FacebookDepartment of Education
Graduate Research Management Office
Research Papers
Academic Year 2011
The Faults of the Generals: How Great Britain Lost the War for America
by Kristoffer R. Barriteau MAJ, USA; David W. Gunther MAJ, USA; Clifton J. Lopez MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
By 1778, the world’s most powerful Empire had failed, for almost four years, to decisively end an internal rebellion in its North American colonies. This failure resulted in the escalation to a world war and the British submitting to defeat in 1783. What is of interest is not the international community’s impact on the outcome of the American Revolution, rather how the British military continually missed the opportunity to end the rebellion in its nascent phase. Therefore, this research will explore the strategic interaction between the British military, the patriots and the American colonists to determine what British military commanders’ decisions contributed to these missed opportunities, and the ultimate loss of their War for America. To illuminate what went wrong, this research will import the McCormick Diamond paradigm to sift through this field of history, framing the strategic decisions, the conditions under which they were made and their effects on the overall British effort to quell the colonial rebels of North America.
Cooking up Psychological Operations the ingredients of successful PSYOP
by Bret M. Bemis CPT(P), USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been integral to U.S. military operations in times of war and peace. Using radio broadcasts, leaflets, loudspeakers, and other forms of media, the U.S. has directed PSYOP toward influencing the behavior of a target audience (TA), in order to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in support of the accomplishment of national aims and objectives. During war, tactical PSYOP is used to lower enemies‘ will to fight and ultimately lead them to surrender. Academics and practitioners have written a large body of literature over the last seventy years that addresses both successful and unsuccessful PSYOP. There has also been a large body of literature written about communication theory. What the literature fails to do is to address the important linkage between PSYOP and communication theory and how the relationship between the two affects the success or failure of PSYOP. Drawing from communication theory literature, this thesis builds a model for evaluating PSYOP products during the development phase. The thesis then applies this PSYOP model to Psychological Operations during the 1950–1953 Korean War, in an attempt to identify the conditions under which PSYOP products are crafted and deployed successfully.
Governing in a Post-Conflict Society Social Fit
by John D. Bishop MAJ, USA; Michael J. George MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
The growing interconnectedness of nations through globalization, and the threat of international terrorism as a destabilizing force, has increased the international community’s concern for stable governance in the developing world. In an era of globalization, with near instantaneous information flow, and a global court of international opinion, the options for governing a society in a post-conflict environment are limited. History is filled with rebellions, insurgencies, coups, invasions, and occupations, which result in regime change or some sort of postconflict intervention by the international community. In each case, prior to conflict, there was an established order, or form of governance. After conflict a new order, or form of governance, has to emerge. In these societies a preconflict political and social order was disrupted, and a new post-conflict political and social order established. Ideally, the crafting of a new political and social order into effective governance requires the acceptance of the governed. As the United States remains committed to assisting nations with establishing governance and fostering stability, policymakers should consider the social acceptance of a post-conflict government by the people.
Institutional Challenges to Developing Metrics of Success in Irregular Warfare
by John T. Bleigh MAJ, USA; Justin D. Hufnagel MAJ, USA; Curt M. Snider MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
In irregular warfare (IW) conflicts, where winning the support of the population is often key, the United States military historically has demonstrated consistent difficulty in developing metrics that describe the effectiveness of its operations. We identify previously neglected aspects of the problem. More specifically, we argue that the institutional pressures generated by a conflict’s national imperative, when combined with the military’s own bureaucratic characteristics, cause the military organization to focus on inappropriate measurements. This causes it to misinterpret the IW environment and therefore misjudge its operational effectiveness. Thus, the search for useful metrics of success in IW must seek to overcome not only the difficulties inherent to measuring IW, but endemic organizational characteristics of the U.S. military; understanding this heretofore neglected interactive effect is crucial to understanding the nature of the metrics problem in irregular warfare campaigns. We develop our argument and illustrate it using historical cases of U.S. IW campaigns.
Security Force Assistance in Support of Population Centric Irregular Missions
by James C. Brown COL, USA
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University, Medford, MA
Dr. Richard Shultz, Director of the International Security Studies Program at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, in conjunction with the National Strategic Information Center, a Washington based institute, is establishing a working group to ascertain how to best determine the appropriate US Military Forces and capabilities to successfully manage population centric irregular conflicts in the 21st Century. Professor Shultz is working to bring together a core working group of key specialist from within and outside the US government that have an understanding of the military force structure requirements and requisite doctrine, tools, and skills needed to successfully prepare for and conduct population centric operations. The objective of this Research Project is to determine how and the extent to which the US should reshape selected existing military forces and capabilities, as well as develop new ones, for the population centric irregular missions. This group will analyze input from DOD, and leverage input from academia and other US agencies to develop a strong comprehensive recommendation to US Senior Leaders on the military's role in population centric warfare.
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Countering Radicalization: Refocusing Responses to Violent Extremism Within the United States
by Christopher J. Brown MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
The Obama Administration designated the local community as the first line of defense against violent extremist radicalization in the United States. In doing so, they called on communities to utilize existing structures such as community policing and to draw on successful models such as the Department of Justice’s Comprehensive Gang Model. Research to date, however, has not shown how this model should be adjusted at the local level to address the specific mechanics of radicalization within the United States. Insufficient attention has been paid to the specific mechanics of recruitment at the individual level within vulnerable communities at the front end of the radicalization cycle. The purpose of this thesis is to identify strategy options for community policing within Muslim populations to counter radicalization before individuals turn to violent means. Prevention programs need to act in the same way and at the same level as the violent extremist activists within the target population to be successful. In a time of budget cuts and reduced resources these options can allow the community to be a force multiplier in the creation and effectiveness of counter radicalization programs. This paper attempts to provide a strategy and framework upon which to base future counter radicalization efforts.
Twenty-First Century Warfare Will Be Hybrid
by Leslie F. Brown COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
Hybrid warfare will be the dominant form of warfare in the twenty-first century due to the prevalence of hybrid threats that currently exist throughout the world. A combination of conventional and irregular warfighting capabilities, hybrid warfare is the twenty-first century kind of warfare with its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions. It is critical for the Department of Defense to determine the strategic implications of hybrid warfare on the National Military Strategy and the way that the United States military will fight hybrid warfare. The Department of Defense must develop a comprehensive military strategy that will guide the services in their development of doctrine for conducting hybrid warfare. This strategy research project will define hybrid threats, examine the emergence of hybrid warfare, postulate on the reasons why hybrid warfare will be the dominant form of warfare that most sovereigns will apply in the twenty-first century, examine the National Military Strategy for defining hybrid warfare, and analyze Joint and Service hybrid warfare doctrine. Finally, this paper will recommend changes in strategy and doctrine to ensure the US military is prepared to counter this dangerous, growing threat for the next 25 years.
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Influence Operations : Redefining the Indirect Approach
by Edward M. Lopacienski MAJ, USA; William M. Grieshaber MAJ, USA; Bradley M. Carr MAJ, USA; Carson S. Hoke MAJ, USA;
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
Across today’s spectrum of contemporary warfare, the human terrain is routinely recognized as the center of gravity, but disconnects exists between how states or power holders seek to influence target audiences and how insurgents, terrorist groups, and similar nonstate actors fight to seize the population’s cognitive terrain. Insurgents and nonstate actor threats increasingly seek the influence advantage through grassroots processes to subvert populations and establish asymmetric advantages against the United States and other state actors. U.S. policy recognizes the need to influence the behavior, perceptions, and attitudes of foreign audiences through an indirect approach, but its influence methods, in reality, remain tied to Cold War constructs unable to generate the desired effects needed for current/future threats. This thesis examines case studies of insurgent and nonstate actor influence operations to analyze their effects on the perceptions and attitudes of various disparate audiences at a grassroots level. The analysis then identifies methodology, vulnerabilities, and opportunities to engage these asymmetric threats within their own influence safe havens.
Partnering with Nigeria for a Stable Future : The Importance of a Persistent Presence
by Christopher Hall MAJ, USA; James Cossey CW3, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the spread of extremist groups can be curtailed throughout Northern Africa and, more specifically, how to stop Nigeria from becoming another Afghanistan. This thesis will focus on how to engage an African government, specifically Nigeria, in order to help it engage in and develop the population. This thesis will demonstrate that one way to ensure the stability of weak states is to persistently provide security force assistance to the local government prior to the need to establish control over a populace through direct tribal engagement.
A Letter to All Guerrilleros: Unifying the Mindanao Resistance Movement and Unconventional Warfare
by Michael E. Davis MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
United States Special Forces have established a well-deserved reputation as experts in direct action operations to kill or capture high-value targets over the course of the Global War on Terror. In doing so, they have neglected their core mission of unconventional warfare. This monograph uses history, theory, and doctrine to study the successful guerrilla operations conducted in the Philippines against occupying Japanese forces and provides lessons in motivating individuals or groups to join or support guerrilla movements that can be applied to current or future unconventional warfare scenarios to support United States’ operational objectives.
This monograph begins with an overview of theories of cooperation and resistance that describe common factors that motivate and deter people from joining or supporting guerrilla groups. These factors are then compared with successful and unsuccessful attempts to build a resistance movement using case studies taken from the Philippine Islands during World War II. Finally, the historical record is compared to current United States policy and doctrine for unconventional warfare to explain the importance of gaining support for resistance movements and ways in which unconventional warfare can compliment conventional campaigns.
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Cyber Operations: The United States Army's Role
by Eubank Christopher L. COL, USA;
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania
In the twenty-first century, the military added another dimension in which operations will be and should be conducted in order to deal with all the possible threats to national security. Historically, military operations were relegated to land, air, and sea, but in the last ten years, two dimensions that are more non-traditional have been added in order to be examined from a strategic, operational, and tactical perspective. First, space was added; then the cyber arena became the latest dimension opened to military operations. The role of the United States (US) Army will be one that is hard to define and execute and will be scrutinized as it grows. This paper examines the role of the US Army as this new frontier for military operations grows in importance in the future. In examining the role of the US Army, this paper will focus on the challenges of standing up Army Cyber Command through the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) lens and then look at the challenge of operating in this new domain. Finally, a recommendation for ensuring that the US Army executes its mission within the cyber domain satisfactorily while facing the unknown future that includes potential personnel and budget cuts will be made.
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Measuring What Right Looks Like: A System in Developing Metrics for Tactical Level Units
by Daniel A. Fuhr MAJ, USA; Hieu T. Pham MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
Since the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, thousands of U.S. service members have been lost and millions of man-hours spent on patrols, cordon and searches, and killing or capturing high value targets (HVTs). Billions of dollars from Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) have been spent on humanitarian aid projects. Despite this investment, outcomes remain vague.
This thesis devises a system for employment by tactical units to develop metrics that determine outcomes in nation assistance. It begins by defining terms and models useful for metric development in nation assistance: Rational Actor Theory, Dr. McCormick’s Diamond Model, The Logic Model, and Correlation versus Causation. The thesis then uses historical examples of metrics from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Next, data analysis of nation assistance operations is reviewed. Difficulties and shortcomings in these historical examples and methods are highlighted. Finally, the thesis covers the Failed State Index that forms the base of the system that develops metrics that determine outcomes. The Tactical Outcome Assessment, was developed by operationalizing the Failed State Index for use by tactical units. The Tactical Outcome Assessment is the system that tactical units can employ to develop metrics that determine outcomes in nation assistance.
Creating SOF Networks : The Role of NATO SOF as a Testing Ground for SOF Integration
by Michael E. Gates MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Forces (SOF) Headquarters and its predecessor the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) have made significant progress in special operations interoperability during its brief history. Despite the rapid progress, large gaps in communications, doctrine, intelligence sharing, equipment, and structure within NATO SOF units remain. The lessons learned from the past decade of persistent conflict and emergence of advanced communication capabilities offer an unprecedented window to analyze and enhance special operations interoperability within NATO and abroad.
This research analyzes what systems and procedures increase special operations interoperability among coalition special operations forces, interagency, and diplomatic partners to enhance combined operations. The overarching hypothesis proposes that special operations coalitions with high levels of camaraderie, social and technical networking, and the presence of common threats enable enhanced special operations interoperability and effectiveness in combined operations. These dynamics coalesce to produce the accelerants of trust, responsibility, and access that contribute to elevate coalitions from marginal levels of integration to become trusted special operations networks. Enhanced special operations interoperability serves as a catalyst to facilitate communication and effectiveness among military, law enforcement, diplomatic, and interagency partners collaborating against common asymmetric threats.
The United States and Yemen: Coin in the Absence of a Legitimate Government
by Jarrod J. H. Gillam MAJ, USA; James E. Moran MAJ, USAF
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
The problems Yemen faces today seem insurmountable. The geographic divisions widened by imperialism were cemented by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. His heavy-handed suppression of the Houthi rebellion on the border with Saudi Arabia, the Southern secessionist movement, and the Arab Spring protesters delegitimized the regime in the eyes of the Yemeni people. With President Saleh at the helm, water and oil resources were squandered and mismanaged. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has found this volatile, ungoverned environment a welcome area in which to recruit, equip, train, and conduct operations. That their antagonistic narrative continues to find a welcome audience in the tribal areas of Yemen and their securing of safe havens is testament to the failed policies of the Saleh regime.
The United States has focused on eradicating AQAP since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In its counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign against AQAP, the United States has focused almost all its effort in working with the Yemeni government. While enjoying a modicum of success, this success has been limited to the elimination of AQAP operatives through kinetic strikes. Moreover, the gains were tempered by President Saleh, who at times acted in direct opposition to America’s goals of eradicating AQAP. His recent removal will likely do little to counter the array of problems Yemen faces.
In this light, America’s foreign policy toward Yemen and AQAP is inadequate in securing our regional interests and needs to be overhauled. To delineate which COIN practices may work best, an investigation of past COIN campaigns was conducted. Malaya, Nicaragua, and Somalia were chosen to provide the widest possible range of tactics used in fighting an insurgency where the host nation government is illegitimate, and represent both success and failure. These three case studies formed the basis of three courses of action: working with the government, circumventing the government and working directly with the tribes, and assisting in the state failure. While all three courses of action have merit, only the third course of action addresses the root causes oftheproblems in Yemen. For this reason, the only way to eliminate AQAP as a threat to the United States is to work through the Yemeni tribes without the central government acting as a roadblock.
Operational Art and the Clash of Organizational Cultures: Postmortem on Special Operations as a Seventh Warfighting Function
by Jan K. Gleiman LTC, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
As the United States Army stands in the midst of a transitional period, it must determine what type of Army it will be. In doing so, the Army must come to grips with new realities of the strategic context that demand a capability to use “Engagement” as defined in the National Security Strategy and an inculcation of “Operational adaptability” as defined in the Army Capstone Concept. Recently, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) proposed a change to Army doctrine that would have made Special Operations a seventh warfighting function for the Army. The proposal failed to pass and the Army is now taking a much slower approach to changes. This monograph uses this failed proposal as a singular case study, or micro-event that illuminates a macro-phenomenon, that could be preventing the Army from meeting its challenges of engagement and operational adaptability. Using key elements of organization theory as a lens for understanding why the proposal failed, this monograph applies process tracing and argument mapping. It demonstrates that the fragmented organizational sub-culture of SOF may have influenced not only the failure of the proposal, but also continues to prevent the Army from leveraging the institutional strength of the SOF community toward engagement and operational adaptability.
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Finding the Right Indigenous Leader and Force for Counterinsurgency Operations
by David J. Hodges MAJ, USA; Robert E. Lee Rowland MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
In recent decades, insurgents and other nonstate actors with their nontraditional styles of warfare have become significant threats to the U.S. and its allies. Failing to draw lessons from past conflicts has been a root cause of the misguided strategies implemented against insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Combating these insurgencies using a military-heavy strategy has proved to be a drain on both the U.S. economy as well as the military forces that have shared the burden of deployments since the onset of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. As a result, the U.S. should consider alternative strategies for dealing with insurgents that are both more tactically sound and less taxing on the economy and military. Using special operations forces (SOF) to establish local indigenous security forces in under-governed areas is one means of accomplishing this goal. This thesis focuses on the importance of choosing the right indigenous leader and force for U.S. SOF to partner with to defeat insurgents through the establishment of security, governance, and development at the grassroots level. A step-by-step process is described in this thesis that will assist SOF units in choosing the best local indigenous force leader (LIFL) and training him and his force. Also discussed is the importance of maintaining that partnership until the LIFL and his force are capable of operating on their own, and lines of support and communication have been opened with higher levels of the host nation government.
Just War Theory And Its Applicability To Targeted Killing
by Matthew B. Holmes MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
The Central Intelligence Agency is involved in a targeted killing program which the United States Government employs in its war on global terrorism. This program identifies terrorists and those facilitating terrorist activities and initiates lethal strikes against these individuals. These lethal missions are covert operations which must first pass a rigorous legal review and require a Presidential finding in order to be initiated. Although these programs are legal according to the laws of the United States Government there has been debate as to whether these actions are just and ethical. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether Just War Theory legitimizes the use of the Central Intelligence Agency‘s targeted killing program in the Global War on Terrorism. First, this paper identifies the basic tenets of both Just War Theory and covert operations. Second, the paper employs the case study of the targeted killing attack on Abu Ali al-Harithi to determine whether or not targeted killing meets the Just War Theory of jus in bello. The thesis finishes by stating that the Just War Theory legitimizes the use of the targeted killing program and finds it in compliance with the requirements of jus in bello.
Command and Control of Special Operations Aviation: Time for a Change
by Hutmacher Clayton M. COL, USA
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania
Currently, all Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA) forces deployed in support of combat operations are under the operational control of a Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC). The JSOAC Commander commands and controls all airpower in support of the overall Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) mission. This practice is contrary to Army doctrine that stipulates that Army Aviation operates as a maneuver force in the ground commander’s regime, integrated into the combined arms team at the tactical level. The JSOAC is largely a USAF manned and led organization and is a peer to the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), reporting directly to the Theater Special Operations Command Commander. This command and control structure consistently creates friction and animosity between the JSOTF, JSOAC and ARSOA. ARSOA is best employed directly under the JSOTF Commander, rather than under the current construct as a component in the JSOAC as prescribed in USSOCOM Directive 525-8.
Changing the Afghan Cycle of Conflict From the Outside, In
by Aamir Masood Colonel, Pakistan Air Force; Khaldon Al-Rawashdeh Lieutenant Commander, Jordan Army; Marcus S. Hunter MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
This study explores the cyclical nature of conflict in Afghanistan and the elusive condition of stability as coalition forces begin their anticipated drawdown in 2011, and complete transition of security to Afghan forces in 2014. Assuming that the basic societal elements of stability require a balancing of political, economic, and security structures to form a sense of national cohesion, this study seeks to determine if national cohesion is sufficient enough to break the cycle of conflict; and if so, what strategy with neighboring countries will foster this cohesion in order to disrupt the cycle of conflict? A regional approach is necessary to buttress any internal strategies attempted within Afghanistan; but to do so, the alliance of partner nations must first begin small and then grow from a strong central core. The core players in the region are Iran, India, and Pakistan, but the nature of their self-interested interactions has proven unprofitable and unsustainable in the long-term. To the degree that these countries can be assisted to move beyond their pursuance of self-interests, to form a cooperative regional alliance, then the goal of regional stability, as well as stability in Afghanistan, can become a reality.
How Vulnerable is Nigeria to Islam Extremism?
by Jacques Alain Ba’ana Tsogo Major, Cameroon Army; Perry Lee Johnson, Jr. MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
This thesis investigates the conditions under which a society endorses or is compliant with extremist ideology. Using social movement theory and literature on drivers of violent extremism, the thesis focuses specifically on the potential for religious extremism in Nigeria. Nigeria is particularly important because it is the most populated country in sub- Saharan Africa and it is where both Christianity and Islam, the world’s two largest religions, converge. Nigeria also illustrates one of the clearest examples of religion being used politically and the potential for extremism that this presents. Examining Nigeria will test the specific conditions that make a state vulnerable to extremist ideology and offer insights into reducing the expansion of extremist religious groups within similar societies.
Return on Investment: Ensuring Special Forces Can Fight Another Day
by Kevin J. Key MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
The purpose of this research is to identify possible cultural and policy changes within the Special Forces Regiment that can elongate the operational lifespan of a Special Forces operator through improved physical conditioning and recovery. Since inception, Special Forces Soldiers have conducted operations differently from any other Soldiers or Service Members. These differences are not only in the types of operations or missions themselves, but in frequency, duration, austerity, and level of resources. As Special Forces Soldiers have continued to succeed at the challenges set before them, many have prematurely worn their bodies down and become less than fully physically capable to continue in their highly demanding field of work. In the situations where these exceptional Soldiers are removed from an operational role, their units lose the vast amount of experience that the individual Soldier had, and need to use additional resources training a replacement. This thesis argues that improving the Special Forces Regiment’s focus on physical readiness through some slight cultural and policy changes can significantly decrease the inevitable losses of Special Forces Soldiers to operational units, and allow the individual Green Beret to remain at a healthy state throughout his career and beyond.
The Filipino Way of War: Irregular Warfare Through the Centuries
by Fernando M. Reyeg Lieutenant Colonel, Philippine Army; Ned B. Marsh MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
The Filipino Way of War is the dominant irregular warfare strategy executed by the Filipino warrior throughout the centuries. Armed with severely limited resources, a strong fighting spirit, and deep traditions, the Filipino warrior has always had to look for another method of warfare other than direct and total war. This has led to the indirect path, the path of irregular warfare. This tradition, built upon a foundation of tribal warfare, shaped by resistance to Spanish and American colonization, and honed during the guerrilla campaign against the Japanese occupation, has emerged in the modern era as the predominant Filipino military strategy. Entering the 21st century, conflict in the Philippines has not been focused on external invaders, but on internal division. In this era, both government and anti-government forces have recalled their traditions and experiences and predominantly used irregular warfare strategies, often through unconventional warfare, insurgency, or special operations. As external military influences wane, it is important to understand and prepare the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the future by understanding their past history, so that the Filipino warrior will be better prepared for tomorrow.
Resolving The Promise of Democracy: Ending Puerto Rico’s Colonial Burden
by Lalo Medina LTC, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
Puerto Rico is a vital partner for the United States. The island’s status in the Caribbean region needs to be evaluated and changed within the next six years. How the U.S. strengthens its current economic relationship, support its democratic government, and enhances its military dominance in the region are all strategic security concerns. Historic policies, actions, procedures, and lack of attention from the U.S. by Congress has demonstrated the failure to address and meet the current needs of the citizens of Puerto Rico. Future courses of action must be determined by the will of the people of Puerto Rico. U.S. strategists must consider multiple potential outcomes including statehood, remaining a Commonwealth, becoming an independent nation or maintaining a free association with the United States. This paper will explore the challenges and advantages of each course of action and provide recommendations that best address both Puerto Rico’s and the United States’ strategic concerns while enhancing the U.S. national and regional strategy.
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Accomplishing American Strategic Goals in the Middle East Through Persistent Special Operations
by Daniel D. Mitchell MAJ, USA; Michael D. Nelson MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
As the war in Iraq draws to a close, the importance of U.S. indirect influence in the Middle East will increase. The large footprint of the U.S. military in the region since 2003 has proven unsustainable for the long term in terms of stress on the conventional Army, acceptability to the population of the Muslim world, and patience of the American public. Further, this large-scale conflict, and the focus it has required, has diminished American ability to conduct indirect operations elsewhere throughout the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility (CENTCOM AOR). Thus, hostile networks have unrestricted access to the Middle East, which threatens U.S. interests and the stability of the region. Regional engagement provides a means to increase partner nation capacity as well as enhance indirect U.S. influence, but the program may not currently be achieving optimized, strategically significant gains that SOF have been able to achieve during other operations. This research seeks to examine how Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) might better conduct engagement through regionally coordinated persistent presence, and how to implement any suggested changes.
A Broader Education for Special Forces Officers
by Andre’ Nelson CW4, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
The purpose of this monograph is to examine whether the measures of effectiveness used in Special Forces officer education venues are sufficient to address the operational requirements over a career in a holistic manner. Past education evaluations approach measurements in an isolated manner and are limited temporally. The educational experiences of the officer over a career have many lasting aspects that should be evaluated in context if approached in a holistic fashion and, in great part, should be in the same lines as operational requirements. In order to recognize these aspects in relation to the changing nature of requirements, an education base that is even broader than what is provided today may provide additional avenues of approach to both the requirements and relevant measures of evaluation. Consequently, since it is unrealistic to expect students to be any better than their educators, education professionals need to be grown from within the Special Forces community to serve as ‘educational artists’ linking the strategic education requirements of the future with the tactical implementation of Special Forces officers.
The methodology of this paper is to examine the context of Special Forces officer education through its brief history and consider how its effectiveness is managed.
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Hezbollah: The Myth of Moderation
by Pick Shaw S. LTC, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
The emergence of non-state actors and sub-national entities on the world stage has presented the established international system with challenges for which it is ill equipped to handle. The historical inclination to resort to military force when diplomacy fails is becoming a less viable model as new and powerful non-state actors establish themselves in the international order with implications for their host nations and the nations of the world. Hezbollah, or the Party of God, is an established Shi'ite jihad movement that has operated out of Lebanon since its founding by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in 1985. Situated in a key strategic location in the Middle East and bordering the state of Israel, Hezbollah's status as one of the most well-organized and well-armed non-state actors in the world is cause for some concern to the United States and its allies. This concern was realized when Hezbollah initiated a 34-day war with Israel in 2006. In addition to being a well-armed jihad organization, Hezbollah also controls the largest voting bloc in the Lebanese parliament, giving it virtual veto power in the Lebanese government. For the aforementioned reasons, many national security professionals and academic researchers have spent years studying this shadowy group. Among the many opinions of Hezbollah, there is a growing body of literature and academic discourse that puts forth the theory that Hezbollah is going through a 'Lebanonization' process. This process of political integration, it is said, is causing Hezbollah to evolve from a violent Iranian-inspired jihadi group to a mainstream part of Lebanese society and politics, and that this process will ultimately result in its disarmament. The allure of this theory of moderation and reformation of Hezbollah is understandable. The potential for the moderation and ultimate disarmament of the best-equipped militant Islamist organization in the world holds much cause for hope. It is difficult, however, to ignore Hezbollah's 25-year history of kidnappings, bombings, and targeting of civilians in its jihad against the West and Israel. This monograph examines Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Iran through a modified DIME framework in order to determine whether Hezbollah has indeed experienced a fundamental shift away from Iranian-inspired Shi'ite extremism and violence and moved towards an ideology of moderation within Lebanon. Modified for the unique Islamic identity of Hezbollah and both Iran and Lebanon, a religion component has been added to the analysis in order to better understand which view of Islam these entities adhere to. Ultimately, this monograph will show that Hezbollah sees the authority of the Lebanese state as secondary to that of the regime in Tehran, and this informs both their thinking and their actions. This is of significant importance to both Lebanon and the United States, as the existence of a well-funded, well-armed sub-national jihadi group operating freely within a country with which the U.S. has diplomatic ties is immensely problematic.
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Consolidated National Intelligence Centers: The Potential Impact on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of America‘s National Intelligence Community
by Andrew R. Ries MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
This thesis examined the suitability of creating regionally and functionally aligned National Intelligence Centers to consolidate the foreign intelligence collection and analysis capabilities of America‘s intelligence community. It assessed the functional limits of intelligence consolidation by proposing a theoretical model that departed significantly from the largely decentralized community framework in existence since 1947. Research focused on official studies and community literature that specifically addressed the potential impacts of consolidation. Interviews with IC leadership and policymakers focused on identifying consensus regarding the advantages and disadvantages of IC consolidation. Research found significant resistance within the IC to consolidated centers for three main reasons. First, a widespread belief remains that true competitive analysis can only be achieved in a ―stovepiped‖ system that preserves unique agency cultures and perspectives at the most senior levels. Second, executive branch departments require highly tailored intelligence that might be jeopardized by consolidation. Third, there is considerable disagreement regarding the proper size and role of the ODNI, especially whether it should produce analytical products or merely coordinate the community‘s efforts. Potential recommendations for consolidation on a lesser scale were identified, to include the creation of a National Intelligence Service for analysts and consolidation of some IC-wide support functions.
Understanding Advisory Roles in Large Scale Counterinsurgencies
by Patrick B. Roberson LTC, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
For approximately the past ten years, the Army has been engaged in large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. These campaigns have forced the Army to reevaluate how it approaches its role in advising host nation forces. This reevaluation is evident in new doctrine addressing the Army’s advising role and new organizational structures. The focus of much of this evolution has been on the Army’s General Purpose Forces as compared to Special Operation Forces, which have intrinsically possessed the task of advising host nation forces.
Finally, it is the contention of this paper that interest by the Army in advising is cyclic. This interest coincides with US involvement in large-scale counterinsurgencies. Concepts of advisory roles are generally forgotten after counterinsurgency campaigns and relearned, through discovery; at the beginning of the next large-scale counterinsurgency. This relearning phase can have disastrous results; therefore, understanding of advisory roles, through education and training, should be of paramount importance to the US Army.
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SOF Integration with Conventional Forces: A Doctrine Gap?
by Stroud Gregory M. MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
Throughout the history of the United States, the American military has integrated capabilities from diverse military units. From the regulars under Washington and the local militias in the American Revolution to the airborne Divisions of World War II to the Special Operations Forces in the Global War on Terror, all of these units developed an organizational culture all their own due to the background of their soldiers and the function of their units. These different organizations and cultures have led to friction whenever they are employed together. The same is true today for discussion of the integration of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the General Purpose Force (GPF). This paper will examine the doctrine within the scope of two case studies: OPERATION ANACONDA and Operations in northern Iraq during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. In both cases, doctrine provided clear guidance in organizing command and control structures. With no gap in doctrine, the problems of integrating GPF and SOF capabilities arise from other areas such as organizational culture, personalities, or understanding.
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Military Innovation in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers Lessons for America
by Benjamin A. Taylor MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
A military‘s ability to adapt its organization, doctrine, and technology strategy to meet the threats of its time influences the state‘s capacity to maintain great power status. This thesis uses a historical overview of military innovation among great powers throughout history to draw lessons for the U.S. military today. In this heuristic analysis, it is determined that great powers that integrated between and among their various elements of national power were able to maintain their positions better than those that did not. The study transitions from a descriptive to a prescriptive mode, concluding with the caution that, if the U.S. military does not begin to transform itself from a Cold War organization to an adaptable, resilient force for the future, it could hasten America‘s loss of global power. Measures that the U.S. military should take to innovate organizationally, doctrinally and in terms of technology strategy are prescribed. Finally, and most importantly, this study finds it essential to foster a climate and institutional culture receptive to innovation.
Irregular Pen and Limited Sword: PSYWAR, PSYOP, and MISO in Counterinsurgency
by Marcus S. Welch MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
Insurgency and counterinsurgencies differ from conventional warfare in that military strength alone cannot bring success. Insurgencies are “people’s wars” as the insurgent forces are dependant on the population for manpower, intelligence, logistics, and security. To combat this support drawn from the people, comprehensive measures are required consisting of political, military, economic, social, and psychological efforts. Of these efforts, many experienced counterinsurgents have heavily valued the pscyhological aspects of counterinsurgency warfare and employed a variety of means to exploit them. Exploiting psychological warfare means has been considered more than simply trying to gain the allegiance of a population, commonly known as “hearts and minds.” Thorough psychological exploitation consists of a systematic approach to combating insurgency, attacking the components that make up an insurgent organzation, and degrading the conditions that faciliate it. This thesis attempts to comprehensively evaluate psychological warfare efforts to determine what lessons can be drawn from past conflict, theory, and doctrine and how to apply the lessons today.
Shoot, Move, Communicate, Purchase : How United States Special Forces Can Better Employ Money as a Weapon System
by Ryan D. Yamaki-Taylor MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
This thesis analyzes how well United States Special Forces (USSF) are employing Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) in accordance with the current Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) guidance on counterinsurgency (COIN) contracting in Afghanistan. By analyzing the current ways USSF are employing MAAWS, specifically in Southern Afghanistan, this thesis identifies friction areas (past, present, future) between guidance and employment at the Special Operation Task Force (SOTF) level and below. Based on this analysis, this thesis provides recommendations to help reduce these friction areas and enable Special Forces tactical units to better employ Money as a Weapon System. The main recommendations focus on incorporating the Yoder Three-Tier Model, modified to meet the needs of USSF and enhancing training on contingency contracting to educate SF Commanders and Soldiers designated to fill the role of contracting officer‘s representative (COR). These recommendations will enable Special Forces to better employ MAAWS in the future and greatly increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their contracting procedures.