Department of Defense
MANUAL

NUMBER 3150.08
August 22, 2013

USD(AT&L)

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. This manual:

a. Reissues DoD 3150.08-M (Reference (a)) in accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.08 (Reference (b)).

b. Implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides comprehensive procedures to ensure consistency with the National Response Framework (NRF) (Reference (c)) and compliance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3150.10 (Reference (d)).

2. APPLICABILITY. This manual:

a. Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (referred to collectively in this manual as the "DoD Components").

b. May also be used by other federal, State, local, and tribal (SLT) agencies when operating with the DoD.

c. Addresses primarily accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DoD custody. However, it may also be useful as a guide for the consequence management (CM) aspects of the response to a U.S. nuclear weapon incident, which is addressed by CJCS Instruction 3261.01B (Reference (e)).

3. POLICY. Consistent with Reference (c) and in accordance with Reference (d), and DoDD 3150.08 (Reference (f)), it is DoD policy that:

a. DoD will respond to and resolve nuclear weapon accidents for U.S. nuclear weapons that are in DoD custody. In accordance with Reference (d) and National Security Presidential

Directive (NSPD) 28 (Reference (g)), all U.S. nuclear weapon accidents or incidents will be considered to be the result of hostile acts until proven otherwise through investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

b. When directed by the Secretary of Defense or when acting under immediate response authority or emergency authority (as defined in DoDD 3025.18 (Reference (h)), the DoD will support the Department of Energy (DOE) in responding to nuclear weapon accidents or incidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DOE custody in accordance with section 1535 of Title 31, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (i)), as applicable. DoD resources must be made available when U.S. nuclear weapon accident response is coordinated by another federal department or agency, consistent with operational availability and Secretary of Defense approval consistent with Reference (c) and in accordance with Reference (h), consistent with applicable international nuclear accident-incident agreements, and in consultation with appropriate federal, State, local, and host nation (HN) agencies and authorities.

c. In conformity with existing bilateral agreements and laws of the HN, U.S. personnel responding to an accident involving U.S. nuclear weapons or components on foreign territory will assist HN responders in saving lives and protecting property, and must reestablish U.S. custody and security of the weapon or component at the earliest possible time. In all aspects of response, DoD personnel must respect the sovereignty of the nation in which the accident occurs and cooperate fully with HN authorities.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. Responsibilities are outlined in References (d) and (f). The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) will ensure compliance with this manual.

5. PROCEDURES. See Enclosure 2.

6. RELEASABILITY. **Unlimited**. This manual is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.

7. EFFECTIVE DATE. This manual:

a. Is effective August 22, 2013.

b. Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication to be considered current in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (j)).

c. Will expire effective August 22, 2023 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website if it hasn't been reissued or cancelled in accordance with Reference (j).



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REFERENCES

(a) DoD 3150.8-M, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," February 22, 2005 (hereby cancelled)
(b) DoD Directive 5134.08, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB))," January 14, 2009, as amended
(c) Department of Homeland Security, "National Response Framework," January 2008
(d) DoD Instruction 3150.10, "DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incidents," July 2, 2010
(e) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3261.01B, "Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons," November 3, 2008[1]
(f) DoD Directive 3150.08, "DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents," January 20, 2010
(g) National Security Presidential Directive No. 28, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security," June 20, 2003
(h) DoD Directive 3025.18, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)," December 29, 2010, as amended
(i) Section 1535 of Title 31, United States Code
(j) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," September 26, 2012
(k) Department of Homeland Security, "National Incident Management System," December 18, 2008
(l) Public Law 100-707, "Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act," November 23, 1988, as amended (also known as the "Stafford Act")
(m) DoD S-5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: The DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Program (U)," July 13, 2009
(n) Part 300 of Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (also known as the National Contingency Plan (NCP))
(o) DoD Instruction 6055.17, "DoD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program," January 13, 2009, as amended
(p) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, "Management of Domestic Incidents," February 28, 2003
(q) DoD O-3020.44-M, "OSD Defense Crisis Management (CrM) Procedures," May 19, 2010, as amended
(r) Title 32, United States Code
(s) Title 10, United States Code
(t) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.03D, "Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports," September 7, 2010
(u) DoD Technical Publication 20-11, "General Guidance and Materiel Hazard Information for Nuclear Weapons, Components and Nonnuclear Weapon Designations," April 24, 2009[2]

[1] Limited – Release via http://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/jointstaff/sjs/imd/directives/default.aspx with control access to only .mil and .gov users.
[2] Available through DTRA/Combat Support Nuclear Logistics Branch , 1680 Texas Street SE, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5669

(v) DoD Directive 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance," December 20, 1993
(w) Public Law 104-191, "Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996," August 21, 1996
(x) DoD Instruction 5200.08, "Security of DoD Installations and Resources and the DoD Physical Security Review Board (PSRB)," December 10, 2005, as amended
(y) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, "Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for United States Forces," June 13, 2005[3]
(z) Part 91.137 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations
(aa) Army Regulation 75-14, Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 8027.1G, Marine Corps Order 8027.1D, and Air Force Joint Instruction 32-3002, "Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal," February 14, 1992
(ab) NUREG-1575/EPA 402-R-97-016/DOE/EH-0624, "Multi-agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM)," August 2000, as amended
(ac) Title 42, United States Code
(ad) Department of Energy Nuclear Weapon Accident Program Plan (NWAPP), January 17, 2008[4]
(ae) Title 18, United States Code[5]
(af) DoD Directive 3020.40, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities For Critical Infrastructure" January 14, 2010, as amended
(ag) DoD Instruction 3025.21, "Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies," February 27, 2013
(ah) National Security Presidential Directive 46/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 15, "U.S. Strategy and Policy in the War on Terror," March 6, 2006
(ai) Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Domestic Interagency Incident Contingency Plan For the Recapture and Recovery of United States Nuclear Weapons or Components," February 7, 2012
(aj) Section 2 of Title 14, United States Code
(ak) Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures NTTP 3-20.31, "Surface Ship Survivability," July 2012[6]
(al) Part 165.20 of Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations.
(am) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," current edition
(an) Joint Publication 3-28, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities," July 31, 2013
(ao) Title 6, United States Code
(ap) Title 43, United States Code

[3] Limited – Release via http://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/jointstaff/sjs/imd/directives/default.aspx with control access to only .mil and .gov users.
[4] Available through NNSA Service Center, Office of Public Affairs, P.O. Box 5400 • Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185
[5] Section 1385 of Reference (af) is also known as the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)
[6] Available through: Navy Warfare Develop Command, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841-1207

ENCLOSURE 2

PROCEDURES

1. INTRODUCTION

a. Scope. This manual provides the procedures and organizational templates for DoD Components responding to accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons. The additional information and resources pertaining to nuclear weapon accidents listed in section 9 of this enclosure can be found at the NARP supplement Website at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/narp. Section 5 of this enclosure summarizes the procedures used in the event of a nuclear weapon incident where the cause has yet to be determined or is known to be the result of a hostile act.

(1) General. This manual is consistent with Reference (c) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Reference (k)). The response organizational templates in this manual are based on the NIMS incident command system (ICS) used by federal and SLT government entities. For domestic U.S. nuclear weapon accidents, DoD responsibilities are defined consistent with the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NRIA) and the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex of Reference (c). This manual is designed for use by all DoD Components involved in the response to U.S. nuclear weapon accidents, as well as for the information of other federal departments and agencies (referred to in this instruction as "interagency") and SLT and HN entities that respond to such accidents. The underlying premise of this manual is that the responding DoD Components will integrate with other responding entities for maximum unity of effort.

(a) NIMS. Reference (k) represents a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management at all levels. NIMS integrates existing best practices into a consistent, nationwide approach to domestic incident management that applies at all jurisdictional levels and across functional disciplines in an all-hazards context. At its core, NIMS is both flexible and standardized so that multiple federal and SLT entities can work compatibly and cohesively when they respond to a domestic emergency.

(b) NRF. Reference (c) is an all-discipline, all-hazards comprehensive framework for appropriate entities to manage domestic incidents. It provides the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of federal support to SLT incident managers and for exercising direct federal authorities and responsibilities. The NRF is always in effect and the activation of any of its elements does not depend on any type of declaration. The NRF coordinates federal assistance without the need for a formal trigger, unlike the requirement for a Presidential declaration for the provision of federal assistance under Public Law 100-707, also known and referred to in this manual as the "Stafford Act" (Reference (l)). These NRF structures and mechanisms apply to all U.S. nuclear weapon accidents, regardless of scope, magnitude, or severity. The NRIA of Reference (c) describes the federal coordinating structures and processes used during an incident requiring a coordinated federal response involving nuclear or radiological materials. References (c) and (k) provide processes and a methodology for integrating the capabilities and resources of

various governmental agencies and offices, incident management and emergency response disciplines, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector entities.

(2) Domestic Accidents

(a) U.S. nuclear weapon accidents are considered domestic if they occur in any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, or any waters within the jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) In a domestic accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in DoD custody, the responding DoD Components must apply the procedures identified in this manual. In situations where this manual conflicts with Reference (c), Reference (k), or applicable federal statutes, then this manual will not apply.

(3) Foreign Accidents

(a) U.S. nuclear weapon accidents that occur in an area not listed in paragraph 1a(2) of this enclosure will be considered foreign accidents. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) leads the federal response to U.S. nuclear weapon accidents that occur within the territorial boundaries or waters of a foreign nation. Accidents occurring outside the territorial boundaries or waters of a foreign nation will be considered single-jurisdictional accidents and will be the responsibility of the Combatant Commander (CCDR) in whose area of responsibility (AOR) the accident takes place. Foreign accidents are addressed in greater detail in section 6 of this enclosure.

(b) Foreign accidents fall into two categories: those occurring on a U.S.-occupied installation in a foreign country or those occurring outside a U.S.-occupied installation in a foreign country. Regardless of the foreign location, the DOS will lead the U.S. response.

(c) In foreign accidents involving a U.S. nuclear weapon, responding DoD Components must use the basic initial response force (IRF) and response task force (RTF) organizational structures and applicable procedures identified in the NARP supplement website; measures outlined in HN agreements; applicable joint operating plans; and other applicable accident response agreements. DOS employs a “playbook” in those countries with which no other accident response agreements exist.

(4) Control Over the Accident Site. Controlling access to an accident site is imperative to maintaining the security of any classified materials, protecting against personal injury and property damage, and preventing the disturbance of evidence.

(a) DoD Installations. For nuclear weapon accidents that occur on a DoD installation involving weapons in DoD custody where the United States has exclusive jurisdiction, DoD forces will establish security in accordance with DoD S-5210.41-M (Reference (m)).

(b) Outside DoD Installations

1. For domestic accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DoD custody, the DoD incident commander (IC) may establish a national defense area (NDA), unless it is determined that the establishment of an NDA will delay the security and transportation of a U.S. nuclear weapon from the accident site to a more secure location. At the onset of all response operations, the DoD IC should work closely with legal advisors to determine relevant jurisdictions and authorities for establishing an NDA.

2. For domestic accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DOE custody, the DOE IC can establish a national security area (NSA) to secure the accident site. Weapons in DOE custody are located only in the continental United States (CONUS).

(c) Foreign Territory. For accidents that occur on foreign territory either on or outside a DoD installation, the HN may declare a weapons restricted area (WRA) to facilitate some degree of security and temporary U.S. control over the immediate vicinity of the weapon(s) to expedite weapon safing and weapon recovery procedures. See section 6 of this enclosure for more information on foreign accidents.

b. Assumptions

(1) To ensure that DoD Component plans and training fully prepare DoD personnel for response to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, the organizational structures and procedures in this manual are based on the following assumptions:

(a) Although extremely unlikely, a radiological release may occur as a result of a U.S. nuclear weapon accident with detectable levels of radioactivity being possible.

(b) The accident site may be multijurisdictional. It is probable that the effects of a nuclear weapon accident resulting in the spread of radioactive contamination or other hazardous materials (HAZMAT) will affect military and civilian jurisdictions. In addition, it is likely that the public affairs (PA) aspects of an accident involving contamination will transcend jurisdictions, even if the physical effects do not.

(c) For accidents occurring outside the boundaries of a federal installation, local civilian emergency responders and law enforcement officials may arrive on scene before any DoD emergency response resources or DoD security augmentation personnel.

(d) For accidents that occur outside the continental United States (OCONUS), DoD responders should plan to manage the DoD response without CONUS-based special team assistance for as long as 36 to 48 hours.

(e) The apparent U.S. nuclear weapon accident could be terrorist-initiated or otherwise intentional in origin and, therefore, must be investigated as a hostile act. The site is considered a crime scene, until determined otherwise through FBI investigation. Thus, planners must make all necessary provisions for including the FBI in the Unified Command (UC), so that

statutory crime scene investigation requirements can be interfaced with the operational requirements of the other UC members and incorporated into development of the overall incident action plan (IAP). The servicing defense criminal investigation organization may also play a role in the crime scene investigation.

(f) Given the potential for a strong public reaction, media coverage of incidents of this nature will be immediate, intense, and prolonged.

(2) The NRIA to Reference (c) contains assumptions that should be considered in developing plans for, and responding to, a U.S. nuclear weapon accident:

(a) The release of radioactive material from a U.S. nuclear weapon accident may not be confirmed until qualified response personnel assess contamination on the surface of materials.

(b) A radiological incident may also include chemical contaminants, which may require concurrent implementation of part 300 of Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), also known and referred to in this manual as the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (Reference (n)), which falls under the purview of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

(c) An accident involving the potential release of radioactivity may require implementation of protective measures.

(d) An expeditious and integrated federal response is required to mitigate the consequences of any nuclear weapon accident. Radiological accidents that result in significant impacts may trigger implementation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex to Reference (c).

(e) If appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and capabilities are not available and the area is contaminated by radioactive material, response actions in a contaminated area may be delayed until appropriate PPE and capabilities arrive. IC authorities will make appropriate decisions regarding the amount of acceptable risk to be taken for life-saving measures.

2. COMMAND, MANAGEMENT, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

a. General. Command relationships and structures are based on the command and Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) described in NIMS and the NRF, which have been accepted generally for use within the DoD by DoDI 6055.17 (Reference (o)). The NRF and NIMS use terms that are commonly used by the DoD, but different definitions often apply. The terms used in this manual and their definitions are based on the NRF and NIMS.

b. Responsibilities. Federal department and agency responsibilities for response to a domestic U.S. nuclear weapon accident are described in the NRIA to Reference (c). Within this annex, federal departments and agencies are designated as coordinating or cooperating agencies. Although this section applies primarily to CONUS response efforts, it should be followed for OCONUS responses as much as possible.

(1) Coordinating Agency. The role of the coordinating agency is to coordinate the federal response to the incident. The DoD is the coordinating agency for domestic accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DoD custody. As the coordinating agency, the DoD is responsible for orchestrating a coordinated delivery of those functions and procedures identified in the NRIA to Reference (c). Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 (Reference (p)), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must coordinate the Federal Government's resources used in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one of the following four conditions applies:

(a) A federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security;

(b) The resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities;

(c) More than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident; or

(d) The Secretary of Homeland Security has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President.

(2) Cooperating Agency. A cooperating agency supports the accident management effort by providing expertise in appropriate functional areas. When the DoD is the coordinating agency for a domestic U.S. nuclear weapon accident, cooperating agencies are those shown in Table 1 of this enclosure. Cooperating agencies are responsible for:

(a) Conducting operations, when requested by DHS or the coordinating agency, using their own authorities, subject matter experts (SMEs), capabilities, and resources.

(b) Participating in planning for accident management and recovery operations and development of supporting operational plans, standard operating procedures, checklists, or other tools.

(c) Furnishing available personnel, equipment, or other resource support as requested by DHS or the coordinating agency.

(d) Participating in training and exercises seeking the continuous improvement of preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities.

(e) Nominating new technologies or procedures to improve performance.

Table 1. NRF NRIA Cooperating Agencies

Department of Agriculture	Department of Commerce
Department of Defense	Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services	Department of Homeland Security
Department of the Interior	Department of Justice
Department of Labor	Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs	Environmental Protection Agency
Department of State	Nuclear Regulatory Commission

c. ICS. The NIMS ICS defines the operating characteristics, interactive management components, and structure of the incident management and emergency response organizations engaged throughout the lifecycle of an incident. It integrates facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure. The ICS is modular and scalable; has interactive management components; establishes common terminology, standards, and procedures; and directs incorporation of measurable objectives in response operations.

(1) Command. The IC has direct tactical and operational responsibility for conducting incident management activities. The DoD IC, who must be trained in NIMS and ICS, is normally the senior ranking military official at the accident site and operates out of the incident command post (ICP). The DoD IC does not have directive authority over non-DoD personnel or assets that are outside the exclusive DoD jurisdiction. In cases where management crosses jurisdictional or functional agency boundaries, a single IC can also be designated if all parties agree to such an option. In all cases, establishment of a UC with affected jurisdictions should be considered if the PA aspects of the accident might have an impact outside the boundaries of an exclusive DoD jurisdiction. DoD personnel always remain under the command, as that term is used by DoD, of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) UC. The term UC is an ICS application used when more than one agency has incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the UC. The designated members will often be the senior person from agencies or disciplines participating in the UC; they will establish a common set of objectives, strategies, and a single IAP.

(3) NIMS ICS Structure. The NIMS ICS structure has five major sections, as shown in Figure 1 of this enclosure, with a potential sixth functional area to cover the intelligence function, if the situation requires it.

Figure 1. NIMS ICS



(a) The command comprises the IC and the command staff, including positions such as the public information officer (PIO), safety officer (SOFR), legal officer (LO), liaison officers (LNOs), and others (such as a medical officer), as required and assigned by the IC.

(b) The general staff comprises the incident management personnel who represent the major functional elements of the ICS; this includes the operations section chief, planning section chief, logistics section chief, and finance/administration section chief.

(4) IRF General Organizational Structure. Consistent with the NIMS ICS, the IRF will be structured in accordance with the general organization illustrated in Figure 2 of this enclosure. It will normally be the first DoD response element at the accident site.

(a) IRF Commander. The IRF commander is the DoD IC upon arrival at the accident site. Since most accidents will require a multijurisdictional and multiagency response, the DoD IC will form a UC with the designated officials from agencies with jurisdictional or statutory authority for aspects of the accident. The DoD IC will have single incident command authority over DoD assets in any security zone that is under exclusive DoD jurisdiction; other members of the UC will retain authority over their personnel within the DoD security zone, as well as authority for areas outside the DoD security zone that are under their jurisdiction.

(b) IRF Command Staff. The IRF command staff reports directly to the DoD IC. Command staff positions must include a PIO, a SOFR, an LO, a medical officer, and LNOs, and may include other positions identified by the commander.

Figure 2. IRF Composition



(c) IRF Functional Staff. Specific organization of the elements under each section is flexible, and will depend on situational requirements at the accident site, as well as the discretion of the IRF commander. The finance/administration section is necessary if the accident is multijurisdictional and involves non-DoD response resources, but may not be required if an accident is under exclusive DoD jurisdiction. The inclusion of a separate air operations branch under the operations section is optional and will be decided by the UC based on the extent of air operations associated with the response. In addition, the demobilization unit may not be required in the early phases of the response.

(d) IRF Integration and Staffing. Command and functional staffs must fully integrate the personnel and resources of all concerned jurisdictions and agencies that are participating in the response outside any security zone under exclusive DoD jurisdiction. The IRF must be staffed for continuous 24-hour operations until properly relieved by the RTF, or as required by the magnitude and duration of the event.

(5) RTF General Organizational Structure. The RTF will likely arrive at the accident site after the IRF. It will be commanded by a general or flag officer who will assume the role of DoD IC. Upon assumption of DoD IC responsibilities, the RTF commander will integrate the incoming RTF staff members into the existing IRF structure, maintaining consistency with the general NIMS ICS, as illustrated in Figure 3 of this enclosure. The RTF must be staffed for 24-hour operations.

Figure 3. RTF General Composition



(a) After transfer of command from the IRF, the RTF commander becomes the DoD IC. Most nuclear weapon accidents will require a multi-agency response. If a UC has already been established, the Commander, RTF, as DoD IC, joins it to represent DoD objectives and priorities. If a UC has not been established, the DoD IC must form a UC with the designated officials from agencies with jurisdictional and statutory authority for aspects of the accident.

(b) The RTF will contain the same four functional staff sections as those of the IRF, and the RTF must have additional command staff positions for a chief of staff and a medical advisor, and it may have a protocol officer. The specific organization of the elements under each section is flexible and will be based on the situational requirements of the accident site.

(c) RTF command and functional staffs must fully integrate with the personnel and resources of all concerned jurisdictions and agencies that are participating in the response outside any security zone that is under exclusive DoD jurisdiction.

d. MACS. The primary functions of MACS are to support incident management policies and priorities, facilitate logistics support and resource tracking, inform resource allocation decisions using incident management priorities, coordinate incident-related information, and coordinate interagency and intergovernmental issues and strategies. MACS may contain multiagency coordination centers/emergency operations centers (EOCs) and multiagency coordinating groups.

(1) General. Following a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, DoD and other federal agencies are represented at all levels—field, regional, and national. At each level, multiagency coordination centers/EOCs coordinate resources to support accident management activities and provide situational awareness for federal and SLT officials. At field and national levels, multiagency coordination groups facilitate accident management and policy coordination. Figure 4 of this enclosure depicts this coordination structure for an accident response operation managed by DHS.

Figure 4. Notional Coordination Structure



(2) Multiagency Coordination Centers/EOCs. These centers provide central locations for operational information sharing and resource coordination in support of on-scene efforts. Their capabilities normally include the core functions of coordination; communications; resource deployment and tracking; and information collection, analysis, and distribution.

(3) Multiagency Coordination Entity. Groups in this level help establish priorities among the incidents and associated resource allocations, resolve agency policy conflicts, and provide strategic guidance to support incident management activities.

e. DoD Coordination and Response Organizations

(1) National Level. At the national level, the DoD is the coordinating agency for domestic accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DoD custody and would support DHS in its role as the federal incident manager in the event that DHS assumes overall management of the federal response pursuant to Reference (p). The National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC) is the DoD primary supporting national multiagency coordination center.

(a) NJOIC. The NJOIC provides continuous, worldwide situation monitoring and crisis management for the DoD. The NJOIC on-duty operations team is likely to be the first national-level organization that is notified of an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon. The NJOIC will activate the joint nuclear accident/incident response team (JNAIRT) to provide subject matter expertise.

(b) The OSD Crisis Management Team (CrMT). In accordance with DoD O-3020.44M (Reference (q)), the OSD CrMT is the task organized element formed in order to provide the decision support policy development functions of crisis management. For a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, the CrMT will request support from the Nuclear Weapon Incident Response Group (NRG) from the Office of the ASD(NCB). The NRG consists of U.S. nuclear weapon SMEs and LNOs from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), FBI, and DOE. The NRG supports the CrMT by providing guidance and technical expertise on U.S. nuclear weapon accidents.

(c) JNAIRT. JNAIRT is a Joint Staff crisis management element that assists in carrying out the responsibilities assigned to the CJCS for response to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident. The JNAIRT is headed by the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3) and composed of all staff elements that are likely to have a role in the DoD response to the accident. The JNAIRT continues to operate until deactivated by the J-3. The JNAIRT works closely with the NRG.

(d) Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS). JDOMS is a division within the Joint Staff Directorate for Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense that is responsible for processing requests for DoD assistance (above and beyond IRF and RTF response) and preparing an execute order, if required.

(2) Regional Level. The geographic CCDRs are designated the supported CCDRs for the DoD response to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident that occurs within their respective AORs. The operations center designated by the CCDR is the regional coordination center for DoD. The supported CCDR is responsible for executing the DoD response mission and exercises operational control (OPCON) over military forces responding to the accident, as specified by the Secretary of Defense. Such forces will include the IRF, the RTF, the defense coordinating officer (DCO) and supporting defense coordinating element (DCE), and any other assigned or attached forces or individuals that are supporting the local response.

(3) Field Level. At field level, the majority of DoD response forces will be at or near the accident site as members of the IRF, RTF, or forces that are supporting the DoD local response.

(a) DCO. Specific DCO functions and responsibilities include:

1. Validating defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) requirements requested by the federal coordinating officer (FCO), State coordinating officer (SCO), and the emergency support function (ESF) representatives.

2. Coordinating with the FCO and SCO to integrate requested and required Reserve Component capabilities, including National Guard personnel who may be under State command and control (section 502(f) of Reference (r) or section 12304a of Reference (s)) not otherwise available, with the responding Active Component units to maximize response capacity without duplicating effort.

3. Assigning and supervising DoD liaison personnel for the ESF staffs at the joint field office (JFO).

4. Coordinating the use of all DSCA resources provided in response to the nuclear weapon accident.

5. Serving as the single DoD point of contact for the coordination of DSCA routinely in a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region, or a FEMA JFO during a disaster, as appropriate. The DCO coordinates requests for assistance (RFAs) for all the response elements outside the purview of the RTF commander, sending validated requests through the geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) to the JDOMS and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) for Secretary of Defense approval, as necessary.

6. Establishing and supervising the DCE. The DCE consists of a staff of assigned personnel and liaisons that facilitate the coordination of DoD resources in support of the NRF ESFs. The DCE supports the DCO in coordinating this support with the primary federal agency. The DCE remains under the control of the DCO at all times to facilitate unity of command.

(b) IRF. If a DoD response element is not already on scene, the NJOIC will direct on behalf of the Secretary of Defense (through the parent Service operations center or the CCDR to which the forces are assigned) the closest DoD installation that has an emergency response capability to deploy an IRF. The IRF commander, when trained in NIMS/ICS, is designated the DoD IC. Although desirable, the tasked installation is not required to have nuclear expertise. However, the IRF must have the capability to establish command and control and contact with higher headquarters (HQ), extinguish fires, rescue, stabilize, and evacuate casualties, establish an NDA, and begin PA procedures. Descriptions of these minimum functions are included in paragph 3d(3) of this enclosure. The IRF will likely be deployed via verbal direction to be followed by a written Secretary of Defense execute order (EXORD). The general organizational structure of the IRF is discussed in paragraph 2c(4) of this enclosure.

(c) RTF. The NJOIC will direct on behalf of the Secretary of Defense an RTF be deployed through service HQ under the supported CCDR. The NJOIC vocal directive pertaining to the RTF will be followed by a Secretary of Defense EXORD. Upon transfer of responsibility from the IRF, the RTF will subsume the IRF, and the RTF commander will become the DoD IC.

(d) Defense Senior Official (DSO). The DSO is a general or flag officer, or DoD civilian equivalent, appointed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), as necessary, to serve as the technical advisor from the field to the Secretary of Defense or designated representative on U.S. nuclear weapon accidents. The DSO's technical expertise includes nuclear weapons composition, characteristics, and safety features; security and use control of nuclear weapons; and the technical capabilities of the various federal response elements. The DSO, if appointed, is a purely advisory position and has no command authority over the IRF, RTF, joint task force (JTF), or DCO under the CCDR responsible for the response.

(e) Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD CSTs). The mission of the WMD CST is to support civil authorities at a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident site. Under the command and control of the governor of their assigned State, the WMD CSTs identify CBRNE agents and substances; assess current and projected consequences; advise on response measures; and assist with appropriate requests for State and federal support. For a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, the WMD CST could provide assistance in identifying radiological hazards beyond the vicinity of the accident site (e.g., outside an NDA or beyond the confines of a military installation), and advise on evacuation or sheltering in place due to a downwind hazard. WMD CSTs will be in Title 32 U.S.C. duty status and will coordinate their response efforts with the IRF/RTF consistent with the NRF (Reference (c)) and NIMS (Reference (k)).

(f) Other DoD Teams. Depending on the location and severity of the nuclear weapon accident, a wide range of additional DoD teams may be deployed. These DoD teams will be placed under the OPCON of the RTF commander, as appropriate.

f. Interagency Coordination and Response Organizations. As DoD will have many responsibilities during the response to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, it is important that all levels of the DoD understand how to interface with interagency partners. If the magnitude of the DoD nuclear weapon accident impacts outside the NDA or military installation are beyond the management capabilities or scope of the RTF, the Secretary of Defense can task the responsible CCDR to establish a JTF to conduct CBRNE CM in support of federal and SLT authorities.

(1) National-Level Multiagency Coordination Groups and Multiagency Coordination Centers/EOCs

(a) Multiagency Coordination Groups. Pursuant to Reference (p), DHS will assume a resource coordination role in four situations, including when more than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident. However, this coordination does not impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense over DoD assets participating in the response. For a domestic DoD custody U.S. nuclear weapon accident, DoD may be required to work closely with DHS and with the following groups to manage the U.S. nuclear weapon accident response:

1. National Security Staff (NSS). The National Security Council (NSC) is an Executive Branch body that is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The NSS supports the President and the NSC process. In the event of a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, the NSS will advise and assist the President in all aspects of the situation.

2. Domestic Resilience Group (DRG). The White House will convene the DRG on a regular basis with DoD participation from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It will develop and coordinate implementation of preparedness and response policy, address issues that cannot be resolved at lower levels in anticipation of or during crises, and provide strategic policy direction for the federal response. The DRG can also be convened at any time at the request of one of its members.

3. National Response Team (NRT). The NRT is an organization of 16 federal departments and agencies responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness and response to oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents, in accordance with the NCP. The EPA and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) serve as Chair and Vice Chair, respectively. A domestic U.S. nuclear weapon accident that produces radioactive contamination must be reported to the NRT through the National Response Center.

(b) Multiagency Coordination Centers/EOCs. EOCs of all the cooperating agencies will be notified and active following a U.S. nuclear weapon accident. DoD will interface with these EOCs through information sharing to maintain a common operational picture (COP) for the U.S. Government (USG). All EOCs are expected, at a minimum, to monitor the situation. It is important to note in particular that the DOE Operations Center would be fully active in any U.S. nuclear weapon accident, as would the FBI Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), at least until the event was determined to be an accident and not an intentional act. The core group of operation centers that DoD will have to interface regarding an accident are:

1. National Operations Center (NOC). The DHS NOC is a multiagency operations center that serves as the primary national-level hub for domestic situational awareness, COP, information fusion, information sharing, communications, and operations coordination pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and domestic incident management. The NOC collects all threats and hazards data from federal, SLT, private sector, and open sources from across the United States and abroad and shares this information with all DHS components. The NOC also operates in an all-threats and all-hazards arena across the spectrum of prevent, protect, respond, and recover activities. It serves as the primary conduit to the White House and the Secretary of Homeland Security for domestic situational awareness to prevent terrorist attacks and manage domestic incidents within the United States.

2. National Response Coordination Center (NRCC). The DHS/FEMA NRCC is the multi-agency center that provides overall coordination of the federal response and supports emergency management program implementation. The NRCC brings together ESF federal departments and agencies to help prepare for and respond to disasters and to issue mission assignments for disaster support. The NRCC maintains direct connectivity with the DHS NOC. In a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, the NRCC will support the efforts of regional and field

components in providing federal resources to federal and SLT responders.

3. SIOC. The FBI SIOC is the focal point and operations center for all federal intelligence, law enforcement, and investigative law enforcement activities related to domestic terrorist incidents or credible threats, including leading attribution investigations. The SIOC is the information clearinghouse that helps collect, process, vet, and distribute information relevant to law enforcement and criminal investigation efforts in a timely manner. The SIOC is directly connected to the NOC. The SIOC will support any FBI investigation pertaining to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident.

4. DOE Operations Center. The DOE Operations Center is the focal point for DOE operations and information in a U.S. nuclear weapon accident.

5. National Response Center. The primary function of the National Response Center is to be the sole national point of contact for reporting all oil, chemical, radiological, biological, and etiological discharges into the environment anywhere in the United States and its territories. The National Response Center gathers and distributes contamination data for federal on-scene coordinators and is the communications and operations center for the NRT. Additionally, the National Response Center maintains agreements with a variety of federal entities to notify them of incidents that meet established trigger criteria. Federal law requires that any radiological release be reported to the National Response Center.

(2) Regional Level. The DHS/FEMA regional response coordination centers (RRCC) are multiagency coordination centers that are standing facilities operated by FEMA. They coordinate regional response efforts, establish federal priorities, and implement local federal program support. In each region, the RRCC is an interim body activated by FEMA for the period of time between when the accident occurs and when a JFO near the accident site is established. If a JFO is not established, the RRCC may be activated to assist DoD in coordinating non-DoD federal support.

(3) Field Level. Pursuant to Reference (p), DHS is responsible for overall management of domestic U.S. nuclear weapon accidents, and DoD should be prepared to interact with the following groups in the field. If the conditions outlined in Reference (p) do not apply and DHS has not assumed a resource coordination role, DoD will coordinate the federal response to an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in DoD custody.

(a) JFO. The JFO is a multiagency coordination center established locally. It provides a central location for coordination of federal, SLT, NGO, and private-sector organizations with primary responsibility for accident support. The JFO uses the scalable organizational structure of the NIMS ICS to enable effective and efficient coordination of federal accident-related response and recovery actions. The JFO organization adapts to the magnitude and complexity of the situation at hand, and incorporates NIMS principles regarding span of control and organizational structure. Although the JFO uses an ICS structure, the JFO does not manage on-scene operations. Instead, the JFO focuses on providing support to on-scene efforts and conducting broader support operations that may extend beyond the accident site. The DoD has appointed 10 DCOs and assigned one to each FEMA region. When deployed to work in the

JFO, the DCO is the single DoD point of contact at the JFO for processing RFAs from other agencies and for DoD. Figure 5 of this enclosure provides a sample JFO organizational structure.

Figure 5. Sample JFO Organization



(b) Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs). In coordination with the RRCC and the State, FEMA may deploy an IMAT. IMATs are interagency teams composed of subject-matter experts and incident management professionals. IMAT personnel may be drawn from national or regional federal department and agency staff in accordance with established protocols. IMAT teams make preliminary arrangements to set up federal field facilities and initiate establishment of the JFO. IMATs are regionally based response teams that provide a forward federal presence to improve response to serious incidents. The IMATs support efforts to meet the emergent needs of State and local jurisdictions, possess the capability to provide initial situational awareness for federal decision makers, and support the establishment of federal coordination efforts with the State.

(c) DHS Situational Awareness Team (DSAT). The DSAT provides timely and accurate information to the Secretary of Homeland Security and departmental leadership when directed by the Secretary. DSAT personnel are under the tasking authority of the DHS Office of Operations and administrative control of DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The DSAT is an early entry capability and will report simultaneously to the NOC to ensure that the Secretary of Homeland Security has early situational awareness.

(d) Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT). The NIRT consists of specialized federal response teams drawn from DOE and/or EPA. These teams may become DHS/FEMA operational assets providing specialized response capabilities when activated during a crisis or in response to a nuclear or radiological incident as part of the federal response.

(e) Other Federal Teams. Depending on the location and severity of the nuclear weapon accident, there is a wide range of additional interagency teams that can be deployed. Examples include damage assessment teams, disaster medical assistance teams, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) emergency response team, Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration specialized response teams, veterinarian medical assistance teams, disaster mortuary operational response teams, national medical response teams, scientific and technical advisory and response teams, donations coordination teams, urban search and rescue (US&R) task forces, US&R incident support teams, federal type 1 and type 2 incident management teams (IMTs), domestic animal and wildlife emergency response teams, EPA emergency advisory teams, and mitigation assessment teams.

g. SLT Coordination and Response Organizations

(1) General. Depending on the location of a domestic U.S. nuclear weapon accident, SLT governments will have some jurisdictional authority at or in the vicinity of the accident site. The elected, appointed, or designated officials of these governments represent the legal authorities that are applicable and the citizens that are affected by the accident. SLT governments also have the capabilities and resources of various emergency management functions—fire, police, public health, emergency medical service (EMS), National Guard, public works, and environmental response—that may be involved in the response to a nuclear weapon accident. It is also likely that personnel from these various SLT organizations will be the first responders at an accident that occurs outside the boundaries of a DoD installation. Therefore, to ensure a successful DoD response, DoD officials and responders at all levels will establish a full partnership with affected SLT officials and responders.

(2) SLT. The State's chief executive is the governor. The local chief executive is normally the mayor or county manager. Tribal chief executive officers fulfill a corresponding function, as authorized by the tribal government, for their respective tribes. Within their respective jurisdictions, each of these officials is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people, as well as the coordination of applicable resources to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from U.S. nuclear weapon accidents. These individuals, furthermore, provide leadership; play a key role in communicating to the public; and help people, businesses, and organizations cope with the consequences of U.S. nuclear weapon accidents.

h. NGOs. NGOs may collaborate with first responders, governments at all levels, and other agencies and organizations that provide relief services to sustain life, reduce physical and emotional distress, and promote recovery of disaster victims when assistance is not available from other sources. They may receive government funding to provide essential public health services, particularly in nuclear or radiological incidents with widespread or long-term effects.

i. Volunteer Organizations. Volunteer organizations, such as the 30 recognized national

organizations in the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster consortium, can provide significant capabilities to accident management and response efforts at all levels. For example, the wildlife rescue and rehabilitation activities conducted during an accident are often carried out by private, nonprofit organizations working with natural resource trustee agencies. The Volunteer and Donations Management Support Annex described in Reference (c) discusses these organizations in detail.

j. Private Sector Organizations. Private sector organizations may support accident management by sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, developing emergency response and business continuity plans, enhancing overall readiness, implementing appropriate prevention and protection programs, and donating or otherwise providing goods and services through contractual arrangement or government purchases to assist in response to and recovery from an accident. Private-sector organizations provide response resources, including specialized teams, equipment, and advanced technologies. The Private-Sector Coordination Support Annex described in Reference (c) discusses these relationships in greater detail.

3. DOMESTIC RESPONSE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Overview. All U.S. nuclear weapon incidents will initially be considered to be the result of a hostile act until determined otherwise through investigation by the FBI. This section describes the procedures that are to be used once it has already been determined that the incident is the result of an accident. However, in practice there will likely be overlap between the initial phases described in this section and the investigation by the FBI. Incident response procedures, many of which are identical to accident response procedures, are discussed in section 5 of this enclosure. For the purposes of this document, events will be referred to as accidents, but responders should not wait for a determination before acting, particularly during the notification and initial response phases.

b. Accident Classification. Each U.S. nuclear weapon accident is unique; however, each will occur in one of four areas: domestic, multijurisdictional; domestic, single jurisdictional; foreign territory; or aboard ship. Foreign territory responses and shipboard responses are discussed in sections 6 and 7 of this enclosure. In determining what type of incident command structure to establish (single jurisdictional or UC), the IC may find the decision tree in Figure 6 of this enclosure useful. Accidents involving multiple jurisdictions are more complex; as such, they require a more complex organizational structure and operational response tactics. The concept of operations detailed in this section will discuss this more complex type of organization—domestic, multijurisdictional response to an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in DoD custody at the time of the event. Although the command structure will differ between a single incident command and a UC, the response phases and procedures discussed in this section will also apply to an IRF and RTF in a single jurisdiction response. This is an accident in which DoD has exclusive jurisdiction over the accident site and none of the physical effects of the accident transcend the boundaries of the exclusive jurisdiction of DoD. Although the IRF and RTF are not required to establish a UC for a single jurisdiction response, DoD response activities will be integrated with those of DHS, DOE, and FBI.

Figure 6. Domestic Nuclear Weapon Accident National DoD Response Decision Tree



(1) The primary mission of the DoD response to U.S. nuclear weapon accidents is the location, security, and recovery of the weapon; the protection of lives and property; and remediation of the site. To accomplish these tasks, the DoD response process can be categorized into five phases that begin when the accident occurs and continue until site remediation (SR) activities are completed. Due to the dynamic nature of the response, there are no solid lines of demarcation between phases; phases will often overlap. For example, SR activities will generally be undertaken in some form during all five phases. Moreover, depending on the severity of the nuclear weapon accident, SR activities could become protracted. The DoD would likely request that coordination of SR efforts transition to a cooperating agency better equipped to handle long-term remediation and recovery efforts. The five phases of U.S. nuclear weapon accident management are:

(a) Phase I – Notification and Deployment. Installations with knowledge of a U.S. nuclear weapon accident will notify the NJOIC immediately through operations report (OPREP) reporting procedures using CJCS Manual 3150.03D (Reference (t)) immediately. Response forces, initially comprising first responders, will deploy to the accident site, as appropriate.

(b) Phase II – Initial Response. Initial response activities begin when the accident occurs, including classification of the event. This phase chiefly comprises actions by first responders—fire, emergency medical, and law enforcement and security personnel—whose response actions focus on extinguishing fires, rescuing victims, treating casualties, and securing the nuclear weapon. The first responders may be civilian, military, or a combination of both. The IRF, in consultation with other initial response elements, should determine the necessity for additional assets or personnel and make appropriate requests through the chain of command. If needed to secure government property, an NDA may be established during this phase.

(c) Phase III – Consolidation. During consolidation, the accident site stabilizes and

transitions from the first responder activities in Phases I and II to the deliberate response activities in Phase III. This phase is marked by the evolution of a large response capability at the accident site and the establishment of a robust federal coordination capability in the area of the accident. The RTF commander would most likely arrive during this phase, if not earlier, and assume the DoD IC role. Activities in this phase include controlling the spread of contamination, continuing actions to minimize health and safety risks to the public and response personnel, consolidating accident site security, preparing for recovery of the nuclear weapon, and initiating SR operations and planning. An NDA may be established, expanded or contracted, if needed.

(d) Phase IV – Weapon Recovery Operations. Weapon recovery operations are those measures taken to assess the damage to the nuclear weapon, stabilize the weapon, and prepare and package the weapon and its components for transportation from the accident site. DoD and DOE will jointly determine a transportation plan for the weapon, including the next destination of the weapon, whether that be an interim or final destination. Ultimately, DOE will determine the final disposition and the packaging required of the weapon. This phase does **not** refer to actions taken to recapture or recover a lost or stolen U.S. nuclear weapon.

(e) Phase V – SR. SR concerns are addressed in all phases of the DoD response and begin with actions to contain or reduce the spread of contamination from the weapon to the immediate surrounding area. During this final phase of the response to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, the DoD will likely request transfer of coordinating agency responsibility to another agency that will manage long-term remediation efforts.

(2) Figure 7 of this enclosure gives a general sequence of events for a U.S. nuclear weapon accident response operation. The Synchronization Matrix available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/narp provides a more specific timeline for the sequence of events.

Figure 7. Notional Phase Timeline



c. Phase I: Notification and Deployment

(1) Overview. The notification and deployment phase begins once an accident has occurred and voice reports are provided to the NJOIC. This phase ends as the organizations required for response are alerted and deploy. The notifications will almost always be made before an accident determination can be made, therefore, the notification process should be identical for both accidents and events that are the result of a hostile act. Actions taken during this phase include notification of appropriate federal and SLT authorities; coordination and communication between the coordinating agency and all cooperating agencies identified during the initial NJOIC conference call and their subordinate organizations; and execution of plans to deploy assets to the accident site. Depending on the circumstances of the accident, the first notification may come from the local response community or from civilian bystanders who witnessed the accident.

(2) DoD Notification. In accordance with Reference (t), any U.S. nuclear weapon accident must be reported to the NJOIC by the lowest level of command having knowledge of the incident, via an OPREP-3 PINNACLE voice report within 15 minutes of occurrence. A written message report must be sent to the NJOIC within 1 hour of occurrence to amplify conditions at the site and to give an updated status of response actions. The reporting agency must use the format specified in Reference (t). It is imperative that both the voice report and the follow-up written message not be delayed while unit and Service chain of command notifications are made. Parallel notification protocols, e.g., notifying the chain of command while simultaneously following OPREP-3 PINNACLE procedures, are encouraged.

(a) The NJOIC, on receipt of the voice report, must convene a conference call with all appropriate national-level agencies, and the reporting agency, if possible. The NJOIC conference participants may include, but are not limited to: the Service operations center, the White House Situation Room (WHSR), DOS, Department of Transportation (DOT), DOE, Department of Justice (DOJ)/FBI, DTRA, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), U. S. Strategic Command, the supported CCDR, and DHS. This conference call activates the national-level response, as well as appropriate nuclear accident response plans and organizations. During the conference call, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) will designate the GCC in whose AOR the accident occurred as the supported CCDR, direct the CCDR and appropriate Service to deploy an IRF and RTF, and may request deployment of DOE emergency response assets, such as the DOE Accident Response Group (ARG) and the DOE-led Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC).

(b) Following standing guidance, the NJOIC must also notify the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the ASD(HD&ASA), and other OSD offices as appropriate.

(c) The DDO, through the NJOIC and on the advice of the JNAIRT, in close coordination with the GCCs and through the Service operations centers, will immediately activate and deploy an IRF (if a local military installation has not already done so) to take immediate life-saving actions and to establish safety and security controls at the accident scene.

The DDO, through the NJOIC and on advice from the JNAIRT, must also direct a Service to deploy an RTF to the accident scene to manage the DoD accident site response. In determining which Service will be tasked with deploying an RTF, the DDO, through the NJOIC and on the advice of the JNAIRT, will consider: the Service with custody of the weapon at the time of the accident; the proximity of each Service's RTF to the accident site; any special considerations (e.g., the damaged weapon is submerged in water or weather conditions at an RTF's location preclude a rapid response to the accident site); and the overall readiness of each Service's RTF. The supported CCDR must exercise OPCON, as specified by the Secretary of Defense, over the IRF and the RTF.

(d) The NJOIC maintains open communications with the reporting accident site and other interested parties that wish to stay informed, such as the DOE Operations Center, the DHS NOC, the FBI SIOC, and geographic Combatant Command operations centers.

(3) DoD Activation and Deployments

(a) Joint Staff. In a U.S. nuclear weapon accident involving military and civilian jurisdictions, the JNAIRT and JDOMS work together in processing requests for DoD forces and assistance, as well as preparing EXORDs, if required. Ideally, a warning order will be issued prior to the issuance of deployment orders (DEPORDs) and EXORDs. However, the seriousness of the accident may dictate forces being notified and deployed simultaneously via voice direction by the DDO. In this case, affected units will move out on voice authority of the NJOIC with the understanding that written DEPORD and EXORD will follow.

(b) OSD. The OSD CrMT will exchange information and coordinate on policy matters that may arise as details become known and federal response plans are put into effect. Additionally, following a domestic accident, the USD(AT&L) may appoint a DSO as a technical advisor for all responses under the NRIA of Reference (p). The DSO will not have directive or command authority over the IRF, RTF, or any JTF or DCO under the responding GCC, interagency, and SLT officials or personnel. The DSO will not serve dual roles as the IRF/RTF commander or the DCO. The DSO must report to the Secretary of Defense or designated representative.

(c) DTRA. When notified of a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, DTRA activates its consequence management advisory team (CMAT). In addition to deploying to advise the DoD IC on technical issues, the federal response mechanism, and specialized teams' capabilities, the CMAT independently or with DTRA Reachback resources will generate hazard area predictions based on reported source term information and release characteristics using forecasted numerical weather predictions. DTRA must forward these hazard area predictions as quickly as possible to the DoD IC to assist in setup of the response management area and for protective action decision making by the SLT or HN authorities. For domestic accidents, DTRA operates the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC). DTRA must coordinate hazard area atmospheric predictions via IMAAC to provide the federal interagency-coordinated hazard area model. The IMAAC is nominally the single federal source of airborne hazard predictions in domestic incidents supporting the NRF and tasked with necessary federal coordination. For foreign incidents, DTRA must also provide direct support to the support CCDR.

(4) Interagency Notification. The NJOIC conference call will normally be the initial notification of selected federal departments and agencies, including the DHS NOC and FBI SIOC. Department and agency representatives at the NOC may also inform their parent organizations.

(a) SLT officials may also report the incident to the NOC using established reporting mechanisms.

(b) Civilian or military officials having knowledge of radiological contamination must report this information to the NRT National Response Center. The National Response Center will, in turn, notify the NOC and the NRT's 16 federal departments and agencies.

(c) Upon notification that a domestic accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon has occurred, the NOC will report the situation to the Secretary of Homeland Security or senior staff, as delegated by the Secretary. The Secretary of Homeland Security will determine the need to activate components of the NRF (including the Incident Advisory Council, the NRCC, JFO, and ESFs). If activated, the NRF components may then be directed to conduct further assessment of the situation, initiate emergency coordination, share information with affected jurisdictions and the private sector, and/or initiate deployment of resources.

(d) The governor of the affected State may request federal assistance when a U.S. nuclear weapon accident occurs in U.S. territory and exceeds the response capabilities of the SLT governments. If the President issues a major disaster or emergency declaration pursuant to the Stafford Act, the President will appoint an FCO to manage and coordinate federal resource support activities. FCOs are not appointed in non-Stafford Act situations, so if the Stafford Act has not been invoked, a federal resource coordinator (FRC) will assume those FCO responsibilities.

(5) Interagency Activation and Deployments. Depending on the location and scope of the U.S. nuclear weapon accident, a wide range of federal resources may be activated and deployed. The departments and agencies involved could include all of the cooperating agencies, as well as other federal agencies, such as the National Transportation Safety Board, that may have statutory authority and responsibility to deploy. DOE, FBI, and DHS will be primary partners for DoD in the accident response. The DoD IC must ensure that the appropriate interagency teams are granted access to the accident site. To the maximum extent possible, security and Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) requirements should be adhered to; however, technical and investigative interagency personnel will not be denied access to the site for reasons of security while the accident constitutes an emergency.

(a) DOE. DOE is a key partner in any U.S. nuclear weapon accident due to its unique knowledge of nuclear weapons and its unique response capabilities and resources. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within DOE, is responsible for managing the U.S. nuclear weapons program and the immediate DOE response to any type of radiological accident globally. Requests for DOE/NNSA radiological emergency response asset support are forwarded to the DOE Operations Center. Once notified, DOE activates the Nuclear Incident Team within the DOE Operations Center, determines whether an

HQ or emergency management team is necessary, assesses the situation, and ensures that the appropriate DOE emergency response assets are notified.

(b) DHS. Upon notification by the NOC of a domestic accident, the NRCC begins interagency operations by coordinating the activation and initial deployment of special teams, as required by the situation. FEMA activates the RRCC to coordinate regional response efforts, establish federal priorities, and implement local federal program support.

(c) FBI. Upon notification by the NJOIC of an incident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon, the FBI SIOC will notify the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Directorate at FBI HQ, which will in turn provide notification to and coordination with the affected FBI field office. The FBI, through the WMD Directorate, will conduct an initial threat credibility evaluation with the field office to assess the incident and determine possible response options, including appropriate investigative actions to determine if the event is an accident or an intentional act. The field office will also activate a local integrated response plan, as needed. The FBI will additionally send a team to the incident site to work potential crime scene issues and send a senior representative to the UC to coordinate FBI objectives and priorities with those of the DoD, DOE ICs, and local law enforcement officials. Depending on the magnitude of the incident and criminal investigation, the FBI may establish a JOC near the site to manage law enforcement and investigative operations and coordinate those activities with other response elements.

d. Phase II: Initial Response

(1) Overview. The initial response phase to a domestic U.S. nuclear weapon accident will almost always begin before the FBI has determined whether the incident is the result of a hostile act. This phase centers on first responder activities that may include, but are not limited to, performing life-saving and firefighting activities, establishing incident command, developing public protection recommendations (SLT governments are responsible for implementing protective actions and requirements), providing for operational security, and controlling the spread of contamination. The first responders may be civilian, military, or a combination of both. These first responders will use NIMS ICS procedures to establish a UC that appropriately represents the federal and SLT agencies that have jurisdictional authority. DoD actions during this phase in order of precedence are to secure the weapon and related classified components and materials; preserve and protect life; prevent additional damage to property and the environment; and preserve evidence. DoD provides the DoD IC, who is responsible for accident management of these security activities and for the establishment and declaration of an NDA, if required.

(2) DoD Accident Site Command. The command function must be established and clearly understood from the beginning of accident response operations. DoD has the primary responsibility for the security of the weapon and related classified components or materials when the weapon is in DoD custody; hence, DoD has exclusive jurisdictional authority within the NDA once the FBI determines that the incident is not the result of a hostile act. The accident UC is composed of officials who collectively are responsible for the NDA and affected jurisdictions (the DoD IC and DOE representatives).

(a) The DoD IC has directive authority over all DoD forces and individuals at the accident site and has tactical and operational responsibility for accident management activities within the NDA. The initial UC may also include first responder elements, such as firefighters and law enforcement, as necessary, while their functional responsibilities are critical to the response.

(b) The DoD IC will operate out of the ICP, which will be established outside the accident site to ensure command of the NDA, if one is required, and access for all members of the UC.

(c) When command is shared or transferred, the process must be announced to all concerned parties. Transfer of command must include a formal or informal briefing that addresses all essential information for continuing safe and effective operations.

(d) The IRF commander fulfills the DoD IC role until command is transferred to the RTF commander, at which time the IRF is incorporated into the RTF.

(e) The information reporting chain for the DoD IC must be in accordance with CJCS and GCC authorities and responsibilities specified by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) DoD IC Phase II Functions. The DoD IC should ensure that the following tasks are completed during the initial response phase of the accident and that efforts to complete the tasks are conducted concurrently whenever possible.

(a) Establish Command and Control. Upon arrival at the accident site, the DoD IC will establish command of the security area around the weapon and classified components, as well as command of all on-scene DoD forces. This requires establishing a UC with the representatives of any entities that have jurisdiction outside the security area or NDA. It may also require a functional UC for critical response activities within the security area or NDA.

(b) Establish Contact with HQ. The DoD IC will establish and maintain contact initially with the NJOIC, then transitioning to the GCC once the appropriate GCC receives OPCON of the accident.

1. The IRF will initiate and continue periodic reporting (time between reports should not exceed 60 minutes) to the appropriate chain of command in accordance with Reference (t) until relieved by the RTF. Reports must not be delayed to gather more information.

2. After communication is initiated by the IRF, it may be necessary to maintain the needed contact by keeping open-line communications and immediately reestablishing this link if it is broken.

(c) Extinguish Fires. Local firefighting capabilities may be requested. If the weapon is exposed to high temperatures and local firefighters are unfamiliar with radiological firefighting procedures, the DoD IC must obtain and provide information to the firefighters contained in

Technical Publication (TP) 20-11 (Reference (u)) on potential hazards and advise them on the proper treatment of the weapon.

(d) Rescue, Stabilize, and Evacuate Casualties. Local ambulances and hospitals may be requested to evacuate and treat accident-related casualties. Treatment of life-threatening injuries should always take precedence over contamination considerations in a nuclear weapon accident. Casualties with non-life-threatening injuries should be surveyed for radiological contamination and decontaminated, as required, prior to evacuation and transport to medical facilities for treatment. Care should be taken to reduce the spread of contamination whenever possible and to avoid unnecessary contamination of medical resources when injuries are minor and adequate first aid is available.

1. Casualty decontamination should be accomplished once casualties are medically stabilized. Ambulances should be kept outside the cordoned and hot zone areas at all times. Therefore, when departing with casualties, ambulances will not be decontaminated prior to departure from the collection point. However, if an ambulance becomes contaminated, decontamination procedures must be accomplished prior to transporting clean or decontaminated patients. Consideration should be given to decontamination standards for military equipment, which may differ from federal or State standards.

2. Responding medical personnel should be immediately integrated into the incident command and operate in areas appropriate to their training and protection level. Although radiological hazards at an accident site should not prevent immediate life-saving procedures, where possible, victims should be rescued by properly trained and equipped responders and moved to a casualty collection area free of significant hazards. When necessary to save lives and whenever possible, medical personnel who are unfamiliar with site hazards and are entering hazardous (radiological, explosive, toxic) areas at the direction of the IC should be accompanied by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel to identify weapon and explosive hazards at the incident site. If EOD is not available during the initial entry to save lives, the team must be accompanied by responders trained in the identification and avoidance of explosive materials. All operations associated with assessment of the weapon status should be conducted from a distance greater than 50 feet. Once EOD arrives on scene, EOD personnel will enter the site to determine the specific condition of the weapon(s) involved.

(e) Presence of Contamination. The first responders must identify and report suspected areas of contamination and provide recommendations based on the nature and extent of contaminated areas to the IC. Where possible, first responders should also delineate and mark areas of contamination. The GCC will be advised whether contamination is detected, and the GCC must immediately forward this information to the NJOIC.

1. In accordance with confirmation guidelines (Figure 8), the DoD IC is required to notify federal and SLT officials of potential hazards and recommend that appropriate public health and safety actions are taken outside the NDA. If necessary, issue protective action recommendations (PARs) to the SLT authorities for them to consider what actions must be taken by the public to avoid or reduce exposure to radiation.

Figure 8. U.S. Nuclear Weapon Confirmation Guidelines

CONFIRMATION GUIDELINES FOR THE DoD IC
In accordance with DoDD 5230.16 (Reference (v)), it is DoD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons at any particular installation or location. There are two exceptions to this policy: 1. The DoD IC is required to confirm the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components in the interest of public safety if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon. The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OATSD(PA)) or the DOE/NNSA Office of PA will be advised of this confirmation as soon as possible. 2. The DoD IC may confirm or deny the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. The GCC PA Office and the OASD(PA) will be advised before, or as soon as possible after such notification.

2. Identify and decontaminate, as necessary, persons who may have been contaminated. Ensure accurate records are established and maintained of personnel who have been exposed to radiation. These records will be turned over to the documentation unit of the planning section of the incident command once the unit is operational. These records must be maintained in accordance with Public Law 104-191 (Reference (w)).

3. Ensure personnel entering an area that is contaminated, or is suspected of containing contamination, wear personal protective clothing and respiratory protection until contamination levels are determined. For time-critical lifesaving actions, responding personnel may be allowed to enter the contaminated area with only respiratory protection without donning protective clothing at the discretion of the IC. The responders would have to be decontaminated after leaving the contaminated area; however, the respiratory protection should protect from additional internal radiation exposure.

4. Request, receive, and use IMAAC hazard predictions. In the interim, first responders must use organic hazard prediction and assessment capability (HPAC) modeling tools with DTRA reach-back, or stand-alone HPAC systems for internal planning only. Use these plots until IMAAC plots are available. Once available, IMAAC plots supersede all others.

(f) Establish an NDA. The DoD IC must establish and declare an NDA in accordance with DoDI 5200.08 (Reference (x)) in any accident in which DoD does not have exclusive jurisdiction of the area containing the weapon and related classified components or materials. The DoD IC will:

1. Request local law enforcement officials or personnel to assist in securing the area, preventing unauthorized entry, and removing unauthorized personnel if military security forces are insufficient or unavailable.

2. Review the rules for the use of force (RUF) to be used by DoD security personnel with the appropriate security forces commander and LO and tailor the RUF for the situation, if needed, consistent with CJCSI 3121.01B (Reference (y)). Ensure that any federal or SLT law enforcement personnel involved in responding to the incident are aware of the RUF in effect for DoD security forces.

3. Provide appropriate protective equipment for perimeter guards who are posted in a contaminated area. When posting perimeter guards, consider the potential for new contamination due to wind shift and the re-suspension of contaminants.

4. Ask about local weather history and current forecasts to determine the best location for assets and minimize relocation of key activities due to changes in wind direction. This information will then be put into the organic HPAC tool to produce a predictive model to help the IC in the decision-making process.

5. Secure the airspace over the accident site by using temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) or other airspace control measures through cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration in accordance with part 91.137 of Title 14, CFR (Reference (z)).

(g) Status of Weapons. Assess the status of weapons and report this information to the geographic Combatant Commands.

(h) EOD Procedures. If EOD assets are available and the FBI has determined that the accident is not a result of a hostile act, the EOD personnel will start weapon recovery operations by performing necessary render safe procedures (RSPs). EOD personnel should not be denied access to the accident site for reasons of security; initial EOD nuclear RSPs take priority over security and PRP requirements. However, to the maximum extent possible, EOD personnel should comply with security and PRP requirements before performing RSPs in compliance with their critical PRP training.

(i) PA. Start PA procedures, including establishing a joint information center (JIC), and establishing direct communications with the geographic Combatant Command PA office and the OATSD(PA). PA guidance should be coordinated with the LO and other members of the IRF/RTF staff. Any information or questions regarding the potential nature of the incident (hostile or non-hostile) should be coordinated with or deferred to the FBI before delivery to SLT officials, the general public, or the media.

1. Immediately develop a coordinated public message between the federal government and SLT officials. The White House expects a senior Washington official (Secretary level) to make a public statement on any incident within one hour of occurrence, in accordance with the Public Affairs Support Annex to the NRF. In conjunction with this statement, the DoD IC will deliver a similar message with SLT officials soon after arriving on scene (within minutes). Information should include that discussed in paragraph 3d(3)(b)1 of this enclosure. To alleviate panic, the message should be factual and synchronized with the message distributed by SLT officials. Consider having a medical professional present at the press conference to address any medical or health concerns.

2. Ensure mechanisms are established to give the JIC scientific and medical data regularly for inclusion in external PA operations. If available, consider assigning medical and scientific representatives to the JIC.

3. Ensure that information channels are established and deliver appropriate news releases, as approved and directed by the geographic Combatant Command PA office and the OATSD(PA). Objectives include, if necessary, confirming the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in accordance with Reference (u). USG policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of U.S. nuclear weapons at any specific location, but exceptions in accordance with Reference (v) are allowed when it is necessary to administer public safety actions or to reduce or prevent public alarm.

(j) Transition Briefing. Prepare a transition briefing for presentation to the RTF commander prior to the transfer of DoD IC responsibility from the IRF to the RTF (see paragraph 3e(2) of this enclosure for additional information).

(k) MACS. Identify a suitable site for establishing the multiagency coordination entity.

(l) Interagency Coordination. Consult with initial responders from DOE, FBI, and DHS to determine if additional assets or personnel are needed and make appropriate requests through the chain of command.

(m) Additional Tasks. If the situation and time permit, the DoD IC will accomplish the following additional tasks before the arrival of the RTF:

1. Protect the public and lessen health and safety hazards. Objectives include determining the status and location of all hazardous or classified material; researching and analyzing weather conditions to determine how they will affect the public and the response; placing air samplers upwind and downwind of the accident site; establishing a temporary contamination control line (CCL), if required; and establishing the accident site health group (ASHG).

2. Provide necessary operational security. Objectives include having a security element for perimeter security, entry and exit control, and protection of classified information and property; coordinating with the FBI, principal legal advisor, and civilian law enforcement officials to ensure procedures are in place to preserve the accident site as a potential crime scene; and properly maintaining any evidence.

3. If no radioactive material was released during the accident, prepare to respond in the event of a release during weapon recovery operations.

4. Establish an operations area, base camp, and contamination control area.

5. Identify a forward operating location, staging area, and reception center for follow-on forces.

(4) EOD

(a) All four Services have EOD assets. All of these assets have the capability to fulfill the initial response requirements of weapons verification, damage assessment, and electrical RSPs, in accordance with Army Regulation 75-14/Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 8027.1G/Marine Corps Order 8027.1D/Air Force Joint Instruction 32-3002 (Reference (aa)). However, to ensure response by the most qualified and knowledgeable personnel, follow-on RSPs and disposal procedures on Service-unique nuclear weapon systems should be performed by EOD personnel of that Service, in conjunction with the DOE ARG. The RTF EOD support will come from the Service associated with the weapon(s) involved in the accident. Initial EOD support in areas OCONUS will come from the nearest EOD unit, with follow-on support coming from the Service that has custody of the weapon. The IRF EOD personnel may become part of the RTF.

(b) The supported CCDR will provide, or request, qualified EOD teams to perform required procedures on the weapon(s). Qualified EOD teams are those that have received EOD nuclear weapon training, either in initial training at Naval School EOD and received some other recurring or advanced training to supplement their basic knowledge. The desired deployment time frame is 30 minutes during normal duty hours and 1 hour after normal duty hours, during weekends, and during holidays.

(c) As the primary element responsible for weapon recovery, the EOD element will conduct weapon damage assessments, initiate systematic searches to reestablish accountability of weapons and components, protect classified components from view, and stabilize the site from nuclear and conventional explosive hazards. Safe paths for movement around the accident site and point(s) for entrance and exit will be clearly marked and briefed to personnel. During the weapons recovery phase, weapons recovery operations are a combined effort of EOD, the ARG, and FBI bomb technicians when possibility of a hostile act exists.

(d) U.S. Navy EOD are the only EOD personnel trained in underwater recovery techniques and will be the only EOD personnel used to recover weapons located underwater.

e. Phase III: Accident Site Consolidation.

(1) Overview. This phase evolves out of the initial response as imminent life-saving and firefighting activities are completed and the accident site begins to stabilize. It is marked by the arrival of a robust group of DoD and interagency response assets at the accident site, as well as a maturing federal coordination capability in the local area. Actions taken during this phase may include, but are not limited to, establishing a JFO, controlling contamination, reducing the health and safety risk to the public and response personnel, removing hazards, continuing security measures, performing initial and follow-on RSPs, addressing PA issues, and initiating longer-term planning activities for SR.

(2) Transfer of DoD IC Responsibilities. The DoD IC responsibilities will transfer from the IRF commander to the RTF commander after RTF arrival at the accident site. The change in

command will occur at the conclusion of the transition briefing and IRF personnel will be incorporated into the RTF.

(a) Transition Briefing. Consistent with NIMS ICS procedures, the transition briefing will capture all essential information for continuing safe and effective operations. It should include the information in paragraphs 3d(2)(a)1 through 3d(2)(a)13 of this enclosure, as well as the information required to complete forms ICS 201, Incident Briefing; ICS 202, Incident Objectives; ICS 203, Organization Assignment List; ICS 204, Assignment List; ICS 205, Incident Radio Communications Plan; ICS 206, Medical Plan; and ICS 215, Operational Planning Worksheet. These forms are available on the FEMA ICS Resource Center Website at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm.

1. Introduction. Introduction and general situation discussion.

2. Command Relationships. The command relationships briefing must identify the various response elements, organizations, and specialized teams on scene, as well as who is in command of local civilian response elements.

3. Weather. The weather briefing must discuss how weather has affected recovery operations, detail the impact on downwind contamination, and provide a forecast that includes wind direction, precipitation, severe weather activity, and lightning. The impact of the weather on personnel should also be included.

4. Safety. A general safety briefing must be included in the transition briefing, including a brief description of primary hazards and actions being taken to mitigate them.

5. Intelligence. The intelligence briefing must include information about any hostile collection or exploitation efforts and should coordinate with the FBI.

6. Operations. The operations briefing must begin with a diagram of the accident scene, including the location of the weapon(s). It should discuss the applicable RSPs, known or estimated magnitude of contamination, the status of any implemented PARs, the contamination control procedures in place, and the status of all specialized teams and capabilities present. A review of all SR actions taken or recommended should be included, as well as details and description of the airspace control measures on place over the accident site, i.e., TFRs.

7. Security. The security briefing must state whether an NDA has been established, any interactions with State or local law enforcement, any badging and access (credentialing) issues, force protection considerations, and the current RUF under which the security force is operating.

8. Medical. The medical briefing must detail any issues relating to casualties, contaminated persons, and any additional potential safety and health hazards. The casualty information should be provided within the construct of its impact on available medical facilities, as well as the response operation. The brief should include preventive medicine, force health protection, and health risk management considerations.

9. Legal. The legal briefing must discuss any significant or unusual legal issues, summarize important claims questions and pending environmental law matters, and provide an overview of the relationship between federal and State authorities, if needed. The briefing should review the RUF in place, note how it has been tailored for the current situation, summarize local police deadly force rules, and review the legal basis for establishing and disestablishing the NDA, along with related legal considerations.

10. Logistics. The logistics briefing must give an overview of personnel currently on site and the timelines for those expected to arrive in the future. The briefing should also cover messing, billeting, support infrastructure, staging areas, transportation, and the availability of critical resources.

11. PA. The PA briefing must give a report of any media on-site, the level of public awareness and their concerns, and whether a statement has been issued concerning the disclosure of nuclear weapon information. This briefing should also provide the press conference schedule.

12. Communications. The communications briefing must list the communications assets available, the status of establishing secure communications, and the extent of any reports made thus far to HQ elements.

13. Relevant Presentations by Other Federal and SLT Elements. Other involved organizations or agencies should brief on specific aspects of the response.

(b) DoD IC Responsibilities During Consolidation. During Phase III of the response, the DoD IC will:

1. Maintain UC with other interagency partners and with SLT officials representing other jurisdictional authorities at the accident site.

2. Maintain or establish secure communications with the GCC.

3. Initiate or continue reporting in accordance with Reference (t), and GCC and DoD issuances.

4. If not previously accomplished and such is in the best interest of public safety and public order, confirm the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in accordance with Reference (v). If a JFO is established, oversight for PA and the federal JIC will transfer to the JFO external affairs officer. Keep the JIC informed of activities at the site, provide technical information in response to queries, make SMEs available for press conferences, and generally support the PA program as necessary.

5. Continue IRF activities, as required, and accomplish any IRF tasks that are not yet completed.

6. Establish priorities for recovering weapon(s) and weapon components, classified radiological material, and radioactive and other hazardous items.

7. Prioritize all NDA-related requests for additional security personnel, emergency support, secondary emergencies, and logistic requirements.

8. Establish a combined ASHG.

9. Establish the joint security coordination center.

10. Establish or continue liaison with the JFO.

11. Coordinate actions with any accident investigation board (AIB) or team and work with the President or Chair of the AIB to assist in the conduct of its investigation while maintaining the safety and security of the accident site.

a. In all cases, the safety and security of the accident site will take precedence over accident investigation activities.

b. Weapon recovery and security operations will consider the safety of the public and the response forces and, to the greatest extent possible, coordinate their actions with the President or Chair of the AIB or team to preserve evidence necessary to the accident investigation.

12. Help the involved SLT government ensure the health and safety of civilians.

13. Coordinate actions with the FBI criminal investigation team.

14. Provide required medical, logistical, and administrative support, as needed by NDA forces.

15. Assess force protection and force health protection requirements and provide for long-term impacts on responding forces.

16. Begin planning for disestablishment of the NDA and orderly transfer to appropriate SLT authorities; ensure DoD and DOE long-term support during the SR phase is provided.

17. Plan, direct, coordinate, and administer the NDA response elements.

f. Phase IV: Weapon Recovery Operations

(1) Overview. Weapon recovery involves a myriad of technical disciplines and supporting infrastructure to reduce and minimize hazards to the public and the environment. Weapon recovery begins once any existing fires have been extinguished, weapons have been cooled, and initial casualties have been removed or stabilized. EOD personnel will then conduct an initial reconnaissance of the area to locate weapon(s) and debris, as well as to prioritize future

actions. The principal resources available to meet weapon recovery responsibilities are Coordinating Agency Nuclear Certified EOD teams and the DOE/NNSA ARG. The DoD IC may request additional support as required.

(a) The DoD IC should consider the following safety, health, and security factors before initiating any activities related to weapon recovery:

1. Explosive ordnance and accident debris are inherently dangerous, but some minimum number of personnel may have to be exposed to hazards to complete the mission.

2. Consequences should be evaluated and mitigated as practicable before exposing personnel to hazards.

3. The high priority given to weapon recovery operations does not inherently imply a need for rapid action. During this phase personnel and public safety must always be the highest priority.

(2) Nuclear Weapon Security. Physical security safeguards required to prevent unauthorized access to classified information and proper control and disposition of classified material must be strictly enforced during all operations involving the weapon(s) or weapon components in accordance with Reference (m). DOE/NNSA technical teams and FBI investigators should not be prohibited from accessing the accident site. However, to the greatest extent possible, security measures as described in Reference (m) should be met and the two-person rule should be observed and enforced. Because of the technical information requirements during nuclear weapon operations, some documents at the accident scene may contain critical nuclear weapon design information (CNWDI). The sensitive information in these documents requires that security measures be implemented consistent with the highest classification assigned. Personnel working in an area containing CNWDI should be properly cleared and authorized until recovery discussions are complete and the applicable items have been covered or removed. The DoD IC has CNWDI waiver authority during an actual emergency, but not during drills or exercises. Similarly, the DoD IC will use the guidance regarding PRP requirements listed in Reference (m), but will not allow the lack of PRP-certification impede FBI personnel or any other authorized responders from fulfilling their statutory responsibilities. Reciprocity between the DoD PRP and DOE Human Reliability Program should be accepted by the DoD IC and security authorities during a joint response. The DoD IC will maintain a credentialing system to process personnel into the accident site.

(3) Weapon Recovery Steps. The basic steps of weapon recovery operations are initial entry, locating weapon(s) and weapon components, performing initial and continuation RSPs (CRSPs), development and approval of the weapon recovery plans, interim packaging, local movement, temporary staging, final packaging, and preparation for offsite shipment of the weapon(s) and components. This phase does **not** refer to actions taken to recapture or recover a lost or stolen nuclear weapon. As part of the FBI investigative determination regarding the nature of the incident, coordination between FBI evidentiary and EOD teams for evidence preservation and collection will take place. The FBI must be allowed to do its own risk assessment of the hazard to their agents using information provided through the UC to determine

if the risk is acceptable to facilitate the accident/incident determination. These actions, however, should not unduly impose on personnel and public safety.

(a) Step 1: Initial Entry. The initial entry will determine the preliminary weapon(s) status and hazards in the area. During the initial entry into the site many hazards will be present, not just from the nuclear weapon, but from the associated delivery system and the transportation mechanism, if applicable. Nuclear weapons and delivery system components may contain conventional explosives and other HAZMAT. Radiological material may have been dispersed by mechanical disruption, fire, or detonation. Weapons may need stabilizing to prevent further damage or explosions. Other explosive items that may be encountered include conventional munitions, aircraft fire extinguisher cartridges, engine starter cartridges, pyrotechnics, and egress or extraction devices. Leaking fluids, liquid oxygen, propellants, oxidizers, shredded or torn metals, and composite materials or fibers present additional hazards. Initial responders will mark these hazards and a clear pathway and/or entryway to the weapon(s). In initial site stabilization, IRF EOD teams, if available, determine weapon condition and, if required, perform electrical RSPs in accordance with applicable TPs.

(b) Step 2: Locating Weapons and Weapon Components. After initial site stabilization is accomplished, EOD personnel begin a deliberate search to locate all recoverable nuclear weapons and components. All reasonable efforts must be made to accomplish this task and, depending on the accident circumstances; weapon(s) and weapon components may be scattered and/or buried over a large area. A systematic search may be required until all weapon(s) and weapon components are located and identified. The search may be time consuming and may require many personnel. The search method used by the DoD IC depends on many factors, including the number of personnel available, topography, and environmental conditions. Metal detectors and radiation detection, indication, and computation (RADIAC) equipment may be needed to find all weapons and components; consider the use of DoD unmanned aerial systems, if available. As components are found, their location should be marked, recorded on a map using global positioning system coordinates, if possible, and photographed. If all components are not found, the EOD team leader should coordinate with the ARG team leader and recommend to the DoD IC additional procedures to be incorporated during the remediation phase of operations. Search techniques are:

1. Creeping Line Search. A search in loose crisscrossing patterns designed to find weapon components rapidly. This technique is used by EOD and radiological monitoring personnel to search the accident area soon after the accident has occurred.

2. Aerial Radiological and Photographic Survey. Used to identify areas of significant radioactive intensity to help find missing weapon components and provide high resolution photography. DOE/NNSA aerial radiological surveys provided by the aerial measuring system can help in this regard.

3. Visual Line Search. A search usually conducted by a slow moving line of personnel positioned abreast at various intervals, depending on the object to be located.

4. Instrument Search. Metal and radiation detector monitoring of those areas where weapons or components were found before. This method may supplement the visual search.

5. Scarifying Procedure. Scarifying procedures are used to locate components that may have been buried during the accident or subsequently covered by wind action. A road grader equipped with scarifiers (large steel teeth) is used to plow a surface. Search teams follow the graders and conduct a visual and/or instrument search for missing components. Coordination must be made with the ASHG before implementing such techniques, in order to assess personnel protection requirements due to re-suspension and the potential impact on site decontamination and remediation.

(c) Step 3: Perform Initial and CRSPs. The DoD IC is ultimately responsible for the proper implementation of any RSPs or CRSPs when a U.S nuclear weapon is involved in an accident while in DoD custody. EOD personnel are tasked to perform RSPs on damaged weapons in DoD custody, but are limited by what procedures the EOD personnel are trained and authorized to perform. EOD personnel will be directly supported and advised by DOE/NNSA ARG scientific and technical personnel. A coordinating agency's nuclear-certified EOD team may be authorized by the DoD IC to perform CRSPs without DOE/NNSA ARG consultation in time-urgent situations. The EOD team evaluates and analyzes the accident situation and advises the DoD IC of the safest and most reliable means for neutralizing weapon-associated hazards. RSPs may begin once the reconnaissance has been completed. In an accident, nuclear materials must be handled according to approved written procedures.

1. When available, DOE/NNSA radiographic equipment is used to assess internal damage and aid standard EOD procedures. DOE/NNSA radiographic capabilities are available for the field diagnostics of damaged weapons in the event of an accident. The ARG deploys with high-energy radiography equipment with digital imaging capability. DOE/NNSA ARG capabilities and knowledge, combined with EOD team procedures and experience in RSPs and CRSPs under hazardous conditions, provide the best method of determining a weapon's condition and providing for its safe recovery.

2. The EOD team's actions, by priority, are:

a. Preventing nuclear detonation.

b. Preventing nuclear contribution or a high explosive (HE) detonation.

c. Detecting, identifying, containing, and reducing the hazards of explosives and external and internal radiation hazards resulting from the accident.

d. Protecting personnel against the hazards noted in paragraph 3f(3)(a) of this enclosure.

3. After completion of the RSPs and CRSPs and coordination with accident investigators and FBI personnel (as applicable), the weapon and weapon components should be removed to an interim staging area.

(d) Step 4: Development and Approval of the Weapon Recovery Plans. If the weapon is in a stable environment, no immediate actions should occur until EOD personnel and the DOE/NNSA have developed coordinated weapon recovery plans. The DoD IC in consultation with the DOE/NNSA senior energy official (SEO) is responsible for approving these plans. In order to ensure timely response, the approval of plans with minimal worst-case consequences should be delegated to the EOD team chief and ARG federal team leader. Weapon recovery actions with the potential for off-site consequences must be approved at higher levels, commensurate with the potential risk. The elements of a weapon recovery plan are:

1. Prerequisites and operational objectives.

2. Detailed procedures. If RSPs and CRSPs that the EOD and the DOE/NNSA ARG develop contain potential nuclear explosive safety concerns, then the joint DoD/DOE weapon recovery safety evaluation team (WRSET), an independent safety review team, will review and approve them before presentation to the DoD IC or designated representative.

3. Special instructions.

4. Hazards and PPE. This includes both the Site Hazards Characterization, as it pertains to the scope of this work, and the PPE Checklist. For EOD operations in airborne radiological areas, some consideration should be provided for scaled-back personal protective gear if it can significantly reduce other more significant risks, like those from heat stroke.

5. Equipment.

6. Personnel.

7. Activity Checklist.

(e) Step 5: Interim and Packaging, Local Movement, Temporary Staging, Final Packaging, and Preparation for Offsite Shipment

1. Hazard Removal. The final step in the weapon recovery phase begins with the removal of identified hazards. The DoD IC establishes priorities for removing all hazards so that other response personnel may conduct operations. It is unsafe for anyone but task-trained personnel under EOD supervision to clear an area of broken, scattered, or uncharacterized HE.

2. Temporary Staging. After EOD personnel and the DOE/NNSA determine the weapons to be safe for local movement, they are moved to a designated interim staging area in coordination with accident investigators. The DoD IC is responsible to assure that adequate security is in place at the interim staging location.

a. Consolidation of large amounts of fissile material in confined areas must take criticality safety into consideration. Fissile material must be stored in a manner using administrative and engineering controls to prevent criticality.

b. If unpackaged, nuclear weapon(s) and weapon components must be covered, in order to protect them from the elements and information sensors, including satellite surveillance.

c. The distances that explosives storage areas must be separated from other operations are determined by the type and amount of explosives stored. An isolated and segregated area should be set aside for the exclusive storage of exposed or damaged explosives. If explosive items cannot be stored separately, a balance of safety and practical considerations requires assigning each item to a storage group based on compatibility characteristics. In some situations, on-site disposal of HE may be possible. However, safety is always the primary consideration, and major factors in an on-site disposal decision are the space available and the hazards presented, including re-suspension of contaminants. The explosives storage area or disposal sites should be large enough to reduce hazards to personnel in the event of a detonation.

3. Custody. Each Military Department has publications that address the storage, security, and safety aspects associated with U.S. nuclear weapons. These publications also address requirements for the custody of U.S. nuclear weapons and weapon components. To provide the DoD IC with the full authority and responsibility for all actions at the scene of an accident, the Services' publications will address the transfer of control of the U.S. nuclear weapons to the DoD IC when assuming command of the accident in accordance with Reference (m). Ultimate disposition of damaged weapon(s) and/or components involves returning these devices to DOE/NNSA; therefore, close coordination between the DoD IC and the DOE/NNSA SEO is necessary throughout the weapon recovery phase. Custody of the damaged weapon(s) and components is transferred to DOE/NNSA at a point decided jointly by DoD and DOE/NNSA.

4. Final Packaging and Marking. The DOE/NNSA ARG maintains the expertise to package safely damaged U.S. nuclear weapon(s) and weapon debris associated with an accident involving U.S. nuclear weapons. Packaging specialist consultation is required for weapon(s), weapon components, and/or explosives damaged or subjected to extreme forces during accidents. Before weapon(s), weapon components, and/or explosives are shipped, they must be packaged to ensure that unacceptable levels of removable contamination do not exist on the container and that the environment expected during shipment will not cause further damage. To meet this requirement, special packing, shipping, marking, and safety instructions should be obtained from the DOE to comply, as much as possible, with transportation regulations of the DoD, DOE/NNSA, and DOT, as applicable. The DOE/NNSA is prepared to provide unique containers that are designed to transport safely damaged nuclear weapons, their components, and/or associated debris.

5. Shipment and Final Disassembly. When the DoD IC and the DOE/NNSA SEO initially decides on a destination, the IC may assign the DoD or request that DOE/NNSA be assigned the primary responsibility for moving the weapon(s). When deciding the mode and route of transportation for U.S. nuclear weapons, the balance of safety, security, and military requirements should be considered so as to minimize the potential overall risk to the population and environment. Movement should be kept to a minimum. Shipments of weapons and/or

weapon components will be eventually routed to a DOE/NNSA facility for examination, analysis, and final disassembly.

6. Redeployment. Although many accident site resources may be released by the DoD IC for redeployment after packaging and transportation of the weapon(s) and/or components is completed, others will have a continuing role at the accident site. The DoD IC should assess which forces can be released and which forces need to remain. Additionally, the DoD IC should prepare for transitioning responsibilities for long-term management of the accident scene to the appropriate authorities. These actions include disestablishment of the NDA/NSA and coordinating measures for federal support for site security and remediation activities, if requested, to SLT governments. For those redeployed assets, the final step of the response is reconstitution of response capability to reestablish readiness for a subsequent deployment.

g. Phase V: SR

(1) Overview

(a) SR is the phase of accident response that addresses cleanup of contamination that may have occurred as a result of the accident and restoration of the affected area to conditions agreed upon by the stakeholders. Although SR is described as a Phase V activity, SR should be integrated into every phase of accident response, and preventing or mitigating the spread of contaminants is a high priority for the IC or UC throughout the response. SR should not be confused with recovery planning. Although recovery planning includes SR, planning for the recovery from the effects of a nuclear accident is generally initiated at the request of the SLT governments, and in most cases does not take place until the accident site has stabilized and immediate actions to protect public health, safety, and property are accomplished. Upon request, the federal government assists SLT governments in the development and execution of recovery plans. Recovery, as used in this section, encompasses any action dedicated to the continued protection of the public and resumption of normal activities in the affected area.

(b) Personnel responsible for SR activities may refer to NUREG-1575/EPA 402-R-97-016/DOE/EH-0624 (Reference (ab)), which was developed jointly by DoD, DOE/NNSA, EPA, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to provide a consistent approach in investigating and remediating radiologically contaminated sites, regardless of the cause – routine operations or accident. Additionally, sections 9601 through 9675 of Title 42, U.S.C. (Reference (ac)) assign liability to each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States during and following a U.S. nuclear weapon accident response for violations of the statutory provisions. As outlined in section 9607(a) of Reference (ac), the potentially responsible party (the coordinating agency) will be responsible for any other necessary costs of response. Specifically, the coordinating agency will be liable for damages or injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources and the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under sections 9601 through 9675 of Reference (ac).

(2) Responsibilities. In a U.S. nuclear weapon accident, DoD is responsible for managing the federal technical radiological cleanup activities after a DoD custody accident.

(a) The DoD IC must establish an SR subgroup within the response and recovery branch of the JFO or multiagency coordination center operations section to coordinate SR environmental remediation and cleanup in concert with cognizant SLT governments. SR support and expertise can be requested from the DOE, the EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers, and other federal agencies that have SR expertise and capabilities (e.g., an advisory team for food and animal health matters). SLT agencies and NGOs with applicable expertise may also assist with SR planning and activities.

(b) SLT governments are primarily responsible for planning the recovery of the affected area. Upon request, the federal government assists SLT governments with developing and executing recovery plans.

(c) The DoD may transfer responsibility for remediation to another federal department or agency to manage long-term cleanup efforts.

(3) SR Process. SR has five fundamental steps: initial actions, site characterization, intermediate actions, long-term plan development, and plan implementation (see Figure 9 of this enclosure for an outline of the process). The SR process is initiated during the early phases of the response. The complete SR process may last for years after the U.S. nuclear weapon and its radioactive components are recovered from the site. Many actions within the process overlap from one step to the next as stakeholders address the complex problems associated with remediating contaminated land, buildings, and property to agreed-upon safe levels.

Figure 9. The SR Process



(a) Initial SR Actions. This step begins during the initial response phase and focuses on actions and short-term planning to prevent or mitigate the spread of contamination and on an initial assessment on the degree and extent of contamination. Contamination prevention and

mitigation actions might include wetting down the contaminated components to prevent suspension or re-suspension and blocking runoff of contaminated liquids. The initial contamination assessment assists in identifying the scope of the problem, the stakeholders, and the range of expertise required. The DOE, through the FRMAC or the DOE CM home team and CM response team, provides information and support to IC or UC radiological monitoring and assessment activities for the initial phases of the response.

(b) Site Characterization. Site characterization begins during the consolidation phase. A comprehensive and complete characterization of the contamination problem is essential to an effective SR effort. The characterization should provide sufficient information on the physical characteristics of the site, including soil surface features, meteorology and climatology, surface water hydrology, geology, demography and land use, and hydrogeology. Emphasis should be placed on surface soils since this is the predominant source of exposure. Characterization should also address environmental conditions that could affect the rate and direction of contaminant transport in the environment. The key actions in this step are highly technical and a full site characterization may take weeks or months to complete. Current Military Department and DOE/NNSA guidance addresses this step in detail. Results of the characterization survey should include:

1. Identification and distribution of contamination in buildings, structures, and other site facilities.

2. The concentration and distribution of contaminants in surface and subsurface soils.

3. The distribution and concentration of contaminants in surface water, ground water, and sediments.

4. The distribution and concentration of contaminants in other impacted media such as vegetation or paint.

(c) Initiate Intermediate Actions. Intermediate actions are initiated during the weapons recovery phase and focus on achieving three principal goals: protect public health and the environment, restore essential services, and develop the basis for a long-term plan. Actions in this step should concentrate on those problems that are most important or can be accomplished quickly and easily. Planning and prioritizing these actions should include the early and full participation of SLT stakeholders, as well as the general public. Openness and transparency ensure questions are answered and gain public confidence in both the process and the SR plan that will be developed. These actions may be time consuming, but will have a significant long-term effect.

1. During this SR step, the DSO must formally establish a site remediation working group (SRWG), with representation from federal and SLT agencies. The IRF or RTF commander may, however, establish an initial SRWG earlier to provide advice and help to ensure that SR decisions and activities are vetted and made a matter of record from the beginning stages of the event.

2. The SRWG will assess the type and extent of contamination; develop the long-term SR plan; obtain federal and SLT government approval for the plan; provide the plan to the DoD IC for execution; and monitor the results. Membership, size, and location of the SRWG are flexible and dynamic. The SRWG will expand and contract with changing conditions at the accident scene. Once the radiological material and classified components have been removed from the accident site, the DoD transfers responsibility for remediation to another department or agency to manage long-term cleanup efforts. The DoD will initially lead the SRWG, but leadership will transfer once remediation responsibilities are transferred.

(d) Long-Term SR Plan Development. The major goals in developing the long-term SR plan are the long-term protection of the public health and environment and restoration of the affected area to a level that is technically and economically achievable within socially and politically acceptable guidelines. This step involves extensive coordination and approval at all levels before a final plan evolves and may take months, or perhaps years, to complete. Although a budget should be developed, the cost of remediation should not be the driving factor in developing a plan.

(e) Plan Implementation. Once all plans have been approved, the federal agency responsible for managing long-term cleanup efforts will work with the other involved jurisdictional entities to implement the plan. Responsibility for long-term federal radiological monitoring and assessment coordination will have transitioned from a DOE-led to an EPA led FRMAC at the beginning of the post-emergency phase and will be terminated when the DHS, in consultation with the DoD, other participating agencies, and SLT governments, determines that:

1. There is no longer a threat to public health and safety or the environment.

2. SLT resources are adequate to manage the requirements of the situation.

3. There is mutual agreement among the agencies involved to terminate monitoring and assessment.

4. SUPPORT TO DOE/NNSA RESPONSE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. General. Pursuant to the NRF (Reference (c)), after an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in DOE/NNSA custody, DOE/NNSA will be the coordinating agency and the DoD will serve as a cooperating agency. The general procedures and resources outlined in this section are designed to support the DOE planning guidance and procedures contained in DOE U.S. Nuclear Weapon Accident Program Plan (Reference (ad)) and to be consistent with the NIMS (Reference (k)) ICS. This manual focuses primarily on DoD Component procedures to execute a unified response to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident when DoD has custody of the weapon. When supporting the DOE, DoD organizations will apply the same basic procedures contained in this manual. Support can be through immediate response, mutual aid agreements or general DSCA response and could include EOD, radiological monitoring, safe haven, fire response, rescue, and logistics resources.

b. Authorities and Type of Support. The support by the DoD Components to DOE/NNSA are provided under different authorities, as described in paragraphs 4b(1) through 4b(2) of this enclosure.

(1) DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents. Reference (f) directs the CJCS to initiate and oversee the DoD response to a nuclear or radiological incident, including support to DOE/NNSA after an accident involving a weapon in DOE/NNSA custody until the CCDR designated by the Secretary of Defense can assume command of the response. DoD support may include the use of communications capabilities of the NJOIC and response forces, as requested.

(2) DSCA. Reference (h) describes the process by which the DoD responds to RFAs by civil authorities (e.g., DOE/NNSA, DHS, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and SLT authorities). Unless approval authority is otherwise delegated by the Secretary of Defense, all DSCA requests must be submitted to the office of the Executive Secretary of the DoD.

(a) Immediate Response Authority. This authority, as part of DSCA, is intended for use under imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency that may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such local conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher HQ, local military commanders and responsible officials from the DoD Components are authorized, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DoD Component, to respond to requests of civil authorities. All such necessary action is referred to as immediate response. Local commanders who receive a request for emergency support will determine whether to utilize their immediate response authority and the initiation of such action will very likely precede any guidance from a superior authority. Accordingly, the DoD immediate response to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident involving a weapon in DOE custody would likely be in the vicinity of a military base. Due to the urgency of the situation, support provided under immediate response authority should not be denied if Secretarial approval is not immediately available. Approval should be sought as soon as possible. The DOE is still the coordinating agency and if an immediate DoD response is locally required, the DoD must inform the DOE Operations Center of this action and be responsive to DOE guidance once DOE forces are established at the scene. The appropriate legal advisor should be consulted as soon as practical when a commander is evaluating whether to use immediate response authority.

(b) Mutual Aid Agreements. The DoD may also provide firefighting and other emergency support under existing local mutual aid agreements.

(c) General DSCA Response Authority. Subsequent to the immediate response and mutual-agreement actions addressed in paragraphs 4b(2)(a) through 4b(2)(b) of this enclosure, nuclear weapon accident situations may require additional support. For DoD support to DOE/NNSA, the guidelines and process for DSCA will be followed for all additional requests beyond any support rendered under immediate or mutual-agreement responses. Unless approved in separate established authorities, the provision of the DoD Component resources to support RFAs is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of Defense.

c. Support to DOE. Given long-standing statutory and policy requirements, and their history of interdepartmental cooperation, the DoD will endeavor to honor all RFAs from DOE/NNSA relating to a nuclear weapons accident. Because the DoD has more installations than DOE/NNSA and these installations are distributed across the country, the DoD likely will be closer than the DOE to an accident scene and more capable of rapidly providing support before DOE can mobilize and move its full response forces to the accident scene. Secretary of Defense approved DoD support may provide an interim capability to supplement existing DOE capabilities until long-term assets from the DOE and other federal departments and agencies can be deployed through the NRF ESF structure. DoD support may continue until joint weapon recovery operations are complete. At all times, the DoD will be in a supporting role as a cooperating agency.

(1) When the DOE is the coordinating agency (has custody of the U.S. nuclear weapon at the time of the accident), DoD assistance (other than assistance provided under immediate response authority) will be requested through the normal DoD RFA process. RFAs should define the scope of DoD assistance and capabilities being requested.

(2) DOE must submit the RFA to the DoD Executive Secretary; this can be done through the NJOIC for the initial RFA(s). The DoD Executive Secretary passes the RFA to JDOMS for evaluation and processing. JDOMS, in coordination with ASD(HD&ASA), evaluates the RFA based on legality, lethality, risk, cost, readiness, and whether or not other departments or agencies can provide the requested support. If the Secretary of Defense approves the RFA, JDOMS issues a Secretary of Defense approved EXORD to U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to conduct the support mission.

(3) After a DCO is deployed to the accident site, or JFO is established, RFAs should be submitted to the DCO for evaluation and processing. The DCO will forward RFAs that meet the minimum criteria (legality, lethality, risk, cost, readiness, and other agencies capabilities) to JDOMS , which will coordinate the RFA with ASD(HD&ASA), via USNORTHCOM for Secretary of Defense approval. If approved by the Secretary of Defense, JDOMS then issues a Secretary of Defense approved EXORD to USNORTHCOM to conduct the support mission.

(4) Phases of Support. DoD response forces may be deployed in one of two phases. If Phase 1 is not necessary, Phase 2 is the only phase that will apply.

(a) Phase 1 (DOE Requests Substantive Support). Phase 1 consists of immediate support, as described in paragraphs 4b(2)(a) and 4b(2)(b) of this enclosure, and covers the situation in which DOE forces are essentially disabled. Pursuant to Reference (f), the CJCS, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, will initiate and oversee the response by DoD.

1. Under immediate response authority, the local commander may initiate response without approval of higher command. In this instance, a DoD command element will be established as quickly as possible and will support whatever DOE command element exists, if any.

2. The DOE, through the DOD RFA process, may request a DoD Commander to act initially as the IC (until the DOE can exercise effective control). Pursuant to Reference (f), response by DoD forces may be initiated by the CJCS (on behalf of the Secretary of Defense) through the NJOIC, and DoD forces would carry out their responsibilities until the commander is relieved by the DOE IC (SEO). The DoD response may require coordination with SLT agency representatives already on site and securing the area.

3. This phase ends when DOE is able to exercise full control.

(b) Phase 2 (DOE Exercises Effective Control). If incident command has not passed to DOE during Phase 1, it will be passed at the commencement of Phase 2. Phase 2 is the most likely scenario for DoD support to the DOE. In this phase, DoD support would be in response to DOE/NNSA RFAs. This support typically will be handled in Phase 2 as a DSCA response, based on requests from DOE/NNSA to the DoD. A standing EXORD will be proposed by the Joint Staff for Secretary of Defense consideration to expedite the process.

(5) DoD resources that may be deployed to support DOE (in either support phase) may include, but are not limited to:

(a) Command and Control. The DoD commander will exercise command and control of all DoD forces on scene and coordinate all DoD support activities with the DOE IC. The DoD commander will report through the normal chain of command.

(b) Security. For U.S. nuclear weapon accidents that occur when the weapon is in DOE custody, DoD security forces cannot provide direct law enforcement support to DOE/NNSA (i.e., request for the DoD to provide security for a DOE/NNSA NSA). However, DOE/NNSA may request law enforcement support from the Attorney General. If the Attorney General cannot provide the requested support, then the Attorney General may request law enforcement support from the Secretary of Defense in accordance with section 831 (e) of Title 18, U.S.C. (Reference (ae)). If the Attorney General's request is approved by the Secretary of Defense, DoD security forces may support DOJ/FBI in the provision of law enforcement support to DOE/NNSA. The Attorney General's request should define the scope of DoD assistance and capabilities requested. Although in support of DOJ/FBI, DoD security forces will always remain in the DoD chain of command. Documents governing the use of DoD forces include Reference (ac), sections 831 and 1385 (also known and referred to in this manual as the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)) of Reference (ae), and DoDD 3020.40 and DODI 3025.21 (References (af) and (ag)).

(c) HAZMAT. The location and nature of an accident may require assistance from HAZMAT professionals to conduct initial site radiation or HAZMAT monitoring and survey to develop information to support PARs. Although this capability likely will come from nearby SLT resources, the DoD may be asked to supplement this type of support when the DOE and SLT resources are overwhelmed or unavailable.

(d) Medical. Accident circumstances may require assistance from DoD medical personnel to conduct initial rescue and life-saving steps. The DoD may be asked to supplement this support when SLT resources are overwhelmed or unavailable.

(e) EOD. A DoD nuclear certified EOD team may be required to conduct initial and CRSPs on a nuclear weapon, or to provide other EOD support, depending on the nature of the accident.

(f) Communications. The DoD may be requested to provide communication support, such as the U.S. Air Force HAMMER Adaptive Communications Element (HAMMER ACE) package when requirements exceed DOE capabilities.

(g) Logistics. The DOE does not possess the range of logistics capabilities that may be required to support the response to a nuclear weapon accident. DoD support could include transportation, material handling equipment, and lodging.

1. DOE transportation assets may or may not be available to move the DOE ARG. The DoD may provide transportation if an appropriate DOE request is approved by the Secretary of Defense.

2. If the arrival airport is a DoD airbase, the DoD should be prepared to assist in off-loading DOE assets and transporting them to the accident scene, if requested and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

3. Lodging, shelter, and berthing for personnel, including command and control facilities, may be requested at the closest military installation, or pre-packaged kits could be requested for remote sites. The Secretary of Defense may approve these requests.

(h) PA. A DoD public affairs officer (PAO) from the responding DoD facility will travel to the ICP or to the JIC to address DoD response force activities in close coordination with DOE PA officials.

d. Funding. The DoD Components will comply with legal and accounting requirements for the expenditure of DoD resources to ensure reimbursement of costs incurred by DoD when providing support pursuant to Reference (i), the Stafford Act, or other applicable authority. However, because DoD and DOE share the responsibilities associated with the nuclear weapon stockpile, each department will normally provide for the use of its respective capabilities.

5. INCIDENT RESPONSE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. General. In accordance with Reference (d), all U.S. nuclear weapon incidents must be investigated as hostile acts until proven otherwise. The term incident covers any unexpected event, intentional or accidental, involving a U.S. nuclear weapon. This section describes the procedures that are used in the event of a nuclear weapons incident where the cause has yet to be determined or is known to be the result of a hostile act. It is assumed that eliminating a hostile act as a cause of the incident may take time. An actual or attempted hostile act involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in DoD custody may initially appear as a type of accident. The procedures and protocols outlined throughout this manual will also be a useful guide in the response to these

types of incidents. However, a malevolent act adds complexity to incident response operations due to the additional agencies participating in the response effort. References (g), (e), and NSPD 46/HSPD 15 (Reference (ah)) and the FBI Domestic Interagency Incident Contingency Plan For the Recapture and Recovery of United States Nuclear Weapons or Components (Reference(ai)) provide more detail than what is contained in this manual about authorities, responsibilities, and coordinating relationships between DoD, the Services, DOE/NNSA, DOJ/FBI, and the rest of the interagency.

b. Authority. Pursuant to Reference (p), the Attorney General has coordinating responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States, as well as for related intelligence collection activities within the United States. The Attorney General generally executes this responsibility through the FBI. As such, the FBI will have lead criminal investigative authority for incidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons. However, the servicing military criminal investigative organization must also be notified immediately after the FBI has been notified. Although DoD functions as the coordinating agency for accident response operations, it will additionally assist the FBI as a cooperating agency in supporting hostile-acts-related law enforcement and investigative operations.

(1) FBI Priorities. The law enforcement and investigative priorities of the FBI in responding to a U.S. nuclear weapon incident are similar to those of the DoD: preserving life, minimizing risk to health, and securing the weapon(s). Therefore, the actions of the FBI and the DoD IC will generally be complementary. The DoD IC must be cognizant, however, of additional FBI priorities—preventing existing hostile acts from being expanded or aggravated and apprehending the perpetrators—while accomplishing life-saving, property protection, and weapon recovery operations. Prior to the determination that the event is not the result of a hostile act, the FBI is the lead agency with the DoD and the DOE acting as cooperating agencies until the accident determination can be made.

(2) Law Enforcement and Investigative Activities. Although the DoD IC has overall responsibility and authority over activities occurring on property where the DoD has exclusive jurisdiction, including establishing an NDA, the FBI still has overall authority over the federal law enforcement and investigative activities occurring in these areas. The DoD IC and FBI must coordinate all activities throughout the U.S. nuclear weapon incident, including access to the NDA. The Attorney General may request DoD law enforcement support from the Secretary of Defense in accordance with section 382 of Reference (s). If the Attorney General's request is approved by the Secretary of Defense, DoD security forces may provide law enforcement support to DOJ/FBI as an exception to the PCA, as discussed in paragraph 5b(2)(b) of this section. The Attorney General's request should define the scope of DoD assistance and capabilities being requested. While in support of DOJ/FBI, DoD security forces will always remain in the DoD chain of command. The DoD IC must coordinate all activities with the FBI throughout the U.S. nuclear weapon incident, including the process for allowing FBI Personnel access to the weapon and other possible crime scene areas within the NDA.

(a) PCA. This act prohibits the use of the Army or the Air Force for domestic law enforcement purposes, except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statute; the Navy and Marine Corps are subject to provisions of the PCA pursuant to DoD regulation issued under authority granted to the Secretary of Defense in section 375 of Reference (s)). The PCA does not apply to National Guard personnel performing duties in State active duty or Title 32, U.S.C. status, nor does it apply to USCG personnel. However, section 2 of Title 14, U.S.C (Reference (aj)) provides that the USCG will enforce federal law. Examples of prohibited law enforcement activities include interdicting vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit, and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities.

(b) Exceptions to the PCA. Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the PCA that allow the military, in certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the laws of the United States. One applicable exception to the PCA is assistance in the case of crimes involving nuclear materials (section 831 of Reference (ae)). DoD personnel are permitted to assist the DOJ in enforcing prohibitions regarding nuclear materials, when the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that an emergency situation exists that poses a serious threat to U.S. interests and is beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement agencies. These authorities include arrest, search, and seizure. As part of the coordination of incident response activities, the DoD may additionally be requested to assist the FBI with establishing the crime scene and provision of security at the site. A commander whose forces will be used for law enforcement purposes should consult with the appropriate legal advisor.

c. Organizational Structure

(1) Overview

(a) The U.S. nuclear weapon incident management operation involving actual or suspected hostile acts is organized as outlined in section 2 of this enclosure. However, involvement of the FBI as lead agency for criminal investigations of potential hostile acts necessitates incorporation of FBI functions into the overall incident management structure. The FBI manages all investigative functions from an FBI command post (see Figure 10 of this enclosure) that is established by the FBI special agent in charge (SAC) of the local field office. This FBI command post generally consists of three functional groups: command, operations, and operations support. This command post is designed to accommodate the participation of other agencies and coordinate the federal law enforcement assets required to respond to and resolve the threat or incident with SLT law enforcement agencies.

Figure 10. FBI Command Post



(b) When the threat or incident exceeds the capabilities and resources of the local FBI field office, the SAC can request additional assistance from regional and national assets to augment existing capabilities. In such circumstances, the traditional FBI command post will transition to a JOC (see Figure 11 of this enclosure), which may temporarily incorporate a fourth functional entity—the CM group—in the absence of an activated JFO. If a JFO is established, the JOC will become a section within the JFO, and the CM group disbands and is assimilated into the appropriate sections of the JFO (see paragraph 5c(5) of this enclosure). Similarly, if a JFO/multiagency coordination center is established, the JOC will become a section within it, and the CM group will assimilate into the appropriate sections of the JFO/multiagency coordination center (see paragraph 5c(5) of this enclosure).

Figure 11. JOC



(2) Command Group

(a) The command group provides recommendations and advice to the FBI SAC regarding the development and implementation of strategic decisions to resolve the situation. The command group is responsible for approving the deployment and employment of law enforcement investigative and intelligence resources. The command group maintains its advisory role to the FBI SAC when the JOC becomes a section of the JFO/multiagency coordination entity. Once a JFO/multiagency coordination entity is established, the FBI SAC becomes the senior federal law enforcement official, and another senior FBI official, normally an assistant SAC, will lead the JOC command group. The command group includes senior officials with decision-making authority from federal and SLT agencies. Law enforcement and investigative strategies, tactics, and priorities are determined jointly within the command group. While these are determined jointly, the FBI SAC has final authority to determine final law enforcement and investigative strategies.

(b) Three specialized teams of command group advisors provide guidance and expertise directly to the command group:

1. Strategic Legal Team. This team is composed of legal counsel from the FBI, U.S. Attorney's Office, and the District or State's Attorney's Office. It provides legal guidance to the command group concerning the strategies under consideration for resolution of the crisis.

2. JIC Team. This team is composed of PAOs from the participating federal and SLT public safety agencies. It manages information to be released to the public through a coordinated, unified approach. A separate media unit within the JOC operations support group provides specific guidance and expertise to the FBI SAC and coordinates with the JIC to ensure the media strategy is consistent with the overall investigative strategy. The JIC team is integrated into the JFO when it is established.

3. Domestic Emergency Support Team. This specialized interagency team is composed of SMEs from the FBI, DHS/Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)/FEMA, DoD, DOE, DHHS, and EPA. They provide guidance to the FBI SAC concerning WMD threats and actual incidents.

(3) Operations Group. The operations group handles all investigative, intelligence, and operational functions related to potential criminal aspects of the incident. Each unit within the operations group provides expertise in a specific functional area that is important in the overall resolution of the incident. The units within the operations group are shown in Figures 10 and 11 of this enclosure.

(a) Information Control Unit. This unit is the central point for receiving and analyzing all information coming into the JOC. The information is checked for duplication, and is prioritized and entered into the information management system.

(b) Intelligence Unit. This unit manages the collection, analysis, archiving, and dissemination of relevant and valid investigative and strategic intelligence. It fuses historical intelligence from a variety of sources with new intelligence. It is normally divided into teams based on functional responsibility.

(c) Investigations Unit. This unit provides oversight and direction to all investigative activities related to the incident.

(d) Field Operations Unit. This unit is based on the specific needs of the incident and is staffed by functional experts in a number of specialized disciplines (negotiation, tactics, evidence response, technical, and WMD/CBRNEs). Activities are communicated between agents at the incident site, in the field conducting operations, and at the JOC in order to ensure situation awareness. During a WMD incident, the FBI's Laboratory Division provides the capability to safely and effectively respond to criminal acts and incidents involving CBRN materials as well as radiologically contaminated evidence, through an integrated effort involving specialized response teams. The HAZMAT Response Team Unit, in conjunction with the HAZMAT Operations Unit and the HAZMAT Science Response Unit, coordinates a national training program, interagency liaison, technical assistance to FBI field and HQ divisions, and the development of field response programs. These units develop the FBI's technical proficiency and readiness for crime scene and evidence-related operations in cases involving chemical,

biological, and radiological materials and wastes. (This unit would fall under the other specialized units in Figures 10 and 11 of this enclosure.)

(4) Operations Support Group. These units are based on the specific needs of the incident and are responsible for ensuring the activities of their units are consistent with the FBI SAC's overall strategy. Units may include administration, logistics, legal, media, liaison, communications, and information management. Although the roles and responsibilities of these units are self-explanatory, an in-depth discussion of each can be found in the Terrorism Incident and Law Enforcement Investigation Annex described in Reference (c).

(5) CM Group. This group consists of representatives of agencies that provide consequence-focused expertise in support of law enforcement activities. It does not manage consequence functions, but instead ensures law enforcement activities with emergency management implications are communicated and coordinated to appropriate personnel in a complete and timely manner. Early in incident management operations, this group monitors the law enforcement criminal investigation and provides advice regarding decisions that affect the general public or critical infrastructure. FBI requests for DoD law enforcement support are made through the Attorney General to the Secretary of Defense and are coordinated as necessary with this group. Agencies assigned to this group may also have representatives in other JOC elements. This group is established prior to activation of a JFO/RRCC. Upon JFO/RRCC activation, this group is assimilated into the JFO structure or the RRCC in the absence of a JFO.

d. Operations. FBI personnel integrate into the ICP if an ICP is established after a nuclear weapon incident. The first FBI special agent or joint terrorism task force (JTTF) member responding receives a briefing from the DoD IC and works closely with the DoD IC as a member of the UC. This representative then informs the local field office and requests additional assets, if needed. Once a more senior special agent arrives, he or she assumes the FBI representative role within the UC.

(1) Integrating with the UC. Once a more senior special agent arrives, the first arriving special agent or JTTF member moves to the operations section as the deputy chief of operations; this position is responsible for managing the deployment and coordination of federal law enforcement and investigative assets in support of the IAP. Additionally, a second special agent or JTTF member assumes the position of deputy chief of planning within the ICP. This position allows the FBI to maintain situational awareness and to serve as a conduit for requests for additional law enforcement and investigative assets. This individual also inputs FBI objectives into the IAP. FBI assets also form a unit in the operations section of the UC to assist with coordination and integration of activities. Throughout the incident, the actions and activities of the UC at the incident scene and the command group of the JOC (or JFO, if established) are continuously and completely coordinated.

(2) Hostile Action Underway. During an incident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in DoD custody, classified plans and procedures take effect. NARP phases of the response may have to wait until successful resolution of the terrorist incident is achieved. However, the DoD's responsibility for ensuring the security of a DoD weapon and classified components and materials will continue and close coordination between the responding agencies is required.

6. FOREIGN TERRITORY RESPONSE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Overview. This section applies only to accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons based in or transiting through foreign territory. Any U.S. nuclear weapon accident occurring in an area not listed in paragraph 1a(2) of this enclosure is considered an international or foreign accident. Although the NRF (Reference (c)) does not govern the federal government response in a foreign territory, the NIMS and ICS templates will be followed to the extent possible to ensure commonality between the DoD Components and interagency elements that may become involved with the response. In a foreign situation, the term lead federal agency (LFA) is often used to describe the role of the U.S. DOS instead of coordinating agency. For consistency, the term coordinating agency will be used in this section. When dealing with U.S. nuclear weapon accidents occurring in foreign territory, the terms coordinating agency and LFA are synonymous.

(1) Differences from Domestic Response. Response to an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in foreign territory differs from domestic U.S. nuclear weapon accident response in two basic ways. First, all response actions must be performed with due regard to the sovereign rights of the HN. Therefore, all U.S. command and response personnel must work closely with their HN counterparts to coordinate activities and ensure all aspects of U.S. response activities are conducted in accordance with applicable alliance and bilateral agreements. Second, the DOS will be the coordinating agency for the U.S. response, in accordance with Reference (g). Although DoD assets will likely comprise most of the U.S. response, all activities of the DoD and interagency response assets must be closely coordinated with the DOS Operations Center and the chief of mission (COM) at the U.S. Embassy in the affected country.

(2) Bilateral Agreements. The U.S. has bilateral basing agreements with all countries where U.S. nuclear weapons are stored. With some countries, the United States has general agreements regarding each nation's roles and responsibilities should an accident occur involving those weapons. In some instances, the United States has very detailed agreements integrating U.S. and HN accident response plans and procedures from the highest levels of government to the first responder level. These agreements may direct response procedures that differ from those used domestically. Operational security considerations preclude identification of specific countries in this manual, but applicable overseas IRF, RTF, and HQ staff personnel are to be made aware of specific agreements and details in their accident preparedness training.

(3) Accident Management Operations. Planners must recognize that the HN has primary responsibility and jurisdiction for managing the overall accident response. Therefore, the IRF and RTF concepts for U.S. domestic accidents will likely have to be adapted to the HN's command structure and operating concepts. Also, although response phases may occur generally as outlined in this manual, SR may or may not require the involvement or application of DoD resources. The DOS and the U.S. Embassy in coordination with the host government will determine the need for and role of DoD resources in SR.

b. Types of Accidents. Accidents may occur on U.S.-occupied installations with possible off-installation contamination or effects, or they may occur off-installation.

(1) On-Installation Accidents. For on-installation accidents, DoD generally has more authority, based upon bilateral agreements. While the agreement provisions vary by country, DoD officials are likely to have more control of the accident scene and surrounding base area. Comprehensive emergency response plans should be coordinated and practiced with HN or host unit authorities. Regardless of the situation, the sovereign rights of the HN must be respected.

(2) Off-Installation Accidents. When no bilateral accident response agreement or integrated joint operating plans exist, off-installation accident management operations will require immediate close coordination between the DoD IC, U.S. Embassy country team, and HN officials at all levels of command. Especially for those countries where no bilateral agreements exist, the DOS has published a U.S. nuclear weapon accident response playbook. The playbook has been distributed to U.S. embassies and appropriate HN government officials in all countries where U.S. nuclear weapons are stored or may potentially transit via aircraft overflight. Although it is neither a bilateral agreement nor joint operating plan, the playbook provides HN and U.S. Embassy officials an overview of accident response tasks to be accomplished, U.S. priorities, and a concept for mutual operations—a common starting point from which to coordinate response activities. The substance and content of the playbook are similar to the operating concepts and procedures in this manual.

c. Phase I: Notification and Deployment. The notification and deployment phase for a U.S. nuclear weapon accident in foreign territory begins once the accident has occurred and ends when response forces arrive at the accident site. Accident notification most likely will begin with submission of a FRONT BURNER report and will be followed by an OPREP-3 PINNACLE voice report from the nearest U.S. military installation with knowledge of, and communications capability to report, the accident to the NJOIC in accordance with the CJCS U.S. nuclear weapon accident reporting procedures in Reference (t). The NJOIC teleconference participants may include, but are not limited to: the Service operations center, the WHSR, DOS, DOT, DOE, DOJ/FBI, DTRA, ODNI, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Strategic Command, USNORTHCOM, and DHS. Actions taken during this phase include notifying appropriate U.S. and HN military and civilian authorities and interagency partners; coordinating initial U.S. response activities with local HN authorities; deploying a U.S. IRF; and executing plans to deploy the RTF, DOE ARG, and additional assets to the accident site, as requested by the CCDR in coordination with the U.S. COM and HN authorities.

(1) Departmental Notification. As in a domestic accident, a U.S. nuclear weapon accident in foreign territory will be reported, as outlined in section 3 of this enclosure and as specified in appropriate Combatant Command directives and arrangements or agreements.

(2) Activation and Deployment. Upon request, the U.S. Embassy Emergency Action Committee will receive support from the interagency consequence management support team (CMST). This team of chemical, biological, and radiological and/or nuclear weapons experts advises the COM and HN on the immediate effects of radiation following an accident. The COM, the CCDR, and DoD IC work in close coordination to ensure all political and military actions and U.S. PA activities are in the best interest of public health, safety, security, and international political stability. They will exchange LNOs to ensure close communications and

situational awareness. Before the U.S. deploys assets, the Combatant Command will provide a manifest for the response teams to the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Embassy will negotiate the response and request HN review and approval.

(a) The NJOIC tasks the GCC to provide the RTF and designate a general or flag officer to command the RTF and serve as the DoD IC responsible for all DoD assets. The IC may request technical assets from any federal agency using the protocols outlined in section 3 of this enclosure. The support may be requested in the form of deployed forces or in the form of reach-back assistance, which may be accomplished by telephone, electronically, or through video teleconferencing. In the case of deployed forces or equipment, the HN must grant approval prior to any specialized forces or equipment entering into the country. DOS will work with the HN to obtain such approvals.

(b) The HN manages the activities outside of any WRA and may request, through the DOS or the COM, technical and logistical support from U.S. agencies, as required. On-site management of any WRA will be consistent with appropriate GCC and Service directives or specific U.S. and/or HN arrangements or agreements. In either instance, the United States will work closely with HN national and local authorities to ensure a fast, efficient, and coordinated response.

(c) The U.S. Embassy Special Action Group may receive crisis supplementation through the interagency CMST. This team of chemical, biological, and radiological and/or nuclear weapons experts advises the COM on accident management issues and may serve as the COM's designated coordinator of the USG accident response. The CMST may also deploy liaison elements to the GCC HQ, the RTF HQ, and the HN crisis management centers. Because the weapon was in DoD custody at the time of the accident, the IRF will be drawn from the nearest in-theater military organization capable of handling the mission.

d. Phase II: Initial Response. The initial response begins with emergency response activities of first responders: fire and rescue, emergency medical, and law enforcement personnel whose actions focus on treating and rescuing casualties, securing the area, and fighting fires. If the IRF must enter the country, it will coordinate its deployment with the COM. The IRF IC and the initial response resources will immediately establish contact with the HN civil or military authorities on-site to gain situational awareness, establish a *modus operandi*, and assume custody and control of the nuclear weapon(s) and components. Initial emphasis is to assist first responders with life-saving, hazard identification, and providing safety and security for the weapons and/or components. The DoD IC must ensure that U.S. security personnel are aware of and abide by the rules of engagement (ROE) and/or RUF applicable in the country where the accident has occurred. The IC should consult with a legal advisor in reviewing whether the applicable RUF or ROE should be tailored for the specific circumstances or situation.

(1) The DoD and the USG, according to their current plans and policies, notify and mobilize response assets for deployment and to support the NJOIC, the JNAIRT, and HN embassies in Washington, D.C., as necessary. For the specifics of Phase II activities, refer to U.S. and HN arrangements or agreements and appropriate GCC and Service directives.

(2) The initial deployment of each interagency asset will be governed by individual plans that recognize each agency's responsibilities. However, the deployment should also be tailored to reflect the capabilities of HN emergency response services. In nearly all cases, the unique expertise and specialized equipment of the U.S. DOE ARG will be required. The deployment of additional U.S. response forces should be carefully managed such that sufficient assets are on hand to perform incident response actions, but do not overwhelm HN support capabilities or offend HN sensibilities.

e. Phase III: Accident Site Consolidation. The arrival of the RTF and the full cadre of U.S. response assets to the accident site mark the beginning of Phase III. The U.S. Embassy coordinates the entry of all U.S. assets into the country with the HN government. The COM will coordinate with HN authorities to establish a UC modeled after the one described in section 2 of this enclosure. If they exist, command arrangements will be in accordance with arrangements or agreements. The DoD IC will lead the DoD response efforts, but will work closely with the COM and HN authorities. For a complete listing of Phase III activities, see paragraph 3e of this enclosure. Following a U.S. nuclear weapon accident in foreign territory, the DoD IC should:

(1) Conduct the transfer of IC responsibilities in accordance with the guidelines in paragraph 3e(2) of this enclosure, recognizing HN roles. This transfer will include a briefing to HN officials, emphasizing the legal relationship between U.S. and HN personnel and officials and relevant presentations by HN officials involved in the response.

(2) Maintain liaison with the U.S. Embassy COM and the HN authorities.

(3) Establish a working and coordinating relationship with HN authorities at the scene, integrating with the HN command structure to the extent possible or required by bilateral agreements.

(4) Coordinate with the U.S. Embassy PAO to ensure consistency among COM, HN, and IC information releases. A combined information bureau modeled after the domestic JIC may be established. Additionally, the U.S. Embassy may establish a combined information bureau at the incident site, modeled after the domestic JIC.

(5) In coordination with HN authorities, develop a plan to locate and ensure perimeter security is established and maintained at a safe distance around the nuclear weapon(s) or components involved. The DoD has the primary responsibility for the security of the weapon and related classified components or material and has exclusive jurisdictional authority within the WRA, as agreed with the HN.

(6) Focus attention and resources toward developing weapon recovery plans as soon as the safety of personnel is ensured, the weapon(s) and components are located, a security perimeter is established, and initial RSPs are accomplished. Weapon recovery procedures beyond initial RSPs should not be conducted until the arrival and concurrence of the DOE ARG.

(7) If requested and approved by DOS, assist HN authorities in developing and coordinating an SR plan, as outlined in paragraph 3g of this enclosure.

(8) Coordinate with the DoD principal legal advisor to ensure actions of U.S. Military security personnel do not violate applicable status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) or applicable HN laws. Ensure the ROE and RUF are developed, if not already established by the CCDR, and ensure the ROE and RUF are consistent with all applicable HN and U.S. laws, as well as applicable SOFAs. All U.S. personnel, including security personnel, must know and understand the ROE and RUF.

(9) In accordance with confirmation guidelines in Figure 8 of this enclosure, notify the HN officials of potential hazards and recommend appropriate public health and safety actions to take outside the WRA. If necessary, issue PARs to the HN authorities for them to consider what actions must be taken by the public to avoid or reduce exposure to radiation.

f. Phase IV: Weapon Recovery Operations and Packaging. During the weapon recovery operations and packaging phase, responders will gain access to the weapon(s) and EOD teams will perform RSPs and diagnose weapon damage to determine or develop safe procedures for packaging of the involved weapon(s) and weapon debris for transport. For additional information about operations during this phase, see paragraph 3e of this enclosure. Special considerations for a response on foreign territory include:

(1) The weapons recovery team will likely consist of DoD EOD, DOE/NNSA ARG, and perhaps HN representatives, as specified in bilateral agreements. To protect classified information in countries where no bilateral agreements exist, HN participation in weapon recovery operations is discouraged. However, if the IC realizes that precluding HN participation in this operation will negatively affect the entire accident management operation, ICs are authorized to allow HN participation. This authorization is based upon the IC's professional judgment and is made after consultation with the COM, DOE/NNSA SEO, and the CCDR. Any and all disclosures of weapon design information must be accomplished within the constraints of sections 2011through 2259 of Reference (ac)), also known and referred to in this manual as the "Atomic Energy Act of 1954," as amended.

(2) In coordination with HN officials, and after EOD personnel and the DOE/NNSA determine the weapons to be safe for movement, the weapons are moved to a designated interim storage area. The DOE/NNSA ARG maintains the expertise to safely package damaged nuclear weapon(s) and weapon debris associated with an accident involving U.S. nuclear weapons. Before weapon(s), weapon components, and/or explosives are shipped, they must be packaged to ensure that no unacceptable levels of removable contamination exist on the outer container and that the environment experienced during shipment will not cause further damage. To meet this requirement, special packing, shipping, marking, and safety instructions should be obtained to comply, as much as feasible, with transportation regulations of the HN and DOE/NNSA.

(3) A WRSET may be formed of U.S. DoD and DOE/NNSA personnel. When authorized in applicable agreements or joint operating plans, the WRSET and a representative from the HN will conduct an independent appraisal of weapon recovery plans to ensure nuclear detonation safety and that the risk of radioactive release is minimized. Any and all disclosures of weapon design information must be accomplished within the constraints of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(4) The IC will have overall responsibility at the accident site for technical operations, command of DoD personnel, and coordination with HN authorities on scene. The COM has overall responsibility for coordinating U.S. efforts. However, depending upon existing bilateral agreements and laws of the HN, the sovereign rights of the HN will likely result in an HN authority having overall incident command.

g. Phase V: SR. Phase V of the nuclear weapon accident response primarily deals with environmental management activities in the affected area. For foreign nuclear weapon accidents, the HN has primary responsibility for SR. The HN may request U.S. assistance with development and execution of remediation plans. All requests for SR assistance will be coordinated through the DOS, and the NSS will approve all offers of assistance. As with a domestic situation, remediation is closely integrated with other phases of accident response. If the HN requests, a few elements of the response teams that arrive early on to support the emergency response and recovery phases may stay at the accident site in some capacity to support remediation. Ideally, the work of remediation begins when response organizations (including the HN) develop plans to integrate their forces at an accident site. Paragraph 3g of this enclosure outlines the RTF responsibilities during this phase of the operation.

7. SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Overview. A shipboard nuclear weapon accident differs from land-based scenarios in several aspects. Results of shipboard fires are well known and documented in repair party training and procedures manuals. Explosions, whether from a nuclear weapon or some other source (e.g., petroleum fuels or conventional weapons), may cause severe damage, affecting the safety and seaworthiness of a vessel. Although the initial response by shipboard personnel will be the same whether an accident occurs at sea or in port, the frequent lack of immediate assistance at sea increases the importance of correct and adequate response by shipboard personnel. A significant difference between a shipboard U.S. nuclear weapon accident and a land-based U.S. nuclear weapon accident is that the vessel may, depending on the damage sustained, be directed to another location for weapon recovery operations and decontamination, if needed. As with a land-based accident, the location of the vessel will affect the level and extent of interagency involvement. The procedures and processes outlined in this section are applicable and may have some utility for an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in a body of navigable water (e.g., a DoD aircraft carrying a nuclear weapon that crashes in a body of water).

b. Purpose and Scope. In a U.S. nuclear weapon accident on a maritime vessel, the commanding officer (CO) of the vessel will focus attention on saving the vessel and crew, protecting the public and crew from health hazards, and keeping the chain of command informed of the situation. The procedures and processes outlined in this section apply to incidents involving nuclear weapons in DoD custody while aboard a vessel; the term vessel refers to any waterborne craft—surface or subsurface. The procedures in this section do not apply to nuclear materials owned or operated by the DoD that are being transported over water by a third party, or to nuclear propulsion systems found on many U.S. Navy vessels; procedures for these accidents are governed by the NRIA to Reference (c).

c. Location. The location of the vessel will determine the level of interagency involvement and will affect response activities. Regardless of location, however, the operational phases identified in section 3 of this enclosure will be followed. Table 2 identifies the possible locations of a shipboard incident, determines NRF (Reference (c)) applicability, and gives basic guidance on where to find response procedures in this manual. The procedures outlined in paragraph 7c(1) of this enclosure apply to all incidents. Subsequent paragraphs (7c(2) through 7c(5)) address differences or additional considerations.

Table 2. Shipboard Accident Locations

LOCATION	NRF APPLICABILITY	PROCEDURES
Underway – Beyond the Territorial Sea	No	Enclosure 2, section 7
Underway – Foreign Territorial Seas	No	Enclosure 2, section 6 and 7
Underway – Domestic Waters	Yes	Enclosure 2, sections 3 and 7
Moored – Domestic Waters	Yes	Enclosure 2, sections 3 and 7
Moored – Foreign Territorial Seas and Internal Waters	No	Enclosure 2, section 6 and 7

(1) Underway in Waters Beyond the Territorial Sea. When a U.S. nuclear weapon accident occurs on a vessel beyond internationally recognized territorial seas, the DoD will be the coordinating agency. As Reference (c) does not apply outside of the domestic territory of the United States, its protocols and procedures do not apply. Nevertheless, the scope of the accident may dictate the significant involvement of other federal departments and agencies, specifically the DOE, DOS, and DOJ/FBI (until terrorism as a cause is disproved). Therefore, the organizational structure outlined in section 3 of this enclosure will apply for the DoD. The CO of the vessel is the IC and should expect little assistance from follow-on forces, particularly during Phases I and II of the accident management operation. Subsequently, the IC and the crew of the vessel will serve as the IRF.

(a) Phase I: Notification and Deployment. The notification protocols are outlined in section 3 of this enclosure. The possibility of rapid supplementation by an RTF or interdepartmental response forces is unlikely, and the vessel crew's response will be critical. Some additional assistance by specialized units may be provided by vessels in the vicinity. Also, EOD detachments may be deployed.

(b) Phase II: Initial Response. These procedures are the most crucial in gaining control of a U.S. nuclear weapon accident. Accordingly, all vessel crew, who by the nature of their official duties may become directly or indirectly involved in an accident, will be trained to perform the procedures in paragraphs 7c(1)(b)1 through 7c(1)(b)5. When a U.S. nuclear weapon

accident occurs, the senior person present will take charge at the scene and direct available personnel to:

1. Attempt to save the lives of personnel involved.

2. Attempt, when required, to extinguish any fire involving weapons or radioactive material. In addition to the guidance provided in paragraphs 7c(1)(b)2a through 7c(1)(b)2i, more in-depth guidance is provided in Reference (u). Standard damage control procedures will be used to limit damage and the spread of any possible contamination. Fire boundaries will be set and maintained to prevent the spread of fire. Additionally, the vessel should be maneuvered, if possible, so the wind is on the beam and carrying any contamination away from the vessel. Normal shipboard firefighting and damage control procedures will apply to fires involving nuclear weapons with these provisions:

a. Extinguishing the fire has priority.

b. Any weapons involved in or near the fire should be cooled to the maximum extent that fire hoses allow.

c. Cooling should be continued after the fire is extinguished until the weapon is at ambient temperature.

d. The primary suppressant for a fire involving a U.S. nuclear weapon is narrow-angle fog (wide-angle fog for below decks on submarines). The propellants used in any weapon, conventional or nuclear, produce oxygen once ignited. They may not be extinguished with smothering agents, and some may cause heat retention within the weapon. This factor does not prevent the use of foam, carbon dioxide, Purple K (fire extinguisher), aqueous film forming foam, or other suppressants on aircraft fuel, Diesel Fuel Marine (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Code F-76), or other petroleum fuel fires that involve a U.S. nuclear weapon.

e. Narrow-angle fog or a firefighting agent should be sprayed over the complete length of the weapon(s) and/or both sides in a sweeping motion to cool the weapon and its HE contents until the weapon is at ambient temperature. When using foam to fight a fire surrounding an intact weapon, water should not be used to cool the weapon because water floats the foam away, which might allow the fire to re-ignite.

f. For below-deck fires, all response personnel going below decks must wear a self-contained breathing apparatus; top-side personnel must wear gas masks. Any firefighters initially responding without respiratory protection will be relieved as soon as possible. Repair party personnel must wear protective clothing, as specified in Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 3-20.31 (Reference (ak)). Involvement of a nuclear weapon does not require additional protective clothing for firefighting personnel. A backup firefighting team, with appropriate respiratory protection, will be prepared to relieve, or rescue, teams at the scene.

g. During firefighting actions, the flow of potentially contaminated water should be noted and the wetted surfaces considered contaminated until they can be monitored.

The flow of potentially contaminated water should be controlled to the extent possible, and dewatering operations should not be performed in port until testing determines if the water is contaminated. The best method of controlling the potentially contaminated water will be vessel- and situation-unique.

h. Fires involving U.S. nuclear weapons in enclosed shipboard spaces should be vented to the atmosphere as soon as practical to deplete the presence of toxic, caustic, and radioactive gases. When venting shipboard spaces, care should be taken to reduce the possible contamination of the exterior of the vessel. In the event of a magazine accident, the normal exhaust system must be secured and emergency ventilation procedures used. Portable blowers and fans should be used if there is no installed blowout system. In all cases, the exhaust vent should be on the leeward side of the vessel. After the fire is extinguished and when in port, unfiltered venting should not be done if it results in contamination being spread to nearby shore establishments or communities.

i. When extinguishing a fire involving a nuclear weapon, a reflash watch will be set to provide an immediate response to any recurrence of the fire.

j. Potentially contaminated equipment used to fight the fire should be placed in a designated area until monitoring and necessary decontamination can be performed.

3. Establish a security perimeter surrounding the accident scene, limiting access to authorized personnel only. The security perimeter aboard a vessel may be defined by securing hatches to a compartment or posting passageway guards. In all cases, once the hatches have been secured, only personnel authorized by the senior person present will be allowed into the incident scene.

4. Direct all personnel at the scene to take emergency breathing precautions. Personnel will at least cover their noses and mouths with a handkerchief or similar item to reduce inhalation of HAZMAT and smoke.

5. Concurrently with initial response actions the senior person present will also notify the officer of the deck (OOD) or the command duty officer (CDO) as quickly as possible that an incident has occurred in a compartment. Upon notification, the OOD or CDO will:

a. Initiate routine announcements over the shipboard intercom as follows: “No eating, drinking, or smoking is allowed until further notice.”

b. Initiate standard shipboard damage control procedures, including initiating a radiation plot; identifying route(s) to the decontamination station; and recommending changes to the vessel’s heading to vent smoke, toxic gases, and contaminated firefighting water. Near-shore releases—regardless of nation—should be done as a last-resort action.

c. Prepare to initiate decontamination station procedures.

d. Begin initial OPREP-3.

e. Notify the CO (if not already completed).

f. Prepare to receive and assist any follow-on forces.

g. Continue OPREP-3 situation reports, as required.

h. Request, if required, helicopter and/or parachute insertion of nearest EOD detachment.

(c) Phase III: Incident Site Consolidation. These procedures are an extension of the initial response procedures; however, they include more detailed procedures for providing positive control of an incident scene. The vessel's CO will be responsible for executing these procedures.

1. Radiological Monitoring. As soon as possible after notification of an incident, damage control radiological control (RADCON) should conduct radiation detection operations. RADCON gamma radiation monitors should then proceed to the extremities of the accident scene, maintaining constant surveillance of the instrument to detect increases in gamma radiation. Any radiation reading above normal background will be reported immediately in accordance with standard Type Commander procedures. If radioactivity is found, monitoring continues to determine the extent of the contaminated area. Personnel monitors identify contaminated personnel who require decontamination and prevent the spread of radioactive material to uncontaminated parts of the vessel.

2. Vessel Monitoring. If contamination was released during the accident, it should be confirmed that parts of the vessel thought to be uncontaminated are in fact clean. Monitors should be initially directed to check passageways at hatches, doors, ladders, and other locations where most personnel place their hands or feet. If contamination is found, its location should be marked for decontamination and re-monitoring. Contamination tracked or carried onto hard surfaces can usually be removed with soap and water, or by wiping with a clean, damp cloth. Then monitors should be directed toward the expected contaminated area. The boundaries of the contaminated area should be defined. Personnel should be advised of these boundaries and the procedures for crossing them, if required, for essential vessel operations.

3. Air Monitoring. Airborne radiological monitoring must be conducted to the extent instrumentation allows; however, many vessels are not equipped with air samplers. Monitoring surfaces for loose surface contamination is the most reliable indicator of airborne contamination. If Table 6, Protective Devices for Emergency Workers as a Function of Surface Contamination, of the Health and Safety section of http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/narp, is used, table values should be divided by 100 to correct for the higher re-suspension factors (0.001 in place of the 0.00001 used to develop the table) that may be expected from shipboard surfaces.

4. RADCON. RADCON is achieved largely through rigid decontamination procedures. A decontamination station will be established; it is usually located at a compartment entrance. Most vessels have insufficient RADIAC instruments to support more than one decontamination station. If potentially contaminated personnel are both above and below decks,

routes to reduce their movement through clean areas should be established. Access to the decontamination station must be possible from both contaminated and uncontaminated areas. A shower and washbasin should be designated for use in decontamination procedures. The wash facilities need not be in the immediate vicinity of the decontamination station, although such a location is preferable.

5. PA. PA will be the responsibility of the fleet commander. The CO informs the vessel's crew on PA releases and, before they debark or use any non-official off-vessel communications, on procedures for responding to requests for information from the news media or from families.

6. Security. Unless accident damage to the vessel and/or weapon(s) has destroyed the normal security provisions for the weapon(s), additional security is not needed. Additional security is provided, if required, to ensure continued weapon protection and to prevent unauthorized access.

7. Debriefings. All the vessel's crew members with information as to the cause of the accident, and particularly those personnel who observed the extent of damage to the weapon(s), should be identified to assist in the accident investigation and debriefed to assess potential internal damage to the weapon.

(d) Phase IV: Weapon Recovery Operations and Packaging. Weather and sea conditions, the extent of damage to the vessel, remaining hazards to the vessel and crew, and the time required to get either expert assistance on board or move the vessel to suitable facilities affect the specific follow-on response actions that the CO might direct while at sea. The CO is limited to the resources on board; the CO's priority is using those resources to reduce hazards to the vessel's personnel and damage to critical equipment, including RADIACs, most effectively.

1. RTF Assignment. After receiving damage estimates of the vessel and the weapon, the fleet commander will provide guidance on recovery operations. This guidance will include the port the affected vessel is to make way for, and the deployment of an RTF. The tasked RTF will be assigned to the GCC that is responsible for the port where the affected vessel is directed to report. Upon arrival at the port, the CO will transfer incident command to the RTF IC, as outlined in section 3 of this enclosure. Upon receipt of incident command, the RTF IC will perform all actions outlined in section 3 for Phases IV and V of the accident management operation.

2. Vessel Decontamination. During preparation for recovery operations (i.e., while the vessel is underway to a designated port or while waiting for the arrival of follow-on forces), decontamination actions should begin, if possible. The amount of decontamination that the vessel's personnel are able to perform will be limited by the number of RADIACs available to monitor and re-monitor surfaces being decontaminated and to operate the decontamination station. Simple cleaning techniques are frequently effective in reducing, if not removing, contamination from many of the surfaces on a vessel.

(e) Phase V: SR. Once the weapon has been transferred to DOE custody and transported to an appropriate DOE facility, remediation operations must be planned and

executed. The protocols outlined in paragraph 3g of this enclosure will be followed as practicable.

(2) Underway in a Foreign Territorial Sea. Response to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident in a foreign territorial sea is very similar to the response to an accident in international waters, with one notable exception—inclusion of the foreign government. Adherence to the procedures and considerations outlined in section 6 of this enclosure is imperative. Above all, the CO must remember the sovereignty of the HN and coordinate all response activities in accordance with all applicable agreements and HN laws.

(a) Phase I: Notification and Deployment. The processes and procedures outlined in sections 3 and 6 of this enclosure apply. DOS through the embassy in the HN will play a key role in notifying the HN and eliciting its support and cooperation. It is conceivable that required follow-on forces will need to enter the HN prior to deploying to the affected vessel; HN authorities must grant permission for all forces and equipment transiting HN borders.

(b) Phase II: Initial Response. All procedures and protocols outlined in paragraph 7c(1)(b) apply to nuclear weapon accidents occurring in foreign territorial seas. However, the CO should be prepared to accept assistance from HN forces, if warranted. Although the situation may not require HN support, maintenance of harmonious relations with the HN— relations that may be critical during subsequent phases of the accident management operation— may necessitate the CO accepting HN assistance. The DoD IC should confer with the fleet commander and use professional judgment in making this determination.

(c) Phase III: Accident Site Consolidation. The procedures outlined in paragraph 7c(1)(c) apply to U.S. nuclear weapon accidents occurring in foreign territorial seas.

(d) Phase IV: Weapon Recovery Operations and Packaging. Although the procedures outlined in paragraph 7c(1)(d) apply to U.S. nuclear weapon accidents occurring in foreign territorial seas, the level of HN coordination will determine the arrival time of the RTF. The fleet commander, in consultation with the affected CCDR and the Secretary of Defense, may decide to route the affected vessel to a port outside of the HN, resulting in delayed RTF arrival or a decision that an RTF will not be deployed. Many variables, including the severity of the incident and the level of HN cooperation, will dictate the actions occurring in this phase.

1. Directed to an HN Port. If directed to an HN port, it is assumed the HN has allowed this step and will also allow the transiting of the RTF. In this case, the HN will have a significant role in Phase IV and V operations. The CO and the RTF commander must maintain an atmosphere of cooperation and openness to ensure mission success. Close coordination between the CO, affected CCDR, DOS, and the fleet commander is necessary.

2. Directed to a Domestic Port. If directed to a domestic port, the procedures outlined in paragraph 7c(1)(d) will apply, as will the provisions outlined in paragraphs 7c(3) and 7c(4).

(e) Phase V: SR. Once the weapon has been transferred to DOE custody and transported to an appropriate DOE facility, vessel remediation operations must be planned and executed. The protocols outlined in paragraph 3g will be followed as practicable.

(3) Underway in Domestic Waters. A shipboard nuclear weapon accident occurring in domestic waters can be more complex than the scenarios outlined in paragraphs 7c(1) and 7c(2) since the NRF (Reference (c)) is applicable. The procedures outlined in section 3 of this enclosure will also apply.

(a) Phase I: Notification and Deployment. The notification protocols outlined in section 3 of this enclosure apply. The possibility of rapid supplementation by an RTF or interdepartmental response forces is likely, but the action by the vessel's crew in the response is still critical. Additional assistance by specialized units may be provided by vessels in the vicinity. Also, EOD detachments may be deployed into the area by several transportation methods.

1. USCG Safety Zone. Following an accident, it may be necessary or prudent to establish a USCG safety zone. The USCG declares a safety zone pursuant to part 165.20 of Title 33, CFR (Reference (al)), under the USCG's authority to control traffic on the navigable waters of the United States. The safety zone limits access to a specific area by people or vessels for safety or environmental reasons; the local captain of the port (COTP) or district commander activates the safety zone by issuing a local broadcast notice to mariners. Public notification through publication in the Federal Register is needed to ensure that criminal sanctions may be available for individuals who enter the safety zone, but the safety zone may be established prior to Federal Register publication. Only the COTP or a district commander may authorize entry into the established safety zone; other entry is prohibited except for authorized law enforcement agencies and DoD assets. For the purposes of DoD resources, establishing a safety zone will be similar to establishing an NDA. However, the USCG will have jurisdiction within the safety zone, not the DoD.

2. NCP. Depending upon the nature and severity of the U.S. nuclear weapon accident, it is conceivable that the NCP will be activated pursuant to sections 9601 through 9675 of Reference (ac). In accordance with guidelines in Reference (n) and sections 9601 through 9675 of Reference (ac), the EPA or the USCG may declare a spill of national significance. In addition, the Secretary of DHS may be required pursuant to Reference (p) to coordinate the federal government's resources in response to the incident. Regardless, the DoD is still listed as the coordinating agency for shipboard accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons, and the FBI is still the coordinating agency with regards to the Terrorism Incident and Law Enforcement Investigation Annex of Reference (c) for any potential hostile act. The NCP provides authority for both the NRT and regional response teams (RRTs) to provide assistance for specific accidents as needed, as well as preparedness and planning. Although a detailed discussion of the NRT and RRT is beyond the scope of this manual, it is important to note that both are interagency groups (16-member federal agencies) that work with other interagency and SLT responders to provide advice and assistance, as well as coordinate the federal response to an accident.

3. ESFs. Depending upon the severity of the nuclear weapon accident, and at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, certain ESFs may be activated. In addition to the ESFs outlined at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/narp, ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex of Reference (c), may be activated.

(b) Phase II: Initial Response. All procedures and protocols outlined in paragraph 7c(1)(b) apply to nuclear weapon accidents occurring in domestic waters. However, the DoD IC should be prepared to accept assistance from the USCG, particularly if a USCG safety zone is established. The IC and the USCG COTP or district commander must work closely together to ensure the integrity of the safety zone and to facilitate entry by responding elements.

(c) Phase III: Incident Site Consolidation. The procedures outlined in paragraph 7c(1)(3) apply to shipboard U.S. nuclear weapon accidents in domestic waters.

(d) Phase IV: Weapon Recovery Operations and Packaging. The procedures outlined in paragraph 7c(1)(d) apply to U.S. nuclear weapon accidents occurring in domestic waters. The RTF IC will establish liaison with the JFO/multiagency coordination entity and the CCDR to execute weapon recovery operations, as outlined in section 3 of this enclosure.

(e) Phase V: SR. Once the weapon has been transferred to DOE custody and transported to an appropriate DOE facility, remediation operations must be planned and executed. The protocols outlined in paragraph 3f will be followed as practicable.

(4) Moored in Domestic Waters. The procedures and protocols for a U.S. nuclear weapon accident involving a moored vessel in domestic waters are nearly identical to those outlined in paragraph 7c(3). The primary difference is the level of support available to the DoD IC. Upon occurrence of the accident, the CO of the affected vessel will immediately assume IRF IC duties and will be supported by the shore organizations, as necessary. Military Departments will ensure a shore-based IRF is assigned to assume IRF duties, if a U.S. nuclear weapon accident occurs with a weapon involved in a logistics move. The DoD IC will take all actions necessary to contain and control the accident effectively. The five phases of nuclear weapon accident management are identical to those outlined in section 3 of this enclosure.

(5) Moored in Territorial Seas and Internal Waters. The procedures and protocols for a U.S. nuclear weapon accident involving a vessel moored in foreign territorial seas and internal waters are very similar to those outlined in paragraph 7c(2). The primary difference is the level of support available to the DoD IC from the HN; this level of support will vary depending upon the situation. Further, applicable HN laws and preexisting agreements between the HN and the United States will dictate the timing and tempo of accident management operations. As stated in paragraph 7c(2), the sovereignty of the HN must be kept at the forefront of the DoD IC's actions. The level of cooperation established early in an accident will dictate the success of follow-on accident management phases. The five phases of U.S. nuclear weapon accident management operations as outlined in section 6 of this enclosure will apply to vessels moored in foreign territorial seas and internal waters.

8. TRAINING AND READINESS STANDARDS FOR RESPONSE PERSONNEL. Successful U.S. nuclear weapon incident management relies on a high level of training and proficiency, as well as frequent exercising of response capabilities by all personnel involved in the operation. Standardized, comprehensive training, as well as regular exercise participation, will ensure personnel respond competently and with a common understanding and approach. This section outlines the full spectrum of training available to or required for key DoD personnel assigned to a custodial base IRF, RTF, or other teams or positions responsible for responding to a U.S. nuclear weapon incident.

a. Training Requirements for U.S.-Based Personnel. The concept for training U.S. military personnel who will respond to incidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons consists of foundation courses, a basic interagency course, and an advanced interagency course. This series is referred to as the interagency U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incident Response Training (NWIRT) program. As indicated in paragraphs 8a(1) through (5), the following courses (or other courses that the Services determine to be equivalent) are either mandatory or optional for respective positions, as noted. Although these courses seek to provide an overview of nuclear incident response, it is incumbent on the Services to provide the technical training for the DoD personnel assigned to a custodial base IRF or RTF.

(1) Foundation Courses. The foundation courses provide a basic overview of national policy and concepts for federal response to major incidents, federal roles and responsibilities, and command structure. These courses are necessary for DoD personnel to understand the operating environment in which they would be responding to a U.S. nuclear weapon incident, specific DoD roles, and the DoD interface with other federal and SLT responders. The foundation courses are developed and maintained by DHS/FEMA (http://training.fema.gov/is/crslist.asp), USNORTHCOM (http://www.dsca.army.mil), and DTRA (https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil). These distance learning independent study (IS) courses are easily accessible for self-study via the organizations' listed websites. All of the below listed courses are mandatory for custodial base IRF commanders and section chiefs, and all RTF commanders and staff. Additionally, they are recommended for all custodial base IRF staff in grades E-6 through O-6.

(a) IS 100.b. Introduction to the ICS (3 hours).

(b) IS 200.b. ICS for Single Resources and Initial Actions Incidents (3 hours).

(c) IS 700.a. NIMS, an Introduction (3 hours).

(d) IS 702.a. NIMS Public Information Systems (3 hours). Also mandatory for IRF PAOs.

(e) IS 800.b. NRF, an Introduction (3 hours).

(f) IS 836. NRIA (1 hour).

(g) NR101DL. Nuclear Emergency Team Operations Primer (40 hours).

(h) J3ST-US010. DSCA Phase I Course (9 hours).

(2) Suggested (Optional) Courses

(a) The FEMA Website (http://training.fema.gov/is/crslist.asp) offers many IS courses tailored to specific aspects of emergency response operations. Nuclear weapon accident and incident response organizations should consider IS 301, Radiological Emergency Response. Also, IS 230.a., Fundamentals of Emergency Management, is a basic course for those who have had no formal training in Emergency Management.

(b) The Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) (https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil/) offers many resident and distance learning courses tailored to provide nuclear weapons core competencies and WMD and CBRNE response training to DoD, other federal, State, and local agencies, and national laboratories personnel. Nuclear weapon accident and incident response organizations should consider:

1. NR120DL, Applied Radiological Response Techniques Level 1. This course provides modules on radiological science, radiation instrument theory, radiation exposure, and contamination control actions, federal regulations, planning reports, and radiation surveys.

2. NW110, Nuclear Weapons Orientation Course. This course provides an overview of the history and development of nuclear weapons, management of the nuclear stockpile, and the issues and challenges of the program.

(3) NWIRT Basic Course. As mandated by national policy, any incident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in DoD custody will require response by several federal departments or agencies, including DoD, DHS, FBI, and DOE, at a minimum. Depending upon the incident location and potential severity of incident consequences, other federal agencies could respond, in addition to emergency management and law enforcement services in the jurisdiction and State of occurrence. The NWIRT Basic Course provides an overview of these response elements.

(a) The Basic Course is presented by interagency instructors in an academic classroom format for DoD and interagency students. The course is mandatory for all custodial base IRF Commanders, custodial base IRF section chiefs, and all RTF Commanders and staff, and is recommended for custodial base IRF staff in grades E-6 through 0-6. The Basic Course is available in two formats:

1. As a three-day course taught by an interagency team at the DNWS, consisting of academic modules interspersed with practical exercises to reinforce the training.

2. As a three-day course taught by an interagency mobile training team at U.S. installations with a nuclear mission.

(b) Basic Course Content. As a minimum, the NWIRT Basic Course for DoD personnel will include:

1. An unclassified overview of the current DoD nuclear weapon stockpile and potential hazards should an incident occur.

2. National policy and structure for nuclear weapon incident response, including applicable Presidential Directives; the NRF, roles and responsibilities of DoD and other federal departments and agencies; responsibilities of SLT jurisdictions; DoD policy and guidance; and applicable unified and major Military Department command plans.

3. An overview of DoD and other departments' and federal agencies' special response teams and resources that could be brought to bear following a nuclear weapon incident, including safety and AIBs.

4. An explanation of the various phases of nuclear incident response and the key activities associated with each.

5. The unique aspects and issues associated with PA and public communications following a nuclear incident.

6. Unique legal issues and concerns associated with response to a nuclear weapon incident.

(4) NWIRT Advanced Course. The NWIRT Advanced Course will be taught at nuclear weapon installations and consists of facilitated, scenario-based interactive discussion tailored to the specific weapons, sites, government structures, and resources within the specific jurisdiction of the training audience. The Advanced Course will be a minimum of 2 days in duration and will include classified nuclear weapons incident response guidance and procedures.

(a) Pre-requisites. In order to gain greatest benefit from NWIRT Advanced Course training, all students must complete the respective Foundation and Basic Courses before participating in NWIRT Advanced Course training or receive a waiver from DNWS.

(b) IRF and RTF personnel are required to complete the NWIRT Foundation Courses, Basic Course, and Advanced Course only once. Completion of the NWIRT Advanced Course will satisfy annual nuclear incident response refresher training for IRF and RTF members for the year taken. Personnel can retake courses as needed to stay current with changing doctrine and procedures.

(5) Exercises. In addition to the training requirements listed above, each custodial base IRF and RTF will participate in at least one U.S. nuclear weapon accident/incident (NAI) training event per year. The interagency community participates in one national level, full scale U.S. nuclear weapon accident/incident exercise (NUWAIX) every 2 years. In the alternating years, each DoD RTF will participate in a regional field training exercise.

b. Training Requirements for European-Based Personnel

(1) General. Proficiency requirements are the same for DoD response personnel based in the United States and in Europe. However, the types of training courses and scope of exercises vary significantly between U.S. and European locations because:

(a) Movement activity to and from Europe is significantly less frequent than within CONUS.

(b) Several sovereign HNs are involved, and the U.S. has different bilateral agreements with each. Further, internal command structures, civil-military relationships, and political sensitivities regarding the presence of United States nuclear weapons vary with each country.

(c) DOS is the primary U.S. agency for coordinating U.S. response on non-U.S. territory.

(d) Political sensitivities at some locations prohibit full- NAI exercises, or even training events involving large numbers of non-local personnel.

(2) RTF Training. A one-day workshop for supervisory-level RTF staff members focusing on the roles and responsibilities of the RTF, the types of simultaneous U.S. and HN actions expected after an NAI, and impacts of existing bilateral agreements on response operations. Select guest speakers from U.S. Embassies, HN Ministries of Defense, and HN Emergency Management Services provide insight into the possible contingencies that may arise from a U.S. NAI on foreign soil. This is mandatory annually for RTF Commanders and staff in Europe.

(3) IRF Training. A one-day workshop for main operating base IRF staff members focusing on the roles and responsibilities of the IRF, the types of simultaneous U.S. and HN actions expected after an NAI, and impacts of existing bilateral agreements on response operations. Select guest speakers from U.S. Embassies, HN Ministries of Defense, and HN Emergency Management Services provide insight into the possible contingencies that may arise from a U.S. NAI on foreign soil. This course is mandatory for all IRF commanders and members annually or within 90 days of a nuclear weapon movement within their respective AOR, as directed by the IRF commander.

(4) Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS) Training. A 1-day workshop for MUNSS and HN Air Base members. This course focuses on the roles and responsibilities of the MUNSS and HN air base during an NAI, the types of simultaneous U.S. and HN actions, and existing bilateral agreements between the United States and the HN in which the MUNSS is located. Select guest speakers from the U.S. Embassy in that HN, HN Ministry of Defense, and HN Emergency Management Services provide insight into the possible contingencies that may arise from a U.S. NAI in that HN. This course is mandatory for all MUNSS commanders and MUNSS incident response team members either annually or within 90 days of a nuclear weapon movement within their respective AORs, as directed by the MUNSS commander.

(5) Executive Briefing. A 3-hour executive briefing for RTF commanders (general or flag officers or civilian equivalents), USEUCOM staff members, U.S. Embassy personnel, and select HN governmental organizations.

(6) Bilateral NAI Course. At the behest of USEUCOM HQ, DTRA, in conjunction with the HN, has developed bilateral NAI Courses with various HNs with which the United States has Implementing Joint Operational Plans. These two to five day courses are geared for U.S. and HN participants from the IC up to the ministerial level. Involved U.S. and HN organizations provide individuals who participate in the course and educate the other participants about their respective organizations. The course includes academic briefings, media interview training, and multiple tabletop exercises.

(7) Multilateral NAI Course. A five-day USEUCOM course similar to the bilateral NAI Course held at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. This course is open to U.S. and all basing nation NATO member personnel with NAI responsibilities in Europe.

c. Medical Education. Clinical military personnel must be well versed in radiation casualty management. The following courses provide the appropriate level of post-graduate medical, nursing, and health physics education for RTF and special team medical professionals.

(1) Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation (MEIR). This course is mandatory for RTF and military special team physicians, physician assistants, nurses, health physicists, and health physics technicians. The course is optional for medical planners; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear specialists; medics; corpsmen; and other military medical personnel. The MEIR course is a two and one half-day course taught by SMEs from AFRRI. The course focuses on radiation injury signs and symptoms, treatment, patient decontamination, nuclear weapon effects on humans, radiobiology, bioassay, and health physics.

(2) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) Radiation Emergency Medicine. The course is mandatory for radiological advisory medical team (RAMT) and medical radiobiology advisory team (MRAT) physicians, physician assistants, and nurses, and optional for other military medical personnel. This three and one half-day course is intended for physicians, nurses, and physician assistants who may be called upon to provide EMS in the event of a radiation emergency.

(3) REAC/TS Advanced Radiation Medicine. This course is mandatory for RAMT and MRAT physicians, physician assistants, and nurses. It is optional for other military medical personnel. This four and one half-day course, designed primarily for physicians, physician assistants, and nurses, presents an advanced level of information on the diagnosis and treatment of a wide range of ionizing radiation injuries and illnesses.

(4) REAC/TS Health Physics in Radiation Emergencies. This course is mandatory for RAMT and MRAT physicists and optional for other military medical personnel. This four and one half-day course is designed primarily for health physicists, medical physicists, radiation SOFRs, and others who have radiation dose assessment and/or RADCON responsibilities.

d. National Guard JTF State Commanders Course. This O-6- to O-8-level course is presented by USNORTHCOM and provides extensive JTF leadership training for RTF commanders and their staffs in the areas of capability assessment, the NRF, and NIMS organizational structures. Practical exercises reinforce each day's lecture materials.

e. Exercises. In addition to the training requirements listed above, each RTF will participate in one exercise per year. Further guidance can be found in Reference (d).

f. Readiness. RTFs and other DoD Components tasked by this manual will be considered mission-ready once they have met the requirements outlined in this section and are deemed certified in accordance with Reference (d). Additionally, each GCC may require the Services to undergo additional training and report readiness. These standards will be relayed by the GCCs and the Services to the RTFs, as well as to the Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Response Subcommittee (NWAIRS), for inclusion in future editions of this manual. Readiness status of RTFs will be reported to the appropriate GCCs in accordance with standard reporting protocols using the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities construct.

g. Conferences. In addition to the training and exercise requirements listed in this section, RTF commanders should participate annually in a conference with other senior-level officials from DOE, FBI, DHS, and DOS responsible for U.S. nuclear weapon incident response. Two such conferences are usually conducted annually, one in Europe and one in CONUS, sponsored by the UC HQ or by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The purposes of these conferences are to: establish working rapport; discuss respective departmental and agency roles and responsibilities and interagency coordination; discuss current events and issues related to U.S. NAI response, lessons learned from GCC exercises, and other relevant topics to aid in effective, efficient, and cohesive U.S. nuclear weapon incident response. Arrangements for these conferences will be made by DTRA.

9. WEBSITE. Additional information on procedures, charts, and other resources can be found on the NARP supplement Website at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/narp. This website contains additional procedural information on these topics:

a. Functional Areas

(1) Administration and logistics.

(2) Communications.

(3) Legal.

(4) Medical.

(5) Health and safety.

(6) PA.

(7) Security.

(8) Contamination control.

(9) Training and readiness standards.

b. Appendixes

(1) ICS functional appendix.

(2) Inter-DoD functional annex.

(3) Notional accident site.

(4) Management of contaminated remains.

c. Radiation Data

(1) Radiological monitoring equipment.

(2) Specialized radiological monitoring and hazard assessment capabilities.

(3) Radiation detection and measurement.

(4) Area and resource surveys.

(5) Environmental sampling.

(6) Radiological monitoring, measurement, and control forms.

(7) Conversion factors for weapons grade plutonium.

d. Reference Documents

(1) References.

(2) Definitions.

(3) Abbreviations.

10. MANUAL REVIEW. The review process will mirror and supplement the review process for Reference (c). As Reference (c) is reviewed and reissued every four years, this manual will also be reviewed. The NWAIRS will oversee this review. Upon revision, this manual will be

coordinated with all coordinating and cooperating agencies listed in the NRIA of Reference (c) through the NWAIRS policy working group. In addition to the reissuance outlined in this section, as part of its standing duties, the NWAIRS will review this manual periodically, as required. Particular attention will be paid to:

a. Presidential Directives/New Legislation. The issuance of Presidential directives or enactment of new laws may significantly change the processes, procedures, and protocols outlined in this manual. If so, this manual will be modified to reflect these changes, and the interim change announced to all coordinating and cooperating departments and agencies according to this section.

b. Changes in Coordinating/Cooperating Structures. Changes in the structures and responsibilities of coordinating and cooperating structures may significantly alter the content of this manual. Reviews will ensure the structures and responsibilities in this manual remain valid; changes will be incorporated via the interim change process outlined in this section. Interim changes will be incorporated during the next formal review.

c. After Action Reports (AARs). A national-level NUWAIX is conducted regularly. Additionally, Services and GCCs often conduct their own nuclear weapon accident exercises as part of their training and certification requirements. Finally, any real-world U.S. nuclear weapon accident will generate an AAR that will incorporate lessons learned and observations. The NWAIRS will review the lessons learned and observations from all of these AARs for possible refinement of this manual. Changes will be made according to this section. Lessons learned from AARs will be incorporated into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System.

d. Defense Threat Reduction University (DTRU). The NWAIRS will receive a report from the DTRU annually on new course offerings. If a new course has particular benefit for the RTF, the NWAIRS will determine if the course should become a requirement for DoD personnel, as outlined in section 8 of this enclosure.

GLOSSARY

PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR	after action report
AFRRI	Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute
AIB	accident investigation board
AOR	area of responsibility
ARG	Accident Response Group
ASD(HD&ASA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs
ASD(NCB)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
ASHG	accident site health group
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CCL	contamination control line
CCS	contamination control station
CDO	command duty officer
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM	consequence management
CMAT	consequence management advisory team
CMST	consequence management support team
CNWDI	critical nuclear weapon design information
CO	commanding officer
COM	chief of mission
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
COTP	captain of the port
CrMT	crisis management team
CRSPs	continuation of render safe procedures
DCE	defense coordinating element
DCO	defense coordinating officer
DDO	Deputy Director of Operations
DEPORD	deployment order
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DNWS	Defense Nuclear Weapons School
DoDD	DoD Directive
DoDI	DoD Instruction
DOE	Department of Energy

DOE/EH	Department of Energy Office of Environmental, Safety, and Health
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DRG	Domestic Resilience Group
DSAT	DHS situational awareness team
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
DSO	defense senior official
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DTRU	Defense Threat Reduction University
EMS	emergency medical service
EOC	emergency operations centers
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPR	Emergency Preparedness and Response (DHS)
ESF	emergency support function
EXORD	execute order
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO	federal coordinating officer
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRC	federal resource coordinator
FRMAC	Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
GCC	geographic Combatant Commander
HAMMER ACE	HAMMER Adaptive Communications Element
HAZMAT	hazardous materials
HE	high explosive
HN	host nation
HPAC	hazard prediction and assessment capability
HQ	headquarters
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IAC	Incident Advisory Council
IAP	incident action plan
IC	incident commander
ICP	incident command post
ICS	incident command system
IMAAC	Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center
IMAT	incident management assistance team
IMT	incident management team
IRF	initial response force
IS	independent study

J-3	Joint Staff Operations Directorate
JDOMS	Joint Director of Military Support
JFO	joint field office
JIC	joint information center
JNAIRT	joint nuclear accident/incident response team
JOC	joint operations center
JTF	joint task force
JTTF	joint terrorism task force
LFA	lead federal agency
LNO	liaison officer
LO	legal officer
MACS	Multiagency Coordination System
MEIR	medical effects of ionizing radiation
MRAT	medical radiobiology advisory team
MUNSS	munitions support squadron
NAI	nuclear weapon accident/incident
NARP	Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC2	nuclear command and control
NCP	National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, also known as the National Contingency Plan
NDA	national defense area
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIRT	nuclear incident response team
NJOIC	National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NOC	National Operations Center
NRCC	National Response Coordination Center
NRF	National Response Framework
NRG	Nuclear Weapon Incident Response Group
NRIA	Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex
NRT	National Response Team
NSA	national security area
NSC	National Security Council
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSS	National Security Staff
NUREG	Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation
NUWAIX	nuclear weapon accident/incident exercise
NWAIRS	Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Response Subcommittee
NWIRT	Nuclear Weapon Incident Response Training

OATSD(PA)	Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OOD	officer of the deck
OPCON	operational control
OPREP	operations report
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PAR	protective action recommendation
PCA	Posse Comitatus Act
PIO	public information officer
PPE	personal protective equipment
PRP	Personnel Reliability Program
RA	restricted area
RADCON	radiological control
RADIAC	radiation detection, indication, and computation
RAMT	radiological advisory medical team
RCA	radiological control area
RD	RESTRICTED DATA
REAC/TS	Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
RFA	request for assistance
ROE	rules of engagement
RRCC	regional response coordination center
RRT	regional response team
RSPs	render safe procedures
RTF	response task force
RUF	rules for the use of force
SAC	special agent in charge (FBI)
SCO	State coordinating officer
SEO	senior energy official
SFO	Senior Federal Official
SIOC	Strategic Information and Operations Center (FBI)
SLT	State, local, and tribal
SME	subject matter expert
SNM	special nuclear material
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOFR	safety officer
SR	site remediation
SRWG	site remediation working group
TFR	temporary flight restriction
TP	technical publication

UC	Unified Command
US&R	urban search and rescue
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USG	U.S. Government
USNORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
WHSR	White House Situation Room
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMD CST	weapons of mass destruction civil support team
WRA	weapons restricted area
WRSET	weapon recovery safety evaluation team

PART II. DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this manual.

access. Close physical or electrical proximity to a nuclear weapon in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage a nuclear weapon. For example, a person would not be considered to have access if an escort or a guard was provided for either the person or the weapon when the person is in close proximity to the weapon.

access to classified information. Defined in Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (am)).

accident scene. The area surrounding an accident site from which all non-essential personnel are evacuated or excluded.

accident site. An area containing the affected weapon(s), warhead(s), special nuclear material (SNM), and any potentially damaged buildings, vehicles, and personal property affected by the accident. Additionally, the accident site will include response personnel, equipment, and resources necessary to control entry and access to the affected area, and to plan and organize health and safety matters, weapons recovery, and other operations essential to recovery from the emergency. The NDA, NSA, WRA, weapon storage area, restricted area (RA), or safety zone will be inside the accident site, but the perimeters of the different areas will **not** be synonymous with the perimeter of the accident site.

accident site consolidation. The phase of nuclear weapon accident response marked by arrival of a robust cadre of DoD and DOE/NNSA response assets to the accident site. This phase emerges from the initial response phase and begins once immediate life-saving and firefighting activities are completed.

aerial measuring system. The DOE aerial measuring system characterizes ground-deposited radiation from aerial platforms. These platforms include fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft with radiological measuring equipment, computer analysis of aerial measurements, and equipment to locate lost radioactive sources, conduct aerial surveys, or map large areas of contamination.

AFRRI. A tri-Service organization in Bethesda, Maryland, that conducts research in the field of radiobiology and related matters essential to operational and medical support of the Department of Defense and the Military Services. The AFRRI provides the MRAT, and also provides educational courses such as the MEIR. (See http://www.usuhs.mil/afrri/)

air sampler. A device used to collect samples of and measure the amounts of various pollutants or other substances in the air. As related to radiation, this device is used to collect radioactive particulates suspended in the air.

ARG. A DOE/NNSA asset composed of technical and scientific experts with specialized equipment. The ARG includes a cadre of senior scientific advisors, weapons engineers and technicians, experts in nuclear and HE safety, health physicists, radiation control technicians, industrial hygienists, physical scientists, packaging and transportation specialists, and other specialists from the DOE/NNSA weapons complex. The ARG maintains readiness to provide DOE technical assistance to peacetime accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons and components anywhere in the world.

ASHG. A group of health and safety experts, staffed by representatives from the DoD and the DOE/NNSA that ensures the health and safety of all on-site personnel during the recovery phase of a nuclear weapon accident. The ASHG is concerned with all associated hazards, not only radiological hazards. The ASHG was formerly known as the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center.

beta particle radiation. An electron or positron emitted by an atomic nucleus during radioactive decay. Beta radiation may be harmful depending on the dose and time of exposure.

bioassay. The determination of type, quantity, concentration, and/or location of radioactive material in the body using either direct measurements of the body or analysis of biological material removed (blood, saliva) or excreted (feces, urine) from the body.

BROKEN ARROW. See nuclear weapon accident.

casualty. Defined in Reference (am).

catastrophic incident. Defined in Joint Publication 3-28 (Reference (an)).

CCL. A line that initially extends 100 meters beyond the known or suspected radiological contamination to provide a measure of safety. Once the contamination control station (CCS) is operational, the CCL becomes the outer boundary that separates the reduced hazard area from the clean area.

CCS. An area specifically designated for allowing entrance and exit of personnel and equipment to and/or from the hazards area/radiological control area (RCA) (also called the exclusion zone). The outer boundary of the CCS is the CCL, and the inner boundary is the line segment labeled the hot line.

CM. Defined in Reference (am).

CNWDI. TOP SECRET//RESTRICTED DATA (RD) or SECRET//RD revealing the theory of operation or design of the components of a thermonuclear or implosion-type fission bomb, warhead, demolition munitions, or test device. Specifically excluded is information concerning arming, fusing, and firing systems; limited life components; and totally contained quantities of fissionable, fusionable, and HE materials by type. Among these excluded items are the components that DoD personnel set, maintain, operate, test, or replace.

command staff. In an incident or accident management organization, the command staff consists of the incident command and the special staff positions of PIO, SOFR, LNO, and other positions as required, e.g., legal and medical advisors who report directly to the IC. They may have an assistant or assistants, as needed.

contamination. Defined in Reference (am).

contamination control. Defined in Reference (am).

CONUS. Defined in Reference (am).

cooperating agency. Defined in Reference (am).

coordinate. To advance systematically an analysis and exchange of information among principals who have or may have a need to know certain information to carry out specific incident or accident management responsibilities.

coordinating agency. The coordinating agency is the federal department or agency that owns, has custody of, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise designated responsibility for the nuclear/radioactive material or nuclear weapon. Coordinating agencies are responsible for implementing processes detailed in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of Reference (c) and have primary responsibilities for federal activities related to the nuclear/radiological aspects of the incident or accident. DHS may assume overall responsibility for federal coordination of the response, while the coordinating department or agency would be responsible for supporting DHS in this mission. The coordinating agency was formerly known as the LFA.

critical infrastructure. Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

custody. The responsibility for the control of, storage, transfer, movement of, and access to weapons and components. Custody also includes the maintenance of and accountability for weapons, components, and radioactive materials.

DCO. A DoD military member who has been appointed by the GCC and is the DoD point of contact in the JFO/RRCC for handling RFAs originating outside the NDA or military installation from federal and SLT agencies.

decontamination. Defined in Reference (am).

decontamination station. Defined in Reference (am).

disaster. See major disaster.

dose. The amount of energy absorbed per unit mass of material, or the time integrated dose rate. The International System unit of dose is the gray. The traditional unit of dose is radiation absorbed dose.

DSCA. Support provided by U.S. federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected state, elects and requests to use those forces in Reference (r) status) in response to RFAs from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.

DSO. Defined in Reference (d).

emergency. An unexpected occurrence or set of circumstances in which personnel or equipment unavailability, due to accident, natural event, hostile act, or combat, may demand immediate action that may require extraordinary measures to protect, handle, service, secure, transport, jettison, or to employ nuclear weapons.

EOC. Defined in Reference (am).

EOD. Defined in Reference (am).

EOD procedures. Those particular courses or modes of action EOD personnel take for access to, diagnosis, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance or any HAZMAT associated with an EOD incident.

ESF. Defined in Reference (c). The ESFs are the primary operational-level mechanism to provide assistance to SLT governments or to federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary federal responsibility.

exclusion zone. An area within the incident or accident site where contamination is present and the highest possibility for worker exposure to hazardous waste occurs.

explosive ordnance. Defined in Reference (am).

FCO. Defined in Reference (am).

federal on-scene coordinator. The federal official pre-designated by the EPA or the USCG to coordinate responses pursuant to subpart D of Reference (i), or the government official designated to coordinate and direct removal actions pursuant to subpart E of Reference (n).

FEMA. The federal agency within DHS that establishes policy and coordinates all civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of executive agencies in response to emergencies that require federal response assistance. FEMA assists State and local agencies in their emergency planning. Its primary role in a radiological accident is one of coordinating federal, State, local, and volunteer response actions.

first responders. Local and nongovernmental police, fire, and emergency medical personnel who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment. This includes emergency response providers as defined in section 101 of Title 6, U.S.C. (Reference (ao)), as well as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) who provide immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery operations. First responders may include personnel from federal and SLT governments, HN, or NGOs.

FRC. The federal official appointed to manage federal resource support activities related to non-Stafford Act incidents. The FRC is responsible for coordinating support from other federal departments and agencies using interagency agreements and memorandums of understanding.

FRMAC. The FRMAC is responsible for coordinating all environmental radiological monitoring, sampling, and assessment activities outside of an NDA/NSA for the response. The FRMAC is a DOE-led interagency asset that is available on request to respond to nuclear or radiological incidents. DOE leads the FRMAC for the initial response, then transitions FRMAC leadership to the EPA for site cleanup. The FRMAC is established at or near the incident location in coordination with DHS, the coordinating agency, other federal agencies, and SLT authorities.

HAMMER ACE. Air Force's quick-reaction, special-purpose communications team. Its primary mission is to provide secure communications support for military aircraft and nuclear mishaps worldwide.

HPAC. A forward deployable modeling capability available for government, government-related, or academic use. This software tool assists in emergency response to hazardous agent releases. Its fast running, physics-based algorithms enable users to model and predict hazard areas and human collateral effects in minutes. It is able to predict the effects of HAZMAT releases into the atmosphere and their impact on civilian and military populations.

hazardous substance. Defined in Reference (n).

HAZMAT. Any material that is flammable; corrosive; an oxidizing, explosive, toxic, poisonous, radioactive, nuclear, unduly magnetic, or chemical agent; biological research material; compressed gas; or any other material that, because of its quantity, properties, or packaging, may endanger life or property.

HE. An energetic material that detonates (instead of deflagrating or burning); the rate that the reaction zone advances into the unreacted material exceeds the velocity of sound in the unreacted material.

Human Reliability Program. A program implemented for specifically tasked DOE personnel who handle, have access to, or control access to nuclear weapon systems and components. The program covers selection, screening, and evaluation of the personnel assigned to various nuclear duties. The program seeks to ensure that personnel coming under its purview are mentally and emotionally stable and reliable.

IAP. An oral or written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident. It may include the identification of operational resources and assignments. It may also include attachments that provide direction and important information for management of the incident during one or more operational periods.

IC. The individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and the release of resources. The IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management of all incident operations at the incident site.

ICP. Defined in Reference (am).

ICS. Defined in Reference (am).

IMAAC. An interagency center responsible for production, coordination, development, and distribution of consequence predictions for an airborne HAZMAT release. The IMAAC generates the single federal prediction of atmospheric dispersions and their consequences using the best available resources from the federal government.

incident. An unexpected event that presents the potential for negative consequences that may be caused by accidental or intentional acts, acts of God, unfavorable environmental conditions, or other factors.

initial actions. The actions taken by those responders first to arrive at an incident or accident site.

initial response resources. Disaster support commodities that may be pre-staged in anticipation of a catastrophic event at a federal facility close to a disaster area for immediate application through an NRF ESF operation. The initial response resources are provided to victims and responders immediately after a disaster occurs. They are designed to augment State and local

capabilities. The DHS/EPR/FEMA Logistics Division stores and maintains critically needed initial response commodities for victims and responders and pre-positions supplies and equipment when required. The initial response resources include supplies (baby food, baby formula, blankets, cots, diapers, ready-to-eat meals, non-slip plastic sheeting, tents, and water) and equipment (emergency generators, industrial ice-makers, mobile kitchen kits, portable potties with service, portable showers, and refrigerated vans).

IRF. A tailored force dispatched from the closest military installation by the Secretary of Defense or by the CJCS for the Secretary of Defense, through the DDO, NJOIC immediately upon notification of a U.S. nuclear weapon incident or nuclear or radiological incident to establish security and mitigate immediate effects of the incident.

JFO. Defined in Reference (am).

JIC. A facility established to coordinate all incident- or accident-related public information activities. It is the central point of contact for all news media at the scene of the incident or accident. Public information officials from all participating agencies should collocate at the JIC.

JOC. The focal point for all federal investigative law enforcement activities during a hostile act or potential hostile incident or any other significant criminal incident, and is managed by the FBI. The JOC becomes a component of the JFO if the JFO is activated.

jurisdiction. A range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an accident related to their legal responsibilities and authorities. Jurisdictional authority at an accident can be political or geographical (e.g., city, county, tribal, State, federal or HN boundary lines) or functional (e.g., law enforcement, public health).

LFA. See coordinating agency. This term is still used for incidents and accidents that occur outside the United States.

LNO. A member of the incident command staff responsible for coordinating with representatives from cooperating and assisting agencies.

local government. Defined in Reference (ao).

logistics section. The section of the incident command responsible for providing facilities, services, and material support for the incident or accident response and management.

MACS. A system that provides the architecture to support coordination for incident and accident prioritization, critical resource allocation, communications systems integration, and information coordination. The components of MACS include facilities, equipment, EOCs, specific multiagency coordination groups, personnel, procedures, and communications. The systems assist agencies and organizations to fully integrate the subsystems of NIMS.

major disaster. Defined in the Stafford Act.

mitigation. Activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property, or to lessen the actual or potential consequences of an incident or accident. Mitigation measures may be implemented prior to, during, or after an incident or accident. Mitigation measures are often developed in accordance with lessons learned from prior incidents or accidents. Mitigation involves ongoing actions to reduce exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from hazards. Measures may include zoning and building codes, floodplain buyouts, and analysis of hazard-related data to determine where it is safe to build or locate temporary facilities. Mitigation can include efforts to educate governments, businesses, and the public on measures they can take to reduce loss and injury.

mobilization. Defined in Reference (am).

monitoring. Defined in Reference (am).

MRAT. A team from the AFRRI of highly qualified radiation medicine physicians, health physicists, and related scientists who provide state-of-the-art advice and assistance to the U.S. CCDRs, allied forces, federal agencies, State and local governments, and others. The MRAT provides guidance on radiological matters, including accidents and incidents involving nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, radiological dispersal devices, and industrial and/or medical sources. The MRAT also provides expertise for managing and treating radiation casualties. The MRAT deploys as an augmentee to the DTRA CMAT, is available by phone for reach-back assistance, and can be deployed independently if assistance is requested directly from AFRRI.

mutual aid agreement. A written agreement between agencies, organizations, and/or jurisdictions that they will assist one another on request by furnishing personnel, equipment, and/or expertise in a specified manner.

National Response Center. A national communications center for activities related to oil and hazardous substance incident response actions. Located at DHS/USCG HQ in Washington, D.C., it receives and relays notices of oil and hazardous substances releases to the appropriate federal on-scene coordinator.

NCP. Maintained by the EPA in coordination with the NRT, the NCP provides the organizational structure and procedures for preparing for and responding to oil discharges and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. To achieve this objective, the NCP establishes the NRT, RRTs, and local area committees to coordinate planning and preparedness efforts. Federal on-scene coordinators coordinate response activities at the incident site. The NCP applies to oil discharges into or on the navigable waters of the United States (including adjoining shorelines and into the exclusive economic zone) and to releases into the environment of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants that may present an imminent and substantial danger to public health or welfare.

NDA. An area established on non-federal lands located within the U. S. or its possessions or territories for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DoD equipment and/or materiel. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such non-federal lands under the effective control of DoD and results only from an emergency event. The senior DoD

representative at the scene will define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity will dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the NDA.

NGO. Defined in Reference (am).

NIMS. Defined in Reference (am) and mandated by Reference (p). To provide for interoperability and compatibility among federal and SLT capabilities, NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles, and terminology. Reference (p) identifies these as the ICS; MACS; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualification and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources.

NIRT. A team created in Section 312 of Title 6, U.S.C. (Reference (ao)) to provide DHS with a nuclear/radiological response capability. When activated, the NIRT consists of specialized federal response teams drawn from DOE and/or EPA. These teams may become DHS operational assets providing technical expertise and equipment when activated during a crisis or in response to a nuclear/radiological incident as part of the DHS federal response.

NRF. The document that establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. It replaces the National Response Plan.

NRT. Composed of the 16 federal agencies with major environmental and public health responsibilities, it is the primary vehicle for coordinating federal agency activities under the NCP. The NRT carries out national planning and response coordination and is the head of a highly organized federal oil and hazardous substance emergency response network. A representative from EPA serves as the NRT Chair, and DHS/USCG serves as Vice Chair.

NSA. An area established on non-federal or federal lands located in the United States, its possessions, or its territories, for safeguarding classified information, RD, or equipment and material belonging to DOE/NNSA or NASA. Establishment of an NSA temporarily places such lands under the effective control of DOE/NNSA or NASA and results only from an emergency event. The senior DOE/NNSA or NASA representative who has custody of the material at the scene will define the boundary, mark the boundary with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The landowner’s consent and cooperation will be obtained when possible; however, operational necessity will dictate the final location, shape, and size of the NSA.

nuclear component. The part of a nuclear weapon composed of fissionable or fusionable materials that contribute substantially to nuclear energy released during detonation. Nuclear components include radioactive boosting materials.

nuclear contribution. Explosive energy released by nuclear fission or fusion reactions as part of the total energy released by a radiological incident or accident.

nuclear detonation. A nuclear explosion resulting from fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials, such as from a nuclear weapon.

nuclear radiation. Defined in Reference (am).

nuclear weapon. Defined in Reference (am).

nuclear weapon accident (flagword BROKEN ARROW). An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or radiological nuclear weapon components that results in:

Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by U.S. forces or U.S.-supported allied forces of a nuclear-capable weapon system that could create the risk of an outbreak of war.

Loss or destruction of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning.

An increase in the possibility of, or actual occurrence of, an explosion, a nuclear detonation, or radioactive contamination.

Nonnuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component.

Public hazard, actual or implied.

Any act of God, unfavorable environment, or condition resulting in damage to the weapon, facility, or component.

Nuclear weapon incident. Defined in Reference (d).

nuclear weapon theft (flagword EMPTY QUIVER). The seizure, theft, or loss of a nuclear weapon, including:

The loss (explained or unexplained) of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.

The forcible, unauthorized seizure or theft of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.

nuclear yield. Defined in Reference (am).

on-scene coordinator. See federal on-scene coordinator.

OPREP-3 BEELINE/PINNACLE EMPTY QUIVER. Notification used to report the seizure, theft, or loss of a nuclear weapon, including:

The loss (explained or unexplained) of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.

The forcible, unauthorized seizure or theft of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.

OPREP-3 BENT SPEAR. Notification used to report an unexpected event involving a nuclear weapon or component resulting in any of the following, but not constituting a nuclear weapon accident:

An increase in the possibility of explosion or radioactive contamination.

Errors committed in assembling, testing, loading, or transporting equipment or the malfunctioning of equipment and material that might lead to an unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon arming or firing sequence that, in turn, might lead to a substantial change in yield, or increased dud probability.

Any natural or man-made occurrence, unfavorable environment, or condition resulting in damage to the weapon, facility, or component.

OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW. Notification used to report a U.S. nuclear weapon accident that does not create risk of nuclear war, including:

Nuclear detonation of a U.S. nuclear weapon.

Nonnuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon.

Radioactive contamination from a U.S. nuclear weapon or component.

Seizure, theft, loss, or destruction of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning.

Public hazard, actual or implied, from a U.S. nuclear weapon or component.

operations section. The section responsible for all tactical incident and accident response operations. In ICS, it normally includes subordinate branches, divisions, and groups.

PAR. Advice to SLT, or HN authorities on emergency measures to be considered in deciding action for the public to take to avoid or reduce exposure to radiation or other hazard.

PPE. The equipment provided to shield or isolate a person from the chemical, physical, and thermal hazards that can be encountered at a HAZMAT incident. PPE includes both personal protective clothing and respiratory protection. For the purposes of this manual, PPE is considered clothing and other protective equipment worn by response and recovery personnel that provide protection from radiological contamination and protection from other hazards. Clothing may consist of coveralls, shoe covers, cotton or latex gloves, and hood or hair cap. While personal protective clothing protects the user from alpha-beta radiation, it is primarily a contamination control device to prevent the spread of contamination. A respirator may also be worn as a part of PPE, which protects against the inhalation of contaminants.

physical security. Elements of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel and classified information; to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, SNM,

and nuclear command and control (NC2) materials, equipment, facilities, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

PIO. A member of the command staff responsible for interfacing with the public and media or with other agencies with accident-related information requirements.

planning section. Responsible for the collection, evaluation, and distribution of operational information related to the incident or accident, and for the preparation and documentation of the IAP. This section also maintains information on the current and forecasted situation and on the status of resources assigned to the accident response operation.

processes. Systems of operations that incorporate standardized, repeatable procedures, methodologies, and functions necessary to provide resources effectively and efficiently. These include resource typing, resource ordering and tracking, and coordination.

PRP. A program implemented for all DoD personnel who control, handle, have access to, or control access to nuclear weapon systems and components, SNM, and NC2 materials. The program covers selection, screening, and continuous evaluation of the personnel assigned to various nuclear duties. The program seeks to ensure that personnel under its purview are mentally and emotionally stable and reliable.

public health. Protection, safety, improvement, and interconnections of health and disease prevention among people, domestic animals, and wildlife.

public works. Work, construction, physical facilities, and services provided by governments for the benefit and use of the public.

RADIAC. A term designating various types of radiological measuring instruments or equipment.

radiation exposure. The level of radiation flux to which a material or living tissue is exposed. The actual dose of radiation from the exposure depends on many factors including length of exposure time, the distance from the radiation source, and the amount of shielding between the radiation source and the exposed object.

radioactivity. Defined in Reference (am).

radiological accident. Defined in Reference (am).

radiological survey. Defined in Reference (am).

RAMT. A U.S. Army rapid response team specifically designed to provide timely expert guidance and services to the CCDR, the IC, and local medical authorities and to provide limited medical support to response teams in controlled areas. The RAMT is capable of responding to a wide variety of events involving limited or mass nuclear casualties, radiologically contaminated patients, or exposed populations from events, such as BROKEN ARROWs, reactor accidents,

radiological terrorism, or nuclear war. The RAMT may deploy within four hours of notification and may operate in an NSA, an NDA, and CNWDI access areas.

RCA. The control area, including all known or suspected radiological contamination at the site of a radiological incident or accident. Also called the exclusion zone.

REAC/TS. A DOE/NNSA asset that provides medical advice, specialized training, and on-site assistance for the treatment of all types of radiation exposure accidents. Additionally, through the Cytogenetic Biodosimetry Laboratory, REAC/TS provides for post-exposure evaluation of radiation dose received.

recovery. Involves myriad technical disciplines and supporting infrastructure to effectively reduce hazards to the public and the environment. Weapon recovery begins once any existing fires have been extinguished, weapons have been cooled, initial casualties have been removed or stabilized, and EOD personnel have conducted initial reconnaissance of the area to locate weapon(s) and debris, as well as to prioritize future actions. The basic steps of weapon recovery operations are initial entry, locating weapons and weapon components, development and approval of the recovery plan, performing RSPs, temporary staging, and final packaging of the weapon and components for off-site shipment.

resources. Personnel and major items of equipment, supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for assignment to accident operations and for which status is maintained. Resources are described by kind and type and may be used in operational support or supervisory capacities at an accident or at an EOC.

RRCC. Defined in Reference (am).

RRTs. As regional counterparts to the NRT, the RRTs comprise regional representatives of the federal agencies on the NRT and representatives of each State within the region. The RRTs serve as planning and preparedness bodies before a response, and provide coordination and advice to the federal on-scene coordinator during response actions.

RSPs. See EOD procedures.

RTF. A DoD response force appropriately staffed, trained, and equipped to coordinate all actions necessary to control and recover from a U.S. nuclear weapon accident. The specific purpose of the RTF is to recover weapons and provide radiological accident assistance.

safing. Defined in Reference (am).

security area. The area surrounding the incident or accident site in a foreign country where a two-person rule is established to prevent unauthorized access to classified defense information, equipment, or material. Cooperation by local authorities and HN consent should be obtained through prior HN agreements. In some countries, this area may be designated as the WRA or RA, in accordance with bilateral or CCDR plans.

SEO. The lead DOE/NNSA federal employee deployed to the site of an emergency operation and is the single point of contact for DOE/NNSA nuclear/radiological support provided to the primary federal agency, coordinating agency, and/or on-scene commander. The SEO is responsible for directing all DOE/NNSA federal and contract activities at the incident site and has the authority to assume custody of SNM.

SME. An individual who is a technical expert in a specific area or in performing a specialized job, task, or skill.

SNM. Plutonium, uranium 233, uranium enriched in the isotope 235, and any other material that, pursuant to section 2071 of Reference (ac), has been determined to be special material but does not include source material; it also includes any materials artificially enriched by any of the previously listed, not including source material.

SOFR. A member of the command staff responsible for monitoring and assessing safety hazards or unsafe situations and for developing measures for ensuring personnel safety.

span of control. The number of individuals a supervisor is responsible for, usually expressed as the ratio of supervisors to individuals. Under NIMS, an appropriate span of control is between 1:3 and 1:7.

spill of national significance. Defined in Reference (n).

SR. The process of removing contaminants from a site that were the result of an incident or accident and restoring the site to conditions agreed on by the stakeholders.

SRWG. An organization formed at the accident scene whose sole purpose is to focus on SR issues. The SRWG draws on the expertise of the various elements who respond to the accident to form a coordinated SR team.

staging area. Location established where resources can be placed while awaiting a tactical assignment. The operations section manages staging areas.

State status. Denotes National Guard forces working under the command of the governor in either title 32 status (Reference (r)) or State active duty status. National Guard personnel can be placed in a title 10, U.S. Code status, placing them under the command of the President, can be placed in title 32 status where they are funded by the federal government but command authority remains with the State governor, or they can be in State active duty status where they are funded and commanded by State authorities.

strategy. The general direction selected to accomplish incident objectives set by the IC.

task force. Defined in Reference (am).

technical assistance. Support provided to SLT or HN jurisdictions when they have the resources but lack the complete knowledge and skills needed to perform a required activity (such as HAZMAT assessments).

threat. An indication of possible violence, harm, or danger.

tribal. Any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaskan Native Village, as defined in or established pursuant to sections 1601through1629h of Title 43, U.S.C., also known as the "Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act" (Reference (ap))), that is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.

two-person rule. Defined in Reference (am).

type. A classification of resources in ICS that refers to capability. Type 1 is generally considered to be more capable than Types 2, 3, or 4, respectively, because of size; power; capacity; or, in the case of IMTs, experience and qualifications.

type command. Refers to how ships are organized in the Navy. All Navy warfighting units are organized into broad categories under one of six type commands: Surface Force, Submarine Force, and Air Force, each for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The type commands report administratively to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet or Pacific Fleet, as appropriate. Each type command is further subdivided into groups and squadrons. This organization carries out normal administration, and a ship or command is normally under the administrative control of its type commander, even when under the operational control of a numbered fleet, task force, or battle group commander. Normally, the type command controls the ship during its primary and intermediate training cycles and then it moves under the operational control of a fleet commander.

UC. In ICS, the UC is a unified team effort that allows all agencies with responsibility for the incident or accident, either geographic or functional, to manage an accident working together, by establishing a common set of incident or accident objectives and strategies. This is accomplished without losing agency authority, responsibility, or accountability.

unit. The organizational element that has functional responsibility for a specific accident planning, logistics, or finance/administration activity.

US&R. Operational activities that include locating, extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures.

volunteer. Any individual accepted to perform services by an agency that has authority to accept volunteer services when the individual performs services without promise, expectation, or receipt of compensation for services performed.

warhead. Defined in Reference (am).

weapon debris (nuclear). The residue of a nuclear weapon after it has undergone a conventional explosion, been burned, or been severely damaged; that is, the materials used for the casing and other components of the weapon, plus unexpended plutonium, uranium, and other components, together with fission products, if any.

weapons recovery. See recovery.

WMD. Defined in section 2332a of Reference (ae).

WRA. A security area surrounding an accident site in a foreign country where a two-person rule is established to prevent unauthorized access to classified defense information, equipment, or material. Cooperation by local authorities and HN consent should be obtained through prior HN agreements.