

The FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL




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JULY-AUGUST 1947



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... see first page.



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BUY A BOOK MONTH

The Field Artillery Journal

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1 August 1947

Dear Member:

We know that you will be pleased to learn . . . just as we of the staff are pleased to tell you . . . that our Association is emerging strongly from a difficult post-war period of financial readjustment.

Yes, there is Open Country Ahead for our Association and our Journal . . . to borrow the title of the editorial on page 248 of this issue. And every member can take pride in knowing that we Artillerymen have wrought this recovery, together, without either raising our \$3.00 membership dues or (it is hoped) sacrificing the quality standard of our Journal. In these respects, we are virtually unique in our field.

To insure that we move into the open country, clearly visible ahead, we are asking your cooperation in a plan that will not only benefit the Association but also result in money savings for members.

We are calling our plan BUY A BOOK MONTH . . . and we are asking every member of the Association to purchase at least one book during the month of August. Members will be given the usual discounts of 10% on orders of \$2.50 or more, and 15% on orders of \$15.00 or more.

With your full cooperation, the increased book sales will unquestionably drive the Association out into open country, and at the same time provide you with books you want at a saving. We are confident, moreover, that once you have given our book service a trial, you will continue to purchase books through the Association.

If you don't see the name of the book you want advertised in this issue, drop us a line and we will get it for you. Books will be delivered to your door, with no extra charge for postage. An order blank has been included on the inside back cover of this issue for your convenience.

May we count on you to help make BUY A BOOK MONTH a success?

Cordially yours,



DEVERE ARMSTRONG
Colonel, Field Artillery
Editor



BUY A BOOK MONTH




Robert P. Patterson



Kenneth C. Royall



Gen. of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower



Gen. Thomas T. Handy




Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins

A Salute To Them All

PICTURED HERE, in order to do honor to each of them, are five War Department leaders whose changed official status had either been accomplished or announced as this issue went to press.

The resignation of Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson not only brought high praise from the press of the Nation for the sterling quality of his seven years of War Department service, but also the warm hope that he may soon find preferment for a high judicial post. He was succeeded as Secretary by the Undersecretary of War and onetime Field Artilleryman, Mr. Kenneth C. Royall, whose appointment was unanimously confirmed by the Senate.

And major changes were in the making within the Army itself. With General of the Army Eisenhower's announcement that he will become the President of Columbia University sometime this coming winter, interest focused on his possible successor. Meanwhile, General Thomas T. Handy—whose vital contribution to the war effort as a planner and more recently as Deputy Chief of Staff may never be fully appreciated by our people—will soon replace General Jonathan M. Wainwright (see page 240) as Fourth Army Commander. Lieutenant General ("Lightning Joe") J. Lawton Collins, whose brilliant VII Corps spearheaded most of the offensive actions conducted in Europe by General Omar N. Bradley (frequently mentioned as the most likely choice as our next Chief of Staff) will be the new Deputy Chief of Staff.



TO THE EDITOR*

Dealer's Choice

Dear Editor:

My subscription to your JOURNAL expired with the issue just received. I do not intend to renew my subscription.

Regret to say that your material is no longer on a level which is of interest to a Doughboy, as it has been in past years. I've been trying to put my finger on it—that is, the factors which changed my opinion—but without success. Believe you are running too heavily to articles of interest mostly to a Regular artilleryman, whereas former issues held much of interest to any soldier, professional or AUS, and regardless of branch. Might help if you shortened your articles and increased your scope to something approaching that of the period 1942-44. At that time your JOURNAL surpassed even the *Infantry Journal*, even to an Infantryman. I'd suggest comparison of the FAJ of the early war years with that of the present.

Please excuse a "Dough" for telling the "Redlegs" how to run their JOURNAL!

1ST. LT. ROBERT B. RANKIN, Inf.
Chicago, Ill.

Dear Editor:

Just a line to let you know that here is one reader (probably among many) who would like to give you a heartfelt "WELL DONE" for the tremendous strides you've made in improving the JOURNAL since the new policy went into effect some time ago.

You have now an intensely interesting, exceptionally readable JOURNAL that I'm sure is appreciated by all ranks of artillerymen.

It may interest you to know, incidentally, that among your avid readers are influential leaders and technical personnel in the Swiss Army, who know a good military journal when they see one.

Carry on!

MAJ. JOHN EDWARD ABER, FA
Berne, Switzerland

*See page 250 for more letters to the Editor.



"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

VOL. 37

JULY-AUGUST 1947

NO. 4

- Cover: The hot weather, so evident in this Marine Corps action photo of a 155mm howitzer section in action shortly after landing on Guam is reminiscent of the Pacific fighting that ended two years ago this season.
- Frontispiece: A Salute to Them All.

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The Field Artillery Journal is not a medium for the dissemination of War Department doctrine or administrative directives. Contributors alone are responsible for opinions expressed and conclusions reached in published articles. Consistent with the objects of our Association, however, the Field Artillery Journal seeks to provide a meeting ground for the free expression of artillery ideas in the changing present.

COLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONG
Editor

MAJOR ROBERT F. COCKLIN
Associate Editor

LENNA PEDIGO
Business Manager

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The World Situation and the Preservation of Peace

The following is extracted verbatim from the Report of The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training under the title, "A Program for National Security," which is for sale (Price 75c) by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Prepared by a non-military group (see opposite page), widely known and respected as individuals for their intellectual and public attainments, the Report impels the attention of every American citizen.—Editor.

AT THE ROOT OF ALL THE COMMISSION'S thinking is the conviction that the only real security for this country or any country lies in the abolition of war through the establishment of the reign of law among nations. The United Nations is the embodiment of our hopes for a durable peace based on justice and cooperation, rather than violence and death. The United States has committed itself to a position of leadership in building the United Nations into an effective instrument for banishing the use of armed might in the settlement of international conflicts.

Unfortunately, at the very time that we have assumed this commitment and before we have achieved it, we have allowed our military strength to fall away from us. The Army that fought with such power against Germany and Japan has been dismantled. Virtually all of what is left is assigned to occupation duty in the defeated countries. At a time when war can strike without warning and with devastating force, our Ground Forces have only 2½ full combat divisions available for duty. Our air and sea strength is somewhat more formidable, but it is dwindling so rapidly that it cannot long be considered a shield against possible attack.

By the same token, the lands that share our democratic ideals but lack our resources of men and material will lose faith in our will or our ability to make real the principles for which we stand. Their industries demolished and their people demoralized, they will succumb the more readily to the blandishments or the threats of competing ideologies. The mantle of totalitarianism will spread its darkness over still larger sections of the earth, increasing the peril to us and narrowing the company of those on whose aid we can count in the search for lasting peace.

EVIDENCE NOW AT HAND demonstrates how completely Nazi dreams of world domination were guided by the belief that the democracies were too weak and too lacking in spirit to challenge Hitler's sinister designs.

Unpreparedness on the part of the democratic nations in organizing their manpower and physical equipment for defense played a decisive role in inducing Hitler to launch his wars of aggression in 1939, instead of waiting for 1943, as originally planned.

The captured documents which were assembled and analyzed at Nürnberg contain many specific references to the military weakness of England and America. They demonstrate how carefully the Nazi strategists analyzed the balance of power and concluded that the unilateral disarmament of the western powers had played into the hands of a government which was openly proclaiming its peaceful intentions but secretly creating a mammoth armament designed to crush its unsuspecting opponents by a surprise attack.

The scope and limitations of the present report do not permit extensive citation of official documents, such as the minutes of Hitler's Cabinet meetings, his secret conferences with his General Staff or the voluminous archives of the German Admiralty.

It is proper, however, to indicate how Hitler's eagerness for war increased as his estimate of the military strength of the democracies decreased. Thus, the so-called Hossbach Notes, catalogued as U. S. Document 386 PS summarize the directives given by the Führer to his military and naval staff at a policy-making conference which took place as early as November 10, 1937. The text reveals that Hitler had set the period 1943-1945 as the outside limit for initiating

aggressive warfare. Beyond that date he did not expect to maintain the preponderance of preparation achieved by the Reich. Germany's relative power would then begin to decrease, he argued, as the other European countries improved their military potential.

It is from U. S. Document 789 PS that we learn why he advanced his schedule and anticipated his timetable of operations by some 4 years:

Providence has had the last word and brought me success * * * The decision to strike was always in me * * * Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us * * * After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord * * *

No Nazi document is more comprehensive in its evaluation of relative military power than 388 PS, the Green Case, with its exhaustive cataloging of aggressive techniques and planned deceit. In assessing the chances for success of the projected attack on Czechoslovakia, this analysis, dated May 20, 1938, cites the weakened military position of France and England as an affirmative motive for taking the gamble. Everything in the preparedness of these two adversaries was judged inferior when compared with the military power of Germany:

No launchings for two years past * * * out-of-date air force and equipment. * * * No General Staff conferences * * * replacement of officer personnel doubtful.

The sudden decision to strike as early as 1939 was taken for reasons outlined in U. S. Document 798 PS, which records Hitler's speech to the Commanders in Chief on August 22, 1939, 9 days before the attack on Poland. Convinced that the democracies were vacillating and weak, he decided to embark on an open program of aggression.

We have nothing to lose, we can only gain; * * * Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities, no men of action * * * Our enemies are little worms. * * * I saw them in Munich.

The relativity of military and naval potential as a factor influencing peace or war was consistently emphasized by other leaders as well. Document C-152, classified as *Top Military Secret*, recounts the advice given to Hitler on March 18, 1941, by Admiral Raeder, Commander in Chief of the Nazi Navy. Japan should take Singapore as soon as possible, he recommends,

since the opportunity will never again be so favorable—the whole British fleet is now contained and America is unprepared for a war against Japan. Document 1866 PS records von Ribbentrop's argument to Mussolini on May 13, 1941, emphasizing the unpreparedness of America: "America's rearmament was the biggest bluff in the world's history." In 1834 PS the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs again categorically advances the argument that even if America should enter the war, she can never enter it militarily as she has not sufficient ground troops nor supply points to land in Europe or Africa. Hence the only practical step America could take would be to establish air bases in England—and the Nazi air forces would take care of that.

These are the techniques of aggressor nations, which may be repeated in the future.

IT IS APPARENT from the lessons of history and from the experience of the postwar period that the only way in which we can lend authority to our voice in international affairs and inspire confidence in the ability of the United Nations to enforce peace is to maintain our armed forces at a level of efficiency and comprehensiveness that will defy challenge by any would-be aggressor. If the people of this country will declare in convincing fashion their determination to support such a program in all its elements for as long as may be necessary to guarantee the attainment of a

stable world order through the United Nations, they will make the greatest contribution to perpetual peace within their power.

We wish we could conscientiously arrive at a different conclusion. There is so much that needs to be done in rebuilding the shattered nations of Europe and Asia, in ending hunger and providing for the homeless, in reviving industry and commerce and the things of the spirit


that we view with horror the need for spending billions of dollars on the upkeep of our Military Establishment. But we recognize that weakness is an invitation to extermination. Without the strength to back up our moral positions or discharge our international commitments, we are impotent in a world where force is still, unfortunately, a determinant of the right. While we try to rebuild, we must not at the same time invite further destruction. A weak Nation can only beg, not command respect and reciprocity.

After nearly 6 months of the most intensive study, the members of this Commission have arrived at the unanimous conclusion that universal training is an essential element in an integrated program of national security intended to safeguard the United States and to enable us to fulfill our responsibilities to the cause of world peace and the success of the United Nations.

**Joseph E. Davies
Harold W. Dodds
Truman K. Gibson, Jr.
Daniel A. Poling**

**Anna M. Rosenberg
Samuel I. Rosenman
Edmund A. Walsh
Charles E. Wilson**

Karl T. Compton, *Chairman*



One Car, Ford, Touring, Model T. Completely Unauthorized

By Col. R.E. Anderson

POT GRAVES (alias Ernest Graves, Captain, Corps of Engineers) was in charge of road building and maintenance at El Valle, Mexico. Being in general dimensions about 5×5, he had acquired the name Pot eleven years previously, while a cadet, and no one ever called him anything else.

A contradiction in many ways, he was very shrewd and quick mentally and physically though he appeared half asleep; he was kindly and tolerant though he longed to be considered tough; he was good natured though pretending to be grouchy; he could not hide the friendly look in his blue eyes nor restrain his spontaneous smile though he wanted everyone, especially junior officers, to think he would bite; he was strong enough to throw a mule two out of three in a fair wrestling contest though he would handle a poor pup as gently as a woman; he was highly efficient and resourceful though he was in the Engineers. Also he was a good poker player.

And when the occasion demanded Pot Graves could really *be tough*. As when a youngster just out of high school he was with a baseball team in his native State, North Carolina. The Tar Heel Mountaineers took their baseball seriously and bet large sums of money on the home team. When the home team lost the loyal fans showed an alarmingly virile interest. As far as they could see the loss was always attributable either to willful blindness on the part of the umpire or some highly unethical behavior on the part of an opposing player. The honor of the Mountains could tolerate nothing like

this, with the result that the umpire or supposedly offending player was often introduced to some convincing mass action.

Pot's team had won a game. In the ninth inning Pot had presumably kept the hometown second baseman's mind off the runner scoring the winning run by the expedient of spiking him. The team had managed to get to the hotel, where they were besieged by the financially depleted citizenry looking for Pot. While he was in his room, presumably changing clothes, the rest of the team were in a huddle in another room trying to fix up some scheme whereby they could get him to the station and aboard the train. Increased commotion outside caused the players to look out the window and there they saw a path being opened up by the besiegers and down this path strolled Pot with his chin stuck out warningly and a bat draped over his shoulder. No one bothered him as he walked to the station.

And his old friends remembered well the terrific tackling by Pot when he was a hundred and seventy - five - pound guard. And he himself remembered especially the Yale game when he was to line up against Hogan. Hogan was six feet two, and two hundred fifteen pounds of dynamite — All American from the previous year when a Junior. Pot had never seen him but had seen pictures of him and had read sport writers' reports which were certainly not reassuring to opposing guards. As Pot, with the well-known nervousness of an athlete before a game, was coming out of what would now be called the "Men's Room," head

down, he bumped into some obstruction. He looked up—and up and up. Finally at the top of this huge obstruction he recognized the face of Hogan. He turned around and went right back in again. But that day Hogan thought he was up against at least two guards.

And here he was in charge of road work at El Valle on the Punitive Expedition where the slogan was "We were seeing Villa home."

There were many peculiar things about this expedition. One was that we were not at war with Mexico but merely chasing Villa, who was personna-nongrata with the President of Mexico as well as the President of the United States. Since Villa dead was more pleasing to Caranza than Villa alive Caranza let us chase him without the formality of declaring war. *But* the national honor of Mexico would not permit us to commandeer a railway—so we were dependent on truck transportation for supply.

Now the Army knew nothing at that time about the operation of truck transportation. Self-propelled vehicles were considered much too good for the Army. Any wagon not pulled by mules or horses was in the class of vile luxury. And furthermore, it would certainly ruin the Army. Infantrymen walked—Cavalrymen and Field Artillerymen rode horses! But without a railway we had to come to it, and supply by motors was inaugurated. True to form, however, the assignment of motor vehicles was strictly limited — combat troops could have nothing to do with them except to swear at the dust they raised. Of course the general policy was

to issue as few vehicles as possible. But trucks and autos being new gadgets in the Army, we had no previous experience on which to base the assignment. So the Army used the same principle then as now: whenever anyone asked for anything—make him justify it, and plenty!

There were no regulations regarding the operation of truck transport. These had to be hastily formulated, for no self respecting Army could be expected to operate anything without regulations. Then it was found that we had no truck drivers in the Army so we had to hire civilians. This caused another strange denouement—we could not try civilians with the Army by Military Commission for *we were not at war*. These gentlemen were consequently very much on the loose, for it was not practicable to turn them over to the Mexican authorities. Finally we got a decision on this matter from Washington. The State Department had decided that *we were at war and also that we were not at war*. As regarded the 59th Article of War (authority for the Army trying civilians in the occupied zone) we were at war—otherwise not.

Since we were not at war with Mexico, except for this Article, we naturally were not expected to shoot up any of the loyal Mexican soldiers. But these looked just the same as the Villistas that we were chasing. The troops had orders therefore not to shoot at *any* Mexican soldiers unless they shot at us first, in which case we could assume they were Villistas and return the fire. It was a good thing Villa did not know about this order which would in effect give him the first bite.

So, with all things considered, it was not surprising that, while Pot was in charge of road building, he was not

authorized an automobile. Nor could he "justify" it to the satisfaction of the Chief of Staff.

But it was not long before a Ford touring car came to join Pot's company—from where no one ever knew. Work progressed amazingly fast with Pot supervising from the back seat of the Ford, contentedly smoking a Londres cigar—two and a half cents apiece at the Commissary. But while the staff of the high command were more than willing to have the work speeded up it certainly did not intend to allow any organization to retain an unauthorized motor vehicle. Fifty miles separated him from Headquarters and orders had to come to Pot by mail over the same route he was maintaining—which took a little time but they eventually arrived. In them Captain Ernest Graves, Corps of Engineers, was directed to turn in to the nearest supply establishment the item—"One car, Ford, Touring, Model T, Complete, Unauthorized." He paid no attention to this and went on building a fine road, surveying the smallest detail from the back seat of the car.

His Company was actually a pioneer in building motor roads. Technical pamphlets described the building of military roads but they were intended for animal drawn traffic, not motors. Even with no book to guide him the work progressed so fast that Pot felt justified in admitting that he was the foremost builder of military motor highways in the world—and possibly he was. But having once accepted this self conferred title, he saw no reason why anyone should bother him. He was the best qualified to determine the equipment needed by an Engineer Company engaged in road work, and that assuredly included a Ford for the Captain. All that the high command had to do was to leave him alone and he would build the roads for them.

However, orders kept coming at regular intervals for him to turn in the Ford. These he continued to ignore on the theory that if he were not a Major he should be, and that the salary of a field officer was after all paid him for accepting the responsibility of disregarding orders when the good of the service obviously required it.

Days were days of accomplishment—and happy days for Pot. No king was ever half as proud of his carriage as he was of his Ford. Occasionally distant road reconnaissance would take him twenty or thirty miles to neighboring camps. On these trips he would try to look commonplace and not too proud.

A rifle was an important part of the equipment carried in the car. A firm belief in the infallibility of the Engineers was part of Pot's creed, and this meant that an Engineer officer should be an excellent shot with a rifle. Just why an Engineer should even be armed was not clear to the other branches, who considered an armed Engineer more dangerous to friend than to enemy. But the authorities who handled the Command and General Staff School and who dominated our tactical theories prided themselves on having accounted for every possible contingency, and they had decided that when the other branches had gotten themselves so badly messed up in a battle that they could do not more, the Engineers would be called to the rescue. They would form a last resort Reserve. Pot claimed that they had never yet failed to retrieve the situation—which was true for the other branches had never yet succeeded in getting themselves so badly messed up, outside of paper problems.

Consequently he welcomed the sight of a coyote one day as he was traveling on one of his reconnaissance trips. The coyote was standing a hundred yards from the road impertinently observing the car—scorning to flee from Engineer



personnel. "I'll sure teach that insolent animal a lesson," said Pot. "Now I'll show you how an Engineer Officer really can shoot." He squeezed the trigger according to the book, but all that answered was a click. The driver had shot up all the ammunition and not bothered to replace it. Pot made a few appropriate remarks.

Weeks ran into months, with the road work going so fine it surprised even Pot himself. By this time the matter of the Ford was a stalemate with the men of the company taking all bets on the Captain winning out. However, orders kept coming in for the turn-in and, if anything, were getting stronger in tone. The first group had been signed by the Adjutant, but now they were signed by the Chief of Staff himself. Pot began claiming now that they could not be referring to his Ford for the orders still dealt with item—"One Car, Ford, Touring, Model T, Complete, Unauthorized" and his car was by this time anything but "complete." It had become quite evident that the only option the Headquarters had was to put him in arrest and relieve him from command. But that was just what they did not want to do, — and they could not send a detachment to take over the Ford by physical force. So Pot went serenely on his way, the angle of his cigar a little more belligerent.

No orders had arrived for two weeks and Pot had decided that the battle was over and he the winner. But, once started, the high command is hard to stop and he was a bit premature in his relaxing, for now he received orders of another kind — orders he could not avoid obeying and which convinced him of the speciousness of the high command—if he needed any convincing. He was ordered to proceed to Columbus, New Mexico, as a member of a Board of Officers meeting for the examination of Engineer Officers for promotion. Other officers would have received this order with great satisfaction—anything to get back to the States, if just for a week. But not Pot—he knew his Ford would be without a guardian.

Snaky Young, the next in command, was summoned to a parting conference. "Young," said Pot, "I am going to Columbus and will be gone about a week. I know I won't be out of camp

twenty minutes before you get orders to turn in my Ford—DON'T YOU DO IT! You tell whoever issues that order that you have to wait till the Captain gets back. Do you understand?" "Yes, sir," answered Snaky.

As a prophet Pot was correct. He had made the mistake, however, of not letting his second in command see any of the orders he had received. Young was somehow of the opinion that the whole matter was just sort of good clean fun, and he certainly was not prepared for any such peremptory orders as were handed to him. He had been in the Army barely two years, and these orders indicated clearly that if he wished to extend this two years' service he had better turn in that Ford. Which he did.

Pot was back in camp about two minutes when he learned that his Ford was gone. Snaky and the men expected smoke, fury and profanity from the Captain, but not a word was said. Apparently the game was up and he was taking his licking like a good sport.

But in two days the Ford was back. And now the "Affaire Ford" started all over again. And the orders demanded that he explain why he had obtained possession of the Ford the second time. All of which he complacently ignored. He was happy again—in fact so happy and good natured that his poker playing suffered. But by this time the fact that the Ford was not "complete" was far from a joke. Headquarters had the winning hand after all, for he could get

no spare parts. The car was barely limping along and it seemed now that it would have to be *towed in*, in order to be *turned in*.

One afternoon an ambulance train rolled into camp just before dusk—that is, all except one ambulance which had broken down two miles out of camp. The train was made up of new Fords. And it was commanded by a new Major Medico who had never been in the field before. However, he knew the value of morale and the book said the best way to keep it high was by proper feeding of the men—they should have plenty of food, the food should be good, and they should be fed on time. So the vehicle was left unguarded while the entire personnel preserved their high morale by going in to camp for a good supper. When a rescue squad arrived later all that was left of the broken down ambulance was the chassis, the solid part of the motor and the wheels. Every removable part was missing.

And in two days Pot was charging up and down the line — his Ford in fine shape. He looked like a man who had suddenly been promoted two grades, and all that kept him from singing and whistling was the eternal cigar. In a few days a letter arrived from Headquarters demanding Pot explain by Indorsement what, if any, parts he had removed from a Ford ambulance about two miles north of El Valle on or about such and such a date. This time he surprised them by answering—he stated he was unable to understand why a communication about an ambulance was sent to him, a Captain of Engineers. But after the 10th Indorsement he weakened and wrote, "I do not remember what, if any, parts I took from this ambulance but I took everything I needed."

Pot kept his Ford. Whether or not the High Command gave it up as hopeless or whether it was finally decided the car belonged to Pot by right of eminent domain is not known. But Pot insisted to the last that he and the item "One Car, Ford, Touring, Model T, Complete, Unauthorized," had done a fine job. And perhaps General Pershing agreed, for in a few months Pot went to France in the personal party of the General—as the senior Engineer Officer, and in the grade of Major.

Graduating second in his class (1905) at West Point and commissioned in the CE, Col. Ernest Graves was retired in 1921, but was recalled to active duty—and is still on active duty—with the Mississippi River Commission. The cut, below, shows him in football coaching garb.



The Bridge That Wasn't There

By Lt. Edwin Hartrich

THE ENEMY-HELD BRIDGE over the Saar River at Taben had been bombed out. A vital supply line for the German forces facing the XXth American Corps had been cut—but was it? In the bitter fighting for the Saar-Moselle triangle, remnants of the Wehrmacht were reportedly separated from their supply bases by the loss of this bridge, yet it was painfully apparent to the doughboys facing the enemy fire that reinforcements of troops and materiel were daily strengthening the German defense.

How did they do it? The Americans enjoyed air superiority and any German attempt to supply their men from the air, as they had done to prolong the agony of Stalingrad, was definitely out of the question in this operation. The bombing had erected piles of rubble where once bridges had spanned the swift waters of the Saar.

Every day American reconnaissance planes swept up and down the River, photographing every foot of the Saar. All important crossings were checked. All means of intelligence about the enemy were exhaustively studied. The photo interpreters examined the daily "milk-run" sorties of the Saar for a due. Then one piece of evidence was found that led to the unraveling of the mystery.

On January 13th an aerial photo revealed that some sort of framework had been erected in the shadows cast by the wrecked Taben bridge, where it was partially hidden from sight except at high noon. There was no activity visible on the photo, but as the Germans did all their work at night this was not unusual. However, Capt. Peter Elstad, the chief interpreter, suggested that a midnight reconnaissance be flown over the Taben bridge.

With the aid of a powerful new device which can illuminate the countryside for

miles from the air, a night photo mission was flown. And what Capt. Elstad had suspected proved correct when the developed prints were laid on his desk the following morning. A complete flooring had been laid on the skeleton framework. Another photo sortie flown that day revealed the framework was minus its flooring.

For the Germans had learned a trick from the Russians at Stalingrad. With their backs against the Volga and with all of Stalingrad's bridges destroyed by Nazi dive-bombers, the Russians had constructed a bridge which lay hidden several feet below the surface of the Volga river and over that bridge they moved men, guns, and supplies into the besieged city at night. The Germans never discovered this trick until it was too late.

At the Taben crossing, under the cover of darkness the enemy was making use of a piece of deception to supply the Wehrmacht defenders on the south bank of the Saar. By laying a wooden plank flooring on the framework after dark each day and removing it before dawn, the Germans had hoped to fool the photo intelligence into believing that the Taben crossing was not in use and thus postpone or

avert another destructive flurry of American shells or bombs. Incidentally, a Russian slave labor battalion was used to build the structure.

But, on the morning of January 16th the massed artillery of the XXth Corps fired a specially-adjusted salvo, with three hits scoring on the bridge that wasn't there. Every day thereafter a few more shells would be dropped on the river crossing to completely disrupt the frantic attempts of the Germans to span the Saar at Taben. As a bitter postscript for the Wehrmacht, the demolished structure was swept away in a February flood that ended all but rowboat traffic across the Saar.





Communication Needs a Face Lifting

By Col. Ralph R. Mace,* FA

ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT lessons learned during the recent war was that all ground force personnel must be thoroughly trained in communication. That this lesson had to be learned *after* we were engaged in a world war indicates that something was drastically wrong with our pre-war training. We must look backward to uncover that "something."

INITIAL ERROR

Many years ago the Signal Corps trained key communication personnel for ground force units. Then, as now, the Signal Corps was a highly specialized branch. It thought in technical terms and its teaching was constantly pointed in that direction. When Army Ground Forces took over the training of its own communication personnel we fell heir to the Signal Corps habits and continued the highly specialized, technical approach. This was a tragic error. The very nature of the Signal Corps' activities dictated its technical approach to communication — and naturally so, since it is for that reason that it is a separate technical service, and is organized to provide signal research, development, and higher echelon repair service. Obviously, signal communication in the ground forces must be practical and must be universally known and applied. Any element of the ground forces is a part of a team wherein communication assumes a vital role. Everyone on the team is concerned with communication and must use it to secure teamwork. This idea of teamwork and lack of compartmentation is being aggressively implemented at the present time by reducing the number of

branches and further implementation is envisaged with the merger of all armed forces. We must do as much for the separate branches. We must not have specialists within branches but rather well-rounded personnel with a complete knowledge of their branch—and that knowledge must include communication.

FAR-REACHING RESULTS

The results of the policy of specialized communication training which we inherited and then carried on in our branches were far-reaching. At the beginning of World War II our Army was embarrassingly deficient in communication. Our equipment was inadequate, obsolete, and unreliable. Except by a few specialists, our training in communication had been for years considered as merely a necessary evil to be included in training, and was grudgingly assigned what few hours could be spared from other subjects. Five out of eight officers had never spoken over a radio or even knew how to go about it; only a few bothered to talk directly over a field telephone, and most of these would do so only when an operator placed the call and reminded them to push the switch on the handset. Tables of organization provided sergeants to supervise the communication and operators to do the talking over the communication system. Officers were wont to stand beside the radio or telephone and dictate their conversation to a waiting operator, pacing about in the manner of a million-dollar executive before an admiring secretary. On the receiving end this relay procedure was merely inverted: The operator took the call and announced the recipient in a manner appropriate to a Dr. Kildare movie: "Message for S-3 . . ."

Communication plans? They were always "normal"—not to be considered in plans and not mentioned in orders. Operations were planned without any particular thought to communication; no thought or consideration was given to the capabilities and limitations of the signal equipment or the time required to install it. And when communication was not available—when Houdini was absent — it was unfortunate, but not surprising.

A NEW DAY DAWNS

The grim realities of war changed all this. New radio equipment was hurriedly produced and tables of equipment were modified to include adequate equipment. Reserve equipment was stocked near the front. Schools were established in every theater and over the United States to train communication specialists. As the war progressed, everyone from private to general officer learned more and more about the value—the absolute necessity—of having reliable communication. The unfortunate thing was that so much of the learning had to be acquired the hard way—by the hours, even days, of anxiety which resulted when there was no contact, no communication, no information. Commanders were relieved, units were decimated, and good young lives were lost because communication had not been provided. The situation was still "normal." But we were learning, and as the war continued we learned more, began to appreciate and consider our communication possibilities along with our operational plans; it was the dawn of a new day. Plans became thorough: they provided for communication. Commanders

*Until recently the Director of Communication at The Artillery School, the author is now assigned to Army Ground Forces Board No. 1.—ED.

could change plans as an operation developed because they had communication and knew what was happening. They could move reserves quickly and could place fire where and when it was needed. Information was available; the commander knew the score, and was not working in the dark.

When the war ended commanders from all types of units and in every grade were communication conscious. It had taken the major part of a world war to effect a true realization of the absolute necessity of having reliable, adequate communication and thorough, practical communication training, but if those lessons were well learned and *are not forgotten*, the time, the heartaches, and the deaths were not entirely in vain.

RECOMMENDED PROGRAM

The entire concept of communication and communication training must be overhauled, modernized, and brought down to the level of practical, down-to-earth knowledge which everyone may be expected to know. Implementation of the following program will go far toward accomplishing this goal.

First, *take the mystery out of communication*. Stop thinking of communication as a highly technical subject which no one but an expert can comprehend. Place communication equipment, procedures, and technique in the same category as weapons. For example, in the Field Artillery there are guns and howitzers of different characteristics and capabilities. These guns are of highly technical construction and the more intricate principles of their operation and functioning are quite properly Ordnance functions. However, every good artilleryman is confident that he knows his guns. He knows the range, the practical operating characteristics, signs of malfunctioning, practical field care and maintenance, and how to place them in position and operate them. He is dealing with a piece of technical equipment, but there is nothing alleged to be secret about it and he does not

think of it in technical terms—the mystery has been eliminated from the guns. Let's approach communication from the same viewpoint and let every officer realize early in his career that he must know his communication with the same thoroughness he knows his weapons.

Second, *eliminate communication specialist instruction except for repairmen*. The instruction now given in AGF schools for radio repairmen provides a source of practical field repairmen for communication equipment. Only in the repair of communication equipment is specialist technical skill required and only in that field should it be recognized and taught. The repairman cares for, maintains, and repairs communication equipment in the same way a gun mechanic does his guns, and when the equipment requires work which is beyond his ability or for which he is not equipped, it is repaired or replaced by the appropriate Signal Corps agency.

The instruction for communication officers and communication chiefs now given in AGF schools is effective but at the same time destructive. By providing some officers and NCOs with special communication training we encourage all other officers and NCOs to avoid it and accept it as something they need not know. Officers show no reluctance in admitting that they "know nothing about communication." Furthermore, the fact that communication specialist instruction is included in our school system tends to reduce the attention given to communication training in regular courses and further reduces the general communication knowledge in our Army.

Third, *simplify communication equipment and procedures*. Design equipment so the procedure of operation is simple and, as far as possible, the same for all radios. Strive for further simplification and uniformity of telephone and radio procedure with a view to the eventual complete integration of wire and radio systems, and thoroughly indoctrinate each officer

with it completely when he first enters the service. Reduce the present large number of types of radios to the absolute minimum — possibly three within a division. Eliminate, below division headquarters, radio sets equipped for Morse code transmission and reception. Code transmissions place radio communication in the "expert" category. The training of code operators is an unending task, and cannot be efficiently accomplished in the field. Voice transmission will satisfy radio requirements below division headquarters (except for rare cases of wide envelopments by special task forces, and then attachment of special radio teams can and should be made from the division signal company) if equipment is properly engineered and headquarters are placed and displaced with reasonable consideration.

Fourth, *provide balanced training in AGF schools to teach each officer the tactics and technique of communication*. Every officer must be a communication officer as well as a platoon leader, battery executive, or gunnery officer. It follows that thorough practical knowledge of communication should be an essential part of the training of every officer. This will require considerable change both in thought and practice. In our schools everything is secondary to branch gunnery and branch technique and most of the instruction time is devoted to those subjects. Everything else, including communication, is regarded as purely incidental. It may be said that in our schools the student is taught branch gunnery and branch technique and is *exposed* to everything else.

At some rung of the educational ladder, each officer must be thoroughly indoctrinated with communication equipment and procedures. Sufficient time must be devoted to communication to teach the subject completely and prepare the officer to use his communication effectively. If the subject is brought forcefully before him and kept there until he realizes that it is a critical

The mystery has been eliminated from guns and gunnery. . . .
Let's approach artillery communication from the same viewpoint.

element of his education—that every officer must be a communication officer—he will then acquire the conviction that to be a successful officer he must know his communication equipment and procedures. This goal of communication efficiency for all officers can be reached by careful and systematic use of training time in the school system.

In the basic officer school, the young officer should be taught the tools of his trade—those equipments and techniques common to all ground forces. For example, in the basic school he should be taught the telephone and the principles of telephone communication so completely that that subject would not have to be included in his higher education. Communication instruction in the branch basic school should begin where the basic school leaves off, and should include equipment and techniques peculiar to the branch along with application of all the equipments to the tactics and technique of the arm. When an officer finishes the branch basic course he should have a thorough working knowledge of communication equipment and procedures, and should be equipped to perform the duties of a *practical* communication officer. Later education in communication should be confined to new developments, new techniques, and planning.

Fifth, *include communication instruction and exercises for all personnel in unit training.* In the average unit, communication instruction and communication exercises are conducted *only* for communication personnel. This idea stems from the age-old custom of considering communication a specialist subject to be taught only to the personnel earmarked as communication "experts." The yearly training cycle should include a well-coordinated and thoroughly integrated course in communication, and *all personnel from the commander to the recruit should participate actively in every phase.*

Not so long ago field artillery firing was considered a highly technical procedure requiring a mathematical wizard. Today, the secrecy has been taken out of artillery firing and it is now recognized that an average person can do it. Communication needs a similar face lifting.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE — 1864

By George S. Burkhardt

Republished by courtesy of the "Infantry Journal."

Psychological warfare is not the infant born of 20th Century war as we might be inclined to suppose. As witness the following:

HEADQUARTERS, CONFEDERATE FORCES
East Tennessee, Jan. 3d, 1864.

*To the Commanding General, United
States Forces, East Tennessee*

Sir, I find the proclamation of President Lincoln, of the 8th of December last, in circulation among our soldiers. The immediate object of this circulation seems to be to induce our soldiers to quit our ranks, and take the oath of allegiance to the United States government. I presume, however, that the great object and end in view is to hasten the day of peace. I respectfully suggest, for your consideration, the propriety of communicating any views that your government may have upon this subject through me, rather than by hand bills circulated amongst our soldiers.

The few men who may desert under the promise held out in the proclamation, cannot be men of character or standing. If they desert their cause they disgrace themselves in the eyes of God and man. . . .

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant General, C.S.A.,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF
THE OHIO
KNOXVILLE, East Tennessee,
Jan. 7th, 1864

*Lieutenant General Commanding
Confederate Forces in East Tennessee*

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of January 3d, 1864.

You are correct in the supposition that the great object in view of the circulation of the President's proclamation is to induce those now in rebellion against the government to lay aside their arms and return to their allegiance as citizens of the United States thus securing . . . the reunion of states . . . restoration of peace.

The immediate effect is to cause many men to leave your ranks to return home, or come within our lines and in view of the latter course, it has been thought proper to issue an order announcing the favorable terms on which deserters will be received.

I accept, however, your suggestion that it would have been more courteous to

have sent these documents to you for circulation, and I embrace, with pleasure, the opportunity thus afforded to enclose you twenty (20) copies each of these documents and rely upon your generosity and desire for peace to give publicity to same among your officers and men.

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. FOSTER,
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF
EAST TENNESSEE

January 11th, 1864.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th of January, 1864.

The disingenuous manner in which you have misconstrued my letter of the 3d, has disappointed me.

The absolute want of pretext for your construction of the letter induces me to admonish you against trifling over events of this great war. You cannot pretend to have answered my letter in the spirit of frankness due a soldier, and yet it is hard to believe that an officer commanding an army of veteran soldiers, on whose shoulders rest, in no small part the destiny of empires, could so far forget the height of this great argument at arms, and so betray the dignity of his high station, as to fall into a contest of jests and jibes.

I have read your order announcing the favorable terms on which deserters will be received. Step by step you have gone on in violation of the laws of honorable warfare. Our farms have been destroyed, our women and children have been robbed, and our houses have been burned and pillaged. You have laid your plans and worked diligently to produce wholesale murder by servile insurrection. And now, the most ignoble of all, you propose to degrade the human race by inducing soldiers to dishonor and forswear themselves.

Soldiers who have met your own and breasted the storm of battle for three long years have a right to expect more of honor, even in their adversaries.

I beg leave to return the copies of the proclamation, and your order.

I have the honor, Sir, to be your obedient servant,

J. LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant General Commanding.

Reserve Officers Meet

THE RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION of the United States held its twenty-first annual Convention at Miami, Florida, during the period 18-21 June 1947.

From all reports, the Convention was considered to be highly successful. The delegates staged their traditional annual banquet, elected new officers for the Association, listened to numerous speeches, heard the report of their Executive Director, and adopted a considerable number of resolutions.

Colonel William H. Neblett of Richmond, Virginia, was chosen as the new president of the Association, succeeding Brig. Gen. Donald B. Adams. Colonel Neblett is shown in the picture below, together with the other Association officers elected by the Convention.

That the Reserve Officers Association is dissatisfied by the progress that has been made in the field of national defense since V-J Day is evidenced by the title of General Adams' farewell address—"Disillusionment of the Reservist." Although much of his speech was directed against the War Department, General Adams also deplored in very strong words the general apathy of the American people and the Congress to the essential requirements of national security.

"Where are our drills?" asked General Adams. "Where are our contact camps? Where are our fifteen-day camps? Where are our maneuvers? * * * I say 'shame' upon a niggardly governmental set-up which will not provide the facilities to protect the rights and liberties for which this country has stood since 1776. I say 'shame' upon a governmental set-up where most of the legislation and many of the regulations inform the civilian components of what they must *not* do. You can search in vain for much legislation and regulations which *encourage* the formation, the organization, and the effectiveness of our Reserve Component."

It was clearly evident from the remarks made by Generals Devers,

Collins and Bres (War Department guest speakers) that the dissatisfaction felt by many of the Reserve officers was very much on their minds. This ill feeling had been voiced in a recent editorial in *The Reserve Officer* which had implied that the War Department is not interested in the Reserves. (This editorial, incidentally, had so shocked the Secretary of War that he answered it himself in a letter which was published in the next (July, 1947) issue of *The Reserve Officer*.) The War Department speakers assured the assembled Reservists that the War Department has a deep and continuing interest in the Reserve Component, since the national security program cannot be implemented without it. In commenting on this matter, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Information, may have equaled General Adams' bluntness, when he said:

"The public and the Congress will

provide the necessary men and money only if they understand the threat to our national security; only if they understand the program itself and only if they understand that the degree of the threat demands the program and that the program demands the men and the money.

"The Congress and the people cannot be expected to understand these things if you and I—the officers of the Army of the United States—are unable to explain them. If we do not present the whole program—if we merely push for our own individual ends—we cannot expect the people to understand or support it.

"That is where you and your Association come in—you can sell this national security program including its essential reserve component and you will have made a real contribution to the national security. Or you can sell the Reserve Officers Association and the interests of reserve officers as individuals and as a group and let the Security Program take care of itself. If you do this, I say to you that this country

NATIONAL OFFICERS OF THE RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

Standing: Col. Clarence E. Barnes, MI-Res., Senior Vice-President, Guthrie, Okla.; Col. Martin H. Otto, Inf-Res., Vice-President, Army Division, Minneapolis, Minn.; Col. William H. Neblett, Air-Res., President, Washington, D. C.; Col. John Bright Hill, JAG-Res., Judge Advocate, Wilmington, N. C.; Col. H. W. K. Zellhoefer, Med-Res., Surgeon, Sioux Falls, S. D. Kneeling; 1st Lt. William H. Ellis, Sig-Res., Junior Vice-President, Rumson, N. J.; Capt. R. L. Wynes, Air-Res., Junior Vice-President, Dubuque, Iowa; Lt. Col. John W. Richardson, Air-Res., Vice-President, Air Division, Detroit, Mich.; Lt. Col. Harry P. Abbott, Ch-Res., Chaplain, Little Rock, Ark. Absent from photograph; Col. Melvin Mass, USMCR, Vice-President, Navy Division, Washington, D. C.; Maj. Francis S. Tennant, Air-Res., Historian, Huntington, W. Va.



will not achieve an adequate program of national security and we will be threatened with another war in which we will be unprepared. If this occurs I am afraid it will be the last time.

"The spirit evidenced in a recent editorial in *The Reserve Officer* unfortunately indicated that some Reserve officers, at least, have chosen this latter course. For all of you to do so would be tragic."

In his report to the convention, the Executive Director, Brig. Gen. E. A. Evans, emphasized the importance of bringing about a federation of the several Reserve groups, saying, in part:

"The strength of one over-all organization is many times that of separate associations standing alone or even working together. All of these organizations exist for the same purpose, that is the perpetuation of an adequate national security for this Nation. If we are united into one Association, it will not only be more economical in operating costs but we can become much stronger and more effective from a legislative standpoint."

General Evans also called attention to the decline in ROA membership, which he said had been evident for a number of months. He observed that many Reserve officers were losing their interest, due to the slowness of the War Department in getting the Reserve program properly under way.

Brief analysis of the thirty-four resolutions adopted by the Convention shows that they fall into four general categories: five dealt with the internal organization and administration of the Association itself; eight dealt with overall questions of national security (support was given to UMT, unification of the armed forces, adequate appropriations, etc); six dealt with the general administration of the Reserve program, mostly on the War Department level (creation of a Bureau of Reserve Affairs comparable to the National Guard Bureau, delay in disposal of military installations until all Reserve requirements are met, etc.); and fifteen dealt with specific benefits and privileges desired for Reserve officers (educational benefits, PX privileges, inactive duty pay, correction of alleged discriminations, etc.).

More on the New Observed Fire Procedure*

THE PRINCIPLES of the new and simplified fire procedure as well as the logic that motivated its adoption (Change 2 to FM 6-40) were both explained fully in the March-April (1947) issue of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL. These principles are summarized briefly below, and two more illustrative problems are included.

RANGE-BRACKETING PROCEDURE

Employ range-bracketing procedure when the observed deviation between ranging rounds is *200 yards or less*.

Bring bursts to the *OT* line by making appropriate *deflection* corrections.

Keep bursts on the *OT* line by shifting deflection one *S* for each 100-yard range change.

Precision fire, adjustment. The object of adjustment is to determine the *trial range*. The trial range is the range for the center of a 100-yard (or 1-fork) range bracket, or a range giving a target hit.

Precision fire, fire for effect. Start fire for effect at the trial range, and with a deflection correction which will place the burst on the *OT* line. The rounds are fired singly or in half-groups of three.

Based on positive deflection sensings, the deflection is moved $\frac{1}{2} S$ or 10 yards, whichever is greater, until a deflection bracket is obtained. Thereafter, the bracket is split until the deflection is correct. Deflection is correct when a target hit is obtained, when a 10-yard deflection bracket (20-yard for *GT* ranges greater than 10,000 yards) is split, or when *deflection over* and *deflection short* are obtained with the same deflection setting.

Obtain and report to the fire-direction center a group of six usable range sensings.

Area fire, adjustment. The object of adjustment is to enclose the target within

a range bracket of suitable depth, with deflection correct, or to obtain target hits. A bracket of 200 yards is appropriate for a target whose location is known only approximately; a smaller bracket or an effective single range may be sought for a visible target. A 100-yard bracket should be obtained when additional batteries or battalions are to fire for effect.

Select the type of ammunition which will be most effective against the target.

Bring the burst center to the *OT* line by appropriate deflection corrections.

In time fire, adjust the height of burst to 20 yards above the center of the target by correcting site. Fire for effect is not started until the height of burst is correct, unless the observer is certain that his next correction will result in the correct height of burst.

If a bracketing volley or a target hit is obtained, start fire for effect immediately.

Area fire, fire for effect. Start fire for effect when deflection and range (and height of burst in time fire) are correct, or when effective fire will result from the next split in bracket.

Start fire for effect at the center range of the bracket selected.

Upon entering fire for effect, center the fire on the target or area to be covered by making an appropriate deflection change.

Improve the range if the preponderance of the fire for effect is over or short. Improve the deflection when positive deflection sensings are obtained. Deflection is correct when rounds from the center pieces bracket the center of the target for deflection.

If fire for effect is ineffective or insufficient, make necessary corrections and command additional fire for effect. Upon completion of fire for effect, send *Mission Accomplished* and report the effect observed.

*Credit for the preparation of this material is due The Gunnery Department, The Artillery School.—
Editor

AREA FIRE MISSION, USING RANGE-BRACKETING PROCEDURE

Situation: Target, enemy mortars in vicinity of an adjusting point; mission, neutralization; materiel, 105mm howitzer; ammunition, HE shell (both M48 and M54 fuzes in battery).

Messages, corrections, and commands	Results	Sensings		Remarks
		HB	RN	
Obsr to FDC: (Initial fire message) FIRE MISSION, FROM BASE POINT, RIGHT 400, DOWN 20 ADD 600, ENEMY MORTARS, TIME FIRE, WILL ADJUST. FDC to Obsr: <i>Battalion, Baker,</i> <i>Time fire,</i> <i>Concentration 7,</i> <i>2 volleys, Center</i> <i>range, When</i> <i>ready . . . On the</i> <i>way.</i>	See Fig. 1	A	?	OT distance from map = 3000 yards. From previous firing in vicinity of this target, observer has determined: (1) S = 30 yards, (2) Guns to left rear, and (3) Range-bracketing to be used. Adjustment is begun with platoon volleys. Observer decides to attack the target with time fire. First volley appears 30 mils left and 15 mils above base of target.
Obsr to FDC: RIGHT 100, DOWN 25 REPEAT RANGE. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the Way.</i>	See Fig. 2	A	+	Small deviation is ignored. Height of burst is now approximately 20 yards. Observer decides to make 400-yard initial range bound.
Obsr to FDC: RIGHT 120, DROP 400. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the way.</i>	See Fig. 3	A	—	Small deviation has persisted and should be corrected. Next shift: LEFT 30 to get on line + LEFT 60 to stay on line = LEFT 90.
Obsr to FDC: LEFT 90, ADD 200. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the way.</i>	See Fig. 4	A	—	Since battalion is to fire for effect, observer will obtain 100-yard bracket before calling for fire for effect.
Obsr to FDC: LEFT 30, ADD 100. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the way.</i>	See Fig. 5	A	+	Observer has established 100-yard bracket. Fire for effect is started at the center of the bracket.
Obsr to FDC: RIGHT 15, DROP 50, FIRE FOR EFFECT. FDC to Obsr: <i>Baker firing for effect.</i>	See Fig. 6			First volley in effect sensed, <i>mixed air, bracketing, deflection correct.</i> Remainder of fire for effect is observed and, if necessary, proper corrections are sent to FDC.

Fig. 1




Fig. 2




Fig. 3



Fig. 4



Fig. 5





Fig. 6



Observer considers fire for effect adequate; reports to FDC:
 MISSION ACCOMPLISHED, FIRE EFFECTIVE, MORTARS SILENCED.

DEFLECTION-BRACKETING PROCEDURE

Employ deflection-bracketing procedure when the observed deviation between ranging rounds is *greater than 200 yards*.

Bring bursts to the *OT* line by making appropriate *range* corrections.

Keep bursts on the *OT* line by making a 100-yard range change for each 1-*S* deflection shift.

Precision fire, adjustment. The object of adjustment is to determine the *trial deflection*. The trial deflection is a deflection giving a target hit, or a deflection for the center of a 1-*S* bracket, or a deflection for the center of a bracket of 80 yards or less when *S* is greater than 80 yards.

Precision fire, fire for effect. Start fire for effect at the trial deflection, and with a range correction which will place the bursts on the *OT* line. The rounds are fired singly or in half-groups of three.

Based upon positive deflection sensings, improve the deflection until it

is correct. Deflection is correct when a target hit is obtained, when a 10-yard deflection bracket (20-yard, for *GT* ranges greater than 10,000 yards) is split, or when *deflection over* and *deflection short* are obtained with the same deflection setting.

Obtain and report to fire-direction center a group of six usable range sensings.

Area fire, adjustment. The object of adjustment is to enclose the target within a 100-yard (or smaller) deflection bracket.

Select the type of ammunition which will be most effective against the target.

Bring the burst center to the *OT* line by appropriate range corrections.

In time fire, adjust the height of burst to 20 yards above the center of the target by correcting site. Fire for effect is not started until the height of burst is correct, or until the observer is certain that his next correction will result in the correct height of burst.

If a target hit is obtained or a salvo brackets the target for deflection, start fire for effect immediately.

Area fire, fire for effect. Start fire for effect when splitting a 100-yard (or smaller) deflection bracket, or when target hits are obtained or a salvo brackets the target for deflection.

Upon entering fire for effect, center the fire on the target or area to be covered by making an appropriate range change.

Improve deflection when positive deflection sensings are obtained. Improve range when the preponderance of the fire is *over* or *short*. Deflection is correct when rounds from the center pieces bracket the center of the target for deflection.

If fire for effect is ineffective or insufficient make necessary corrections, and command additional fire for effect.

Upon completion of fire for effect, send *mission accomplished* and report the effect observed.

PRECISION REGISTRATION MISSION, DEFLECTION-BRACKETING PROCEDURE

Situation: Target, check point; mission, precision registration; materiel, 105mm howitzer; ammunition, HE shell, quick fuze.

Messages, corrections, and commands	Results	Sensings		Remarks
		RN	DF	
Obsr to FDC: (Initial fire message) FIRE MISSION, MARK CHECK POINT 1, FIRE RANGING ROUNDS, PRECISION REGISTRATION, WILL ADJUST. FDC to Obsr: <i>Able, Ranging rounds, Fuze quick, Check Point 1, When ready . . . On the way.</i>	See Fig. 7		+	Deflection sensing obtained from second ranging round. <i>OT</i> distance from map = 2000 yards. With field glasses, observer measures 125 mils between ranging rounds. Observed deviation = 250 yards (125 × 2). <i>S</i> = 80 yards. Range factor = 30 mils (125/4). Deflection-bracketing to be used. Observer decides to make 4- <i>S</i> shift. Since first burst is 400 yards off line (in range) no range change will be required to place next burst on <i>OT</i> line when 4- <i>S</i> deflection shift is made.
Obsr to FDC: LEFT 320, REPEAT RANGE. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the way.</i>	See Fig. 8		—	<i>S</i> appears to be satisfactory.




Figure 7



Figure 8

Precision Registration Mission, Deflection-Bracketing Procedure—Continued

<i>Messages, corrections, and commands</i>	<i>Results</i>	<i>Sensings</i>		<i>Remarks</i>
		<i>RN</i>	<i>DF</i>	
Obsr to FDC: RIGHT 160, ADD 200. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the way.</i>	See Fig. 9		?	To bring next burst to the <i>OT</i> line, change in range of 50 yards ($15/30 \times 100$) is indicated.
Obsr to FDC: REPEAT DEFLECTION, DROP 50. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the way.</i>	See Fig. 10		+	Range bracket between sensed rounds is now 150 yards (200—50).
Obsr to FDC: LEFT 80, DROP 75. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the way.</i>	See Fig. 11		—	Range bracket is now 75 yards; deflection bracket is 80 yards; with next split in deflection bracket, observer is ready to begin fire for effect.
Obsr to FDC: RIGHT 40, 3 ROUNDS, ADD 40. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the way.</i>				
First round	See Fig. 12	—	?	 <p style="text-align: center;">Figure 11</p>
Second round	See Fig. 13	+	?	
Third round	See Fig. 14	+	+	
Obsr to FDC: LEFT 20, REPEAT RANGE. FDC to Obsr: <i>On the way.</i>				
First round	See Fig. 15	—	—	Deflection is correct, since both <i>deflection over</i> and <i>deflection short</i> were obtained at the same deflection setting.
Second round	See Fig. 16	—	?	
Third round	See Fig. 17	+	+	




Figure 9




Figure 10




Figure 12



Figure 13

Obsr to FDC: 3 OVERS, 3 SHORTS, REGISTRATION COMPLETE.



Figure 14




Figure 15




Figure 16




Figure 17

Philosophy of Soldiering

His work-a-day administrative whirligig is such that the average American officer seldom finds time to reflect on the broader aspects -- the "philosophy," one might call it -- of his profession. We're the greatest "doers" in the world, but we seldom pause and ponder.

This is far from a happy circumstance, and we Artillerymen, unfortunately, are frequently vulnerable to the charge. Every so often we tend to get ourselves mentally snarled in the minutiae of our branch technique. The reasons for this are entirely understandable and, for the most part, entirely commendable -- it is our splendid technique that has made our field artillery so decisive in modern battle. But, as Mr. Baruch reminds us pointedly on page 230 of this issue, wars are not won -- or lost -- on the battlefield, alone. And he adds that the "Armed Forces' horizons must be wide and deep." This charge, we Artillerymen must note well.

The following three articles deal with several broad avenues, among many, of the challenging "philosophy" of our profession.

Commander Unwin's article on the Principles of War is the more interesting since, for some curious and obviously unthinking reason, many of us are prone to think of his chosen subject as falling within the soldier's particular province of interest.

Many readers will disagree vigorously -- as does this writer -- with some of Hoffman Nickerson's convictions. But his ideas are invariably pungent and stimulating, and we may thank God that we live under a system that permits open disagreement with what would be known elsewhere as "the party line," even in the pages of what is frequently called the "semi-official" Field Artillery Journal. -Editor.

Notes on U. S. Military Policy

By

Hoffman Nickerson

INTELLIGENT military policy must start from an over-all survey. Spotty, disjointed discussions of any important detail, for instance many recent public statements for and against universal training, are certain to be useless and may be positively harmful for want of due proportion. Money, the index or common denominator of goods and services, is the limiting factor of policy, and only by seeing national strategy as a whole can we wisely determine how many cents out of every defense dollar ought to be spent for this or that form of preparedness.

Our survey must start from the basic facts of human and physical geography. Thus we have the continental United States with its population of somewhat more than a hundred and thirty millions, very wealthy when compared with other peoples and possessed of high mechanical aptitude, with oceans to the east and west, certain island and other outposts including the important Panama Canal, and no potentially threatening land neighbors. Next come national characteristics and policies. Few Americans have ever been willing to serve as soldiers in peace-time, and for a century we have shown no desire for permanent conquest of any considerable land area. Besides the primary policy of preserving our national independence,

we have certain other military liabilities outside our own borders, the Monroe Doctrine, the defense of American overseas trade and other legitimate interests, also certain occupational and international commitments of which the future is not yet entirely clear. Thus our national strategy cannot be other than a long range, overseas strategy. Except in distant and thinly peopled Alaska, no formidable opponent can reach us or be reached by us except overseas. Whatever the instruments by which future sea power may be exercised, large American ground forces can come into action against strong opposition only after an ocean has been crossed in one way or another.

* * *

TURNING NOW to the instruments of strategy, we run into the chief difficulty of the whole subject, i. e. that no one can tell us just how effective the "new warfare" based upon strategic bombardment will be. In the old days when ships were the only means of crossing broad waters the problem was simple, but the plane has complicated matters, while the robot bomb and the long range rocket promise to complicate them still more, not to speak of atomic explosives or disease cultures which might be planted in time bombs by enemy agents.

Among so many uncertainties the only wise course is to try to play safe, to "hedge our bets" according to first principles based — as far as we can do so — on known facts, weighting the scales of probability somewhat against our hopes and wishes when we must supplement facts by what we believe to be probable guesses.

Our wealth — although far from unlimited — and our mechanical aptitude permit us to supplement man power considerably by generous use of material and mechanical power. In the atomic bomb we recently enjoyed and probably still enjoy a temporary monopoly of a powerful instrument of strategic bombardment. However, since military knowledge tends to level out, we must reckon with the future possibility of atomic explosives being used against us. In other words, we must look upon the atomic weapon with

concern. If it continues to be as effective technically as it has so far proved, and matters certainly look as if it would, then we should do what we can to lessen the chances of critical damage to ourselves by surprise use against us.

Whatever the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of this or any other means of strategic bombardment, such bombardment is the only form of attack which we have to fear while we remain sufficiently strong at sea. If we can prevent critical damage to our rear areas by surprise attacks, then sea power — including, of course, control of the air over the sea — will come into its own again, and we shall have time to build up our striking power.

The means of defense against strategic bombardment will vary with the probable means of offense. Defensive functions divide naturally into detection, active or passive resistance, and finally repair of damages. Passive resistance will include concealment and dispersion, while damage control will include the orderly evacuation of masses of city dwellers. When people say that there can be no defense against strategic bombardment, what they mean is that they think the best defense will be prompt retaliation by strategic bombardment of our own. Preparations to retaliate consist in taking up positions of offensive readiness of such a nature that the means of retaliation will be morally impossible to destroy by surprise attack. In principle, the retaliation will be like counter-battery work in ground actions. The known chances of effective retaliation may deter possible aggressors. Once an attack is begun, however, retaliation will not protect unless and until it destroys the enemy's power to bombard. In the meantime bombed populations will be very angry at those among their own leaders who have neglected other defensive measures.

Only officers with high scientific training and civilian scientists of the first rank can speak with any approach to authority about the probable technique of the new weapons. A single conclusion now seems fairly certain, i. e. that the great fleets of piloted, long range bombing planes which attacked German

and Japanese cities in pre-atomic days will no longer be necessary, perhaps not even desirable. A single plane can now carry explosives powerful enough to destroy most of a good sized city, so that the duties of other planes accompanying it will be reduced to dissipating the efforts of the defense or to escorting the one or more queen bee bombers. It would have been pure waste to have exploded more than one atomic bomb over Hiroshima. Robot bombs and long range rockets will also cut in on the heavy bombers' former function.



Accordingly most of the piloted combat planes of the future may well be either fighters for strategic defense or tactical fighter-bombers for comparatively close cooperation with surface forces. While no one would underrate the future effect upon strategy of air transport of troops and material, the overseas use of enough airborne troops to threaten the continental United States seriously seems too improbable to be feared for some time to come.

As far as ground defense is concerned, a comparatively small effort at dispersion, concealment and direct protection of particularly vital points would greatly decrease the vulnerability

of the country as a whole to strategic bombardment.

Meanwhile amid the technical uncertainties of the present the prosaic but obvious necessity for large scale civilian defense has been largely neglected. A conspicuous and honorable exception to this neglect has been Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, USA, Retired, now commanding the N. Y. State Guard who has set up a War Disaster Corps for his State, but he himself would be the first to recognize that the problem is essentially a Federal one. However much we may disperse, conceal and protect, the cities of the world must remain vulnerable. In proportion to its size, a great city when bombed will present a formidable problem of what the Navy calls damage control. Fires, perhaps very large fires, will have to be fought. Order will have to be kept and the planned evacuation of much of the population supervised. A minimum of vital services like water supply, light and power, which may be interrupted, must be restored at the earliest possible moment. All this will require planning and organization. There must be large numbers of emergency firemen, repairmen, and policemen with the necessary training. These emergency forces and especially their officers must be carefully screened for reliability and probable immunity to Fifth Column activities. The functioning of civilian defense or—in deference to General Drum—of a War Disaster Corps might make all the difference between tolerable and critical damage to material objects and national morale.

Since command of the sea and survival in the teeth of strategic bombing together constitute our number one problem of national defense, it is astonishing that as yet no distinguished soldier except General Drum seems to have mentioned civilian defense. This is particularly strange in connection with the oceans of ink spilled for and against universal military training. Such training has been consistently discussed in terms of the specifically military training of combat troops which is almost wholly irrelevant to damage control in bombed cities. It is barely possible, although

very doubtful, that emergency policemen might do their job better after six months of the training plus country club regime now enjoyed, according to press releases, by the exemplars or guinea pigs of universal training at Fort Knox, but this has no more to do with fire fighting or prompt repair of public services than the man in the moon.

If anyone in the War Department has publicly mentioned the necessity for civilian defense before Secretary Patterson's letter to Senator Lodge, published in the N. Y. *Times* of May 1947, that fact has escaped diligent search by the present writer. Senator Lodge had previously reminded Dr. Karl T. Compton, the Chairman of the President's Commission on Universal Training, that such training in itself would by no means constitute a valid military policy. He next sent Secretary Patterson an article by Hanson Baldwin, the able editor in the N. Y. *Times*, published in that paper on May 4, 1947 of which the key sentence is "... any consideration of all the factors makes it plain that universal military training is a very dubious form of security, if indeed it offers any security at all, in this technological and industrial age." To Mr. Baldwin's further statement that the proposed universal military training program "is not pointed toward disaster control and civilian defense," Secretary Patterson replied to Senator Lodge "This is exactly contrary to the fundamental basis of the whole universal military training plan as envisaged by the War Department.***" One is tempted to substitute three exclamation points for the three asterisks which appear in the *Times*' transcript. Secretary Patterson's letter also—again apparently for the first time during the public discussion of the subject—mentioned the necessity for large numbers of service troops for the logistical support of the combat forces, but again omitted to show the connection between specifically military training and the duties of service troops.

* * *

WE TURN NOW to preparedness for global strategy, for action at a distance from our own borders, which

action, however defensive in motive, is offensive in form. Of course there is always an overlap between strategically offensive and defensive preparations. In many instances the same military instruments which make it difficult for a possible enemy to carry the fight to us at the same time make it possible for us to carry the fight to him. Nevertheless the distinction between defense and offense, although not rigid, is real.

In connection with action far from our home territories, we must look at the probable effectiveness of strategic bombardment in a very different light. Where we were rightly concerned with it as a danger, indeed as the only immediate and serious danger to be feared, we must now weight the scales of judgment against ourselves in the opposite direction. We must now remember that we cannot be sure of its technical effectiveness as a weapon, still less of its appropriateness as a weapon in the only large scale conflict which we might in the near future be compelled to wage.

As between offensive and defensive devices, scientific development will remain a two way street. From time to time most of the traffic on that street may be going in one direction, but developments in the opposite direction are always possible, and no one can be certain when a change may come. Accordingly, in considering our own use of strategic bombardment against others, we should remember that hitherto the idea of an omnipotent attack has always proved a peace-time fantasy soon disproved by actual war. Since we Americans are nationally tempted—and with some reason—to worship gadgets and labor saving devices, we should beware of hoping too much from the technical effectiveness even of so formidable a gadget as the atomic bomb when used by ourselves. Future bombardments, however devastating, may resemble past bombardments in seldom proving decisive until followed by assault and occupation.

In addition to our technical margin of doubt, we should also ask ourselves how far strategic bombardment might prove inappropriate to our own military

purposes. So far such bombardment even with old fashioned explosives has been largely a means of indiscriminate destruction, and with atomics it will be still less discriminating. Now it can be strongly argued that in at least ninety-nine cases out of a hundred indiscriminate destruction cannot achieve the only rational object of warfare, i. e. a better peace for the victor than that which preceded the war. The present condition of Europe and the inevitable effects of that condition upon the United States might be used to support such a view. For the moment, however, let us limit ourselves to the particular case which we might have to meet.

For the time being, the only power in the world which might compel us to an all-out military effort is the Soviet Union. This is not said to disparage other powers, still less to saying that war between us and the Soviet is either desirable or inevitable. On these points we here give no opinion whatsoever. We merely state the fact that it seems inconceivable that in the near future the purposes of any other great power will violently conflict with our own, whereas the connection between the Soviet government and Communism, which most Americans strongly oppose, makes a clash between us and the U. S. S. R. at least conceivable.

Now it "leaps to the eye" that a U. S.-Soviet war, at least in its early stages, will be far from a neat map problem in strategy, and will on the contrary be a potential civil war throughout much of the world. The Soviet concentration upon propaganda and the discipline of international Communism make it certain that such a war would begin largely as a war of words, with "left wingers" of different shades tending to take the Soviet side. At the same time the United States would not be without political weapons inside Soviet and Soviet-occupied territory. No people has ever knowingly and willingly accepted Communism; the masses have always had to be tricked or forced into doing so, and subsequently they have had to be held down by force, as the history of Soviet terrorism and "purges" abundantly proves. Thus any Communist government must reckon with the possibility of serious revolts against its

authority. For instance, during the Second World War the former Soviet General Vlasoff raised an anti-Soviet army which has been reliably estimated as high as two million men, and this was done in spite of the foolish brutality of the Germans in the Soviet territories occupied by the invaders. For an historical analogy to the widespread internal divisions of today one must go back beyond the Revolutionary-Napoleonic period to the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Wars of Religion with their gloomy pattern of divided loyalties and complicated treacheries all over the place.

In a word, it would be difficult to predict what many national governments throughout the world would do in case of a U. S.-Soviet war, and still more difficult to say how vigorously each government would be able to act. Over vast areas the political map would not be clearly marked in black and white, it would be blurred, with many shades of grey. Further, the comparative numerical weakness in ground troops of possible opponents of the Soviet indicates that at any time in the near future the Red Army would at first be able to advance for considerable distances in a number of directions — not, of course, in all — if ordered to do so. Moreover the poverty and the chronic food shortages within the Soviet might tempt the Red Command into invading countries where food and other valuable loot could be found, even if the invasions were politically unwise.

Now it has always been axiomatic that when friendly and hostile troops are closely intermingled in a ground action, long range weapons cannot be fired for fear of doing more harm than good. For instance, in the Cretan fighting in 1941 the repeated British bayonet charges not only testify to the fighting spirit of General Freyberg and his men, they also limited the support to the German ground troops which was being given by German planes acting as "flying artillery." Something like this on the scale of grand strategy would probably be the case in a U. S.-Soviet war if the Red Armies held their present position and still more if they advanced. Even if Soviet industry, oil supply, etc., were hard hit by strategic bombing, Soviet ground troops could probably live for

some time on looted supplies, and could do a good deal of fighting before being forced to retreat. Meanwhile for U. S. strategic bombardment to attack western and central European cities might do more harm in point of propaganda than the resulting destruction would be worth in strictly military terms. A bombing strategy of town-smashing would contribute to the disorganization and social chaos which have already so increased the political strength of Communism outside of Soviet-occupied areas.

A more rational U. S. strategy would be one modeled on Wellington's conduct of the Peninsular War against Napoleon and the French Marshals in Spain, using the air arm chiefly to stimulate and to supply revolts in the rear of the presumably widespread Red Armies. The holding of sufficiently large bridge-heads on a continent is normal to sea power and would be appropriate to the political circumstances of the war. Even if we had a mass army, probably we would not be able promptly to ship much of it overseas. A comparatively small number of well trained divisions, acting with allies against Soviet forces who would be at the end of long lines of communications, could begin the reconquest of Soviet-occupied territory.

* * *

TO SUM UP our geographical position plus the numerical weakness of our land neighbors makes us strategically an island. Thus the foundation of our national strategy is our power to survive strategic bombardment and to prevent the crossing of the oceans by hostile armies. Our distant action must be either by air borne or sea borne forces. The mass army which universal military training presupposes is technically irrelevant to defense against strategic bombardment. On the other hand, the usefulness of strategic bombardment by ourselves in the only first class military effort in which we might be called upon to make may prove technically limited and politically unwise. Not would the prompt mobilization of a mass army overseas be essential to the opening stages of such a war even if the prompt transportation of such an army overseas were possible.

A Cold War

By Bernard M. Baruch

MY EXPERIENCE in two world wars, the aftermaths, and the endeavors to make a lasting peace make me marvel at the regularity with which errors are repeated. One of the errors that most frequently recurs is failure to study and understand the records of past experience. It seems as if my hearing aid is out of kilter—the voices and arguments are the same.

At my first meeting with the then Under Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, he asked, "Why is it that we don't start off where we finished in the last war? Why don't we adopt what was learned?" Later, the Under Secretary of Navy and others propounded the same question.

They may have had in mind, among other things, an outline of action that we drew up at the War Industries Board, covering America's participation in the first World War. I sent it to President Wilson, and he accepted it as the mandate for our existence. It is as true today as it was on November 10, 1918—thirty years ago. Time has tested the formula and found it good. It will be equally true of our next war, which the fates forbid. I quote from it:

"Wars are fought and won—or lost—on the land, on the water, in the air, and on those battle lines behind the front where the civilian forces stand.

"It is not enough to mobilize the Nation's military strength. There must be a mobilization of her full economic resources—industrial, agricultural and financial. These must be organized, coordinated, and directed with the same strategy that governs the operations of the purely military arms of service.

"The prodigious strain upon the world's productive capacity must be met and balanced to provide the means of warfare and to maintain the civilian population as well as to preserve the economic fabric.

"To control and regulate industry in all its direct and indirect relations to the war and to the Nation, the President has created the War Industries Board and placed the responsibility for its operation

in the hands of the chairman. * * *

"It is not only the duty of the War Industries Board to stimulate and expand production in those industries making war essentials, it is equally the Board's duty to protect, as far as may be, those industries not immediately essential to the war program.

"The War Industries Board is a method of control devised by the President to equalize the strain placed upon the American industrial structure by the war.

"Further, the Board regulates all and controls certain other industries of first-rate war importance, it fixes prices through the price-fixing committee, it creates new and converts old facilities, it clears the national business requirements, and it leads to conservation, which is needed to bridge the gap between the extraordinary demand and the available supply—a gap which exists in almost all the great commercial staples.

"The War Industries Board embraces all and each of the Nation. Food and fuel are separately administered, but with every other article of military need and of ordinary life the Board has a direct connection, and it has a basic relationship with food and fuel, too, for both require in production and distribution the materials that the War Industries Board provides. Its strength lies in the full and patriotic cooperation that American business, including both the employers and employees, gives in working out the problems common to us all.

"The abnormal conditions of the war demand sacrifices. It is the price of victory.

"Our actual needs, not fancied wants, should and can be satisfied.

"To save heavy and long privation,

temporary deprivation must be the rule.

"America's willingness to accept these conditions marks her ability to quicken the end of the conflict."

DESPITE ALL of the foregoing learned in World War I, many of the same mistakes were made over again in World War II. Faltering step by faltering step we moved towards controls, but those controls were never sufficient and far-reaching enough. If they had been applied immediately, many lives would have been saved, our casualties lowered and billions saved. Despite warnings of graver danger, the English and French made even more mistakes.

Also, as a result of piecemeal price control, we are now faced with inflation which, next to human slaughter, maiming and destruction, is the worst consequence of war. It creates lack of confidence of men in themselves and in their government. If, from the beginning, there had been an effective, over-all price control law including everything—regulation and control of all prices, wages, rents and food—there would have been a quicker ending of the war, a lessened cost, and less dissatisfaction among all classes. But, after having granted favors to one class, group after group fought for favors, until we found ourselves upon economic stilts. Then restrictions were removed while peace was still distant. Although the shooting war is over, we are in the midst of a cold war.

The Armed Forces had an M-Day plan, which would have saved precious lives and the wasted wealth, but they were not permitted to put it into effect. We were told that this was a different kind of war, and none of that "old world war stuff" was wanted.

We must not again make the mistake of not being properly organized in case another war is thrust upon us.

You are now making plans again. You have studied the results of the last two wars. I would like to see definite plans—blueprints—ready to draw out, as they were ready before, and with a

... *Extracts from an address delivered by America's uncommonly revered elder statesman, Bernard M. Baruch, to the graduating class at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on 26 June 1947. He "sees with eyes sharpened by years of experience," and pulls no punches in assaying the cost to our Nation, in lives and dollars, of the neglect of history's lessons, and in charging soldiers and sailors to widen their horizons.* — Editor

public better educated as to what total war needs are. With the new instrumentalities of mass destruction, we will not have time to improvise. Bravery or resources will not overcome an enemy who has destroyed us.

War preparations must be governed by a desire for peace and security. The Armed Services today have to be versed not alone in war but in government, politics, the humanities—economic, social and spiritual—necessary to work constantly for peace. We know our country has no will for war. It has the will for peace. Thus, preparedness takes on the symbol of peace.

Here is the minimum program that should be placed upon the statute books, ready to function, should war come:

Mobilize the full might of America — militarily, economically and spiritually.

Have universal military training.

All men and women subject to mobilization with a work-or-fight clause. The same applies to all professions, science, calling, crafts, industrial and agricultural efforts including labor of all kinds. In other words, there should be a pool of all our manpower—brains and brawn—ready to be tapped at any moment for war purposes.

An industrial plan ready to go into effect with full control of production, distribution and prices, with power of allocation, priority and even exclusion for everything. The wisdom with which we organize our resources, men, money and materials will make for the greatest of all — winning morale.

Taking unfair profits out of war and preventing inflation through an over-all price regulation, tax and savings program. There must be only enough profit to keep our economy and production going. That cannot be done by favoring any one segment of our society.

While we must keep our civilian structure alive, skeletonize by restricting materials and manpower for unnecessary wants. In the last war too much went for wants rather than needs.

An organization to export materials in demand by other nations and to buy the things our Nation needs or desires to keep from enemy hands.

Accumulation of critical imports.

Retention of war plants, particularly synthetic rubber plants.

Intensified scientific research.

A standard form of contract set up now.

An intelligence service enlarged far beyond what now exists.

Information and propaganda organized, gone over and continually improved to be ready when action demands.

Until some effective international guarantee of security has been established or resort to war eliminated, we cannot disregard the dangers inherent in developing mass housing in cities. Surveys must be made of underground industrial establishments, refuge for civilians and dispersal of populations.

These organizations should be planned in considerable detail and gone over every three or six months by the National Resources Board. Competent men should be trained to fill the key positions. The Chiefs of Staff should make recommendations to the Resources Board for such changes as they deem wise and necessary. Setting up of industrial and social machinery should not be left to M-Day.

All organizations continually exposed to the proper Congressional committees, keeping them in touch with defense plans. The American people must be taken into the fullest confidence. They will do anything required of them if they are told why. Do not try to fool them.

Universal military training must be regarded as the apex of a pyramid grounded upon the broad bases I have outlined above. It has neither purpose nor effect except as part of such a structure. To believe that our national security can be assured through universal military training alone is to deceive ourselves and to waste the precious time of our youth. Only if combined with a sound and comprehensive program for our national security can it be really effective.

And I stand with the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and the Chiefs of Staff of both Services, in favoring uniform hemispheric training and armament. We should make South, Central and North America a complete unit.

THERE ARE certain phases of the time immediately before us which I see with eyes sharpened by years of experience.

We face a future that is unrestful but not alarming.

I see no war with Russia as an immediate threat. With others of my countrymen, I feel deep irritations, but I do not fear explosions.

We have been just and generous, but there has been a lack of cooperation on

the part of those whose friendship we solicit.

Perhaps they expect our economic collapse. If so, they will be disappointed. We shall continue long after their experiment has failed.

We dedicate ourselves to the individual. The others elevate the State into a God Head.

But in the cold war that is being waged against us, we must always remember that their objective is our unrest. We can guard against that by a firm belief in ourselves, under the magnificent flowering of our century and a half of national life.

We resent the continued efforts of Russian sympathizers to change our system of government and life. But we can make ourselves secure against their machinations by bettering our conditions. That we are doing, slowly but surely.

Let us watch England. She is conducting a great experiment. I do not believe she can be successful, but she has the right to pursue any course she elects.

Can Britain go on with her collectivism, her socialism, her regimentation, without imperiling those great democratic principles for which Britain—and this country, too—fought so long and so devotedly, and to which Britain and this country are wholly dedicated?

"Ancient Right unnoticed As the breath we draw,

Leave to live by no man's leave,

Underneath the law."

JUST A FEW words about the Utilitarian aspects of your training which has brought you in touch with government, production and distribution, management and labor, and widened your horizons. It has equally widened the horizons of civilians. This gives added value to your future work. Daily, men are claimed from the Army, Navy and Air Forces for the highest posts in our political, educational, industrial and social life. This is evidence that we train a nation for war and peace, and that soldiers and sailors are trained as much for peace as for war.

The Armed Forces' horizons must be as deep and as wide as the problems they have to meet.

We should be well prepared for any contingency we may have to face. To that purpose, this Class, this Institution are devoted.

You are the protectors of our safety. You are the guardians of our security.

Principles of War . . .

THE ACID TEST

By Commander J. H. Unwin, D.S.C., R.N.

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FROM TIME TO TIME one hears it said that there are no such things as Principles of War, and in these days of mechanical progress and the development of new weapons, the same idea is prevalent in many circles. It should be both of value and interest, therefore, to take the standardized Principles of War and to examine them in the light of the events of the late war and see whether their application proved successful, or their neglect, fatal.

MAINTENANCE OF THE OBJECT

It has been asserted that the first great Principle of War is Maintenance of the Object. With it go the other two major Principles—Offensive Action and Concentration. History is studded with examples of commanders who failed because they did not always keep the object in view, but allowed themselves to be led away down attractive but unessential side lanes. It is curious how the Germans, who are tactically magnificent soldiers, so often made large mistakes in the strategical sphere. These mistakes appear usually to have been due to failure to keep the ultimate object constantly in view and to subordinate all else to it. There are many notable examples of this in the late war. In 1942, in their Summer offensive in Russia, the Germans appear to have started with one object—to cross the Volga and then sweep round behind it to the North to capture Moscow and to envelop a large portion of the Russian Army. If they had stuck to this one object alone and used all their forces to achieve it, they might well have been successful. But the successes that attended their initial advance in the Spring must have gone to their heads, and they split their forces to go for a second object—the capture of the

oilfields in the Caucasus. The result is history: the Northern armies were halted at Stalingrad and after a long and gigantic struggle were beaten back and a very large number surrounded and captured; the Southern armies were finally halted and turned back at the very gates of the oilfields. The failure to stick to the primary object and the addition to it of the very attractive and potentially profitable Caucasus adventure caused a complete breakdown of the German plans and started the retreat which was the first step from the Volga to the Oder.

Another example is to be seen in the efforts of the Germans to neutralize our Eastern Mediterranean fleet during the early and middle months of 1941. They attempted to achieve this by air attack, and it is true that in the Central Mediterranean the fleet was mauled and forced to retire to the eastern end. Here the Germans began bombing raids on it in Alexandria and laying mines with the object of bottling up the fleet and closing the Suez Canal to shipping. The raids on Alexandria were small and badly carried out; in fact, they were abortive. The minelaying was, however, much more dangerous and threatened very severely to dislocate traffic. But then the Germans stopped, presumably to send their aircraft up to the Russian fronts. Had they not only continued these raids but also very much increased the scale and intensity of them, things might have looked much blacker; the Mediterranean Fleet might have been immobilized and, in that case, probably Egypt and the whole Middle East bastion might have been lost.

Another example, which is closely bound up with neglect of the Principle of Concentration, is the failure of the Germans to devote all their efforts to the

destruction of our seaborne supplies of food and materials. After the failure of their plan to invade this country, they obviously and quite correctly appreciated that short of invasion, destruction of our merchant shipping, and so of our food supplies, was the only way to defeat this country. They used their submarines continuously and bravely to achieve this object. But they sent out only two raiders—the "Graf Spee" and the "Bismarck," and these singly and at different times; both succumbed to concentrations of our forces. Their aircraft were never used intensively against our shipping nor in concentrated and continuous attacks against the ports through which our seaborne merchandise had to come. Had the Germans kept this one end—the destruction of our merchant shipping—in view, they would surely have concentrated all their forces on it and have attacked our ships at sea with all available submarines, aircraft and surface ships, and have concentrated all bombing attacks on our Western supply ports. By this means we might well have been brought close to disaster in the early part of 1941.

OFFENSIVE ACTION

Victory can only be won by Offensive Action: that is the great psychological Principle. The offensive confers the initiative and with it liberty of action and the denial of it to the enemy. That was clearly demonstrated in the late war. Once the enemy's initial assaults had been held, owing to our command of the sea, we were able to exercise our offensive strength wherever we wished. We had freedom of action and the enemy had to dance to our tune. He tried to be strong everywhere and to surround the whole of Europe with

an impenetrable wall, to turn it into an impregnable fortress—*Festung Europa*; the result we all know: the invasions first of North Africa and then of Sicily, Italy and finally Normandy and the South of France, all made possible for us by the old and ever-present weapon of sea power.

Admiral Sir Philip Vian's protection of a convoy against greatly superior forces in March, 1942, provides another excellent example of the power of the offensive. The convoy was proceeding westwards to Malta, protected by four small cruisers, one A.A. cruiser and some ten destroyers. After beating off many air attacks, an Italian surface force, consisting of the "Littorio"—a 15 in. battleship, one or two 8 in. cruisers, three 6 in. cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers appeared from the northward. Leaving his convoy lightly screened, Admiral Vian at once led his small force of four cruisers and six destroyers towards the enemy. After a series of brilliant manoeuvres consisting mainly of making a smoke screen and dashing out of it to harass the enemy and darting back into it for cover, a most gallant torpedo attack by the destroyers succeeded in putting one torpedo into the "Littorio." The enemy had had enough. He turned and ran—and the convoy steamed on to Malta.

Another example is provided in the Battle of the Atlantic, that long drawn-out and crucial battle on which all else depended. In the early days, we had only sufficient forces to be able to provide escorts for our convoys—a defensive strategy. But as our resources grew, we were able to use some of them in an offensive role. Defensive cover was provided for threatened convoys, while all other available effort, both sea and air, was devoted to attacking the U-boats. Special escort groups were formed to seek out and attack the enemy; of these, perhaps the most famous was commanded by the late Captain Walker in the "Starling." Aircraft were used to "flood" certain areas through which the U-boats had to pass and also to attack U-boats on the surface concentrating on a convoy. By the use of offensive action, the U-boat menace was held and sinkings of U-boats gradually increased.

After the evacuation of Dunkirk, during those long, long months and years from 1940 until the landing in North Africa in 1942, the only offensives possible to us from the United Kingdom were bombing raids and small amphibious raids on the coasts of France and Norway. With the very limited forces available, these may not have had much effect in themselves; but they did pay large dividends, both psychologically on the morale of the people in that they knew we were doing something and attacking somewhere, and also from a training and experimental angle in that thereby we were trying out and perfecting new material and technique.

CONCENTRATION

The third great Principle is usually inextricably bound up with the other two—Maintenance of the Object and Offensive Action; for the object must be ruthlessly pursued with the maximum Concentration of Force.

The Germans first showed us how well they understood the tactical advantages of Concentration. Their initial break through at Sedan and their use of armoured columns as a battering ram to penetrate the enemy's lines are excellent examples of this. Yet, it is curious how, in the wider strategical sense, they seem to have neglected it. Examples of this are given under Maintenance of the Object—the German assault on Stalingrad and the Caucasus in 1942 and their attacks on our shipping in port and at sea.

Our final technique of heavy bomber attacks gives an excellent example of this Principle. Here the operations of a very large number of heavy bombers were not only concentrated in space—on one target—but also in time, the actual attacks being compressed into the shortest possible period. It was not until we began to use these tactics that our heavy bomber attacks really began to pay dividends.

Another excellent example can be taken from the Battle of the Atlantic, this time from the enemy angle. When in the early part of the War the Germans found their U-boat attacks unsuccessful they changed their tactics. They spread their U-boats in the probable path of a

convoy; as soon as one boat intercepted the convoy a sighting report was made and the whole pack, some 30 to 40 U-boats strong, concentrated on the convoy. Not until this concentration was complete was the attack launched. These tactics achieved great success and for a time our merchant ships sinkings were very heavy. They were only overcome eventually by methods which included Mobility—the evasive routing of convoys; Concentration—more ships in each convoy so that convoys were made more difficult to locate; and Offensive Action against the U-boats both in packs and when proceeding at high speed on the surface to the concentration.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

The Principle of Economy of Force covers the correct distribution and employment of all forces. There must always be a compromise between the two Principles of Offensive Action and Concentration on the one hand, and Security on the other. To a large extent, the correct balance dictated by the Principle of Economy of Force is governed by mobility.

Perhaps one of the most outstanding examples of the correct appreciation of this Principle is provided by the fact that even during the worst times of 1940, when invasion appeared imminent, we were shipping men, guns, tanks and aircraft to the Middle East to strengthen our woefully weak bastion there.

The disposition of our naval forces must be dependent on and always provides examples of this Principle, allied with those of Concentration, Security and Mobility. This is commented on again under Mobility.

SURPRISE

Surprise can be of several types: operational surprise—either strategical or tactical; the surprise of a new weapon; or the surprise of a new technique. Many examples can be taken from the late war.

The German break through at Sedan is an excellent example of Surprise both tactical and of technique. We did not expect the Germans to attack in the Ardennes through that most difficult, closely-wooded, hilly country nor, despite

the lesson of Poland, were we prepared for his successful technique of using his armoured forces as an initial battering ram and a speedily advancing column.

The Battle of El Alamein provides an excellent example of Concentration and of the traditional use of Surprise. The sudden concentrated assault of our armoured forces, very cleverly masked beforehand by highly-detailed measures of deception, took Rommel by surprise and produced a situation from which he never recovered.

Perhaps the most successful surprise afforded in the War by a new technique founded on a new weapon is to be found in the British use of radar as an Air Raid Warning system, and then as a Fighter Interception system. This enabled our very small fighter force effectively to combat the enemy bomber force in the Battle of Britain, first by day and then by night. It was also successfully used at sea from the start of the War and contributed in no small measure to our success in the Eastern Mediterranean.

An excellent example of surprise of technique can be seen in the fire support plan for the initial assault landings in Normandy. It is, I believe, a fact that the enemy, learning his lesson from Pacific operations, had expected our initial bombardment to last for some time and had actually withdrawn his coastal forces some distance inland. Our first landings, following immediately after the very heavy air and sea bombardments at dawn, took him by surprise.

MOBILITY

Mobility is a no less important Principle of War. It covers among other things: speed of decision on the part of the commander; the strategical and tactical disposition of forces; good communications; and the speed of movement and endurance of our forces. As the American general, Nathan Forrest, is quoted as saying, the art of war is "to git thar fustest with mostest."

Mobility is one of the chief factors in naval strategy, and many examples of naval mobility can be taken from the last war. The Navy, with its carefully-thought-out and equipped bases disposed

throughout the world, is essentially a mobile force. Good examples are the rapid and effective concentrations of force to deal first with the "Graf Spee" and later with the "Bismarck" and in providing effective escorts for a succession of Malta Convoys from ships who were sometimes a fortnight before thousands of miles away.

In the Pacific War, air power was necessary to provide initial softening, then support and cover for the assaulting forces. Owing to the large distances and lack of equipped airfields, shortbased aircraft could not be used. Air forces, though tactically very mobile, are still strategically very immobile. Carriers in large numbers were produced and the necessary air power was provided by ship-borne aircraft.

Perhaps the most novel and impressive example of increase of mobility of land forces due to the air was seen during the campaigns in Burma. Here the use of air supply and air transport gave our Army such mobility as had never seemed possible in that most difficult terrain.

SECURITY

Without Security, a force loses its freedom of action and must conform to the enemy's wishes, and, unless the base be secure, offensive action is impracticable. But this Principle must not be held to justify undue caution and avoidance of all risk. Bold planning and execution, founded on a secure base, is the foundation of success in war.

The outstanding example of Security in the late war was the successful efforts made to keep Great Britain secure as a base from which to attack the Germans. Nevertheless, this was never taken to mean that all our strength had to be kept at home, e.g., the sending of powerful naval, military and air forces to the Middle East even in the worst times of 1940.

Another good example of this Principle was the decision not to reinforce our fighter strength in France after the German break-through, but to retain as large a fighter force in this country as was possible, ready for the inevitable air attacks.

Examples of Security in its most literal sense are provided by all three of

the major assault landings in Europe. Inconceivable as it was beforehand, Security was so good that in all three of our major landings in North Africa, Sicily and Normandy, we did actually achieve tactical surprise.

CO-OPERATION

The most striking examples of Co-operation in the late war were, of course, the great combined assault landings in the Mediterranean, in Normandy, and the Far East. These could not have been carried out so successfully without complete co-operation between the Services. Combined assaults are justly rated the most difficult operations of war, and our records of them in the past have not been universally happy or successful.

A nation's full strength can only be achieved with complete and effective co-operation between all component parts of a force, between all three Services, and between the Services and the civil power of the country. The war effort of this country in the recent total war is truly a magnificent example of Co-operation.

Good examples of Co-operation between Services can also be seen in the Battle of the Atlantic, with Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force working under the operational control of the Admiralty, and in the operation of Tactical Air Forces specially designed to work with the Army.

CONCLUSION

Enough has been said, it is hoped, to show that the well-established Principles come out extremely well in any analysis of operations of the late war. Further consideration would, it is suggested, confirm that the Germans, headed by that best General on the Allied side—Corporal Hitler—neglected these Principles to a staggering degree in major matters, whereas we on our side, although, of course, not always right, made many fewer transgressions. Nevertheless, Principles are a guide, but not an automatic key to success. Napoleon's famous dictum still holds good "It is not some unfamiliar spirit which suddenly discloses to me what I have to do in a case unexpected by others; it is reflection, meditation."

The Association

Medal Winners

OUR ASSOCIATION has resumed the pre-World War II custom of making available from Association funds a suitable medal for award each year to the outstanding cadet in each senior ROTC unit in the United States. Medal winners are selected by the PMS&T. The medal is a bronze replica of the Association seal, which was taken from the Palma Vecchio portrait of Saint Barbara, patroness of artillery.

As was explained in our September issue of last year, the story behind this Association custom is one of warm human interest—the story of Leroy Johnson, who in 1935 was the thirteen-year-old son of a South Dakota farmer. Wanting to "help his dad," young Leroy wrote to the Chief of Field Artillery and asked his help in obtaining a team of artillery horses "too old to be of any use that you could give away." Arranged by our Association, the Field Artillery came across with a team and harness, and wound up with money enough left over to strike the medal shown above.

Honored on this page are four 1947 medal winners.

Cadet First Lieutenant James R. Hall won the award at Colorado A and M College. Cadet Hall returned to college after serving for twenty-one months in the Army Air Forces as a B-29 gunner.

His home is Huntsville, Ohio. He is majoring in forestry, and has been unusually active in college activities as a member of the swimming team (Big Seven Co-Champion Diver), Ski Club and Forestry Club.

Cadet Marco J. Caraccia was awarded the Association medal at the Presidential Review of the Cornell ROTC on 29 May 1947. Cadet Caraccia served for over three years in the Marine Corps during the late war, two of them being overseas in the Pacific Theater. Married, with a ten-month-old son, he is studying for a degree in Agricultural Economics, and has won honors as a



student during the past year. His home is Fancher, N. Y.

Cadet Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Coddou, who comes from Houston, Texas, was the outstanding ROTC cadet at the A & M College of Texas. Cadet Coddou's outstanding achievements at A & M College of Texas earned his being listed in the Who's Who in American Colleges and Universities. Among other accomplishments, he is Secretary-Treasurer of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, which is the field of his major collegiate interest.

Cadet First Lieutenant George W. McClure, Jr., whose father is a Field Artilleryman, won the Association medal at the University of Oklahoma. Cadet McClure enlisted in the Army Air Forces in 1944, was discharged as a corporal two years later, and entered the University of Oklahoma. The PMS&T, Colonel Jerome J. Waters, Jr., FA, states that Cadet McClure was selected as a result of his outstanding scholastic record, and his unusual ability, leadership, cooperation and attitude throughout the year in his ROTC work.



Cadet Joseph W. Coddou



Cadet Marco J. Caraccia

Above: Honorary Captain Violet Walton watches, approvingly, as Cadet James R. Hall receives his medal from Col. G. J. Reid, FA. Below: Maj. Gen. Cliff Andrus, Commandant of The Artillery Center, makes the award to Cadet Geo. W. McClure, Jr., as Col. J. J. Waters stands by.

Officer Procurement

*... Whereas qualified officers with World War II experience will continue for the present to be accepted, the War Department has evolved long range, integrated plans for officer procurement.**

OFFICERS FOR THE REGULAR Army will in due course be procured from three sources: Military Academy graduates, honor graduates of Senior ROTC Units, and from newly commissioned officers serving on competitive tours. Of these sources, competitive tours — a greatly expanded "Thomason Act" concept, in principle— will eventually provide a majority of each annual increment. For this reason, the bulk of this article is devoted to explaining these competitive tours.

OCS, ROTC, AND SPECIALISTS

Plans have been made for Officer Candidate Schools to graduate an estimated 4,000 officers annually who will be commissioned initially in the Reserve Corps and who may be called to active duty immediately for a two-year period, or placed in the Organized Reserves on an inactive status, or assigned to National Guard units. The Army Air Forces OCS will graduate about 500 non-rated officers annually who will follow the same procedure as for Army OCS graduates. In addition, the Army Air Forces plans to commission annually approximately 750 graduates from flying training as rated officers.

Although the number of graduates from Senior ROTC Units is exceedingly small this year, this pipeline is filling rapidly, and eventually the large majority of newly commissioned officers for the civilian components will again be procured from the ROTC. It is estimated that 9,000 graduates may be received from ROTC next June, and it is anticipated that this source will eventually build up to as many as 25,000

and 30,000 annually.

Plans are underway for the commissioning of professional and technical specialists who are considered critical to the needs of the Army and for whom the Army is unable to provide training in their particular specialty. As soon as a list of these special categories is completed and qualifications necessary and grades for appointment are standardized, a War Department directive will be published. It is also intended to commission during the remainder of the year those applicants from the source of flight officers, warrant officers and enlisted personnel of the first three grades who are found eminently qualified to be awarded commissions in the civilian components.

COMPETITIVE TOURS

As a result of our current integration system, it is estimated that we will have approximately 35,000 officers in the Regular Army by the end of this year. This will leave about 15,000 vacancies which the War Department plans to fill during the next 10 years. With attrition during this period estimated at 1,000 per year, the annual procurement objective for the Regular Army will be 2,500 per year. Of these, some 500 graduates can be expected each year from the Military Academy, and the annual intake of honor graduates from the ROTC may reach 500. This leaves an estimated balance of about 1,500 which will be sought each year by competitive tours. Regardless of the number of officers who apply for competitive tours, definite standards will be established so that quality will never be sacrificed for the quantity among those selected for Regular Army from this group. It is emphasized, however, that never in the history of the United States has the opportunity to obtain a Regular Army commission been so great.

At the time WD Circular 101 was published, little time remained to procure many officers from presently available sources for these competitive tours; therefore the number entering competitive tours this summer will be exceedingly small. They will come from two sources — officers still on active duty, and those officers honorably separated from the service and still within prescribed age brackets. Obviously, these sources will diminish

rapidly with the passage of time, whereas the main source from which our future requirements for these tours will be drawn will increase. Eventually, all officers on competitive tours will have come from either ROTC or OCS graduates. Since the officers for the initial tours commencing 1 July have been procured, plans for the long range program only are here discussed.

Officers entering upon competitive tours must be physically qualified for appointment in the Regular Army under current regulations, and must have completed at least two years of college, and must not have reached their 26th birthday at the time they enter competition on either 1 July or 1 January of any year. OCS graduates and those appointed either from the list of warrant officers or from the first three enlisted grades will be required to undergo a prescribed course of training prior to entering competition. This will be known as a basic associate course. Each arm and service will prescribe this initial training course and accept officers for active duty in sufficient time to attend the course prior to initial assignment. For example: a newly commissioned graduate desiring to compete for a commission in the Signal Corps will be sent to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and attend the basic associate course at the Signal Corps School. Since this course will be of approximately three months' duration it will be necessary to call the applicant to active duty on or about the first of April so that he can enter his competitive tour on July first of any year; similarly, if he intends to enter a competitive tour on the first of January, he must be called to active duty on or about the first of October. In addition, the applicant will be required to apply no later than sixty days prior to the time he is called to duty.

Those who fail to complete the basic associate course because of academic deficiencies, disciplinary reasons, or disqualifying physical defects will be relieved from active duty prior to entry on a competitive tour. All applicants must agree to remain on active duty for a two-year period. ROTC graduates (eventually representing the largest number of officers on competitive tours) will not be required to take the basic associate course.

(Continued on page 237, col. 2)

*This article is based on advanced information furnished, for planning purposes, to a recent conference of G-1 representatives from the various area commands by the Director of Personnel and Administration. This information will soon be confirmed by W. D. Circular.—Editor.

NEW NATIONAL GUARD CHIEF

Major General Kenneth F. Cramer of Wethersfield, Connecticut, has been nominated by the President to replace Major General Butler B. Miltonberger as Chief of the War Department's National Guard Bureau. Gen. Miltonberger is leaving active duty this fall by reason of physical disability.

General Cramer, who was Assistant Division Commander of the 24th Infantry Division in the Pacific during the war, has been active in National Guard affairs for the past seventeen years. He was given command of the 43rd Infantry Division last October when it was reactivated as part of the National Guard. He had previously served as commander of the 169th Infantry of the 43rd Division prior to its induction into federal service early in 1941.

A graduate of Princeton University in 1916, he received his M.A. the following year. From college, he went directly to Officers' Training School and was commissioned a temporary 2nd lieutenant on August 15, 1917. For his World War I activities as a lieutenant of Infantry, General Cramer holds the Purple Heart Medal. During World War II, he was awarded the Silver Star with three Oak Leaf Clusters, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star and the Air Medal.

Leaving his civilian pursuits as President of the K. F. Cramer Coal Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, the newly designated Chief of the National Guard Bureau enters office for a four-year term.



When the annual ROTC output reaches 25,000, it is anticipated that as many as half of these officers will apply for competitive tours. OCS will furnish the balance.

Candidates entering a competitive tour in the Zone of the Interior will remain there for one year in order to prevent loss of time in moving them overseas.

Applicants who are not awarded Regular Army commissions at the time of a year of competition may apply for an additional year, provided they still meet the age and physical requirements. It is intended to relieve all of these officers, however, either at the end of their two-year extended active duty tour or at the completion of not more than two competitive tours.

During the competitive tour each candidate will be given an efficiency rating by more than one officer. In the report each rating officer will include a statement as to whether or not the candidate is qualified for appointment in the Regular Army. If the candidate is not recommended, reasons therefor will be stated. The rating officer need not be the candidate's immediate commander but will be specifically designated by the first echelon of command to which the candidate is assigned, which is normally commanded by a general officer, so that the ratings will be made by an officer of well known impartiality and mature judgment.

Whereas it is impossible for the War Department to prescribe a complete list of the specific duties to which these officers will be assigned during competition, it is mandatory that they be assigned to company level positions in the units of the arm of service in which they are seeking appointment. They will not be assigned to staff or specialized duties, and no part of the competitive tour will be spent as a student.

Each commander of organizations to which these competitors are assigned will be charged with close supervision of them and will render all assistance possible toward assisting their training objectives and indoctrination. Since these competitive tours will constitute the major source of our future Regular Army officers, the vital character of this responsibility is patent.



OF MORE THAN PASSING INTEREST

Happy Birthday! The USAAF is forty years old on 1 Aug 47. (Incidentally, 38 members of the AAF won the Medal of Honor in World War II.)

Stars and Stripes. After trying civilian life for several months, one-time Brig. Gen. (Nat'l. Guard) Harold H. Richardson recently enlisted in the RA as a Mr. Sgt.

Operation "Snowdrop." The 505th RCT of the 82nd A/B Div, supported by elements of the Ninth Air Force, will participate in oversnow airborne maneuvers at Pine Camp, N. Y., this coming winter. Utilizing approximately 2,050 AGF troops, Operation "Snowdrop" will be commanded by Lt. Col. W. E. Eckman, Inf.

Artillery Center Briefs Brig. Gen. Wm. S. Lawton will replace Maj. Gen. Robert T. Frederick as Ass't. Comd't. of TAS, Seacoast Branch, with General Frederick to head the Ground Section of the Air University. . . . Recently added to TAS — a Department of Analysis and Research, headed by Col. W. E. Waters. . . . Brig. Gen. Chas. E. Hart will replace Brig. Gen. Robert M. Montague as Assistant Commandant of the AA and Guided Missile Branch of TAS, at Ft. Bliss. . . . Cited by the French Government: the 1st FA Obsn Bn — Croix de Guerre with Palm; the 18th FA Bn — Croix de Guerre with Silver Gilt Star. . . . Col. Barksdale Hamlett now heads the Gunnery Department, succeeding Col. Andrew P. O'Meara, who now commands the 5th FA Group.

Congratulations! Former artillerymen E. H. Brooks and Joseph M. Swing, both temporary Major Generals, were recently appointed permanent Brigadier Generals in the RA.

Decorations System. A board of senior, combat experienced officers is to study the entire military decorations system and recommend new policies and procedures, based on World War II experience.

WELCOME TO THE FIELD ARTILLERY

The United States Field Artillery Association is proud to extend greetings and congratulations to each of the following named artillerymen who were recently nominated for commission in the Regular Army.

This latest increment brings the total number of officers integrated into the Regular Army since the first increment in June, 1946, to slightly more than 20,000.

Capt. William L. Adams, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Henry T. Agee (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Marshall H. Armor, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Paul Autrey (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. George W. Aux (1st Lt.)
 Maj. George B. Ax (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. William H. Bach (Capt.)
 Maj. Marshall W. Baker (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Richard G. Banks (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Tom W. Barnett (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Frank H. Bayle (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Francis L. Beaver (Capt.)
 Maj. B. T. Behnken, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Walter T. Belland (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Leon Bieri (Capt.)
 Col. Ernest O. Black (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Kemuel K. Blacker (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Howard V. Blackburn (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Homer C. Blake (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Bernard B. Blank (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Alexander P. Bolding, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Capt. James D. Bowen (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Lawrence Bowlby (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Thomas F. Bristol (1st Lt.)
 Col. Albert S. Britt, Jr. (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Leon A. Brock (Maj.)
 Lt. Col. Robert L. Brooks, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Hugh G. Brown (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Howard H. Burd (Capt.)
 Maj. James E. Campbell (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. James N. Cargill (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Raymond W. Carraher (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Bruce B. Caulder (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Roy T. Chappell (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Roy U. Clay (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Charles F. Coffey, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Hubert P. Coleman (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Clay O. Collier (Capt.)
 1st Lt. Harry O. Collins (2nd Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Charles D. Colman (Maj.)
 Maj. Paul A. Conlin (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Leo J. Conway (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. John T. Cooper, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Col. Stafford A. Cooper (Capt.)
 Capt. Thomas H. Cooper (1st Lt.)
 1st Lt. Lloyd A. Corkan, Jr. (2nd Lt.)
 Maj. Louis C. De Goover (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Robert E. Divine (1st Lt.)
 Col. Leland R. Drake (1st Lt.)
 Maj. William E. Dressler (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Forrest W. Duff (1st Lt.)
 1st Lt. Thomas H. Eblen (2nd Lt.)
 Col. John B. Egan (Capt.)
 Maj. Fred L. Eistrup (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Michael P. Elcano (1st Lt.)

Maj. Gerald W. Evans (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Bruce T. Falls (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Vincent F. Fazio (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. David W. Fierke (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Harrison H. Finlayson (Capt.)
 Maj. Calvin F. Finn (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Frank O. Fischer (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Henri F. Frank (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Benjamin J. Freeman (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Robert F. Freeman (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Edward H. Geiger (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. William D. Gnaou (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Elmo B. Good (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Albert J. Goodwin (Capt.)
 Capt. Herschell G. Gordon (1st Lt.)
 Col. Milo Gray (Maj.)
 Lt. Col. Warren J. Green (Capt.)
 Capt. Harold M. Hall (1st Lt.)
 Col. Elmer H. Harrelson (Capt.)
 Capt. Herbert W. Hartung (1st Lt.)
 1st Lt. Francis H. Heller (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Elon L. Hiller (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Clifford C. Hines (Capt.)
 Maj. Joel P. Holcomb (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Donald J. Huckaby (Capt.)
 Maj. Edward M. Hudak (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Kelvin H. Hunter (Maj.)
 Maj. Robert W. Jarlais (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Delbert J. Jellum (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Robert W. Johnson (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Dearl F. Jones (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Thomas G. Keithly (Maj.)
 Capt. William T. Kidd (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Lawrence G. Kiely (Maj.)
 Capt. James B. King (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Lawrence M. Knapp (Capt.)
 Maj. Frank E. Lee (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Charles F. LeGuyer (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Richard C. Leib (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Harlen V. Logsdon (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Paul A. Loop (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Robert L. Lowe (Capt.)
 1st Lt. Thomas A. Lowe (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Carl G. Lutz (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Kenneth T. Macek (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Owen H. Malcolm (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Herron N. Maples (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Lawrence E. Martin, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Capt. William R. Mathews, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Paul B. McCain (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Robert J. McDonough (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Wallace B. McFarland (1st Lt.)
 Col. Floy W. McGinn (Capt.)
 Maj. Henry E. McCreedy Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Maj. F. J. Michaelson (1st Lt.)

Maj. Arlo A. Miller (1st Lt.)
 Col. Guy V. Miller (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Henry L. Miller (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Melvin Miller (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Charles A. Minot (Capt.)
 Maj. Frank G. Moffett, Jr. (Capt.)
 Maj. George L. Morelock, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Dale L. Morgan (1st Lt.)
 1st Lt. Richard L. Moriarty (2nd Lt.)
 Capt. Jack W. Morris (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Thomas V. Munson (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Manford R. Murphy (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Walter H. Mytinger (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Victor M. Nixon (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Russell L. Norgordt (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Eugene C. Oates, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Luther E. Orrick (Capt.)
 Maj. John W. Oswald (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Arley L. Outland (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Francis J. Pallister (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Harold J. Pearson (Capt.)
 Capt. Claire B. Penzkofer (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Peter R. Peterson, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Theodore W. Peterson (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Donald R. Pierce (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Charles H. Pitney (1st Lt.)
 1st Lt. Robert L. Pomerene (2nd Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Walter J. Preston, Jr. (Capt.)
 Capt. David Prior (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Reinhold C. Riede (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Max J. Roadruck (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. C. F. Roberts, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Thomas A. Rodgers (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Harry E. Ruhsam (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Eric A. Rundquist (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Edward A. Ryan (Capt.)
 Maj. Chester C. Schaefer (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. David G. Schepp (Capt.)
 Maj. Homer W. Schweppe (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Millard Shaw (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Walter A. Shaw (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Victor B. Shemwell (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Louis A. Shuford (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Hubert W. Shurtz (Capt.)
 Lt. Col. Robert H. Slover (1st Lt.)
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 Lt. Col. Robert B. Smith (1st Lt.)
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 Capt. Claude C. Stewart (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Paul W. Stone (Capt.)
 2nd Lt. J. L. Strelecki, Jr. (2nd Lt.)
 Lt. Col. William R. Swarm (Capt.)
 Maj. Donald R. Tam (1st Lt.)
 1st Lt. William P. Tavoulares (2nd Lt.)
 Maj. Cloyd V. Taylor (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. John F. Taylor (1st Lt.)
 1st Lt. John Teselle (2nd Lt.)
 Lt. Col. Thomas J. Thorne, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Forrest B. Tilton (1st Lt.)
 Lt. Col. James C. Todd (Capt.)
 Capt. Robert T. Townsend (1st Lt.)
 1st Lt. Robert E. Trigg (1st Lt.)
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 Lt. Col. Lou G. Van Wagoner (Maj.)
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 Lt. Col. Ralph H. Watson (Capt.)
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 Lt. Col. Edwin H. Whitaker, Jr. (Capt.)
 1st Lt. Jesse W. Whitley (2nd Lt.)
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 1st Lt. Leland F. Wilhelm (1st Lt.)
 Maj. Charles A. Wooten, Jr. (1st Lt.)
 Maj. William L. Yeomans (1st Lt.)
 Capt. Charles M. Young, Jr. (1st Lt.)

The TC's postwar fleet

By Roland W. Charles*

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AMERICAN military responsibilities throughout the world require an unprecedented peace-time fleet of Army transports.

Many variables had to be considered in determining the size of the postwar fleet, but on the basis of projected plans the Transportation Corps has outlined its requirements—79 sturdy vessels.

Well over half of these will be troop transports—52 of the vessels fall into this category—the bulk of the remainder will be freighters, while a few will be for miscellaneous purposes.

Some idea of the size of the fleet may be gained from a comparison with history. Before the Civil War the U. S. Army had no ocean-going vessels. Just prior to the Spanish-American War a few small Army craft were in use, although the fleet was enlarged to carry troops to Cuba and the Philippines. During the ensuing years of peace the number of Army transports greatly decreased, although it had been proven that the transport fleet was no longer either an expedient or an easily dispensed with auxiliary. The same pendulum swing continued after World War I so that by early 1939 the transport fleet consisted of only four large troopships and two freighters, all of which had been in service for several years.

*Naval Architect, Office of the Chief of Transportation.

As coming events cast their shadows before, the Army began to acquire more ships and, ultimately, during World War II, approximately 200 large overseas vessels — including 65 large troopships, 24 large hospital ships, a great many cargo ships, and numerous large repair ships of various types — were owned or operated directly by the War Department.

That number would have been much larger had not the creation of the War Shipping Administration solved the problem of troop and cargo carrying so that the difficulties of ship operation were not added to those of ship scheduling for the Army.

When World War II ended, many of the Army transports were beyond economical repair because of age. Some had been converted from types basically unsuitable to troopships, and those of foreign construction needed expensive replacement parts. Several ships on bareboat charter were returned to the owners. Hence, very few vessels of the wartime fleet were retained in the postwar fleet.

The Office of the Chief of Transportation has a basic interest in the Army's transport fleet and is directly concerned with the availability of suitable vessels for Army use. Cost estimates are prepared and appropriate directives are issued for obtaining, converting, scheduling, operating, and maintaining the vessels of the fleet.

Based on the requirements for overseas transportation of service personnel and their families, as determined by national policy and as approved by the War Department General Staff, vessels are assigned to the various ports of embarkation for operation to and from contiguous theaters or to overseas areas for local operation.

While the overall planning for the use of the vessels is done largely in OCT, detailed plans are formulated under OCT supervision at the ports to which the vessels are assigned. Vessels are routed and scheduled by OCT to meet the world-wide transportation requirements as submitted to the War Department by overseas commands, supplemented by information from the General Staff Divisions.

At present, approximately 75 per cent of all Army cargo is being carried overseas commercially. The fullest possible use is made of such facilities when and where available. However, the present distribution of troops is such that the Army is forced to call at many ports for which the number of passengers and the amount of cargo do not warrant diverting commercial vessels.

The utilization of commercial steamships for handling *all* military shipments being impracticable, therefore, a suitable Army-operated fleet appears to be a necessity. Hence, in its contemplated fleet the TC feels that it has the solution to many of its problems.



A TRIBUTE AND A CHALLENGE

. . . . An address (slightly condensed) by General Jonathan M. Wainwright before the graduates of the Advanced Course at The Artillery School at Fort Sill, on 9 June 1947.

AS ARTILLERYMEN YOU MAY WELL BE proud of the record made on the final testing ground, which is combat. You may well be proud of the decorations won under the most grueling conditions of warfare this world has ever known. And you may well be proud of the crossed cannons on your collars.

But remember this. That which you learned in battle, and the lessons you have absorbed here in the finest Artillery School in the world, are but a foundation upon which you must constantly build. You cannot, you must not, rest upon your laurels.

The rich traditions of our Artillery go back more than one hundred and seventy years. Since that day in 1775 when Washington had Colonel Henry Knox appointed Chief of Artillery, tremendous advances have been made in artillery weapons and techniques. And those advances have been made because artillerymen have never ceased to strive for improvement.

Perhaps the most important step forward, however, was taken on November 23, 1910, when the War Department issued orders that read: "Captain Dan T. Moore, 6th Field Artillery, is relieved from duty with his regiment and will proceed to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and report in person to the commanding officer of that post for duty in connection with the establishment of the Field Artillery School of Fire."

Captain Moore established himself as a top-notch artilleryman, and on July 19, 1911, orders were issued detailing him as Commandant of The School of Fire for Field Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Since that order was issued there has been a never-ending march of students passing through the various courses of instruction here at Fort Sill. Eager young lieutenants have learned the difficulties of picking up the puff of smoke from a light gun in a blinding

snowstorm. Worried OCS candidates have quivered fearfully in anticipation of a day to be spent coping with the mysteries of South Arbutuckle. Dignified field officers have wiped the perspiration from worried brows as they pondered over problems of tactics. But out of the worry, the work, the fears, and the struggles for perfection have come artillerymen whose accomplishments have made glorious history.

World War II saw the importance of artillery emphasized more than ever before. The old seventy-five gave way to the 105. Self-propelled artillery took its place among the roaring armorplated monsters of the armored divisions. And everywhere our artillery was distinguished by its aggressiveness. Every man was filled with the determination to give fire support wherever and whenever it was needed. It was not unusual to find 155 mm gun battalions firing in direct support of the infantry. Very frequently corps artillery battalions could be found emplaced in advance of the divisional light artillery. And who could question the courage of unarmored towed battalions following armored troops deep into enemy territory and fighting with small arms in their gun positions?

The war correspondents gave the Air Forces much publicity for its truly outstanding accomplishments, but the infantryman will tell you of the magnificent support he received from the artillery and how it was always ready with its fire, night or day, in fair or foul weather. Almost any foot soldier can tell you of the times when he walked into the enemy lines standing up because the supporting artillery fire was so heavy and so well directed. I have been told many times of the day when the searching fire of a 105 mm howitzer battalion flushed a whole regiment of Germans into the open near Nancy, France; how all the artillery in the area was called into action and the doughboys

stood in their foxholes and cheered as the enemy tasted the devastating accuracy of our artillery while they fled in disorder.

And we must not forget the forward observers who lived and fought and died with the infantry. Theirs was a job calling for high courage and great skill in the conduct of fire. Their accomplishments have earned for them the admiration of all fighting men.

But it took more than courage and individual skill to give us the artillery superiority that we had in every major engagement. The sound doctrine which was developed here at Fort Sill was a large contributing factor. The thorough instruction, emphasizing flexibility, control, and concentration, proved its value in the acid test of war. The training, from the top commander down to the last cannoneer, left nothing to chance. Every artilleryman knew not only his own job but that of several others as well. And our tools—the 105 mm howitzer that came to be known as "the work horse of the artillery," the self-propelled guns, the "pozit fuze," the graphic firing tables, which simplified and speeded up fire direction center work—all of these, and many more, added up to the final result of artillery which was the most devastating, the most mobile, and the most effective ever known.

The graphic words of one captured German officer testify to the battle role of modern artillery more effectively than any volume of facts and figures which I could present to you today. He said, "We could see the American planes in time to dive into a trench. We had a chance to hit American tanks with our 88's. But when our positions were smothered, without warning, by an American artillery concentration then not even the birds or rabbits could escape. It caused most of our casualties, and the shell fragment wounds were twice as deadly as bullet wounds." That statement is only one of many which have been made by the enemy in reference to our artillery.

Our JOURNAL is proud to utilize this opportunity to publish, for the benefit of artillerymen everywhere, a great American commander's tribute to the Field Artillery and challenge to the future. And our JOURNAL is even more proud to utilize this opportunity to wish health and good cheer to General Jonathan M. Wainwright, heroic defender of the Philippines, in the well-earned retirement that will be his on 31 August 1947.—Editor.

NO ONE KNOWS WHAT THE FUTURE holds for our nation. We live today in a world troubled by suspicion and torn with conflicting ideologies. And while we fought in hope of permanent peace, that peace is not yet a fact. The United Nations are not truly united; the diplomatic halls resound with the discord of disagreement. All of you have known the hell and horror of war and want no more of it. Yet we must not overlook the possibility.

The people of our nation depend on us to keep strong the defenses. The armed forces are a potent aid to the diplomat, but only when the strength and the power exist in reality. It is the people's decision as to what that strength and power will be. It is our job to carry out that decision. And so it behooves us to strive constantly as individuals for professional proficiency, to search untiringly for new and better methods of accomplishing our mission. World War I saw the appearance of poison gas, the tank, and the airplane as weapons of war. By the time World War II took place the tank and airplane had become so far developed as to be indispensable in our war effort. The important weapons of World War II were rocket missiles and atomic bombs. Neither of these proved of really great importance during the war. Yet, just as the tank and the airplane moved into the spotlight of wartime necessity, so are destined the rocket missiles and the atomic bomb.

And so we see that new weapons and new techniques are constantly being developed. As officers it is our obligation to keep abreast of each new development and to seek methods by which our defenses can be built up.

The challenge of the future is real. I thrust it upon you, knowing full well your ability and readiness to carry on with the same desire for service and the same intelligent action which has always been the tradition of America's fighting men.



Artillery Tactics

. . . Extracts from a recent presentation by the Department of Combined Arms at The Artillery School to a National Guard Orientation Course that highlight current thought—some of which has not been officially approved—on the principles and practice of field and antiaircraft artillery employment.

This article digests current thought at The Artillery School on the principles and practices of artillery employment, including organization, organization for combat, and the assignment and execution of technical and tactical missions. Complete revisions of FM 6-20, *Field Artillery Tactics and Technique*, FM 6-120, *Field Artillery Intelligence*, and certain subcourses in the Extension Courses of The Artillery School are practically complete. Much of this discussion is based on them, although the field manuals have not been officially approved. It is hoped that they will soon be printed and distributed.

ORGANIZATION

Field Artillery.

Firing Batteries. All light and medium batteries, both divisional and non-divisional, will have six pieces. Heavy batteries now have four pieces, except the 240-mm howitzer and 8-inch gun, which have two. If heavy self-propelled cannons are to be used by single piece for short range destructive fire, as they were used against the Siegfried Line and elsewhere, it may be that these numbers will increase.

The present rocket battery has twelve twenty-four tube launchers. It can fire two hundred and eighty eight 4.5-inch rockets in twelve seconds to a range of 5200 yards. Whereas the inaccuracy of a single rocket is very great, the battery can drench an area with massed fire of tremendous effectiveness. We at the

School think the future of this weapon is promising.

As to transport, all armored division artillery will be self-propelled. For the present, all infantry division artillery will be towed, but we feel that this is an interim measure, and that the tendency is toward self-propelled weapons. No decision has been made on transport for heavy artillery pieces, but the tendency again is toward self-propelled weapons.

Firing Battalions. All, including the rocket battalion, have a headquarters battery, a service battery, and three firing batteries. Light battalions of division artillery have radar platoons in their headquarters batteries for countermortar work, and have nine forward observers.

Observation Battalion. This unit has a headquarters battery and two observation batteries. Each observation battery has a flash-ranging platoon and a sound-ranging platoon. It has been recommended that a third observation battery be added, and that a radar platoon be added to each observation battery.

Division Artillery. Organic division artillery consists of a headquarters battery, three 105-mm howitzer battalions, one 155-mm howitzer battalion, and one antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion. (The term division artillery, incidentally, is defined as all artillery *organic and attached* to the division.)

*Group.** A field artillery group consists of a headquarters battery and

one or more assigned battalions. The School teaches that four battalions in a group is the best number, though more can be handled effectively. The group should include battalions of different types and calibers, to increase flexibility in attack of targets by the group.

Battalion-Group. This unit has no Table of Organization, but consists of a battalion (usually an organic direct support battalion) with one or more other battalions attached to it. The commander of the direct support battalion normally commands the battalion-group, regardless of rank of the commanders of the attached battalions. Preferably this unit consists of only two battalions, though more can be added.

Corps Artillery. Organic corps artillery includes only a headquarters battery and an observation battalion. Groups are attached as the situation requires and permits. Separate battalions may be attached, and conceivably might operate directly under corps artillery command, not as a part of a group. This results in a lack of close tactical and administrative supervision, and normally is not desirable. Last year's artillery conference, after a lively argument, proposed an organic artillery division in each corps, to include the minimum number of firing battalions necessary under any circumstances. Advantages appeared to be better esprit, administration, tactical training, and teamwork. Disadvantages appeared to be increase in headquarters and service units and some loss of flexibility. To date, this proposal has not been accepted.

Army and WD Reserve Artillery.

*The School presentation included an illustrative problem on the organization for combat that was omitted due to space limitations.—ED.

*Hq, AGF has recently recommended the discontinuance of the designation "group" and the return to the designation "regiment."—ED.

There are no organic army artillery units. The army artillery officer and his section of officers and enlisted men is organic to army headquarters. All non-organic artillery units are called War Department Reserve Artillery, regardless of location.

Antiaircraft Artillery.

Outwardly, the organization of the antiaircraft is similar to that of the field artillery. However, four firing batteries and a headquarters and headquarters battery are combined to form a battalion. (Note that the antiaircraft artillery battalion does not have a service battery, the service elements being integral to the headquarters battery.) These battalions are self-contained administratively and tactically, and may be attached as desired to an air force unit, to a ground force unit other than antiaircraft artillery, or to an antiaircraft artillery group, which organically contains only a headquarters and headquarters battery. Like the battalion, the group may be attached to an air force unit, to a ground force unit other than antiaircraft artillery, or to an antiaircraft artillery brigade, which, like the group, consists organically of a headquarters and headquarters battery. The group normally contains three to five battalions of various types, and the brigade three to five such groups. It will not be forgotten, of course, that the division artilleries of the new infantry and armored divisions each include one organic antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion, self-propelled.

Inwardly, however, there are concepts peculiar to antiaircraft artillery that must be understood in order to appreciate the organization for combat. It is necessary that we understand the term "fire unit." It is the smallest unit in antiaircraft artillery that can effectively engage the enemy. Its size and composition vary in the various types of antiaircraft artillery batteries. The antiaircraft artillery gun battery contains only one fire unit, consisting of four 90-mm or 120-mm guns, the range section, and the machine gun section. It contains within itself all personnel and equipment to bring a single target under fire. The automatic weapons battery, on the other hand, contains eight fire units, each fire unit consisting of one 40-mm gun, director, and quadruple 50 caliber machine gun.

There is a tendency, as a result of war experience, to consider that the quadruple 50 caliber is, of itself, a separate fire unit. It has been so employed quite frequently. The tendency in automatic weapons also is toward self-propelled armament. When self-propelled, the armament of the automatic weapons battery consists of eight quadruple 50's on half-tracks, and eight twin 40-mm guns on full-tracks. The searchlight battery contains twelve fire units, each of which contains one 60-inch searchlight and attendant detecting and control equipment. The searchlight battalion contains only three batteries.

At present, there is research pointing toward an increase in the number of guns in the gun fire unit, since it is felt by many that four 90-mm or 120-mm guns are an inadequate number effectively to engage the modern heavy bomber, but no decision has been reached.

In marked contrast to field artillery battalion commanders, an antiaircraft artillery battalion commander cannot exercise any gunnery control, or, as we term it, "fire control." This must be left to the fire unit commander. Also unlike the field artillery, the antiaircraft artillery battalion commander has no control over choice of targets, or as we term it, "fire direction." Air situations change too rapidly for the control to be higher than the fire unit commander. However, the higher antiaircraft artillery commander can influence fire control and fire direction by issuance of general instructions prior to the beginning of action, usually in the

form of standing operation procedure.

COMMAND AND STAFF FUNCTIONS

Certain details of artillery command and staff functioning are worthy of mention.

Flexibility. Since a battalion is administratively and technically self-sufficient, there is nothing to hinder the attachment, detachment, and reattachment of battalions as the situation requires. However, detached units should be restored to assigned status as soon as possible.

Staff Organization. Staffs are organized and employed as desired by the commander. Tables of Organization prescribe the available staff personnel. Field manuals prescribe the functions to be performed and suggest, but do not prescribe, typical assignments of individuals to perform these functions. This gives full flexibility of staff employment to fit varying situations. Of course, reasonable standardization of staff organization is necessary to permit smooth inter-staff operation.

Administrative Responsibility. It is customary to refer to division artillery headquarters and corps artillery headquarters as organizations which are "primarily tactical." We believe this is correct, but suggest that *command is indivisible*, that it includes complete responsibility, that a poorly administered unit is a poor tactical unit, and that all artillery commanders must exercise definite and positive supervision over the administration of their units. Administrative communications between division or corps artillery battalions and division or corps headquarters should pass through the artillery headquarters, where necessary information is extracted and the communications forwarded, usually without indorsement. Thus the artillery commander is informed of the administrative situation in his units at all times, and can step into the picture promptly when corrective action is needed. Vigorous and frequent personal inspections must back up this paper check. Many obvious matters, such as awards, promotion of officers, critical shortages of equipment and supplies, and the morale of his troops require the personal action of the commander.

Chain of Command. The army artillery



officer is a staff officer. He has no command functions except in his own section. The corps artillery officer and the division artillery officer are staff officers, but also are commanders of their corps and division artilleries. There is no direct chain of command through artillery channels from army artillery officer through corps artillery commander to division artillery commander. Nevertheless, there must be a strong informational, advisory, and supervisory channel between these three officers. It must be based on mutual confidence and frequent contact. As staff officers, they issue orders only as authorized by their own commanders. The scope of this authority must be clearly prescribed by each commander. As commanders, the division and corps artillery commanders issue orders to their own units.

The dual status of the division artillery and corps artillery commanders poses a difficult problem on the location of their command posts. As staff officers they must be close to their commanders. As commanders they must be close to their troops. In both capacities they must be in intimate and continuous touch with the situation from the viewpoint of the division or corps commander, and able to react to and influence that situation immediately. We believe that the artillery commander should act, in effect, as a deputy division or corps commander. Occasionally, the division or corps command post is in a suitable location from which to exercise close command of the artillery units, but usually it is not. Two solutions have worked well. The first is to place the main artillery command post with the division or corps command post, and to establish an advanced artillery command post under the executive near the artillery position areas from which immediate operational command of those units is exercised. The second solution is to place the artillery command post near the artillery position areas maintaining strong and capable representation at the division and corps command posts. In either case, good communication between the two echelons of the artillery command posts is essential. The personal location

of the artillery commander will vary widely with the situation, the personalities of his subordinates, and the desires of his commander. He will spend much time at both echelons, and must be tied to neither. Actually, the difference in functioning under the two solutions is not great. The School teaches that the establishment of the artillery command post near the artillery position areas usually is the preferable solution.

The S-2. The S-2 is concerned primarily with information of the enemy. He is not a reconnaissance officer. Reconnaissance and survey are command or S-3 functions. Certain assistant S-2's are designated as reconnaissance and survey officers. While performing these duties, they are working under direction of the commander or S-3.

Fire Support Coordination. It has been proposed that staff responsibility for the coordination of fire support by artillery, naval gunfire, and air forces in all land mass operations shall be charged to the artillery officer at all levels. This plan proposes no change in the present system of naval gunfire spotters, forward air controllers, naval and air liaison officers, and the like, but provides that artillery forward observers at the company level, liaison officers with battalions, liaison officers with regiments, division artillery commanders, corps artillery commanders, and army artillery officers function as fire support coordinators, that they screen all requests for fire support, and that, at appropriate levels, they shall have authority to *direct* the appropriate agency to deliver the necessary fire support. This School concurs in principle with this proposal.

Command versus Control. Manuals speak of centralization and decentralization of command and of control. These terms are often used loosely, with resultant confusion. What do they mean? "Control" is defined as "authority less than full command exercised . . . over a part of the activities of subordinates or other organizations." In other words, command is complete; control is partial and may exist without command. Let's assume a situation. In a corps of three divisions, a battalion of

corps artillery has been attached to each division. Command of these battalions has been decentralized to division commanders, but of course remains centralized in the corps commander. Thus, decentralization of command is relative, and never complete as long as a military force exists. Control, "authority less than full command," is exercised in various ways, but a very common form of control is the use of liaison and request channels to secure artillery fire. Any individual who reports a target, requests fire and gets it, is controlling fire. These request channels exist whenever communications exist with any artillery unit, and their free use increases artillery effectiveness. Command of artillery units is centralized and decentralized in varying degrees. Control of artillery units varies with each situation, but should never be centralized in trained artillery units. Centralization of command increases flexibility and efficiency of artillery fires; centralization of control handicaps efficiency of artillery fires.

Division, Corps, and Army Artillery. According to current doctrine, "army artillery . . . has for its principal mission distant interdiction and destruction fire, and reinforcement of the fire of corps artillery." However, The School believes that neither the army artillery officer nor the field artillery brigade commander has sufficient operations personnel and other means to function effectively as a tactical commander, that the corps battlefield extends at least as far as the range of the 8-inch gun, and that the use of army artillery as such means an overlapping and duplication of effort. It follows that army artillery should consist only of units in transit, re-equipping, or in a similar status. And the field artillery brigade should be eliminated. The Command and General Staff College appears to agree with these concepts, and a revision of field manuals is in process. Obviously, the development of an accurate guided missile with a range of 75 miles or so might necessitate a revision of this opinion.

Thus, any quarreling about the relative importance of division and corps artillery is profitless. Both are essential. Of the 404 battalions of field artillery in the ETO shortly after V-E

Day, for example, only 189 of them, or 47%, were divisional. Little attention was paid to the training of corps artillery during the pre-war years. This mistake must not be repeated. Experiences of the past war have emphasized the importance of training both echelons, and drawing them together into one dose-knit fighting team.

Missions. FM 100-5 says that field artillery has two missions, to support infantry and similar units, and to give depth to combat. Stealing some thunder from the Tactical Air Command, we at The Artillery School suggest that there are three missions: (1) to gain supremacy over the hostile artillery, (2) to isolate the battlefield, (3) to furnish close support to infantry and armor. Priority of these missions depends entirely on the circumstances. If the enemy artillery is strong, active, and effective, counterbattery operations must receive great attention. If the enemy is rushing up reinforcements and supplies in great quantity, isolation of the battlefield must be emphasized. If the enemy infantry is strong, well-armed, well-disposed, and well-led, close support becomes of primary importance. All types of artillery weapons, with obvious qualification, can and do undertake all of these missions.

Attachments. Attached units receive their tactical missions from the commanders of the units to which they are attached. What should be our policy on attachment of corps artillery to divisions? Such attachment decreases the amount of artillery fire which is quickly available to the corps as a whole. It is decentralization of command, and a dispersion of means. On the other hand, the principle may be stated roughly, "If you can't handle them, let somebody have them who can handle them." If distance, lack of dependable and rapid communication, fast movement, or lack of information effectively prevent any artillery commander from furnishing the best possible fire support, he should unhesitatingly attach his units to those units which require that support. Usually, quibbling about whether an artillery unit should be attached or supporting indicates untrained commanders or troops. An experienced infantry regimental commander summed

it up, "The only way I could tell whether my artillery battalion was attached or supporting was to ask its commander. I always got the same effective fires in either case, and couldn't tell the difference."

Command of the Integrated Artillery. Certain problems in command and staff functioning are arising as a result of the integration of the artilleries. As yet, The School is not at all sure of all the answers.

It seems clear that the division artillery commander and the corps artillery commander are responsible for the tactical employment of both antiaircraft and field artillery. In the immediate future, few such commanders will have had much experience with both types of artillery. Should the commander be an officer who was trained in one branch, and his executive in the other? Should the commander of an attached antiaircraft artillery unit also be a special staff officer of the commander? Should the operations section have a field artillery sub-section and an antiaircraft artillery sub-section? Will an increase in the size of these staffs be necessary? Eventually, as all officers become thoroughly familiar with both types of artillery, this problem may disappear, but for the present it is a very live one.

At the army level, the situation is even more difficult. It should be noted that at this level and above the field artillery problem becomes primarily an advisory or staff problem with few operational features involved. On the contrary, the antiaircraft artillery operational problem becomes increasingly complex, involving larger units, larger areas, defense of more vulnerable targets, and more detailed coordination with the air forces. We assume that there will be at least one brigade of antiaircraft artillery employed directly under army command for defense of the army area. There is little in common between the duties of the former army artillery officer and of this antiaircraft artillery brigade commander. A possible solution is a major general, army chief of artillery, who advises the army commander on all artillery matters, and in addition commands the army antiaircraft artillery. If in the future we find a long range ground-to-ground weapon adapted to

employment as army field artillery, this may become an even more desirable solution.

At present most antiaircraft artillery commanders feel strongly that antiaircraft artillery command *must be as centralized as possible*, and that the command must be through antiaircraft channels. Consider an amphibious operation involving an army. We would probably find antiaircraft artillery battalions attached to the divisions, antiaircraft artillery groups attached to the corps, and an antiaircraft artillery brigade attached to the army—this for the movement to, and the initial landings on, the hostile shore. As soon as the corps commander decides to assume command ashore of his divisions, the time has come for the non-organic battalions with each division to be attached to the antiaircraft artillery group. And, likewise, when the army commander takes command over his corps, the antiaircraft artillery brigade should take over its groups. Admittedly, there are occasions when antiaircraft units should be attached outright to subordinate units—in short, in any case where the higher commander will, because of distance, speed of maneuver, or difficulty of communication, lose effective exercise of command anyway. But normally command centralized in antiaircraft artillery channels is to be preferred because it allows a pooling of antiaircraft artillery resources, of which there are never enough, so that those objectives can be defended which are most important to the command as a whole. It also facilitates coordination between contiguous defenses.

TECHNIQUE AND TACTICS

It is appropriate to mention briefly a number of tactical and technical details.

Counterbattery Operations. There is no counterbattery officer in the U. S. Army. Counterbattery operations are a function of the operations section. Emphasis varies. If, conceivably, the enemy has no artillery, there are no counterbattery operations. On the other hand, if the corps command post is being shelled, *everybody* engages immediately in counterbattery operations.

Photo interpretation is the basis of counterbattery operations. It takes time

to make good photo interpreters, but they become amazingly expert. Photo interpretation teams at corps artillery and division artillery command posts are useful, but the important things about a photograph, for an artilleryman, are the accurate coordinates and the descriptions of targets deduced from that photo. When command is centralized, these can best be produced by a photo interpretation center and transmitted by electrical means.

If the situation is stabilized and an attack is being planned, there are two conflicting requirements in counterbattery shooting. Every opportunity should be seized to destroy observed enemy artillery by precision fire. This requires much ammunition. On the other hand, if counterbattery intelligence is good, the locations of the hostile batteries will be known accurately and completely and the preparation should include very heavy ammunition expenditure to smear these batteries before they start moving as a result of the attack.

Air OP's. Each field artillery headquarters battery, except that of the observation battalion, includes an air section. Great success in their use has been achieved by centralizing the airstrips, maintenance, and operation of all planes in the division artillery under the division artillery air officer. The use of the terms direct support, general support, and reinforcing missions to these air sections is applicable. Air OP's can take pictures, both vertical and oblique, which are extremely useful. This function should not be pushed too strongly, lest it pull these liaison planes away from their primary mission and lead to demand on them for which they are not adapted.

Oblique Photos. These photos are useful for terrain study and reconnaissance. With a mil grid superimposed, they can be used for target location and designation, but vertical photos are simpler and more accurate. The primary use of oblique photos may be as a substitute for panoramic sketches.

Positions. A common pre-war concept of artillery position areas was: lights up front, mediums behind them, heavies behind the mediums. However, the School teaches that range is built into

cannon to permit them to reach into the enemy's territory and hit him where it hurts, not to permit them to sit well back from front lines. Furthermore, the bulk of fire missions of light artillery are close to our front lines. These missions can be reached from rear positions. Isolation of the battlefield and some counterbattery shoots require forward positions to secure maximum range. Conflicts about priority and reservation of position areas are more likely to occur on the map than on the ground. Once in position, artillery units occupy no space, relatively speaking, and can be superimposed on areas used by other units.

Formerly our doctrine taught that artillery units which are heavily shelled always move to alternate positions. Experience indicates that such a move often results in increased casualties and loss of effectiveness, especially in the case of towed artillery. Such units in well-organized positions prefer to stay in place and keep digging. Alternate positions should be prepared, and occupied when such a move will facilitate the execution of assigned missions. This remark is not applicable to rocket units or antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons used in a ground role. Such units must move frequently and fast. Armored self-propelled artillery also may move out from under shelling with no great difficulty.

Coordination of Fire and Observation. Artillery pays little attention to boundaries between units when it has worthwhile targets to shoot. It must support its own force, but that frequently requires fire outside of that force's boundaries. Safety of adjacent troops must be assured, and this is accomplished by the maintenance of a no-fire line, short of which no fire is delivered except on the request of, or clearance with, the unit occupying that area. The current location of this line is transmitted through artillery channels to all artillery units which can reach the area concerned.

An X-X line parallel to the front and near the maximum range capabilities of the light artillery is designed to focus the attention of division artillery short of that line, and of corps artillery beyond it. Whether or not this is practical is

doubtful, since it may delay effective fire, and tend to produce quibbling over responsibility. The use of this line is not recommended.

Coordination of observation from ground observation posts, which is an S-2 function, is based on map or visual reconnaissance, improved by trial-and-error. Observers are sent to promising terrain, report their observation capabilities, and are moved accordingly. Priority in selection of OP's is not a serious problem. A hill can always hold another foxhole. A division artillery observer in a steeple can always adjust a corps artillery battalion. The important consideration is to assure that all possible enemy terrain is under observation.

Form of Fire Plans. All are familiar with a defensive fire plan produced on tracing paper, consisting of an amazing number of small numbered circles, the whole looking like a bad case of chicken pox. Such a graphical form of fire plan is excellent to display to a commander so that he may see the general nature of the plan, but it is of little use to the S-3. Fire plans should be produced to tabular form, showing the data needed by S-3's, including the accurate coordinates of the targets.

Transmission of Corps Fire Missions. Corps artillery group commanders must be kept in the chain of command. However, when the corps artillery S-3 wants immediate fire from one or more battalions, he may save several minutes by transmitting the message direct to the battalions, notifying the group headquarters later. The best method is to use radio, then all headquarters are informed simultaneously.

Command Check of Gunnery. A positive personal check on the overall effectiveness of field artillery fire should be made frequently, probably daily, by division artillery and corps artillery commanders or their designated representatives. It can be done readily from any good ground observation post or an Air OP by selecting any prominent terrain feature such as a crossroad and calling for a few rounds of surprise fire on this check point from each unit. This procedure verifies communication, survey, metro data, fire direction technique, and service of the piece in one operation.

Antiaircraft Artillery

Searchlights. This war has seen an extensive use of antiaircraft artillery searchlights to provide battlefield illumination. They are unquestionably useful in any situation where increased illumination is valuable. They possess most of the advantages of moonlight plus the advantage of getting the light when it is wanted, where it is wanted, and shining in the right direction. The use of the lights for battlefield illumination, however, is a command decision based on a consideration of the loss to air defense as balanced against an increase of fighting potential of the ground units to be served by the lights.

Missiles. The advent of guided missiles like the V-2 has posed a tremendous problem to antiaircraft artillery. Our present fire control systems at the best can cope with planes or missiles traveling at not more than 600 miles per hour. The V-2 at 3,600 miles per hour cannot be touched. To combat it, the only probable solution is another guided missile. Realizing this, Army Ground Forces has formed the 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Guided Missile Battalion at Fort Bliss with the mission of developing anti-guided missile tactics and organization.

Since it will be some time before a guided missile designed specifically for antiaircraft or anti-guided missile work will be developed, work continues on improving the present guns and fire control equipment with the goal of being able to handle planes at speeds up to subsonic limits (720 miles per hour) and at altitudes up to 50,000 feet.

Flak Analysis. Another development to come out of the war is flak analysis—a system of analyzing an antiaircraft artillery defense to determine the strength it can exert in any particular direction against an air attack. This is a double barreled weapon. It was used in this war to analyze enemy antiaircraft defenses so that our Air could choose a route into a target and a route out that would cause the least losses. The system was credited with saving thousands of lives and hundreds of planes. The other barrel is that we can analyze our own defenses and insure that there are no weak spots for the enemy to exploit.

FUTURE TRENDS

What the long range future holds for the artillery and the artilleryman, no man can say. Perhaps it is safe, however, to estimate the trend of development in the immediate future, say in the next ten years if we are at peace, or in the first year of a war during that period.

The tempo of operations should continue to increase under the influence of better motor transport, more motor transport for personnel, more air transport, more self-propelled weapons, and more and better armored units.

Radio will become the primary means of tactical communication.

Rapid and accurate survey, both of our own and enemy installations, will be performed by radar and radio.

Medium and heavy self-propelled artillery pieces will be used freely for attack of point targets, including fortifications, either with point-blank direct fire or more likely with indirect fire at such ranges as to secure pin-point accuracy.

The threat of air attack, either by the atomic bomb, conventional munitions, or airborne troops, will force greatly increased dispersion of units and installations of all types, with rapid concentrations of forces to attack or to meet an attack.

Air transport will increase greatly, but the staggering tonnages involved in support of a major operation are such that surface transportation will be required, and an airborne corps operating from an airhead a thousand miles or more from surface transport is not visualized.

Improvement in present types of cannon will be slow, but improvements in propellants, fuzes, and possibly explosives may be more marked.


Whatever changes may occur in equipment, organization, or technique, the School is convinced of one fact—namely, that the decisive factor in battle will continue to be fire power, whether that power be delivered by the long-bow, the 8-inch howitzer, or the rocket-propelled missile, and that it will continue to be necessary to gain supremacy over the enemy fire power, to isolate the battlefield, and to assist the assault forces to close with and destroy the enemy.

ARTILLERY INSIGNIA


Both Field and Coast Artillerymen will be interested to learn that the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, has recommended that the present Field Artillery insignia be designated for the prospective combined Artillery. The recommendation was also made that the present Armored insignia, modified only so that when worn on the coat the tanks point toward each other rather than in the same direction, be designated for the prospective Armored Cavalry.

The following extract from the book, *Extracts from Orders, Decorations and Insignia, Military and Civil*, written by Colonel Robert E. Wylie in 17921, shows that whereas the Coast Artillery is the older of the two branches, the crossed cannon has been continuously identified with artillery since 1834:

"Next came the cross cannon of the artillery which have been in continuous use by that branch of the service since 1834, when they were placed on the regimental colours. In 1836 they were adopted for the uniform, although as stated above, they were shared with the ordnance, as the latter had crossed cannon on their buttons until 1902. Prior to 1901 the artillery was organized into regiments and the regimental number was placed in a medallion in the center of the crossed cannon. In that year the regimental organization was abolished, and officers of the Field Artillery then replaced the number by a wheel, those of the Coast Artillery by a projectile. The latter has remained to the present time, but in 1907, when the Field Artillery was organized into regiments again, it abandoned the medallion, putting the regimental number above the crossed cannon as in the Infantry and Cavalry."



Here to stay!



PUBLISHED BIMONTHLY BY THE UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN 1910 WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTS—AS WORTHY NOW AS THEN

The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

The ★
UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

Organized June 7, 1910

Honorary President

HARRY S. TRUMAN

President of the United States

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAYMOND S. McLAIN, President
MAJOR GENERAL CLIFT ANDRUS, Vice-President
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"We are half way between annual meetings. For this and other reasons brought out herein, this seems a good time to reflect briefly, to appraise our current circumstances and to cast an eye to the future."

The above quotation is taken from an informal memorandum report that the Secretary-Editor and Treasurer sent to Association members a year ago. The words are repeated here since they explain succinctly the reasons motivating this editorial.

Some members may wonder why their Secretary elects periodically to make these somewhat lengthy and completely candid and unvarnished reports. *Answer:* he is

sold completely on the simple truth that American soldiers invariably respond 100%, if they know *what* is being done and *why* it is being done.

A BACKWARD GLANCE

1946. The outlook for our Association was certainly bleak as the year 1946 opened. Although the auditors recorded a net loss of only \$3,600 for the preceding year, the financial report for 1945 included non-recurring donations and other income items totaling over \$5,700, and over \$3,800 of very doubtful assets that were written off in 1946. These stark realities were in the Secretary's mind when he told the annual meeting that "the financial circumstances of the Association are not as healthy as might be gathered from a casual analysis of the foregoing (1945 financial) report." He added, however, that "the unsound current trend can be reversed, but * * * to do so will require the active and continuing support of the entire membership."

Just how bleak our Association's outlook was at that time stands forth boldly in the diagram on the opposite page. Our average monthly loss for the first six months of 1946 was over \$1,400. Looking at this figure another way, our Association's net worth was then *melting away at a rate of something approaching 5% a month!*

Reasoning that to coast along was to invite complete failure, numerous bold changes were made and the Executive Council approved a policy of deficit financing—all with the object of wrenching our Association, somehow or other, back to a solid basis for postwar operations. These things produced results, thanks to splendid support from the membership, and it was possible to report on 15 June 1946 that: "The Association is at the crisis of (its) recovery effort. Circulation has hit bottom and is increasing slowly. Book sales are improving. More important, perhaps, there can be sensed a strengthening will among members to sustain a healthy Association and a virile

JOURNAL, published monthly * * * so *Every Member Get A Member!*"

Member reaction, during the last six months of 1946, to the challenge presented can again be shown—more powerfully than by using words—by reference to the diagram below. Fortified with these data, the Secretary confidently reported to the annual meeting last December: "In 1946 our Association weathered the crisis of its postwar financial difficulties. A year ago we were plunging downward. That plunge has been arrested, and we are now climbing back."

Whereas 1946 was a successful year for our Association, it was not without its disappointments. Quoting again from the Secretary's report: "The major disappointment of the year was not financial—it was our failure to achieve an augmentation to our editorial staff, which was essential to continuing the JOURNAL on a monthly basis. A merger with the Coast Artillery Association would have solved this problem automatically, but this did not come about in 1946. * * * (However), the publication of a bimonthly JOURNAL is not without compensations of real importance. Provided the psychological reaction of members to a less frequent JOURNAL is not damaging to our healthy current financial trend, the resultant internal economies should serve to balance income against costs in 1947."

1947. The psychological reaction of members to a less frequent JOURNAL has not damaged our healthy financial trend, and the promised internal economies have been made. For the 1947 record to date, look once again to the diagram.

PRIDE, COMFORT, REASSURANCE AND HOPE

We of the staff feel that every member of our Association can take real pride in knowing that we Artillerymen have wrought this recovery, *together*, without either raising our \$3.00 membership dues or (it is hoped) sacrificing the quality standard of the JOURNAL. As was stated in a most recent BUY A BOOK MONTH letter to members, all of us may take added pride in knowing that *in these respects we are virtually unique in our field*. Comforting, too, is the realization that there is no "water" in our balance sheet and no non-recurring items in our current income. And reassuring is the thought that some day the Coast Artillery Association will undoubtedly see fit—as it has not to date—to accept our Association's repeated invitations

to swing along with the developments in the Army and merge with us into a bigger and stronger and more useful "Artillery Association." And we may also hope that one of these times a full hearing of the facts by the appropriate Congressional Committee will result in striking from the statute books the discriminatory legislation now preventing us from accepting paid advertising.

QUESTION AND ANSWER

The question, then, before the membership the question of this editorial and the diagram below—*Is Open Country Ahead?*


Mindful of the record and the onward and upward surge of our current trend, it would be most easy to answer a complacent "Yes" to this question.

But this we must not do! Like any unbeaten team just before the championship game—*complacency can ruin our record.*

Unquestionably, however, our Association will burst forth strongly and proudly into the open country of profitable operations, *provided every member keeps his shoulder to the wheel.*

And your Secretary's confidence that we Artillerymen will continue to heave together is no less now than when, late in 1945, he wrote the following words into *The Changing Present*, his first editorial:

"The objects of our Association 'are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.' I am confident that, like our Nation and our Army, we face a good future."





Element of Truth

Dear Editor:

I read with much interest and some favor your comment about the recent hot editorial in *The Reserve Officer* called "Does the War Department Want the Reserve?" It may have been unkind to say that the War Department "doesn't give a damn," but there is an element of truth in the caustic comment at that. As an example I will discuss the kind of training I find available for myself this summer. I am offered the following:

1. Routine garrison duty at the F.A.R.T.C. at Fort Bragg, N. C.
2. Battery Commander's course, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
3. Mountain warfare training, at Camp Carson, Colorado.

Now this seems like plenty of opportunity. But I spent more than two years with heavy artillery line outfits at Fort Bragg before going overseas in 1943, so I don't see much point to option No. 1. As for option No. 2, I am already a graduate of the B.C.'s course at the F.A. School at Sill. Option No. 3 has some attraction, but as I understand it, is really an Infantry officer's detail and is not available to many persons anyway.

Prior to the war, I didn't miss a training period from 1935 to 1940, inclusive. Maybe I didn't learn so much, but I did learn something, and I hate to think of the fix I'd have been in when I suddenly became a battery executive in the 36th F.A. in 1941 if I hadn't had that summer training.

I have acquaintances in the Naval, Air, and Marine Corps Reserve. All three of these branches seem to have much better planned summer training schedules than the Army Ground Forces are offering, what with cruises, flight training, etc. It is admitted that

the Navy, Air Corps and Marine Corps have little, if anything, to worry about with respect to occupational duties, which are a heavy burden on the ground forces. Even allowing for that, however, still leaves some shortcomings in the Reserve program. The local Naval Reserve set up is a going concern, with men and equipment. The Air Corps Reserve has the facilities of a nearby Army Air field. Just what the Marines have I don't know, but it can't be any less than the ground forces Reserves have. We can get together once a month or so and discuss plans for a category C unit that may or may not be activated on paper five years from now.

There is no desire on my part to be sent to Oak Ridge for a short course on atomic warfare, but I would like to get up to date on a few of the later developments of artillery, such as rocket mortars, self propelled heavy artillery, airborne artillery, etc. I fired my last combat mission on May 2, 1945, and haven't seen a round land since, so a bit of service practice would not be out of place at all.

Frankly, the situation still seems badly snafued.

FEEDERICK W. BECKERT, JR.,
Capt., FA-Res.

West View, Pa.

✦—Although *Keeping in Focus* (the editorial reply to *Does the War Department Want the Reserve*) discounted to a degree the over-all merits of the charges leveled at the War Department by *The Reserve Officer*, its publication was impelled solely by the urge to register shocked distress at "the method selected to stimulate corrective action—assuming, that is, that corrective action is indicated," and to enter a strong plea for all soldiers of all components to be prepared "to adjust ourselves in an

orderly and mutually supporting manner to something considerably less than the optimum in our postwar Military Establishment." Our staff is in no way competent objectively to evaluate the War Department program for Reserve officers.—Ed.

Rather Skimpy

Dear Editor:

Having been a reader of the JOURNAL for these many years I would like to point out a distinct hole in the article coverage.

During the war over two dozen field artillery observation battalions were expanded from the only one in existence in our peace time army. From my own experience with several of them, I would guess that our infantrymen knew more about our work than did most of the wagon-soldiers. Considering the number of such units (a fair proportion of the FA), their broad coverage and combat service, and general lack of understanding by cannon-shooters in general, together with the fact that any artilleryman may be called on at some time to work with one, or can or should call on them for help, *one article and a very few casual mentions* in the entire file of JOURNALS seems rather skimpy. Also, since there is no publication for the observation men, it seems that they should be counted in the family, same as other Redlegs.

As a starter I suggest an article on the "head of the family," the 1st F.A. Observation Battalion, now at Fort Sill. This outfit claims more time in actual combat than any army unit since the Civil War. We "long-haired," gunless artillerymen feel rather neglected (even though we are generally inarticulate) and we do feel that we have something to offer to the rest of the Field Artillery.

LT. COL. A. R. HERCZ, FA
G-3 Section, MTOUSA,
APO 512, New York

✦—Only cannon-shooters *lacking in combat experience* would ever even think for an instant of reading observation men out of the Redleg family. Active steps have been taken to plug this hole in our article coverage.—Ed.

Of Great Help

Dear Editor:

The article by Colonel W. S. Nye entitled "Germany—Two Years After V-E Day" in your May-June 1947 issue contains so much information about present-day Germany and about the problems facing American soldiers and dependents in that country that I would like to have it mimeographed for use on our Troop Information Program aboard transports for Germany-bound personnel. I feel sure that this material would be of great help to our program.

COL. WILLIAM R. PATTERSON, TC
New York Port of Embarkation

✦—Whereas written permission is desired and a credit line is expected, our JOURNAL is always pleased to have constructive use made, without remuneration, of any published material. Clearance by the staff of the specific copy to be used is required, however, in the case of either partial quotes or digests.—Ed.

Oldest Unit

Dear Editor:

I have been asked to reply to your letter concerning Battery D, 5th FA. Since I was a member of this famous unit from 1938-46, I am only too happy to oblige.

Battery D was one of the firing batteries of the 2nd Bn, 5th FA, when the regiment was brought up to strength at Fort Benning in 1939-40. It furnished the cadre to reactivate Battery C, 2nd Bn, 5th FA. Later, when the regiment was reorganized into the 5th FA Bn, proud old Battery D, armed with 75mm guns, became the antitank battery of the battalion. Thus we had a Headquarters Battery, Firing Batteries A, B and C, Battery D antitank, and Service Battery. In about September 1941, the Army organized tank destroyer units and the antitank function of the field artillery battalion was taken over by the antitank platoon of Headquarters Battery. Battery C, 5th FA, was used as a cadre to activate the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion at Fort Devens, Massachusetts; and Battery D was rearmed with 155mm howitzers and thus became the third firing battery in the battalion. The battery went overseas 1

August 1942 along with the 5th FA Bn and the other units of the 1st Infantry Division and fought gallantly through eight major campaigns. Today it still flies the Alexander Hamilton Guidon as Battery D, 5th FA Bn, and is stationed in the vicinity of Regenbun, Germany.

LT. COL. V. R. RAWIE, FA
Fort Monroe, Virginia

✦—The foregoing letter (which contains information then sought for another purpose) is published as a matter of general interest to artillerymen, some of whom may not realize that Battery D, 5th FA Bn, is the *oldest unit in the United States Regular Army*. Known as the Alexander Hamilton Battery, it was activated in 1776.—Ed.

Comparing Plans

Dear Editor:

General Hart's article, *Artillery with an American Army in Europe*, in the January-February issue of the JOURNAL was certainly an informative article which has long been required. I would like to comment on the paragraphs under the heading of *Allocation of Artillery*, as they applied to the Pacific Theater.

You will recall that General Hart came to Manila with the advanced detachment of the First Army, in order to plan for the role of that Army in the invasion of Japan. At that time General Hart evidenced some apprehension over the amount of artillery being set up for the invasion of Honshu. The following is a comparison of the artillery set up for First Army's cross-channel operation with that set up by General MacArthur for the Army Group then scheduled to invade the Tokyo area:

Type	Normandie	Honshu
FA Observation Bn	3	8
FA Brig Hq	1	
FA Group Hq	11	10
105mm Bn	9	9
4.5-Inch Gun Bn	3	
155mm How Bn	15	16
155mm Gun Bn	9	18
8-Inch How Bn	6	8
240mm How Bn	3	7
8-Inch Gun Bn	2	3

It must be realized, in this analysis, that (1) the attack against Honshu was to be made by *two* armies, and (2) the

actual composition of each army was subject to review by the army commanders concerned.

Quoting from General Hart's article, the artillery requirements of an army are determined only after consideration of "the army mission, the character and defensive organization of the battle area, the quantity and quality of the enemy artillery, the artillery actually available, etc." Under the *et cetera* must be added the competing requirements for shipping—a major factor in the Pacific area. Let us consider these factors in a detailed comparison of the two battle grounds.

The army missions were not dissimilar. Both called for the total defeat of the enemy.

The character of the battle area appears to be more difficult in the Tokyo area. The area itself is very restricted, the roads are not good, and the cross-country mobility is poor. (Personal reconnaissance on Y Day realistically substantiated this.) On the other hand, the defensive organization in Europe was far more formidable than it was in Japan. Actually the indications of any considerable fixed defenses in the Tokyo area had been small, whereas the defenses in Europe were known to be extensive. In other words, in Europe the terrain favored the movement of artillery and the defenses necessitated the uses of large masses of artillery; in Japan, the restricted roads hindered all artillery movement, and the lack of fixed defenses (except for caves) decreased the requirements for massed artillery.

As for the quantity and quality of the enemy artillery, there is no need to make any comparison. The Japs had little artillery and, compared to German standards, used it poorly. As a matter of fact, a Jap artillery officer captured in Leyte stated that Japan should withdraw from the war until they learned how to utilize artillery!

The artillery actually available in the Pacific was not a guiding factor since any additional artillery required was to be redeployed from Europe where sufficient of all types was available to us. The amount to be moved was entirely dependent upon shipping, and by shipping I mean overall shipping

requirements and the ability to handle the unloading. Since the overall shipping requirements were in excess of the shipping available within the limited time, all requirements conflicted with all others and a decision could be made only by weighing the urgency of the various type units. This required the elimination of many desirable units so that necessary units of other types could be brought in. A case in point—the engineer requirements were very heavy, but absolutely necessary in order that the landing could be made and the attack could go forward. Despite this limiting factor, it was felt that the artillery set up for the invasion of Honshu was entirely adequate for the task at hand and that the First Army would have found as much artillery available to accomplish the calls for fire as that Army had had available to it in Europe.

It might be of interest to comment on the utilization contemplated for the 8-inch gun battalions. Three such battalions were prepared for the theater well ahead of V-J Day. General Borden, from the Office of Chief of Ordnance, suggested that since European experience had proved the 8-inch gun to be of limited general usefulness that these units should be re-equipped with other type weapons of more general use. However, this advice was turned down, since the 8-inch guns were already on the water and shipping was our bottleneck. Consideration was given to landing these battalions on Toshima, a small island south of Oshima, which protected the outer entrance to Tokyo Bay. Knowing there were coast defenses on Oshima, consideration was given to neutralizing them with 8-inch guns. After study, however, it appeared that the coastal defenses were at approximately 3200 yards' range and that effective fire would be most difficult. It was finally decided that, in view of the range, the difficulties of landing the 8-inch gun over beaches, and the expected effectiveness of our air and naval bombardment, this would not be an economical operation, and it was planned that these guns could be installed on the Chiba Peninsula, to fire across Tokyo Bay.

COL. F. H. CHAFFEE, GSC (FA) GHQ, FEC

Artillery Miscellany

NATIONAL GUARD INSTRUCTORS

The following is a list of Senior Ground Instructors assigned to areas indicated. The names of Field Artillery officers are shown in italics.

First Army. Col. Charles Gettys, Del; Col. Joseph Ready, Me; Col. Warren McNaught, Mass; Col. Carroll Bagby, NH; Col. Frederick Herr, NJ; Col. Horace Harding, RI; Col. James Mitchell, Vt; Col. Frederick de Rohan, Conn.

Second Army. Col. Charles Myers, DC; Col. James Hamilton, Md; Col. Robert Van Volkenburgh, O; Col. Leo McMahon, Pa; Col. Harry Meyers, Va; Col. Francis Fainter, W.Va.

Third Army. Col. Paul Franson, Ala; Col. Harold Haney, Fla; Col. Clifford Mathews, Ga; Col. Thomas Oliphant, Miss; Col. William Fitts, Jr., NC; Col. Paul Miller, SC; Col. Rufus Ramey, Tenn.

Fourth Army. Col. Don Scott, Ark; Col. Francis Woolfley, La; Col. Claude Thiele, NM; Col. David Craig, Okla; Col. John Murray, Tex.

Fifth Army. Col. Dennis McCunniff, Colo; Col. Clinton McClure, Ill; Col. Robert Taylor, Ia; Col. George Smith, Kans; Col. Edward Roberts, Mich; Col. Mose Kent, Minn; Col. James Short, Nebr; Col. Eric Erickson, ND; Col. Edwin Keatley, SD; Col. Archibald Mixson, Wisc; Col. Robert Turley, Jr., Wyo; Col. Merritt Olmstead, Mo.

Sixth Army. Col. John Zellars, Ariz; Col. Leonard Boyd, Calif; Col. James Barnett, Idaho; Col. Robert Offley, Mont; Col. John Hamilton, Ore; Col. Christianity Pickett, Utah; Col. Edwin Crabbill, Wn.

Insular. Col. Ercil Porter, Hawaii; Col. Edward Strobehn, Puerto Rico.

DIVISION ASSOCIATION NOTICES

The Society of the First Division will hold its annual reunion in New York City on the 29th and 30th of August 1947. All former members of the First U. S. Infantry Division and any of the units attached to the Division during combat are urged to write for information on the reunion and for a copy of the Division history which will be published this fall, to the Society of the First Division, Box 13, Station C, Grand Rapids 6, Michigan.

The 80th Division will hold its 28th annual reunion in Greensburg, Pa., August 14, 15, 16, and 17. Headquarters will be established

at the Penn-Albert Hotel. Any veteran of the 80th Division of both world wars who is interested in attending the annual reunion or in the 80th Division Veterans Association, should write to National Headquarters of the 80th Division Veterans Association, 313 Plaza Building, Pittsburgh 19, Pa.

The 5th Armored Division will hold its first annual reunion on August 28 and 29, 1947, at the Congress Hotel in Chicago.

Preliminary plans include a luncheon on the 28th with Major General Lunsford E. Oliver, wartime division commander, as the principal speaker, and a banquet and dance on the 29th.

The selection of the Labor Day weekend for the convention makes it possible for delegates to lengthen their stay in Chicago to several days. Members are invited to bring their wives, and entertainment will be arranged to include them. Inquiries should be addressed to the Fifth Armored Division Association, 1719 K St., Washington 6, D. C.

TAPS

By Ruth M. Scithers

Like many beloved, never dying melodies, Taps seems to have no origin, no author. Mysterious and beautiful, it is a deep part of the memories of all those who have known Army life.

It has been established that it does belong to America and has no relation to the martial music of any other nation. In 1867 when General Truman Seymour, an Artilleryman, was requested to prepare a series of bugle calls for the United States Army, Taps was included. And it was then that it became generally recognized.

So many people have written words to Taps that I thought I should also like to try — it always sounds to me like a Mother's last lullaby when her son goes off to be a soldier. . . .

Soldier sleep
Dreams be deep.
Night's blue dome
Is your home
As you roam.
Angels bless
Winds caress
Dreams be deep.

Soldier rest
You are blest
Life is long
Life's a song
For the strong.
Honor bright
Guide you right
You are blest.



PERIMETERS in PARAGRAPHS



By Col. Conrad H. Lanza, FA, Ret.

THE GENERAL SITUATION

Prepared by a widely-known military scholar and writer, PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS is a recurring feature dealing with the military, political and economic realities in world affairs. Whereas an understanding of these realities is deemed essential to the American soldier, it is emphasized that PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS reflects the opinions of the author, alone. This installment covers the period 15 April-15 June 1947.—Editor.

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL situation has deteriorated. It is dominated by conflicting interests between the United States, now become the greatest Power in the world, and Russia, which is the greatest ground force Power.

These two Powers operate under different ideals — respectively democracy and communism. Each represents itself the real exponent of liberty, differently interpreted by each of them. The press of the two Powers is mutually hostile to the other and becoming more so. Conflict, possibly ending in war, is foreseen. Should this happen the belief is that it will be a most frightful and devastating war. Fear of such a war is causing increasing unrest and is a main argument for maintaining the greatest armaments ever before had in time of peace.

Perhaps the reason most often alleged for a future war—for a World War III—is that democracy and communism cannot exist side by side in the world at the same time, and that one or the other must fall. This is denied by some statesmen who think the two ideals can work together side by side, without necessarily involving any war. No man

can now say with certainty which belief is correct.

Without arguing the question as to whether democracy and communism can, or cannot, exist peaceably at the same time, it is well to consider the facts. They are ascertainable and are of major importance to the military service.

During the past ten years there have been an unparalleled series of wars collectively known as World War II. They commenced in 1937 with Japan's invasion of China. Not one of these wars was waged either for democracy or for communism. The reason was invariably *Security*.

SECURITY

Security is an old principle of strategy. All books on the art of war speak about it. The definition of security has from time to time changed. No definition was given to the word *security* by our War Department for many years. Its publications listed it as one of the major principles of war, but failed to explain what was meant.

Nobody can discuss anything intelligently unless the subject is defined, in order that all may know what is being discussed. A definition of security is needed. This is not now difficult. This writer suggests that since World War I, security, as regards nations, has a new meaning which is generally agreed upon.

For a nation, or group of nations, security means dominance of adjacent and neighboring states by military occupation, or by reduction of neighbors to puppet states. This principle has been the major factor in World War II.

Japan considered it necessary as early as 1895 to seize Korea for its security. This led to the subsequent occupation of Manchukuo to provide security for Korea. In 1937 north China was taken to furnish security for Manchukuo. This was soon followed by occupation of all of eastern China for the security of previous conquests. It was an afterthought to claim that Japan was seeking an Asia for Asiatics. That was a good slogan but Japanese occupations were organized for no one but Japan.

Germany started to seize neighboring territories in 1938. Security for Germany was the reason. In 1939 Russia fought *with* Germany to divide Poland between them. Two years later she fought *against* Germany over a dispute as to which should secure control of the Balkans and the Istanbul Straits, which each believed necessary for its own security.

In 1939 and 1940 Russia attacked Finland to obtain bases which she represented were necessary for security. She seized and then organized three small Baltic states as puppets and later annexed them. She seized Bessarabia from Romania. In no case was the spreading of communism a factor. Military control of neighbor states based on the principle of security was the reason.

During 1940 Germany occupied in turn Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. All were reduced to puppet states to provide security for Germany. Her great attack against Russia in 1941 was for the same reason—to reduce a powerful neighbor to a puppet condition. Russia and Germany

did not fight one another to spread communism or secure adherents for nazism. Each fought to destroy the independence of the other, and to establish its own security by reducing neighbor states to impotency.

President Roosevelt during 1939 and 1940 represented that German victory meant a future German invasion of America. For our security the destruction of Germany was considered a necessity. The control of all islands throughout the Pacific is generally believed to be desirable for the security of the United States.

There has never been a war between democracy and communism. Russia fought with the United States, and she fought for and against Germany, always over the principle of security, which was interpreted to mean reduction of neighbor states. Communism had nothing to do with the origin of these wars.

In view of this long record there seems but slight probability that war will arise between communism and democracy in an effort to spread their respective ideals. Marshal Stalin on 9 April in an interview with Mr. Stassen expressed the opinion that differences in government between the United States and Russia was not of essential importance and no reason for war, or lack of cooperation. This opinion accords with the facts.

COMMUNISM

Communism has not yet been a cause of war. Nevertheless it is an important military factor.

The only states having a Communist Government are Russia and her satellites, or puppet states. Communist parties exist elsewhere and in some states threaten to seize control of the local government, but they have not yet done so.

Neither in Russia nor in any other state do the members of the communist parties form a majority of the population or of the voters. In Russia the membership of the Communist Party has not exceeded 5% and for a long time was below 3%. The Communists have never claimed their party as containing a majority of voters. There is reason to believe that the Communists intentionally limit membership in order

to maintain a working unit which is not so large as to be unwieldy.

Communism is a doctrine which rests upon the abolition of private property, ownership being ascribed to the state. The state controls the means of production, distribution and consumption. The right of individuals to control his own labor is denied, each one being required to do whatever is most advantageous to the state.

It follows from these extensive powers of the state that no individual has any rights which the state is bound to respect. Hence, communist states are always atheistic, since to be otherwise would be to admit that there was a duty to a God or Superior Being.

No communist state has been established, or maintained, except by a brutal exercise of power. Property is seized by communist states without compensation to owners. To prevent a dissatisfied lot of former owners from seeking to recover what they lost, in Russia owners were killed. More recently in occupied countries, many have been expelled, either out of the country as in the case of Germans, or to Siberia or some other locality for forced labor.

Communist states are ruled by a clique under a dictator. The latter, as in Russia, may be subject to control by some sort of council—such as the Politbureau—of which the dictator becomes the executive. Whether the directing authority is a single person, or a council, absolute obedience to orders is a prime requirement. Disobedience brings the severest punishments. Lack of complete support to the directing authority, or even a suspicion of failure to maintain complete subordination to the party line, is sufficient to cause execution, exile or confinement for long terms under revolting conditions.

Communist states maintain extensive secret police forces. Outside of duties which would be usual and legitimate in democratic countries, communist secret police are charged with locating and accomplishing the disappearance, by death or otherwise, of anyone opposed to the communist state.

Communist states are always threatened with an uprising of their own citizens, who invariably hate the

government controls and the extinction of the liberties of individuals. It is the business of the secret police to see that dissatisfied persons do not have an opportunity to organize.

On account of its extensive duties and the large number of persons who are, or are suspected of being, not in sympathy with the state, the secret police force in communist states is always large. It seeks to control all citizens and their beliefs. With that purpose in view all publications are censored, and all movies, radio broadcasts and amusement centers are rigidly controlled. Exchange of information by any means whatever between the interior of communist states and the exterior is discouraged. The mission of the censorship service is to represent interior conditions as ideal, and exterior conditions as the opposite. In Russia, for example, the alleged wonders of communism are constantly extolled, while the alleged horrible conditions of monopoly capitalism (Stalin's term) are continuously being published.

These conditions have two major effects on the military power of communist states. First, their own countries contain large sections of people who seek to be rid of a system which they fear and detest. In 1941 this led to extensive surrenders of Russian troops to the invading Germans. In some areas, such as the Crimea, practically the entire population welcomed the enemy as liberators. In other areas many, but not all, welcomed them. This condition still exists and is a weakness of the communist state.

Secondly, the communist state has the advantage that it can conceal what is going on within its own country from the knowledge of outsiders. It may prepare for war, and may make advanced preparations for an offensive, with much better chance of being undetected than a democratic state.

In 1938 and 1939, foreigners circulated freely throughout Germany. There was no doubt that Germany was preparing for war. No end of observers obtained quite full information. In 1947, there is no certainty as to what military measures are being taken behind the iron curtain. Perhaps there are no dangerous ones, at least at the

moment. But as long as doubt exists, fear of war and fear of being a victim of a sudden attack will materially affect the international situation.

The result of all this is that the democracies fear the communist states. They do not believe that the communist states will embark in a new war for the purpose of spreading communism. There is no evidence that they will. Communism is a means to an end. It consolidates entire countries under the leadership of a dictatorial minority, without considering the wishes of the inhabitants.

All communist states are now under the control of Russia. Their military forces are being integrated with those of Russia and are intended to form one irresistible whole. Their economic systems are being rearranged and extended to enable Russia and its puppets to provide the weapons, munitions and supplies necessary for war with the Western Powers. It will take some years to do this. Until the required preparations have been completed, Russia desires no major war.

When and if war comes, it will be

fought over the principle of security—the seizure of adjacent states, or their reduction to puppet states.

How, or whether, this will come about, no one knows. The moves and action of nations are subject to so many unpredictable factors that no calculation can be made in advance as to what they will do in the future.

The general situation is one of preparation during which the democracies and communism will seek to strengthen their own home forces, and consolidate their hold on adjacent puppet or satellite states.

RUSSIA

THE UNITED STATES VS RUSSIA

It is understood that when President Truman on 12 March last announced the intention of the United States to support Turkey and Greece with funds for military purposes, that information had been received that Russia was about ready to seize the Istanbul Straits. As previously discussed in these columns, Russia had during a year past accumulated large forces near Turkey. A GHQ had been organized near Odessa under Marshal Zhukov, a very able general. Under him was a large army in the Balkans which could have been launched towards Istanbul, and a smaller army on the east frontier of Turkey, which could have attacked westwards. There is no evidence that Russia intended to enter Greece. That was not the danger point.

Under the action of the United States, Russia—desiring no major war—has desisted from threatening movements. She has not withdrawn her former official requests for the right to station her troops on the Istanbul Straits. Temporarily this is in abeyance.

For Russia, Turkey is a rather vital area. From Turkish airfields a large part of the industrial and mining areas of south Russia are within bombing range. So are the oil fields in the Caucasus. Erecting an efficient military force in Turkey is bound to provoke Russian reaction.

Most likely counter efforts to be expected are firmer and more rapid consolidation of Russia's position in adjacent puppet states, particularly in Poland and in Czechoslovakia. A commencement has been made by the conversion of the government in Hungary (which was representative of the people and anti-Communist) by another which is friendly to Russia and subservient to her wishes. The United States has protested by letter, but without result to date.

The geographical situation of Austria would indicate a Russian probable attempt to absorb that small state. The obstacles to so doing (which was not the case in Hungary) is the fact that the Western Powers continue a military occupation of a large part of Austria, and will oppose Russian expansion. This being the case, Russia holds on to what she has in Austria. She refuses to alter the status quo, by declining to agree to a peace treaty which would restore Austria to independence and involve all foreign Powers withdrawing their troops.

The United States is anxious to establish peace with former enemy countries, and restore trade conditions as soon as practicable. Russia has no such desire. Her puppet states are being integrated within the Russian economic system. A formal peace with countries not totally under her control would be of no special economic benefit to her. Russia is not prepared to undertake

important trade relations with nations beyond her immediate sphere. As to former enemy countries, peace treaties can wait.

SPAIN VS RUSSIA

There has been an absence of Russian propaganda directed against the government of General Francisco Franco of Spain. Both Marshal Stalin and the Russian radio have announced that Russia can cooperate with nations having a different system of government. Most commentators have assumed that this meant cooperation with the United States. It may have had a wider significance. Shortly after the interview between Marshal Stalin and Mr. Stassen (which, as noted above, included a Russian offer to cooperate) was published, the Madrid radio made a similar announcement.

For years Russia has been most hostile to Spain. Spain has been equally hostile to anything with a Communist brand. Their discontinuance of propaganda against each other, with public announcements regarding cooperation, may indicate a change in policy.

The geographical situation of Spain gives it a peculiarly important strategical position in Europe. If Spain remains neutral, as it did during World War II, it may have no important role. If Spain does not remain neutral but joins either the democratic or communist nations, its accession will strengthen the side it joins.

COMMUNISM IN EUROPE

All European states have a communist party and a communist vote. Within Russia and her puppet states, the communist vote exceeds by far the number of communists. Elsewhere the communist vote approximates the party strength.

The countries having the largest communist parties are France and Italy. In the elections held in June, 1946—latest reported on—the communist vote was 28% in France and 19% in Italy. French communists are not completely subservient to Moscow, and they are not likely to become so. Italian communists usually follow instructions from Russia. During the past two months the communists have been ousted from the governments of both France and Italy, where before they held a certain number of ministries, roughly proportional to their strength.

Having no communists, the new governments of France and Italy have been welcomed by the United States. These two countries for the time being may be considered as part of the democratic nations. Integration of French military forces with those of the British Empire has started with the issue of British equipment to French parachute troops.

While the democracies have gained in France and Italy, they have lost in Hungary. Based on an alleged confession, the Prime Minister of Hungary (absent in Switzerland on leave at the time) was ousted at the end of May, and is to be tried in *absentia* on charges not yet revealed. His place has been taken by a Russian communist named Rakosi, a graduate from Moscow school of communism. His task is to integrate the Hungarian army with that of Russia.

At the last free election in Hungary on 4 November 1945, the communists obtained 17% of the votes cast. They obtained representation in the Council of Ministers, including the key positions of Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior (includes police supervision), and Minister of Education (includes propaganda and censorship).

On 28 May, while the Prime Minister Ference Nagy was in Switzerland on leave, the Deputy Prime Minister suddenly "discovered" a plot involving

Nagy in an attempt to overthrow his own government. Charges which have been made public allege that conversations were had with an American diplomat relating to the next election. Even if true, which is doubtful, it would not have been illegal under the law of either Hungary or the United States to discuss an approaching election, and express an opinion regarding the same, or listen to some one else expressing an opinion. Diplomats are supposed to listen. Most of the accused escaped to adjacent countries, less one alleged conspirator who made a "confession."

The persons accused, if apprehended or *in absentia*, are to be tried before a People's Court. Few who are arraigned before such courts fail to be convicted.

In the meantime, the democratic Premier Ference Nagy has been replaced by the Deputy Prime Minister as acting Premier. That individual, Matyas Rakosi, was born Hungarian and in his early years was a salesman in a clothing store. He became an active communist. He was first arrested in 1923, and again in 1925, on charges of being a Russian stooge engaged in subversive activities. He was found guilty and sentenced to 8½ years' confinement. After completing that term he was next arrested in 1935, charged once again with subversive activities and also as being connected with 21 murders and 489 other crimes committed by communist agents. He was sentenced to exile, and went to Russia. There he received special instruction and became a Russian citizen. He is now a brigadier general in the Russian army, presumably on detached service.

This short history illustrates the danger of having a communist minority represented on a country's government.

Rakosi is now in effect Dictator of Hungary. According to the Hungarian Constitution the next election is scheduled for November of this year. Rakosi is governing until then as Acting Premier. His problem is to be elected head of the government in November. Present plan to accomplish this is to remove, prior to the election, prominent opponents under any convenient charge. If they are taken they are to be condemned in a People's Court. The majority of the accused flee the country

to avoid torture and condemnation. It is possible that the communists are willing to permit escapes, thereby saving the trouble of staging trials to which the Western Powers are likely to strongly disapprove.

Next step is to combine the Socialist with the Communist parties, with a single ticket. This is in process of negotiation, with emphasis on what might happen if an agreement is not reached. Together, these two parties might have about 50% of the vote.

Final step is to disqualify voters of the opposition. On 2 June, Rakosi announced in the Parliament that "friends of conspirators must disappear from public life." And on 3 June, the Minister of Justice announced that "all who without a doubt are enemies of democracy must be excluded from the franchise." The government is the judge as to who is a "friend of conspirators" and who shall be excluded from the franchise. Enough citizens in communist countries are excluded from voting under these headings to enable the single ticket for communism to have a majority of votes cast. After a few experiences, the vote becomes unanimous for the single ticket.

On 5 June President Truman denounced as an outrage the Russian action in Hungary. On the same day hundreds of meetings were scheduled throughout Hungary where communist speakers declaimed against the Western Powers and particularly against the United States. The gist of the speeches is that the United States is a fascist, monopoly capitalistic, reactionary and imperialistic state. All newspapers are censored to prevent any news or comments favorable to the United States, but with columns devoted to the alleged glories of communism.

As this account closes, Russia has gained in her consolidation of Hungary. It is her counteroffensive to balance the loss of Turkey which she was preparing to seize. It increases her hold on Austria by affording a frontier from which an offensive action against Austria was successfully launched in 1946, and which could be repeated.

Several reports are at hand regarding the consolidation of the Balkans. First and most important project is to

unite Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria into a single state, with a single army under Russian control and with Russian equipment. This unification has been previously discussed in these columns. It has been favored by Yugoslavia as that state expects to be the dominant member of the proposed consolidated state. For that very reason, the other states have not been enthusiastic. Under Russian guidance objections are likely to be overruled and consolidation accomplished.

Such a new state would have a population of 24,000,000 with proportionate military strength. Organized for Russia, the latter's strategical position with regard to Austria, Italy and Greece would be greatly improved.

Construction of a naval base in Albania is proceeding and may be completed in 1948. A navy to use it is not in sight. Should Russia obtain the Istanbul Straits, her Black Sea Fleet would find a Mediterranean base.

Some Americans who had been refused authority to observe conditions in Romania traveled through that country without authority and managed to come home and tell about it. They agree that Romania is terrorized and pauperized.

Romania has a population of about 16,000,000 normally anti-Russian and anti-communist. The inhabitants are descendants of old Roman settlers and speak a Latin language. Russia is seizing

food and oil (the main products of the country) and is not leaving enough for home needs. It appears to be a policy of deliberate degradation.

Russian propaganda and censorship is in full force, and a special effort is made to show the United States in an unfavorable light. There are numerous concentration camps. Some contain Russians who, having come in contact with American or British troops, are suspected of no longer believing stories of how much better off Russian workers are than Americans.

According to the statements of refugees, Latvia has been nearly depopulated of Latvians by murder or deportation to distant areas. They also report that Russian planes patrol the Baltic Sea and sink refugee boats. To a lesser extent the same conditions are reported from Estonia and Lithuania. The removed population is being replaced with Russian settlers.

Part of the industrial establishments of the Baltic states have been removed to Russia. Very strict police supervision exists, and anyone suspected of not giving wholehearted support to the communist regime is liquidated. Opposition to the Russian occupation is extensive, but is underground. In case of war this dissatisfied element, which is armed, may be expected to favor an invader promising liberty.

Some redistribution of troops has taken place. At the end of March occupation troops in Germany had been

reduced perhaps 50%. At least part of this represented divisions transferred to Marshal Zhukov's reserve for the Balkan theater. Due to the action of the United States in interfering to support Greece and Turkey, no troop action in the Balkans occurred.

German troops in Russian uniforms are reported to have appeared in the Baltic states, where they are on occupation duty. Only infantry battalions have been noted. These have 3 rifle companies of ordinary Germans, and 1 communications platoon of German communists. There are no heavy weapons. These battalions are on trial and Russia is not very certain of them. Each night the rifle companies have to turn in their rifles, less those needed for the guard, to the communications platoon which locks them up until next morning. Only a minimum amount of ammunition is issued. The Germans are no longer taught Russian. Experience has shown that that enabled men to desert and return to Germany.

A large number of German POWs remain in confinement. Their number is variously reported as from 700,000 to over 2,000,000. They are employed on various labor projects.

A German Army CP is reported to be still functioning in an advisory capacity. Its members are composed of former high ranking Germans who surrendered at Stalingrad in February, 1943. They are supposed to be working on war plans.

GREECE

On 21 May the Investigation Commission of the United Nations submitted a report on the war in Greece. The Commission reported that:

1. **Speeches by government officials regarding a new state of Macedonia have caused tension and suspicion.**
2. **Political refugees from Greece are harbored in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, and vice versa, who engage in political and military activity against their countries.**
3. **Violent propaganda inflames passions already too high.**

The report mentioned no names or dates of the government officials seeking

to establish a new Macedonia. This has been previously explained in these columns. The government officials were Yugoslavian and Bulgarian who recommend a Macedonia state to include north Greece, and adjacent parts of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria mostly populated by Macedonians. This new state to form an additional member of the super-Baltic state discussed elsewhere by joining Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania into a single communist state.

The refugees crossing frontiers include guerrillas operating in Greece. To escape Greek troops they withdraw

to conveniently established "labor" camps in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. There they are re-equipped if necessary, trained and briefed for the next operation. There are communist refugees within Greece, who agitate against Russian dominated countries, but there is no evidence that Greece has organized them into military units and sent them to invade Yugoslavia, Bulgaria or Albania.

American aid for Greece has been voted, with an initial appropriation of \$300,000,000. This will not disrupt the equipping and training of the Greek

Army under British direction, which is to continue on a reduced scale. Part of the funds are available for improving the road and railroad nets, which are in a very bad state.

The war in Greece is between armed bands of guerrillas operating mostly in north Greece. They represent themselves as communists and enemies of the Western Powers, especially of the United States. At the elections in Greece on 31 March 1946, which were free, the Communists obtained only 9% of the vote. There may be an additional 6% violently opposed to the government of Greece.

Although the communists are fighting for what they call the freedom of communism, the real reason is to bring Greece within the Russian orbit. The tactics used are typically Russian. The guerrillas assemble in adjacent territory until ready and until a convenient opportunity presents itself. They then dash across the frontier at night and attack some village. As their intelligence service is good, the attack often succeeds and the village is captured.

The mission of attacks is to cause a feeling of insecurity and terror. The guerrillas bring lists of persons opposed to them and, if found, they are executed. Stores and homes are looted, and sometimes burned down. Young men are seized and carried off for forced labor. Inhabitants remaining are usually lectured. They are told that the attack will be followed by others. Until the

next attack, the inhabitants are told to think it over. If they wish to avoid communist raids and destruction of property and loss of lives, they must join the communists and renounce any idea of liaison with the United States or the British Empire. They are told that Russia is winning, communism is spreading, and the sooner they realize this and get on the band wagon, the better it will be for them.

These raids have caused the abandonment of many villages, as it is impracticable to furnish a guard for every village large enough to oppose the guerrilla attacks. This has resulted in a refugee problem and a serious drop in the production of food. The best that Greece can do for the refugees is to issue to each a ration of 2/3 lb. of bread plus the equivalent of 10c U. S. currency per day.

Military operations have been under direction of the Greek II Corps. Officially this corps has 3 divisions (a paper force of 60,000), but not over 15,000 seem to be available for combat duty at any one time. The front runs from the northeast to southwest, extending generally from Salonika to Larissa and Karditsa. The plan was to drive northwest and force the guerrillas into traps against the mountains. The front being 120 miles long, the number of troops was inadequate. It was possible to pass through the lines and not many guerrillas were rounded up. When contacts occurred, the troops

invariably won. Usually the guerrillas avoided combat and withdrew across the border if necessary or desirable where pursuing troops could not follow them. Total guerrilla force is estimated as 20,000 but only a part can be used at any one time due to lack of lines of communications and lack of rations. The troops have the advantage of a small air force which is using rockets with reported good effect. The guerrillas have no air force but are well armed with infantry heavy weapons.

The guerrillas captured Katerine by a night raid on 4 May, and on the same night captured three villages north of Salonika. They came from Yugoslavia. When attacked next morning they withdrew across the border. The combined guerrilla force seems to have been about 1,500.

On the night of 29 May guerrilla attacks were made against Florina and Kilkis. At Florina the attack was repelled; at Kilkis it had partial success. In these attacks the guerrillas had greatly increased fire power, supposedly furnished by Yugoslavia from where they came and to whence they returned. The new weapons are German and British which had been turned in by Yugoslav troops who are being issued Russian arms.

Minor communist activities are reported in the Peloponnesus and on Crete. These are not known to be supported by a foreign Power.

TURKEY

The President's recommendation that the United States appropriate \$100,000,000 for the purpose of strengthening the military forces of Turkey under American supervision has been authorized by Congress, and an American mission under Major General Lunsford E. Oliver and Rear Admiral Ernest E. Hermann reported for duty in Turkey on 21 May. The operations of this mission are confidential.

For the past three centuries war between Russia and Turkey has occurred on the average of once every 23 years. Consequently there is a wealth of

evidence of military operations in this theater. The Turkish General Staff should have full studies of what is required, should another such war develop.

The Turkish Army has been on a war footing since 1939. Its disposition is:

3rd Army, based on Erzurum, is guarding the east frontier. Main force is blocking roads from Russia through Kars (good road and good railroad) and Ardahan (road not too good). Network of roads through this area is bad. Left flank guarded by the Smali Anadolu Mountains bordering the Black Sea

having few passes, and these very steep for an invader. Right flank is guarded by Iran, which is under treaty to aid in a war with Russia. Aid may not be very important.

1st Army is guarding the European front astride the railroad from Bulgaria to Istanbul. This is a front of about 160 miles. Low mountains form the right half. Flanks are protected by the Black Sea on the right and the Aegean Sea on the left. This army can be reinforced by a sea power, provided that Istanbul remains in friendly hands.

2nd Army is near Istanbul and presently in GHQ reserve. It can easily

reinforce the 1st Army, and is charged with repelling amphibious expeditions which might land in rear of the 1st Army on either the European or Asiatic sides of the Istanbul Straits. Due to inferior roads and railroads, the 2nd Army can not quickly reinforce the 3rd.

Experience of past campaigns shows that the west frontier can be attacked anywhere or everywhere. Latest previous campaign in this area was in 1912, when the attackers overcame the Turkish field army within a few days. The Turks were saved by the Istanbul fortifications into which they had been driven. Latest previous campaign on the east frontier was during World War I. Turkey was the victor and, in 4 years, gained an advance of about 40 miles. Poor lines of communications prevented major operations in this area and limited the fighting largely to the few existing

roads. This condition remains unchanged on the Turkish side frontier to this day. On the Russian side substantial improvements have been made in the road net.

Total strength of the Turkish Army is reported to be 600,000 men, including services. This number could be doubled. Instruction is good, but usually limited to company training. Combat training for large units is lacking. This is partly due to lack of modern equipment (particularly in armor, artillery and planes) and partly to inadequate staff training. Equipment on hand is not uniform. For example, the artillery has batteries from six different nations, whose ammunition is not interchangeable. This causes a complicated supply problem.

It is now the American problem to create an efficient modern army out of the Turks. The individual Turk is a

fighter. There have been so many wars with Russia that it is considered only natural that there should be another, and apparently everyone is willing to prepare for this possibility.

To accomplish the American mission, a large program will be needed for suitable air bases and for new and good roads and railroads, besides training and equipping the military forces. In the opinion of this writer, \$100,000,000 will be just a beginning to carry out what is really a vast program. A beginning has been made. Contracts are reported as signed for constructing 2 modern airfields near Ankara and Adana. These will be just about equidistant from the east and west frontiers and will connect with Anglo-American air bases in the Mediterranean. Another contract provides for enlarging the existing airfields near Istanbul.

INDIA

India has long desired independence. On 16 May 1946, the British Government advised that it was prepared to grant independence unconditionally to India as soon as representatives had organized a government. The intention was to form a state of India having about 412,000,000 people who might remain within the British Empire or secede as they pleased. Most people thought India would secede.

Now that independence is within their grasp the Indians have found that exercising the right to govern themselves is not simple. Major difficulty was that disagreement arose between the Moslems and Hindus. In spite of all efforts it has been impossible to unite these two religious elements into a united state. Neither is willing to trust the other.

Prior to the arrival of the British, India was divided into hundreds of states. The Moslem states had military superiority since their religion is forceful and the Hindu religion is pacifist. Consequently, although numerically inferior, the Moslems ruled the greater part of India. They

are now totally unwilling to join in a union with the Hindus, whom they dislike, where the latter would have a majority of votes in a constitutional government. The Hindus are equally opposed to being under Moslem rule, largely because to Hindus cows are sacred while to Moslems they are just excellent food material.

India has been a united country only under the British. For the past 90 years internal peace has prevailed within India, and during this period the population has increased enormously, and has risen from an inferior civilization to a much higher one. Industrially India has become a major center. It has the largest steel mills within the British Empire. It raised an army of over two millions in World War II, and its divisions fought in North Africa, Ethiopia, Italy and Burma. It is capable of becoming a major military power.

No agreement as to a single India having been reached by 3 June, a new solution was offered by Great Britain—to turn over the government to two Indian states, one Moslem and the other

Hindu. Both parties have accepted this solution, and are engaged in working out boundaries and drawing their respective constitutions.

It appears, however, that instead of two India states, there may be at least three. For the British solution does not apply to that part of India governed by Indian Princes and who never have been under British rule. Each state has an individual treaty with the British by which the latter handle foreign affairs and some other matters. But each state is politically independent.

Some of the princely states have declined to join either Moslem or Hindu India, but desire to resume complete independence. Others are undecided. These states cover 45% of India and are so located that Hindu India will be separated into three irregular areas. Moslem India will be separated into two areas 900 miles apart at the northeast and northwest corners of India. The population of areas, in round numbers, is: Moslem—93,000,000; Hindu—219,000,000; and Princes—100,000,000. Each is large enough to become one of the Powers of the world.

The Moslems and Hindus have announced that they will remain within the British Empire.

According to partial reports, that part of the India Army which is British is

being regrouped within the princely states, with the main force in Hyderabad which is centrally located. The British naval base at Bombay is being broken up, and the large drydocks have been

moved to Malta. With naval bases at Malta, Aden, Ceylon (which is not part of India) and Singapore, the British line of communications to the Far East and to Australia is assured.

CHINA

POLITICAL SITUATION

On 16 April a new Kuomintang government was organized at Nanking under General Chang Chun as Premier. However, Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek appears to remain the real leader, without essential change in the government. Its main characteristics are incompetence and corruption. Main mission of the government is to go ahead with the extermination campaign against the Communists, who are estimated to have about half a million troops against four millions much better equipped Kuomintang troops.

With these odds it would seem that the extermination campaign might succeed. Only it hasn't. In the past 25 years the Kuomintang leaders have waged extermination campaigns against the communists at least once a year, except during the period of Japanese occupation. No extermination campaign ever succeeded, and most of them were badly defeated.

This has resulted in China now being war worn and partially demoralized. The Kuomintang High Command persists in the same strategical plan which it has constantly followed—to seize and hold supposedly key cities. In general key cities are in Kuomintang possession, but they are closely besieged by Communists who hold the surrounding country from which the key cities are isolated as they are from each other.

All roads and railroads are interrupted except minor stretches. With the Kuomintang holding junctions and large cities the main lines of communication are useless to the Communists, but the Kuomintang cannot use them either since the Communists hold the lines in between the cities. It being impracticable to

distribute supplies, this situation has resulted in famine in some areas and undernourishment nearly everywhere. What food is available brings famine prices, and numerous riots against the government have occurred. They have been suppressed with barbarity. With trade nearly at a standstill, economic ruin is in sight.

Outside of military events the Kuomintang hold on Manchuria is weakening. The Manchurians are disgusted with Kuomintang rule. They resent the appointment of south Chinese to practically all government jobs. The Kuomintang troops in the province are south Chinese, speak a language unintelligible to the natives, and are heartily disliked. The government, where there is any, is notably inefficient and corrupt.

A separation movement is appearing. A provisional new government for Inner Mongolia was installed on 23 April at Wangyehmiao. This place is 220 miles west of Harbin on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Troops from this new government have since appeared in line on the Communist side.

The Kuomintang is friendly to the United States from whom it has received great quantities of munitions, supplies and funds. It wants more, but hasn't recently received as much as was heretofore customary. Best evidence is that if American funds are given to the Kuomintang it will be used to pay and support large forces holding those key cities, without any real prospect that the war with the Communists will be won.

On 26 April the United States announced that an unspecified number of naval ships were being transferred to the Kuomintang. A law passed on 16 July 1946 authorizes such a transfer, provided that the vessels be surplus and

do not exceed 271, plus not over 100 officers and 200 men as training cadres.

As this account closes the U. S. Marines in north China have nearly completed their withdrawal, but the U. S. naval establishment and naval school at Tsingtao has not been withdrawn. Otherwise, no American combat forces remain in China.

The Communists are conducting an active anti-American propaganda. They charge that the United States is wilfully supporting a fascist and incompetent Kuomintang government in order to have a handy base in case of war with Russia. This charge is spreading and is accepted by many non-Communists who are becoming hostile to the United States in spite of the enormous outlay of money, supplies and men which was furnished the Kuomintang during the ten years of war with Japan.

The Communists do not expect to be able to defeat the Kuomintang by driving their better equipped troops out of the key cities, except in isolated cases. They are working to prolong the war until economic disintegration brings about a Kuomintang collapse. Then they expect to succeed to power.

In the opinion of this writer the Communists will be able to prolong the war and this may well bring about economic collapse. But it does not follow that the people will at once adopt communism. They may look to some other leader to save them.

MILITARY SITUATION

For the Kuomintang the military situation has deteriorated materially during the period of this report.

Large Communist forces, as yet unorganized, have appeared in all of the provinces south of the Yangtze River less Kiangsu. Famine and corrupt officials

are a main cause of the people joining the Communists. To meet this situation, considerable forces have had to be furnished by the Kuomintang which has correspondingly reduced armies in the main theaters of operation. Three of these theaters are north of the Yangtze and may be designated respectively as West, East and North.

West Theater. This includes west Hopeh, Shansi, Shensi, west Honan and north Hupeh. The Kuomintang garrisons held the cities of Tatung, Yangku (or Taiyuan), Linfen and Anyi along the Tatung and Puchow Railroad. All places are under close siege and are supplied by air drops. The large number of planes required for this service handicaps air operations elsewhere.

Main effort is around Yangku which is the provincial capital and the center of a mining region. To relieve this place the Kuomintang ordered the Commanding General in Chahar to march south and relieve the siege. Meeting no special opposition, this force assembled at Laiyuan, 160 miles to the northeast, on 18 May. There the relief force stalled.

In Shensi two Kuomintang columns at Yulin and Suiteh were ordered to march towards each other. Distance is about 70 miles, but they didn't make it.

Numerous other minor engagements have taken place with no general change in the situation except that the Communists have captured a considerable mileage of railroads between the key cities. The railroads are being destroyed.

East Theater. The Kuomintang mission has been to advance from bases near Suchow, clear Shantung, and open the Tientsin and Pukow Railroad to through traffic. The Communists held most of this line north of Tsinan.

Unexpectedly, the Communists concentrated about two divisions on 25 April, and attacked the Kuomintang 72nd Division at Taian. Advised of the hopelessness of fighting, this division made only a token resistance and surrendered the next day. The Communists took the American equipment of the division, and paroled all prisoners. No effort was made to hold

Taian and it was reoccupied by the Kuomintang on 6 May. An advance was thereupon ordered in pursuit of the enemy, located as east of Mengyin in a position blocking an advance into Shantung. To drive the enemy out the Air Force was ordered to bomb them and did so, using 100 planes, which is a large number for China. This was done on 15 May, but instead of bombing the enemy the planes bombed their own advance guard—the 74th Division—which suffered heavy losses. Two days later the 74th Division surrendered to the enemy with all their American equipment. About the same time the main Kuomintang ordnance base at Suchow exploded.

General results in this area is that the Communists have captured valuable stores, thanks to the general incompetence of Kuomintang leaders.

North Theater. This includes Manchuria, Jehol and Chahar. At the beginning of the period the Kuomintang held Changchun and Mukden as main key cities, and also Chihfeng, Tolun and Kalgan along an alternate line of communications from the south. Troops in general had American equipment. The divisions which had fought under General Stilwell in Burma were present and supposed to be first class troops. However, no spare parts for American equipment had been received since leaving Burma two years ago. This was due to faulty administration and not for lack of parts which were available but not where they were needed. There was also a lack of replacements resulting in divisions being about 25% short of their T/O strength.

Nothing unusual happened until mid-May. The Communists then undertook a general offensive against the line Mukden - Kaiyuan - Szepinghai - Changchun, all of which cities were held by the Kuomintang. Six newly trained and equipped Communist divisions appeared having completed combat training in the school area near Kiamusze in northeast Manchuria close to the Russian border.

Heavy fighting developed. The Communists easily gained the intervals between the garrison key points but, as this account closes, they had captured

only Kaiyuan with a partial success at Szepinghai. The Kuomintang supported its troops by dropping supplies and reinforcements by air, but they have been unable to drive off the Communists. The surrounding country is passing quickly to Communist control, partly due to dissatisfaction with the Kuomintang and partly due to its appearing that the Kuomintang is not winning.

The Communists are completely destroying the railroad. Reconnaissance in June by American observers from low flying planes showed that the rails have been removed and ties piled and burned. Telegraph poles have been cut down and also burned. All bridges are down. It will take a long time to reopen this road.

Following the withdrawal of the U. S. Marines, Communist troops have interrupted the railroad between Peiping and Tientsin and from Tientsin to Mukden.

General result is that the Communists have made large gains of territory.

Sinkiang. On 7 June an armored force of Outer Mongolian troops, with attached planes, made a raid northeast of Kuchengtze (or Kitai). Mission of the raid has not been ascertained. Uranium deposits have been reported in the area. It is possible but not known that the raid was a reconnaissance to determine the facts about that.

More important is the fact that Outer Mongolia has armored troops and an air force. Since the raid Russia has announced that she trained and equipped these Mongolians. It will be remembered that in 1945 there were two Mongolian divisions, with much armor and motorized equipment, that were used by Russia against Manchukuo. They seemed to have been efficient. These Mongolians may later be an important factor.

Railroads in China. As this report closes the total length of Kuomintang operated lines is reported as about 6,250 miles including non-combat areas. This is nearly 1,000 miles less than was operated when the extermination campaign was launched three months earlier.



BOOK REVIEWS

Contemporary Americana

INSIDE U. S.A. By John Gunther. 946 pp. Index. Harper Bros. \$5.00.

John Gunther deserves a large measure of praise for the courage he has displayed in undertaking so gargantuan a task as writing *Inside U. S.A.* He faced all the usual difficulties confronting any author plus the big time and space factor which must have been a continuing nightmare right up to publication. The footnotes attest to the impossibility of getting such a work published before some of the subject matter became outdated. However, the antedated portions detract little from the overall excellence of the product.

Inside U. S. A. is a unique experience in Americana that should not be missed. Few books have been as widely discussed. It has been praised and damned to the high heavens, but the fact remains that everyone is reading it.

In brief, *Inside U. S. A.* is a vivid portrait of the United States as it is today. A picture not only of the physical layout of the various sections of the country but an insight into their development, their mores, politics and the people who run them. The book is written not only for the benefit of Americans but also to give a contemporary picture of our country for the better understanding of it by foreigners. It is narrative; it is descriptive; it is analytical; it is interpretive. Not only is it a fount of information, it makes exceptionally good reading.

Mr. Gunther analyzes the U. S. A. state by state, starting with California, moving across the country and back, ending with Arizona. In each locality he based his quest for information on three or four general questions, reiterating them to every likely source of

information that he could collar. "Who runs this community?" "What makes this state distinctive?" "What does your community contribute to the country as a whole?" Mr. Gunther admits to astonishment at the luxuriant variety of the answers. "An enormous number of things run this country! No single person, principle, ideal, commodity, abstraction, or vested interest runs it." A man from Mars would find the country enormously conglomerate and interlocked, says Mr. Gunther.

The author's keen interest in politics is everywhere evident in this book. This is

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by no means unnatural to a man who has spent his entire adult life as a reporter, author and world-traveler. In many respects the overtones of political interest are a tremendous boon to the work. For what explains the American way of life better than our political ideals and beliefs? His love of politics also contributes many outstanding individual portraits throughout the book. Such national figures as Taft, Vandenberg, Dewey, Stassen and Arnall receive attention but the sketches of lesser known local leaders and political machines are the most interesting and informative.

Since very few of us know the country as well as Mr. Gunther, we are apt to measure the quality of the book by the treatment accorded the areas with which

we are familiar. In many ways this is not entirely fair to the author of such a tremendous volume, as the book is not entirely without error. However, the errors which this reviewer uncovered were definitely minor and detracted not a whit from the worth of the book. There are many who will find distasteful the frank discussion of persons and places dear to them. But I doubt if any serious denial can be made of Mr. Gunther's allegations. RFC

The Viscount of Alamein

MONTGOMERY. A Biography. By Alan Moorehead. 255 pp. Coward-McCann, Inc. Illustrated. \$4.00.

By Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley, USA, Ret.

Surprisingly, this book is, according to the author, the first attempt to tell the full story of Field-Marshal Montgomery's life. It is a book that can be recommended to the thousands of Americans who had some contact with him ("Now you have seen me and I have seen you."). Many of them found him hard to understand. This book with its dispassionate and penetrating examination of his, at times, tragic life will give them some enlightening background for a clearer picture of this unusual soldier.

Alan Moorehead is an Australian correspondent whose book on the European campaign, *Eclipse*, has been well received in both England and America. The first three paragraphs of his present book indicate how directly he faces the problems of Montgomery's character and characteristics:

"When Montgomery went down to the War Office in London in June 1946 to become Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he was just on fifty-nine years of age, and still one of the most-controversial figures in England.

"For many hundreds of thousands of soldiers and millions of their relatives the war time glory persisted. He was still 'Monty,' the dynamic little man in the black beret, still the hero of the proven legend of invincibility. They believed that he had succeeded as no other British soldier since Wellington, and that he had brought something else to his work besides—a plain devotion, an inspiration and a talent which sealed him up in history along with the very greatest leaders.

"But to others Montgomery was no such hero. He was a Judge Jeffreys in the Army, a harsh, narrow and ruthless man, much overpuffed with personal publicity. True, they argued, he had had a remarkable run of victories in the war; but he had had extraordinary luck as well. Always there had been behind him more capable men who managed the real brain work while he harvested the glory on the battlefield. Greatness had been thrust upon him. And had he not been over-cautious in his campaigns? Too slow, too quarrelsome, too contemptuous of advice?"

(Mr. Moorehead simply says, "Alexander had already been appointed Governor General of Canada.") Montgomery's own book *Normandy to the Baltic* may help to answer some of these questions when it becomes available to the general public, and there are several other military histories of the Western European campaign in preparation. They will all be better understood against the background of Mr. Moorehead's biographical picture.

No Plots, Heroes or Villains

DARK DECEMBER. By Robert E. Merriam. 234 pages, maps and charts. Ziff-Davis. \$3.00

"Time and space" factors enter constantly into the life of an editor, and this short review (substituted at deadline time for another) should not be taken as a measure of my personal estimate of the quality of *Dark December*; a better indicator is the fact that it heads the military list in the neighboring *Current and Choice* column.

Merriam's product — the result of careful analysis of a mass of reports and

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There are, of course, many reasons why Mr. Moorehead has not been able to come up with a definitive answer to what manner of man Montgomery really is. Not enough time has elapsed since the end of the war; the Field-Marshal's career is still continuing, and he is in a position that precludes some of his subordinates from airing their views, whether favorable or unfavorable; and finally this is a "popular" biography, not a documented and complete record. But within these limitations, the author has done a remarkable job—far above, it might be added, some of the recent biographies of America's top military and naval men.

The professional military reader will have some unanswered questions "outside of the personal business of biography" (to quote a phrase of the author's) when he finishes this book. Was Montgomery primarily responsible for the successful outcome of the Battle of the Bulge, or only partly responsible? Could he have crossed the Rhine earlier? Was he a second choice to Alexander as Chief of the Imperial General Staff?

data as well as personal interviews with virtually all of the responsible commanders, both German and Allied — sets down, in layman language and for the first time, the component elements of the great Battle of the Bulge in their proper relative perspective. He spares no feelings, particularly in his treatment of our Intelligence, but he makes no effort to build up any "plots" or to create any heroes or villains among the commanders. *Dark December* is calm and reflective throughout, and contrasts sharply in tone and intent with the several explosively written and limited viewpoint books on the Bulge that have appeared to confuse the general reader. Most interesting, in this connection, is Merriam's 'Myths of the Ardennes' section of his final chapter, wherein he explodes a good many of the popular misconceptions that have grown up concerning the decisive days of *Dark December*, 1944.

I heartily recommend this book to anyone seeking a solid understanding of what happened in the Bulge, and why.

DA

CURRENT and CHOICE

MILITARY . . .

Dark December By Robert Merriam	\$3.00
Montgomery By Alan Moorehead	\$4.00
Yank: The GI Story of the War By Yank Staff	\$5.00
The Soldiers' Album By DuPuy and Bregstein	\$5.00
The War Reports By Marshall, King and Arnold	\$7.50
The Strange Alliance By John R. Deane	\$3.75
Marshall: Citizen Soldier By William Frye	\$3.75

NON-FICTION . . .


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England's most brilliant
correspondent writes the
life story of England's
most brilliant general



Montgomery

By ALAN MOOREHEAD
Author of "ECLIPSE"

DESPITE Mr. Ingersoll, Montgomery is one of the great generals of the English-speaking world—a leader whom history may rank as the peer of Cromwell, Wellington, Sherman and Lee. Here is the full story of his life: the steady, unsung years that preceded his fame—much as his prodigious artillery barrages opened the way for each dramatic break-through—his rendezvous with destiny in the desert, his sweep across North Africa, his amazing change-over from desert warfare to semiamphibious operations, his desperate toehold at Caen, and his final triumphant drive into the shattered Reich.

Alan Moorehead was with Montgomery all the way from Egypt to the Elbe. His eye-witness reports of Monty's battles are unequalled. And his extraordinary perception of human motives, his superb gifts of analysis and interpretation make this study of England's most remarkable general as fascinating as it is authoritative.

"No better choice of a biographer could have been made . . . Alan Moorehead tells this story superbly well, with as marked an ability for biography as Montgomery had for winning battles."—

J. B. Priestley.

\$4.00

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Neglected History

THE AIR WEAPON, by John R. Cuneo.
Bibliography. Index. 75 Maps.
Military Service Co. \$5.00.

By Col. Don Z. Zimmerman, AC

There has been far too much bias, conjecture and emotion injected into the writing, talking and thinking about the past performance of military aviation. To anyone interested in an objective review of the part played by air forces during World War I up to 1917, *The Air Weapon* offers an interesting, thorough and scholarly treatment. The author presents the facts and often aids them in telling their own story by showing how they have been unknown, intentionally omitted, ignored or abused by aerophiles, air detractors or just plain historians.

How many people know that the German declaration of war on France gives a series of reports from an imaginative German population about French air raids that just didn't happen? Many such incidents are brought out in bold relief.

From 292 references, selected from an existing mass of data, emphasis has been

the book such as Boelcke's rules for fighter pilots, or Maurice Baring's comment on a conversation with the Chief of Italian Army aviation: "He said one thing that stuck in my mind, and which made me laugh a good deal internally, although I kept an absolutely grave countenance. He said: 'What I am going to say to you will be absolutely unintelligible and unthinkable to you as Englishmen, but I regret to say here, in Italy, it is a fact that there exists . . . a certain, occasional shall I say, friction between the military and naval branches of our flying service.' We murmured 'Impossible.' The single term "Aerial Reconnaissance" carries more than a full page of references in the finely printed Index.

The Air Weapon 1914-1916 is the second volume of the five volume Winged Mars series. The first volume *The German Air Weapon, 1870-1914* was published in 1942. Plans call for the third volume to complete the histories of the German, French and English air forces up to the eve of World War II, and the final volume to be or that war. The author says "This series is primarily

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placed on those events which have been critical in determining concepts. Yet the whole military picture of the time of the event is sufficiently drawn to allow the air situation to appear in its proper perspective. The corresponding air action is woven into the fabric in such a manner that you may find yourself peering through the mist from a Zeppelin trying to see the British Battle Fleet off Jutland. With the facts before him, the reader has an opportunity to judge military decisions made at all levels from the government down to an individual doing the fighting.

The three parts—"Tactical Air Operations Over Land," "Tactical Air Operations at Sea," and "Strategic Air Operations" (over land and/or sea), cover 368 pages and fit current U. S. terminology in its division of types of air actions. The following 110 pages are devoted to "Notes" which seem threatening by their very bulk but omission of them would lose some of the most enlightening and pungent parts of

an attempt to ascertain the true role of the air weapon in warfare . . . the basic tactics and strategy of the air operations of World War II can be found in the *neglected history* of World War I." These matters concern every American, particularly personnel of the Armed Services and especially the airmen.

Thoughts of the future can only come from existing knowledge.

Snow on Russia

STALIN MUST HAVE PEACE By Edgar Snow. 184 pp. Random House. \$2.50.
By Col. John E. Coleman, FA-Res.

A few months ago Mr. Snow, whose Russian residence has been much longer than that of most writers, publisher several articles in the *Saturday Evening Post*. Expanded, they form the first three chapters of this book. To then he has added a section suggesting a concrete program for peace. Martin Sommers, Foreign Editor of the *Post*, has contributed an introduction which is in some respects the most important part of the volume.

Mr. Snow does an excellent job in his first chapter in detailing some of the reasons *Why We Don't Understand the Russians*. Mere lingual differences are rather unimportant, for example. What does matter, however, is the different meaning conveyed by the same words to us, with our heritage of Anglo-Saxon liberties, and to the Russians, who are accustomed to a high degree of Marxist double-talk. Our country's institutions, thoughts, and experience are at such variance that even the simplest and most common words carry amazingly different connotations. With this section there can be little disagreement.

Matters are different, however, when Mr. Snow takes a look at the world, and especially the United States, *As It Looks to Ivan Ivanovitch*. Here there is some valid criticism of the difference between some of our pronouncements and some of our acts, it is true. But entirely too much of the chapter ignores some cold facts. Some of these are that despite her nominal disbanding of the Comintern, Russia never actually ceased working actively for world control and has

which wittingly or unwittingly are serving as Communist-fronts. This is not to say that Mr. Snow has imbibed enough of the anti-democratic brew of the dictators to have intentionally adopted their methods for the purpose of furthering their cause—but the inescapable fact is that we must not allow our thinking to become muddled or confused from any cause.

Mr. Snow's book should be read widely, but equally carefully. Much in it is good, true, and sound. But the chaff must be kept separated from the good grain.

At His Best

THE GENERAL. By C. S. Forester. 263 pp. Little Brown Co. \$2.50.

Thousands of new readers were introduced to the writing of C. S. Forester and his fabulous character, Horatio Hornblower, through the medium of those small, paper-covered books issued to the Armed Forces during the war. As each new shipment arrived overseas, they were hastily scanned for the latest Hornblower adventure and within a very short time their tattered,

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recently officially revived this phase of her activity. Another is that although Russia was one of the anti-Axis Allies, her cooperation with the Western Allies was more akin to a shotgun marriage than the result of a proper understanding and courtship; certainly there was a minimum of the trust and confidence that should exist between equals, and a tremendous difference between the open doors found here by Russian representatives and the cold suspicion our own found in Muscovy.

So many part-truths are found that the informed reader will begin to wonder a bit just what company Mr. Snow prefers to keep. He seems to wobble back and forth, stating some uncontrovertible facts but then swerving off with apparently equal frankness but with strange twists. One result, of course, is that many a reader will believe that all facts and accounts are equally complete and thus swallow the biased or more one-sided statements. This is the same technique currently used by pacifist speakers, with considerable success. And it is the approach of fellow-travelers and groups


well-thumbed appearance gave mute testimony to his popularity.

Exploiting this popularity, the publishers have wisely decided to reissue *The General*, which was written some years before the Hornblower series. Even lacking the colorful life of Hornblower's namesake, Nelson, to draw on, Mr. Forester has proved himself an outstanding spinner of tales. Forester fans will need little encouragement to get this book and read it but it is gratifying to be able to report that they will in no way be disappointed. It is Forester at his best.

Basically, *The General* is the story of the rise of Herbert Curzon from an obscure staff position in the British Army to a Lt.-Generalcy and peerage during the first World War. Actually it is more than just a fictional biography; it is a superb portrait of the old-time, plodding career officer who covered his lack of color with a blind devotion to duty and a hatred of all things foreign to the daily routine of soldiering. It is a picture of the resistance of change and new ideas that

THE GENERAL

By C. S. Forester



CLIFTON FADIMAN says:

"Eleven years ago I read *THE GENERAL*. Since then, Forester has written the now classic Hornblower series. I still consider *THE GENERAL* his finest and most important novel."


KENNETH ROBERTS says:

"It's a great book, devastating in its dead-pan exposure of the sort of soldier that makes armies repellent to so many other soldiers."

\$2.50

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WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

The story of a man who resigned from the white race.



pervaded all armies during that period and for some time later.

We meet Herbert Curzon as a junior officer in the Boer War who, quite by accident, manages to break a stalemate resulting in one of the few British victories of that war. It is true that Curzon gained no lasting fame from the incident but the D. S.O. which he received as a result of it distinguished him a bit from the mass of his contemporaries.

The period from the Boer War to World War I found Curzon pursuing the same routine army life without incident, receiving his promotions in due time and with the usual regularity. Fate took a hand shortly after the outbreak of the first World War and Curzon found himself in command of a regiment. He was not a man to be overcome with his own importance but strived to do his duty to the best of his ability. His rigid self-discipline set an example for his men and his unit was never found lacking in any of the various inspections, manuevers and other training

on the subject of leadership, and the qualities of the good leader, only recently has the problem been recognized for what it basically is, namely a problem in human relations. The only sound approach to the study of such a problem is the psychological approach.

Dr. Kraines, professor of psychiatry at the University of Illinois, has had wide experience in the study of the human mind, particularly in its impact with military life. As psychiatrist in a wartime Replacement Training Center, he devoted his attention to the prevention of nervous disorders in recruits. He was outstandingly successful because he early discovered that preventive psychiatry is largely a matter of good leadership, especially at the lower levels. Leadership must come from the top, of course, but unless it gets all the way to the bottom it is not successful. The important link in this chain is the platoon commander, whose intimate daily contacts with the recruits make him a tremendous factor in their lives. Upon

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requirements. Vacancies by reasons of death, ineptitude and the fortunes of war brought a Major Generaley to Curzon in a short time and his marriage to nobility did nothing to deter his advancement. His subsequent command of a corps and Knighthood climaxed his fruitful career but throughout his meteoric rise, he remains the same steadfast individual confident in his own mind that the army will be much better off when the civilians are returned to their jobs and the army can return to the spit and polish peacetime days.

It is impossible to capture the lure and finish of Forester's storytelling in such a drab outline of his book. His is a skillful job and one that will provide a good evening's entertainment.

RFC

Down to Fundamentals

MANAGING MEN. By Samuel Henry Kraines, M.D. 194 pages. The A. B. Hirschfield Press. \$1.50.

By Brig. Gen. John M. Devine,* U.S.A.

While much has been said and written

the attitudes of the lieutenants and sergeants depend the attitudes of the recruits and the morale and success of the organization. It is here at this level that leadership must be taught from the proper angle.

True leadership is based on a knowledge and understanding of human nature, and involves patience and tolerance in dealing with the frailties of individuals. Guidance and advice must come before correction and punishment. Most men want to do the right thing and need help in doing it, rather than threats as to what will happen if they do the wrong thing.

Similarly true discipline must come from within, rather than be imposed by force from without. It must be willing, eager and cooperative; it too must be based on knowledge and understanding. Good leadership produces sound discipline; the two are inseparable, and between them constitute seventy-five percent of the military virtues.

Dr. Kraines in this book gets right down to fundamentals and approaches the problem of "Managing Men," which is after all only a matter of leadership and discipline, from the viewpoint

*General Devine commands the UMT Experimental Unit at Fort Knox, Ky.—ED.

of the psychiatrist. He has produced a book which has a message for every officer and non-commissioned officer in the Army. He defines leadership and discipline in terms which are familiar to most old soldiers, but have been forgotten or never learned by many of the new.

Should Universal Military Training become the law of the land, this book should be the subject of a series of Information and Education periods for all troops, even as the book itself makes an implicit but constant plea for an improved Information and Education program in order to produce the genuine understanding soldier.

High Adventure

JOURNEY TO THE END OF AN ERA.

By Melvin Hall. 426 pp. Index.

Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.75.

By Col. John E. Coleman, FA-Res.

If you're surfeited by war books and comes on the discouraging current events of today, if you want high adventure that is more than mere fiction, if you're curious about the world's back-areas before they were changed by

were to him. Here is good entertainment, with at least a dash of nostalgia.


Intelligence Treatise

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN SECRET INTELLIGENCE. By Dr. George S. Pettee. 120 pp. Infantry Journal Press. \$2.00.

By Col. Percy G. Black, Rtd.

Dr. Pettee's book, *The Future of Secret Intelligence*, is a valuable contribution to the study of the intelligence problem. The name is misleading. The book does not deal with secret intelligence. It is a scholarly treatise on strategic intelligence. It is the result of an urge on the part of the author to put on paper his conclusions derived from his service with the FEA during the war. Where Dr. Pettee draws on his own experience the book is excellent.

In order to illustrate the need for a sound intelligence doctrine and a working intelligence organization, Dr. Pettee commences by citing examples of the failures of American intelligence during the war. He then proceeds to show the immense task of research which was required to process the ever



NOW You Can Own
this history-making work to
which Time Magazine recently
devoted eleven columns—

A STUDY OF HISTORY

By Arnold J. Toynbee

You have heard for years of Arnold J. Toynbee's A STUDY OF HISTORY and you have probably hoped to read it . . . only to find that it was all but unobtainable. Now, at last, in D. C. Somervell's brilliant one-volume abridgement, you can discover for yourself "the most monumental analysis of civilizations ever attempted by a single man."

"If (you) have time for only one book during this year—and the next and the next — Somervell's abridgement of Toynbee's *A Study of History* should be that book."—Edward D. Myers, *The Nation*.

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macadam roads—then this is the book for you! Mr. Hall has led a life that itself is high adventure. He has a zest for living that is infectious. And he had a keen eye for color and detail while wandering over this globe of ours.

It all started—his wide roaming, that is—when he was only twelve; in 1902 he motored through France, Germany, and the low countries with his family. Other trips followed, the more important being a circumnavigation of the world almost entirely by automobile in 1911, and a most interesting trip around the Baltic just before World War I. In that war he served with French and British forces and in the fledgling Air Service of our Signal Corps, then went with the Iranian government as a financial advisor; in the course of several years he lived in most parts of that remote country.

Mr. Hall has been extremely fortunate throughout his life. But he has had the resourcefulness, and the stamina, to take advantage of the opportunities he has had. And he has the knack of making his experiences as vivid to the reader as they

increasing volume of raw information into finished intelligence which resulted from new scientific developments in the field of collection and the demands of the new strategy of air power. This is by far the most valuable point of the book. It exposes the very heart of the intelligence problem, the creation of an organization capable of absorbing the vast quantity of information available and required in the conduct of a total war. In his discussion of the organization and problems of strategic intelligence, Dr. Pettee touches on the contribution which can be made, not only by the exact sciences, but by the social sciences as well.

Dr. Pettee's conclusions are sound and his recommendations well thought out. His book is not a textbook for an amateur, but for those who have not had an opportunity to see at first hand the magnitude of the intelligence task, the book will be revealing. For those who have worked in the field of strategic intelligence, it gives much food for thought.

YANK

*The GI Story of
the War*



**WRITTEN BY THE STAFF OF
YANK, THE ARMY WEEKLY**

Here is the extraordinary and enduring record of what American arms did to achieve the victory. Told in powerful, direct, human language—with action photographs, drawings, cartoons—this is history as only soldiers could write it. It is not a story of grand strategy or command decisions but the individual soldier's story of the war written from the foxhole level. This is the perfect gift for the veteran of World War II.

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Medical History

THE RANKS OF DEATH. By Colonel P. M. Ashburn, MC. 298 pages. Notes and index. Coward-McCann. \$5.00.

By Richard Cordon McCloskey

There are two major influences on American civilization that I have long considered neglected: the rifle and medicine. I have recently been reading a manuscript that for the first time gives credit to the powerful influence of the rifle, and now comes this discerning book on the medical history of the conquest of America.

America was in truth a new world when the Europeans landed. It was a huge, isolated land mass inhabited by one great race. "To it came two other races" (the white and the black). "The three collided, mixed, struggled; with their religions, their weapons, their cultures, and, most of all, with their diseases. Disease very nearly defeated the white man to begin with . . . The red man . . . fell before the silent menace of microscopic forms of life which he could not see and did not know existed. . . The black man . . . brought new and

emerged a set of extremely important social documents, mostly quite brief, covering a cross-section of backgrounds, educations, wartime ranks, and service.

Fifty-three authors are here represented. They came from all over the country, from cities and farms, from grade schools and colleges; they served with all branches of the armed forces, and in all capacities. Together they give a picture of America, of war, and of Americans in war that is truly enlightening, and at some points startling. I thoroughly recommend it to every officer.

Navy Field Manual

FUNDAMENTALS OF NAVAL WARFARE. By Lee J. Levert. 488 pages. Illustrations, index. Macmillan. \$5.00.

By Richard Gordon McCloskey

Brodie's *Guide to Naval Strategy* is such an excellent book that I admit I approached this one with a disinclination to like it. But I found it good enough to overcome my negative feeling. If it had been written in anything but dreary

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even more terrible disease with him as a kind of judgment."

This is an absorbing and fascinating account of how disease and medicine have helped shape the course of American history. It is scholarly, well-written, and excellently documented. Colonel Ashburn's reputation guarantees the facts, so for me this book becomes one of the standard histories of the United States.

Veterans Report

THE PURPLE TESTAMENT. Edited by Don M. Wolfe; preface by John Dos Passos. 299 pp. Biographical notes. Doubleday & Co. \$2.50.

By Col. John E. Coleman, FA-Res.

A year and a half ago Mr. Wolfe instructed at American University a group who were training to become National Service Officers to aid their fellow veterans. Their work included the writing of many of their experiences before and after but mostly during the war. Thoughts, emotions, reactions—honest reporting, in short—were of much greater importance than mere literary style. Consequently there

naval "gobbledegook" I would recommend it without hesitation. It is written as poorly as some of the worst field manuals, but the facts are there—and if you want them, you can dig them out.

Commander Levert's book on the principles, methods and materiel of naval warfare is comprehensive and particularly well organized. The first section summarizes the history of naval warfare, the development of its weapons, and discusses most of the major naval battles from Salamis in 480 B.C. to Surigao Strait in 1944. The next section discusses naval weapons, short installations, harbor defense, and naval vessels. Another part discusses engineering, communications and control (which Brodie does not cover). Types of naval warfare and naval staff problems lead up to his final chapter on "The Future." Up to this chapter Levert pretty consistently sticks to standard naval doctrine; but in this one he sticks his neck out, and defends it stoutly. He foresees the twilight of the

(Continued on page 270)

WRITING YOU'RE READING

By Major Robert F. Cocklin

Few Americans lived through World War II without becoming familiar with the writing of Ernie Pyle. Certainly the service men and women and their families grew to know and love him for his homey reporting of the war, which provided an inimitable family link with the battlefield. Ernie was both pleased and surprised at the popular reception given his wartime writings but earnestly felt that they were not his best work. He regarded the fruits of a five-year, pre-war, roving assignment as his best efforts. These articles have recently been compiled into one volume entitled *Home Country* (\$3.75) and the result gives weight to Ernie's contention. With no more equipment than a battered portable typewriter and an equally decrepit Ford, Ernie took a five-year jaunt through America, its territories, and even some of its neighboring countries. During the trip he talked to all kinds of people, visited all sorts of remote places, and in general just got well acquainted with the land. *Home Country* is an aggregation of his observations and experiences on the tour. The unique style of Ernie Pyle's writing needs no superlative description. It has made him one of America's best loved literary figures.

* * * * *

The Story of Mrs. Murphy (\$3.00) by Natalie Anderson Scott is another unpleasant story of human weakness. Its present invasion into the best-seller lists gives evidence that the public still clamors for tales of mental sickness. Concerning the life of an alcoholic, *The Story of Mrs. Murphy* immediately argues comparison with *The Lost Weekend*. However, this book delves deeper into the effects of debauchery on the principal's family, fiancée and friends. This is *not* just another alcoholic novel but is a powerfully moving story that stimulates a morbid enchantment not readily dispelled. It will be popular but not pleasurable.

* * * * *

Although the case for Hawaiian statehood has not received widespread attention in the national press, heavy pressure is being brought against Congress to give this matter early attention. This situation makes for excellent timing in the publication of *Hawaii, the 49th State* (\$2.50). Written by Blake Clark of the faculty of the University of Hawaii, the book is a comprehensive history of the Hawaiian Territory. It tells the colorful story of the islands from the early days of the explorers and whaling ships to the modern

cities and agricultural estates of the present day. Military readers will be particularly interested in that portion of the book devoted to a discussion of the long-term martial law under which the islands labored during the war years. The much-publicized controversy between the military and civilian authorities is given ample coverage and in more detail than given by the press. Not only a highly informative history, Hawaii: the 49th State is also a thoroughly intriguing story.

* * * * *

The Big Sky (\$3.50) by A. B. Guthrie, Jr., ranks high on the list of the season's best novels. A blunt, adventurous story of the early development of the Indian country, the book takes a pleasantly refreshing tack away from the usual run of historical novels. Mr. Guthrie's familiarity with the background territory is very much in evidence and his characterizations are superb. Actually it would be more correct to use the word characterization in the singular form, as all other members of the cast are sublimated in the presence of Boone Caudill, the principal of the piece. Briefly *The Big Sky* is the story of a young Kentucky mountaineer who has to leave home after a fracas in which he brains his father with a stick of wood. Striking out for the mountain country to the west, Boone subsequently becomes a trapper and guide. His "hair-raising" experiences include marrying an Indian squaw, Indian attacks, being trapped in a blizzard, killing his best friend; to name just a few. Extremely well-written, *The Big Sky* provides a large measure of entertaining reading for those who like their stories rough and tough.

* * * * *

Though murder mysteries hold very little allure for this reviewer, I found myself irrepressibly attracted by the title of *The San Francisco Murders* (\$3.00) edited by Joseph Henry Jackson of the title-town's *Chronicle*. My waywardness proved fortunate, as this volume contains the best series of celebrated murder cases that I have ever read. The early, roisterous life of San Francisco was naturally conducive to assorted mayhem and the writers of this book combed the files and have come up with a set of true murder stories that are far more entertaining than the great majority of fictional crimes. *The San Francisco Murders* will appeal to many nor normally addicted to a regular diet of murder before bedtime.

* * * * *

Photography fans will be entranced with the newly-published *Darkroom Handbook* (\$2.50) written by Katherine Chamberlin.



A superb new story of action and romance by the author who gave you THE BLACK ROSE . . .

■ Charles VII was king . . . The French courtiers were adroit conspirators, but the real power behind the throne was the king's mistress. Agnes Sorel. Into this tapestry of royal splendor came a new figure — Jacques Coeur, financial wizard, a commoner who rose to be the king's Moneyman, and whose life reached a climax in one of history's most dramatic murder trials. But not before he had carried on the work begun by Jeanne d'Arc, as his despised "bombards" succeeded in a single campaign against Rouen where a century of knighthood had failed in driving the English bowmen from the territory of France. "A story of rich romance, of high in trigue."—*Book of the Month Club News*.

THE Moneyman

by THOMAS
B. COSTAIN

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The ARMY WIFE

**What She Ought to Know About
the Customs of the Service and
Managing an Army Household**

By **NANCY SHEA**



THE way the wife of an Army officer meets the expectations of the Service affects not only her own happiness, but also considerably influences her husband's career. This readable and informative picture of Army life from the woman's viewpoint shows what she may expect from the Service and what the Service expects of her.

"Not merely a handbook on etiquette, but a warmhearted discussion of the problems faced. Authoritative, human, the only one of its kind in existence."—*Army Times*.

"An accurate picture of Army life and a valuable guide for the uninitiated Army woman to follow." — Elizabeth A. Helmick (wife of Maj. Gen. Eli A. Helmick, Ret.).

"At last, the book we have all been waiting for, for so many years! It covers the problems of Army life from every angle." — Eleanor P. Arnold (wife of General of the Army H. H. Arnold).

\$2.50

aircraft carrier, the emergence of the submarine as possibly the dominant unit of future navies, and proposes a new type of vessel: the battle-carrier. This is a 55,000-ton battleship combined with a 45,000-ton aircraft carrier. His reasons for this vessel are interesting and logical. Whether they are practical, time will probably tell.

A thorough review of this interesting and useful book would require more space than I have. I can strongly recommend it as solid in fact and stimulating in conjecture.

A Day That Will Live in Infamy

PEARL HARBOR. By *George Morganstern. Devin-Adair Co. 330 pp. plus 83 pp. in Appendix and an Index. \$3.00.*

By Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Rtd.

The battle of Pearl Harbor is described in this book—briefly but correctly. But the Pearl Harbor story is just a base for a discussion of how the United States became involved in the war, and who was responsible for failure to anticipate the Japanese attack. The author seeks to prove that the Administration provoked Japan to war, was expecting an attack,

at Hawaii, nor the Administration so interpreted the intelligence available.

What happened was that there was positive evidence that a Japanese invasion fleet had assembled in the first week of December off south Indo-China. This was interpreted as indicating an intent to invade Thailand or Malaya or the Philippines. Thailand was considered as the most likely enemy objective as through that country the Burma Road might be reached. As that wasn't certainly known, reconnaissance by our naval forces was ordered to determine which way the enemy would go. It was also foreseen that Hong Kong might be attacked by ground troops of the enemy already in China. There was no information about other Japanese invasion forces in Formosa, none about any Japanese fleet en route towards Hawaii. That Japan could attack Thailand and Malaya and the Philippines and Hong Kong at the same time, and simultaneously engage in another major operation against Hawaii nobody foresaw.

Certainly all of this was a gross

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should have foreseen that this would first be on Hawaii, and failed to issue appropriate orders.

The account presented to readers is unusually complete and is well supported by references. It would have greater weight had the author not assumed in the opening chapters that the Administration was to blame for the disaster, which was the very thing he was seeking to prove. Yet the proof submitted in following chapters does seem to make it clear that Washington knew that war was coming, but chose to accept it rather than relent on loosening the economic penalties imposed upon Japan which were slowly strangling her.

The charge that the Administration knew (or should have known) in time to have so advised local commanders that the initial enemy attack would be at Pearl Harbor on 7 December is not convincing. Certainly there was evidence to that effect. Yet neither the War Department nor the Navy Department, nor the local commanders

underestimate of the enemy's strength, but evidence is entirely lacking that it was intentional.

Mr. Morgenstern is right in stating that if sufficient weight had been given (and of course it should have been) to evidence as to Japanese intentions regarding Hawaii, the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been foreseen. There was unjustifiable delay in forwarding to Hawaii information available through the interception of Japanese messages during the night 6/7 December. Instead of telephoning it at once, it was sent only after considerable delay, and then by telegraph, with the result that it arrived hours too late. Here again there is an absence of evidence that this delay was intentional.

ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

(If not listed, unsigned illustration are from authors, by the Journal staff, or from special sources. References are to pages.)

Marine Corps: Cover.

Signal Corps: Frontispiece, 237

Reserve Officers Ass'n: 221

Now that school's out, do you yearn for your children far away in camp, or are they a bit too evident underfoot? Either condition can be bettered by the gift of a good book from you to add to their summer's pleasure. Approved book lists of old favorites are available in public libraries, so our greatest service to you is to take on where they leave off. Hence our choice of the *best* of the *newest* books on the market. Since our list was compiled, the New York Herald Tribune made public its Children's Spring Book Festival awards. Those winning first prizes in the primary, intermediate and senior classes are marked with two asterisks. Those on their "honor" list have one asterisk before the titles. Having read most of these from cover to cover, we're tempted to toss ***** all over the place. Mindful of the Journal's dignity, we'll restrain ourselves and let you do it. ***** S. L. A.



Suggested Summer Reading for Children

<i>Grade</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Author</i>	<i>Price</i>	<i>Grade</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Author</i>	<i>Price</i>
1	The Golden Egg Book	M. W. Brown	\$1.00	*3-6	The End of Long John Silver	David W. Moore	2.00
1	The White Bunny and His Magic Nose	Lily Duplaix	1.00	3-7	High Stepper	Helen Orr Watson	2.00
1	The Elegant Elephant	} Russell McCracken "Slottie" toy included in each (each)	1.00	3-7	The Flying House	R. and L. Carroll	2.00
1	The Mystery of Carmen the Cow			3-7	The Heavenly Tenants	Wm. Maxwell	2.00
1	The Gentle Giraffe			3-7	The Owen Boys	Hazel Wilson	2.00
1	Timothy Turtle	Al Graham	2.00	3-7	Little Brother of the Wilderness (Johnny Appleseed)	Meridel LeSeut	2.50
1	*The Bad Little Duckhunter	M. W. Brown	1.50	3-7	*The Secret of the Porcelain Fish	Margery Everden	2.25
1	Sing Sang Sung and Willie	Peggy Gulick	1.50	4-6	Freddy, the Pied Piper	Walter Brooks	2.00
1	Freddie The Owl	Guy Audros	1.00	4-7	The Visiting Jimpsons	Irmengarde Eberle	2.00
1-2	*Wee Willow Whistle	Kay Avery	1.50	4-9	**The Twenty-One Balloons	Wm. Pene duBois	2.50
1-2	The Rooster Crows	Maude and Miska Petersham	2.00	5-up	America's Stamps	The Petershams	3.50
1-3	Too Many Kittens	Helen Hoke	2.00	5-up	*The Little White Horse	Elizabeth Goudge	2.50
1-3	**Oley the Sea Monster (see cut)	Marie Hall	1.50	5-8	Tales of Momoluu	Lorenz Graham	2.50
1-3	Anywhere in the World	Irma E. Webber	1.50	6-9	The Lion's Paw	Rob White	2.00
1-3	Who Am I?	Lily S. Sacrinen	1.50	6-10	Jonathan Goes West	Stephen Meader	2.25
1-3	Country Boy	Margaret W. Buck	1.50	7-10	*The Rain Forest	Armstrong Spetry	2.50
1-3	Hercules, the Gentle Giant	Nina Schneider	2.00	7-10	Wild Animals of the Five Rivers Country	George C. Franklin	2.50
1-3	Captain Dow and the Hole in the Doughnut	R. and L. Carroll	1.00	7-10	The Feathered Cape	Hal Goodwin	2.00
1-3	The Man in the Manhole	J. Sage and B. Ballentine	1.50	7-10	*The Sugar Bush	Dorothea Dana	2.50
1-3	*Taffy and Joe	E. and L. Burton	2.00	7-10	*Secret Passage (see cut)	Betty Cavanna	2.00
2-5	*Dot for Short	Frieda Friedman	2.00	7-10	Northward to Albion	Rosemary Sprague	2.50
2-5	Jasper, The Drummin' Boy	Margaret Taylor	1.50	7-10	Your Manners Are Showing	Betty Betz	2.00
2-5	The Silver Robin	Dean Marshall	2.50	7-12	The Big Silver Bowl	Philip Harkins	2.00
2-5	Famous Myths of the Golden Age	B. Alexander	1.00	8-12	Pirate Lair	Leon Dean	2.00
2-5	The Middle Sister	Miriam Mason	1.75	8-12	The Kid Comes Back	John Tunis	2.00
2-5	The Golden Bowl	Edith Heal	1.50	8-12	Pat: Story of a Seeing-Eye Dog	Col. S. P. Meek	2.50
2-7	The Cowtail Switch	H. Cowlander and George Herzog	2.00	8-12	Modern Wonder Book of Ships	Norman Carlisle	2.50
3-6	**Pancakes-Paris	Claire H. Bishop	2.00	8-12	Modern Wonder Book of Trains and Railroadng	Norman Carlisle	2.50
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3-6	Windy Foot at the County Fair	Frances Frost	2.00	8-12	*Discovering Design	Marion Downer	3.00
3-6	Benjamin West and His Cat Grimalkin	M. Henry and W. Dennis	2.50	8-12	*North Star Shining	Hildegard Swift	2.50
3-6	Adventures of Arab	Louis Slobodkin	2.50	9-12	Hawaii's Queen Liliuokalani	A. Stone	2.50
3-6	Plum Daffy Adventure	E. Coatsworth	2.25	9-12	*Willow Hill	Phyllis Whitney	2.50
				9-12	Green Grass of Wyoming	Mary O'Hara	2.75

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


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THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

has the revolutionary

NEW INDOOR TARGET GUN




Developed by
MELVIN M. JOHNSON, Jr.
 (famous military arms inventor,
 President, Johnson Automotics)

Here is the first indoor target gun ever made that is actually accurate enough for *serious* indoor shooting. *Not* an air rifle, *not* a firearm, it is virtually as accurate as a fine rifle at ranges up to 30 feet. Yet so safe that the pellet will not break the skin if you hold your hand in front of the muzzle.

Real rifle quality in looks, too—as well as performance. Adjustable front

and rear sights (for windage and elevation)—all metal parts of fine blued steel—rugged stock of highly polished plastic.

Packaged with a complete home shooting gallery, too. Every package includes a novel indoor target range—65 rounds of re-usable Johnson Micro-Match Precision Pellets — extra propulsion unit—shot-saver backstop. **\$15.00**



Rear Peep Sight—military-target-shooting type—adjusts for elevation. Front sight adjusts for windage. Actual conditions of target rifle shooting are reproduced.



Ordinary B-B shot (new, never used)




Johnson Micro-Match pellets (re-used many times) Another reason for the Johnson Indoor Target Gun's superb accuracy. Johnson Micro-Match Pellets are actual steel ball bearings—no flaws to cause "flyers". 65 with each gun.

FINE RIFLE ACCURACY —

ideal for serious target competition



5-shot group at 25 feet. ¼ inch spread. Corresponds to a 3 inch group at 100 yards. Here is true rifle accuracy right in your own home.



10-shot group at 25 feet. ½ inch spread. All firing by one operator, using sights, firing from bench rest, with elbow and forearm support.



40-shot group at 25 feet. Vertical spread: ½ inch. Horizontal: 9/16 inch. Here's *proof* this new gun gives you serious, indoor target practice.

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