

The FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL



JAN.-FEB. 1948



SOME STATEMENTS ABOUT UMT . . . page 15



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
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The United States Field Artillery Association recently presented to President Truman (who is also the Association's Honorary President) a specially engraved presentation model of the Indoor Target Gun which is sold to members through the Association's Book Department. Illness unfortunately prevented General McLain from attending the ceremony at the White House, so General McAuliffe, the next senior member of the Executive Council stationed in Washington, made the presentation on behalf of the Association.



PUBLISHED BIMONTHLY BY THE UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN 1910 WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTS—AS WORTHY NOW AS THEN

The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.



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Organized June 7, 1910

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"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

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NO. 1

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The Cornell University ROTC

By Colonel Ralph Hospital, FA

BACKGROUND

CORNELL UNIVERSITY, being a "Land Grant" institution, has offered courses in military science and tactics since 1868, and military instruction has been an integral part of Cornell's history.

Prior to World War I, military training at Cornell was administered by an officer detailed by the War Department as Professor of Military Science and Tactics, assisted by one or more noncommissioned officers of the regular service. An extract from one of the earliest military orders, published in 1868, is most interesting and is as follows:

"Section 2. At reveille (the signal for rising), which will be given by the ringing of the university bells at 5 o'clock A.M., during the months of March and October; and at 6 o'clock A.M., during the remainder of the year, all cadets will rise, dress, arrange their furniture, beds, etc., and sweep their rooms. Sweeping will be allowed at no other hour during the day. Captains of companies will inspect each room of their respective companies half an hour after reveille, to insure compliance with

these regulations, and to see that all cadets were present.

"Section 3. At the signals for meals, which will be sounded by the university bells as follows: breakfast call at 7 o'clock A.M.; dinner call at 1:30 o'clock P.M.; and supper call at 6 o'clock P.M., companies will be formed on the company parades by the first sergeants, under the supervision of the captains, and will be marched by their captains in a military and orderly manner, to their proper places in the mess-halls. At the breakfast call, the rolls of the companies will be called by the first sergeants, and the result will be reported on the spot to the captains. All absences from rooms at inspections and from roll-calls will be noted on the morning reports of the companies, made by the captains to the commandant.

"Section 7. Tattoo will be sounded by the bells at 9 o'clock P.M., immediately after which captains will inspect the rooms of their respective companies to verify the presence of the occupants. Absences will be noted on the next morning report.


"Section 8. The hours between reveille and breakfast, between 8 o'clock A.M. and dinner, and between 7 o'clock P.M. and tattoo, will be

regarded as study hours; during which the utmost quiet in the rooms and the halls of the building will be observed, and visiting between rooms as much as possible avoided, in order that those who desire to study may not be interrupted.

"Section 10. On Sunday mornings, at church call, sounded by the bells, the cadets at each building will be formed into squads, without regard to the company organization, and will be marched by the senior officer present in each, to their respective places of worship. On arriving at the places, the squads will break ranks and enter without military command, and after service will return without military formation.

"Section 11. Reports of absences from stated roll-calls and inspections, and of other irregularities which may be made by captains under this order, will be notified by the adjutant to cadets, who will call at the commandant's office at the next morning hour and offer explanation.

"The commandant will in person inspect the rooms in both buildings, between the hours of breakfast and dinner, and at other times. Rooms will



The 1.9-acre Floor of Barton Hall.

never be locked. Efficient measures will be taken for the security of property.

"This military system cannot fail to inculcate habits of promptness, punctuality, order, and obedience to prescribed rules and constituted authorities. All of these are no more the fundamental principles of military discipline, and peculiar to that, than they are essential in a high degree to the man and the citizen, whether in a public or a private station.

"It is granted that this great university was not founded for the purpose of educating soldiers, but if it can imbue citizens with all that is good in soldiers, and fit them to be soldiers in time of need, who shall say that its results will not be commensurate with its high purposes, and its influences as beneficent, as the efforts to extend them are self-sacrificing and earnest?"

With the establishment of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps at Cornell in January of 1919, officers of several of the arms and services were detailed as Assistant Professors of Military Science and Tactics, all under the able leadership and command of the late Colonel Frank A. Barton, U. S. Cavalry. Colonel Barton received a degree in Mechanical Engineering at Cornell in 1891. The Infantry and Field Artillery units constituted the bulk of the students, while the Signal Corps, Ordnance and Veterinary units offered specialized professional military instruction. The ROTC has been continuously in operation at Cornell since 1919, and produced many outstanding officers of high rank who served with distinction in World Wars I and II. Cornell contributed 4,442 officers and 4,409 enlisted men in World War I, and almost 18,000 officers and men in World War II.

With the impetus given the ROTC at Cornell after World War I, the foundation of the present "Post War" ROTC was laid. Immediately following VJ Day, the Advanced Course was reactivated by War Department Circular 300, dated 3 October 1945, having been discontinued under the provisions of War Department Memorandum No. W145-4-42, dated December 23, 1942.

From the Fall of 1945 until the Fall of 1947, there was included in the ROTC an "Interim Course" for

advanced students who entered their training prior to September 1946, but students entering after that time were given the regular prescribed Advanced Course. The "Interim Course" comprised instruction common to all branches and arms of the service, and was designed as a temporary measure during the period of transition from war to peace. This course was discontinued prior to the beginning of instruction in the Fall of 1947.

In the Fall of 1945 and Spring of 1946, twenty-seven students registered for the Advanced Course, and of this number 80% were veterans. Although in many cases these veterans were freshmen or sophomores, they constituted the only material from which cadet officers could be selected. In the great majority of cases, their experience as veterans more than compensated for their lower academic standing. Many of these veterans had been decorated for "gallantry in action" either on the ground or in the air and were highly respected by the "Elementary" cadets.


With the reactivation of the Advanced Course after World War II, units of the Artillery, Ordnance, Signal Corps and Quartermaster Corps were established. In the Fall of 1947, an Air unit was established and this is proving a distinct asset to the entire ROTC. The

Air Officers detailed to Cornell are outstanding in their cooperation, assistance and general understanding of Ground Force problems, and assist materially in instruction in many Elementary Course subjects and those subjects common to all arms in the Advanced Course.

TRAINING

Chart I is the program of instruction now given at Cornell. It will be noted that exclusive of final examinations the Elementary Course students receive 90 hours of instruction each year instead of the 96 hours as prescribed in W. D. Memorandum No. 145-10-1, 5 May 1947, and Advanced Course students receive 150 hours in lieu of the prescribed 160. Because of the fact that the terms of instruction at Cornell each consist of fifteen weeks instead of sixteen, it has been found necessary to take advantage of the provision in existing regulations permitting a ten percent variation in the prescribed hours of instruction.

It will be observed that, in general, the course is identical with that prescribed by the Department of the Army for all Senior Division ROTC units, the one major exception being the inclusion of a course entitled the "World Military Situation." This course, together with courses in "Occupied Territories" and "Combined Operations,"



Terrain Board Instruction.

CHART I
ELEMENTARY COURSE

SUBJECTS	First Year Hours	Second Year Hours
World Military Situation	14	
Military Organization	8*	
Hygiene and First Aid	10	
Leadership, Drill, and Exercise of Command	34	34
Physical Development Methods		6
Individual Weapons and Marksmanship	19	
Maps and Aerial Photographs	9	14
National Defense Act and ROTC	4	
Military Administration		8
Evolution of Warfare		17
Military Law and Boards		11
Final Examinations	3	3
	93	93

ADVANCED COURSE

SUBJECTS	First Year Hours	Second Year Hours
Military Leadership, Psychology, and Personnel Management	16	
Leadership, Drill, and Exercise of Command	15	17
Military Problems of the United States		12*
Military Law and Boards	11	
Tactics and Technique of Selected Arm or Service ...	96	87
Command and Staff		11
Combat Intelligence		4
Military Teaching Methods		11
Psychological Warfare		4
Geographical Foundation of National Power	12	12
Military Mobilization and Demobilization		4
Final Examinations	5	5
	155	155

*Not given in 1947-48

was discontinued, effective in the Fall of 1947, by a special Department of the Army directive, but Cornell was allowed to present a "World Military Situation" course to all first term freshmen. This course consists of one hour each week for the term, and the College of Arts and Sciences allows one hour of academic credit toward a degree for this course alone. Much preparation and many conferences were necessary between the Military Department and the College of Arts and Sciences prior to the introduction of this course, but the effort was well worth while, the course itself being conducted by members of the faculty who are outstanding in their particular fields of endeavor. In view of the importance of this course, the subject

of each lecture, together with the responsible faculty member, as scheduled for the current academic year, are given in Chart II.

In view of this authorized change in the instruction program, increases were possible in the number of hours allocated to "Map Reading and Aerial Photographs" for sophomores and to "Tactics and Technique" for both juniors and seniors. It will be noted that "Tables of Organization," which is a sophomore subject at Cornell, has been omitted because of the fact that this subject was given the present year sophomores during their freshman year. Courses in Military Sanitation and First Aid are conducted by members of the Cornell Medical Department and local physicians. The

course in Military Law for first-year advanced students is being conducted by Mr. R. B. Meigs, Secretary of the Board of Trustees and a graduate of the Cornell Law School.

The advantages of having the academic faculty conduct classes of instruction in the Military Department are twofold: 1st, it insures that the best qualified personnel available imparts instruction in subjects the study of which has constituted their profession; and 2nd, it affords a community of interests between the academic faculty and the Military Department.

Examinations are given both during and at the completion of each course, and those students averaging 85% are exempt from the final comprehensive examination given at the end of each term.

In connection with the preparation for theoretical classroom instruction, there has been established a "Training Aids Section" in charge of a high-ranking noncommissioned officer. Every training aid, be it moving picture film, film strip, map, chart, diagram, lantern slide, or photograph, is catalogued, indexed, and filed in its proper place, making it available at a moment's notice. This noncommissioned officer is also responsible for the requisitioning of training films and the current posting of the training-progress chart. Speaking of training aids, the new "Military Map Reading Kit," prepared by the Corps of Engineers for the ROTC and described in TM 5-9990, is one of the best training aids which this writer has ever seen and full advantage of such an outstanding piece of equipment should be fully utilized by every ROTC unit.

FACILITIES

The activities of the Military Department at Cornell are centered about Barton Hall, an enormous stone edifice consisting of two towers housing classrooms and an unobstructed floor space of 1.9 acres. The hardwood floor affords an ideal location for the training in "Leadership, Drill, and Exercise of Command" in inclement weather. About the perimeter of this floor have

CHART II

<i>Lecture No.</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Instructor</i>	<i>Date</i>
1.	Geographic Factors in the World Situation	Prof. O. D. von Engeln	25 Sept. 1 Oct.
2.	International Political Relations	Prof. H. W. Briggs	9 Oct.
3.	International Economic Rivalry	Prof. G. P. Adams	16 Oct.
4.	Race and Population Problems	Prof. L. Sharp	23 Oct.
5.	British Empire	Prof. F. G. Marcham	30 Oct.
6.	British Empire	Prof. F. G. Marcham	6 Nov.
7.	France and Northwest Europe	Prof. E. W. Fox	13 Nov.
8.	Central Europe	Prof. Victor Lange	20 Nov.
9.	Mediterranean and Middle East	Prof. M. Einaudi	4 Dec.
10.	Russia in Europe	Prof. M. Szeftel	11 Dec.
11.	Russia in Asia	Prof. M. Szeftel	18 Dec.
12.	The Western Pacific	Prof. K. Biggerstaff	8 Jan.
13.	Northeast Asia	Prof. K. Biggerstaff	15 Jan.
14.	U. S. in World Affairs	Prof. C. P. Nettles	22 Jan.

been erected suitable metal fences which enclose and provide for the safety of motor vehicles, an M24 tank, a 13-ton tractor, a battery of 105mm howitzers, an M1 155mm howitzer, and two 90mm antiaircraft guns. Within this inclosure is also a motor laboratory used for Artillery and Ordnance advanced instruction, displays of motor blocks, "mockup" ignition systems, transmissions, a nickel-plated cut-away model of a Ford chassis, and a similarly prepared Chevrolet motor.

Although the facilities offered at Barton Hall are superior, it is necessary for classes in Military Science to be held in other university buildings. Present requirements in classroom instruction methods demand small classes, so it is obvious that the 10 classrooms in the towers in Barton Hall do not provide adequate facilities for 300 Elementary Course students, plus junior and senior Advanced Course students in five separate branches, all undergoing military training at the same time.

Practical instruction is stressed and use is made of all available training aids and equipment. Because of the size of Barton Hall floor, applicatory methods designed for outdoor training may be employed throughout the year.


During the summer of 1947, each Army conducted within its own area a

conference attended by representatives from its own headquarters, Professors of Military Science and Tactics of all ROTC units (both Junior and Senior), and institution heads or their representatives. The announced purposes of the conferences were: to assemble civilian educators and military personnel concerned with the ROTC to consider all aspects of the ROTC program in the light of the first year of operations under the new postwar policy; to obtain a free expression of their views on both general and detailed questions involved in the continuing improvement of the ROTC program; and to develop these views into definite

recommendations for desirable changes in programs, policies, curricula, and administrative procedure. This conference in the First Army Area was held at Yale University on 27-29 August 1947, and was very well attended. Committees were appointed to make special studies and prepare reports on the following subjects: General Organization of ROTC; Curricula; Personnel; Supply; Facilities; and Relationship of ROTC to the Institution. These conferences were well worth while and I am positive that all personnel and institutions will greatly benefit as a result.

LEADERSHIP

Great stress is placed on "Leadership," toward insuring that the Cornell man be able to face any situation in life with success and honor. Each Elementary Course student has one hour a week of "Leadership, Drill, and Exercise of Command." At the beginning of each year, the freshmen are divided into small groups of about 10 or 12 regardless of a company organization. A regular noncommissioned officer, or, when available, a cadet officer, is placed in charge of each group. During each of these periods, the cadet officer drills his group in movements previously indicated in the Schedule of Instruction. Later on, individual members of the group will be called upon to exercise the function of command. This system enables the Military Department to obtain a "Leadership" mark for each cadet officer each day and about 4 such marks for each Elementary Course student



Class is Motor Instruction.

per term. The daily mark in "Leadership" includes the following subjects: Military Courtesy, Attention, Attitude, Appearance and Bearing, Effort and Knowledge of Subject, and Performance. At the end of each term, a cadet's mark in "Leadership" becomes a part of his permanent record, but does not enter into his academic mark for work taken in the Military Department. This latter mark is an average of all oral and written work performed during the term in question, with each subject proportionately weighted in accordance with the number of hours prescribed for that particular subject.

After roll call at each Elementary Course formation, the instructors carry out a detailed inspection in ranks. Appropriate demerits are given for such derelictions as a needed shave or haircut, spots on uniform, dirty shoes, articles of uniform missing, improper wearing of uniform, lack of attention, and similar causes. More than 10 demerits require the repetition of the term's work, unless the cadet elects to perform extra duty at the rate of one hour of such duty for each demerit in excess of the permissible 10. Elementary students are allowed three hours of unexcused "cuts" per term; if these are exceeded, it means a repetition of the term's work. These "cuts" cannot



Advanced Class in Small Arms.

be made up.

UNIFORM

Cornell is on a commutation of uniform status, which assures that every cadet receives a brand new uniform upon his entering the course, and inasmuch as it then becomes his own

property, there is an incentive to keep it in good condition.

AWARDS

The "Distinguished Cadet" medal is awarded to Elementary and Advanced students who at the end of each term have met certain standards in military scholarship, leadership, and attendance. About 25 such awards were given last year to a corps consisting of about 800 students. It is believed that an award which is given on a larger percentage basis loses its real value. At the conclusion of the year's training, at the annual review of the entire corps by the President of Cornell University, the following awards are made: medals from the U. S. Field Artillery Association, Army Ordnance Association, Signal Corps Association, Quartermaster Association, American Legion, Sons of the American Revolution, and the Military Department. Mr. Charles Burns, of Hartford, Conn., annually awards a trophy to the outstanding member of the Pershing Rifles in honor of his son, who died while at Cornell when in command of this Company.

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

There is no one thing which will maintain continued interest in an ROTC unit more than participation in extracurricular activities. It is in this



Instruction on 90mm AA Gun.

connection that the instructor meets the student on more or less the same level, where friendships are really made, and where the Military Department can exercise a wholesome influence upon its student members.

Equitation and Polo. Cornell is one of five ROTC units in the country retaining horses; these, after 30th of June 1948, will be entirely supported by the University. This activity is the nucleus for continued equitation and polo activities which are supervised in the evenings and on Saturdays and Sundays by the Military Department. This affords a common meeting place for the academic faculty, the students, and the army, and much good is derived from such contacts. The Athletic Association awards "C's" to members of the Polo term.

Marksmanship. The indoor pistol and rifle range is in constant use from 8:00 AM until 10:00 PM. The Military Department trains ROTC and Varsity teams and the Athletic Association awards "C's" when appropriate.

Pershing Rifles. The Pershing Rifles is a national organization founded by the then Lieut. John J. Pershing in 1904 at the University of Nebraska. Company "C" of the 5th Regiment at Cornell is very active. This company devotes 3 hours a week to this activity, in addition to the time devoted to required military training, for which full credit is given by the Department of Physical Education for university requirements by that department. This company acts as a color guard, guard of honor, and military escort to distinguished visitors to the campus, and performs other duties of a similar nature. For such dress occasions, white leggins, crossbelts, and gloves are worn, in addition to the regular Pershing Rifle fourragère. This organization receives continuous field training in both defensive and offensive operations, and during the course of the year gives several very excellent demonstrations in the attack and defense of a position. For this problem a full field uniform with equipment is worn, and maximum use is made of blank ammunition for automatic weapons, charges simulating artillery fire, and other sound effects.

Officers' Club. The membership of the Cadet Officers' Club is composed of all Advanced Course members.

Meetings and social functions are held throughout the year.

Scabbard and Blade. The Cornell Chapter of Scabbard and Blade was reactivated in May 1947 and elections are held twice each year. This is an honorary military society and contributes a great deal to the ROTC.

The Bands. The Military Department includes in its curriculum a Military Bands Course. Within this course are two bands:

1. The "Big Red" Band
2. The ROTC Band

The "Big Red" Band. In 1927 Brigadier General Joseph W. Beacham, Jr. (then Colonel), was assigned by the War Department to Cornell as the Professor of Military Science and Tactics. One of the first of his activities upon reporting for duty was the organization of the "Big Red" Band. At that time, the Military Department assumed the sponsorship of this band, which has been continued up to the present time. The department is responsible for the supply, discipline, marching, and general administration, and regularly assigns one officer and one noncommissioned officer to this duty. The musical training is under a professional band director.

This band was also known as the ROTC Band until the fall of 1947; at that time the "ROTC" designation was discontinued because most of its members were not ROTC enrollees. This band appears at football games at home and abroad, as well as at other athletic contests, and at rallies.

Membership in this band satisfies the university's requirements for military training. Members of this band have a distinctive uniform made famous by its red coat.

The ROTC Band. This is a smaller band composed of between 25 and 30 players, and is composed exclusively of members of the ROTC. It is distinctly an extracurricular activity and no ROTC credit is given except on occasions when the band participates in a ceremony in which ROTC organizations are engaged. This band is a "feeder" for the "Big Red" and wears the regulation ROTC uniform. Music may be secured through military channels of supply.

CONCLUSION

The place of the Reserve Officer in any future national emergency is well recognized, and because of this the Department of the Army has placed special emphasis and a high priority on the supply and training problems of the ROTC. There is no question but that their well directed efforts will pay dividends; that was proven before and during World War II. These dividends will be immeasurably increased in the future. This will be particularly true in the event of the passage of the bill now being studied by the Congress providing for Universal Military Training. It is my understanding that such a bill provides for 4 years of Advanced Course instruction for those students who elect training in a college or university subsequent to their initial six months of camp training.



Armistice Day, 1947.

PROBLEMS OF A NEW ROTC UNIT

By Colonel Giles R. Carpenter, FA

STARTING a new Reserve Officers' Training Corps unit at a college where there has never been one before is a major undertaking. Having just started an Artillery Unit at the College of William and Mary at Williamsburg, Virginia, I shall attempt to outline the process.

Normally, when a new unit is contemplated by a college, its interest is made known to the Department of the Army, through the Army Headquarters having jurisdiction over the area where the college is situated. A board of officers is then sent to determine the feasibility of starting a unit of the ROTC there. If the report of the board is favorable, the College is invited to make application in accordance with paragraphs 87 and 88 of Army Regulations 145-10. If the application is considered favorably the new unit is started.

Because of fiscal reasons, the PMS&T usually cannot report before July of the year the unit is to be started. It would be preferable if he could report in March or April, with at least one officer and one enlisted assistant.

The Army has been conducting fine schools for officers who are going on ROTC duty. I attended the school from 22 to 29 June 1947 at the Ground General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, and found it to be well worth while and helpful. ROTC instructors, assembled from institutions where ROTC units were going concerns, prepared a course of instruction with the assistance of the Ground School authorities, and did their best to instruct and guide the newly appointed instructors. I hope that the course will be continued.

Upon arrival at the college the PMS&T has two immediate jobs: reporting his arrival to Army Headquarters by letter as required by Change number 4, paragraph 30, AR 145-10; and calling on the head of the college. In my case I had corresponded

with the president of the college, writing my first letter as soon as I received my orders, and many adjustments had already been made prior to my arrival.

At this time there are many factors to consider and decisions to be made. I shall discuss these in greater detail.

There are two kinds of housekeeping to consider: that which concerns the military personnel as individuals and that which concerns the instruction.

For military personnel, housing, of necessity, takes high priority, as persons who are not adequately and satisfactorily housed do not do their best work. Arrangements for medical care can be made at an Army post if there is one nearby. If there is no Army post near, write a letter to Army Headquarters asking for a solution to the problem and the designation of the hospital where your personnel can be cared for if need arises. A morning report will have to be started and necessary publications procured by requisition. In this connection the Eastern ROTC Conference held at Baltimore, Maryland, 22, 23, and 25 August 1947 recommended that a standard kit of pertinent publications be supplied to the PMS&T, to arrive at the college before he gets there. I would recommend that a new PMS&T visit Army Headquarters on his way to the new unit for orientation, and while there insure he has the publications, documents, and blank forms listed in the box.

Arrangements for support in higher echelon maintenance of equipment by the Ordnance Department and the Signal Corps can be arranged during this visit or later by letter. Some arrangement for motor transportation should be accomplished. I drove my private car more than two thousand miles the first month I was at the College of William and Mary and most of the mileage was on government business.

Army Regulations 145-10
(ROTC Administration)
Army Regulations 145-20
(ROTC Supply)
Army Regulations 35-6520
(Property Accountability)
WD Memo 145-10-1
(Program of Instruction)
WD Memo 145-10-29
(Report of Enrollment)
WD Memo 145-10-31
(Use of Reserve Officers on ROTC Duty)
WD Memo 145-10-32
(Post War ROTC Program)
WD Memo 700-10-10
(Property)
WD Memo 35-3520-1
(Payment of Subsistence Allowance)
T/A 90-20*
(Authorization and Allowances for Equipment)
T/A 21-2
(Clothing and Equipment for ROTC)
WD Supply Catalogs
QM 3-1, 3-2, 3-4, 6, 7, 8
Sig 3, 5, 6
Ordnance Supply Catalog
(Property and Equipment)
WD Letters and Procedures for Post War Depot Plan for Distribution of Supplies
WD Circular 204, 337 (1947)
(Supply of WD Publications)
Field Manual 21-6
(Publications)
Field Manual 21-8
(Training Aids)
ROTC Manuals
(Instruction)
Subject Schedules for Arm or Service
Blank Forms—WD AGO Form Nos.
1—(Morning Reports)
12—(Requirements for Publications)
17—(Requisition blank for Publications, forms)
130—(Report of Enrollment)
131—(Students' Record ROTC)
445 & 445a—(Requisition Blanks)
446—(Property Issue Slip)
447—(Property Turn-in Slip)
456—(Declaration of Student)
457—(Statement of Service)
458—(Contract Form)
10-51—(Public Bond)

*Appropriate T/A for type of unit activated, i.e., Class CC, Class MI, etc.

Housekeeping for the academic part of the job includes obtaining adequate office space, a supply room, a motor and gun park, and a site for an indoor rifle range, including janitor service. According to the application submitted (see paragraphs 87, 88, AR 145-10), the college agrees to appoint a Military Property Custodian and to

execute an adequate bond in accordance with AR 145-20. Although the language of these documents is clear, assistance by the PMS&T is necessary to insure that the college may carry out its part of the job. Arrangement for the proper receipt of property and its storage have to be made. At the College of William and Mary all except very heavy articles are handled by the regular receipt and delivery system of the College.

One difficult decision concerns the uniforms for the advanced-course students—juniors and seniors. The government-issue officers' uniforms may be furnished the student or the college may accept commutation of uniform allowance under the authority of paragraph 17, AR 145-20, as amended by Changes 4 and 6, and purchase uniforms for issue to the advanced-course students. If the issue uniform is used the student must return it at the end of the course. If commutation of uniform is used the college usually gives the student the uniform. The difficulty is in providing a decent uniform with the allowance given and the selection of the type of uniform to buy, because of the uncertainty as to the uniform to be adopted by the Army. At the College of William and Mary the government-issue officers' uniform is used.

Supply is one of the most difficult matters to get under way. Although the college, through the Military Property Custodian, is responsible for supply the job has to be accomplished initially by military personnel. As I see it the steps are as follows:

- a. Determine whether to use issue uniforms or commutation for the Advanced Course.
- b. Study AR 145-20, T/A 90-20, and 21-2 thoroughly.
- c. Determine what property you need and estimate the date it will be needed or when you can first care for it. Obtain only minimum essentials at first.
- d. Prepare requisitions carefully, complying with all instructions as completely as possible — stock numbers, requisition numbers, etc. If requisitions are not exactly correct there is a tendency for the services to delay action and finally return the requisition for correction.

Prior to action by higher headquarters on initial requisitions the college must

have executed a bond. This is a tedious process for the college as it requires a meeting of the Board of Regents or similar governing body. Assistance by the PMS&T in the preparation of the bond is indicated.

When the bond is ready and the initial requisitions prepared, I recommend that the PMS&T obtain authority to go to Army Headquarters and upon arrival hand-process the bond and the requisitions and make necessary corrections on the spot if he can, or obtain data upon which to make necessary changes after his return to the college. If the request for the visit to Army Headquarters is denied, the papers can be sent to the ROTC Officer by covering letter asking him to hand-carry them.

Other supply matters requiring attention are the preparation of the supply room for receipt of the property, especially for safeguarding small arms, arranging for local alterations of uniforms, obtaining a storekeeper and janitor, initiating stock record and similar accounts and training personnel to handle them. Take advantage of other ROTC units in the vicinity by visiting them with your staff to learn methods they use. Keeping supply records are matters we know from our army experience, and help to the college is indicated. However, always insure that the college realizes its property responsibility and furnishes clerical and other necessary assistance. Most colleges require a deposit by the student before he is issued any equipment. Amounts vary greatly.

Academic arrangements require early decisions by the college authorities in order that announcements of the MS&T course offered may be made to acquaint students with the program. Some difficulties will be encountered, as the ROTC program will not be understood by the faculty, yet it affects all departments, and must take its proper place in the college as another new department. Before the announcement can be made, credits and hours per week have to be settled.

WD Memo 145-10 requires three hours per week for the elementary course (freshmen and sophomores) and five hours per week for the advanced course (juniors and seniors). Since one

of the hours is devoted to drill, many institutions have allowed an extra hour, making two hours of drill per week. The extra hour assists materially in covering the work required and since it is an extension of drill there is little opposition. As to credit, various solutions are in effect. The most satisfactory condition is one which will cause the course to be desirable but will not overload the student in total number of hours' credit taken. Three credits for two classroom hours and two drill hours per week for the elementary course and four credits for four classroom hours and two drill hours per week are allowed at the College of William and Mary and this seems to be a satisfactory solution.

As soon as credits and hours are settled, the announcement of courses is written and all possible publicity is given the ROTC program. At the College of William and Mary information was mimeographed and mailed to all male students. It also formed the basis of numerous talks before civic bodies and for newspaper items. All publicity media have been used—the college paper, Alumni Quarterly, bulletins, etc.

Prior to the opening of the fall session of the College the following factors should be considered.

- a. Time schedules should be arranged with the academic department of the college, including days and hours for classes and drills. Uncertainty of the number who will enroll, the fact that MS&T cuts across all departments of the college, and the fact that military instruction is new and must fit into already crowded schedules and classrooms increase the difficulties. As a very rough guide one may expect an initial enrollment of a minimum of five percent and maximum of 15 percent of male students at the college.

- b. Weekly and semester schedules are prepared and submitted as required by the college and the Army.

- c. Lesson plans should arrive automatically, but seldom do so. Help can be obtained from other PMS&T's and by writing to contemporaries at the various service schools.

- d. Early requisition is necessary for texts, training aids, and money for payment for charts, as supply of many

items is short and repeated requisitioning is necessary. If you are near a service school much help on instruction materials, methods, and texts can be obtained.

e. The assignment of instructors, preparation of lessons, use of charts, and perfection of instruction by rehearsal are conducted in a manner similar to that used by the Army generally and at our service schools, so it will not be discussed further, except for the caution that students are college men and the approach can be varied from that used customarily with enlisted men.

f. A special qualifying examination of the AGCT type is required by the Department of the Army. Try to have it given by the College testing personnel, as they have the "know how" and obtain better results than persons not used to giving the tests.

g. Physical examinations for prospective ROTC students are a source of concern. If possible arrange to have these examinations given by army personnel.

h. Chapters of the Scabbard and Blade with National Headquarters at 705 North Main Street, West Lafayette, Indiana, of the Pershing Rifles with National Headquarters at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska, and participation in the National Rifle Association program should be considered and put into effect if advisable.

One of the big jobs when starting a new unit is forming cordial relations with the college authorities, the faculty, and the public in general. One must become a joiner of faculty clubs, the Athletic Association, local civic bodies, and similar activities. The ROTC program is a good thing and will sell itself to those who are informed about it. At first the college authorities and the faculty, no matter how much they would like to do so, will not know how they can help. As they become informed, more and more assistance will be offered. As a corollary, the Military Department must endeavor constantly to enter the college life and bend over backward to assist and participate wherever possible.

As a final word I should advise anyone going on ROTC duty to develop and sharpen his ability to be patient.

Joint Operation . . .

"Exercise SEMINOLE"

By Lieutenant Colonel John V. Roddy, FA

Prepared under the direction of Brig Gen E. A. Zundel, Fourth Army Artillery Officer, who was Chief Umpire for the Exercise


"EXERCISE SEMINOLE" was a joint Army-Navy-Air Force amphibious exercise conducted in the vicinity of Tyndall Field, Florida, on 2-7 November 1947. Major forces participating were Combat Command "A" 2d Armored Division, 12th Air Force, and Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. The Commanding General, Fourth Army, was in overall command and was designated, for purposes of the exercise, Commander of the Gulf Theater of Operations.

To provide a logical background for the operation, a general situation was drawn up and disseminated to participating troops by means of daily situation reports. It was assumed that a large "Aggressor" force* had landed in

*A full discussion of the purpose, as well as a description of the organization, uniforms and insignia, equipment, and manner of employment, of an "AGGRESSOR" force is contained in the September 1947 issue of the *Infantry Journal*.

the southeastern United States in August and had pushed rapidly inland, seizing a large part of the states of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. The "Seminole" Task Force was assigned the mission of landing behind the front lines (à la Anzio) to draw off Aggressor reserves so that the main U. S. forces could successfully mount a major offensive to drive Aggressor from the country.

The operation was conducted under a plan which provided for the initial landings to be made by the 186th Infantry Division (assumed) on D-Day, to secure a beachhead. CC "A" 2d Arm'd Div followed the assault landing on D+1, occupied assembly areas, and made preparations to continue the attack inland in conjunction with the 186th Inf Div. Tactical air support for ground forces was furnished by the 12th Air Force, Carrier Group 3 (Navy), and Marine Air Group 14. Naval gunfire



Pneumatic 105mm How used by Aggressor



105mm How landing from LCT

support was provided by elements of the attack force.

An Aggressor force was utilized to furnish a realistic basis for naval gunfire support and close air support and for intelligence training of all units. This force was organized with technical teams from the Ground General School and a company of infantry, and commenced operations in the objective area on 1 October to develop the enemy special situation. In the month prior to D-Day, Aggressor installations (artillery positions, command posts, vehicle parks, supply dumps, beach defenses, etc.) were established in the target area to represent the Aggressor defenses in the area. These defenses were picked up by air photos during the periodic preliminary reconnaissance, and the resulting information was used by the landing force in building up the intelligence picture and formulating plans for the landing.

Aggressor installations were represented by pneumatic full-scale models of U. S. equipment. It was possible by this means to outline a relatively large force. Since there was no ground maneuver with contact between opposing forces, the relatively small Aggressor force was able to represent a force of approximately one division after the landing, by installing and displacing artillery positions, vehicle parks, CP's, etc.

During the operations ashore, the Aggressor targets were attacked by friendly air, naval gunfire, and artillery.

Flash simulators were used at all Aggressor field artillery and antiaircraft positions to increase realism and provide identifiable targets for friendly air observers. They provided an excellent test for these observers and for photo interpreters of the landing force. Small night patrols, wearing Aggressor uniform, infiltrated assembly areas of armored units to test local security. Aggressor prisoners of war and documents were provided for exploitation by intelligence sections, and psychological warfare was played by means of propaganda leaflets and ruses designed to trick U. S. soldiers into leaving their units.

Aggressor air attacks were carried out by a fighter squadron based at Shaw Field, South Carolina. This squadron

was equipped with distinctive aircraft and planes were marked with the Aggressor insignia. Strafing and bombing attacks were made on the landing force during the course of the exercise.

The intelligence training resulting from employment of the Aggressor force was exceptionally effective in all echelons. By employing available information on Aggressor order of battle, uniforms and identifications, and the developments in the situation in the Gulf Theater of Operations, it was possible to conduct extensive training on all levels prior to the exercise. As a result every participant was intelligence conscious to a degree rarely encountered in peace-time training. Umpire reports, staff inspections, and the results of the actual intelligence work performed, indicated the valuable amount of intelligence training accomplished.

An additional note of realism for ground-force units was added by extensive employment of fire-marking parties, which marked Aggressor artillery fire on units of the landing force during the landings and operations ashore. The parties used pyrotechnics and explosives in conjunction with sonic units which reproduced battlefield noises. The fire marking was extremely effective in increasing the value of the training.

Tactical air support of the landing force by Air Force, Navy, and Marine units was provided on a relatively large scale. Close support of ground troops was emphasized for maximum training value; approximately 25 air strikes and



Half-tracks landing from LST

**M26 Tank**

reconnaissance missions, requested by the landing force, were carried out on each day of the exercise. Naval gunfire play was also extensive, with an average of 45 naval gunfire missions per day.

Close air support and naval gunfire missions were carried out in support of the simulated 186th Inf Div. The actions of this unit were played in detail and coordinated by means of messages and orders prepared by the staff of the ground-force commander and issued to all interested agencies. Tactical control parties and shore-fire control parties were organized to request and control air and naval gunfire missions in support of this unit.

Of particular value to artillerymen was the training afforded in the coordination of close fire support for ground troops. This coordination was carried out by the Fire Support Coordination Center, organized and operated by the Expeditionary Troops Artillery Officer. This agency provided the ground-force commander a means for controlling and coordinating artillery and naval gunfire and close air support, and for furnishing the most effective support, when needed, with minimum delay. Its operations were similar to the operations of a corps artillery fire-direction center, expanded to enable effective coordination of air and naval gunfire support.

During the initial amphibious assault phases, coordination of fire support was exercised by the naval commander afloat. During this period, the FSCC acted in an advisory capacity, assisting naval personnel and keeping informed on the tactical situation ashore. Target

information was collected and collated for use after moving ashore.

The FSCC went ashore on D + 1 and assumed responsibility for coordination of fire support when command passed ashore at 1630. It was established adjacent to the 12th Air Force Joint Operations Center in order to facilitate close liaison in planning and requesting air-support missions. Communication with naval gunfire elements afloat was accomplished by radio and dispatch boat.

Operations of the FSCC consisted principally of planning fire support for the following day's operations, screening requests for fire missions, determining type of support (air, naval, gunfire, or artillery) for specific targets, and securing fire on targets when necessary. Adjustment of naval gunfire and artillery by high-performance planes and air OP's was arranged and

coordinated. A Target Information Center, operated by the S-2, maintained a comprehensive record of all known Aggressor targets, and coordinated with other intelligence agencies in the development of artillery intelligence. The FSCC also assigned fire missions to the 14th Armd FA Bn and 66th Tank Bn (CC "A" units) after their establishment on shore.

Topographic maps, scale 1/25,000, overprinted with a shore-bombardment 1,000-meter grid, which was further subdivided into 200-meter squares, were used for all fire-control purposes by Army, Navy, and Air Force units. This type of map proved to be well adapted to fire-control requirements. It greatly facilitated target designation by ground and air observers.

Exercise SEMINOLE was a marked success in providing valuable training to participating units. On the troop level, it furnished comprehensive training to individuals and units in the technique of conducting amphibious landings with armor and other heavy equipment. The training in the art of staff planning for amphibious operations was of real value to staff officers of all services, and the opportunity to conduct fire-support operations, utilizing all three services, was of considerable professional benefit to individuals engaged in this work. The intelligence training proved to be a high light of the exercise, and it is believed that the technique evolved will be of considerable value in conducting future training.

**M4E8 Tank**

◆ SOME STATEMENTS ABOUT UMT ◆

Extract from an address by the Honorable James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense

The job of maintaining national security is a buck that can not be passed to anybody else. It has to be a common responsibility. You can not buy certain security by gadgets. The nation itself and all of those in it have to charge themselves with responsibility if we are to remain free.

I have heard Dr. Compton's remarks about universal military training and I endorse them completely. I am frank to say that this is a matter about which I only recently came to have a deep conviction. During the war I was not convinced that UMT was necessary to our military establishment, first because of the danger that it might delude the country into the belief that in itself, it was sufficient guarantee of our safety, and because it was difficult for us in the Navy to see how it could be applied to Naval training. However, after carefully studying the report of President Truman's committee, and examining the studies and listening to the presentations made by the Department of the Army, I believe there is no alternative if we are to have the trained forces necessary in an emergency.

As a democracy we do not start wars and therefore we can never be in a state of absolute readiness — it is only the men who plan wars who keep completely ready. We must rely, then, upon the best general preparation that we can devise so that our young men in case of a war—which you can be assured will come with lightning speed—will not be called upon to fight without adequate training. No coach will put his men into a hard competitive football game without serious and careful training. In football it is only arms, ankles, and noses that are broken. In war we expose young men to the loss of life itself.

Extract from an address by the Honorable Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army

The Military Establishment, under the able guidance of Secretary Forrestal, is formulating and implementing its program with these considerations

[present conditions of the world, development of new weapons, contracting distances on the globe] definitely in mind. We are re-examining our weapons, our organizations, our logistics and our specific plans in light of conditions as they exist today. Our purpose is to capitalize on the experience of the past and to give full effect to the changes and developments of the present and the reasonable probabilities of the future.

The program requires men in addition to machines — large numbers of men, in uniform and out. We must have—at least for the present—a regular Army and Navy and Air Force of a million and a half. Both for the present and until a much greater degree of world stability is attained, we need trained military reserves of at least five or six million more. And the defense departments must supplement their military personnel with American civilian employees, who for the immediate future will total approximately 700,000 for all the three departments.

Some of the military reserves will be in units of the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps. Other military reserves must be composed of civilians of an ever-current age group. I may add that in the opinion of our military and many of our civilian leaders, as well as in my own opinion, the requisite National Guard and Organized Reserve cannot be obtained and maintained and an adequate civilian pool will not exist without Universal Military Training.

A statement by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

The fundamental principle of democracy is equality—equality of burden as well as equality of opportunity. Where the defense of our country is concerned, this principle imposes on each American the duty of service in the manner most effective for the preservation of our way of life. Selective Service was its wartime application. Its logical peacetime application is Universal Military Training, an equitable method of preparing the citizen for his personal

defense responsibility so that—should war come again—it shall not find us unready. So long as the use of force has not been forever and effectively barred from international relationships, this responsibility must be met soberly and seriously by the United States. Universal Military Training, as proposed by the President's Advisory Commission, is an important clause in American democracy's insurance policy against extinction by war.

Extract from an address by General Jacob L. Devers

As you know, the policy of this country has always been to depend on a comparatively small Regular Army and a large Reserve and National Guard. This traditional policy has been repeatedly endorsed by the Congress and was emphatically restated by General Marshall when he was Chief of Staff.

I am sorry to say that we are depending on a reserve that in general is not organized—we are depending on a reserve that today does not exist as an effective fighting force. This is not the fault of the reserve or of the Regular Army, for on paper the reserve organizations are well planned. A total of six thousand, three hundred and thirty-three reserve units have been activated. Thirteen of them are Class A units—with a full complement of officer and enlisted personnel. We are planning unit training for many reserve units next summer, and expect a great many more reserve units to reach strength in the near future, but the total will still be far short of the twenty-five divisions we plan to have eventually.

We have plenty of reserve officers, particularly in the higher grades, but not enough actively interested enlisted men and junior officers. The junior officers can be provided by the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in our colleges and universities, but that will not fill the ranks.

A solution to the problem of providing a suitable reserve is found in the report prepared by the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training, generally known as the "Compton Commission" after its chairman,

Dr. Karl Compton, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The report of this commission, one of the most important and, I should add, one of the most readable documents to come from an official commission in recent years, lists six essentials of an integrated national defense program, none of which can be sacrificed if we are to avoid the misery and destruction that another war would bring.

These six essentials are:

A STRONG, HEALTHY,
EDUCATED POPULATION
A COORDINATED
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION
AND STOCK-PILING
ADEQUATE REGULAR ARMED
FORCES
UNIVERSAL TRAINING

Of these six equally important essentials, five are in process of realization. One has not been achieved. That is Universal Training. Universal Training would provide the men to make up the reserve on which we are depending in a large measure for our security. As you know, the plan is to provide six months' training for every young man in the nation, followed by several options, one of which is a period of enlistment in one of the civilian components, such as the National Guard or the Organized Reserve. Without the reserve of trained manpower that this program would give us, we should continue to be the prime target for any powerful aggressor.

**Extract from an address by General
J. Lawton Collins**

Some time ago the President appointed a distinguished group of civilians to study the needs and problems of preparing ourselves to defend our hard-won peace. This group, under the direction of Dr. Karl Compton of MIT, prepared a report known as the Compton Report. It is the most careful, objective and thorough work of its kind we have ever known. And it is important from the point of view of a member of this democratic society that the members of the President's Commission were all civilians. Thus no Army man can be accused of defending a report designed to further his own

ambitions or to perpetuate his own functions.

The Report recognizes that in the early days of a total war such as we may know in the future—probably an atomic war—we could well be confronted by chaotic conditions in our great industrial and population centers. To provide for such an unpleasant eventuality the Report recommends that we have an Air and Airborne Striking Force, composed of highly-trained professional troops, equipped with the most advanced weapons and maintained in a constant state of alertness.

It would be the objective of these forces to:

1. Intercept the enemy's attack and to prevent him from following up with additional attacks.
2. To retaliate against the enemy with all possible intensity, using, if it is within our power, even greater strength than the enemy has used against us.
3. To dislodge the enemy from the bases he is using for his attack and to stop him from occupying other bases.
4. To gain control of bases as close as possible to his boundaries so that the impact of our counterattack may be stepped up and the frequency and size of our raids on his homeland increased.

Even with the utmost success in our counterattack we will be laboring under the handicap of essentially defensive warfare, since the aggressor will have the full advantage of surprise, which in this atomic age can be tremendously destructive. But before we have such a force as mentioned here we must have the trained manpower to carry out the defense plan. There is only one way to build such a force. Universal Military Training must be adopted.

I have only one answer to the few but vociferous critics who hurl epithets like "conscription," "un-American," and "undemocratic" at UMT. They fail to understand the only process by which UMT could be adopted. It must be written into a law and passed by Congress. Congress is the body chosen by the people to make the laws to protect the people, individually and collectively.

It would be a people's UMT plan, it could exist only with their consent and continue only with their approval. The Regular Army of today is no different.

We are headed by a civilian President and a civilian cabinet officer. We get our money through Congress. And we get only as much money as Congress sees fit. That's why this is strictly your Army.

**Extract from an address by Lieutenant
General Raymond S. McLain**

I wish that every American could read and study the report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, better known as the Compton Report. Dr. Karl T. Compton, its chairman, had as distinguished associates on the Commission such nationally known figures as Father Walsh of Georgetown University, President Dodds of Princeton, Dr. Daniel Poling of Philadelphia, and President Charles E. Wilson of the General Electric Company. Ambassador Davies was a member. Others were Judge Rosenman of New York and Truman Gibson of Chicago.

Eight great men and one woman—Mrs. Anna Rosenberg of New York, an outstanding labor consultant—gave six months of intensive study to the problems of national security. They heard military leaders and civic leaders, business leaders and churchmen. They listened to spokesmen for the men who have fought our wars, to women's groups, to scientists, and to educators. Their conclusions and recommendations, together with accompanying staff studies, stand as the most comprehensive and profound treatment of our national security problem ever produced by any group of Americans and covered by one paper.

The mission of our National Guard and Class A Reserves requires that they be ready at all times to take the field on M-Day as a fully equipped, effectively trained fighting machine. What does this mean in terms of training hours? It takes 1,000 hours to adequately train the individual soldier in basic discipline, basic weapons and basic specialties. It takes from 1,000 to 2,000 additional hours of team training to create an effective fighting unit. And all of this training depends on having trained cadres and adequate facilities to do the job.

Universal Military Training would provide the basically trained manpower.

The opposition has stressed the fact that universal training did not save France, or Germany, in this war, both of which had Universal Service. They say that America won because she didn't have it. Let's see how this logic works. France didn't have it in 1870—she lost. Napoleon III had relied on a large hard-hitting Regular Army. France had Universal Training in 1914 and won. She had it in 1939 and lost. Germany had it in 1940 and won, but she lost in 1945. Russia had it and won. Sweden has had it since 1812 and has stayed out of war; in fact, it has stayed out of every war since then. America didn't have it, but could not stay out of the war. Therefore, the historical angle gives no logical answer.

The opposition says that Universal Military Training will not produce a single unit ready to fight. That is true. The Army would, of course, like to have sufficient units ready to fight. But it costs too much and requires conscription. Therefore, they ask for part to be ready and the rest to be in a state of readiness making them quickly available. I suspect that if you go into your own kitchen or icebox, you will find the greatest part of the food there is not ready to eat. But it is there, in a state of advanced preparation, so that it can be made fit to eat in the required time, before you might begin gnawing on the furniture. They say Universal Training will cause others to follow our example. That's funny, because we are the only major power without it. Of 44 members of the United Nations in 1946, 38 had compulsory military service, one has a compulsory militia. They say we should lead in disarmament. What have we done? We now have about one-tenth the combat divisions we had in the war. What other major power has cut its armed forces in such proportion? They say Universal Military Training will militarize our people. I don't believe the Army is that efficient. I don't believe it can undo in six months what the home, school and church have done in 18 years. I don't believe our boys who spent several years in the Army are militaristic. I don't believe those who returned from World War I were militaristic. As long as the military in this country do not control or dominate our education system, we can never

have militarism. Our military leaders today are just as sincerely opposed to militarism as any other American; and more so than some who are using this assertion.

To my mind the cross-focus of the entire problem of defense rests on the increased velocity of war, carrying the probability and potency of a blitz attack, together with new training problems arising from the great expansion of weapon and means employed both by the individual and the team in modern warfare. We must first stop a blitz or we will be unable to fight a war. The enormous expansion in numbers of weapons, and the increase in their technical character, have complicated the training program tremendously. For every weapon used in World War I we had two in World War II. We had bazookas, rockets, the Nebelwerfer, V-bombs, fighters and bombers by the thousands. We employed new types of artillery, flame throwers and land mines in profusion. We had armor and air power. We had innumerable types of motor transport. And all this was in addition to the rifle, bayonet, grenade and machine gun, and artillery of World War I. Yet, we did not discard any of the weapons of World War I, not even those we used in the Civil War.

To this long list we have now added the atom bomb, guided missiles, pilotless planes, jet propulsion and supersonic speeds. Other new forms of warfare, entirely within the realm of practicality, could prove the deadliest of all. Horrible though these weapons are, their very ghastliness increases the necessity for training our own people both in their possible use and for defense against them. And defense is in some measure possible. For strange to say, the new and more powerful weapons introduced in World War II produced fewer percentage casualties in any major battle than the older and simpler weapons of World War I, or even of our Civil War. As long as men live on the earth or sail the seas, ground armies and surface navies will be important to our national security as our great Air Force protects the skies above us.

In total war, the staying power of an army, or a navy or an air force, and ultimate victory, is in its reserves and

the time these reserves can be brought to bear and the manner in which their efforts are synchronized. There must always be strong, able, alert, well-organized striking forces in the regular establishments. But because the regular forces would be going into action so fast and on such a world-wide scale, it is more important than ever that we have adequate reserves ready to back them up. Such a regular force must be freed for action; not cadred to death nor sacrificed for want of support. We cannot get these reserves without Universal Military Training. Nor, back of the National Guard and the Organized Reserves, can we without UMT provide and maintain a pool of trained men in the unorganized reserves on which to draw in wartime. Universal Training is thus the foundation for our present military manpower planning. Without it, there would be no effective reserves when needed most, nor trained replacements for the regular forces, unless we again resort to selective service. Nor could we plan without UMT for an adequate civil defense. For civil defense requires training in such things as organization, sentry duty, sanitation, transportation, first aid, patrol, disaster control, fire fighting, bomb disposal, evacuation.

Without Universal Military Training we could also have a series of new Bataans all over the world. We must never again, by our improvidence, deliberately place brave men in a situation where we could neither reinforce nor supply them. Nor must we ever again rely on such a weak military policy that we can evacuate only a handful of the men standing guard at our outposts, leaving the remainder to suffer humiliating surrender, brutality and death, to a savage and brutal captor.

Universal Training as described in the Compton Commission Report is essentially American and democratic. It is built on the equality of all Americans to defend their country, for in the end that means to defend themselves. What right have we, or has anyone, to say that one boy shall die on the battlefield while another boy, equally fit for military duty, remains safely at home, without the inconvenience of even preparing to defend himself or his country?

You're NOT an Orphan . . .

THE FIELD ARTILLERY SECTION of the CAREER MANAGEMENT BRANCH P and A DIVISION GSUSA

MANY OFFICERS, particularly those who have recently entered the Regular Army, doubtless wonder where their assignment orders originate, and whether there is any intelligent basis for the manner in which individuals are shifted from one station to another. Assignment orders of Field Artillery officers, including those for overseas theaters, generally have their inception in the Field Artillery Section of Career Management Branch. This office, located in the Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., is the lineal descendant of the Personnel Section of the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery. When the latter agency passed out of existence early in 1942, the Personnel Office was transferred to Headquarters Army Ground Forces. It remained there until December, 1947, when it became a part of the Personnel and Administrative Division, Department of the Army. The functions of the office, however, have remained essentially the same since 1918. The office still files the records of officers who have been in the service since before World War I; and even some of the original furniture from the Chief's office is still in use there. Though the name has been changed, a genuine effort is made to preserve some of the traditions of the Chief's office.

By "tradition" is meant principally the policy of assuring to all Field Artillerymen a warm, sympathetic interest in their own personal problems as related to personnel matters. Many officers occasionally write informally to this office in connection with questions which seem inappropriate for official

channels. Field Artillery visitors in Washington are always welcome in this purely "Red Leg" office; and the personnel on duty there are constantly anxious to become better acquainted with their "clients," with a view to raising the Branch's work above the level of that of a cold, impersonal machine.

It is realized in FA-CMB that many officers are moved much more frequently than is desirable from any point of view. This is partly the heritage of the war, stabilization not having yet been fully attained. The necessity of keeping the overseas roster filled has been another factor in producing too-frequent shifts of individuals, though this condition should gradually be alleviated through the promulgation of fixed overseas tours and by a reduction in the overseas troop strength. Among other causes for the lack of stabilization are the heavy requirements of the military education program and the career guidance policies designed to broaden the individual's background by means of rotation through various types of duty.

In making assignments, the Field Artillery Branch office gives full consideration to the officers' expressed preferences. The cynical belief of many officers that the reverse is true can be explained in part by the obvious fact that vacancies do not always coincide with availability. For example, a returnee from overseas may have asked to be assigned to Fort Sam Houston, yet at that particular time there are no "openings" at the post in question. The officer cannot be held indefinitely at the

port, so he is assigned elsewhere, as nearly in accordance with his desires as the exigencies of the service permit. Naturally the needs of the Army must be given first consideration, but every reasonable effort is made to avoid making assignments in an arbitrary manner. The FA office is always alert to secure data useful in making long-range plans for career management.

FA-CMB is the repository of one copy of the officer's efficiency report, his Form 66, and sundry correspondence not included in the official 201 file in the office of The Adjutant General. These latter papers generally consist of informal correspondence relating to assignments.

The branch office maintains lists of officers who are eligible to attend the various service schools. It makes final selection of officers to attend the Basic and Advanced Courses at Fort Sill. Final selection of candidates for the general service schools is made by higher authority. In this connection, it is entirely unnecessary for officers to submit applications to attend the Basic or Advanced Course at Sill, the C and GSC, the AFSC, the ICAF, or the NWC. Applications are appropriate, however, from officers who desire to pursue graduate studies at civilian schools, foreign military schools, or schools conducted by other components of the Armed Forces or by branches or services other than artillery.

Colonel John F. Uncles, FA, who has been Chief of FA-CMB during the past two years, is currently under overseas orders; his successor is Colonel Wilbur S. Nye, FA.

DEFLECTION-BRACKETING—A SIMPLIFIED METHOD

By Lieut. William N. Martin, U.S.C.&G.S.

DURING the development of the new methods of conducting fire as explained in the articles of Maj. Gen. Clift Andrus and Lt. Col. Walter E. Barker in the March-April 1947 FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, the following method of deflection-bracketing was developed by Major Walter C. Wells, U.S.M.C., and the author at the Field Artillery School, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. The main changes from the old methods are incorporated in this method of deflection-bracketing (to save confusion we will call it the Simplified method as differentiated from the Ft. Sill method in this article). Spots are given in yards so as to bracket the target in deflection, bursts are kept on the OT line, and the terms are identical with those used in the aforementioned articles. The difference is in the use of two factors, which eliminate the necessity for the observer keeping a running record of range brackets.

Numerous problems using this method have been tested in the field on different types of terrain by gunnery instructors and students at the Field Artillery School, Quantico. From a comparison of the results obtained using the two methods, the author is convinced that the Simplified method is the easiest to learn and use, and results in faster problems with less rounds expended.

The Simplified method of deflection-bracketing combines perfectly with the range-bracketing procedure as developed at Ft. Sill. Factors may be obtained by firing ranging rounds, from previous firing, by the use of the M10 Plotting Board as described by Lt. Col. E. P. Foley in the May-June issue of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, or from the fire-direction center. The author believes the last should not be discarded entirely, and that ranging rounds should be fired only when

absolutely necessary. There are times when the FDC can supply the factors without undue strain or loss of security; ranging rounds before every mission would be very helpful to enemy observation units.

There is not much apparent difference in glancing over the two methods, but they are not as similar as they look. The Ft. Sill method is an adaption of the old large-T method, which was the most difficult of the OP methods. Using the Ft. Sill method of deflection-bracketing, if the initial factors aren't exactly right, it means computing to line and then keeping track of both a deflection bracket and a range bracket. In the Simplified method, only the deflection bracket is kept, and in the process of keeping the bursts on line, the target is bracketed for range automatically.

TERMINOLOGY

The terminology is the same as explained in Lt. Col. Barker's article in the March - April FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, except that if deflection remains the same, the command "repeat deflection" is omitted.

PRINCIPLES

As deflection is the controlling element, it is *used* as the controlling element in obtaining a trial deflection in the same way that range is used as the controlling element in range bracketing. Remember that, in range-bracketing, deflection changes are made to keep the bursts on the OT line during adjustment and it is not necessary to keep a deflection bracket; similarly, in deflection-bracketing, range changes are made to keep the bursts on the OT line and it is not necessary to keep track of a range bracket.

FACTORS

Two factors are used in this method. The L' factor is necessary to bring off-line bursts to line. It is the value in yards, *along the gun-target line*, of one mil measured at the OP. If the target offset is known, the L' factor can be computed by dividing the OT range (in thousands of yards) by the sine of the target offset, or $r/\sin T$. The use of obliquity factors will simplify computations. If ranging rounds are used, the L' factor is computed by dividing 400 yards by the measured deviation in mils between ranging rounds. By multiplying the observed deviation of a burst by the L' factor, a range change can be determined to place the next burst on the OT line (based on only one round, no range change is commanded to get to line unless the change to be commanded is greater than two range probable errors).


To keep the bursts on the OT line during changes incident to the adjustment, a factor, called the R factor, must be determined. The R factor is the range change necessary to keep a burst on the OT line with a 100-yard change in deflection. If the target offset is known, or if the lateral displacement between ranging rounds has been determined, the R factor can be obtained from the following table.

Target Offset (angle T) Mils	R-Factor Yards	Lateral Displacement Ranging Rounds Yards
500	190	190
600	150	220
700	120	250
800	100	280
900	80	310
1000	70	330
1100	50	350
1200	40	370
1300	30	380
1400	20	390
1500	10	395

The lateral displacement of ranging rounds is obtained by the mil relation, multiplying the observed deviation in mils by the estimated OT range. The table could be glued on the back of a GFT, inside a helmet, in or on the field glass case.

The R-factor table is derived from these formulae:


(1) T and R factor.



$$\tan (1600-T) = \frac{R}{100}$$

$$R = 100 \times \tan (1600-T)$$

(2) T and lateral displacement.



$$\sin T = \frac{L. D.}{400}$$

$$L. D. = 400 \sin T$$

By applying one R in the proper direction for each 100 - yard deflection shift commanded, a range change can be determined which will keep bursts on the OT line.

PROCEDURE

Deflection-bracketing procedure is used when the target offset (angle T) is greater than 500 mils (lateral displacement of ranging rounds over 200 yards). Bursts are brought to the OT line by appropriate range changes (multiplying the observed deviation in mils by the L' factor). After a positive deflection sensing, the target is bracketed

for deflection in hundred-yard units. For each 100-yard deflection shift, one R is applied in the appropriate direction to keep the burst on line. When an off-line burst can be sensed for deflection, a range change to get to the OT line is combined with a range change to stay on the OT line with the next deflection shift.

PRECISION FIRE

In precision fire, a trial deflection is determined by adjustment. A trial deflection is either a deflection giving a target hit or a deflection for the center of a 100-yard deflection bracket. Fire for effect is started at the trial deflection with a range

which will keep the bursts on the OT line. Fire for effect is by single round and, based on positive deflection sensings, the deflection bracket is split successively until deflection is correct. Deflection is considered correct when a target hit is obtained, when a 10-yard deflection bracket (20 yard for GT ranges greater than 10,000 yards) is split, or when a deflection over and a deflection short are obtained with the same deflection setting. The adjusted elevation is based on six positive range sensings, which are reported to the FDC by the observer. The method of computing the adjusted elevation is the same as explained in Lt. Col. Barker's article for the range-bracketing procedure, and is fundamentally the same as for the old OP shooting.

AREA FIRE

In area fire, adjustment is conducted by platoon or battery salvos, beginning with the flank away from the observer. The L' factor is used to bring bursts to the OT line. When a positive deflection sensing is obtained, the target is bracketed for deflection, applying 1-R in the proper direction for every 100-yard deflection change so as to keep the bursts on line. Deflection is successively split, keeping the bursts on the OT line with range changes. Fire for effect is started when the observer splits a deflection bracket of 100 yards, or when a bracketing salvo or a target hit is obtained. The deflection change for the initial volley in fire for effect is accompanied by a range change to center the fire on the target.

CORRECTION OF FACTORS WHILE FIRING

Factors which do not give the desired results must be corrected promptly. The L' factor is corrected by using the asked - for/got formula. The range change commanded (in yards) is the "asked for" part of the formula and the deviation obtained (in mils) is the "got" part of the formula.

An example will best show how the R factor is corrected while firing: Guns are to the left rear, R = 80 yards and L' = 2 yards per mil. After a sensing of short, line, the observer commands LEFT 200, ADD 160. This round is sensed as doubtful, 20 left. A command, ADD 40 would be necessary to bring the burst to line. A deflection

shift of 200 yards required a total range change of 200 yards to go from line shot to line shot. R would therefore equal 200/2 or 100 yards instead of 80 yards.

Approaching the same problem in a different manner, we see that the R factor is too small. If it is 40 yards too small for two 100-yard deflection shifts,

it is 40/2 or 20 yards too small for each 100-yard deflection shift. The correct R is 80 + 20 or 100 yards.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE, DEFLECTION-BRACKETING, PRECISION FIRE

Target, check point; mission, registration; materiel, 105mm howitzer; ammunition, HE shell, M51 fuze.

MESSAGES, CORRECTIONS AND COMMANDS	RESULTS	SENSINGS		REMARKS
		RN	DF	
Obsr. to FDC: BAKER ONE FIRE MISSION MARK CHECK POINT 2 PRECISION REGISTRATION WILL ADJUST FDC to Obsr: Baker, fuze quick, Check point 2, when ready. ... On the way.	80 72 		?	From a map and estimation, OT range = 3000 yards and target offset = 900 mils. R = 80 yds, L' = 3.8 yds/mil. Guns are to the left rear. Two range probable errors = 36 yds. □ represents adjusting point. To get to line using L' factor, 80 × 3.8 = 300 yds.
Obsr. to FDC: ADD 300	10 72 		?	L' factor computes as 300/70 = 4.3 yds/mil. Decision to change factor on basis of one range rests with observer.
Obsr. to FDC: ADD 40			+	Observer decides that a 200-yd deflection shift should give a deflection bracket.
Obsr. to FDC: RIGHT 200 DROP 160			—	(Drop 40 necessary to get to line). New R factor = 100 yds. (160 + 40)/2 Add 100 necessary to stay on line. Combining, DROP 40 and ADD 100 = ADD 60.
Obsr. to FDC: LEFT 100 ADD 60			—	Split 100-yd deflection bracket for fire for effect.
Obsr. to FDC: LEFT 50 ADD 50		+	?	
Obsr. to FDC: REPEAT RANGE		+	+	Split 50-yard deflection bracket by shifting either 20 or 30 yards.
Obsr. to FDC: RIGHT 20 REPEAT RANGE		+	?	
Obsr. to FDC: DROP 50		—	—	
Obsr. to FDC: LEFT 10 REPEAT RANGE		+	+	
Obsr. to FDC: RIGHT 5 REPEAT RANGE		—	?	Deflection is correct with split of 10-yard deflection bracket.
Obsr. to FDC: 4 OVERS 2 SHORTS REGISTRATION COMPLETE				

AERIAL MODEL



OBSERVATION OF 1861

By Lieut. Col. Carl T. Schmidt, Infantry

ONE day toward the end of July 1861, an indignant young man called on President Lincoln in the White House. The young man, Thaddeus Sobieski Constantine Lowe, was boiling mad. Four times he had tried to see the General-in-Chief of the United States Army, old Winfield Scott, and four times he had been rebuffed. Lowe had even borne a note written by the President: "Will Lieut. Genl. Scott please see Professor Lowe once more about his balloon? A. Lincoln." But each time the General was engaged, or eating his lunch, or asleep. Evidently the crusty hero of Chippewa and Chapultepec was not to be bothered by hare-brained balloonists trying to get the army to take a fling at aeronautics.

The President heard Lowe's story out. He laughed and stood up. "Come on," he said as he clapped on his old stovepipe hat. Over to Scott's office the President and the Professor trudged. This time, in Lincoln's tow, Lowe had no trouble getting straight in to Scott. And now, too, the General was most solicitous about the matter of balloons for the army. The question would be looked into at once. In fact, even more happened. For within a few days Lowe was hired to serve as "military aeronaut" with the Army of the Potomac. Thus began the Army's first effective aerial observation service.*

Lowe, a 29-year-old New Englander, already had behind him considerable experience as a balloonist. More important, he had a fertile imagination, keen intelligence, and unbounded self-

confidence. In 1859 he had constructed a huge balloon in which he planned to cross the Atlantic. But Lowe's admirers—among whom was Professor Joseph Henry, celebrated scientist and Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution—advised him to try a long land voyage before risking his neck over the Atlantic. Accordingly, the young aeronaut took off from Cincinnati early on 20 April 1861 in the balloon "Enterprise." Nine hours later he set his ship down near Unionville, South Carolina. He had made a 900-mile trip in record time.

Lowe was enthusiastic; he was convinced of the practicality of a transatlantic flight. But fate ruled against him. Only a week before, Sumter had fallen to Beauregard. The Civil War was on.

No cheering throngs greeted the intrepid young airman in South Carolina. The professor of ballooning had not reckoned on the passion and suspicion with which the Carolina secessionists already viewed all Yankees. And a Yankee who dropped from the clouds, carrying a sheaf of Cincinnati abolitionist newspapers (intended as proof of the date on which he took off from the Ohio), was likely to be doubly damned as a dangerous spy. Lowe was arrested and clapped into the Columbia jail. Certain hotheads even proposed a tar-and-feather party. Happily, his reputation was known to some of the leading citizens of the town. The Professor was courteously given a special pass, and he made his way back north safely enough by slow train.

Lowe now saw a more valuable use for his balloon than a romantic flight over the ocean. He was sure that aerial

observation, under his able guidance, could do much for the Union cause. Encouraged in this idea by his acquaintances, Lowe brought the "Enterprise" to Washington. On 11 June he met the President, who showed great interest in the innovation. A week later Lowe made several ascensions in Lincoln's presence. From an altitude of a thousand feet, Lowe sent a message: "To the President of the United States: . . . I have pleasure in sending you this first dispatch ever telegraphed from an aerial station, and in acknowledging indebtedness for your encouragement for the opportunity of demonstrating the availability of the science of aeronautics in the military service of the country." Lincoln was highly pleased, and predicted that aerial observation would in time be of great use in military operations. He was especially interested in the notion that artillery fire could be directed from a balloon.

During the succeeding days, Lowe made several ascensions over the Virginia environs of Washington. Just then the Federal troops were routed at Bull Run, and rumor filled Washington that the Confederates were marching in force on the Capital. To check this report, Lowe made a free flight from Fort Corcoran. "I obtained an altitude of about three and one-half miles and had a distant view of the encampments of the enemy, and observed them in motion between Manassas Junction and Fairfax. . . . The result of my observations showed the report to be untrue and restored confidence. . . . I commenced to descend, thinking that the undercurrent would take me back far enough to land near Arlington House.

*But not the first in the world. The French had experimented with observation balloons in battle as early as 1794.

When within a mile of the earth our troops commenced firing at the balloon, supposing it belonged to the rebels. I descended near enough to hear the whistling of the bullets and the shouts of the soldiers to 'show my colors.' I had no national flag with me, and . . . concluded to sail on and risk descending outside of our lines. This I accomplished, and . . . brought back the balloon, though somewhat damaged."

Several days later, as we have seen, Lowe at last succeeded in penetrating General Scott's sanctum. On 2 August 1861 the Professor was hired by the army to construct a balloon for military purposes. Once the balloon would be ready for use, he was to serve as civilian aeronaut with the army, at a pay of \$10 per day. Lowe's persistence had at last overcome the inertia of officialdom.

Lowe was not without competitors. During the summer of '61 other balloonists urged their services on the War Department. There was old John Wise, who had vainly offered his balloon experience to the Army fifteen years before, during the Mexican War. There was James Allen, whose attempts to demonstrate his aerial skill ended when his two balloons were damaged on the ground. (Allen later served loyally and skillfully with Lowe's balloon corps.) And there also was John La Mountain, who indeed had the honor of being the first to serve the army as a balloon observer. During July and August '61 he was employed by General Benjamin F. Butler to fly over the Confederate lines near Fortress Monroe. Afterward, La Mountain operated more or less as a free-lance balloonist with the Army of the Potomac. Temperamental differences with Lowe led to his dismissal from the service early in '62. Whether by reason of the superiority of his aeronautics or because of his infectious confidence, Lowe succeeded where his rivals failed.

The new balloon was completed before the end of August, and Lowe joined the army at Washington. During the following months he made many ascensions over the lines. Although no spectacular information was obtained by aerial observation—the opposing armies were then quiet—Lowe did prove that the balloon was a practical and valuable means of reconnaissance. He showed that the enemy could be kept under

constant surveillance so long as the weather was at all reasonable. Moreover, the balloon could easily be towed from place to place. The following message is typical of Lowe's reports of this period:

"On Saturday morning I ascended quite early and took an observation of the enemy's country. Very few troops were visible, and these were scattered both up and down the river. We could see into nearly every street of Leesburg, but scarcely any troops were visible. The main body appears to be between Leesburg and Centerville — I should judge fifteen or twenty miles below the former—as camps and heavy smokes were quite visible in that direction. Later in the day I ascended again, and a number of their tents which were visible in the morning inside of their earth-works between Edwards Ferry and Leesburg were taken down, and teams were observed moving toward the village of Leesburg. In the afternoon I was accompanied in my ascension by General Stone, who added several points to his map. The balloon still remains inflated, and will be ready for use at all times, in charge of a competent assistant aeronaut. . . ."

Lowe's observations undoubtedly contributed to the security of Washington.

On 24 September artillery fire for the first time was directed by an aerial observer. The method employed is outlined in a message from General W. F. Smith to General F. J. Porter, with whose division Lowe was then on duty:

"At about 8:30 tomorrow morning I wish to fire from here (Camp Advance) at Falls Church. Will you please send the balloon up from Fort Corcoran and have note taken of the position reached by the shell. . . . It is very important to know how much the shot or shell fall short, if any at all. . . . If we fire to the right of Falls Church, let a white flag be raised in the balloon; if to the left, let it be lowered; if over, let it be shown stationary; if under, let it be waved occasionally."

Reports were also transmitted telegraphically from the balloon. Apparently General Smith was satisfied with Lowe's demonstration that artillery fire control from the air was practical.

Lowe's activities aroused great interest among high-ranking officers of the Army of the Potomac, particularly Generals McClelland, F. J. Porter, McDowell, and Heintzelmann. On 7 September McClelland went aloft with the Professor, in order to have a look at Confederate installations near Washington. So favorably was McClelland impressed by the possibilities of military aeronautics that Lowe was soon authorized to construct four more balloons, as well as portable inflating equipment. Matters progressed rapidly, and by the beginning of '62 a full-fledged balloon corps was in operation along the Potomac lines under Lowe's direction.

The new balloons were given patriotic names like "Union," "Washington," "Constitution," and "Eagle," and were gaudily decorated with stars and stripes, spread eagles, and portraits of George Washington. Of assorted sizes, they could lift loads ranging from one to five men. A small barge — the first aircraft carrier in history—was made available for ascensions from the Potomac. Lowe enlisted the services of a number of assistant aeronauts—all on civilian status—as well as telegraphers and maintenance men. Small details of troops were attached to the balloon corps for duty as ground crews. But the organization was gangling and none too efficient. Its exact status within the army was never clearly defined, and it was successively administered by the Army's topographical engineer, quartermaster, and chief engineer. Lowe too often was handicapped by the red tape and punctilio of his immediate superiors.

In order to keep the balloons inflated while in the field, Lowe devised a simple mobile gas generator. Using the sulphuric acid and iron filings method, this apparatus could fill the largest balloon with hydrogen in a few hours. It was portable in a standard army wagon. Lowe also invented a system of long-range visual signalling from the air, employing small balloons that carried bright markings or flares. Moreover, he constructed a calcium illuminator, for use in balloon operations at night. Someone suggested to Lowe that photographs be taken from the balloon, and he promised to look into the matter. However, there is no evidence that

aerial photography was ever attempted by the balloon corps.

With the opening of the Peninsular Campaign, in the spring of '62, the aeronautical corps was put to the test of rigorous combat conditions. Throughout the campaign the balloonists were in constant demand for reports on the whereabouts and activities of the Confederates. A message from McClellan's chief of staff, dated 13 June 1862, typifies the attitude of the army's command toward the balloon service during this period: "Order Lowe to make frequent ascensions and report everything."

At first Lowe was kept busy in the vicinity of Yorktown. His own account is graphic:

"On the 3d of May I made a reconnaissance near Warwick Court-House and again before sundown before York-town, General McClellan and staff being on the spot; General Porter and myself ascended. No sooner had the balloon risen above the tops of the trees than the enemy opened all of their batteries commanding it, and the whole atmosphere was literally filled with bursting shell and shot, one passing through the cordage that connects the car with the balloon. . . . Fearing that by keeping the balloon up the enemy's shots would do injury to the troops that were thickly camped there, General Porter ordered the balloon down. . . . I did not sleep any more, however, that night, and got the balloon ready for another ascension, which I made before daylight. As soon as it became a little lighter I discovered that the enemy had gone. This I immediately communicated to General Heintzelmann, who on learning it ascended with me, satisfied himself of the fact, and reported it by telegraph to General McClellan. . . . We had no means of communicating to let our advance guard know where the enemy were, which we could see, as their rear guard was not more than one mile from Yorktown."

To General Fitz John Porter apparently goes the honor of being the first—though unwilling—parachutist of the American Army. One day during the siege of Yorktown the General went aloft by himself. Finding that the rope which connected the balloon with the ground was broken, he "opened the valve until all the gas had escaped, and

as the balloon was constantly falling the silk was kept extended, and presented so large a surface to the atmosphere that it served the purpose of a parachute, and consequently the descent was not rapid enough to be dangerous." Lowe adds that, because of General Porter's accident, he "found it difficult for a time to restore confidence among the officers as to the safety of this means of observation."

During the army's advance toward Richmond, Lowe accompanied General Stoneman, commander of the Union cavalry.

"We arrived near the Chickahominy on the morning of the 20th, and on the following morning, accompanied by General Stoneman, I ascended, and there had a distant view of Richmond. . . . On the 25th . . . General Stoneman ascended with me to an elevation of a thousand feet; had a splendid view of the enemy's country; discovered a force of the enemy near New Bridge, concealed to watch our movements. The general then took two batteries and placed them to the right and left of Doctor Gaines' house, and caused the enemy to retreat for at least a mile and a half, while he remained in the balloon with me, directing the commanders of the batteries where to fire, as they could not see the objects fired at. The general then went to Mechanicsville and drove the enemy from that position, while I remained up in the balloon to keep up appearances and to see if a larger force opposed him."

On 29 May, when McClellan's forces were divided by the swollen Chickahominy, Lowe reported that the enemy was concentrating in front of Fair Oaks; their movements could be seen only from the balloon. In consequence, McClellan ordered reserves up to support his exposed troops at Fair Oaks. But for the information obtained by the aeronaut, the outcome of the battle on the 31st might have been disastrous for McClellan.

Lee now attempted to turn McClellan's right at Mechanicsville, north of the Chickahominy, and to cut him off from his base at White House. "On the 26th of June," Lowe writes, "I reported that the enemy had crossed the Chickahominy in large force, and was engaging our right wing. . . . Other reports were made at short intervals

[during the 26th and 27th], and at 6 o'clock I reported that the enemy on Gaines' Hill were making a desperate advance, while a large column was moving to outflank our forces on the extreme right, and evidently intended to intercept our crossing at Woodbury's Bridge. Soon after this report was made our reserves were sent to protect the crossings and to relieve those troops who had been engaged for two days. I have no doubt myself that the information given in the above reports saved a large portion of our troops engaged from being taken prisoners . . . and also prevented the enemy from getting into our rear."

The main function of the balloonists was to observe and report the whereabouts and activities of the enemy. As we have seen, the aeronauts were sometimes used to direct artillery fire. Minor duties included the making and correction of maps and panoramic sketches, and observation of friendly troop units.

Most of the ascensions were made in captive balloons, although on a few occasions there were free flights over the enemy-held area. Whenever possible, the balloon ground station was sited in a position defiladed from enemy fire and observation. Ascensions were made at all hours of the day and night, whenever weather permitted. Wind was especially troublesome, and often forced the grounding of balloons at critical moments in a battle. At Chancellorsville, Lowe reported the wind to be "so flawy that the balloon was blown from a thousand feet elevation to near the earth." Fog and smoke at times also interfered with observation.

The captive balloons were sent up to altitudes anywhere between 400 and 5,000 feet. The aeronauts' range of observation depended upon their altitude, atmospheric conditions, and the power of their glasses. Lowe reported smokes from camp fires as far as 25 miles away, and encampments were spotted at distances up to five or six miles. From a point about seven miles from the Confederate capital, Lowe saw "ten distinct earth-works around Richmond," but he could not "distinguish whether they had guns mounted in them." The observers were especially interested in evidences

of what the enemy was doing—for example, whether he was in bivouac, as indicated by tents and numerous campfires, or whether he was in movement, as shown by dust over roads, wagon trains, and troops visibly on the march. At times it was plain that the enemy was preparing to attack, or digging in. Thus at Chancellorsville Lowe observed that "a column of the enemy are now crossing a small run . . .", and that "the enemy are throwing up earth-works for artillery on a little rise of ground. . . ." Practical methods were hit upon for estimating the size of an enemy force in a particular locality, as by counting the number of tents in an encampment or measuring the time-lengths of marching columns. When expert observation was required, a staff officer would ascend with the aeronaut. Thus, "General Barnard [an expert on fortifications] made very frequent ascensions during the whole time our army lay before Richmond, and from observations thus taken he was better enabled to locate earth-works, etc."

Communication between the balloon and the ground was by telegraph, visual signals, and dropped messages. A code for standard words and phrases was devised in order to save time in transmission. Lowe proposed a system of long-range visual signals for communication with distant friendly units, but this was not accepted.

The Confederates did their best to make life miserable for the pestiferous aerial observers. The balloons were constant targets for the Southern artillery, and occasionally for musket potshots. Although their fire often came uncomfortably close, no balloon was ever destroyed by the "anti-aircraft" gunners.

"At one point," Lowe says, "they masked twelve of their best rifle-cannon, and while taking an early morning observation, all the twelve guns were simultaneously discharged at short range, some of the shells passing through the rigging of the balloon and nearly all bursting not more than 200 feet beyond me."

The hail of shot and shell so often drawn by the swaying spheres was an annoyance to the Union troopers on the ground. Probably they cursed the balloons as heartily as did the men in grey.

No greater compliment was paid the balloon corps than the tribute of General Alexander, CSA:

"I have never understood why the enemy abandoned the use of military balloons early in 1863 after having used them extensively up to that time. Even if the observers never saw anything, they would have been worth all they cost for the annoyance and delay they caused us in trying to keep our movements out of their sight."

The balloon corps continued to find useful employment during July '62, while McClellan's forces were entrenched at Harrison's Landing, on the James River. A period of inactivity followed the army's return to the Potomac lines. At the battle of Antietam, the balloons arrived too late to be of help to McClellan. "On this occasion," Lowe states, McClellan "greatly felt the need of reports from the balloons, which, having been on so many previous occasions furnished without even being called for, were perhaps not sufficiently valued." The General now promised to put the balloon corps on a better administrative footing, and to commission Lowe. But McClellan was relieved of command before anything could be done.

Lowe and his assistants made numerous observations during the Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville campaigns, and their reports were of value to the Union commanders. But the corps' days were numbered. Just before Chancellorsville, friction between Lowe and his latest immediate superior, Captain Cyrus Comstock, the Army's Engineer, came to a head. Involved were disagreements over rates of pay, the employment of Lowe's father with the balloon corps, Lowe's difficulties in keeping within channels of communication, and his understandable irritation at his strict subordination to a man who knew little of ballooning and had even less esteem for the balloonists. Perhaps Lowe's ill health at this time was also a factor. At any rate, Lowe resigned after the battle of Chancellorsville.

Thereafter, matters went from bad to worse. A number of Lowe's assistants attempted to carry on, but they felt themselves stultified by inept administration. One of the aeronauts wrote: "I fear that things will soon be in

such a condition that when an important observation is wanted, it cannot be had. This comes from one or two aspiring young officers without any knowledge or experience whatever assuming command of the business. . . . We, as *civilians*, are not in the least respected by these officers, and the men we are obliged to direct (when using the balloons) do not obey our orders. We are often directed to do things against our better judgment. . . ."

Just before Gettysburg, the balloon service was abandoned. What the Confederate "anti-aircraft" artillerists had failed to do was accomplished by bad administration. The divorce of authority from responsibility had unhappy consequences, as it usually does.

In his final report to the Secretary of War, written in June '63, Lowe urged: "The plans I have proposed are calculated to be of great value to the Army, and if proper facilities were afforded most important results could be obtained. Instead, therefore, of any curtailment of the aeronautic department I would most respectfully recommend its being permanently adopted as an arm of the military service, with established positions and regulations for those connected with its management."

Not until thirty years had passed was another effort made to provide the Army with aerial observation. This may seem curious, in view of the favor that Lowe and his associates found with high-ranking officers in '61 and '62. It was bad luck for Lowe that his chief proponents among the generals were removed from active service or reassigned after Antietam. Perhaps, too, the balloonists' activities would have made a more lasting impression had the Army of the Potomac been more successful in 1862. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the reports of the aerial observers—many of which were fragmentary or of no immediate obvious import—were systematically collated. If the air observations were not consistently tied to one another and to information from other sources, it may be that their significance could not be adequately appreciated.

Lowe combined great courage and loyalty with brilliant ideas. Unfortunately for his fame, his ideas were ahead of the times.

ARTILLERY WITH THE TEAM

By Major General Archibald V. Arnold, USA

THE UNIFICATION Act passed by Congress and signed by President Truman in July 1947 was countrywide recognition of the National Security Team of land, sea, and air. World War II proved conclusively the need of the unified effort of Army, Navy, and Air to bring success in war. Not one of the three combat forces could make sustained progress without the aid and assistance of the others. Success came in full measure when cooperative effort built up the combined teamwork. V-E and V-J Days were the result of coordinated combined effort.

The Pacific operations are an example of the results of cooperative effort of the land, sea, and air. Ground Forces, convoyed by the Navy and protected by the Air, seized island bases which were used to launch new advances. Seizure by the land forces of the Marshalls, the Marianas, the Solomons and New Guinea, the Philippines, and Okinawa progressively brought the Army, Navy, and Air within reach of the Japanese Empire in preparation for the invasion of Japan. The Marshalls were a stepping stone to the Marianas, where Naval and Air bases brought our striking power within reach of Japan. New Guinea and the Admiralties provided harbor facilities and air fields in the forward move to the Philippines. On Leyte the all-out effort of the Japs to retain the Philippines was defeated, and in the naval battle of Leyte Gulf the existing Japanese fleet was reduced to total ineffectiveness. Luzon, the Bonins, and Okinawa were the last combined moves before the planned invasion of Japan. The combined pressure brought the end of World War II.

War is a test of strength, a test not only of the Armed Forces but a test of the whole nation which stands behind the Armed Forces. The total effort of the nation must be concentrated in the successful planning and prosecution of the war effort. The National Security Team of the Armed Forces must be planned and developed to produce the overwhelming force to insure victory.

Each service has the responsibility to improve this team by the increase of its own individual effectiveness. Each must develop its own strength as it helps the others to increase their strength, a mutual effort at strengthening the National Security Team. The Army must concentrate on improving its strength and its capabilities by building up its components into a strong well-balanced Army team, a united and efficient armed force ready to go in a minimum time. The infantry-artillery team, with origin in World War I, has been the core of the ground force strength for many years. Experience has developed the mutual confidence and effectiveness which made for success in World War II. A critique of the action of this team with particular attention to the artillery is in order when considering future development. What made the artillery effective during the late war and what preparations must be made to increase this effectiveness for any future emergency?

In the pre-war period we find the introduction and development of our fire-direction system which made possible concentrations and development of fire power hitherto unknown: ten, twenty, fifty battalions on a target at will, the delivery of tons and tons of destruction on an objective at the same instant, the intense shock of explosion concentrated in an area. Even with this power at our disposal we find that this did not always insure victory.

As an aid to development, it is helpful to examine our failures as well as our successes. We can see where we went wrong and why, where we were right and how. For our future security we must look forward from the past, using the experience of the recent war as a springboard to future progress and development. We must study particularly the early part of the war where the greater number of mistakes occurred and make sure that we do not repeat them. Modern war is essentially a contest in speed and precision. Science is making the test of combat more and

more severe. Science, working for the artillery, must develop speed, mobility, and economy along with greater destructive power.

It has been said that the artillery mission is a simple one: get there and shoot. The two parts of this responsibility must be examined so that proper plans will provide the most effective help to the infantry and to the Army's part of the big team. The getting there is just a means to the end—shooting at the enemy. We must develop lighter, more powerful transport so that no handicap of terrain, no matter how severe, will prevent our reaching the firing positions. We must provide the guns with the necessary ammunition in continuing supply so that they may accomplish their firing missions. We must examine our weapons to determine the weaknesses which science must eliminate. We require greater accuracy, greater destructive power. In the last analysis the sole reason for the existence of the artillery lies in its ability to deliver effective fire on the enemy. This is the artillery's contribution to the Army team.

What can we do in this interim period to improve the efficiency of the Artillery? How can we improve our accuracy and our effectiveness? Science must help us with the ballistic qualities of our weapons. World War II saw the tryout of the 8" howitzer and proved that it was a most successful weapon, highly accurate and capable of doing its battle job. If we intend to build companion pieces to the 8" howitzer and the 240mm howitzer, we want them to have even greater accuracy than the 8" howitzer. We want improved accuracy in our projectiles and in our rockets. We want developments which will give us control of the guided missile. We want improvement in our instrument controls so that we can hit point targets at will. We want a simplification of these instruments so that

more people can more readily develop accuracy with them. We want instruments which will cover new fields of control — all building up to greater accuracy.

The improvement in the weapon and in the instrument must be followed by an improvement in the methods. We are involved in both individual control and in group control. The accuracy of fire controlled by the individual is dependent on his capability. The artillery has tended in the period between wars to complicate its firing methods. With plenty of time in peacetime firing we tend to add refinements which are beyond the need of combat. During World War II observed-fire methods were elemental in their simplicity but they were highly effective. We used a method so simple that any intelligent individual could be taught to adjust fire successfully. One division commander stated that the time used in teaching infantry officers and men to fire paid large dividends. We must maintain simplicity of method so that all personnel may be taught easily to adjust artillery fire. In the fire-direction centers there must be added accuracy developed in the instruments and added simplicity in their use, so that they can be organized quickly and personnel instructed easily to perform their missions accurately. Our methods covering the use of instruments must be so simple that they are proof against error.

It has been truly stated that in any future emergency time will be at a premium. We cannot expect to have a year or more in which to develop our combatant forces. It is essential that intense study be given to organization and training so that accurate, fast-firing, effective artillery can be developed for combat in the minimum time. Simple weapons, simple instruments, simple methods, and a simple organization will lead to the rapid organization of artillery for accurate fire. In the matter of handling accurate fire, each and every artilleryman must set as his own personal goal the development of the skilled touch of a surgeon. He must have the finesse to probe the enemy position much as the surgeon probes during an operation. He must have the sure, accurate touch with a battery of artillery. He must have a clear understanding of

the use of shock and the ability to organize and deliver tremendous concentrations with timely accuracy. To be a true artilleryman he must know his artillery and have the skill to handle it accurately.

It is a great satisfaction to observe the progressive build-up of confidence of the infantry in the artillery. Starting with a regiment of infantry and one particular artillery battalion, the infantry, through favorable experience, gradually accepts the close-in fire of another battalion and then another until all the infantry of a division shows supreme confidence in all of the artillery. As far as the division goes this is the perfection of teamwork, but the cooperative feeling should go still further to include attached artillery and supporting air and navy. This objective is to build complete confidence in all members of the team. It is something which takes time and concentrated effort to build, but which can be destroyed by a single lapse in accuracy. We want the infantry to appreciate the benefits of artillery fire, to use it as a protective shield, to have the confidence to follow it closely. We have succeeded when the last artillery round is falling on the objective as the first infantry grenade explodes on the same target. The objective of the artillery must be 100% accuracy. Anything less than perfect accuracy will endanger the success of the infantry-artillery team.

Too few artillerymen have investigated the scope of "effective" fire or have shown a practical understanding of its use. Effective fire is fire adequate to do the job. It is enough fire for the mission but not too much. It is fire fitted to the character of the objective. To acquire the ability to put down effective fire, the artilleryman must also be an infantryman with the latter's appreciation of terrain and tactical formations. He must be an engineer to understand the details of construction of the works he is to destroy. His education as an efficient artilleryman capable of delivering effective fire will take him into many fields in order to give him a thorough appreciation of his targets and their relation to the main effort. His study of battle must develop a quick appreciation of a situation with a ready solution in terms of effective fire. He must develop an intuitive analysis to arrive at the artillery answer.

Artillery is only effective through its fire. Fire takes ammunition. There is never enough ammunition, just as there are never enough men. Effective fire requires the use of the means at hand to do the job adequately but economically. Artillery fire saves lives and it must be used to the utmost to insure maximum saving. The artilleryman is faced constantly with the serious responsibility of producing the greatest effect with his limited means. The artillery has emphasized for many years its power to concentrate, and this has resulted in the belief that volume of fire is necessarily effective fire. Volume of fire as such is effective only when it accomplishes its mission. It is used to increase our infantry's fighting power and to destroy the enemy's will to fight. There are countless examples of enormous concentrations of fire which did not materially assist the infantry to its objective. Possibly they were poorly conceived, poorly planned, poorly timed, or otherwise poorly executed. This type of fire has been well described as an "Agricultural Blitz," a very effective plowing up of the ground and nothing else.

Following World War I THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL published two articles by an eminent French artilleryman, who showed in the first that artillery destroys everything, and in the second that artillery destroys nothing. Under the second heading were examples of millions of rounds fired in three- and four-day preparations on an objective without insuring infantry success. In World War II there are examples of successful and unsuccessful use of artillery fire, examples of too much or too little. On Okinawa in the Ryukyus, in May 1945, the Tenth Army faced the outpost of the main Japanese defensive position. The terrain was rough and rugged with scattered rocky outcrops and escarpments. A combined army attack was planned to follow a short 30,000-round preparation concentrated on key positions. As it moved forward the infantry found no noticeable reduction of hostile resistance. The fire was not effective in paving the way for a bloodless advance by the infantry. The Jap defenders in limestone caves and tunnels were beyond the reach of the artillery,

although the concussion must have had some effect on enemy morale. Volume of fire was not the answer on Okinawa. On the other hand, the capture of the island of Kwajalein in the Marshalls by the 7th Division is an operation in which volume of fire was effective. Kwajalein, a flat, gourd-shaped atoll island, was 6,000 yards long and tapered from six hundred to two hundred yards in width. It was possible for the Navy to position fire-support ships in the lagoon as well as on the seaward side of the island. The division artillery was landed on an adjacent island the day preceding the main attack, in order to participate with the Navy and Air in an overwhelming preparation. Nine hundred tons of ammunition, fired in the preparation, cleared the beach of obstacles and defensive installations and permitted the infantry to land and advance half a mile without hostile resistance. Volume of fire immobilized the defenders in underground shelters, where they were destroyed or captured by ground troops. The effect of the concentrated and sustained fire on combat efficiency could be judged by the deafness and blurred vision observed in prisoners. Volume of fire insured the capture of the island in five days, and the destruction of five thousand Japs with a loss of only 64 American lives. Volume of fire was the answer on Kwajalein.

In France, late in February, 1945, the XIII Corps crossed the Roer River with two infantry divisions abreast. The artillery with the corps, including the division artillery, totalled 420 guns of all calibers from 105 to 240 mm. A 45-minute preparation was necessary to neutralize the known enemy batteries and communication centers. For one week prior to the attack the artillery fired intensively at some time prior to daylight. While this fire did not approach in volume the actual preparation, it was intensive enough so that the preparation when fired would not announce the crossing. The preparation and the fires during the attack were highly effective. The hostile command and communications net was so disrupted that the enemy did not react to the attack. One regimental command post captured five hours after the jump-off did not know, until they came under attack, that the crossing had been made.

Its communications had been destroyed and the continuing fire prevented their reinstallation. This is an example of very effective volume of fire, intelligently placed, and timed to afford maximum support to the infantry. During the attack through the Siegfried Line in Germany, the entire division artillery of one division and approximately twelve supporting battalions were made available to support a limited attack by one regiment of infantry. Fires were carefully planned and consisted, in general, of a series of successive concentrations commencing immediately in front of the infantry and rolling forward on a time schedule. The fires went off as planned, but unfortunately the jump-off of the infantry was delayed for a few minutes. With the fire several hundred yards in front of our infantry, the enemy was able to re-man its weapons to stop the infantry in its tracks. It was necessary to reorganize the infantry and repeat the performance at a later hour. At that time, coordination was excellent and the infantry moved forward with few casualties. Planning must insure foolproof coordination for effective volume of fire.

Effective fire is ready fire. In the Okinawa operation a group of 155mm guns was positioned on a neighboring island before D-Day to give early fire support. The group was registered by liaison plane on a number of check points and was ready to go. An alert air observer discovered an artilleryman's dream — a Jap regiment marching in column on a road leading to the main defensive position. He alerted the fire-direction center, saw the approach to his check point, and then an unbelievable halt astride that point. His command "Fire" was most effective. The artillery reduced the Jap resistance to the Tenth Army advance by having ready, effective fire. An example, in miniature, of effectiveness of accurate fire is the night protective fire on Kwajalein. The infantry night perimeter was a solid line across the 600-yard width of the island. A 200-yard-deep normal barrage was registered in to protect the infantry during its first night ashore. Jap activity brought an excessive number of calls for the barrage from the infantry. Investigation showed that while the barrage had stopped all hostile action in

immediate contact, it had failed to suppress the fire of knee mortars farther in rear. The protective fire was modified by introducing a 500-yard roll for some batteries. This discouraged the Jap mortar men and proved effective for the remaining nights. Protective fire is costly in ammunition at best; it is prohibitive unless effective.

I have mentioned previously that the artilleryman, like all other members of the team, must invade the fields of effort of the other branches and the services in order to become a true artilleryman. In combat, as the artillery adviser to the commander, he must concentrate on tactics, the enemy's as well as his own. With a practiced artillery eye he must search for the weakness of the hostile position—the key to the success of the operation. He must concentrate all artillery skill on this critical area. With full recognition of economy of force, which includes ammunition, he must contribute to the victory by effective fire. His solution may be an intense concentration of hundreds of battalions or again it may be one gun.

In the operations in France on 7 October, 1944, a XII Corps attack to clear the northern half of the Corps sector up to the Seille River was supported by twenty-three artillery battalions. There was a forty-five-minute artillery preparation. Thereafter the artillery rendered continual close support, its fires consisting both of observed missions against targets of opportunity and prearranged fires on call. Extensive use was made of time-on-target missions, including one ten-battalion and two eleven-battalion concentrations, all upon the key town of Jeandelaincourt, nine miles north of Nancy. Effectiveness of artillery support, and especially the counterbattery program, was amply evidenced by the fact that enemy artillery reaction to the attack was very light. Antiaircraft artillery supporting the 80th Infantry Division Artillery silenced a battery of enemy 88mm guns with two direct hits at a range of 12,950 yards. The preparation completely disrupted the enemy's command and communications systems, leaving his isolated units incapable of reacting effectively by the time our infantry and armor were

upon them. The force of the concentrations was so great that many of the enemy garrisons fled their positions and sought shelter far in the rear. Hours afterward our infantry was still finding them, stunned, weeping, and physically and morally disorganized, huddled in cellars of the battered buildings of the French villages. This is volume of fire at its best.

In the Tenth Army attack on the Shuri position on Okinawa, the 96th and 7th Divisions of the XXIV Corps were involved in attacking heavily organized limestone escarpments. One particular resistance point was a rocky crag on the boundary between divisions, which was in fact a three-story pillbox, shaped like a ship, dominating a thousand yards or more of open approach. It was the key to the advance of the two divisions. Volume of fire, accurate fire, was tried for two days but the crag resisted and continued to take its toll of our infantry. Since volume of fire was not effective, could not reach into the caves and tunnels to eliminate the defenders, the only solution appeared to be to remove the obstacle. A 155mm howitzer with concrete-piercing fuzes was posted for direct fire at eight hundred yards to saw off the crag at its base and drop it down upon itself. In spite of hostile fire from the crag, the artillery crew accomplished its mission with some 50 rounds. The crag fell, literally, and the infantry moved forward. The fire of one howitzer, fifty rounds, was effective. The right weapon and the right method had been used for the job at hand.

It has been well said that "Superiority is attention to detail." It develops from an appreciation of the small points which will add polish. It stems from the few extra touches which change the ordinary to the extraordinary. It results from refinements which lead to perfection. The artillery must be superior. To reach this goal, every phase of artillery activity must be investigated and improved. No point can be too small for careful scrutiny. No effort can be too arduous if it leads to improvement. Superiority must be the artillery's contribution to the infantry-artillery team, and to the Army team. Superiority must be the artillery contribution to our National Security.

NEW MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Brigadier General Edward J. McGaw, upon graduation from the US Military Academy in 1920, was commissioned in the Field Artillery. During the war he commanded the 63rd Infantry Division Artillery. Subsequently he served as AC of S G-3, AFWESPAC, and as commander of the 11th Airborne Division



Artillery. He is a graduate of the FA Basic School, the C&GSS, and the AWC. He is now Commandant of the Army Information School and Commanding General of Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, where he and Mrs. McGaw live.

Brigadier General Henry C. Evans, Maryland National Guard, went overseas in 1917 with the American Ambulance Field Service. He later was commissioned and served with the 6th FA, 1st Div, AEF, being discharged as a captain in 1919. He joined the National Guard in 1921, and was a colonel when called to



active duty in 1941, being promoted to BG in 1942. He served with the 76th Infantry Division in the ETO. He is a member of the GSUSA Committee on National Guard Policy. General and Mrs. Evans live in Baltimore, where he is a partner in Stein Bros. and Boyce, Investment Bankers.

Lieutenant Colonel Beverley E. Powell, upon graduation from the US Military Academy, was commissioned in the Field Artillery. During the war he commanded the 93rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion in North Africa and Italy, and later was AC of S G-1, II Corps, in Italy and Austria. From October 1945 to July



1947, he was Secretary of TAS, following which he was Executive Officer to the AC of S G-1, Hqrs AGF, and is now assigned to the P and O Division, GSUSA.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Cocklin, Field Artillery Reserve, a graduate of the OCS at Ft. Sill in June 1942, first went on active duty in March 1941. He served in the Pacific Theater with the 93rd Infantry Division, participating in the Bougainville, Bismark Archipelago, New Guinea, and Philippine Islands campaigns. From March 1946 until his return to civil



life in November 1947, he was Associate Editor of the FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL (in which he still feels a strong avuncular interest) in the grade of major. He is now Business Manager of THE NATIONAL GUARDSMAN, the official publication of the National Guard Association, with offices in Washington.

Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the United States Field Artillery Association, 15 December 1947

IN ACCORDANCE with the call of the Executive Council, the thirty-eighth annual meeting of the United States Field Artillery Association was held at the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D. C., at 5:30 P.M., 15 December 1947. Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain, President of the Association, presided at the meeting.

A quorum was present for the transaction of business.

It was moved, seconded, and carried that the reading of the minutes of the 1946 annual meeting be dispensed with, since they had been previously printed in the January-February issue of the JOURNAL.

The President called upon the Secretary-Editor and Treasurer to present his report.

REPORT OF SECRETARY-EDITOR AND TREASURER

Membership status. During the past twelve months, the membership has increased at an overall average of about 30 a month. Most of this increase has accrued during the latter portion of the period, as a result of a membership drive that was started last August by our predecessors. This drive was directed toward former members and former artillerymen who have returned to civil life, mostly members of the NG or ORC. This encouraging increase is continuing, though at a diminished rate, as most of the cream has by now been skimmed. The membership is around 5,000.

Book sales. As a result of the efforts, again instigated by our predecessors, made to boost book sales, there has been an encouraging increase in this field. As you all know, this is the Association's only source of income outside of subscriptions. While not a large income, it contributes materially to our being able to keep our heads almost above water and to continue to publish the JOURNAL. The best month was August, when the gross sales were just short of \$1,600.

Fire insurance. The Association has taken out a \$2,000 fire insurance policy on its furniture and fixtures and other physical properties.

Report of the Auditing Committee. The Auditing Committee, consisting of Lt. Cols. Warren H. Hoover and Douglass P. Quandr, reported as follows:

"The cash-book and certain vouchers and cancelled checks of the Association have been examined and found to be correct and in accordance with the summary statement of the Treasurer for the period ending November 30, 1947.

"A spot check of the paid subscription list was made against the mailing list.

"The attached statement of securities, held by the Washington Loan and Trust Company for the United States Field Artillery Association, was examined and found to be in accordance with the summary statement of the Treasurer."

FINANCIAL REPORT FOR YEAR ENDING NOV. 30, 1947

ASSETS NOV. 30, 1946			
Government appreciation bonds	\$14,606.80		
All other bonds & securities	9,747.75		\$24,354.55
Checking balance Nov. 30, 1946		8,278.29	
Inventory: furniture & equipment		3,332.95	
Inventory: books for re-sale		321.45	
Inventory: mailing supplies		90.00	\$36,377.24
ASSETS NOV. 30, 1947			
Government appreciation bonds	\$14,888.40		
All other bonds & securities	9,954.40		\$24,842.80
Checking balance Nov. 30, 1947		6,293.79	
Inventory: furniture & equipment		3,251.49	
Inventory: books for re-sale		100.00	
Inventory: mailing supplies		150.00	\$34,638.08
			\$ 1,739.16
Cash value securities 11/30/46	\$24,354.55		
Cash value securities 11/30/47	24,842.80	gain	loss
Net gain in value securities fiscal Yr. '47		\$ 488.25	
Inventory: furniture & equipment 11/30/46	\$ 3,332.95		
Inventory: furniture & equipment 11/30/47	3,251.49		
Net loss in value furniture & equipment fiscal yr. '47			\$ 81.46
Inventory: books for re-sale 11/30/46	\$ 321.45		
Inventory: books for re-sale 11/30/47	100.00		
Net loss in value books fiscal yr. '47			221.45
Inventory: mailing supplies 11/30/46	\$ 90.00		
Inventory: mailing supplies 11/30/47	150.00		
Net gain in value mailing supplies fiscal yr. '47		60.00	
Excess of disbursements over receipts Yr. '47			1,984.50
			\$ 2,287.41
			548.25
Net loss, fiscal year 1947			\$ 1,739.16
COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR YEARS ENDED NOVEMBER 30, 1946 AND 1947			
Receipts	1946	1947	
Membership dues and subscriptions	\$14,498.09	\$15,676.99	
Book Department sales	8,512.05	10,721.29	
Proceeds from sale of securities	14,180.75		
Proceeds from sale of equipment	41.00	49.70	
Interest received on securities	268.19	224.97	
Miscellaneous (only one payment recd. from AF Digest in '47. Publication discontinued with Dec. 1946 issue)	3,284.72	436.84	
	\$40,784.80	\$27,109.79	
Disbursements			
Printing and mailing FA JOURNAL	\$14,464.06	\$10,848.05	
Authors, artists & photographers	1,782.33	993.50	
Job printing	984.71	730.45	
Office equipment	155.65	203.49	
Office supplies	334.79	274.33	
Postage	1,615.99	1,028.83	
Book purchases	6,463.22	7,793.54	
Salaries	6,167.09	4,332.50	
Rent	1,500.00	1,500.00	
Telephone	290.16	260.97	
Refund on dues	330.69	61.70	
Insurance & taxes	19.68	27.05	
Miscellaneous	1,855.48	1,039.88	
	\$35,963.85	\$29,094.29	

The President then invited discussion of or comment on the report. There followed some general discussion of the aspects of the report, in the course of which Colonel Armstrong, who retired as Secretary-Editor and Treasurer after editing the September-October issue, made a statement essentially as follows:

He recalled that at last year's annual meeting — a meeting that concluded a fiscal year during which the Association sustained the greatest loss in its history, but in so doing had achieved an appreciable degree of recovery from a critical postwar depression — he had forecast that the accomplishment of certain internal economies together with a continuation of the then healthy current financial trend "should serve to balance income against costs in 1947." He asked that it be noted, as a matter of record, that the events of the year had substantiated his forecast, in that the Association's income had exceeded disbursements during the last six months of the fiscal year. He referred to the following:

<i>1st 6 mo. of fiscal Yr.</i>		<i>2d 6 mo. of fiscal Yr.</i>	
Receipts	\$12,993.81	Receipts	\$14,115.98
Disbursements	\$15,065.21	Disbursements	\$14,029.08
Operating loss	\$ 2,071.40	Operating gain	\$ 86.90

The fact that the difference between the operating loss and gain is greater than the net loss for the year of \$1,739.16 is due to an appreciation during the year in the value of Association-owned securities.

He noted that the September-October (1947) issue of the JOURNAL was the first profitable issue published by the Association in over four years.

He went on to explain that the match-selling venture, started at his recommendation in the spring of 1946, had been a financial failure, and that in liquidating this contract the Association would probably sustain a loss of \$200-\$250 in 1948. Colonel Armstrong expressed regret that this loss had not been anticipated in ample time to have the Association absorb it prior to his reassignment to other duty.

It was then moved, seconded, and carried that the report be accepted.

The President next called upon the Nominating Committee (Colonels John F. Uncles and Wilbur S. Nye) to present their slate, which was as follows:

Lt. Gen. Raymond McLain	vice Lt. Gen. Raymond McLain
Brig. Gen. Edward J. McGaw	vice Brig. Gen. E. S. Ott
Brig. Gen. Henry C. Evans	vice Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker
Col. Jess Larson	vice Col. Jess Larson
Lt. Col. Beverly E. Powell	vice Lt. Col. Robert B. Neely
Lt. Col. R. F. Cocklin	vice Maj. Gen. Frank E. Lowe

After opportunity had been afforded for further nominations, a vote resulted in the unanimous election of the choices of the Nominating Committee.

The President, on behalf of the Association, expressed his warm appreciation of all that had been done for the Association and the JOURNAL by Colonel DeVere Armstrong and Lt. Col. (then Major) Robert F. Cocklin during their incumbency as Secretary-Editor and Associate Editor, respectively. This was heartily concurred in by the members present.

The meeting then adjourned.

Immediately after the general meeting the Executive Council met. The following officers were elected:

President—Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain
 Vice-President—Major General Clift Andrus
 Secretary-Editor and Treasurer—Colonel Breckinridge A. Day.

The President then appointed a special committee, consisting of Major General Harold W. Blakeley, Colonel DeVere Armstrong, and Colonel John Lemp, for the following purpose:

"To make a study of the obligation of the Association to Miss Lenna Pedigo, in view of her long and faithful service, as regards providing some form of employee social security for her (and incidentally for any other civilian employees the Association may have in the future), and to examine into ways and means of accomplishing this. To submit a report, with necessary recommendations as to appropriate possible actions that could be taken."

B. A. DAY
Col., FA

Secretary-Editor and Treasurer

The JOURNAL takes pleasure in tendering its congratulations to the following list of distinguished field artillerymen who were recently recommended for nomination as permanent general officers in the Regular Army.

To Be Major Generals

Raymond S. McLain
 Archibald V. Arnold
 Louis A. Craig
 Stafford LeR. Irwin
 Alfred M. Gruenther
 Joseph M. Swing
 Edward H. Brooks
 John P. Lucas
 Ira T. Wyche

Clift Andrus

Harry J. Malony
 Edwin P. Parker, Jr.
 Orlando Ward
 James A. Lester
 Horace L. McBride
 John M. Devine
 Arthur M. Harper
 George P. Hays
 Doyle O. Hickey

To Be Brigadier Generals

Jonathan W. Anderson
 Charles G. Helmick
 Arthur A. White
 A. Franklin Kibler
 Lester J. Whitlock
 Anthony C. McAuliffe
 Maxwell D. Taylor
 Edwin A. Zundel
 Robert M. Bathurst

George D. Shea

Ward H. Maris

Ralph J. Canine

Josef R. Sheetz

William A. Beiderlinden

Thomas F. Hickey

Jesmond D. Balmer

Vernon E. Prichard

Paul V. Kane

Rex W. Beasley

David L. Ruffner

Williston B. Palmer

Robert M. Montague

Blackshear M. Bryan, Jr.



A National Defense Program

Dear Editor:

Never has the United States found itself engaged in a major war with the initial advantage of being prepared. In our early history, we were fortunate in being faced by a greater power which had under-estimated our potential strength and therefore failed to concentrate his superior forces. Later, we have been given time to prepare *after* the war had commenced, while our allies bore the brunt of the enemy's force. This unpreparedness has prolonged conflicts, caused needless thousands of casualties, and immeasurable economic waste.

Today we cannot afford to gamble again. We are no longer a second or third rate World Power which will be underrated. We will be the definite military objective of any aggressor nation. We must be prepared to defend ourselves.

Before examining the best method of preparation, let us briefly consider the possibility of avoiding war altogether. No one will deny that wars are wasteful in every sense of the word. Every effort to create a world free of the threat of war should be pursued. However, as long as we live in a world of conflicting national interests, and as long as we are unwilling to give up our way of life to one imposed upon us by force, we must be ready to meet any threat of force with a superior force. Being so prepared will in itself deter any nation or group of nations from trying to impose their will on us.

How can we best be prepared to defend ourselves should we be attacked? We do not wish a large standing army of such size that it would be an unbearable drain on our pocketbooks. Such an army would appear as a threatening force to other nations. The rapid technological advances in the tools of warfare have made such an army not only unnecessary but foolish.

What we do need is a trained and organized group of citizens, which is in line with our tradition. Should we be attacked, the attack would come as a sudden hammering of blows on our concentrated centers of direction, communication, and production. To meet the threat of such a disrupting attack, our defensive planning must follow the principle of decentralization. Each community must be organized and its people trained so as to be an integrated defensive strong-point in itself.

This can be accomplished far easier than it would appear on first glance. By expanding and utilizing the existing Organized Reserve and National Guard organizations we can plan and prepare thousands of integrated military strongpoints. The personnel of these units will be present day "minute-men"—civilians who have gained combat experience in World Wars I and II, plus the graduates of a Universal Military Training program. These persons, with a familiarity with a military weapon, an incomparable knowledge of the local terrain by virtue of their residence in the area, plus a definite assignment in the local defensive organization, would constitute an unbeatable holding force to meet any lightning attack. All this could be gained by a few hours a month devoted to organization and training.

As stated before, we already have the nucleus for community defensive forces. We have pilots, infantrymen, engineers, et al, with combat training and experience in all communities. We have many others trained and experienced in skilled trades and professions who, because of physical defects, were not eligible as members of the armed forces, but whose services in a community defense set-up would be invaluable. Graduates of a Universal Military Training program would furnish constant replacements familiar with the latest developments in military arms.

The need for a Regular Army would still be present. But its size need not be great. A small well-trained and equipped striking force would be vitally needed. It would be ever ready to strike back and steal the offensive from any attacking force. A small staff, familiar with the latest weapons and methods of warfare, would travel about and suggest improvements of community defensive strong-points.

Care should be taken to avoid "red-tape" in administering the community defense program. The communities should organize themselves on the bases of natural defensive areas, population, vulnerability to attack, and likely key communication and industrial targets in the vicinity. Once the community areas are organized, the local commander should be responsible for its defense. From this point on the organization should be run on a local basis with only consultations and advice from the Regular Army. The community defense units must be flexible—organized along the defensive needs of the area and the capabilities of the population rather than the strict functional lines of a Regular Army unit. In this way, the most efficient yet economical use of the communities' resources would be available to meet any initial attack.

By following this plan we would prevent the enemy from defeating us in a sudden surprise attack. We would gain time to organize our power and unleash it in counter-blows. We cannot afford to expose our country to a sudden knock-out blow. Let's prepare TODAY.

WILLIAM E. MELVIN
1st Lieut., FA-Res.

San Francisco, Calif.

—The new capabilities of airborne attack, which would enable any strong aggressor to strike without warning at many points deep within the country, have convinced many authorities that a large, active National Guard and Organized Reserve, backed by UMT, have become increasingly essential to our national safety. The writer of the above letter has obviously given serious thought to the matter, and the letter is published here as an encouraging sign of the, we hope, expanding consciousness of the need for nationwide defense.—Ed.

THE RENDEZVOUS

By Roy Denial

IT WAS A DRIZZLING dark night in the early fall of 1944. My battalion had just effected a crossing of the Moselle River. During the swift advance that ensued, elements of the battalion became so widely separated that the Battalion Commander decided to hold up the operation while he sent a couple of runners on a patrol to locate Companies "F" and "G" and arrange for an assembly of the forces.

Shawcress and Winters, two buddies of mine, were picked for the job. After the CO had given them instructions concerning the best route to take in reaching the next ridge of hills where the other two companies were supposed to be in position, the lonely pair of Infantrymen started off down the hill, grumbling and stumbling.

The steady downpour and inky blackness did little to raise the spirits of the two men. And though they strained their eyes, it was difficult to make out any of the landmarks the captain had so warmly recommended.

After what seemed an eternity, Shawcress stopped suddenly and nodded toward a large blob of shadow which was barely discernible against the meager horizon. "That look like a house to you?"

"Yeah, it does at that. One of the companies might have set up a CP there," Winters mumbled, wiping water from his face. "Let's have a look-see."

"Okay, least we'll get in out of this stinkin' rain. God, what a night!"

They plodded over to the farmhouse, and after a little search found the door. "Funny there's no outposts around," Winters remarked, trying to force the door.

"Ah, they got some sense," blurted Shawcress. "On a night like this the sensible place to be is next to a nice, warm fire. This war'll keep."

Shawcress had begun pounding loudly on the door. He pounded harder. "Come on, in there. Open up!"

They kept at it for a few minutes longer and finally the door did open and a breeze-blown candle flickered across the face of a frightened French farmer. He mumbled something neither Shawcress nor his buddy could understand, but they pushed their way inside and soon made it known to their unwilling host that they were plenty cold. Did he have some coffee?

He did. It was mostly chicory, but it was hot. The Frenchman stood stolidly in the corner, watching them as they drank. There followed an interlude of uneasy silence, then Winters suggested they attempt to find out from the Frenchman whether he'd seen any GI's around. Shawcress made a try at it. Finally through a series of complicated gestures and frequent repetition of the word "soldat" he succeeded in evoking a knowing smile and healthy nod from the farmer.

By half understanding, half intuition Shawcress managed to find out that other soldiers had left barely moments before they came. At this news Winters was jubilant.

"Hey! That's some break! Get him to—"


"Listen to this," Shawcress

interrupted. "He says these guys have only left for a short while. They oughta be back any time. We'll just settle down here and wait. He's gonna bring down some of their blankets and stuff to cover us with."

"Oh boy!" Winters sighed, taking off his pack. Shawcress had already doffed his helmet and begun laying down his rifle and pack preparatory to warming up the fire. Meanwhile the Frenchman slipped out of the room to get the covers for them.

Winters had just taken off his combat jacket and was cuddling up closer to the crackling stove when the farmer re-entered, his arms laden with equipment. As he moved into the light, however Winters' throat tightened and he began feebly trying to button his jacket again. Shawcress seemed to sense the same thing. Without further ado he dropped his firewood. Mustering as much steadiness as possible, both men quietly shouldered their equipment, plunked on their helmets, and sidled over to the door. And before the uncomprehending Frenchman could recover from his astonishment, Shawcress and Winters had eased back into the dripping, dark anonymity of the night.

The farmer stood there, his mouth agape. In his hand he held two German shelter-halves and a brown, horsehair Kraut pack. As he had mentioned, the "other soldiers" would be back soon. But Shawcress and his buddy had no intention of waiting up for them.



SO YOU HAVE TO BUY A HOUSE!

By Lieutenant Holmes F. Crouch, U.S. Coast Guard

YOU HAVE to buy a house! I had to. So did a lot of others in the Army, Navy and Coast Guard. And when rent controls are removed in full, there will be many more who will have to buy a house also. Let no one underestimate the significance of the contributing circumstances.

The plight of those on active military duty with a continuous service record is truly a *special problem* in today's critical housing situation. Finding a place to rent is a practical impossibility—even under the much nurtured "bonus" system. What few rentals there are, are conditioned upon restrictive eligibility clauses which leave faint hope for military persons with children (and/or pets). Being forced into the purchase (and sale) of a house, by virtue of little or no control over time and place of an official transfer, is costly in time, money, and convenience. Contrary to some popular opinion, the purchase of a house is *not* "the same as paying rent." It is much more complicated and works toward a definite economic disadvantage. A full appreciation of such a disadvantage can be best understood by those who have undergone the experience, or are preparing to do so.

In my own case I had no other alternative but to buy a house. I did so, reluctantly, knowing full well that it was a forced investment. As a Coast Guard officer I was compelled to seek an urban or suburban domicile. This precluded the more economic possibility of cave-dwelling or forest life in a lean-to. Naturally, I would have to buy on the most inopportune real estate market imaginable.

A graduate of the U. S. Coast Guard Academy in 1940, Lieutenant Crouch served during the war in Coast Guard cutters in Greenland and North Atlantic waters and subsequently was on Merchant Marine Inspection duty in San Francisco. After V-J Day he was assigned to the Public Information Division at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D. C., where housing conditions led to the experiences described in this article.

*Republished (slightly condensed) by
courtesy of the United States Naval
Institute Proceedings*

My exhaustive quest for that proverbial "roof" led me to dire things. After checking on more than 200 advertisements and looking at more than 50 houses, in sheer desperation I paid \$14,000 for a house I know is worth only half as much. I shouldn't have paid this price. In the first place my fixed income does not warrant it. In the second place, as a member of the regular establishment, I never know when or where I'll be transferred, or how long I'll be when I get there. You say I can't afford it—with a family, and with the general cost of living having doubled since 1939. I'll concede the point. But, remember, I didn't *want* to buy; I *had to*. What else was there to do?

Upon my transfer from San Francisco (where I also had to buy a house) to Washington, D. C. in March 1946, more than three months were spent searching for a place to live. What hectic months they were! Fortunately, some relatives in Baltimore were kind enough to set up a bed and a table in their basement—just an ordinary row-house basement—while I commuted daily, 45 miles each way, to and from Washington. My two children were loaned to other relatives some 800 miles away. The experiences I had during those months may be worth recounting—especially so that others might derive some benefit from them.

To add unbelievable color to the realty picture, I would like to report that the asking value of property rose approximately one thousand dollars per month during the time of my search. My next door neighbor, I later found out, paid five thousand *less* than I did. Our houses are the same. He bought his house only six months before I bought mine. A neighbor two doors from me (incidentally a Marine Corps officer) paid two thousand dollars *more* than I did for the same type house. Since then, however, I understand that realty values have "leveled off."

Rather than weigh all of the factors preceding and following my purchase, suppose I summarize only the more significant features or basic principles of the "lessons learned." This is the only practical course to take inasmuch as local conditions vary, and houses and agents also vary.

As in any purchase, a piece of furniture for example, there is a definite order of events. First, we have a need for the article and start looking around. We are attracted by an advertisement. Then, in consecutive order, we meet with a salesman, examine the object to be purchased, and go over contract stipulations (verbal and/or written); then follows settlement (the "sign on the dotted line" moment), possession, and reflective thinking. So it is with the purchase of a house.

Frequently, real estate advertisements are misleading. Perhaps they are designed to be that way. If you were to read of a "lovely, 6-room brick house, new, complete in every respect, reasonable," you might feel, understandably, that here was your opportunity. Yet a personal investigation might reveal otherwise. It would not be uncommon to find that the "lovely" would refer to an ordinary rectangular house with no noticeable architecture; the "rooms" would be over-sized closets; the "new" might mean under construction, or built sometime during the past decade; it might be "complete in every respect" except for those items which must be paid for as "extras"; "reasonable" might mean anything from \$13,000 to \$23,000, or higher. Actually, I have followed through on several "medium priced" houses to find them quoted, on the scene, in the twenty thousands. If you ever see "running water and electricity" mentioned, you can be pretty certain that speculative interests have gone out on the farm.

On occasions I have noticed that some builders would run an announcement something like the following: "\$14,950, full basement, oil heat, weather-stripped, landscaped for 60

feet, two houses available for immediate occupancy" and other apparently relevant matters. Somehow, the word "up" was omitted from the \$14,950; the "full" basement might be full of water, full of scrap lumber and piping, or full of building supplies which have been stored temporarily therein. "Oil heat" does not mean, necessarily, that all fuel lines and wiring are connected, nor that all essential parts of the burner motor are installed and ready to go. "Weather-stripped" might mean that one door is so fitted, or more than one, but not necessarily every window and door throughout the house. "Landscaped for 60 feet" might mean anything from 20 to 60 feet of landscaping so long as the lot does not exceed 60 feet in width. The two houses "immediately available" have either "just been sold" or are immediately available in 10, 20, 30 days or longer, depending on possession date and other factors.

So much for advertisements; what about realty agents themselves? Here a solemn word of caution is in order. My experience has taught me that it would have paid me to study my agents as carefully as they were studying me. As soon as an agent would uncover the fact that I was a newcomer to the area, had children, and was living in cramped quarters, he knew the advantage of a "sellers' market." No matter how hard I tried to withhold this information, I was not always successful. This process is known to realty men as "feeling out." They seek to distinguish the "sightseers" from those in need. It is a question of selection rather than selling.

Once an agent has determined your need for a house, his next step is to determine your "ability to pay." Of course, he will always take the very upper limit of your ability; he works on a commission basis, you know. The thing that the prospective buyer should do, then, is to make a complete character study of each agent, builder, or owner, with whom he is dealing or about to deal.

All realty persons are human beings. Self-survival is the primary motive of their business. To achieve this end some agents are boastful, some resort to "high pressure." There are those who would intimidate you, while others would speak only in half-truths. Some are purposely vague; they use such phrases

as "here or there," "more or less," "on or about," etc. Some are psychologists—in their own way. They casually refer to what might well be a fictitious "other person" who has already made a bona fide offer, or they use that "last one left" spur. Some have a code of ethics that is quite difficult to comprehend.

Beware of those agents or builders (or owners) who verbally agree with your every request but always find some excuse for not putting it in writing. Beware, also, of those who have a shrewdness for misrepresentation by implication. For example, if you were to ask "How far back does the lot go?" the egotistically shrewd agent (or builder, or owner) could wave a bold, definite hand in the direction of *all* trees 30 feet back, 60 feet back, and 200 feet back. He would say very positively, "Way back beyond those trees." He would mean, of course (but you wouldn't know at this time), those trees just 30 feet back. And, finally, beware, oh! beware of the evasive agent—the type who just won't give you a specific answer to any of your questions and who keeps referring to "hidden" values.

There is no other way to study an agent than by seeing him in action. Consequently, by the time you have come to some partial evaluation of an agent or builder, you will also have made at least a preliminary examination of some house and its premises. This should reveal your interest to the extent that further inspection is, or is not, necessary. If you are interested further, it may prove to your advantage to warm up your "eagle eye" and make particular note of the following: layout and size of rooms (length, breadth, cubic footage, number of windows, wall space, etc.); closet and storage space; size and utility value of kitchen, the most important spot in any fixed income home (you might be examining a 1942 house with a 1934 refrigerator); condition of flooring (knots, wormholes, amount of creaks, etc.); paint work, (inside and out); woodwork; plumbing (leaky faucets, chattering, whistling, or continuously running toilet valves, rusty joints, weak holding-brackets, drain and clean-out access, etc.); tilework and roofing (and spouting); size of, and accessibility to, attic; condition of basement, if any (look closely for evidence of moisture);

type and construction of foundation and main beams; size of lot, drainage (look for ground wash and low places), and landscaping; condition of sidewalks (if any) and gutters and curbs; plus many individually minor items, but most costly in time, convenience, and nuisance value—such as door bell, fire-place cleanout traps, hand railing on stairways, window locks, light bulbs, fuses, etc. Better ask a few questions about zoning; that is, whether the property is residential (A or B), commercial (X or Y), or industrial (Q or T). For example, one might ask, "Is there any re-zoning taking place in the community?" or, "Is there a master plan of zoning in effect"—an important question in a newly developed area. Zoning affects the future value of property.

The foregoing comments are based upon the premise that the house is financially within your reach, though admittedly it is probably at the extreme of your fingertips when both hands are strenuously extended. Today, when there are ten families-in-need for every available home, this condition prevails. Consequently, further financial and contractual discussions will automatically follow any more-than-casual examination of a home. As a result every deal will involve, at the outset, a deposit and a contract to purchase. Here it is important to note that the colloquial real estate "contract" is a contract *to* purchase; it is *not* a contract *of* purchase. This latter act, in the office of the lending institution, is manifested by mysterious rituals at the time of final settlement and possession. The "contract," accompanied by a deposit, is merely an assurance that *you* intend to buy. The deposit is subject to forfeiture in case of bad faith on your part. Bad faith on the part of some agents or builders is a highly technical and debatable question. In one case, I had to forfeit \$100 to learn of bad faith *not* on my part.

You can be quite sure that the "form" contract adequately protects the interests of the realty agent or builder. In my opinion, every particle of printed matter already on the "form" is one-sided, and you also can be certain that whatever has been forgotten is covered by a catch-all clause at the bottom. Accordingly

any prospective buyer should take definite written steps to protect his own interests. He should define his every term. Even then the buyer is not always safe. For example, in my contract, I stipulated "lot to be tapered full length." Upon possession, I found the lot to be V-shaped. Questioning the builder revealed that it was "double-tapered." With swaggering arrogance he informed me that *he* reserved the right to interpret the contract as *he* saw fit.

If the house is to be occupied in 30 days or less, an attempt should be made to strike out the "or more" that is occasionally and unobtrusively inserted in the form contract. If the house is one of recent construction, it might prove advantageous to include a phrase that it was built in accordance with specifications on file at the local building inspector's office. Then ask to see the specifications, but don't be too surprised at "corner cutting." On a house calling for three coats of paint (in the specifications) a contractor may lead you to believe he has produced the same effect with two coats. Guard against those contracts which have a tie-in arrangement with a loan or finance company not of your own choosing (if you want to choose a loan or finance company). There is usually a reason for the "tie-in" which is *not* to your best interests. Most contracts state that a purchaser agrees to comply with "all covenants of record." Ask to see them. Ostensibly covenants are for the protection of the property. However, in the real estate industry, an element of profit making is reflected in some covenants. Consider, for instance, a new development of houses, each house without a garage. The public-minded builder or developer will arrange a covenant whereby, in the interests of community "harmony and uniformity," no garage or other structure can be built unless *he* approves the plans. What will prevent him from disapproving any and all such plans unless he or some of his associates get the full opportunity for the work? In short, it would be most wise to have several days' prior access to all "form" contracts for personal scrutiny before affixing signatures. This privilege, of course, may not always be accorded — for obvious reasons.

Even though a contract is drawn, possession of the house and property cannot be had until "settlement." This involves a down payment, a mortgage, handling (or closing) charges, a deed, a title search, and possibly (if you are financially unfortunate) a second trust (or a third)—an I.O.U. to someone other than the first mortgagor. The down payment (your deposit is included in this) and second trust can be considered as the inflation value of your purchase. Today, this amount frequently equals or exceeds the maximum first mortgage. The first mortgage is an index of the true worth of your house on a so-called "normal" market. The mortgage stipulates many conditions on which you may occupy the house, the primary ones being to make your monthly payments and bear *all* expenses incident to maintaining the property at its par value — interest, taxes, insurance, repairs, improvements, etc. Surmounted on these expenses and also *not* included in the sale price of the house, are innumerable handling fees and charges. There are title fees, appraisal fees, inspection fees, settlement fees, separate charges for the preparation of deed and loan, separate charges for recording of deed and loan, notary fees, federal and state tax stamps, adjustment fees, and a dictionary of others. A house with a price tag of \$13,375 may come out of this mill at \$13,651.60 — the more expensive the house, the higher the mill handling charges. In other words, the buyer pays for *all* of the mortgagor's work in connection with a loan. The interest on that loan is another entity.

Before you dip your pen in ink for affixing a signature to the "form" (that word again) mortgage, you had better get a clear—and I mean a *very clear*—understanding of the "release" clause, technically known as "full prepayment privileges." This is important and could prove very embarrassing to a military person upon receipt of official transfer orders when it became necessary to sell in a hurry (which is certainly not the best way of selling real property). Every finance company or bank is in business to make money—for the welfare of its shareholders. When a loan is granted, the morale (synonymous with "dividends" or

profits") of the shareholders and lending management is pre-computed in a sense on the basis of so much interest money from each mortgagee each year for so many years. Naturally any premature termination of a mortgage is reflected by a corresponding reduction in lending institution morale. In some cases this possibility is recognized in terms of a 1% or 2% (of the original loan) "penalty." In other words, on an original \$9,000 F.H.A. or bank loan, it may cost between \$90 and \$180 just for the privilege of being "released." Finance companies do not always make this recognition. Their "forms" stipulate, in effect, that the "Board of Directors" (that august body) *may not* release you. If the "Board" does release you, it's for a monetary penalty. If it does not release you, you are simply "stuck." A fine mess to be in! And there *are* cases on record of military persons in this predicament. This is probably a poetic penalty for failing to read the small print and those references to the "rules and by-laws" of the finance association (which are seldom supplied without request). See what a fast-moving pen can get you into? I had one; have you?

When all matters regarding the transfer of property are settled to the satisfaction of prior ownership interests (probably not to your satisfaction, but you do need a house) a "settlement date" is effectuated. This date (hour and minute) is recorded in the land office of the presiding county seat and represents the line of demarcation for any legal controversies that may later develop.

Actually the term "settlement date" is a misnomer. It's only the *beginning*. It is an inaugural date for a long-term financial obligation. You are reminded of this date twelve times a year.

The question of financing the circumstance-forced purchase of a home is a deep personal problem. It gets down where it hurts. But the problem must be solved if one is to have shelter for self and family. The ability to locate between \$1,000 and \$5,000 (the average limits of cash down payments today) depends a great deal on one's personal thrift (that is, his *life* savings), relatives, outside sources of income, and such collateral as furniture, automobile,

and life insurance policies. The G.I. loan is not available to active duty personnel who have never been separated from the Service. The objective, therefore, is to pay as little cash down as you can and adjust the combined monthly payments (if more than one loan is carried) somewhere in the vicinity of one-fourth the monthly pay check—a pre-war "rule of thumb" somewhat difficult to apply today.

In selecting the source of a loan it is usually desirable to keep away from finance companies—building and loan associations, perpetual building associations, "plan" banks, mortgage "banks," etc. In the first place, they are apt to carry that "may not release" feature. In the second place, their interest rates are usually higher than conventional banks and F.H.A.—by ½% to 1% or so. Don't be fooled by such small percentage differentials. When you stop and figure that on the first \$90 monthly payment (say on a combined \$10,000 loan at 5%), \$41.67 goes for *interest* alone, a ½% difference in rate can mean a tidy sum in 12 times 20 payments (about \$4.17 per payment). In the third place, some finance companies compute their interest charges on an "unpaid balance" every six months, instead of monthly. On the figures just given the interest depreciates about 21 cents per month. With no depreciation for a six month period, that means an added institution morale factor of some \$3.15 per borrower *over and above* that enjoyed by a conventional bank or F.H.A. loan. And so on. Barring a forced "tie-in" with a finance company, a commercial bank or F.H.A. loan is preferable. Try F.H.A. first. You may get a higher loan at an equal or less interest rate than from a bank.

Once all arrangements for financing and "settlement" have been made and you become the physical possessor of the property, conditions should then gradually permit reflective thinking and evaluation of your purchase. If you take advantage of conditions, it is a healthy sign, as it indicates a willingness to learn (even if it is the "hard way"). If you bought a used house you may find that the automatic hot-water heater (or the heating system itself) may begin to act up, then not act at all. Or there may be malfunctioning

or malformation of some other necessary item which may cost you good money to repair or replace. If you bought a new house, the windows may not fit right (after all, you can't check every one of them before you move in), the paint work may need touching-up, cracks may develop in the ceilings or bathroom tile, floors may become uneven, plumbing fixtures may prove faulty, there may be missing fixtures and a lot of other items to challenge your patience and integrity evaluation of the agent or builder who sold you

the house. But all this is good for the soul, as it keeps one in mental trim for the inevitable receipt of new orders and the signal for starting the whole damned cycle over again.

So, if you *have to buy* a house, of course you have to. Be wary; be cautious; be as realistic as you can. But, remember, you are not apt to get a good buy. There are painfully few good buys on today's realty market. About the best you should hope for is a roof and suitable cubage thereunder. The drier the roof, the better.

ANIMAL TRANSPORT AND THE NATIONAL GUARD

By Capt. Edward L. Bimberg, Cav-Res.

MANY AN INFANTRY UNIT in World War II found itself fighting under conditions for which it was scarcely prepared. In Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, Southern France, Burma, New Guinea and the South Pacific the doughboys were forced by rugged terrain to all but abandon their motor transport and replace it with pack animals that could negotiate mountain and jungle.

Inasmuch as pack transportation had not been taught in most infantry outfits for years, the men who were supposed to organize the animal transport hadn't the faintest idea of where or how to begin. In Italy, for instance, each regiment, and sometimes each battalion, had a "mule officer." In many cases this individual was a poor, bewildered gent whose only previous experience with the equine species was in periodic sojourns at the local track.

The mule officer usually gathered around him a cadre of enlisted men of varying experience. In any outfit men could be found who had driven mules on ranch or farm, but the technique of *packing* animals is one requiring a high degree of skill, which was all too often lacking. The result was slipping packs, sore backs, sick animals—in sum, poor pack transportation within the division.

How can we remedy this situation in the future? In the Regular Army the problem is comparatively simple. Selected officers and enlisted men are periodically sent to the Mountain Warfare School at Camp Carson, Colorado,

or to the Department of Horsemanship of the Ground General School at Fort Riley. But for the National Guard, whose men seldom have the time to attend service schools, the problem must be attacked from scratch.

Why, then, can't each state have one or two separate National Guard animal transport school companies? The personnel for these companies would be Guardsmen with horse experience and their initial training would be refresher courses in packing, animal management, etc. Each company would have enough pack animals for demonstration purposes and the men would be trained in all infantry weapons to be packed.

Once the animal transport school company was in operation, selected members of National Guard infantry units in the neighborhood could be sent to the company one night a week for instruction in pack transportation, animal management, horseshoeing, etc., until a specified course was finished. In this way each infantry unit would eventually have enough trained personnel within its ranks to take over the job of animal transport should the need arise.

Many infantrymen will ask the question, "Is this knowledge of animal transport necessary? Will we ever again need to abandon mechanized means of transportation in difficult terrain?" To me, the answer seems obvious, since no vehicle has yet been devised that will negotiate trackless mountain and jungle.



PERIMETERS in PARAGRAPHS



By Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Ret.

EUROPE

Prepared by a widely-known military scholar and writer, PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS is a recurring feature dealing with the military, political and economic realities in world affairs. Whereas an understanding of these realities is deemed essential to the American soldier, it is emphasized that PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS reflects the opinions of the author alone. This installment covers the period 16 October - 15 December 1947.—Editor.

THE GENERAL SITUATION

On 22 October, Colonel General Andrei A. Zhdanov, a member of the Russian Polit Bureau and Secretary-General of the Russian Communist Party, issued a declaration of Russian policy. This charged that the United States was seeking **"world domination through American imperialism . . . [through] a new imperialistic war against socialism and democracy and by supporting reactionary and anti-democratic pro-Fascist regimes everywhere."**

Zhdanov listed the peace-loving democracies as consisting solely of Russia and its satellite states, less Finland—considered as partly Fascist. India, Egypt, and Syria were probable new members, while the revolutionists in Indo-China and Indonesia were expected to join. All other states throughout the world were charged as in "preparation for new military adventures" under American domination.

This allegation corresponded with similar statements made by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vishinsky before the United Nations on 18 September; by the Communist Information Bureau on 5 October; by other Russian officials; and extensively by the Russian press.

Against the supposed threat of a new and fearful war against the peace-

loving democratic states of Russia and its satellites, General Zhdanov announced that Russia would take the lead to oppose the United States. He called upon all communists in the world to join in the battle. To start the campaign, he said that "the USSR will put all effort in seeing that the Marshall Plan is not realized." Previously the Communist Information Bureau (new name for the Comintern) had on 27 September and 5 October issued statements announcing the organization of the communist states to combat alleged American efforts to start a new war. The first objective was to secure France and Italy. This was to be done by 5th Column activities designed to replace the existing national governments with communists. Thereby the friendly contact of these two states with the Anglo-Saxon Powers would be broken, and in lieu thereof close cooperation arranged with Russia. It was believed this objective could be gained during the winter of 1947-48.

Russia's open avowal that it would do all it could to break the Marshall Plan, and at the same time seek to produce revolutions in Italy and France, are unprecedented actions for a Power to take in times of peace. A delicate situation has consequently arisen.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

As heretofore reported in this column, our Secretary of State General Marshall, in his Harvard speech of 5 June, 1947, invited the European nations including Russia and its satellites to arrange an economic program to assist one another. If, as might be expected, they would be unable to balance their needs,

applications might be submitted for whatever was required in addition to preserve nations from famine and to place them economically upon a sound basis, and thus restore peace to a very troubled world. The United States promised that requests presented with those ideas in view would be considered in a benevolent spirit of generosity.

There followed the Paris Conference, in which Russia and its satellites refused to take part. Sixteen west European nations were present. They submitted their report and request for United States aid on 22 September. They had earlier made a tentative report which had estimated that \$30 billion would be needed from the United States through the four years 1948 to 1951 to balance the economies of the sixteen participating nations. This averages \$7½ billion per year. It happens that this amount is about what the United States will have furnished Europe during the years 1946 and 1947 each, as gifts, or "loans" which few expect will ever be repaid. Whether the Paris Conference accidentally arrived at the same average figure for the succeeding years is not surely known. The available evidence indicates that it was not accidental.

Some of the sixteen nations signing the Paris Conference report adopted a theory that the United States, to maintain full employment at home, just had to export \$7½ billion per annum, more or less, to prevent an economic disaster of the first order. Since the United States had to make gifts, it might well be themselves to whom these were issued. The problem, as they looked at it, was thus reduced to determining which nations

would receive how much; and this they did. In support of this strange idea, the British Lord President of the Council, Mr. Morrison, stated that American gifts to other countries were a positive advantage to the American economy. The French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, expressed the idea that the United States was in as great a need of "lending" as Europe was of borrowing.

The \$30 billion Plan was disapproved by our State Department as soon as it was made public. The Paris Conference thereupon reconsidered its intentions. According to press reports this was done with bad grace. The final report called for a little less than \$20 billion for the four years, but maintained the \$7½ billion for the year 1948. This would permit an upward revision of the lesser amounts which the new plan provides for the three following years before 1949 arrives.

There is a psychological element in the action of the Paris Conference. The sixteen west European nations are to a greater or lesser extent all suffering from devastated areas and/or disrupted economies. They form a depressed class—temporarily, it is hoped—but for the present they need aid. Like other depressed classes they are acutely sensitive of anything that contributes to their acknowledging a subordinate position. Accepting gifts or subsidies is to them humiliating. They do not want to be considered as objects of charity, especially if this is accompanied by inspections, requirements for reports, or agreements of a political or military nature. It is much more satisfying to their national pride to represent that aid from the United States is an agreement whose primary mission is to prevent an economic disaster within the United States. From that point of view only they are doing us a favor by accepting our goods and assuring employment to our workers. Consequently they represent that the goods should be furnished free and without conditions, economic, political, or military. Requirements for American inspections to cover distribution of gifts and "loans" are resented.

Few nations show gratitude for favors furnished in the past. It hurts to acknowledge that there ever was a time when they were unable to maintain themselves in the world without foreign aid. During World War II, Russia and China were faithful allies while in the

receipt of large subsidies from the United States. With the cessation of the subsidies, Russia is no longer friendly and China is dissatisfied. Russia now claims that the success of American arms against Germany and Japan was solely due to the Russian armies. China pretends that if it had not been for her assistance, the United States would not have won the war against Japan. Neither will concede that American aid received during the war was of material assistance. On the contrary they profess that the United States is deeply indebted to them. The precedents of history indicate that for allies to turn against their benefactor after the need for subsidies has passed, is normal. There are exceptions but they are few. Allowance should be made, in granting further subsidies from America, for the probability that it is likely that little, if any, return will be made by the recipients of our generosity.

Now comes Russia with the publicly avowed intention of wrecking the Marshall Plan proposed by the United States in order to aid Europe to reestablish economic independence, and thereby contribute to restoring peace and order.

This action of Russia is strictly military. The advantages to Russia include:

1. To stop American exports to Europe to the extent of the \$7½ billion furnished yearly during 1946 and 1947, and proposed for 1948. This with the hope that it will cause unemployment in the United States and help in starting an economic crisis.
2. To separate west Europe from cooperation with the United States by installing communist governments friendly to Russia, and ready to join Russia.
3. To secure control of the great industrial plants and resources of manpower in west Europe. United to the resources of Russia the combined resources and industrial plants, after reconditioning and coordination, will equal or exceed those of the United States, while the combined manpower will be vastly superior.
4. To secure desirable and numerous bases fronting on the Atlantic Ocean for air and naval forces.

The writings of Marx claim that industrial (called capitalistic by Marx) nations have alternate booms and depressions; that booms are caused by large exports or markets, and depressions by lack of exports and markets. His remedy is communism, where government, ownership will insure uniform production and uniform distribution. This method will work in a closed economy, provided that a uniform standard of life is accepted. In practice as shown by the experience of Russia, and that under way in England, it means a low standard of life. The doctrine of alternate booms and depressions is accepted in Russia. Its leaders have for two years been predicting a coming depression in the United States. They have been hoping that when this came the United States would be so embarrassed that it would cease to be a major Power. The only fault in this argument is that there hasn't been any depression, or sign of depression, within the United States since World War II. This has been very disappointing; something had to be done about it. This turns out to be a political activity, not involving formal war, to detach west Europe from the American trade zones. Not only would this, if successful, result in the loss by the United States of the \$7½ billion yearly gifts, but also of about the same amount of goods which have been paid for. This great reduction in trade might start an economic disaster; it seemed worth trying.

The plan to accomplish this was part of the latest Russian Plan, approved at Moscow on 2 September 1947. This called for the reconstitution of the Comintern, renamed the Communist Information Bureau, whose first mission would be to overthrow the existing governments in France and Italy and replace them with communists. These two countries are the largest in west Europe, with the greatest populations and the best industrial plants. Their location strategically is such that if occupied the American line of communications to the eastern Mediterranean would be threatened. Germany would be encircled on three sides. It would be impossible to defend Germany under those conditions. The small states of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland would be unable to maintain their independence.

Spain and Portugal might be defended, provided necessary measures are taken in time. Even Scandinavia would be in danger, and this possibility has been feared by the General Staff of Sweden. Russia's progress in carrying out its plan is discussed below under the heading of France and Italy.

The continuing independence of France and Italy is of major strategical importance to the United States. The effort of Russia is to deprive the United States of this advantage by political activity which involves little risk for Russia if it fails, and great gains if it succeeds. As this account closes, this problem is under consideration by the government of the United States.

FRANCE AND ITALY

In these countries, communist parties have been operating for years, and have been in close liaison with Russia. They were both represented at the initial meeting of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) last September, and joined in the declaration that uprisings against their own national governments should be carried out this winter. From what later developed, the uprising was to take place toward mid-November. On the 12th of that month serious communist riots started in Marseille and Naples. They were on the same pattern—strikes of port employees to tie up imports. There was considerable violence and some slight initial successes for the communists. A few days later the strikes were extended in France to coal mining and industrial areas and in Italy to industrial cities. Strikes by government employees in France stopped railroad traffic and public services. For some days the situation looked serious.

The Italian government took vigorous steps to quell the communists. The strength of the MPs (Carabinieri) was increased by 10,000 by transfers from other military organizations. This Italy was entitled to do under her peace treaty. The French government was at first not vigorous. The French Communist Party on 14 November issued a declaration stating they were opposing collusion with the United States, and would proceed to greater violence if necessary. Making no headway against the

communists, the French government on 21 November resigned. A new government under M. Robert Schuman was formed. It ordered troops to suppress disorders, and authorized them to use ball ammunition if necessary, which had the necessary effect. Similar energetic action was taken in Italy. Communist demonstrations now fell off. On 9 December, the communists acknowledged defeat by calling off strikes and disorders in both France and Italy.

Comment. The fact that the communist uprisings followed the same pattern and occurred between the same dates in both Italy and France points to a common origin. Whether this was a joint plan adopted at the September meeting which reconstituted the Comintern, or whether it was pursuant to orders issued later, is not yet known. The important fact is that the communists were decisively beaten in all areas in which they operated.

According to reports from private correspondents the majority of members of the French Communist Party joined to secure better social conditions—particularly higher wages to meet the increased cost of living. They did not join to further the policies of Russia. A return of French citizens to other political parties on a rather large scale has been reported.

The failure of the communist parties in France and Italy is a decided setback for Russia's adopted mission to break the Marshall Plan.

GREECE

Military operations have been limited to minor engagements along the north Greek frontier, with major fighting by the 7th and 8th Greek Divisions in the area east and north from Ioannina, against communist forces based on Albania. At a conference held at Greek GHQ it had been decided to start an offensive against the communists about 15 November. However, up to a month later when this account closed, there had been no offensive. Explanation is lack of artillery and machine guns, supposed to be furnished by the United States but not yet issued. In general the military situation has deteriorated for Greece, with corresponding

improvement for the communists, who are increasing their forces and adding new equipment, particularly artillery. This has not yet appeared in line.

The US Engineer Corps has opened an office in Athens to supervise public works partially financed by the United States. The major work for military purposes is the reopening of the railroad from Athens to Salonika and thence to the Turkish border. This involves rebuilding of numerous bridges and some tunnels which had been destroyed by previous military operations. Considerable work is being started on roads to make them practicable for military movements in the expected campaign. Air Fields are being enlarged or improved, and some new ones are being built. American liaison officers are being added to Greek forces down to division headquarters. The main object appears to be to instill energy into Greek units for an offensive which has been continually delayed under various pretexts. A National Guard for local defense, scheduled to release about 20,000 regular troops from garrison defense duties, is under formation. A major problem is the care of over 300,000 refugees from northern areas. They can not remain on their farms without being subject to forcible impressment by communist raiders, and there is no suitable place for their care. Possibly some may be absorbed in the Engineer road and railroad labor projects.

TURKEY

American aid is now being received. New construction involves additional air fields and improvement of existing ones. Lines of communication within Turkey are few and poor. It is doubtful whether, with American aid limited to \$100 million, much can be done about this in view of other demands. It will be necessary to improve ports, and to undertake extensive road and railroad construction from the ports into the interior of Turkey, and particularly its western and eastern frontiers. Both these frontiers are garrisoned on a war basis, but communication between them is poor, and quite unsuitable for rapid movement of troops from one front to the other.

TWO CONFERENCES—BERLIN AND LONDON

I. In November, 1940, Mr. Vyaschelav M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of Russia, packed his bags and traveled from Moscow to Berlin, for a conference with that well-known German, Adolf Hitler, at that time at the head of his state. The mission of the conference was to arrange, if possible, for continued peace between Russia and Germany, who were then the two leading military Powers. Molotov stated his terms. Romania, Bulgaria, and the Istanbul Straits were to be given to Russia. He would concede Yugoslavia and Greece to Germany. That was his price. If he received what he asked for he saw no reason why peace between Germany and Russia might not continue for a long time. Hitler considered the price too high. He refused Molotov's request. The conference closed with both sides knowing that it had been a failure and both knowing that war between them was inevitable. Molotov repacked his bags and returned to Moscow to prepare for that war. Owing to Hitler's greater energy and resources he was ready for the war first and started it in June, 1941. It would have come anyway. It was accidental that Germany was ready before Russia was.

II. Seven years passed after the Berlin Conference. Then in November, 1947, Mr. Vyaschelav M. Molotov, still Foreign Minister of Russia, again packed his bags and traveled from

Moscow to London for a conference with the Western Powers, whose chief spokesman was the American General George Marshall. The mission of this conference was to arrange, if possible, for peace ostensibly with Germany, but more between Russia and the United States, now become the two leading military Powers. Molotov on 26 November stated his terms. Germany was to be organized into a single state under conditions which would leave it substantially under Russian control. Besides, Germany was to pay Russia \$10 billion as reparations. That was Russia's price.

Secretary Marshall on his return to the United States discussed Molotov's proposition. Germany didn't have \$10 billion, and could only get it by obtaining a loan for that amount from the United States in order to then pass it over to Russia. The Western Powers didn't like Germany passing to Russian control. Molotov's price was too high, and it had been refused. Thereupon Molotov repacked his bags, and as in 1940, traveled back to Moscow.

Comments. The London Conference, which ended on 15 December, 1947, was the occasion for much speech making by the Powers. There was considerable camouflage and propaganda. Russia charged the United States with seeking war. Eliminating the camouflage, propaganda, and unproved charges, Russia's terms,

which were only partly expressed openly, can be seen. As in 1940, Russia desires an increase of territory. At Berlin she particularly wanted the Istanbul Straits in order to secure an outlet on the Mediterranean Sea. At London, she specially desired to control Germany to secure direct access to the Atlantic Ocean. Besides, Germany would bring her large and valuable resources and a great increase of manpower.

Russia is opposed to the Marshall Plan. She considers it a device to organize west Europe into a coalition against her and headed by the United States. Molotov's proposition was that Germany be given to Russia to balance what the United States has secured. In view of the fact that the United States was considering providing \$20 billion to the 16 European nations to benefit from the Marshall Plan, Russia asks for half that amount, or \$10 billion. That is Molotov's price—Germany and \$10 billion. As in 1940, he was refused.

The general belief is that the London Conference accomplished nothing. It accomplished just as much as the Berlin Conference of 1940. In 1940, Molotov represented a Russian government headed by Marshal Stalin. In 1947, the same Molotov represented exactly the same government. The Russian reaction is likely to be a duplicate of that of 7 years ago.

THE ADVANCE OF COMMUNISM

Until recently, communism has had no connection with the military situation. Unhappily a new and special form of communism has arisen which has a close connection with world strategy. Its success, or failure, may well determine which country will be the ally of whom should a World War III arrive. It is of major importance to the security of the United States, which hates communism and is in turn hated by the new form of that ideology, to take action to preserve its own freedom. It is best to first look at the record.

DEFINITION OF COMMUNISM

Communism has been discussed, and has operated on a limited scale, for over 2,000 years. In theory it means the total or partial abolition of private ownership, which passes to the community as a whole or to the state. The state also assumes the right to regulate the production, distribution and consumption of products of industry. It may control the right to assign labor, each individual being required to do that which is most advantageous to the community. As ownership becomes

nationalized the state becomes correspondingly responsible for the support of its citizens.

Communism depends upon citizens' devoting their lives to whatever work the government designates, for such compensation as may be allotted, with the understanding that in general no one will be permitted to rise in his living standard above a prescribed level. The theory assumes that the state will be able to raise the standard of the working classes forming a majority, and believed to have been too low, by reducing

the standard of the minority of property owners, believed to have been too high.

EXAMPLES OF COMMUNISM

Military units are a type of communism. Each of its individuals is required to perform that duty for which he is best fitted or which most needs his services. Property belongs to the state and is issued as needed. The state assures, to each member, pay, rations, clothing, shelter, and whatever he needs, regardless of whether he is able to perform duty, or is incapacitated by legitimate reasons. This type of communism is ancient and efficient.

In civil life, communism has existed in certain religious orders for small communities. It is found in the Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Episcopalian churches; also on a larger scale in Buddhist countries, as, for example, among the monks of Tibet. This type of communism has also been found satisfactory.

Partial nationalization of certain kinds of property has developed only within the last 100 years. A familiar and nearly universal example is the post office. In a number of states railroads have long been nationalized. Since World War II, nationalization has increased. Thus in Great Britain the coal industry has been taken over by the state, while the railroads and the steel industry have been slated for early nationalization. In France certain industrial works have recently been nationalized. As state ownership has increased, state responsibilities have become greater; these appeared as pensions and new allowances for workers. In these cases, abolition of private ownership, and the right to assign labor, has worked, for it has been arrived at by voluntary agreement. If in the military services citizens have been drafted to the colors against their consent this has been with the approval of the nation as a whole. Usually the draft has been restricted to times when the independence of the nation was in danger, or for a limited period to provide universal military training to prepare for the safety of the state.

Complete communism, involving abolition of all private ownership on a national level, has never been voluntarily adopted, although this has

been written and talked about since before the days of Christ.

MARXIAN COMMUNISM

Extension of communism to embrace an entire nation happened for the first time after World War I. Russia accomplished it. It was not a voluntary movement of its citizens. It was imposed by able, ruthless and determined enthusiasts. Their action followed principles recommended by Karl Marx, and his writings are to this day the basis for Russian policies. Marx wrote his main work — *Das Kapital* — some 80 years ago. The evidence indicates that its ideas had been formed about 20 years earlier, or just a century past. Marx believed in communism on a national and world level. He noted that no nation had voluntarily adopted it. He saw no practicable way to secure universal communism through voluntary action. He recommended the use of force on the theory that evils caused by such action would be more than compensated for by ultimate gains.

Marx felt that owners would never voluntarily surrender all their property to the state. He proposed to overcome that difficulty by massacre of the owners, thereby securing the property without cost, and at the same time preventing the forming of a class of dissatisfied citizens composed of former owners. In Marx's time, education was not general in the non-property owning classes. Marx realized that owners were usually educated, and that, if they were killed, not enough educated persons would be left to organize and run a great state. Marx's solution for this was to establish a "Dictatorship of the Proletariat," of selected able men who in the name of The People would establish communism. He foresaw that communism forced in this manner would be resented. To overcome that difficulty he recommended the overthrow of existing social conditions. This involved extermination of individuals objecting to or opposing the new system. As the wholesale seizure of private property without compensation, together with mass murders of property owners and disbelievers in communism, were contrary to the principles of every religion in the world, Marx prescribed war against any and all churches. These

special features of Marxian communism — extensive murders, atheism, and violent seizure of property—form no part of the general theory of communism. The forcing of these unnatural features on unwilling nations is what makes Marxian communism such a fearful threat to the world.

Russia imposed communism in its own country precisely as recommended by Marx. Millions of persons were put to death, religion was all but destroyed, and private property was seized. A Dictatorship of the Proletariat was established and is functioning in the name of The People. It is the well-known Polit Bureau.

Marx did not consider it possible for his system to work in just one country. It had to start somewhere, but to maintain it Marx prescribed that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat first established would have to extend his kind of communism to all other states. When all nations had been brought under the new rule, the Dictatorship could be discontinued and The People given their freedom. The officially announced intention to spread Marxian communism is supported by the observed efforts to compel Russian areas occupied as the result of World War II to embrace that form of government. In a declaration dated 5 October, 1947, the newly formed Communist Information Bureau announced that the spread of Marxian communism to countries not yet occupied by Russia, including Italy and France, was to be undertaken. Initially this was to be through action by 5th Columns, who were to grasp in their hands the governments of their respective countries.

ATTEMPTS TO SPREAD MARXIAN COMMUNISM

The earliest effort outside of Russia occurred in Germany in 1919. It was suppressed with considerable brutality. It then restarted more cautiously, resulting in numerous riots. It was finally squelched by the organization of the Nazi Dictatorship under Hitler in 1933.

Shortly following World War I a concerted effort started in Italy to install Marxian communism. This had a partial success. A number of industrial plants were seized without compensation to owners, and further violent measures

were threatened. Then Mussolini arose, and established a Fascist Dictatorship which eradicated communism for the time being.

A serious attempt to establish Marxian communism occurred in Spain in 1936. The communists had profited by their failures in Germany and Italy, and this later attempt was better organized. A major measure was to first prepare the way for revolution by removal by murder of probable competent opponents. Then revolt came, and had a temporary success. Property was seized and confiscated, owners were put to death, religion was persecuted. A 3-year civil war followed which was won by the establishment of a Dictatorship under General Franco, which is still in power and has completely suppressed communism.

Portugal during this period was threatened with communism. It headed this off by the installation of a Dictatorship under Salazar, which still is in power. It too extinguished communism.

The foregoing four efforts to establish Marxian communism, which occurred between World Wars I and II, all ended with failure and the establishment of other dictatorships in place of the expected Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The substitute dictatorships seem to have had the support of the majority of their people at time of installation. They have differed widely in their methods of government. None have been overthrown except by outside interferences which formed the basis for World War II.

On 29 November the United Nations voted for a partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. This was accepted by the Jews, but is violently opposed by all Arab states. The partition establishes boundaries between the new states as recommended by the UN Special Committee on 31 August, 1947. The boundaries are irregular, being supposed to be drawn so as to place as few Jews as possible within the Arab state, and vice versa. Strange boundaries result. Railroads and axis

roads cross and recross frontiers, making it possible for either state to establish road blocks against the other.

Since World War II, the most prominent effort to establish Marxian communism has been in Greece. The communists in that country are based upon adjacent Russian satellite states, which afford havens of refuge in case of defeat, and opportunities for rest, reorganization, and reequipment to recommence hostilities. This movement has been so serious a threat to the peace of the world that the United States in March 1947 intervened. As discussed separately in this column, the Grecian problem has not yet been solved.

A threat to establish Marxian communism in Turkey was headed off by the timely intervention of the United States at the same time that it acted in favor of Greece.

Commencing in October 1947, communist 5th Column activities began simultaneously in France and Italy. According to the Russian declaration of 5 October, this is understood to be a primary movement to disrupt the lawful governments representing a majority of the citizens.

Comments. Basic communism, involving the partial or entire nationalization of property, has been spreading. In theory this assumes the right to assign labor. This feature has to date been adopted only to a minor extent. This form of communism is a social and economic question, which is not a threat to the peace of the world and ordinarily does not affect the military situation. Its establishment has been with due regard to the freedoms of the individual, which involve the right to vote freely for government leaders, and provide for freedom of speech, of religion, etc.

PALESTINE

roads cross and recross frontiers, making it possible for either state to establish road blocks against the other.

The Arab states have concluded a secret agreement arranging for future action to oppose the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Arab states lack resources and man power to oppose either the United Nations or any major power, yet they have an unusually high nuisance value. They hold Egypt and the borders of the Suez Canal; they control extensive oil areas necessary to the Anglo-Saxon Powers;

they might arouse Mohammedan uprisings or operations all the way from Pakistan to Morocco. The majority of Arabs in Palestine are Mohammedan, but there are a considerable number of Christian Arabs who in some sections form a majority. The latter seem to be as much opposed to the Jews as their Mohammedan brethren.

Marxian communism has never been installed voluntarily. Where it exists it came by violence and is maintained by force. It involves abolition of all freedoms, the individual becoming the property of the state, with no rights that the latter need respect. What the state will do with the individual under that kind of government is seen in Russia.

Where Marxian communism has struck outside of Russia, the reaction in each case to date has been the establishment of some kind of dictatorship. In theory, this differs from the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in that the rights of the freedoms of the people are guaranteed. The European nations appear to have voluntarily accepted this type of dictatorship to avoid the greater evil of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. That any kind of dictatorship affords opportunities for oppression and illegal actions is certain. That of the Nazis is an example of how far a dictatorship originally established to insure freedom of the people can wander from the true and rigid path of justice.

Now that Marxian communism is again threatening Europe, just as it did after World War I, there is once more a tendency to seek some kind of dictatorship to meet the new peril. This movement is opposed by the United States, which is insisting on democracies remaining at the heads of states supported politically or economically by American means. This is a new method and its ultimate success is not yet assured.

The struggle against the extension of Marxian communism is on.

An immediate result of the partition of Palestine has been the outbreak of a savage guerrilla warfare between Jews and Arabs throughout Palestine.

CHINA

THE STRATEGICAL SITUATION

A National (Kuomintang) Government has been at war with the communists for over 20 years. Notwithstanding superior forces and resources, in this long period the Kuomintang has been unable to win victory. On the contrary, the communists have gradually increased in strength, and have now larger forces than ever. There is no probability that the Kuomintang can overcome its enemy by military measures unless foreign assistance is secured. China (Kuomintang) is looking to the United States for such aid, with delicate hints promulgated from time to time that, if it is not forthcoming, it will be necessary to turn towards Russia. The communists naturally look towards Russia. They have announced that they are followers of Marxian communism, and consider Moscow as their guide.

The United States is opposed to the Chinese communists. It does not, however, admire the Kuomintang Government but recognizes it as legal. American aid to the Kuomintang has all but ceased. No loans have been made for some time, and none appear to be contemplated at date of writing. The United States has reverted to the strategic policy followed during the winter of 1941-1942. At that time it had been decided to concentrate American preparations against Germany, the Pacific areas being temporarily abandoned. That resulted in the loss of Southeast Asia to Japan, necessitating subsequent military operations for three years of heavy fighting before Japan was overcome.

In the winter of 1947-1948 American support is again being concentrated in the European theater, by furnishing economic and military support to nations with a view to stopping communism from spreading to west and southeast Europe. The spread of communism in the Pacific theater is temporarily neglected. As happened similarly six years ago, this policy is resulting in communism in Asia spreading through China, and incidentally Korea. Communism has already a strong hold in Indo-China and threatens to go beyond. The further

spread of communism in the Far East is to be expected, and will ultimately require correspondingly greater military measures whenever the decision is made that it is time to bring it to a halt.

When in 1931 Japan seized Manchuria it had the aid of some Chinese. They were not numerous and were not organized. In 1947 communism within China is actively supported by an organized armed force estimated to have about a million well-armed troops. This is a much greater danger to China than the Japanese advance 16 years earlier.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The communists have been spearheading the arrival of their troops by propaganda parties. The main effort is in the territory just north of the Yangtze River and between Hankow and Nanking. About 100 propaganda parties have been identified in this area. They are composed of young men and girls in uniform, whose mission is to establish communist cells, organize an Underground where desirable, establish schools, and generally prepare for a communist organization. Many of the propaganda parties are graduates of Chinese schools and colleges. They appear to be having considerable success.

Communist commanding generals have issued general orders directing strict enforcement of discipline. All property taken is to be paid for and inhabitants are to be treated with courtesy. In practice these orders are not always followed. Inhabitants known to be opposed to communism are annihilated as provided in Marxian communism, and their property is of course subject to confiscation. Still the communists have a higher rating than the Kuomintang in regard to seizure of property and levying of taxes, in that these are disbursed for public purposes and do not go to corrupt officials.

The economic situation has deteriorated. The Kuomintang has made efforts to improve its administration. Some officials have been changed and an effort made to recover alleged huge sums illegally held by certain individuals. The suspected individuals appear to have transferred their assets to

foreign territory and it may be difficult to recover any substantial amount.

An election was held on 21 November to elect an Assembly, which was to convene on 25 December and select a President and full staff for a new popular government. An "election" was held with undetermined results. The mass of Chinese are unlearned; do not know the difference between communism and democracy; never saw an election before; appeared to be little interested. Results have not been disclosed. However, the actual Government has postponed the meeting of the Assembly for 3 months. At the same time the present Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and all his various bureaus and staffs were authorized to hold office until successors were properly elected. A new Constitution, modeled somewhat on that of the United States, has been announced as in force from 26 December. On paper this is a good Constitution—the main trouble is that nobody pays much attention to it.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

According to Kuomintang returns of 30 October, its military forces consisted of:

Officers	536,913
Enlisted men	4,020,449
Total	5,557,362

No return of communist forces is available. Estimates by American correspondents in China give figures of around 1,000,000. The Kuomintang has a crushing numerical superiority, yet it does not overcome its weaker opponent. The Kuomintang claims that this is the fault of the United States. Its troops are indeed largely equipped with American materiel, and some divisions are American trained. It is now represented that the United States issued the materiel at various periods down to 1946 and that much of it is worn out or needs repair. The United States has not been repairing worn materiel, nor has it furnished spare parts. Consequently it is claimed that nobody except the United States is to blame for communist successes. That China might have done something to procure spare parts, or

manufacture them locally, is left unexplained.

The Central Theater. This extends northwards from the Yangtze River to the Great Wall. As reported in the preceding number of this JOURNAL, the communist general Liu Po-cheng marched out of Shantung during the past summer to escape superior Kuomintang forces. He established himself in the bend of the Yangtze River about 100 miles east from Hankow. From this position he interrupted traffic along the Yangtze and threatened to cross that river. An unconfirmed report is that crossing the Yangtze will be undertaken as a major objective during 1948. This force numbers about 5 weak divisions. Another communist force of about the same strength is centered at the northwest corner of Honan in the Hsiung Erh Mountains. This command interrupts the Lung Hai RR and raids the Hankow & Peiping RR often enough to keep that line interrupted. A third communist force of about 50,000 men is widely dispersed throughout Shantung, with its main body covering that area from a position just west of Tungshan (or Suchow). This force interrupts traffic along the Pukow and Tientsin RR. These three communist forces are engaged in consolidating their hold on central China. From a strategic point of view the proper course for the superior Kuomintang forces would be to intervene between the 3 hostile forces of about 1 corps each and defeat them in detail. They are 300 to 350 miles away from each other, allowing ample terrain for maneuver. However, nothing like this has been undertaken.

On 8 November about 3 communist divisions started an attack against a single Kuomintang division garrisoning Shihkiachwang Junction, in central Hopeh. There had been 2 divisions in the garrison, but one of these had been detached in October to relieve an attack against Tsinghuan and had been all but

destroyed en route. On 12 November, Shihkiachwang fell to the communists, largely through the effects of artillery fire. Including the division previously lost, 2 had been destroyed by this short campaign. This battle well illustrates Chinese tactics. The Kuomintang undertakes to garrison "critical" points. This requires a very large number of troops, who are immobilized within defenses and lose the spirit of undertaking field operations. Against these "critical" points the communists from time to time assemble a superior force. They are by no means always successful, but sometimes they are. The loss of Shihkiachwang resulted in the Kuomintang withdrawing 3 divisions from Manchuria for duty south of Peiping, under an assumption that the victorious communists would move northwards toward that city. At the same time a new army of 7 divisions was formed under General Pai Chung-hoi, totaling with attached troops about 100,000 men, with orders to clear the enemy pocket in the bend of the Yangtze southeast from Hankow. General Fu Tsi-yi was appointed commander for the Peiping area. This general issued a general order on 4 December. He announced that whenever the enemy concentrated he would strike somewhere else. He considered this to be a new type of aggressive war. Up to 15 December, General Fu had accomplished nothing important. General Pai, under naval and air protection, crossed the Yangtze near Kiukiang. Before his superior forces the communists withdrew to the northwest. Two more divisions at Hankow were placed at the disposition of General Pai, who sent them to Sinfang on the Hankow & Peiping RR to head off the communists. This maneuver succeeded, and the communists thereupon turned eastward from the vicinity of Sinyang. This operation remained uncompleted at the date this account closes.

The Manchurian Theater. At the beginning of the period a communist offensive had been launched against Changchun and Kirin (advanced Kuomintang posts) and against Hulutao (main Kuomintang base). Communist strength in Manchuria was estimated as 250,000, against a Kuomintang force of over 300,000 holding the South Manchuria RR from the Great Wall to Changchun. Because the railroad was being constantly interrupted by enemy raids, supply and replacements for the Kuomintang were by air. The communists have no air force. The communist attacks made no progress and, as reported above, 3 Kuomintang divisions were withdrawn to Peiping. As replacements, 3 new divisions from south China were landed at Yingkow by 28 November, and were then forwarded by air to Mukden and Shangchun. These new troops had no winter clothing and were short of materiel. No important operations followed.

Sinkiang. On 22 October motorized enemy troops supposed to be Mongolians, but using Russian trucks and equipment, crossed the border and captured Sharasume, in the extreme north. The Chinese (Kuomintang) troops withdrew towards the south. A rebellion against the Kuomintang has arisen in north Sinkiang, where the inhabitants are Moslems. Russian propaganda is strong in this area. It stresses the fact that many Russians are Moslems, and very friendly people; contrasts the alleged corrupt Kuomintang with the alleged efficient communist government; promises better and cheaper goods if the people join Russia. Sinkiang is a country difficult of access by ground movements except from the direction of Russian territory. The entire country is easily accessible by air. Held by a strong air force, it would be a major factor in a war in which China was involved. This little-known territory deserves more attention than it is receiving. It is likely to be heard from again.

SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE GENERAL SITUATION

The Japanese invasion of southeast Asia has produced major political

effects throughout both that area and south Asia, or India. Japan failed to secure the support of the more than

500,000,000 people owing to the intolerable manner in which they treated the inhabitants. But the Japanese slogan

of *Asia for the Asiatics* went over. The harvest is now being reaped, for everywhere these Asiatic races are demanding independence.

Great Britain has decided not to fight the movement but to grant independence. In so doing she hopes to maintain friendly relations with her former subjects, who may elect to largely remain within the British Commonwealth. To date this change is progressing on the whole smoothly. The United States has pursued a similar course in the Philippines, who have been given their independence. Both the British and the Americans have retained the right, without substantial objection from the new native governments, to maintain certain military bases in their former possessions.

The French and Dutch are resisting the demands for independence in Indo-China and Indonesia respectively. They are engaged in military operations to suppress insurrections. Thereby they have been, and are, incurring the ill will and hatred of their present subjects.

One state—Siam—is independent. It has started a movement to organize a new state, yet without a name, to consist of itself, Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. Such a state would have a predominantly Malay population of well over 100,000,000, and would meet on better terms the greater states of China to the north and India to the west. Nothing has been done about this other than to start the idea.

INDIA

On 15 August, Great Britain granted independence to India. This state had for over a hundred years been united to form a single Empire, and had reached a high state of civilization. During both World Wars, Indian troops had fought in North Africa and Europe and in lesser theaters. As many as 3 million troops were under arms at one time.

Prior to British jurisdiction India was divided into a multiplicity of

states, some of which were Moslem and others Hindu as to religion. These rival religions, which had for centuries engaged in wars against each other, had been brought to live in peace. Under British rule, Indian divisions might contain both Hindu and Moslem troops. It was the British hope that India would continue as one state with both religions living and working for one government. The Moslems refused to agree to a single joint state. They numbered only about 25% of the population and felt that they would always be a despised minority. So two states were organized, designated as India and Pakistan, the latter being Moslem. The British established the boundaries between the new states, which for a period of 2 years are to be Dominions. Under the new arrangement, Pakistan will contain 55,000,000 Moslems and 15,000,000 Hindus; while India will contain 33,000,000 Moslems and 260,000,000 Hindus. It is apparent that Pakistan contains only $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Moslems. The $\frac{2}{3}$ remaining within India form a nucleus for future demands. Three India states, with a combined population of about 25,000,000, have joined neither Dominion, desiring to consider this problem for one year prior to making a decision.

British GHQ, under Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, was established at New Delhi with the mission of reorganizing Indian divisions so that each would be all Hindu or all Moslem. It was also to provide for a common defense. These missions failed, owing to the refusal of Moslems and Hindus to collaborate; consequently, British GHQ was closed on 30 November. Immediately following the surrender of British authority, British troops were repatriated. There followed a series of massacres in border areas of Punjab, with Hindus and Moslems on opposing sides of the boundary ruthlessly torturing, mutilating, and killing. Local authorities seemed to have no particular desire to stop the slaughter. This resulted in about 4,000,000 Moslems moving from India into Pakistan, and about the same number of Hindus moving from Pakistan into

India. All had to abandon homes and property.

Regular military operations occurred only in Kashmir. This state of 4 million people is ruled by a prince who happens to be a Hindu, although 75% of the people are Moslems. The prince announced for joining India, whereupon the Moslems started an insurrection to join Pakistan. This minor strife at date of writing is continuing. The probable outcome will be to partition Kashmir between Pakistan and India.

The governments of India and Pakistan are earnestly endeavoring to maintain order. However, the precedents of 1,000 years are not favorable to a lasting peace between Moslems and Hindus. For the present, India, which played an important role in World War II, has ceased to be a serious military factor.

BURMA

Great Britain has granted independence to Burma, effective on 6 January 1948. Burma has elected not to remain within the British Commonwealth, and is not a Dominion. The British have been granted military bases, and friendly cooperation with Burma is expected. British troops, other than the base garrisons, are withdrawing. Burma will start with a somewhat turbulent situation. An insurrection has broken out in Arakan, which wants to be independent of Burma; China has laid claim to a large section of north Burma; a communist insurrection has appeared in central Burma; there is much banditry. The British are turning over these undesirable problems to the new government.

SIAM

On 9 November, a Japanese-trained group of officers seized control of the government. There was no serious opposition. The leader of the new government is Field Marshal Luang P. Songgram, who during the Japanese occupation was the local C-in-C.

INDO-CHINA

The war between the French and the Viet Nam continues. Owing to the censorship, reliable information is difficult to obtain. It appears that the French are employing some 40,000 troops, and hold most of the key points. The Viet Nam holds the country outside the key points. Neither side is able to overcome the other. Rumors as to a peace between the contending factions are based on occasional discussions, which to date have led to no result.

INDONESIA

There is no change in the military situation. The Dutch occupy the key points, and the Indonesians the balance of the country. No operations, other than patrol encounters, have recently occurred.

THE PHILIPPINES

Granted independence on 4 July 1947, the local government is endeavoring to overcome Hukbalahap opposition. The members of this sect are in open rebellion, mostly in central Luzon. They seldom have more than a company in action at any one time, and are unable to secure important objectives. They do have a nuisance value, and have succeeded in raiding lines of communication and in spreading terror among the population. This kind of activity is normal for Malay states; Malays just take to secret organizations. There are always some who are ready to participate in attacks against whoever the authority may be.

A REVERIE OF PATRIOTISM

There's no one here but me, and yet
I seem to see, in my mind's eye,
Haggard faces with eyes deep-set,
Blood-spattered men about to die.

Three thousand strong they stare at me.
They plead, they beg, they seem to say,
"You look afraid—you needn't be.
We feel no agony today.

"We suffer not, for we are not;
We are but the souls of men.
A brave lot we are, but you've forgot
In the short time since it began."

I sit entranced. Who can they be?
—This awful multitude of dead.
Why should spirits visit me?
What's the meaning of what they said?

"Yes, you've forgot," they all repeat,
And then they start to fade away.
"Three thousand men, and half the fleet—
The heathen Japs—a Sabbath day."

And now they fade into a mist.
They're gone, and I'm alone again.
But still I sit, repeating this,
"You did not fight, nor die, in vain."

—WILLIAM M. HEARN

ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

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In books lies the soul of the whole past time: the articulate audible voice of the past, when the body and material substance of it has altogether vanished like a dream. — "Hero and Hero Worship," THOMAS CARLYLE.



Waves of the Future

AIRBORNE WARFARE. By Major General James M. Gavin. 178 pp. Infantry Journal Press. \$3.00.

By Maj. Gen A C McAuliffe, USA

An important new concept of World War II was the delivery of troops by airplane, parachute and glider deep into enemy territory to assist in accomplishing the ground mission. *Airborne Warfare* is a history of those operations in which we participated, a discussion of the principles which governed our successes and an estimate of the future role of airborne troops. It is a sound and thoughtful treatise for military men and civilian students, an accurate account of past operations and a valuable text and reference for the planning of future ones.

It was written by an airborne pioneer, Major General James M. Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. In a foreword, Major General William C. Lee writes: "This book is by an expert — an expert in airborne warfare. . . . I know of no man better fitted than he is to write it."

Of particular interest to most readers will be the chapter on the airborne invasion of Holland in September, 1944. In this largest of airborne operations, the delivery of airborne troops was accurate and successful; yet the ground mission was not fully accomplished. What caused this want of complete success? General Gavin attributes it to the failure of the ground forces to arrive in time at Arnhem to exploit the initial successes of the 1st British Airborne Division. He suggests that dispersion of the airborne troops contributed: "Clearly, they must be employed in mass and not in small packets."

The plan was "to capture and hold the crossings over the canals and rivers on the British Second Army's main axis of advance from about Eindhoven to Arnhem, inclusive." The road distance from Eindhoven to Arnhem, over the famous Hell's Highway, is about 50 miles. It was evident at once that with the British 1st Division dropping near Arnhem, the American 82nd south of Nijmegen and the American 101st north of Eindhoven, mutual support would be impossible; control and communication by the British Airborne Corps, located near Nijmegen, would be difficult. The original plan for the 101st proposed the dropping of the division in seven packets along 14 miles of highway. General Taylor disliked this arrangement, so a change was made by which one regiment was dropped near Veghel and the remainder of the division near Zon.

Control and communication did prove difficult during the operation. In the Arnhem area, drop and landing zones could not be held. They were seized by German infantry and tanks, but apparently this information did not reach higher headquarters. It was real tragedy on D plus two when the hard-pressed British troopers, their ammunition and food almost exhausted, watched their entire resupply, 439 gross tons, dropped on the prearranged zones but into the hands of the enemy. The American divisions were able to seize and hold all canal and river crossings south of Arnhem, but they could not protect the entire length of road. On two occasions the Germans attacked between bridges and interrupted traffic. Says General Gavin: "The 82nd held a 25-mile perimeter for three days. . . . It is quite a feat tactically to be able to fight in one direction to seize an objective and at the same time keep looking over one's shoulder fighting in

the opposite direction to hold a landing zone."

Throughout the book the reader senses the spirit of the airborne soldier, his dashing courage in battle, and his frequent indifference to orthodox military caution. Typical of many similar incidents during airborne combat is the report of the German armored car which drove merrily from the rear through a column of marching Americans, the Kraut occupants tossing hand grenades to their startled enemy. More bizarre is the adventure of a German railway train on the night of D-day in Holland. It puffed placidly north through an area controlled and occupied by the Americans and continued into Germany without having a single shot fired at it.

One could wish that it were practical for the author to give a frankly critical analysis in detail of each airborne operation he discusses. One suspects that he has expressed his views to his own officers, and probably to his superiors, much more explicitly than they are presented here. His method is to intersperse his narrative account with statements of the abstract principles involved. This is satisfactory pedagogy, but it disrupts continuity in a book. The narrative is so entertaining that interruptions to digress on general matters are annoying. These are minor irritations, however, which detract but little from the solid worth of the complete study.

The final three chapters cover the future of airborne warfare: organization, tactics, technique, equipment. "The ideal troop-carrier aircraft would be one that would permit the release of the entire fuselage as a land vehicle upon landing or at an altitude of a few feet upon arrival at the airhead." "Attacking armies will concentrate in flight

from dispersed airfields. They will be preceded by a missile barrage. . . ." "What was Pearl Harbor in 1941 followed in six months by an amphibious effort at Midway will, in the future, be a missile barrage followed in six minutes or six hours by an airborne attack."

General Gavin is an enthusiast, but his enthusiasm is based upon experience and upon detailed knowledge of past developments, present equipment and future possibilities. Those who consider him unduly optimistic might be reminded that as late as 1939, at one of our leading service schools, a suggestion that we investigate mass parachute landings behind enemy lines was generally adjudged rather wacky.

Colorful Commander

WAR AS I KNEW IT. By General George S. Patton, Jr. Annotated by Colonel Paul D. Harkins. 425 pp. Frontispiece and maps. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. \$3.75.

By Maj. Cen H. W. Blakeley. USA-Ret'd

Some books, even autobiographies, do not reflect a clear picture of their author. This one does. It is, as General Patton was, emphatic and irritating, while at times charming and often slightly unbelievable. Who but General Patton could have, in July 1944, been "obsessed with the belief that the war would end before I got into it" (he, of course, had already been in it in Africa and Sicily), and then, in January 1945, have written in his diary, "We can still lose this war"?

The book is in four parts: the first consists of extracts from General Patton's letters to his wife written during the African and Sicilian campaigns; the second is an account of the author's personal experiences in the Western European campaign; the third, entitled "Retrospect," includes comments on war and the author's military life; the fourth is primarily a collection of rosters. A notable introduction by Dr. Douglas Southall Freeman does much to integrate what could otherwise be a somewhat uncoordinated book.

The first or letters section was included, according to Dr. Freeman, in order to introduce General Patton. They are not, "strictly speaking, military papers, but they have interest in themselves besides showing what

manner of man George Patton was." The extracts are from what Mrs. Patton, who edited the entire volume, refers to as "open letters"—that is, letters which were of a nature which, even under war restrictions, could be shown to friends. Naturally, they have very little military information in them. They deal primarily with countries and peoples as the writer saw them, and with ceremonies incident to audiences with the Sultan of Morocco and visits to senior French officers.


The second part is the meat of the book. In a brief foreword, General Patton says that it is a "hastily written personal narrative for the benefit of my family and a few old and intimate friends." It is, then, his own condensation of part of a very full diary that he kept from July 1942 until December 5, 1945, but not, apparently, a condensation intended for publication. Personal references, says Dr. Freeman, have been toned down or eliminated. Some of the comments are still definitely caustic, and the elimination of the name of a corps or division commander in the text is not a very effective disguise, particularly as they are all listed in the rosters in the back of the book. Those criticized can only take comfort in the fact that General Patton himself says, "I have criticized numerous individuals without knowing their side of the question," and, in the cases of some of his victims, he later recommended them for promotion and decorations.

The first-hand picture of the grueling job of a driving, energetic Army commander is the essence of this part of the book. There is continued proof, if any further proof is needed, of General Patton's constant "will to win," of his insistence on constantly attacking, changing plans if necessary, but always maintaining pressure on the enemy.

Nothing in the book substantiates the claim made in Colonel Wallace's recent book, *Patton and his Third Army*, that General Patton planned and executed the breakthrough. An interesting, but not conclusive, comment on the control of Allied strategy and tactics is Patton's statement that on January 30, 1945, he "had a message from Bradley that we were to lose the 95th Division to the Ninth Army. As usual I kicked, but

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WAR AS I KNEW IT



**General
George S. Patton, Jr.**


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
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was informed that the order came from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington." It is probable that this statement should not be accepted literally. The transfer of a specific division by the Combined Chiefs seems unlikely, but General Patton later says "Eisenhower had been directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to assign the Ninth Army to the British Twenty-First Army Group" which seems to indicate a considerable control of operations in the ETO by Washington. Incidentally, the military student who uses this book in connection with a detailed study of any part of the Western European campaign should not accept without confirmation dates and unit designations in the text, footnotes or maps. For example, Brigadier General Roosevelt was Assistant Division Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, not the 1st, at the time of his death; the First Army began the breakthrough on July 25, not July 26; the French 2d Armored Division and the 4th Infantry Division entered Paris on August 25, not August 23.

The "Retrospect" section of the book is divided into two parts called "Reflections and Suggestions" and "Earning My Pay." The more sensational items have been much quoted in the press. The "Reflections and Suggestions" are recommended reading for all professional soldiers. General Patton's interests were many—he was a fox hunter, a polo player, a yachtsman and a student of history—but he was, of course, primarily a soldier. His views on tactics, discipline and administration are based on a wealth of study and experience. He had a superior mind (sometimes, it is true, subordinated to his emotions), and his "suggestions" in the military field merit consideration. Many of his thoughts are what our schools and texts have taught for years, but he often gives a fresh twist to the accepted doctrine. Sometimes it is hard to agree with him. "War is a very simple thing, and the determining characteristics are self-confidence, speed and audacity," he says. Of course, war is not a very simple thing, but have we underrated self-confidence, speed and audacity in our teachings? When extracts from this book were published in the *Saturday Evening Post*, one C. Atkinson wrote to

the editors, "I personally think 'Autobiography of an Arch-Egoist' would have been a more appropriate title." When does self-confidence become egoism? This book is not the whole answer in the case of its author. The picture is clear, but not complete. Those who have known General Patton as a gracious host in his own home, sensitive to any discomfort or embarrassment of a guest, have a very different picture of him than that given by some of this book and by some of his acts and speeches. Dr. Freeman says, "It is to be hoped that General Patton will be among the first to attract a competent biographer and that others will leave him alone—Patton was cast in the mold of great American soldiers; his personal papers are among the fullest left by an American General. He will be an ideal subject for a great biography." Pending the publication of such a volume, *War as I Knew It* will probably be General Patton's most accurate, but incomplete, portrait.

Unrest in Asia

DANGER FROM THE EAST. By Richard E. Lauterbach, 386 pp. Appendix 36 pp. and Index. Harper & Bros. \$3.75.

By Col Conrad H Lanza

A more appropriate title would have been *Danger in the Far East*. The book is about observations as a reporter through Japan, Korea and China during 1946 and the first half of 1947. 180 pages are devoted to Japan 70 to Korea, and 124 to China.

The author was impressed with the progress made in Japan. It is greater by far than in China and will result in Japan operating independently earlier than China, if permitted to do so. General MacArthur and his staff are reported as well pleased with the Allied occupation. Japan is complying with orders and has an efficient government. Our original intent was to destroy most of Japan's industries but policies have been softened and many factories are now back in production. With exports thus made available Japan is partly able to pay for food imported and to support its expanding population.

The author claims that the U. S. Army is giving too much attention to preparing Japan as an outpost in case

of World War III. He doesn't like that, but fails to show just what measures the Army should have taken.

Korea is described as capable of governing itself. The author considers it an error to have agreed at Yalta and later conferences on imposing a trusteeship on Korea and he thinks it would have been better to have had no occupation. Now that it has occurred, evacuation of occupying forces is being delayed while the Russians organize a Communist state with armed forces in the north half of the country and the Americans form a democracy without armed forces in the south half. All will agree that this is an unsatisfactory condition.

China is depicted as being hopeless. The Kuomintang regime is noted as a corrupt, incompetent dictatorship. This reviewer has long agreed with that

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opinion, and with the conclusion that the mass of Chinese do not know the difference between communism, democracy and a dictatorship. They don't care which kind of government is in power, favoring whichever one gives lowest taxes and most to eat. As the Communists levy lower taxes and have improved the subsistence level in their areas, they are securing adherents who have no idea of what communism may be.

Lauterbach considers that the American military arms are controlling its foreign policy in such a way as to prepare for a possible new war. He believes that in the Far East a new conflict is in tact breeding. To head this off, his solution is that the United States withdraw its foreign policy by turning it over to the United Nations for control, while at the same time placing large sums at the disposal of that organization to improve living conditions throughout the Far East. This reviewer can not agree with such a view. It is contrary to the precedents of history.

Danger from the East gives a layman's view of Army operations in occupied territories. It is worth studying.

RAINTREE COUNTY. By Ross Lockridge, Jr. 1060 pages. Houghton-Mifflin. \$3.95.

On its fifth day, 1948 became a fortunate and outstanding year for the American novel through the publication of Ross Lockridge, Jr.'s, *Raintree County*. Over a thousand pages make a formidable and doubtful course for any author to cover with the hope of sustaining a high degree of variety and values, but all of this thousand contain interest and a large proportion presents stimulating characters and ideas of genuine importance. An absorbing story, interspersed with passages of hilarious humor, lyrical passion and pungent philosophy, furnishes hours of excitement and pleasure for readers of nearly every age or taste.

The setting in time and place is 19th century America, with a strong focus on one county of Indiana, but although the picture of that period is painted with a wealth of detail the book is far more than another popular historical novel. Its main figure, John Wickliff Shawnessy — citizen-soldier, teacher, intense participant and interpreter of the American epic—becomes to a great degree the essence of all Americans; the life which flows around and through him embraces the reality and dream of America in every era and far into the future.

The narrative of *Raintree County* hinges on one day in the life of John Shawnessy, then principal of the public school at the small town of Waycross, Indiana, which is in the gala throes of a memorial celebration on the 4th of July, 1892. For this program a brief homecoming is arranged for several men of national prominence — long absent but former citizens of the community and close friends of Shawnessy's earlier years. As he meets them and goes through each of the day's events, John Shawnessy's mind (and the author's story-telling) goes back in considerable detail over the half-hundred main episodes in his varied and full lifetime. Thus the story unfolds in vivid fragments, held together by the pattern of one day's happenings and their impact upon the power of association within one man's mind. To the author this device presents high opportunity for effective

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Raintree County

By Ross Lockridge, Jr.



Johnny Shawnessy was a soldier in one of the bloodiest conflicts in American history, the War between the States. He fought at Chickamaugua, saw the destruction of Atlanta, marched to the sea with Sherman, almost died in a Washington hospital. When he came home again, Johnny was a different man, looking in vain for the youth he had left behind in "Raintree County."

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variety, dramatic suggestion and suspense, and nostalgic flavor; readers will, I think, follow the pattern with sympathy and a heightened sense of reality.

The lives and events thus presented form a highly enjoyable and often intensely powerful saga of human life—in particular that of our midwest in the latter half of the 19th century. Three men share the center stage with John W. Shawnessy through the course of youth and final maturity: his friendly rival, Garwood B. Jones, born politician who successfully follows the main chance to the U. S. Senate; shrewd-dealing Cass Carney, who relentlessly pursues another form of material gain to become the possessor of empty millions; third, Professor Jerusalem W. Stiles, keen but corrosive student of human events and follies. More important than any men—perhaps excepting the "Perfessor"—as contributors to the slow growth of John Shawnessy, are the four women with whom he shares love: Nell Gaither, his youthful and never attained ideal of flesh and spirit; violent sensual Sue whom he marries through young passion to inherit a disastrous part in America's greatest tragedy; the glamorous actress Laura Golden, whose materialistic caution strongly conflicts with their mutual attraction; finally, Esther, a young girl whom the mature Shawnessy marries after a county-shaking courtship, to gain adoration and quiet family happiness.

These characters and a host of appealing, deftly portrayed minor figures live through scenes of stirring drama (sometimes melodrama) which bring alive the tremendous sweep of America and the great forces loosed in it during the book's half-century. John Shawnessy's youth was entirely in Raintree County, Indiana, where he joined zestfully in the community life and under the acid aegis of Professor Stiles combined the best of classical learning with a sensitive, growing perception of the earth and people in which his roots were so deeply set. With his exotic young bride he lived in New Orleans and was delighted but ominously disturbed by the older, gracious, yet alien culture. During the Civil War John Shawnessy campaigned from Chickamauga to Atlanta, then

with Sherman to the sea and north through South Carolina. In the colorful and miserable adventures of Corporal Shawnessy, Professor (then war-correspondent) Stiles and Shawnessy's fellow "combat infantrymen" of another era, there is great truth and impact; revelry behind the lines, the grim and occasionally high soldiers' humor during brief lulls in action, the fighting man's overpowering sense of weariness and unending battle, and above all, the shock and confusion of front-line combat are all presented in terms which will appeal with clarity and force to anyone who experienced the similar elements of World Wars I or II.

John Shawnessy returned wounded and wearied to Raintree County to renew his attempt at realizing the best in American life, which then saw the rise of tremendous industrial power, with worship of material values and resultant dimming of the older American ideal of individual human dignity. He made an unsuccessful try at political reform, shifted to New York City in order to work out his writing in the currents of metropolitan life (where both he and the author are not at their best), and finally returned to think and work at peace in Raintree County. Here he achieves a perspective on America—its selfishness and generosity, its narrow prejudices and sweeping ideals, its ruthless, hectic materialism and magnificent epic poetry. Shawnessy finds what none of his nationally famous friends obtained—a completely satisfying sense of permanence within a continuing and worthwhile upward march of mankind.

The author writes with power of expression, richness of detail, and passionate conviction in the eventual worth of the energy and dreams that form America, which inevitably invites comparison with Thomas Wolfe. I feel that Lockridge has somewhat less depth and breadth and in several cases his lack of chronology, as in Wolfe, gains little if anything to balance resultant confusion; his narrative has more balance and sharper focus and, above all, a fine quantity and quality of humor which should make far more readers enjoy his fare. This humor, which pervades the book, makes Lockridge's writing far warmer and more optimistic than that of Wolfe.

N. L. D.

Roosevelt's Youth

F. D. R.: HIS PERSONAL LETTERS; EARLY YEARS. Edited by Elliott Roosevelt. 543 pp. Illustrations, index. Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1947. \$5.00.

By M. Hamlin Cannon

There is no question but that the personal correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt will be of great interest to historians as well as to the reading public. As Mrs. Roosevelt points out in the foreword, the first volume, comprising his early letters, makes clear some of F. D. R.'s training and background. The reader will, however, look in vain for the key to the many-sided personality which dominated the American scene for more than twelve years. These are typical schoolboy letters, more frequent and possibly more affectionate than the average; they contain engaging, unstudied accounts of every-day events.

The boy revealed in these spontaneous, often hasty letters is a likable, busy, athletic person—in other words, an extrovert. The correspondence has a strong human appeal, from the first uneven writing of a five-year-old, through the numerous Groton letters, and on to the briefer communications reflecting the many interests of a Harvard student and a newly-engaged man. It is true that one does not always set down his most profound thoughts when writing home, although the strong bond between mother and son would have made it more likely in this case; nevertheless, there is no evidence to show that F. D. R. took time out from his varied activities to do much serious thinking. We must await the forthcoming volumes to bring us closer to the man who became one of the outstanding Presidents of the United States. It is interesting, however, to note in passing that at the age of twenty he said of his kinsman, President Theodore Roosevelt: "His tendency to make the executive power stronger than the Houses of Congress is bound to be a bad thing."

Elliott Roosevelt has done a remarkably fine job of editing his father's letters. The careful elucidation of obscure names and places leaves nothing to be desired. Although the volume will probably appeal most to the legion of

admirers of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the historian will find in the letters an excellent portrait of Roosevelt's childhood, youth and early maturity.

Presidential Candidate Revealed

WHERE I ST AND! By Harold E. Stassen. 205 pp. Doubleday & Co. \$2.50.

By John R. Cuneo

To Harold E. Stassen the key to the fate not only of this nation but of the world lies in our American economic system. On its ability to forge ahead hinges our national and international peace and well-being. Therefore he has devoted this frank statement of his political views to some of the challenges which threaten our progress.

Foremost is the labor-capital conflict. On the basis of his experience with excesses both of capital and labor, he views the Taft-Hartley Act—although not perfect—as the beginning of a fair labor policy for this country.


Tied in with labor relations is the challenge of Communism both from abroad and from within. From his own observation of Russia — including his well-known interview with Stalin—Mr. Stassen feels that the external threat can be met if the American free capitalistic system can avoid an economic crash. It must set an example of a high standard of living shared by all which Russia's planned economy cannot meet. The internal danger is to be faced by a twelve-point program of exposing known Communists, denying them public pay, squarely meeting the issues they raise and correcting the abuses, particularly against labor, which the Communists are accustomed to use for gaining their own ends.

To revive and extend our capitalism, Mr. Stassen proposes to encourage investments by reducing taxes in the higher brackets. The results would help the nation far more than the comparatively small amount of taxes raised by the present exorbitant level.

The housing jam is to be broken by an annual Federal building program of a billion dollars but the government is to get out of the field as soon as the units are finished. The inadequate health situation is to be met in part by federal aid to expand hospital and

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It was formerly regarded as the height of folly for any office-seeker to express any opinion except in the broadest generalities. If for no other reason, Mr. Stassen's challenge to this age-old belief merits attention. It is a far more honest bid for public support than the customary campaign biographies.

But its immediate importance lies in the fact that Mr. Stassen is presenting his views as a potential candidate for Presidency. Every voter should be interested in him. Plainly and interestingly written, his statement is within the grasp of everyone. The anecdotal style which often brings in Mr. Stassen's service background makes the book particularly appealing to readers in the military service.

Britain at War

LETTER FROM GROSVENOR SQUARE. By John Gilbert Winant. 279 pages. Houghton-Mifflin Co. \$3.00.

By Edmond C. Love

It is doubtful whether Mr. Winant's book will add any new factual information on the relationships between the United States and Great Britain during the crucial year 1941, and readers who pick up the volume expecting to find such a fund of new material are bound to be disappointed. In spite of this omission, the book is one of the more significant additions to our literature on the war.

Mr. Winant deals largely in terms of personalities. Mr. Churchill is presented as a shrewd, determined, and very human being. He is much more a man than he is a Prime Minister. The story of how he received the news of Pearl Harbor on a fifteen-dollar gift radio is typical of the vein of Mr. Winant's reminiscences. Similarly, we have a much clearer picture of Anthony Eden, the vegetable gardener, than we do of Anthony Eden the statesman. In this spotlighting of personalities lies the great value of Mr. Winant's memoir. Its emphasis on the fact that the leading figures with whom the Ambassador had to deal were tired, harassed, and human gives Americans a much better picture

of what they were trying to do than any other similar volume is likely to present.

The picture of England during the Battle for Britain, the story of how the Embassy operated, and the careful exposition of the basic differences between the two governments will help the reader understand many of the events of the period.

I do not remember ever having read a clearer picture of what England was like during the blitz. Mr. Winant has conveyed much of this through deft, colorful bits of understanding observation. England is best exemplified in his description of the presentation of honorary degrees at Bristol University. "The company were in academic robes, as is customary, but under them they wore the most extraordinary assortment of clothes. Some were in service uniform, others in civil defense uniform, many in firemen's dress, and nearly all still soaked from their labors. They had been hard at it all night (fighting fires from the bombings), but all turned up. . . through the windows we saw the smoke and flames and hoses of the firemen still playing on the burning buildings . . . now and again we heard the crump of a delayed action bomb." In this setting the words of Winston Churchill that followed seemed as natural as those of two Iowa farmers discussing the weather. "I see a spirit bred in freedom . . .," Mr. Churchill said, "which will surely at this moment . . . enable us to bear our part in such a way that none of our race who comes after us will have any reason to cast reproach upon their sires."

One may search the pages of this first volume in vain for some answer to the question of Mr. Winant's tragic death. The book is a simple statement of one man's observation of the stirring events with which he was connected. As such it is an extremely valuable addition to the literature of the war.

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BOOKS IN COLUMN

By Major N. L. Drummond, FA

Whenever your own library formation appears a bit ragged, the Field Artillery Association can easily close up the gaps for you. Drop us a line—preferably with check.

This column will appear before you from time to time (presuming you get this far back in the magazine). The objective will be discussion of points which have current interest to members of the Association regarding policy and events within the JOURNAL'S Book Department, outstanding trends in the general publishing field and briefly informative sketches of books which are not featured in the regular reviews—not because of minor quality, usually, but owing to their lesser degree of interest for the membership as a whole. Incorporated in the future will be short reviews of our reviewers — biographical notes whereby you may better judge the verdicts rendered by the judges.

From day to day the Book Department will keep rendering the same prompt attention to your book orders or queries which has come to be expected. In each issue of the JOURNAL the book section will feature display and reviews of the best recent publications; in accordance with demonstrated interest of the membership these will be concentrated first on books of military value, next on non-fiction and third on outstanding current novels. For reviewers the JOURNAL is fortunate in having the services of men with sound experience and, in many cases, of considerable prominence in military, scholarly and literary fields; in order to achieve variety and the application of specialized talent to particular fields, these sources will be gratefully exploited and continually expanded. We would appreciate your comments as to how these daily and bimonthly services might be increased.

As a preview of detailed future items we present the following:

1. In immediate effect is a policy whereby a flat 15% discount will be allowed on all books ordered by members whose total account during the previous year has amounted to at least two hundred and fifty dollars (\$250.00). Limited discounts available to the JOURNAL require this minimum figure, while the convenience is extended so our most active members may buy books in small amounts

from time to time without the necessity to choose between loss of discount or holding over a mail order until they can consolidate it with a bulk purchase.

2. Interest in the children's book page has been indicated as too slight to justify so much space. For those who utilized this feature, or might in the future, we shall continue a single column summary of the best recent publications as frequently as activity in that field and membership interest seem to warrant.

3. Convenient and valuable listings of books will appear from time to time to keep members posted on such points as the best of current books, unit histories available and titles published in the Department of the Army's 94-volume series of official World War II history. An annual or perhaps semi-annual listing of the best publications in various fields will be presented. On the basis of queries already received, plans are afoot to draw up a model military library for artillerymen through recommendations of appropriate authorities.

• •

Nothing So Strange, by James Hilton, lacks the nostalgic charm of his *Goodbye Mr. Chips* or the compelling illusion of *Lost Horizon*, but harnesses the dramatic power of pre-war and war-time atomic research to the popular stuff of combat neurosis for a smooth-flowing tale of fair interest. One central theme of a mother and daughter in love with the same man is touched only lightly in favor of more fast-moving material.

• •

Somewhat apart from books, but offered this month to members of the Association at special discount, are the four folios of sporting prints done by outstanding artists. We feel that these splendid color prints are ideal for inexpensively yet handsomely decorating homes or clubs. To anyone interested in sport or natural life, they reflect a rare combination of artist and outdoorsman. Since all are of identical size they are perfectly suited for use in a manner whereby an acquaintance adds variety and interest to his walls; frames with one open end allow easy removal of a complete set of pictures and substitution of new ones each few months.

• •

Next issue—less policy, more books.

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German Strategy

DEFEAT IN THE WEST. By Milton Shulman, 319 pp., Appendix & Index. E. P. Dutton & Co. \$4.50.

By Col Conrad H. Lanza

The author was a major in the Canadian Army during the invasion of France and Germany in 1944 and 1945. Attached to G-2, he interviewed German POWs and examined captured papers, continuing on this duty after the surrender. From what he so learned he has written a book the object of which is to point out the strategical mistakes of Germany.

Major Shulman charges that the great errors committed were due to an impracticable Adolf Hitler, who was unintelligently obeyed by a subservient staff. These men feared to disobey impossible orders and were unable to convince their master of the evils of his way.

Germany did commit strategical errors. But this was not exclusively due to Hitler. Hitler listened to his staff. He had a fact finding board which investigated and reported upon proposed lines of action and discussed various solutions. As in most staffs, there were frequently differences of opinion. Hitler made the decision, and he was by no means always wrong.

Grievous strategical errors charged to Hitler include the failure to invade England in 1940, the attack on Crete in 1941, and the failure to advance after El Alamein was reached in 1942.

This reviewer believes that the decision not to invade England in 1940 was strategically sound. The British Navy was enormously superior to that of Germany. If the attempt had been made, and had it shown any signs of success, it was almost certain that the US Navy would have intervened, just as it had already done to insure essential supplies reaching England. Against the combined American and British navies there was little chance of success for Germany.

Crete is alleged to have delayed the invasion of Russia by several weeks and thereby prevented the campaign from being victorious before winter. This is highly doubtful. German troops in Crete amounted only to about 2 divisions. This was too small a force to

have materially affected the invasion of Russia which employed over 150 divisions.

After Rommel reached El Alamein in the summer of 1942, it would have been desirable to have continued on to the Suez Canal. The reason why it was not done was not the stupidity of German GHQ as charged, but lack of supplies over an extended line of communications and a strong British position, close to their base, which could not be turned.

This book also gives useful information about the invasion of Normandy, including German accounts not previously published. In this the author is at his best.


BOMBER OFFENSIVE. By Sir Arthur Harris. 288 pp. index. Macmillan Co. 1947. \$2.75.

By John R Cuneo

It goes without saying that any review of the war by the head of the RAF Bomber Command deserves attention. That it is both a personal history and the story of the British bombing offensive increases the value of the book.

Two characteristics strike the reader in the very beginning of the book: a bitterness towards the other branches of the armed service and an unabashed egotism. The bitterness stems from the days when the RAF was struggling to survive—the direct opposite of today's situation when it is probably the best off from the point of finances and procurement priorities. This attitude makes the author's statements about the surface forces so obviously biased that anyone other than a rabid air enthusiast will find it hard to continue reading the book. This difficulty increases with the exuberant egotism displayed by the author.


The book has a distinct pro-British slant but this is to be welcomed. There has been some tendency in this country to regard the AAF as the alpha and omega of aerial warfare. This volume questions this attitude and makes the reader aware of the other side to many points of aerial tactics and strategy. It is tragic that the author's bias on other points may hide this feature which would increase the importance of the book to American readers.



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