski's "Little" series need no testimonial to her illustrating and story-telling talents. She has used them here exceptionally well to tell the story of Noah's Ark.

Fish in the Air. By Kurt Wiese. (Viking, $2). Loads of pictures and a minimum of text feature this wonderful story of a Chinese boy named Fish, who persuaded his father to buy him a huge fish-shaped kite. It carried him away, of course, to fascinating adventures.

Little Peewee. By Dorothy Kunhardt. (Simon and Schuster, $.25). What happens to a tiny, tiny circus dog, when he starts growing. Excellent illustrations.

The Seven Sneezes. By Olga Cabral. (Simon and Schuster, $.25). This story of how a ragman's hearty sneezing upset a whole community is slightly below the standard of the others, but still good.

Walt Disney's Bambi and *Pinocchio*. (Simon and Schuster, each $.25). Good brief tellings of these two classics, with, of course, illustrations from the film versions.

Golden Book of Nursery Tales. (Simon and Schuster, $1.50). An excellently edited and illustrated volume combining such old stand-bys as The Gingerbread Man and The Three Bears with modern classics like the Lion-Hearted Kitten and the Huckabuck Family.

The Wonderful Story Book. By Margaret Wise Brown. (Simon and Schuster, $1.50). 42 highly entertaining stories and poems you've probably never seen before, with fine illustrations by J. P. Miller.

(It should be noted that you can hardly go wrong with any of the Simon and Schuster series—either the Little Golden books which sell for a quarter and are perfect for the train or rounding out a gift package, or the Big Golden books, which sell for $1.50, and form a fine permanent library.)

More Folk Tales from China. By Lim SiamTek. (John Day, $2.50). Another Chinese volume, this one of brief and imaginative folk-lore stories, accompanied by delightful pictures.

My Father's Dragon. By Ruth Stiles Gannett. (Random House, $2). An outstanding nonsense tale of how a small boy would rescue a baby dragon from an island inhabited by wild animals. His ingenious devices include giving chewing gum to the tigers and helping the lion untangle his mane with a comb. The pictures are as enchanting as the story.

The Favorite Uncle Remus. (Houghton Mifflin, $3). A fine new edition of the best of Joel Chandler Harris' Uncle Remus stories.

Watchdog. By Laura Bannon. (Whitman, $2.50). A little Mexican boy acquires a much-desired dog on an unusual fiesta day.

The Early Readers—6 or 7 to 10 or 11:

Toby, A Curious Cat. By Irma Simonton Black. (Holiday House, $1.50). Toby gets a new home, and the title pretty well describes the rest.

Pogo's Farm Adventure. By Jo and Ernese Norling. (Holt, $1.50). Pogo, a city day, and his master learn all about life on a big ranch-farm.

The Horse Called Pete, by Elisa Bialk, and *Monte*, by George Cory Franklin. (Houghton Mifflin, each $2). These are the first two in a new series with a specially elementary vocabulary for the readers of 8 or 9. Miss Bialk's book is an appealing story of the friendship between a small boy and a circus horse that goes blind. Mr. Franklin's "Wild Animals of the Five River Country" won all sorts of prizes, and "Monte," the story of a grizzly's fight for freedom in the Colorado mountains, is a worthy sequel.

Beno, The Riverburg Mayor. By Glenn O. Blough. (Holt, $2.25). Excellent illustrations help tell the story of the boastful mayor, who claims he can do any job in town, and learns by failure to be humble and do a good job in his own post.

Starlings. By Wilfrid S. Bronson. (Harcourt, Grace, $2). This is non-fiction. It not only tells all about starlings in graphic fashion but also does a pretty good job telling how birds in general got that way.

The Story of the Philippines. By Hester O'Neill. (McKay, $2.50). An excellent sequel to the volumes on Russia, Holland, and China, which answers such fascinating questions as when it is a good idea to have cracks in the floor, how does a bamboo pole become a firecracker, and who is the only one allowed to blow the "tambuli." For the early seeker after facts.

11 or 12 to 15:

Spooks of the Valley. By Louis C. Jones. (Houghton Mifflin, $2.50). An entertaining job by the director of the New York Historical Association on how two small boys meet all the famous spirits of the Hudson River valley, including Captain Kidd, the headless horseman, and Aaron Burr.

Green Treasure. By M. I. Ross. (Harper, $2.50). A sound adventure yarn for the scientific-minded, telling of a plant exploration cruise to the Dutch East Indies.

The Story of the Negro. By Arns Bontemps. (Knopf, $3.). A fine history by the distinguished chief librarian of Fisk University.

Pasteur. By Laura N. Wood. (Messner, $2.75). A good biography.

Understanding Science. By Filliam H. Crouse. (Whittlesey, $2.50). An outstanding volume which is a must for the young scientists, covering everything from electricity to the A-bomb and from engines to television.

The Young Adults:

Judith of France. By Margaret Leighton. (Houghton Mifflin, $2.50). This is a natural for the teen-age girl, the fascinating romance of the granddaughter of Charlemagne, compelled to marry an aging British king rather than the gallant Bras de Fer, whom the really loves.

Everglades Adventure. By Willis A. Boughton. (Bruce Humphries, $2). A fast-moving adventure yarn of a pampered rich boy whose plane is forced down in the Everglades, where be is befriended by a white hermit and a Seminole Indian, and with them outwits some movie-type badmen.

The Tortured Angel. By David Garth. (Putnam, $2.50). A slick "confidential mission" type story, of Denis Furlong's search for French Resistance secret documents.

Baseball for Everyone. By Joe Dimaggio. (Whittlesey, $2.50). *Best Sports Stories*. (Dutton, $3). Volumes on the *Cincinnati Reds*, *Boston Braves*, and *Pittsburgh Pirates*. (Putnam, each $3). Good bets for the baseball fans.

Star Reporters. (Random House, $3). *On Being an Author*. By Vera Brittain. (Macmillan, $3). *How to Be a Successful Advertising Womon*. Edited by Margaret Mary McBride. (Whittlesey, $3). For the would-be journalists.

The Working Girl's Own Cook-Book. (Little Brown, $2.50). An excellent volume not only on cooking but shopping tips and other helpful hints for the beginner.

The Complete Party Book. (Sheridan House. $3.50). For the junior hostess.

Folk Song U.S.A. By John and Alan Lomax. (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, $6). An outstanding volume of American folk ballads by America's foremost folk song collectors.

Also: Ray P. Holland's beautiful book on *Bird Dogs*, (Barnes, $5); Jim Corbett's *The Man Eating Leopard of Rudraprayag* (Oxford, $2.50); Rankin and Rogers fine book on *New York, the World's Capital City*, (Harper, $5); Ralph B. Swain's excellent *Insect Guide*. (Doubleday, $3); and Deven Francis' story of the B-26 Marauder, *Flak Bait*. (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, $5).

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