


Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

**CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY
AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE:**

ALGERIA 1954–1962

REVISED EDITION




United States Army Special Operations Command

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

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AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE:
ALGERIA 1954–1962**

REVISED EDITION



Paul J. Tompkins Jr., Project Lead

Erin M. Richardson, Editor

United States Army Special Operations Command

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The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

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INTRODUCTION TO REVISED EDITION

This study was originally published by the US Army Special Operations Research Office in December 1963. As we developed the Assessing Resistance and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project and work began on the new studies, we determined that this study is still important and relevant and thus should be republished. The two major factors that contributed to the revolution—the economic plight of the masses and the political frustration of the intellectual elite—are present still in modern-day revolutions.

The majority of the book was reproduced exactly as it appeared originally, with some minor spelling and punctuation corrections as well as changes in formatting to conform to modern typesetting conventions and to match the new ARIS studies in presentation. The process for creating this revised edition entailed scanning the pages from a copy of the original book; using an optical character recognition (OCR) function to convert the text on the scanned pages to computer-readable, editable text; refining the scanned figures to ensure appropriate resolution and contrast; and composing the document using professional typesetting software. Then, word by word, the revised text was compared to the original text to ensure that no errors were introduced during the OCR and composition processes.

These efforts resulted in the creation of this revised edition in the following formats: a softbound book, a hardbound book, a PDF, and an EPUB. The EPUB was generated by creating a new set of files from the print-ready files, adjusting various settings in the files to facilitate maximum compatibility with e-readers, exporting the files to .epub, and reviewing and revising the code to allow for optimal viewing on standard e-reading devices. The final step was to test the book on multiple e-readers and then repeat the entire process as necessary to address any remaining issues in the code.

Although the processes for creating the various formats of this edition are for the most part straightforward, they take several weeks to complete and require considerable attention to detail. Several staff members from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory devoted time and effort to making the various formats of this revised edition possible: Kelly Livieratos, Annie Marcotte, Magda Saina, and Erin Richardson.

This study and the other products from the ARIS project are essential learning tools developed to enhance Special Operations Forces personnel's understanding of resistances and insurgencies. For more than fifty years, Special Operations Forces have conducted missions to support resistances or insurgencies (unconventional warfare); to counter

them (counterinsurgency operations); or to support a partner nation in eliminating them (foreign internal defense). These operations are collectively referred to as special warfare. Special Operations doctrine gives general principles and strategies for accomplishing these operations but in most cases describes the resistance or insurgency only in generalities. The ARIS project was designed to serve as an anatomy lesson. It provides the necessary foundational material for the special warfare practitioner to learn the elemental structure, form, and function of rebellions, thus enabling him or her to better adapt and apply the doctrine professionally. Additionally, these products inform doctrine, ensuring that it is adapted to meet modern social and technological changes.

When citing this study in scholarly work, please refer to the PDF version available at www.soc.mil.

Paul J. Tompkins Jr.
USASOC Project Lead

**CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY
AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE:
ALGERIA 1954–1962**

Primary Research Responsibility

Paul A. Jureidini

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016

December 1963

FOREWORD

This is the third publication in a series of studies by the Special Operations Research Office on insurgencies and revolutions. The first report is a *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts*. Three of these revolutions which were of particular interest were selected for more detailed analysis: this study of the Algerian Revolution (1954–1962); a previously published study of the Cuban Revolution (1953–1959) and the forthcoming Vietnamese Revolution (1941–1954). A related study on the Guatemalan situation between 1944 and 1954 is underway.

Like its predecessors, this book deals with its subject analytically and is organized in support of the objective of portraying the Algerian Revolution's essential causes, persons, movements, actions and consequences in such a way as to make possible the systematic comparison of one revolution with another. In this way it is hoped that we and other social scientists of similar interest may develop a more general and valid understanding of revolutionary processes. Until this goal is achieved, the reader of the studies in this series may make his own cross-comparisons and draw generalizations for his own use in understanding, coping with, or teaching about revolutions.

Readers' comments and suggestions on this study will be gratefully received.



Theodore R. Vallance

PREFACE

A few words concerning the style of this case study of the Algerian Revolution are required in order to avoid misunderstandings about its concept and intent.

The case study is not a chronological narrative of the revolution from beginning to end. That type of historical case study is valuable for many purposes and a number have been published (see Bibliography). Rather, this study attempts to analyze, individually and successively through time, a number of factors in the revolutionary situation and the revolutionary movement itself which, on the basis of prior studies of revolutions, have been identified as being generally related to the occurrence, form, and outcome of a revolution. The case study, then, is devised to test the “explanatory power” of certain statements of relationships in terms of their applicability to the Algerian Revolution in particular. For this reason the reader is urged to read the definition of terms and the conceptual framework underlying the study which appear in the Technical Appendix.

Such an approach has both advantages and disadvantages to the reader. One who is interested in a particular topic (e.g., social antagonisms, revolutionary organization) need only read that section to get all the essential information on that topic. The reader who is interested in the entire case study will inevitably notice some redundancy from section to section, although every attempt has been made to keep unnecessary repetition to the absolute minimum. But some redundancy is inevitable for two reasons: a given historical event can have multiple significance (e.g., both social and economic significance, or both psychological operations and sabotage significance) and there is an interaction among events in a given society (e.g., political actions may be related to economic actions, or underground supply effectiveness may be related to guerrilla interdiction effectiveness).

The rationale for using such a systematic approach goes beyond the quest for analytic understanding of the Algerian Revolution itself. Companion case studies also have been prepared on the Vietnamese Revolution (1954–1962) and the Cuban Revolution (1953–1959) using the same conceptual framework and evaluating the same factors.^a At the same time, a case study of the situation in Guatemala between 1944 and 1954 is being prepared, using a different approach more suitable to that situation. Thus, a basis is being prepared for comparative analyses that will, hopefully, provide generalizations applicable to more than a single revolution. The net result of this approach for this case study

^a As a final note on redundancy. It should be noted that this Preface and the Technical Appendix are identical with those in the companion case studies.

is a series of related analytic conclusions regarding the character and dynamics of the Algerian Revolution, but not a smoothly rounded literary story.

All of the sources used in preparation for this study are unclassified, and for the most part secondary sources were used. Again, certain advantages and disadvantages accrue. As an unclassified document, the study will be more widely distributed and whatever contribution to understanding it contains will be put to wider use. Reliance on unclassified secondary sources, however, may have led to the exclusion of certain significant considerations or to the use of unreliable information and thus to factual and interpretative errors. It is believed, however, that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. If, because of its sources, the study adds no new information about the revolution, it does claim that maximum, systematic, analytic use of already available open information is a meaningful contribution to the study of insurgency and revolutionary warfare.

Finally, the intent of this case study is not to present any particular “slant” on the Algerian Revolution, the actors and parties in it, or the role of foreign (to Algeria) powers. Rather, the intent is to present as objective an account as possible of what happened in terms of the hypotheses being evaluated. Thus, some of the case study necessarily deals with how the Algerians perceived events, or, more accurately, how it is believed they perceived events.

The aim has been to prepare the case study from the viewpoint of an impartial, objective observer. Perhaps such an aspiration is beyond grasp—the events may be too recent, the sources too unreliable, the “observer” too biased toward objectives compatible with Western democratic interests. For these reasons, no infallibility is claimed and it is readily conceded that this study cannot be the final word on the Algerian Revolution. Subsequent events always have a way of leading to reinterpretation of prior events. However, any errors of omission or commission are not deliberate, but truly errors—and they certainly are not a result of an intent to foster any particular political “slant.”

At the same time, there is no question that many of the subjects discussed are “politically sensitive.” It must be recorded, therefore, that the above denial of any deliberate intent to “slant” the case study also means that there was no intent to “cover up” historical facts and interpretations which might be perceived as reflecting unfavorably on any party. Little is to be gained in terms of increased understanding of revolutions if justification of past particular policies, or advocacy of any given current policy, was the real intent under the guise of objective analysis. An effort was made, however, to avoid use of a style and language which in itself would be unnecessarily offensive or in poor taste.

Beyond the resolve of objective analysis in the preparation of the study, sources were selected on the basis of their judged reliability. A balance was sought among sources of known persuasion in order not to unwittingly bias the case study in one direction or another. As a final check, the study draft was submitted to five area specialists, Dr. Bernard Fall of Howard University, Dr. Abdel Aziz Said of The American University, Dr. Hisham B. Sharabi and Dr. William H. Lewis of Georgetown University, and Mr. James R. Price of the Special Operations Research Office. The experts reviewed the manuscript for accuracy of fact and reasonableness of interpretations and their comments and criticisms provided the basis for final revisions. Although their contributions were substantial, final responsibility for the manuscript, both with respect to substantive content and methodology, rests solely with the Special Operations Research Office.

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SUMMARY

PURPOSE OF STUDY

The objective of this case study is to contribute to increased analytic understanding of revolutionary (internal) war. Specifically, the study analyzes the Algerian Revolution by examining two types of information in terms of their relationship to the occurrence, form, and outcome of the revolution:

- (1) social, economic, and political factors in the prerevolutionary and revolutionary situations;
- (2) structural and functional factors of the revolutionary movement, such as the composition of actors and followers, revolutionary strategy and goals, organization and techniques.

The study is not focused on the strategy and tactics of countering revolutions. On the premise that development of U.S. policies and operations for countering revolutions—where that is in the national interest—will be improved by a better understanding of what it is that is to be countered, the study concentrates on the character and the dynamics of the revolution.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

The first two parts contain the major analyses of the case study. Part I presents an analysis of social, economic, and political factors in the revolution, Part II, an analysis of the revolutionary movement. For the benefit of the reader, a brief Epilogue of events after independence is presented in Part III.

This Summary is for readers who must restrict their reading and is focused primarily on major analytic conclusions. For those readers who wish to study more deeply the aspects of the revolution, a Bibliography is provided which contains references to the source materials used in the preparation of this report. The Technical Appendix contains a description of the rationale and the study procedures used, reserving this Summary and the other parts of the study for substantive content and analysis.

SYNOPSIS

In 1830 a French military expedition began the limited occupation of the coastal zone of what today is Algeria proper. Sporadic, fierce resistance by the indigenous population and uncertainty over long-term objectives delayed French expansion; by 1837 only Bône, Oran,

Mostaganem, Arzew, Bougie, and Constantine had fallen. In 1840 the policy of limited expansion was abandoned when it became apparent that the safety of these cities depended on the pacification of the interior. In 1857 all of Algeria was finally occupied; however, pacification was not achieved until 1881, and much of the unrest of this period resulted from the influx of settlers and the process of colonization. Friction between settlers and the indigenous population over land rights caused uprisings in 1871–1872 and in 1881. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the 20th century the settlers had acquired a large portion of Algeria's most fertile land.

The indecisiveness of French policy also produced friction. Paris wavered between two alternatives: outright annexation, or the possibility of granting Algeria some degree of autonomy. The ordinances of 1833 and 1834 proclaimed the occupied sections of Algeria an extension of France. This implied that French law, without major modifications, would be applied in Algeria. French citizenship, however, was not extended to the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria at this time;^a they continued to be subject to special police and military regulations. In 1871 a Governor General was appointed, but Paris maintained direct control over Algerian affairs until 1896. At this time the Governor General assumed major responsibility for administration, with the exception of education and justice. In 1898 a measure of self-determination was granted; Algerians were given a direct vote in the financial, fiscal, and economic affairs of the country through the establishment of the *Délégations Financières*. The indigenous population, nonetheless, benefited very little. Denunciation by some 500,000 French settlers, who by now had become the entrenched political, economic, and social elite, forced their national government to limit Muslim participation.

Indigenous political ferment began at the end of World War I. A small number of French-educated Muslims and former Muslim officers of the French Army demanded political equality. The disparity between the rights of a French citizen and those of a French subject became their focal issue. Returning Muslim soldiers and factory workers, on the other hand, focused their attention on economic disparity. This demand for political and economic equality influenced the development of three major movements within the Muslim community during the interwar period.

The first movement, the *Fédération d'Élus Musulmans d'Algérie* (Federation of the Elected Muslims of Algeria), was composed of French-educated intellectuals. It sought total assimilation with France and political equality within Algeria. It never developed mass support, but

^a The Crémieux Law of October 1870 granted French citizenship to all Algerian Jews.

such members as Ferhat Abbas and Dr. Ben Djelloul achieved widespread recognition and stature.

The second movement, the *Etoile Norde Africaine* (North African Star—ENA), under the leadership of Messali Ahmed Ben Hadj sought complete independence from the French while advocating Islamic-proletarian economic and social reforms. It developed more of a popular base than was achieved by the Muslim intellectuals. Alongside the ENA there developed a religious organization, the Association of Ulema (religious teachers). This third movement was made up of orthodox Muslims who were offended by French controls over their religion; this association had originally developed as an Islamic reform movement. It shared three points in common with the ENA: independence from France, opposition to French culture, and designation of Arabic as the official language.

Pressure from these movements met with resistance from the settlers. The acceptance of any program, or even part of any program, sponsored by any of the three movements would have upset the special status which the European community had come to enjoy. Response in Paris was divided. The conservatives and the business lobbies opposed any concession to the Muslim community, while the liberals and the Left supported Muslim demands for equality within the framework of the French Republic. With the advent of the Popular Front Government of Léon Blum in 1936, a reform proposal (the Blum-Violette Plan) was introduced in the French National Assembly to extend French citizenship to some 25,000 Muslims. The resignation of all the French mayors of Algeria prevented this bill from even being debated.

Under the Vichy regime, which came to power after the fall of France in 1940, the Muslim community lost many of the small benefits which it had acquired over a period of years. The settlers were given a free hand. Muslim leaders were jailed, and all of the nationalist movements were banned and persecuted. After the Allied landings, in November 1942, attempts by the Free French to enlist the support of the Muslim community in the war were met by the Algerian Manifesto. In it, the nationalist leaders demanded self-determination and agrarian reforms (to solve the crisis in the rural areas where unemployment, underemployment, and food shortage were rampant) as a precondition to their full participation in the war. These demands were brushed aside with vague promises. In 1944 Ferhat Abbas organized the *Amis de Manifeste Algérien* (Friends of the Algerian Manifesto—AMA), to press for social reform within the French political framework, while the *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (Algerian People's Party—PPA), the newly reconstituted ENA, advocated direct action in the countryside as the only way of achieving improvements. On May 8, 1945, "Liberation Day,"

the settlers and the government bloodily put down what was thought to be a nationalist uprising in Sétif. The official figures listed the Muslim deaths below 4,000 while unofficial figures put that number over 40,000. The suppression of this incipient uprising was to have a lasting effect on the younger Algerian nationalists.

In 1947 a small number of young militant members of the *Mouvement Pour le Triomphe de Libertés Démocratiques* (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties—MTLD), organized in 1946 by Messali Hadj to replace the outlawed PPA, created within the structure a paramilitary organization called the *Organization Speciale* (Special Organization—OS). Disgusted by the lackadaisical attitude of the nationalist parties, including the MTLD, and their apparent inability to unite in effective opposition against France, especially after the passage of the Algerian Statute of 1947 and the rigged elections in Algeria of 1948; their aim was to prepare for a general revolution which would achieve these aims. The discovery of the OS by the authorities in March 1950 split the MTLD and precipitated a crisis which paralyzed party activity. When it became apparent that the unity of the party and the nationalist movement could not be effected, nine former members of the OS created the *Comité Révolutionnaire Pour L'Unité et L'Action* (Revolutionary Committee For Unity and Action—CRUA), in July 1954, with the avowed purpose of launching a revolution. In the latter part of October 1954, the members of the CRUA met for the last time and set November 1 as the date for the uprising. On the morning of that day they adopted a new name: *Front de Libération Nationale* (National Liberation Front—FLN). Then the revolution began.

During the night of October 31 and the early hours of November 1, 1954, bomb explosions and attacks on French military and *Gendarmerie* posts were reported throughout Algeria, while the Voice of the Arabs from Cairo announced that the Algerian war of independence had been launched by the FLN. In more than 7½ years of bitter and bloody fighting, the FLN grew from a small band of 2,000 to 3,000 militant nationalists to a revolutionary force of about 130,000. The vast majority of the Algerian people who were uncommitted at the beginning eventually rallied to its cause, and opposing nationalist leaders also joined its ranks. It was able to create what the French claimed did not exist: a separate and distinct Algerian personality.

The Algerian Revolution was not without repercussions in France. At first dismayed by their inability to stem the course of the revolution, and then by the desire of the French governments of the Fourth Republic to seek negotiations with the rebels, the French Army in Algeria staged a virtual coup d'état on May 13, 1958, which toppled the Fourth Republic and brought General Charles de Gaulle back to power. Convinced that

a protracted conflict would turn the French Army into a political force and aware that the rebels had effectively demonstrated that an “*Algérie Française*” was nothing but an illusion, de Gaulle—after what seemed to be an initial hesitation—sought to end the war by negotiating with the FLN. Feeling betrayed again, the French Army elements attempted two abortive coups which gave rise to the formation of a dissident group, the *Organisation de L'Armée Secrète* (Secret Army Organization—OAS), dedicated to the maintenance of a French Algeria by fighting both the FLN and de Gaulle. On March 18, 1962, the government of President de Gaulle formally accepted the political fact that Algeria was indeed a separate personality, despite a favorable military stalemate, and recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. On July 1, 1962, after a national referendum, Algeria became an independent nation.

SELECTED ANALYTIC CONCLUSIONS

Given the surging tide of nationalism which has characterized the 20th century, one may ask whether the Algerian revolution and, indeed, Algerian independence were inevitable. Would the implementation of timely French economic, social, and political reforms have proved futile, or would they have succeeded in reversing the trend and keeping Algeria under French control. Algerian scholars are divided in their opinions on this question. Some hold that no amount of reform could have stemmed the tide; that Algerian nationalism did not arise from the inequities of the French regime but was nurtured by the ideological theories of the 20th century, especially self-determination, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Islamism; and that the concessions which were granted to Tunisia and Morocco in 1954 and 1955 were bound to influence the Algerians to seek similar rectification of their grievances. On the other hand, implementation of reforms would have had a salutary effect. Charles-André Julien, a noted French authority on North Africa, believes that timely political reforms would have kept for France her North African territories, while Jacques Soustelle, an outspoken conservative, states emphatically that widespread economic reforms and improvements would have stifled the revolutionary impetus. The arguments which they present are logical and clear, but they are divided in the assessment of which aspects of their proposed reforms needed the most urgent consideration; and in a sense this has been the dilemma of most of the French governments. There is no way of resolving the question categorically, but an analysis of the social, economic, and political weaknesses of the French regime in Algeria, and the dynamics of the revolutionary movement may provide a partial answer.

Environmental Factors

The significance and the interplay of the environmental factors which contributed to the revolution can best be understood if analyzed from the point of view of the MTLD, the initial members of the CRUA–FLN, and the principal actors of the revolution who subsequently came to form the leadership. In the planning and early stages of the revolution, these men all came from the Algerian lower class, and had in common similar educational backgrounds, social status, and aspirations. In the intermediary and latter stages of the revolution, the principal actors came to include intellectuals from the Algerian middle and upper classes. As a group, these actors shared one common goal: national independence. Ideologically, however, they represented a variety which ranged from extreme Left to extreme Right. They were able, nonetheless, to avoid fundamental division on issues and to compromise on points in question, with the understanding that these would be clearly formulated in the independence era.

Economic Maladjustment

Economic maladjustment is one of the factors on which the revolutionary actors could not wholly agree. The MTLD had made agrarian and socioeconomic reform one of its main objectives, but it was never clarified and remained a fuzzy concept and, as such, won the group only a nominal following in the rural areas. In fact, all that the MTLD advocated to alleviate the economic plight of the peasant was distribution of land, most likely land belonging to the settlers. The question of land reform remained unformulated in the FLN platform as well. There was among the FLN, however, a growing realization that an equitable redistribution of land would not materially increase the total agricultural productivity of the country, and indeed that it might even prove harmful. Toward the latter stages of the revolution, the FLN accepted the formula that distribution of land would not necessarily alleviate the problem, maintaining only that all large estates which remained uncultivated would be nationalized and distributed to the peasants.

Notwithstanding the above, there was consensus on one point: that the fruits of production fell largely into the hands of the settlers, and that more than 90 percent of the production was jointly controlled by settlers and Metropolitan French concerns. The fact that the economic development of Algeria was largely due to the settlers—and that in an overall sense it brought relative economic prosperity to Algeria—was disregarded by the nationalists. They were quick to point out that the economic development of Algeria had benefited only the settlers. The settlers received the majority of all profits, and the money was not reinvested in the country to further its economic growth. Participation

by Muslim Algerians was limited to unskilled labor because no labor training centers had been created, and thus there was no opportunity to develop a skilled native working class. It was also pointed out that the tariff or customs agreement with France tended to stifle Algerian economic growth. Agricultural diversification and industrial developments were in most cases only undertaken when they did not compete with French agriculture and industry. What the nationalists wanted was, in fact, a chance to develop the Algerian economy in a manner which they judged to be the best suited for alleviating the economic problems of the country. It was by denying them this opportunity that France contributed to the development of revolutionary potential in Algeria.

France contributed heavily to the overall economic development of Algeria. Extensive road and railway networks were built, along with modern ports and airports. Short- and long-range loans were extended for land development, agricultural modernization, and industrial development. Most of these projects tended to benefit the settlers inasmuch as they controlled the means of production. There was, on the other hand, little effort to resolve the socioeconomic problems which the introduction of a modern economic system into an underdeveloped area tends to create. Modern hygiene gave rise to a tremendous population growth which, by 1939, had outstripped Algeria's agricultural output; nor could full employment be achieved in the agricultural rural areas due to the archaic exploitation methods which were still in use at the time. The chance of a better life in the urban centers attracted an ever-increasing number of migrants from the countryside. But their hopes never materialized. Industries in the urban centers could absorb no more than 30,000 unskilled workers by 1954, and many of them could only provide seasonal employment because they were mainly concerned with food-processing. With no other outlets available, these immigrants became a discontented and restive subproletariat. From this subproletariat the FLN was able to draw its human resources, and there is much to be said for the contention that timely economic reform projects might well have deprived the nationalists of a potent weapon, be it propaganda or human.

Social Antagonism

Social antagonism in the form of race hatred was aimed at the settlers and the privileged status which they enjoyed, but had no anti-French overtones. In the rural areas, the traditional society resented the sudden and forceful attempts of the French administration to introduce in the late 1940's, after more than a century of negligence, a French culture which because of its secular and linguistic characteristics (the administration sought to eliminate the teaching of the *Koran*

and the Arabic language in the newly erected schools) was regarded by the population as anti-Muslim. Very much under the influence of the orthodox reformist Association of Ulema and their religious schools, the rural society, more often than not, refused to send their children to the new secular schools and viewed with a jaundiced eye the efforts of the administration to eliminate the Muslim religious schools.

In the urban areas, the native lower class, composed of unemployed and underemployed workers and their families, resented their inferior status—a status lower than that of the European lower class—and the efforts of the settlers to maintain an advantageous *status quo*. The transformation of resentment into racial hostility was due to a large extent to the political agitation of the indigenous political parties and movements, especially the ENA–PPA–MTLD, which more than the other native parties resembled the mass-type parties of Europe with its educational and indoctrination programs. In an effort to develop a dedicated following among the urban workers and to drive a wedge between the two major communities the MTLD, in city and village meetings and discussions, constantly highlighted the efforts of the settlers to keep the native Algerian in his inferior position. At the same time, the settlers contributed to the growing social tension by believing themselves to be and behaving as the superior race; they felt that they had been able to create what the natives had not been able to do in centuries—a modern Algeria. Settlers constantly referred to the Muslims as “coons” and “simpletons,” and counter attempts to educate them on the basis that the natives were simply incapable.

The position of the native intellectuals was frustrating. Mostly French-educated with strong pro-French leanings, this group, which developed in the 1930's, found itself in a social vacuum in the post-World War II era. Opposed by the settlers who refused to accept them as equals and leaders of the native element and threatened by the rise of a younger and more nationalistic class of intellectuals who considered their theories outmoded, these men, seeking to maintain their status and role joined the rebel side in 1955 and 1956, thus giving the revolutionaries an added aura.

Political Weaknesses

Perhaps the political imbalance that existed in Algeria contributed the most to the development of a revolutionary potential. The native movements of the interwar period were essentially protests. The *Fédérations des Élus Musulmans d'Algérie* sought political equality and integration with France; the ENA–PPA advocated basic socioeconomic reform as its primary objective, despite the fact that it sought some form of political autonomy; and the Association of Ulema demanded that it be

allowed to implement religious reforms which would give the practice of Islam its orthodox purity. Conscious awareness of Algeria as a separate and distinct entity had not jelled, and the desire for nationhood remained an undefined concept except in the minds of a very few. Ferhat Abbas and the intellectuals of his group were in fact completely opposed to separation of any sort. This desire for integration within France transcended the World War II period, despite the actions of the Vichy regime.

Even after the incipient uprising of May 8, 1945, the local political parties agreed to confine their activities to legal methods, in the hope that the proposed forthcoming French political reforms would prove satisfactory. When the Algerian Statute of 1947—a document which disappointed most of the nationalists—was succeeded by the rigged elections of 1948, the younger nationalists began to question the wisdom of adopting legal methods in their search for reform. It became increasingly evident to them that the French governments, buffeted by the French Right and pressured by the settlers, would never be able to implement reforms, be they economic, social, or political. And yet a large segment of the nationalists continued, through legal methods, to seek some political formula, which in most instances envisaged autonomy within the framework of the French Republic. The revolution was launched by a small number and it failed to get widespread support in its first 15 months. In the last instance, it appears that the FLN was able to enlist the support of all the native nationalist factions when the French governments refused to make political concessions, and instead emphasized economic reforms. Evidence indicates that if the French Government had, during the very early stages of the revolt, made drastic political concessions—the FLN having advocated autonomy as a first step—the revolution might never have taken a violent course.

Revolutionary Dynamics

Actors and Organization

The desire for direct action on the part of the nine members of the CRUA and their small following reflected the impatience of the younger nationalist militants with the general course of the nationalist movement as a whole. The movement in the early 1950's had been paralyzed by two major factors: the decision to adopt legal devices as the best means of achieving reforms, and the inability of the various factions within the nationalist movement to agree on some unity of purpose and action. By launching their revolution these men hoped to force unity on the nationalists by presenting them with a *fait accompli*. The revolution was intended to bring the nationalist movement out

of its lethargy; with the outbreak of hostilities the nationalists could either join or support France. To facilitate unity, the FLN adopted an open-house policy, and its platform was moderated to appeal to all factions. Yet this policy did not imply that political parties could, as such, associate themselves with the revolutionaries while maintaining their separate entities. The leadership of the FLN intended the movement to represent a departure from previous nationalist movements; unity could only be achieved and maintained if other parties disbanded and urged their members to join the FLN as free individuals.

The changing of the infrastructure of the FLN in 1956, and the constant expansion in the leadership of the movement, was undertaken in response to the influx of new members. The organization of the MTLD which the FLN had adopted as its own in the early stages of the revolution proved to be narrow and inflexible. It created problems in communication and could not accommodate the new members that joined, especially the nationalist leaders, in accordance with the open-house policy. The changes undertaken at the Soummam Valley Congress allowed the FLN to overcome its communication problems, and maintained the unity of the movement by giving all known nationalist leaders prominent leadership positions.

Techniques

Although the revolution was hastily organized, its leadership included veterans of many European campaigns and of the Franco-Vietminh war in Indochina who had gained experience in conventional and unconventional warfare. The FLN thus demonstrated from the very first its understanding of the military requirements. They launched a two-pronged war against the French administration in Algeria: guerrilla warfare in the rural areas and terrorism in the urban centers.

With very little support and practically no modern weapons, the guerrilla units withdrew to the inaccessible mountain ranges of Algeria. In this area they recruited the population to their support, and engaged small French patrols in the hope of capturing their arms. At the same time they began to organize their supply lines and established two safe bases of operations in Tunisia and Morocco after these two countries had achieved their independence. By 1957 the guerrilla units had succeeded in clearing the Aures and Kabyle Mountains and had developed their strength to the point where they could engage the French forces on the battalion level.

That they developed into a strong revolutionary movement was due in part to inadequacy of the initial French military reaction. The French Command refused to recognize the revolution for what it was, considering it another manifestation of tribal warfare. Accordingly,

classical large-scale operations—bombing, strafing, and mopup operations—were launched against areas in which rebel activity had been reported, but yielded practically no positive results. Lack of discrimination between passive civilians and rebels alienated the population and forced them into the rebel camp. By the end of 1957 the French Army, recognizing the magnitude of the revolution, developed counterinsurgency tactics which stemmed the growth of the revolution. Nevertheless, all that was achieved from 1958 to the cease-fire in 1962 was a military stalemate. The inability of the French Army in Algeria to win over the population during this stalemate, despite its civic action programs and its attempted coups d'état, convinced de Gaulle that Algeria was not and could not be a part of France, and that continued fighting in Algeria would be detrimental to the national cohesion of France.^b

Terrorism and the counterterror which it generated served the purposes of the FLN admirably. These tactics made cooperation between the European and Muslim communities impossible, silenced most of the Muslim opposition to the FLN, and committed a large segment of Muslim population to support of the FLN as a result of the indiscriminate methods which the French authorities used in their counterterrorism campaign. The FLN, in a sense, was able to achieve its main objectives not solely by military means but by effectively enlisting the support of the people, on whom France had based its thesis that Algeria was French.

Summary to Selected Analytic Conclusions

Charles-André Julien has attributed the loss of Tunisia and Morocco to the French politics of “lost opportunities.” This theory applies to Algeria as well. Basically, two major factors contributed to the revolution: the economic plight of the masses, and the political frustration of the intellectual elite. In the interwar period these two factors were transformed into political movements which sought solution to their problems independently of each other, but within the framework of the French political parties and the French political system. The ENA-PPA, which came to represent the Algerian proletariat, first developed as an adjunct of the French Communist Party, and sought economic reform through the French parties of the Left. *The Fédérations des Élus Musulmans d'Algérie*, and subsequently Ferhat Abbas' Young Algeria,

^b As result of the attempted coups d'état by elements of the French Army in Algeria, de Gaulle feared the immersion of the entire French Army in national politics. In late 1960 he suspended the application of assimilationist policies and concomitant civic action programs. That makes it difficult to pass final judgment on the effectiveness of the French Army civic action program.

associated themselves with the French liberals in their search for political equality. Frustrated by their unrewarding association with the French political parties, these representative movements began to fuse in the post-World War II era. The launching of the revolution proved to be the necessary catalyst. United, the FLN could rely on the masses for its human resources and on the intellectuals for leadership.

It would be unfair to state that the French governments made no attempt to alleviate the grievances of the masses and the intellectuals. Certainly, the Blum-Violette proposal and the Algerian Statute are indicative of the cognizance of these governments and their good intentions. The fact that the many reform proposals were never or only partially implemented should be blamed on the French political system. France, until the Fifth Republic, was almost always equally divided between Left and Right, but its governments were always of the Center. Having to rely on either the Left or the Right for parliamentary support, these governments were obligated to compromise on all sensitive issues, of which Algeria was one. The French Right, in general, represented the settler viewpoint. The Left, divided between radical, Socialist, and Communist, could not present a solid front to counteract the Right. As a result, most of the legislation dealing with Algeria tended to favor the Right and the settlers.

It would also be a mistake to credit Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism with being the major causes of the revolution, although once the revolution was launched, they provided the FLN with an important ideological weapon. More than anything else, it was the “*immobilisme*” of France’s Algerian policies—brought about by the void between France and the realities of Algeria which created a gap between the needs of the Muslim masses and the expectation that these needs would be met—that precipitated the revolution. The rise of Nasserism in the Arab World, the nationalist struggle in Tunisia and Morocco, the French debacle in Indochina, and the independence of numerous former colonial possessions also contributed to the revolutionary process.

**PART I—FACTORS INDUCING
REVOLUTION**

ECONOMIC MALADJUSTMENT

Foreign Control of Economy

In 1954, after more than a century of French control, Algeria had 50,000 miles of roads, of which 27,000 were considered first-class routes, and 3,000 miles of railroad tracks. More than 30 airports handled the international and domestic air traffic, while 6 modern ports channeled most of Algeria's shipping, which in 1960 amounted to 22½ million tons. Iron, phosphates, lead, zinc, antimony, copper, and other mineral deposits were being exploited. Locally extracted coal and oil partially supplied the country's 35 power stations, and the 800 million kilowatt hours of electricity which they generated helped power a burgeoning light industry which employed more than 30,000 workers. Despite these achievements, however, Algeria remained predominantly an agricultural country. The agricultural output, which accounted in exports for over one-third of the national income and used 72 percent of the labor force, could support only two-thirds of the population. Unemployment and underemployment were at a high level, and this problem was aggravated by an extremely high rate of population growth—250,000 yearly. The Muslim standard of living was much lower than that of the European community, which controlled 90 percent of the industry and commerce and owned 40 percent of the most fertile and amble land. To the Algerian nationalists, this foreign control of the economy was one of the most distasteful aspects of the situation. "What interests the Algerian nationalist leaders in our time is . . . the fact that the fruits of production fell into European hands in large proportion."¹

Review of France's Land Appropriation and Resettlement Policies Since 1830

After the initial French landings in Algeria on June 14, 1830, Minister of War Gerard explained the proposed limited conquest as follows:

It was based on the most important imperatives, those most intimately connected with the maintenance of public order in France, and even in Europe: the opening of a vast outlet for the excess of our population and the marketing of our manufactured products, in exchange for other products foreign to our soil and climate.²

Despite the "most important imperatives," however, the French Government had undertaken this conquest without devising a colonization plan for the country. The decade 1830–1840 was a period of free colonization. The captured coastal cities of Bône, Oran, Mostaganem,

Arzew, Bougie, Constantine, and their environs attracted a hoard of mercenaries and land speculators. “French soldiers settled with government encouragement; wealthy investors bought estates; Spanish peasants migrated to Western Algeria; and Italian, Maltese, and Corsican peasants and fishermen found their way to Eastern Algeria.”³ By 1839 Algeria had 25,000 European settlers, of which only 11,000 were of French origin.

In 1840 limited occupation was abandoned in favor of total conquest. This marked the beginning of a period of “official,” or government-sponsored, colonization. The French Government believed that official assistance would encourage the development of small French peasant settlements, and hoped that with the presence of a large number of French settlers the Gallic civilization would spread more easily, and that Algeria would soon become genuinely and thoroughly French. Free land was made available to individuals by the arbitrary confiscation of indigenous holdings. In 1840 certain Algerian tribes were placed on restricted reservations (cantonments) and their remaining land was appropriated. All lands belonging to Algerians who had taken arms against France were confiscated on November 1 of that year. In 1843 the lands of the Dey and the *habous* (church lands)^a were also confiscated. All nondeveloped properties for which no justifiable titles were held prior to July 1, 1830, were proclaimed to be government land in 1844 and 1846. In 1872, as a result of a Kabyle uprising, 1,120,000 acres of land were further sequestered and assigned for colonization.

By 1874 it had become apparent that the attempt to populate Algeria with Frenchmen had failed: out of a total of 109,400 Europeans only 47,274 were French. In that year large land concessions were made to private investment companies,^b in the hope that they would be able to stimulate immigration by establishing settlements on their holdings. This effort by the government was no more successful than previous attempts, but the overall effect of the policy of confiscation was to press back the Algerians from the fertile coastal zone into the less fertile mountainous hinterlands.⁵

The government of Napoleon III attempted in 1863 to safeguard the interests of the indigenous population by applying French property concepts to land still held by the natives. An imperial decree proclaimed

^a “The *habous* were lands or other donations made in perpetuity to the Muslim cult. The incomes derived therefrom supported the mosques, Muslim officials, and other religious activities, thus permitting the Independence of Islam.”⁴

^b Thus the *Compagnie Genevoise* received close to 50,000 acres of land in the Sétif area on condition that it install 500 settlers on its estates. The *Société de l’Habra et de la Macta* obtained over 50,000 acres of land to build a dam on the Sig River, and the *Société Générale Algérienne* (later *Compagnie Algérienne*) was awarded 247,000 acres in return for giving the state credit.

the tribes to be the inalienable owners of their lands, and at the same time, “recognized and established both individual property rights.” Communally held lands (arch) could no longer be bought by settlers until they became private property. However, the salutary effects of the decree were negated in the surveying operations to delimit ownership and distinguish between public domain and tribal lands. Some of the boundaries drawn were made to cut across tribal lands and divested the indigenes of some of their remaining property.⁶

Ten years later the French Government again attempted to introduce French property concepts. Communal tribal lands were made available for sale. But once sold, these lands “remained thereafter under French land codes and could not return to a previous status under Muslim property law even if bought by a Muslim.”⁷ This measure proved to be a total failure. The indigenes were again victimized by land speculators:

In one notorious transaction of 1885, a settler bought for twenty francs a small share of a 700-acre parcel of land belonging jointly to 513 Arabs; he divided the whole parcel into shares for each holder, charging for his troubles 11,000 francs; when that fee could not be met, he acquired in payment the whole 700 acres.⁸

The “differences between French and Muslim property ownership laws,” which were exploited by land speculators, resulted in Muslim discontent.⁹

Economic Relations with France: Nondevelopment of a Viable Economy

Algeria, prior to the French occupation, was an undeveloped but an agriculturally self-sufficient area. Exploitation of land and resources was archaic, but it was adequate to feed and clothe the indigenous population.^c Internal and external trade was active. French colonization, however, through the process of modernization disrupted this traditional economic system, and replaced it with one that benefited the settler without correspondingly improving the lot of the indigene.

During the first 30 years of French rule the Algerian economy was made to form a direct part of the French economic system. Tariffs, in particular, were determined by France. In the 1860's the adoption of free-trade policies by the French Government led to a relaxation of economic attachment, and in 1866 the Algerian Council General was permitted to impose tariffs of its own. In the 1880's, however, free trade was abandoned. France was becoming industrialized, and the need for industrial outlets assumed even greater importance. A regime of tariff

^c In 1830 the total population of Algeria was only about 2,000,000.

assimilation was introduced in Algeria whereby added taxation was imposed without reciprocal and corresponding benefits. Non-French goods entering Algeria were thus subjected to French duties without any attempt being made to facilitate or increase Algerian exports. As a result, trade with other countries declined, and Algeria became the safety valve of French industry. In 1905 the policy of tariff assimilation was abandoned after settler agitation forced the government to grant certain economic concessions especially as far as manufactures, tariffs, and foreign investments were concerned. Association rather than assimilation became the temporary aim of some of the reform-minded governments. But since association implied some measure of autonomy along the lines of British colonial policy—a policy which ran contrary to French colonial tradition—it was never seriously implemented. Assimilation remained the basic theme, and the lack of an independent tariff system stifled the development of industry.

The economic concessions granted to Algeria were in keeping with the policy of assimilation. French commercial and financial interests allied themselves with settler interests to shape the Algerian economy to their mutual profit. Concentration on cereal and wine production allowed the settlers to exact subsidies from the French Government. At the same time, French interests prevented the development of sugar and cotton production in order to guarantee the Algerian markets for French textiles and sugar.

Algeria is kept as a preserve of metropolitan France by means of a customs union, which benefits chiefly big exporters among the settlers and big capitalists among the importers, and of a “monopoly of the flag” whereby almost the entire maritime traffic is reserved to big French and Algerian companies.¹⁰

Attempts by the French administration, after World War II, to create a more viable economy^d were largely undermined by the continued application of a regime of tariff assimilation, and by settler opposition. This customs union prompted “French competitors to resist any change,”¹¹ and any change in the bases of the Algerian economy, which tended to lower the standard of living of the settlers, prompted these settlers to actively seek to maintain the *status quo*.

^d Between 1940 and 1957 two 4-year plans were initiated to modernize the agricultural system, increase grain production, and develop industrialization through long-range credits and tax exemption; in 1956 land-reform programs were initiated to encourage the development of small Muslim farms.

Failure to Integrate Algerians into the Modern Economic System

At the outbreak of the revolution two contrasting economies existed in Algeria. On the one hand, the large and rapidly increasing Muslim population, poor and undernourished, derived a scant living from subsistence-type farming and nomadic sheepherding. On the other hand, a small European community—numbering about one-tenth of the population—had succeeded in developing modern farms, small industries, commerce, and finance to the point where a few of them had been able to accumulate huge fortunes, and the remainder were able to maintain a standard of living considerably higher than that of the Muslim population.

The plight of the indigenous population was largely the result of the failure of the French administration to integrate the Muslims into the modern economic system which was introduced into Algeria by the settlers. Deprived of some 5 million acres of the most fertile land,^e unable to rely on the old communal tribal lands,^f and plagued by a galloping population growth, the position of the Muslim peasant did not improve proportionately to that of the French settler. In almost all instances the Muslim peasant worked a plot of land too small and too poor to suffice his needs and those of his family, used archaic agricultural equipment and techniques, and continued to rely “on the bounty of nature to determine whether he shall eat or starve.”¹²

Not until after World War II did the French administration attempt to correct the economic situation in Algeria. Programs of irrigation, drainage, and soil conservation¹³ were initiated, and special fiscal policies were adopted to give impetus to industrial development. However, the agricultural programs were aimed at increased productivity and were not accompanied by sweeping land reform, while industry—most of which was related to food processing—absorbed only a small part of the surplus labor and failed to produce skilled labor. As a result, increased productivity and employment were easily offset by the

^e In many instances the land acquired by the settler was not per se fertile, but was made so through the constant application of modern European agricultural methods.

^f Prior to the French occupation four types of landed property existed in Algeria: state lands, church lands, tribal lands, and private holdings. The tribal lands, which accounted for the greatest acreage, were in themselves large enough to sustain a whole tribe. The French appropriated most of these lands by declaring them vacant and ownerless and broke up the remainder into small lots in which the future use of modern agricultural machinery proved to be economically unprofitable to the owner and the state. Muslim inheritance law, which provides for the equal division of property among male heirs, further reduced the size of these holdings. French policy, on the other hand, encouraged the growth of large holdings among the European settlers. In the early years of the French occupation, plots of about 20 acres were made available to settlers. After 1870 big French companies and societies were awarded vast holdings and were encouraged to buy out the smaller holdings and regroup them into large estates.

tremendous population growth, and the problem of unemployment and underemployment remained.

Summary

In the 1950's European settlers in Algeria controlled 90 percent of industry and commerce, and owned 40 percent of the most arable Algerian land. French control of the Algerian tariff system along with land confiscations in the 19th century stifled the development of Algerian industry, and drove the Algerians from the fertile coastal lands to the mountainous hinterlands. Over a period of 130 years in Algeria a European community developed; 10 percent of the population accumulated and controlled most of the wealth, while a growing community of Muslims lived at a subsistence level.

Concentration of Land and Landless Peasants

Discrepancy Between Settler and Algerian Land Tenure

Algeria has 32 million acres of arable land, of which only 17½ million can be cultivated by modern methods due to irrigation problems. Five to seven million acres of the most fertile land belonged to the European settlers. In 1944 there were 26,000 European landowners. By 1951 this number had dropped to 21,650 and in 1957 it amounted to only 19,400.^g With their families, these 19,400 landowners formed a population of about 80,000 people.^h More than 1 million Muslim families—about 7 million people—lived on the remaining 10 million acres. Of these 1 million families, only 600,000 owned land, and the remainder constituted a population of about 3 million landless peasants, “an agricultural proletariat who have work only for a few days every year.”¹⁴

With the exception of some 7,400 European settlers who owned less than 25 acres, the average holding of the European settler amounted to about 250 acres, and 8 percent of the total land owned by the settlers belonged to French companies with holdings of 15,000 acres and above. On the other hand, 70 percent of the Muslim holdings averaged 10 to 15 acres,ⁱ and only a small number owned large European-type estates. The position of the Muslim farmer was further aggravated by the generally poor quality of the land he worked, as indicated by the

^g Although the number of landowners decreased, there was no corresponding decrease in land tenure.

^h The average European family is composed of four persons and the average Muslim family of six.

ⁱ The minimum of nonirrigated land in Algeria on which a family can subsist is 60 acres.¹⁵

fact that the average yield per acre of Muslim land was one quarter that of an acre of European-owned land.¹⁶

French Agrarian Reform Policies Since 1944

The French Government turned to agrarian reform in 1937, after it became evident that Algeria could not produce enough food for its people. The years from 1937 to 1940 were spent in the study of agricultural problems, but World War II interrupted even that effort. After the war agrarian reform was tackled once again. A Reforms Commission, set up by Governor General Yves Châtaigneau, concluded that it was impossible to assure minimum existence and work for all Algerians without reorganizing the agricultural system. Three main recommendations were submitted: (1) development of new lands, (2) reclamation of land through irrigation and soil restoration, and (3) improvement of agricultural techniques and the yield of the small Muslim peasant. Of these three recommendations, only the third became the focus of greater attention. To resettle 600,000 Muslim families on lots of 25 acres would have necessitated the acquisition and development of some 15 million acres of land, and France, at that time, was unable to assume the financial costs which such a project would involve. One hundred and three Sectors of Rural Amelioration (SAR) were created to provide the small Muslim farmer with short-term loans with which to purchase seed and seedlings, medium-term loans for livestock and equipment, and long-term loans for land improvement, and to supervise the implementation of better agricultural techniques. From 1946 to 1956 greater emphasis was placed on modernization of techniques and equipment. Programs of irrigation, drainage, and soil conservation were initiated, and new heavy agricultural equipment was introduced. These projects met with only partial success and failed to halt the downward trend in the position of the Muslim farmer. The SAR, operating on a limited budget (2½ percent of the total capital investment for Algeria) affected only about 75,000 to 80,000 Muslim families, or less than 10 percent of the total number. Furthermore, the financial aid and the modernizing projects which were initiated tended generally to benefit the traditional peasantry—those already established on land—and failed to reach the others, while the introduction of agricultural equipment reduced the number of employed agricultural laborers. These projects brought about an increase in agricultural production, but the per capita production of the Muslim farmer decreased due to population growth.¹⁷

In 1956 the French administration turned to the problem of land reform proper. Decrees were issued to limit irrigated holdings to 125 acres, irrigate 75,000 acres of land, appropriate estates of more than 2,500 acres that had been abandoned or left uncultivated, redeem

155,000 acres of the *Compagnie Algérienne* lands and 37,500 acres of the *Compagnie Genevoise*, and distribute 650,000 acres of state land and common land. The main object of these decrees was to resettle as large a number of landless peasants as possible on productive small farms of about 20 to 25 acres. Yet, by early 1958 only 100,000 acres had been redeemed and only 5,000 Muslim families resettled.¹⁸

Summary

Approximately 3 million Algerian peasants and agricultural laborers who were seldom employed were landless in the 1950's. The best arable lands were in the hands of European settlers. Reforms to improve the lot of the Muslims were studied by the French in the late thirties, and some were instituted after World War II. By 1957 these reforms had included the establishment of irrigation projects, the extension of rural credit, the introduction of improved agricultural methods, and the institution of resettlement programs. The reforms were only partially successful however, and failed to halt the downward trend of Muslim farming. The problem was aggravated by the growing Muslim population.

Absence of a Diversified Economy

Two-Crop Agricultural Economy Geared for Export

The production of cereals and the cultivation of wine grapes accounted for the greatest part of Algeria's agricultural revenue and constituted about one third of its gross national product. Secondary crops—citrus fruits, cork, cotton, alfalfa, and vegetables—though important, represented a small, almost insignificant percentage of the total exports and gross national product of the country.

Cereals constituted the main staple food as well as one of the country's important export items. Wine production accounted for 30 percent of Algeria's total agricultural revenue and over 40 percent of the country's agricultural exports.¹⁹ About 9 million acres—80 percent of the cultivated land—were planted annually with hard wheat, soft wheat, barley, oats, and maize, and one million acres were planted with vineyards. Hard wheat, and barley, which grow on marginal land, were the Algerian crops. Very little of these was exported, since the total production could not even suffice the needs of the native population. Wine grapes were not cultivated by the indigenes because of the poor quality of their land, and because Islam prohibits the consumption of alcohol. However, soft wheat, oats, and wine, which were introduced by the settlers and which require the fertility of the European farms, were exported in large quantities to France.

In a colonial economy such as Algeria's, the production of cereals and wine for export purposes would not have tended to be profitable, were it not for the subsidies which the settlers received from the French Government in the form of direct compensation or the above-world-market prices which France paid for Algerian grain and wine.^j The price of Algerian grain in French markets depended on the market conditions in France (France generally has no export surplus of grain) rather than on the volume of production in Algeria. Although the price of Algerian grain was generally 10 to 20 percent below the price of French grain, the European settler was able to derive a profit because of the above-world-market prices and the compensation received from the French Government.

Algerian wine, because of its poor quality, did not rival that of France, but equaled that of Greece, Spain, or Portugal. Yet France purchased the Algerian wine at prices 45 percent higher than the price it would have paid for similar wines from the above-mentioned countries. This arrangement tended, of course, to encourage the continued production of wine.

The trade arrangement between the two countries was not without benefit to France, of course. Non-French goods imported into Algeria were subjected to prohibitive tariffs, quotas, and licenses; this allowed France to sell Algeria French textiles, mechanical and electrical products, and certain foodstuffs at prices above average world prices. However, the fact remains that the European settlers and certain French industrialists, rather than the French Government, benefited most from these tariff and trade arrangements.^k

Two-Crop Economy as a Hindrance to Diversification

The tariff and trade arrangements have been detrimental to local industrial expansion.^l The continued free entry of French commodities into Algeria, tended to favor French industrial competition and restricted the growth of local industry. It was observed that, in 1956, some industries which had thrived in the immediate postwar period were forced to close down as a result of increased French competition

^j The French Government subsidized its farmers and certain industries by fixing the price of French grain above that of the world market and protected them against world competition by tariff restrictions.

^k Algerian nationalists used these tariff and trade arrangements as a basis on which to accuse France of exploiting Algeria. This position is not totally justified. Although the balance of trade generally favored France, it was France that covered the Algerian trade deficit with budgetary allocations.

^l Industrialization of Algeria has been restricted, too, by the physical makeup of the country, the absence of cheap energy, the distribution and insufficiency of certain basic materials, inadequate transportation facilities, and the absence of skilled native labor.²⁰

in the 1950's. Others were vulnerable to French penetration since they existed only on the sufferance of metropolitan industry.²¹

The French Government had, since the end of World War II, attempted to correct this condition,^m but Algerian *Gros Colons* (large landowners and big businessmen) and certain powerful French industries (sugar beet and textiles) to whom these tariff and trade arrangements were beneficial, prevented their repeal or modification. Private capital, as a result, was found to be more profitable when invested in France; thus, expansion in the cultivation of Algerian sugar beet and cotton, which would have opened new occupational outlets for the unemployed and led to the development of new industries, was frustrated.

Summary

Algeria derived its revenue primarily from the production of cereals and wines, which constituted the country's major items for export. Although the production of these items would not have been economically feasible, the French Government subsidized them and offered the European settlers who were producing them higher than world market prices. Furthermore, France imposed tariff and trade restrictions on Algeria's imports and exports that not only favored the European settler and the French industrialist, but also hindered industrialization and diversification in Algeria.

Unemployment and Underemployment

Underemployment in Rural Areas

The problem of underemployment existed mainly in the rural areas and those affected were Muslim agriculturists. Unable to sustain their families on the meager yields of their small farms, the majority sought extra work on European farms. Most failed to find additional employment because at the seasons when they might have found it they needed to work their own land. Their problem was further complicated by the fact that they were unskilled in modern farm techniques. In 1955 the number of underemployed was estimated at close to 1 million (one-third of the agricultural work force). This number has undoubtedly increased since, due to the population growth and the dislocation which the revolution has brought about.

^m France awakened to the military and political importance of North Africa, to which the bulk of her armed forces withdrew, after her defeat in 1940. Postwar military and political needs, along with economic and social considerations, motivated the desire to industrialize Algeria. Serious efforts at industrialization, however, did not come until after the outbreak of revolution.²²

Unemployment in Urban Areas

In the urban areas the vast majority of the unemployed were also Muslim Algerians. In 1955 French estimates placed the number of unemployed at over 100,000 out of a grand total of 450,000.ⁿ This number has increased constantly because the labor market could not absorb the increase of surplus workers. The situation was made worse by the fact that 90 out of 100 able bodied men were unskilled laborers.²³

Mass Emigration to France: France's Impact on Algerian Workers

The emigration of Algerian Muslim workers to France began during World War I, in response to the manpower needs in French mining and other industries. This practice was not stopped at the end of the war because few of the immigrant workers showed any desire to settle in France permanently, and because it provided French industry with cheap labor, while alleviating the growing unemployment problem in Algeria. Attracted by the higher wages paid to workers in France, and the metropolitan family allowance system, more people emigrated, until in 1954 it was estimated that the number had reached 150,000. During the revolution, emigration reached a peak of 400,000 workers.^o It was encouraged by the French Government partly to relieve the pressing unemployment created by the virtual cessation of work in Algeria, but principally to prevent the unemployed masses from joining the ranks of the revolution.

Emigration to France had a marked impact, on Algerian Muslim workers. The higher wages and better labor conditions made them more conscious of the economic inequalities in Algeria. Most of the early arrivals joined, or came under the influence of, the French Communist and other leftist parties. Late in the 1920's a number of them withdrew from these parties to form, in France, an Algerian labor political movement. In the 1930's nationalist agitation in Algeria coincided with the establishment of this movement which had been created in France.^p

Summary

Unemployed and underemployed Muslims in 1955 comprised approximately one third of the agricultural work force and close to one fifth of the urban labor force. Muslim emigration to France, where

ⁿ This figure should actually be much higher. French authorities considered as employed all persons who worked for a period of 90 days. Also, this figure does not take into account the number of women (960,000) that were also unemployed.

^o During that time, it was reported, some 2 million people in Algeria depended upon the remittances and allowances of these workers.

^p See section on Political Imbalance, below.

employment and comparatively high wages were to be found, was encouraged by the French, especially during the revolutionary period, when the French authorities were attempting to prevent the unemployed from joining the ranks of the revolutionaries.

SOCIAL ANTAGONISM

Tension Within the Social Structure

The Relationship of Wealth to Ownership and Social Mobility Among Settlers and Algerians—Its Effects on Both Communities

Although Algeria became legally and administratively a part of France, her social structure continued to reflect the stereotype divisions and lack of cohesion of a colonial society. The Algerians of European origin stood apart from, and well above, the indigenous Algerian society.

At the outbreak of the revolution the existence of two separate economies was paralleled by the existence of two distinct civilizations. About 1 million Algerians of European ancestry, French in cultural outlook and enjoying a French standard of living, had come to dominate the social, economic, and political life of the country. In fact, the upper and middle classes of Algeria had become predominantly European in composition. Approximately 15,000 *Gros Colons*,⁹ high administrators, and civil servants constituted the effective social, economic, and political elite, while more than 700,000 clerks, teachers, shopkeepers, and skilled laborers formed the middle class. Only about 7,500 Europeans, mainly unskilled agricultural laborers, could be classified as lower class. The Algerian indigenous society, on the other hand, numbering about 9 million, could be classified as lower class, with the exception of a small number of wealthy landowners and a somewhat larger middle class.

The 50,000 wealthy Muslims, referred to sometimes as *Beni Oui Ouis* (yes men), had practically no influence. They were completely servile to the dicta of the French administration, and were not fully accepted in either *Gros Colon* or Muslim circles. The traditional Muslim middle

⁹ The *Gros Colons* included such a man as Henri Bourgeaud, Senator from Algiers, “king” of wine, owner of the newspaper *Dépêche Quotidienne*, of the *Domaine de la Trappe* (1,056,720 gallons of wine per year), and of the apéritif *el Borjo*, administrator of the *Société Anonyme du Chapeau de Gendarme*, *Compagnie Generale Nord Africaine*, *Union Foncière Nord Africaine*, *Domaine de Beni*, *Nord-Africaine Commercial* (agricultural), *Compagnie Ceres*, *Establishments Jules Vinson*, *Peugeot Latil*, *Usines Nord-Africaines de Casablanca*, *Mouline de Chetir*, *Distillerie d’Algiers*, *Liéges et Produits Nord-Africaines*, *Chantiers Warot* (lumber), *Cargos Algériens*, *Société Lucien Bourgeaud et Cie* (textiles), *Nord-Africaine de Ciments Lafrage*, *Manufacture de Tabacs Bastos*, *Indochinoise de Tabacs*, *Credit Foncier d’Algérie et du Tunisia*, and *Compagnie de Phosphates de Constantine*.

class, eliminated during the 19th century, was in the process of reconstituting itself. Yet, its average income placed it a level lower than that of the European middle class; hence it was in fact a lower-middle class.[†]

Social mobility in these trio civilizations differed radically. Among the Europeans, the class structure was rigidly defined. Wealth was the determining factor; and unless a person substantially improved his financial status, mobility was virtually nonexistent. Thus there existed a definite distinction between *Gros Colons* and *Pieds Noirs* (large landowners and average middle-class men). Social rigidity among the Europeans did not cause social tensions because the upper class had been elected and accepted as the leaders of the European community. In the ever increasing hostility of the Algerian environment, the Europeans were united in their efforts to maintain their overall advantageous social status.

In the Muslim society, education and profession, rather than wealth, were the factors which determined the social structure. Although the wealthy generally found it easier to acquire a higher education, a number of Muslim leaders have risen from the lower classes. The social tension that existed in the Muslim community was generated by racial considerations. The Berber population, although Muslim in religion, had resisted the efforts of the majority to Arabize them. The Algerian revolution appears to have unified, for the time being, the Berbers and the Arabs.

Social tension in Algeria was due mainly to friction generated by the interaction of the two major communities: the Muslim who was determinedly seeking to improve his lowly status, and the European who was insensitive to the welfare of the Muslim inhabitant.

The Feeling of Racial Superiority Among the Settlers, and Their Fears of Being Inundated by the Muslim Masses: the Impact on the Algerians

Two main factors prevented the cohesive integration of the two major Algerian communities: (1) the racial superiority complex of the European settler and his contempt for the Muslim,[§] and (2) settler fear of the future revenge of the Muslim. In 1892 the French Prime Minister, Jules Ferry, described the settler in the following terms:

[†] The average income of the European middle class in 1951 was \$502 per person while the average income of the native Algerian middle class was \$240.²⁴

[§] Joseph Kraft illustrated this point with the following paragraph: "In a well-known trial the judge was told that there were five witnesses: 'two men and three Arabs.' In the settler lingo the Muslims were '*melons*' (simps), '*ratons*' (coons). 'They weigh in the scales,' a settler mayor, Raymond Laquiere, once told me, 'as feathers against gold.' Another reporter recalls hearing on European lips the phrase: 'He was an Arab, but dressed like a person.'"²⁵

. . . He is not wanting in virtues; he has all those of the hard worker and patriot: but he does not possess what one might call the virtue of the conqueror, that equity of spirit and of heart, and that feeling for the right of the weak. It is hard to make the European *colon* understand that other rights exist besides his own, in an Arab country, and that the native is not a race to be enslaved and endentured at this whim.²⁶

Some 50 years later, Gen. Georges Catroux had this to say about the settlers:

They have remained, through atavism, that which their fathers were at the beginning of their settlement in Africa, pioneers, men of action and isolated men. There is lacking in these men . . . a sentiment of spiritual values, a less materialistic and egotistical conception of relations among men and therefore of the native problem.²⁷

The settlers derived their sense of racial superiority from the fact that they had been able to achieve, in the span of a few decades, what the indigenous population had been unable to achieve in centuries: a modernized society. This ability to develop Algeria had given them economic, political, and social preeminence—a special status which they sought to preserve at all costs. They effectively blocked major legislation which would have improved the lot of the Muslims and upset the *status quo*.

When, in the immediate post-World War II era, the nationalists concluded that no agreement or satisfaction of their grievances could be obtained from the settlers, the Muslim leadership began to advocate open rebellion. For the propaganda aspect of their agitation they selected the settlers as a prime target. Reports received by Governor General Marcel-Edmond Naegelen from the French administrators and prefects, late in 1948, revealed that nationalist slogans (“the suitcase or the coffin”; “we will divide the lands of the *Colons*, every one of us getting his share”; and “the French will be thrown into the sea”) had not only created a feeling of insecurity among the Europeans, but had engendered a civil war psychosis which manifested itself in tendencies to leave Algeria for France, or to arm and fortify their communities.²⁸

Summary

European settlers made up most of the upper and middle classes in Algeria. Muslims, with few exceptions, made up the bulk of the lower class. The two elements of Algerian society were mutually exclusive,

each having its own social structure; the European element, however, dominated the economic, social, and political life of the country and stood apart and well above the indigenous Algerian society. The air of superiority which the Europeans maintained throughout the colonial period was challenged by the Muslims after World War II.

Demise of Traditional Society

The Gradual Elimination of an Algerian Middle Class

During the period of Turkish suzerainty, the traditional urban Algerian middle class, ancient in origin, highly intellectual, and influential in the rural areas, dominated the Turkish ruling class, especially in the cultural field.²⁹ It was thus able to limit and absorb the impact of Turkish culture. The virtual elimination of this middle class, during the first 17 years of French occupation, deprived the French governments of this important cultural conveyor. As a result of this, and also because of the forcible measures which the settlers adopted throughout, the diffusion of French culture was resisted, and cultural assimilation was never achieved.

The development of a new, small Muslim middle class in the 20th century coincided with the development of Algerian nationalist movements. By then, opposition to French and *Colon* was crystalizing, and continued *Colon* intransigence prevented this new middle class from moderating the course of Algerian nationalism.[†] In the end, from 1945 to 1956, to maintain their position in the Muslim society, they joined the ranks of the nationalists in advocating and supporting open rebellion.

Breakup of the Traditional Social Structure

Before the French invasion, the extended family formed the basic unit of the Muslim society. Obedience was demanded by the senior male, and primary loyalty was given to the family unit. The next unit commanding the loyalty of the individual was the village, and finally the tribe. Tribes formed distinct groups and, although they lived in close physical proximity, there was little contact between them. The first 40 years of French rule disrupted this pattern in many areas. Deprived of their lands and facing impoverishment, an ever increasing number of rural Algerians began to leave their families, villages, and tribes for the urban coastal areas, reaching France ultimately in the 1900's. Adjustment to this new environment, devoid of the traditional

[†] This small Algerian middle class was composed mainly of moderates but included a number of nationalists.

social structure and loyalties, was impossible, and this mass of immigrants began to develop into a dissatisfied proletariat.

Hopes for a better life in the urban centers never materialized, but population pressure continued to feed the cities with new immigrants. Close contact, however, with a larger portion of the Muslim population began to foster a sense of belonging and loyalty to a new, larger entity, different from that of the traditional social structure. The idea of an Algerian nation began to develop. In the early 1920's, particularly in the urban centers of France, this new sense of belonging began to translate itself into nationalism:

This time an urban nationalism came into being among Algerians in Paris; here they were stimulated by mixing with the French proletariat and were brought into contact with the stirring world events of the moment—the birth of Communism, the class struggle, the French mandate in Syria, the Turkish revolution of the Mustafa Kemal, the war in the Rif.³⁰

Thus exposed to new political ideas in the urban centers in which they had not been allowed to compete with the Europeans, this new proletariat rejected the offer of assimilation with France and the narrow restrictive traditional social pattern. At the same time, those who returned could no longer accept the leadership of the traditional French appointed *Caids* (chieftains) and religious teachers because of the latter's servility to France. They were, in fact, awaiting a new radical leadership.

Islam: Its Pan-Arab Effect on the Algerians

The Arab conquest of North Africa began in 647 A.D. It was not, however, until the 12th century, after the majority of the inhabitants of the area were converted to Islam, that North Africa became an integral part of the Middle East. During the following 7 centuries in which North Africa underwent political separatism from the Arab Empire, Turkish suzerainty, and French occupation, Islam continued to function as the principal conveyor of Middle Eastern culture.³¹ Thus it is not surprising that the theories of Pan-Islamism and Pan Arabism, political movements which originated in the Middle East in the latter part of the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, found advocates in North Africa.

³⁰ The teachings of the Egyptian religious reformist Sheikh Djamal ed-Din el-Afghani (1839–1897), his disciple Sheikh Mohammed Abdo (1849–1905), and the Syrian theologian Sheikh Rashid Rida (1865–1935) were well known in North Africa and were used in the reform movement there. El-Afghani, moreover, advocated the liberation of all Islamic states.³¹

Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism found expression in Algeria in the Association of Ulemas (Muslim scholars). The Association of Ulemas began as a reform movement—the revival of Islam in Algeria through a modernization of its practices—but it took on sociopolitical overtones when its teachings came into conflict with the assimilationist efforts of the French administration. These teachings based on the Wahabi^v reform movement of Saudi Arabia and the doctrines of el-Afghani and Abdo, tended to generate nationalist feelings, they stressed the unity of the Islamic world, brought about by a common, religion, language, and history, and the impossibility of unity between Algeria and non-Muslim France. But the appeal of the Ulemas was limited to the traditionalist society which opposed Western-oriented secularism.

Summary

Through the colonization of Algeria the French gradually eliminated the traditional middle class and broke up the traditional social arrangement (family, village, and tribe). These developments brought the individual Muslims together, and a new feeling of loyalty developed among them which began to translate itself into nationalism. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism also tended to generate nationalist sentiment; they stressed the unity of the Islamic world, and also rejected Western-oriented secularism.

Marginality of Intellectuals

The marginality of the Algerian Muslim intellectuals resulted from the fact that they were never accepted by the settlers as Frenchmen, and were suspected and rejected by the Muslim community for their pro-French orientation. For these reasons, they were unable to moderate the radical course of Algerian nationalism.

Inacceptability of a Westernized Muslim Elite in the Inner Circles of the European Community

Most of the Muslim intellectuals, except the religious leaders, were the products of the French officer corps or graduates of French institutions of higher learning. In the late 1920's and early 1930's they were antinationalist, and manifested their pro-French tendencies by advocating the total assimilation of Algeria with France—a fact which, in itself, implied total political, social, and economic equality with the *Colons*. The *Colons* refused to accept this concept. In 1936 the implementation

^v The Wahabi reform movement swept Saudi Arabia in the latter part of the 18th century and advocated a return to the fundamentals of Islam.

of the assimilationist Blum-Violette proposal, which would have given some 25,000 Muslims French citizenship without a priori abandonment of their personal status under Muslim laws,^w was blocked by the resignation of all the European mayors of Algeria. The *Colons* insisted on the abandonment of the personal status as a precondition to the acquisition of French citizenship by Muslim Algerians—a precondition which most Muslims rejected because it would have set them apart from the Muslim community. By 1946, when it became apparent that meaningful assimilation would never be implemented, these intellectuals began to press for a federation of a free Algeria with France, and on the basis of this platform most of them were elected to office. In April 1948 the *Colons*, in connivance with Governor General Naegelen, blocked their reelection. Denied French citizenship and their leadership position, these intellectuals gradually turned against France; by 1956 most of them had joined the nationalist rebels.

Inability of a Western-Oriented Muslim Elite To Influence a Traditionalist Society

The emergence of the intellectuals in Algeria coincided with the development of a nationalist movement strongly influenced by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism. The pro-French orientation of these intellectuals, their habit of speaking French and frequenting French circles, brought them into conflict with the nationalist leaders who advocated independence for Algeria, preached the distinguishing and uniting virtues of Islam, and stressed the use of the Arabic language as the mother tongue of all Algerians. In the 1930's these intellectuals were not rejected—opposition to France had not as yet polarized—but their cause found little appeal in the Muslim community. In the post-World War II era these intellectuals found themselves totally rejected. A new generation of Algerians, more radical than the previous generation and more highly influenced by political theories and developments in the Middle East, engulfed and overcame these intellectuals. At the outbreak of the revolution in 1954, and with nothing tangible to show for more than 30 years of being pro-French, these intellectuals chose to join the revolution as the only alternative open to them.

^w Muslim law forms part of the Islamic religion: and since the French Government guaranteed the free practice of the Islamic religion by the Act of 1830, the Muslim community continued to be governed by these laws which deal primarily with marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the like. French law, however, applied to all Muslims in criminal and other cases. The *Colons* came entirely under the French *Code Civil*.

Summary

The Western-oriented Muslim intellectuals were faced with a conflict that was not resolved until the outbreak of hostilities in the 1950's: they were discriminated against by the European community because they preferred to remain Muslims, and rejected by the Muslim community for their pro-French tendencies. Within this tension-building environment, they could neither influence French policies nor moderate the course of Algerian nationalism.

POLITICAL WEAKNESSES

Political Imbalance: Representation, Participation, and Discrimination

Many of the causes of the 1954 revolution can be traced to the lack of political foresight of the French:

. . . since the earliest days the French government has been struggling to find a workable means of assimilating the territory to France. The systems adopted have varied between military and civilian government, the methods have been by turn autocratic and conciliatory. The common factor is that they were all, and continue to be, experimental.³²

One of the major causes of political weakness was the low degree of political integration—the discontinuities in political communication and an uneven reach of political power. The ordinances of 1833 and 1834 proclaimed Algeria an extension of France; this implied that French law, without major modifications, would be applied. French citizenship, however, was not extended to the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria at this time. They continued to be subject to special police and military regulation. In 1848 only the settlers “were given the opportunity to exercise their rights as citizens and send representatives to the [French] Constituent Assembly.”³³ In 1865, the *Senatus Consulte* of Napoleon III, a decree intended to calm the growing discontentment of the Muslims, defined the citizenship of the Algerians and the conditions under which they could become French citizens. “Muslims were offered French citizenship, with the possibility of serving in the French armed forces or the civil administrative bodies, on condition they renounced their Islamic personal status including plural marriage and subjected themselves to French civil and judicial regulation.”³⁴ This offer was prompted by the best of intentions, but it demonstrated the extent to which the French Government had failed to understand the

local customs and religion of Algeria; very few Muslims accepted this offer which, in their eyes, was tantamount to apostasy.

In 1898 a measure of self-determination was granted when Algerians were given a direct vote in the financial, fiscal, and economic affairs of the country through the establishment of the *Délégations Financières*—an advisory body consisting of 24 *Colon* representatives, 24 representatives of the administration, and 24 Muslim representatives. The indigenous population benefited very little. Denunciation by some 500,000 *Colons*, who by now had become the entrenched political, economic, and social elite, forced the government to delay Muslim participation until 1922; and even then the Muslims were ineffectual because their representatives were continually outvoted by the *Colon*-administration majority.^x Under the Algerian Charter of 1919, French Premier Georges Clemenceau attempted to give the Muslims full voting rights. This attempt was defeated by a coalition of rightist deputies and *Colon* lobbyists, and a watered-down version gave the Muslims the right to elect the members of the *Délégations Financières* only. In 1936 the implementation of the assimilationist Blum-Violette proposal was blocked by *Colon* agitation.

The military importance of Algeria, so well demonstrated during World War II, prompted the French Government to consider decisive political measures for Algeria. The May 1945 Constantine uprising indicated the necessity for such action.^y

In 1947 the French National Assembly granted Algeria an Organic Statute which attempted to strike a balance between the interests of France in that country and the demands of the Algerians. It recognized the special political status of the country, and sought, at the same time, to integrate it with metropolitan France. Algerians received a measure of self-determination with the creation of an Algerian Assembly composed of two colleges—one elected by Europeans and certain special categories of Muslims, and the other elected by the indigenous population. Also, the presence of Algerian deputies in the French National Assembly plus other representatives in the French Council of the Republic and the Assembly of the French Union purportedly guaranteed Algerian interests at the national level. French interests, on the

^x In the 1920's and early 1930's the French administration made sure of Muslim compliance by "ensuring" the election of handpicked candidates.

^y On May 8, 1945, V-E Day, the *Colons* reacted swiftly to nationalist pressure and attempted reforms by the French Government. Provoked by Muslim extremists, and fearing that the violence which had hitherto marked the celebration was the signal for an uprising, the European community resorted to massive repression. Police, citizens' militia, and army invaded the Muslim sections of the major cities and at the end of the blood bath an estimated more than 4,000 Muslims had perished. Unofficial sources estimated the number of Muslim dead at 40,000.

other hand, were safeguarded by the Paris appointment of a French Governor General, who was endowed with extensive executive powers, to head the French administration in Algeria.

The powers of the Algerian Assembly were limited. Articles 9–12 of the Statute expressly excluded deliberation of “all laws guaranteeing constitutional liberties, all laws of property, marriage, and personal status, treaties made by France with foreign powers, and in general all laws applying to military and civilian departments or posts.”³⁵ Moreover, although the Governor General was responsible for the implementation of all legislation enacted by the Algerian Assembly, he could, by invoking Articles 39 or 45 of the Statute, veto any decision which he judged to be detrimental to French interests or beyond the competence of the Assembly.³⁶ The real power of the Assembly was related to the financial field; all legislation proposed by the Assembly’s Finance and General Commissions regarding the budget and all fiscal modifications and new governmental expenditures were contingent on its approval.

The Organic Statute was never fully implemented, thus reaffirming in the minds of the nationalists the insensitivity of the French Government to local conditions. Meaningful application was circumvented by fraudulent elections, frequent suspensions of the Algerian Assembly, and disparity in representation whereby 9 million Muslims equaled 1 million Europeans. The severe repression which came in the wake of the 1945 uprising had estranged the Muslims. The urgent passage of the Statute was, in itself, an attempt to redress the situation. But the establishment of two colleges perpetuated the estrangement, whereas the creation of a single house elected on the basis of universal suffrage without ethnic and religious distinction would have led to greater political integration. The fraudulent elections of *Beni Oui Ouis*, who obviously did not represent the Muslim masses, prevented the emergence and understanding of Muslim aspirations, and placed the attainment of political power beyond the reach of the true Muslim elite. Thus the Muslim masses had, in reality, no voice in the administration of the country and were not fully represented in the Algerian Assembly.

Summary

One of the major Muslim dissatisfactions in Algeria was the lack of meaningful Muslim representation at both the local and the metropolitan levels. Being unable to obtain French citizenship without first giving up certain Islamic practices, Muslims generally did not have the rights accorded to Europeans in Algeria. Muslim participation in political affairs was ineffectual: European representation outnumbered and outvoted Muslim representation in policy-making bodies and advisory councils. The overriding powers of the French Governor General

diluted Muslim demands in the postwar attempts to integrate Algeria with France.

Political Fragmentation of Ruling Elite and Opposition Groups

Discord in Algerian and French Governments

Another major cause of political weakness in Algeria was the discord which arose at different times over a span of years between the French Army, the French governments, the Governors General, and the *Colons*, over the initiation and implementation of policies for Algeria.

The government of Charles X began the conquest of Algeria without any plans for its future, and as a result the army assumed the task of pacifying and governing the country. Under the military regime, and in the absence of a show of firmness by the French Government, France was, in 1840 embroiled in the total conquest of Algeria. The territories which came under military rule were treated as part of the colonial empire rather than an integral part of France, despite the ordinances of 1833 and 1834. As such, European colonization was controlled by the army, and a department for native affairs and the *Bureaux Arabes* (Arab Bureaus)^z were set up to act as a regulatory arm of the military authority. In 1848 some 52,000 French settlers, “chafing under the military regime and demanding some sort of political representation in France,” pressured the French Government into replacing the military regime with a civilian Governor General. Nevertheless, in 1852 the military regime was restored and continued until 1858, when the office of Governor General was abolished and a Ministry of Algeria was created within the French cabinet. In 1871 Algeria was, once again, “placed under the authority of a Civilian Governor General, appointed by, and responsible to, the French Ministry of the Interior. Algerian affairs were allotted to the various French Ministries, with the result that the Algerian administrative services became almost completely dependent on decisions made in Paris.”³⁸

The cause underlying the above changes in the nature of the French administration of Algeria was a latent power struggle which had developed within French political circles since the beginning of the occupation. The liberals had opposed any form of occupation, limited

^z The duties of the Arab Bureaus “included the settlement of tribal quarrels, the administration of justice both French and native, the latter through native judges, the assessment and collection of taxes, the supervision of education, and the collation and forwarding of military intelligence. The Bureaus were never popular with the French civil population in Algeria, to whom they were constant reminders of the arbitrary character of the regime.”³⁷

or otherwise, and once occupation had been accomplished, they had demanded that the country be made a part of France rather than a colony and that it be placed under civil authority. The army, on the other hand, and later advocates of a military regime, wanted to keep Algeria as a colonial preserve and transform the country into French territory by gradual rural colonization.^{aa} The upshot of this power struggle was that Algeria came to be ruled more and more by an uninformed French National Assembly, while the Governors General became executive agents of the Paris Ministries. In 1892 Jules Ferry had this to say:

The Governor-General had no longer any authority, and could not even study proposed measures to see if they were practicable. The Governor-General was nothing but a “*decor coûteux et inutile*” (a costly and useless ornament) Instead of being, like the British Viceroy of India, the director of the country’s welfare.³⁹

This situation led to the passage of unrealistic legislation which displeased both settlers and Muslims, and encouraged the settlers to bypass the Governor General and seek satisfaction of their demands in the lobbies of the National Assembly.

Between 1896 and 1902, as a result of the report of the Senate commission of inquiry of 1892 which denounced the “fundamental error of considering Algeria as an extension of France, and of having seen it as anything else than a colony,”⁴⁰ the French Government passed a series of laws which recognized the separate character of Algeria. The administrative responsibility for Algeria was reinvested in the Governor General, and Algeria was given a large measure of fiscal and budgetary autonomy. From 1900, and during the interwar period, the settlers were powerful enough to block the passage or application of any proposed legislation which would have tended to correct the social, economic, and political imbalances in Algeria. In 1898 settler agitation had prevented the meaningful participation of Muslims in the *Délégations Financières*; in 1919 they were equally successful in watering down Premier Georges Clemenceau’s Algerian Charter; and, in 1936 they were also successful in blocking the assimilationist Blum-Violette proposal. After World War II *Colon* vested interests, in association with the French political parties of the center and the right, were able to secure the dismissal of liberal and the appointment of amenable Governors General. In 1947 the settlers, in collusion with Finance Minister René Mayer, deputy from Constantine and a member of the *Parti Républicain Radical Socialiste* (RRS), were able to effect the removal of reform-minded

^{aa} After the defeat of France by Germany in 1871, the discredited French Army retired from the political scene.

Governor General Yves Châtaigneau and secure the appointment in his stead of Socialist Marcel-Edmond Naegelen—a man well-liked by the settlers for his antinationalist tendencies. “Within a matter of months, the settlers and M. Naegelen had contrived to empty the Algerian Statute of all content. Their weapon was systematic, unblushing electoral fraud.”⁴¹ In 1956 the *Colons* again secured the dismissal of General Georges Catroux as Resident Minister and obtained the appointment in his stead of Robert Lacoste, who was well known for his pro-*Colon* sympathies. The tragedy here was that most of the Governors General, and the Army after 1954, became imbued with the settler spirit, and then proceeded to undermine the efforts of the French governments to arrive at an equitable solution.

During the course of the revolution, the *Colons* organized themselves into semiclandestine movements such as the *Union Française Nord-Africaine* (UFNA), *Organisation de Résistance de l’Algérie Française* (ORAF), *Front National Français* (FNF), which sought to keep Algeria “French.” These movements, and a number of others, were behind the terrorism which was aimed at the Muslims and Muslim sympathizers, the bazooka attack on General Raoul Salan in January 1957, the demonstrations of May 13, 1958, and the plots against General de Gaulle in 1959 and 1960.⁴² From 1957 on, these movements received increasing support and cooperation from the French Army in Algeria.

The French Army, as a whole, has always been interested in the overseas territories of France, especially those in Africa. “In Algeria, particularly, the Army has been intimately concerned with colonization. Pacification followed the conquest of Algeria. The Army not only provided protection for the settlers but was involved in colonizing itself. Fighting and working the land always went together.”⁴³ After 1871, its role in political affairs was reduced to a minimum; therefore, it did not contribute directly to the political imbalance which came to exist in Algeria prior to the outbreak of the revolution. But its attempt to dictate policy to the French governments after 1956, prolonged the course of the revolution and made earlier and more advantageous settlements with the rebels impossible.

The French Army looked upon Algeria as the battlefield on which it could not only vindicate its honor,^{ab} but also apply the lessons which it had learned in Indochina. It was, therefore, determined not only to suppress the revolution, but also to institute reforms which would ensure Algeria against future revolutionary outbreaks. General Henri Navarre commented as follows in 1956:

^{ab} The French Army has blamed the politicians in general, and the French democratic system in particular, for the fall of France in 1940, their defeat in Indochina, and the loss of Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

As in Indochina we are dealing with nationalisms of which we have not foreseen the inevitable rise, which we have not channeled by reforms made at the right time, which we have not allowed to be led by elites formed in our own school, and which we have not brought to our side in a place that would have linked their fate to ours. Not more than in Indochina have we been able to define a coherent policy.⁴⁴

The policy which the French Army advocated, and which was imposed on the French governments,^{ac} was assimilationist^{ad} in nature. The rebels were offered a cease-fire, which was to be followed by elections and then negotiations. “But the stress was entirely on the first term, which became a primary condition to which the others were increasingly forgotten appendages.”⁴⁵ Unrealistic as this policy and peace offer were, the army pursued them to the point of obsession. In the meantime, the army also scuttled all attempts by the governments to reach negotiated political agreements with the rebels;^{ac} thus, wresting more and more power for itself in Algeria, while blaming the ineffectiveness of the French governments for its military failures. On May 13, 1958, after about 4 years of fighting, when it became apparent that the government of Premier Pierre Pflimlin might negotiate a settlement with

^{ac} This was particularly true of the government of Premier Guy Mollet and those that succeeded him. Upon taking office, early in January 1957, Mollet spoke of restoring peace in Algeria, whereupon he appointed General Catroux as Resident Minister in Algeria. Catroux hinted at the creation of an Algerian Assembly composed of one college, and the future possibility of endowing this Assembly with limited executive power. A few days later, while in Algeria, Mollet fired Catroux and replaced him with Robert Lacoste, and enunciated his new cease-fire—elections—negotiations policy.

^{ad} The French Army spoke of a “New Algeria” in which the Muslim would be given full equality with the *Colon* in the social, economic, and political fields. Algeria, however, was to remain French.

^{ae} On October 23, 1956, the French Army Command in Algeria ordered the interception, over international waters, of a Royal Moroccan Airways DC-3 which was carrying four top rebel leaders from Morocco to Tunisia. This act was carried out at the time when the government of Guy Mollet had enlisted the support of President Bourguiba of Tunisia, and the Moroccan monarch to bring about negotiations with the rebels, and the presence of the rebel leaders aboard was in response to the invitation of King Mohammed V. Although the interception was committed without the knowledge or permission of the French Government, Guy Mollet, nonetheless, chose to take credit for it. On February 8, 1958, the French air force in Algeria, once again without the knowledge or permission of the French Government, bombed the Tunisian city of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef. This time the government of Premier Felix Gaillard chose to assume the responsibility. The effect of these two acts was to discredit the French governments in the eyes of the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments who had repeatedly offered their good offices in attempts to settle the Algerian problem. The bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, however, cut infiltrations by 40 percent for about a year because of Tunisian fears of further reprisals.

the rebels if invested, the Army of Algeria staged a virtual coup d'état^{af} which toppled the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle was returned to power on the assumption that he would keep Algeria French by underwriting the policy and programs of the mutineers. When the new President of the Fifth Republic gave indications that he was considering independence for Algeria, the generals who had been instrumental in putting him in office felt that they had been betrayed once more. On April 22, 1961, elements of the Army of Algeria, led by Generals Raoul Salan, Maurice Challe, Edmond Jouhaud, and André Zeller and a number of colonels, and supported by the *Colons* attempted another coup. "Their plan was to seize Algiers, to rally the armed forces in the name of army unity and French Algeria, and then to seize Paris, driving De Gaulle from office."⁴⁶ Algiers was seized, but the coup fizzled when the navy, the air force, and the draftee units failed to support the generals. Challe and Zeller surrendered to the authorities, but the rest went into hiding, and subsequently created the terrorist Secret Army Organization (OAS). The aim of the OAS was to keep Algeria French despite de Gaulle, through counterrevolution; and it was strongly supported by the *Colons*. The counterrevolution never materialized, because the OAS failed to establish a foothold outside the large Algerian cities. Terrorism in the Algerian cities and in France was used instead. Assassinations and bombings became daily occurrences. After the conclusion of the Evian Agreement, the OAS stepped up its terrorist campaign, singling out the Muslim population in an attempt to provoke communal strife and the intervention of the French Army on the side of the settlers. With the apprehension of Jouhaud and Salan, the movement lost much of its impetus, and final secret agreements with the rebels put an end to its activity.

Lack of Unity of Purpose Among Nationalist Parties, and Intraparty Splits

The lack of unity of purpose among the indigenous Algerian political parties and movements throughout contributed indirectly to the political imbalance which plagued the country. Differences in ideological orientation, personality clashes, and intraparty splits prevented the formation of a viable opposition which, by presenting a concerted political platform, might have enabled the French Government and the administration to better gauge the extent and magnitude of Muslim discontent. As it was, these movements and parties worked at cross purposes, dividing the people, and their separate activities yielded meager

^{af} The May 13, 1958, coup d'état was preceded by two similar attempts: one in February 1956, led by General Faure, and the other in 1957, led by Generals Cherrides and Chassin. Although foiled in their attempts, these generals were able to get off with a light reprimand. In a sense, therefore, the servility of the French governments invited the coup of 1958.

results. It was not until 1956, approximately 2 years after the outbreak of the Algerian revolution, that unity was finally achieved.

In the immediate post-World War II era, opposition to French rule in Algeria centered around three political groupings: the *Movement Pour Le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties—MTLD), the *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (Democratic Union for the Algerian Manifesto—UDMA), and the Association of Ulema.^{ag} The MTLD was founded in the latter part of 1946 by Messali Ahmed ben Hadj, former member of the French Communist Party and “father” of Algerian nationalism, to replace the outlawed Algerian People’s Party (PPA) and its predecessor, the North African Star (ENA).^{ah} The structural organization of the MTLD was patterned along Communist lines. Cells formed the basic unit, and they were grouped into a *Fawdj* (group). The lowest territorial designations included the *Fara* (section), *Kasma* (locality), *Dijha* (region), and *Wilaya* (province). The territorial organization of the MTLD, furthermore, extended to and divided France into the seven provinces of Marseilles, Lyon-Saint-Etienne, Western France, Paris and suburbs, Lille-North, the Ardennes, and Strasbourg-East. Leadership of the party resided in a Central Committee and a Political Bureau; Commissions named by the former dealt directly with leaders at the local level through the *Kasma*, where officials for Local Organization (ROL), Propaganda and Information (RPI), Local Assemblies (ARL), Trade Union Affairs, and Finances were to be found. A General Assembly, which met on an *ad hoc* basis and represented the different sections, was convened whenever it was deemed necessary to define and approve the policy of the MTLD.⁴⁷

^{ag} The Algerian Communist Party is not included among the opposition because its policies, along with those of the French Communist Party, were at best ambiguous and contradictory. In the late twenties and early thirties, the Communists supported the claims of the Algerian nationalists. In 1936, with the advent of the Popular Front Government of Léon Blum, the Communists, in an about-face, supported the assimilationist Blum-Violette proposal. The French Government which ordered the repressions, in the wake of the 1945 Constantine uprising, included two Communists: Maurice Thorez and Charles Tillon. It was the latter who, as Air Minister, ordered the aerial bombing of native villages in Algeria. The Algerian Communist Party, on the other hand, denounced the uprising as Fascist-inspired and its members participated actively in its suppression. At the outbreak of the revolution in 1954, the Communists once more denounced the nationalists. Less than 2 years later, the Algerian Communists sought to join the rebels, while the French Communist Party supported the rebels in the French National Assembly.

^{ah} The ENA movement was founded in France in 1925 by Hadj Abdel Kader, a member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, as an adjunct to that party. In 1927 Messali Hadj assumed the leadership of the movement, and his Communist background left a deep imprint on the structural organization of the ENA. It is not surprising, therefore, that the PPA and the MTLD should have had structural organizations patterned along Communist lines.

The type of following which the MTLD attracted gave it its proletarian and revolutionary character. Membership consisted mostly of poor disgruntled Algerian workers, students, and young intellectuals who were always ready to resort to violence and direct action. This brought about severe repressions in the form of arrest, incarceration, and banishment—which, by necessity, imposed on the MTLD a cloak of secrecy. By 1954 its membership was estimated at over 14,000.

The MTLD program demanded election by universal suffrage, without racial or religious distinction, of a sovereign Algerian constituent assembly; evacuation of Algeria by French troops; return of expropriated land; Arabization of all secondary education; and abandonment of French control over the Muslim religion and religious institutions. Although this platform represented a more cautious and prudent approach to practical Algerian politics than that of its predecessor, the PPA, it was by far the most radical of all the postwar opposition platforms, for it demanded in essence full self-determination and proletarian Islamic social reforms.⁴⁸

In 1946 also, Ferhat Abbas, a pharmacist from Sétif and an intellectual in his own right, founded the UDMA. In 1921 he had founded the Young Algeria Movement, and in 1944 he had joined in creating the Friends of the Algerian Manifesto. The UDMA was a cadre type organization with little mass support. Its membership was drawn chiefly from the French-educated Muslim intellectuals and from the professional class. In general, the UDMA program called for federation of a free Algeria with France. Ferhat Abbas stated his position^{ai} in the following terms:

Neither assimilation, nor a new master, nor separatism. A young people undertaking its social and democratic education, realizing its scientific and industrial development, carrying out its moral and intellectual renewal, associated with a great liberal nation: a young democracy in birth guided by the great French democracy: such is the Image and the clearest expression of our Movement for Algerian renovation.⁵⁰

The Association of Ulema was founded in the 1930's by Sheikh Abdel Hamid ben Badis, a graduate of the Islamic Zeitouna University

^{ai} In the 1930's Ferhat Abbas had supported direct assimilation of Algeria with France. He had declared that he was French, and that there was no foundation for Algerian nationalism, since a historical Algerian fatherland had never existed. "We are," he concluded, "children of a new world, born of the French spirit and French efforts."⁴⁹ The defeat of France in 1940, the anti-Algerian repressions which the Vichy government initiated, and the Atlantic Charter influenced the adoption of this new position toward France.

in Tunis. The objective of the Association was religious and, as such, it appealed mainly to the traditionalist class. The program of the Ulema advocated: “liberation of the Muslim religion—equality with Christianity and Judaism; liberty for instruction in the Arabic language; liberation of Koranic law; and liberation of the Arab Press.”⁵¹ Politically, however, the Ulema supported the MTLD because of basic agreement on some aspects of their programs.

Major attempts at alliances were made in 1943, 1947, and 1951, but these attempts were frustrated by disagreement between those who favored revolution through evolution—generally the older generation—and those who advocated evolution through revolution—generally the younger generation. In 1943 Ferhat Abbas, the PPA, and the Ulema joined together in drawing up the Algerian Manifesto, which set forth Muslim demands and expectations. In March 1944, the three parties merged, forming an organization which became known as the Friends of the Algerian Manifesto (AMA), and whose membership reached ultimately 500,000. To men like Ferhat Abbas, the AMA represented a nonviolent mass movement, but to younger men like Belkacem Krim, of the PPA it represented a front behind which they could arm and plan for direct action. When the PPA was clearly implicated in the 1945 abortive uprising, Abbas withdrew from the now outlawed AMA.

In 1946 the MTLD and the UDMA (having ostensibly renounced direct action)^{aj} “concentrated their efforts on elections to various assemblies, and both scored marked success. . . . But the passage of the disappointing Algerian Statute at the end of 1947, and the initiation of systematic election rigging under Naegelen in April 1948 precipitated within Messali’s movement a new drive for direct action.”⁵² The creation of an armed organization—*Organisation Secrète* (OS)—within the structural organization of the MTLD followed. Its discovery by the authorities, in March 1950, broke the tacit alliance between the UDMA and the MTLD, split the MTLD, and the crisis which it precipitated paralyzed party activity.

In 1951 the Central Committee of the MTLD, after having dissolved the OS and publicly renounced the use of direct action in 1950, concluded an alliance with the Algerian Front of the Defense and Respect of Liberty, composed of the UDMA, the Algerian Communist Party, and the Association of Ulema. Sensing in the action of the Central

^{aj} At the MTLD’s first congress, held in March 1947, a disagreement arose between the moderate and radical wings of the party. The former advocated abandonment of direct action in favor of cautious reform more in line with the UDMA, while the latter favored the creation of paramilitary organizations and direct action. The congress voted in favor of a policy of political activity only, adopting a wait-and-see attitude, and postponed consideration of whether to create a paramilitary organization.

Committee a threat to his absolute leadership, Messali Hadj chose to take an opposite stand. Over the protest of the Central Committee, he launched a personal tour of Algeria, which resulted in demonstrations and clashes. Deported to France in 1952 for subversive activity, Messali Hadj then proceeded to convene at Hornu, Belgium, on July 15, 1954, an MTLD congress which voted him full powers and excluded the Central Committee. The latter retaliated by convening, on August 13, another congress in Algiers, which invested it with full powers and declared the unique leadership of Messali Hadj to be outmoded. When it became clear that the partisanship between Messalists and Centralists had immobilized the activities of the MTLD, Mohammed Boudiaf, a member of the OS, attempted to effect a reconciliation. Messali Hadj, however, remained adamant in his demands for full powers and a vote of absolute confidence. Disgusted with both factions, Boudiaf called a meeting of old OS members in Berne, Switzerland, in July 1954, from which the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA) and a plan for separate and direct action resulted. When further attempts by the CRUA in August and September of 1954 failed to bring about a reconciliation within the MTLD, a decision to launch a revolution was adopted. Its date: November 1, 1954.⁵³

With the outbreak of the revolution, the nationalist alliance, forced to choose between support of the rebels and support of France, broke up and by 1956 its members had joined the rebel ranks. Only Messali Hadj and his new party, the Algerian Nationalist Movement (MNA), refrained. For all practical purposes, unity had been achieved.

Summary

Political fragmentation was characteristic of both the ruling elite and the opposing Muslim nationalists in Algeria. On the one side, political factions in Metropolitan France opposed each other on the question of Algeria's status within the French system; and since the turn of the century, especially after winning meaningful political and economic powers, the increasingly conservative European settlers in Algeria blocked many attempts on the part of the French Government to institute reforms which would have broadened the Muslims' role in Algerian politics. The French Army joined the settlers in the 1950's and undermined French efforts to solve the Algerian question without violence.

On the other side, Muslim nationalist groups were also divided in opposing French rule. Generally, they were split into two major factions: a radical proletarian-type faction, and a relatively moderate cadre-type faction. Internal divisions among the nationalist groups, which greatly weakened their ability to influence French policy, were based as much

on personal differences as on differences of action. By 1956, however, most of the groups were united in action against the French.

Inefficiency of Governmental Machinery

Neglect or Failure to Change Old Institutions To Meet New Needs

Failure to Extend Control Beyond Urban Center. Since the occupation, the French administration in Algeria had preoccupied itself with urban centers, and had failed to extend proper administrative control to the rural masses. As a result, the rural areas lacked adequate educational and hygienic services.^{ak} In some remote areas of the Kabyle and Aures Mountains the population had not seen a Frenchman since the middle of the 19th century, and viewed with suspicion post-World War II efforts by the administration to improve conditions. Eighty percent of the indigenous population still lived in rural areas, so this apparent neglect tended to isolate the local communities while frustrating cultural assimilation. There was, in other words, no identification with France. Thus, in 1954, it was easier for these communities to accept the presence of rebels among them than it was to accept sudden French “protection.”

The absence of a rural administration, with all its ramifications, was in part due to the aspect which colonization took. The Europeans settled the coastal area, and the administration was initially set up to protect them from rebellious tribes. It therefore centered itself in the urban centers, and failed to extend its control to areas where colonization had made practically no inroads. Later on the administration, usually imbued with the *Colon* contempt for the Muslim, did little to bring France to the masses. Education in the rural areas suffered as a result of the same spirit, but here the problem was compounded by a singular lack of imagination on the part of the French. Since Algeria was legally considered part of France, the educational standard—luxurious schools and French certified teachers—had to reflect that of France. The cost of undertaking such a vast program would have been prohibitive, but nothing was done even to implement Jules Ferry’s more realistic goal: “a school in every hamlet; a modest hut, mats, no tables or chairs, a blackboard and slates.”⁵⁴ Moreover, in rural areas where schools were built, the almost entirely French curriculum offered tended to arouse resentment in a traditionalist society.

It was not until after the outbreak of the revolution that the French Army effectively undertook to bring the French administration into

^{ak} In 1954, the illiteracy rate in Algeria was above 90 percent, and only 9 percent of the Muslim males could write. Less than 2,000 doctors were available to tend to the needs of an indigenous population of over 9,000,000.

the rural areas through the Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS). French Arabic-speaking officers were specially trained in Algerian affairs and then sent to SAS posts. There they built schools, supervised the educational system, provided the population with medical and dental services, initiated work projects to provide employment for the inhabitants, and arbitrated local complaints. Even the army conceded that the success of the SAS had come too late.

In the urban centers, where education was pushed more vigorously, the administration failed to provide employment for the educated unemployed. From the point of view of Franco-Algerian relations, the importance of a numerically small group of educated Muslims was not appreciated. "Of all the civil servants in Algeria, only 5,000 [were] Muslim and of those all but a handful [were] in very minor positions."⁵⁵


Failure to Gauge Extent of Discontent. Population growth in Algeria, an essentially agrarian country with a poor soil and a hostile climate, resulted in chronic unemployment and underemployment and an exodus from the countryside to urban shantytowns. This contributed to the misery and despair of an increasing mass of individuals and families. While this proletariat grew larger and more bitter, a small French-educated Muslim bourgeoisie was seeking not only an economic, but more important, an administrative and political outlet which was being denied it. All of the French reforms and promises, from the Blum-Violette proposal to the Algerian Statute and the rigged elections of 1948, were systematically abandoned, sabotaged, or violated. Thus two kinds of discontent arose: the social uneasiness of the masses and the political uneasiness of the Muslim elite. When united, these two factors created an enormous explosive force.⁵⁶ And yet the administration and the government failed to gauge the potentiality of this force, although indicators abounded.

The previously pro-French moderates, represented by Ferhat Abbas, had changed their stand vis-a-vis France. In the years after 1943 they began to accept, more and more, the idea of a totally independent Algeria and they became progressively more alienated by French intransigence. The masses had also begun to show a political preference: the AMA which demanded the recognition of a separate Algerian entity attracted over a million members. But above all, the impatience of the masses was being demonstrated daily by their readiness to resort to direct action and violence. The May 1945 uprising was a manifestation of this trend, as were the crowds which came to listen to Messali Hadj's polemics and the disturbances and clashes which resulted from them. The numerous incidents of anti-*Colon* terrorism and the discovery of the OS should have alerted the authorities, but until the very eve of the revolution the French refused to recognize these indicators and

instead advocated applying the “Peace of Algeria” to rebellious Tunisia and Morocco. In a sense, it is this apparent failure to gauge the magnitude of the situation that undermined the effectiveness of the initial reaction to the revolution.

GENESIS OF THE ALGERIAN REBELLION

From the
NORTH AFRICAN STAR
1925
to the F.L.N. and M.N.A.
1955



Inadequacy of Government's Initial Reaction to Revolutionary Movement: the Military Aspect

The Algerian revolution caught France totally by surprise. On the very eve of its outbreak the Governor General had received word from his prefects and mayors that the situation was calm and normal. The relatively quiet years that followed the May 1945 uprising had lulled the French administration into a false sense of security. Accordingly, the extent of the revolution and the number of troops required to quell it were grossly underestimated. The French administration was convinced that it was facing another tribal uprising which could be crushed in a matter of a few months. Thus, on November 20, 1954, 50,000 tracts with the following message were dropped in the Aures:

Agitators and strangers have brought bloodletting to our country and have settled in your territory. They live off you . . . exact tribute and take your men into criminal adventure. . . . Soon a terrible calamity will befall the rebels, after this French Peace will again reign.⁵⁷

When it became apparent that this was indeed a revolution, the French Army found itself unprepared. It lacked units in France suitable for this kind of warfare. The veterans of the war in Indochina had not yet returned, and the units that were initially sent to Algeria were unable to cope with the situation. They were NATO-type divisions, created for a European war. Heavy and massive, equipped to fight a frontal war, they proved to be unadaptable to the geographic conditions of combat, and ineffectual against the extremely flexible objectives of guerrilla warfare.⁵⁸ In February 1955, Jacques Soustelle, the newly appointed Governor General, described the military situation in these terms:

. . . The resistance to terrorist aggression disposed of very feeble means: regular troops were few and poorly trained for the purpose; little or no extra means; practically no helicopters, few light aircraft, almost no radio equipment. . . .⁵⁹

During the first 15 months of the revolution, the French Army resorted to small-scale combing operations—several battalions were noisily massed to encircle and search a given area where guerrilla action had taken place—while the *Gendarmerie* (constabulary) arrested all known nationalists, regardless of political affiliation, and disarmed all of the clans and tribes, leaving the pro-French defenseless and at the mercy of the rebels. These classical methods of fighting a tribal uprising yielded almost nothing, and served to alienate more and more Muslims. In April 1956, the French Army adopted new countermeasures.


The pacification of Algeria was to be achieved by applying *quadrillage* tactics—“a grid operation garrisoning in strength all major cities and, in diminishing force, all towns, villages, and farms of Algeria.”⁶⁰ Accordingly, French effectives were increased to 400,000 men; supersonic jet fighters were replaced with slower ground-support planes and helicopters; the Tunisian and Moroccan borders were thoroughly fenced off to cut the supply lines of the rebels; and areas of heavy rebel concentration were declared security zones. The inhabitants of these security zones were moved to resettlement camps; all villages and hamlets were burned; and only French troops were allowed in, with orders to shoot anything that moved. The tracking down of rebel units was then left to small and mobile handpicked units, generally paratroopers, whose total number never exceeded 50,000 men—a number roughly equal to the effectives of the rebels. The success of these tactics brought about a military stalemate in 1958, but by then the psychological advantage had passed to the rebels, and French efforts to win the population over by civic action came too late to be really effective.

Summary


The performance of French governmental machinery in Algeria was less than satisfactory in some critical areas: French administration did not extend its authority to the rural areas where 80 percent of the population lived; it was unable to measure the social discontent of the masses and the political discontent of the educated elite, and did not see the revolution coming; when French Army officers were sent to introduce civic action programs in the rural areas after hostilities broke out, they were successful but too late; and the French Army, being committed elsewhere and totally unprepared for the type of war being fought in Algeria, was slow to improve its methods and win the military advantage.



(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)
 An ALN land mine crippled and nearly overturned this French half-track in the Blida region. Note the fertile Metidja plain in the background.



(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)
 Instruction in the use of a French-manufactured 24/29 automatic rifle in a rebel camp.
 Note the use of French.



(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)
An example of ALN sabotage—blowing up a power relay tower.



(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)
Weapons, including U.S.-manufactured captured by the ALN in engagements with French units.



(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)
ALN soldiers mining a railway line. Note the French paratroop uniform and hat.




(United Press International photo)

An instance of an escorted civilian convoy in the Aures Mountains. The area became heavily infested with rebels soon after the outbreak of the revolution, and was considered unsafe for travel by Europeans.



(United Press International Photo)

A hunter-killer paratroop unit of the 5th French Foreign Legion Regiment seeking rebel bands in Djebel Bou Zegana in the Kabyle Mountains.



(United Press International Photo)


Muslim Algerian laborers constructing the Maurice Line—an electrified fence running some 400 kilometers along the Algerian-Tunisian border on either side of the Bône-Tebessa railway line. Construction of this barrier began in 1957, and is credited with substantially reducing the number of ALN infiltrators from Tunisia.



(United Press International Photo)
An assortment of weapons, ranging from the modern British-made automatic Sten gun to the obsolete flintlock, seized by French troops and police in the Casbah of Algiers. Note the picture of former Egyptian Premier, General Mohammed Naguib, in the foreground.



(United Press International Photo)
Another example of terrorism perpetrated by the FLN against Muslim Algerians. The body of Dr. Mohammed Medir lies beside his automobile, wrecked by explosion.




(United Press International Photo)

The body of Doumene Abdelkader lies on a street in Algiers after having been executed by order of the FLN for his support of the rival nationalist organization, MNA.



(United Press International Photo)

Rubble litters the streets in the Algiers Casbah following the Muslim riots of December 11–14, 1960. Note the pro-rebel—“Long live the FLN” and “Long live Krim”—slogans scribbled on the wall.



(United Press International Photo)

Algerian students and workers demonstrating in Paris, October 1956, against the proposal of the Mollet Government to grant the French Administration special powers with which to crush the rebellion. Note the FLN nationalist flag.



(United Press International Photo)

Ben Bella, Khider, Ait Ahmed, and Boudiaf (in the background from left to right) talking with Prince Moulay Hassan (in uniform), son of the Sultan of Morocco just before boarding the plane which was to carry them to captivity.



(United Press International Photo)

Members of the first Algerian Provisional Government. Left to right in the back row: Mohammed Yazid, Abdelhamid Mehri, Dr. Mohammed Lamine-Debaghine, Benyoussef ben Khedda, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal. In the front row: Dr. Ahmed Francis, Belkacem Krim, Ferhat Abbas, Abdelhafid Boussouf, and Tewfik el Madani.



(United Press International Photo)

French troops unloading from the ship, "Athos," some of the 70 tons of arms which the French authorities claimed came from Egyptian Army depots and allegedly consigned to the FLN-ALN. The "Athos" was intercepted by the French Navy off the coast of Algeria.



(United Press International Photo)

"The road to friendship. YES to the new Algeria." A referendum poster depicting Muslim and French workers facing an industrial future together in Algeria. This poster appeared on the streets of Paris on December 29, 1960.

PART II—DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION

COMPOSITION OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTORS

Leadership

The leadership of the OS, the precursor of the CRUA and the FLN, was composed of four men: one national chief (Hussein Ait Ahmed, 1947–49; Mohammed Ben Bella, 1949–50) and three regional chiefs who were to direct and supervise the Organization in their respective areas. These men, in cooperation with Mohammed Khider of the MTLD Central Committee and OS liaison with the party, were responsible for defining and expanding the structural organization of the OS. With the creation of the CRUA in 1954, and until August 1956, the leadership of the revolutionary movement was expanded to include nine members, divided into two coequal bodies collectively responsible for the conduct of the revolution. Mohammed Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Hussein Ait Ahmed formed the External Delegation, or political leadership, with headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. Mustapha Ben Boulaid, Mourad Didouche, Rabah Bitat, Mohammed Larbi Ben M'Hidi, and Belkacem Krim formed the Internal Regional Delegation, or military leadership in the *wilayas* of the Aures, Constantine, Algiers, Oran, and the Kabyle respectively. This group was essentially drawn from the lower-middle and lower classes, and did not include intellectuals or politicians of stature. They were all in their late twenties or early thirties, had been militants in the PPA and MTLD, and a number of them had gained experience in warfare while serving in the French Army (Ben Bella, Boudiaf, and Krim had risen to the rank of sergeant, and had served in various European campaigns). Apart from the various positions of importance which members of the group held in the MTLD or the OS, Khider served as deputy from Algiers to the French National Assembly; he was the only one of the group to hold an official position.

In August 1956 the revolutionary leadership underwent major expansion and modification at the FLN Soummam Valley Congress. The CRUA was abolished and replaced with two new governing bodies: the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA), composed of 17 full members and 17 associate members, and the Committee for Coordination and Execution (CCE), composed of five military leaders then in Algeria whose names at that time were kept secret. These two bodies were later to develop into the legislative and executive branches respectively of the FLN.^a The creation of the CNRA represented the most important political decision reached at Soummam. In a sense, it affirmed the predominance of the political over the military, but most

^a See "Organization" on page 79.

important of all, it established a representative form of government, and avoided the pitfalls of unique leadership which had previously paralyzed the activities of the MTLD under Messali Hadj. Another important aspect of the CNRA was the fact that it gave representation to all of the factions within the FLN, some of which had joined the revolution after 1954, by including in its membership intellectuals and politicians of stature such as Ferhat Abbas and Dr. Ahmed Francis, formerly of the UDMA; Tewfik el-Madani, former leader of the Ulema; and Dr. Lamine-Debaghine, Mohammed Yazid, and Abdelhamid Mehri of the MTLD.

At the second annual conference of the CNRA, held at Cairo in August 1957, consideration of the establishment of a future Algerian parliament prompted the expansion of the CNRA and the CCE from 34 to 54 members, and 5 to 14 members respectively; and on September 18, 1958, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria was constituted. Composed of 18 members, and headed by a President of the Council, Ferhat Abbas, this body integrated within itself both political and military functions by giving representation to all the factions within the FLN. With the exception of a change of government in August 1961—Benyoussef ben Khedda replaced Ferhat Abbas as President of the Council—this form of leadership remained in effect until after conclusion of the Evian Agreement.

Following

During the initial planning stage, 1948–1954, the revolutionary following was estimated at 2,000 to 3,000 persons, mostly drawn from the ranks of the MTLD and OS, although some outsiders were included. As a whole, these came from the rural lower class because the revolutionary leadership purposely avoided enrolling revolutionaries who might be suspected by the authorities. The revolution itself was launched by these 2,000 to 3,000 ex-members of the MTLD and the OS, but it enjoyed practically no popular support. By 1962, however, the ranks of the revolutionaries had swelled to an effective force of some 40,000 to 60,000 regulars,^b and the FLN came to enjoy large-scale popular support among the Muslims. Political parties such as the UDMA and the Association of Ulema, which had disassociated themselves from the revolutionary movement in 1954, voluntarily disbanded and urged their members to join the FLN as free individuals. Students and labor union members also joined the revolution, and the population, which

^b The FLN put the number at over 180,000. Although exaggerated, this number could have included the auxiliary and irregular fighters, and the members of the terrorist groups in the urban centers.

had been apathetic at the beginning, enthusiastically supported the FLN directives to strike and to demonstrate. A complete cross section, in other words, of the Algerian indigenous society came to be represented in the FLN.

Summary

The revolutionary leadership in Algeria was young and drawn essentially from the lower-middle and the lower classes. Until 1956 no intellectuals were included in the leadership, and only one leader had held an official position—in the French Assembly. After 1956, however, the leadership expanded and included a number of intellectuals and politicians of some stature. The revolutionary following, drawn mostly from the rural lower class in the early years of the revolution, included a cross section of the entire Muslim population in the later years.

OVERALL STRATEGY AND GOALS

Four considerations prompted the creation of the OS: fear that political action alone would immobilize the MTLD in legalism at a time when armed resistance elsewhere was beginning to prove effective; belief that the time for resistance was at hand in view of the failure of legal methods; belief that armed resistance alone could dramatize the political problems sufficiently; and finally, the vulnerable position in which the MTLD had placed itself by seeking the legal approval of an authority which it denounced as illegitimate, thus losing among the masses the benefits which only an intransigent attitude could procure. The specific objectives and strategy of the OS were not enunciated. At no time was it made clear by the OS leadership whether they supported the political program of the parent MTLD, or whether they had goals and strategies of their own.

The motivations which prompted the creation of the CRUA, in July 1954, and the launching of the revolution, on November 1, 1954, were the belief that action alone could bring unity of purpose among the nationalist parties, and that the time for resistance was ripe. The main political goal of the revolution, as set forth on November 1, 1954, was national independence, and the “restoration of the sovereign, democratic and social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles.” The internal objectives of the political program of the FLN called for (1) “Political reorganization by restoring the national revolutionary movement to its rightful course and by wiping out every vestige of corruption,” and (2) “the rallying and organization of all the sound forces of the Algerian people in order to liquidate the colonial system.” The external objectives called for (1) “The internationalization of the

Algerian problem,” (2) “the fulfillment of North African unity within the natural Arab-Muslim framework,” and (3) “within the framework of the United Nations, the affirmation of active sympathy with regard to all nations supporting [the] liberation movement.”⁶¹

The political aims of the FLN leadership, however, were: (1) to gain the support of the Algerian masses and that of influential Algerian leaders; (2) to create a cleavage between the Algerians and the French, thus establishing the concept of an Algerian nation as a separate and distinct entity; (3) to become the only *interlocuteur valable* (valid negotiator) for this Algerian nation; and (4) to force France to recognize the separateness of the Algerian nation. Hence, the emphasis was on sovereignty rather than independence in the political program.

To achieve these aims, the primary objective of the FLN in this early stage of the revolution was to keep the uprising alive and develop it from mere rebellion to full-scale civil war.

The uprising, launched by a small number of ill-equipped and isolated Algerians scattered in small bands over the country, had yielded the FLN very little materially. But, it had signaled a decisive turn of events in Franco-Algerian relations by bringing the Algerian nationalist movement out of its paralysis. If the uprising could be kept alive, it would ultimately leave Algerian nationalists with only two choices—siding with France, or actively supporting the FLN. Attacks, therefore, of the November 1 variety were not to be kept up. With the element of surprise gone, such attacks against an alerted French Army and other security units stationed in and around the urban centers would have resulted in the annihilation of the rebel army, and the FLN movement with it. The task of the rebel army in that stage was to fall back on the practically inaccessible rural areas, where French influence was virtually nonexistent, engage in guerrilla warfare to give effective demonstrations of its continued existence, develop its organization, and recruit the local population in the cause of the FLN.

By 1958 most of the FLN objectives and aims had been achieved. Yet, the FLN had failed to attain the strength required to eject the French forcibly from Algeria. France, meanwhile, had refused to grant Algeria any form of sovereignty. The bitterness generated by the war of attrition that followed, from 1958 to 1962, caused the FLN to shift the emphasis in its program from sovereignty to independence. From 1958, therefore, the major goal of the revolution became unequivocally total independence.

Summary

FLN goals from 1954 to 1968 included the establishment of a sovereign Algerian state headed by a popular organization whose leaders

could make decisions independent of French influence. To achieve these goals the FLN launched a guerrilla war against the French, a war which became stalemated by 1958. The French refused to grant any form of sovereignty to Algeria, and from 1958 the FLN fought for total independence.

IDEOLOGY OR MYTH

National Orientation

A rudimentary form of Algerian nationalism found early expression in the war (1832–1847) which the Amir Abdelkader waged against France, and the subsequent peasant uprisings which broke out in Algeria during the 35 years that followed. The unity and patriotism of the Algerian nation in its resistance to France was inspired by a common religion, “community spirit and the instinct of self-preservation.”⁶² With the pacification of Algeria in 1882, and the destruction of the Arabic cultural centers and the traditional society, this early manifestation of nationalism failed to survive the onslaught of French culture. Not until the early 20th century did new expressions of Algerian sentiment begin to be evidenced.

These new expressions differed radically from those of the first five decades of French rule in that the Muslims sought “change within the framework of the French State and French political parties.”⁶³ Algerian sentiment was not anti-French, but rather assimilationist in nature: what was sought was political and economic equality, French citizenship and participation in local government, and a united tax system which would equally apply to Muslims and Europeans. In essence, these demands were voiced by two distinct groups—a small French-educated elite which sought political equality, and a large number of Algerian workers in France who demanded economic equality. In the interwar period, however, such “elements as a revival of Islamic religion and culture combined with increased political consciousness (itself a result of visits and work periods in France), higher education, activities in political, revolutionary, and labor movements.”⁶⁴

The educated elite, imbued with the spirit of French liberalism and rationalism, continued to favor assimilation. The Algerian workers, on the other hand, having first come under the influence of the French Communist and Socialist parties, then under the influence of Pan-Islamic theories, began to agitate for separatism. Thus Algerian nationalism, as it came to be represented by the movements which were founded by Messali Hadj, first reflected the Communist influence under which the ENA had come. The main emphasis of the ENA platform was

on colonial emancipation^c and Marxist socioeconomic reforms. Nevertheless, in 1937 the nationalists shifted their ideological orientation from Marxist to Pan-Islamic. Messali Hadj had split with the Communists over the assimilationist Blum-Violette proposal, and had, through the influence of Pan-Islamism, formed a tacit alliance with the Ulema. The PPA, accordingly, demanded recognition of a separate status for Algeria^d on the basis that its religion, culture, and language made it a separate and distinct entity which could never become a part of France.

The nationalist movement gained strength during and after World War II when the educated Muslim elite, in an about-face, began to voice demands for separatism. The anti-Algerian repressions of the Vichy government, the Atlantic Charter, the rejection by the Free French of the Algerian Manifesto, the repression of May 8, 1945, the 1947 Algerian Statute, and the rigged elections of 1948, had convinced these elites of the futility of their cause.^e They were only able to exert a moderating influence. Thus, in the immediate post-World War II period, Algerian nationalism did not take on violently anti-French overtones, but came to represent a desire for autonomy within the framework of the French state, which would give the indigenous population an important role in the administration of their country. The revolution broke out only after this desire was frustrated by France's inflexible and outmoded colonial policy. It could be said, therefore, that "Algerian nationalism, in the sense of 'a living and active corporate will' to independence and an overriding loyalty of any large number of Algerians to that goal, is a product rather than a cause of the 1954 rebellion."⁶⁵

Throughout the revolution, nationalist ideology was vague on all points except the greater goal of independence. The FLN referred to social and agrarian reforms, the collective responsibility of the Algerian people, and equal rights, but there were "no allusions as to how the economy will be developed, to what form justice will take, or indeed, what form of government will be established, beyond the declaration that it will be 'a democratic regime exclusively in the service of the people; a social regime up to this time unknown in the history of

^c In this case independence for North Africa, which included Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

^d Two main considerations motivated this shift: first, the legal status of Algeria differed from that of Tunisia and Morocco—Algeria was a part of France, whereas Tunisia and Morocco were protectorates; second, the nationalist movements which had evolved in these countries were seeking independence within a purely local context.

^e President Franklin D. Roosevelt's sympathy for North African Independence, which evolved from his discussions with Sultan Mohammed V at Casablanca in January 1943, the independence of Syria and Lebanon in 1943—former French mandates and the espousal by the Arab League of North African nationalism were considerations which equally motivated this change of attitude.

Algeria.’”⁶⁶ The absence of a defined ideology was due largely to the fact that the FLN included within its ranks persons of widely divergent views, ranging from extreme left to extreme right, and lacked institutional groupings. Nationalist unity, in other words, rested on the common desire to attain independence, and this desire overrode all social, economic, and political differences.

International Orientation

Since the 12th century Algeria has had strong religious, cultural, and linguistic ties with Tunisia and Morocco in particular, and to a lesser degree, with the Arab Middle East; it is these factors which influenced the international orientation of Algerian nationalism in the 20th century.

In 1927, when Messali Hadj began his political agitation in France, his movement, although it reflected Marxist ideology, was strongly connected with Tunisian, Moroccan, and Arab-Islamic nationalist movements, and had an essentially pan-North African scope. His conversion to Arabism and Islam in 1935 marked the turning point in the future course of Algerian nationalism.

Messali Hadj, like Salah Cherif and Abdel Aziz Taalibi of Tunisia, and Abdel Khalek Torres and Mekki Naciri of Morocco, became a disciple of Chekib Arslan, the Lebanese “father” of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism who preached total independence for, and the complete and indivisible unity of, the Arab countries. This conversion enabled Messali Hadj to reach a tacit alliance with the Islamic reform-minded Ulema, and identified the Algerian independence movement with the greater Arab and Islamic struggle against colonialism. In 1937 the political platform of the PPA contained “suggestions of fraternity and solidarity with North Africa as a whole and Arab and Islamic worlds.”⁶⁷ Algerian nationalism thus came to receive its spiritual inspiration from developments in the Middle East. In 1948, for instance, the Arab League formally espoused the cause of Algerian independence, and in 1952 a number of Algerians were reported being trained at commando centers in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

With the outbreak of the revolution, North African unity within the “natural Arab-Muslim framework” was reaffirmed by the FLN, and the ties with Tunisia, Morocco, and the Arab world were strengthened. Egypt, in particular, came to have a dominant influence on the ideological orientation of the revolution. As the revolution progressed, the FLN leadership adopted an increasingly neutralistic stand in the ideological struggle between East and West. Following in the footsteps of Egypt, they identified themselves with the Afro-Asian bloc, and

attended the Bandung and Belgrade Conferences. Pro-Western Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Morocco exerted a moderating influence on the ideology of the revolution, as was demonstrated by the desire of the FLN leadership to maintain their ties with the West.^f

Religious Emphasis

Islam played a major role in promoting Algerian nationalism, first by contributing to the development of a conscious awareness of an Algerian political entity among the Muslims, and second by stressing the unity of Islam and the Islamic world. During the revolution, it provided the FLN with a moral force and a morale factor in the conduct of the war.

The revival of Islam, as carried out by the Ulema, owes much of its impetus to French intrusion. "Aiming at a return to the pure principles of Islam, they ran athwart France, as the standard-bearer of modernity."⁶⁸ By attacking the *Marabouts* (administration-appointed religious leaders) as auxiliaries of the French Government who had underwritten the controls placed on the Islamic religion, the Ulema were able to undermine the position and authority of the *Marabouts* and to win over the hitherto faithful to their own school of thought. Their teachings ("Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my country."⁶⁹) were expounded in their *madaress* (religious schools), which were located in most cities and villages. By stressing the unique and distinct qualities of Islam and Arabism, these *madaress* became a "breeding ground of young nationalists."⁷⁰ With the conclusion of the tacit alliance with the PPA, Islam became an ideological component of Algerian nationalism.

Islam again proved to be a potent weapon during the course of the revolution. To the masses, the FLN represented the revolution as a *jihād* (holy war) in defense of Islam and the Arab heritage. The launching of a holy war binds all Muslims to the cause, and demands of them the ultimate sacrifice if necessary; although the response of the Algerians was by no means total, it nonetheless provided the revolutionaries with additional recruits, and morally obligated those who did not join to assist the revolutionaries because of their religious affinity. Islam, moreover, proved to be a major disciplinary factor in the conduct of the revolution. The rebels were governed by its stringent rules. They were forbidden alcohol and women, and were expected to obey orders blindly. "Disobedience, desertion, a hint of disloyalty, meant death."⁷¹

^f It must be pointed out in this respect that by this time the Communist bloc had adopted a new strategy of lending support and encouragement to nationalist bourgeois revolutionary movements.

Yet with all this austerity, morale remained high—"a kind of hard, confident fatalism"⁷² which derived from religious belief and observance.

Mystique of Revolution

The choice of the term "front" was in itself a deliberate attempt by the revolutionaries to create a mystique which would embody the aspirations of the Algerians. This was an attempt to disassociate themselves from the disunited nationalist past, and to represent the revolution as a new movement, united and all inclusive, which would be the real vanguard of a new era. "The term 'Front' was deliberately employed to indicate that they represented not one specific clique or program, but wished to be an amalgamation of all political opinion in Algeria."⁷³

Disunity among the nationalists had discouraged a large number of Algerians from joining the cause of nationalism. Presented with a united front, it was hoped that they would forget their misgivings and join. This was a fortunate choice, for it really came to represent a fighting brotherhood, and not just another movement, after the FLN absorbed the other parties.

Summary

A unified demand for separatism was not voiced until the 1940's. Up to that time the educated elite were, ideologically, assimilationists: they wanted French citizenship, and political and economic equality. On the other hand, the workers, guided by leftist ideologies and Pan-Islamic theories, were separatists: they wanted "colonial emancipation" and radical socioeconomic reforms. Islam promoted nationalism and became integrated in the revolutionary ideology. It not only gave nationalism a touch of spirituality and provided the FLN with a moral force and a morale factor, but it promoted a feeling of solidarity and fraternity with other Arab states.

ORGANIZATION

During the first 20 months of the revolution the organization of the FLN evolved from a rudimentary and highly decentralized structure to an efficient machine, in which the political and military functions were well integrated. This was a transitional trial-by-error period, but the FLN had the advantage of being able to fall back on the organizational structure of the PPA-MTLD, and the experience gained from the OS and the CRUA, to see them through. The organizational structure which emanated from the Soummam Valley Congress embodied the

principles of what was to become later, through constant refinement, a democratic form of government.

Political Apparatus

Structural

On the eve of the revolution, the rebel command structure consisted of one body—the CRUA—in which the military and political functions were unified. With the outbreak of the revolution, the CRUA changed its name to FLN and split into two distinct bodies: the External (political) and the Internal (military) Delegations. In August 1956 the Internal and External Delegations were replaced with two newly created bodies: the CNRA, the highest and policy-making organism of the FLN; and the CCE, the FLN war council charged with the conduct of the revolution within the framework of the policies laid down by the CNRA. Thus, the CCE, was subordinate to the CNRA. In August 1957 the two bodies were placed on a near-equal footing when the CCE was given broader executive powers, and made responsible to the CNRA. In September 1958 the CCE was abolished and replaced with a Provisional Government which assumed executive functions. The CNRA assumed the legislative functions. With the exception of a change of government in August 1961, the FLN structure remained unchanged after 1958.

The territorial organization of the MTLD—five *wilayas* in Algeria and seven autonomous *wilayas* in France—was adopted by the CRUA as its own. This territorial organization remained in effect until August 1956, when the Soummam Valley Congress added another *wilaya* and the autonomous zone of Algiers. In 1957 the East Base and West Base, along the Algerian-Tunisian and Algerian-Moroccan borders respectively, were added as autonomous zones. The decision to make Algiers and its environs an autonomous zone was dictated by military circumstances. As a major urban center, Algiers was well garrisoned by French troops and, thus, beyond the potential of the rebel army. The city, however, had a powerful rebel underground. To maintain security, and because of the nature of its functions, the underground was given a large measure of freedom of action—hence the autonomous zone; but it continued to be controlled by the CCE and its successor, the Provisional Government.

Functional

The Internal Delegation was concerned primarily with directing the military phase of the revolution; accordingly, it held power over local decisions. The main responsibility of the External Delegation was to procure arms for the revolution, establish lines of supply, and secure

financial, military, and diplomatic aid from “friendly” states. The lack of communications between these two bodies created tensions which, by August 1956, threatened to open a rift in the ranks of the FLN. Three main factors contributed to these tensions. Arms, a major requirement, remained in critical shortage, thus endangering the course of the revolution in a number of *wilayas*. This cast suspicion on the motives of Ben Bella, “the principal controller of the arms flow,” who had meanwhile gained enormous prestige and power. “The leaders of the interior, still bitterly mindful of Messali’s domination and with grievances over arms shortages to boot, came to look on Ben Bella’s rising star with deep misgivings.” Of greater importance, however, was the need for some centralized organization which would be able to reach decisions and impose them on all concerned.⁷⁴

These problems were resolved at Soummam. The FLN Congress voted to grant the interior priority over the external in the allocation of resources while recognizing the priority of the political over the military. Moreover, it endorsed the principle of collective leadership as a means of combatting the rise of personal power. It was also a means of uniting the leadership of the party by including in the membership of the CNRA the Interior and Exterior leaders and the new figures who had subsequently joined the FLN. The following responsibilities became the major functions of the CNRA:

The C.N.R.A., the highest organ of the Revolution, guides the policy of the [FLN] and is the sole body authorized in the last resort to make decisions relative to the country’s future. For example, only the C.N.R.A. is capable of ordering a cease-fire.⁷⁵

The CCE, on the other hand, was given the following functions:

The C.C.E. is a real war Council, and is responsible for guiding and directing all branches of the Revolution: military, political or diplomatic. It controls all the organized bodies of the Revolution (political, military, diplomatic, social and administrative).⁷⁶

Inadequate communications between the CNRA, located in Cairo and Tunis, and the CCE, centered in Algeria, perpetuated the internal-external division. Tensions, aggravated by two divergent positions vis-à-vis possible negotiations with France, generated a power struggle within the FLN. The politicians, led by Ferhat Abbas, opposed the attachment of a *prealable* (precondition)—that France give advance notice of its intentions to recognize Algerian independence—to these negotiations, while the military, led by Mohammed Lamine-Debaghine, demanded this a priori guarantee. The inability of the military to convince the

FLN leadership of the desirability of this hardline policy set the stage for the CNRA conference in August 1957.

At Cairo, the conference eliminated the distinctions between internal and external. The membership of the CCE was expanded to 14, of whom more than half were former externalists, and given broad executive powers.

The CCE “has extensive powers on all problems, except those which engage the future of the country, for example: negotiations, end of hostilities, alignment with one bloc or another, and international solution to the Algerian problem, intervention of a third party in the Franco-Algerian conflict, etc. . . .”⁷⁷

The CNRA, on the other hand, suffered a slight decline in power. Its membership was expanded to 54 full voting members, and it now took a two-thirds vote to overrule CCE actions. Thus, in a sense, the political achieved predominance over the military. The power struggle over negotiations continued, and was not resolved until September 1958, when the Provisional Government was created.

A number of factors precipitated the creation of the Provisional Government, the most important of which were the declaration of France of its right to hot pursuit, and the bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiët-Sidi-Youssef. President Bourguiba of Tunisia, fearing that the war might spread to Tunisian soil, pressured the FLN into moderating their terms for an agreement with France. The FLN demanded, in return, Tunisian and Moroccan recognition of a provisional Algerian government which could negotiate with France as the sole representative of the Algerian people. The moderate tone which the FLN adopted in April 1958 came after a placating agreement which gave the military key positions in the forthcoming provisional government, and an equal say in its policies. Krim received the Vice Premiership and the Ministry of the Armed Forces; Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, former chief of *Wilaya* II, became Minister of the Interior; and Abdelhafid Boussouf, former chief of *Wilaya* V, became Minister of Communications and Liaison.⁷⁸ In order to affirm the predominance of the political over the military, political commissars were attached at all levels of command. The task of these political commissars was not only “preparing the ground for a military operation through propaganda and informational activities, but also of setting up local administrations to take care of non-military problems during the Army’s stay in a given area and thereafter.”⁷⁹

The policy of political moderation influenced military developments. Military operations were reduced to a minimum, and this created resentment among some of the field commanders. Some of the

political cadres, on the other hand, continued to favor a policy of no compromise with France. Their position had, all the more, been strengthened by Communist overtures, and it was "felt that concessions to the Communists would bring quick and decisive military support." When, therefore, in the latter part of 1958 and during 1959, France submitted unsatisfactory negotiating terms, they precipitated a showdown with the Provisional Government.⁸⁰

At the meeting of the Provisional Government in Libya, in December 1959–January 1960, the hard-line advocates were defeated, and Abbas remained in firm control. The importance of this moderate victory was the fact that the army came under the stricter control of a three-man general staff composed of Bel Kacem Krim, Ben Tobbal, and Abdelhafid Boussouf. Thus, the military remained subservient to the political. In 1961 another showdown precipitated once more by intransigent French negotiation terms resulted in the downfall of Abbas. Benyoussef ben Khedda, who replaced Abbas as Premier, was a "partisan of negotiation but differed in being more willing to back up his position by recourse to Communist diplomatic support."⁸¹ Thus the primary function of the Provisional Government remained unchanged. It continued to act as the sole representative of the FLN and the Algerian people in the negotiations with France. On March 18, 1962, a truce agreement was reached with France, and the revolution came to an end on March 19, 1962.

Underground

From November 1954 to June 1957, the structural hierarchy of the Algiers underground was relatively simple. Cells, the basic unit, were of two functional types: military and political-administrative. These were headed by two deputies who in turn were responsible to a chief in whom the military and political functions were combined. In June 1957 the underground was reorganized. Collective responsibility was introduced at the highest level, and another type of cell (liaison intelligence) was added. Cells of each functional type were then grouped into districts, three districts into a sector, and three sectors to a region. Algiers was divided into three regions: Region 1 included the two largest sections of the Casbah; Region 2 included the remainder of the Casbah and Western Algiers and its suburbs; and Region 3 included Eastern Algiers and its suburbs. These three regions formed the Autonomous Zone. The zonal political, military, and liaison intelligence activities were directed by three men who were responsible to the Council of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers, the underground's supreme authority. The Council, composed of a political-military chief and three deputies

charged respectively with political, military, and liaison intelligence responsibilities, directed the terrorist network.⁸²

The regional military branch in each region was made of three groups, each of which included 11 men—a chief, his lieutenant, and three cells of three men each. Including the regional chief and his deputy, there were 35 armed men per region, 105 in all Algiers. Besides these “military” persons charged with protecting FLN members and their activities were the 50–150 hard-core terrorists who formed the bomb-network. The bomb-network, in many instances, used known gangsters or unemployed persons to carry out terrorist activities.⁸³

The political branch in each region consisted of 50–70 persons, according to the particular region. These were entrusted with the distribution of tracts, the delegation of assignments, and clandestine transportation. Another unit, the “choc group” was charged with enforcing the directives of the FLN by means ranging from intimidation to beatings and assassination. Moreover, each region also had a propaganda printing-diffusing unit. The principal equipment of this unit consisted of a typewriter and a mimeograph machine. All tracts prepared at the zonal echelon had to be mimeographed in every region so as to minimize the dangerous transportation of tract packets in Algiers.⁸⁴


Each regional-level political branch also enjoyed the services of a financial commission which, in theory, was composed of five businessmen well established in the region. This commission performed essentially three tasks: it assessed the taxes which were to be levied on other businessmen, kept a running account of the revenue thus derived, and acted as a banking institution by depositing the revenue in the accounts of its members’ respective establishments. In practice, however, the system was generally directed by one of the political or business leaders of each region.⁸⁵ The specific function and organization of the intelligence-liaison branch remains, to this date, unclear.


Trade Unions

The revolution began without the support of any of the existing trade unions—the Communist-dominated *Confédération Générale du Travail* (GT), the Socialist *Force Ouvrière* (FO), and the Catholic *Confédération Française de Travailleurs Chrétiens* (CFTC)—none of which was nationalist-oriented. In March 1956 the FLN created the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens* (UGTA) to counter the Messali Hadj sponsored *Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algériens* (USTA), and also because of the dawning importance on the FLN leadership of trade union activity. In July 1956 the UGTA was admitted to the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU)—an American-influenced

organization—because of the pressure which the *Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail* (UGTT) exerted on the ICFTU, and because the UGTA commanded greater support in Algeria than any of its rivals as a result of its close association with the FLN. Within a month after its formation, the UGTA claimed to have enrolled 18 unions, and its membership was estimated at between 55,000 and 100,000. Ostensibly, the UGTA was headed by a General Secretariat and an Executive Committee which represented the different unions. Its leadership, however, “overlapped high-level F.L.N. personnel.”⁸⁶ In the Autonomous Zone of Algiers, for instance, it took its directives from the underground, while its activities in Algeria were directed by the CCE and, later on, by the Provisional Government.

The importance of the UGTA lay in the fact that it provided the FLN with additional funds, intelligence, and recruits. Even after severe repressions pushed it underground in 1957, it continued to perform these duties. Sabotage and strikes were also within the realm of UGTA activities, but these did not prove very successful.





From January 1956 on, black sectors indicate zones secured by nationalist forces. In the crosshatched areas nationalist forces are able to introduce a considerable degree of insecurity.

Nationalist Military Activity November 1954–1958.

The Rebel Army

During the first 20 months of the revolution, the organization of a rebel army was left to the *wilaya* commanders. The task of these men was to build and organize an army in their respective *wilayas* as they saw best. Thus they were the ultimate authority. They did their own recruiting, organized their own lines of supply, foraged for their own arms, dictated their own military operations, and named their own subordinates. Liaison and coordination between *wilaya* commanders was virtually nonexistent. By August 1956 the insurgents had succeeded in establishing themselves in almost all of Algeria, and the FLN Soummam Valley Congress undertook the organization of these insurgents along purely military lines.

The rebel forces were formally designated as the National Liberation Army (ALN), and a regular command structure was created. Algeria was divided into six operational theaters, or *wilayas*, identical with the earlier civil divisions. These were: *Wilaya I*, Aures Nementcha; *Wilaya II*, North Constantine; *Wilaya III*, Kabylia; *Wilaya IV*, Algiers region; *Wilaya V*, Oran; and *Wilaya VI*, Aumale. *Wilayas* were in turn subdivided into zones—*Wilaya I*–6; *Wilaya II*–3; *Wilaya III*–4; *Wilaya IV*–3; *Wilaya V*–9; and *Wilaya VI*–2 (regions and sectors). The city of Algiers was made an autonomous zone. In 1957 the East Base (Souk-Ahras) and the West Base (Nador), along the Algerian-Tunisian and Algerian-Moroccan borders, respectively, were added as autonomous zones.^g

The regular forces of the army (*moudjahiddine*), estimated at 40,000,^h were organized into battalions consisting of 350 men (three companies and 20 officers), companies of 110 men (three platoons and 5 officers), platoons of 35 men (three groups plus a platoon leader and his assistant), groups of 11 men which included a sergeant and two corporals, and half-groups composed of five men and a corporal.⁸⁷ In 1957 the battalion was enlarged to 600 men and the company to 150 to allow for coordinated major engagements. In 1958 these major engagements proved too costly to the ALN, and the large units which were heavy and vulnerable were broken up and reorganized into light, company-size (100 men), self-sufficient, and highly mobile commando units. The irregular (*moussabiline*), estimated at between 55,000 and 100,000, were not affected by this reorganization. Their prime function continued to be that of assisting the regulars in certain limited operations, in gathering intelligence, and acting as advance guards.

^g France made up *Wilaya VII*. Although no military action was undertaken, France experienced FLN-directed terrorism.

^h Of these, an estimated 35,000 were outside of Algeria.

The ranks, grades, and insignia that became standardized in the ALN were:

- a. Corporal—red inverted V
- b. Sergeant—two inverted V's
- c. Sergeant Major—five inverted V's
- d. Adjutant (Warrant Officer)—red V underlined by a white stripe
- e. Cadet—white star
- f. Second Lieutenant—red star
- g. First Lieutenant—one red star and one white star
- h. Captain—two red stars
- i. Commandant (Major)—two red stars and one white star
- j. Colonel—three red stars

The badges which were worn on all caps consisted of a star and a red crescent.⁸⁸

Levels of responsibility for the various ranks came to be almost identical with those of the French Army. Colonels, in the absence of the rank of general (the nationalists did not want to name anyone a general because, they feared the growth of personal power), were included in the membership of the CCE, and commanded the *wilayas*. Each was assisted by three majors. The zones were commanded by captains, each of whom was assisted by three first lieutenants. The regions were commanded by second lieutenants who were each assisted by three cadets, and the sectors were commanded by adjutants assisted by three sergeants major each.⁸⁹ The three assistants at all of the levels of command represented the three main branches in the ALN: political affairs (the political commissar assumed the same rank as those of the other assistants, regardless of the echelon), military affairs, and liaison-intelligence. Appointment, dismissal, and demotion of officers were handled by the CCE at the recommendation of the commanding colonel, while noncommissioned officers were promoted or demoted by the head of the *wilaya*.

Logistics was mainly concerned with the supply of weapons and ammunition. Food was no problem since the restricted diet of the ALN—unleavened bread, peppers, *cous cous*, rice, mutton, and goat's milk—enabled it to live off the land. The ALN acquired arms—ordnance rifles, submachineguns, machineguns, 20-mm. bofor cannons, mortars, and bazookas—through direct purchases from any source, or as gifts from countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. An estimated 10 percent of the total weapons of the ALN came from French sources, either as a result of losses in direct combat or as

“gifts” which deserters brought with them. The purchase of weapons was generally undertaken by members of the governing body of the FLN; the arms were shipped to Tunisian or Moroccan ports, and then transferred to the borders. Some of the Egyptian arms shipments took a somewhat more direct line via Libya, into southern Tunisia, and then Algeria. Since the ALN lacked vehicles and air transportation, most of the armies were ferried across the Tunisian and Moroccan borders by mule caravans. After 1957 the ALN’s main supply depots became the East and West Bases.

The major logistical problem which the ALN encountered, other than French interception and tight control measures,¹ grew out of the heterogeneous nature of the arms which were acquired. The variety of calibers, makes, and models made it impossible to maintain an adequate supply of spare parts and ammunition. This often delayed operations until the proper spare parts, ammunition, and weapons were received.

Summary

The FLN comprised the main revolutionary effort in Algeria in the 1950’s. Its precursor was the OS, an illegal armed group organized secretly by a radical wing of the MTLD political party. When the existence of the OS was discovered by French authorities, the MTLD was driven underground and some of its members reconstituted the OS as the CRUA in the summer of 1954. The CRUA changed its name to FLN for propaganda purposes at the outbreak of the revolution in November of that year. The FLN, with its military arm, the ALN, was highly centralized and combined political and military functions.

From November 1954 the FLN underwent a series of political and military modifications. In September 1958 the FLN created the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, a government-in-arms which included a premier, several vice premiers, and a number of cabinet posts. Decisions reached by the Provisional Government were binding on all Algerians inside and outside of Algeria.

TECHNIQUES

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency Operations

ALN strategy appears to have drawn on—and reversed—the *tache de l’huile* (grease spot) strategy of Marshal Lyautey of France. Lyautey

¹ These, in many instances, created acute supply shortages especially in the areas farthest from the borders.

succeeded in pacifying Morocco in 1925 by massing his troops in settled areas and then spreading “in widening circles a French peace.”⁹⁰ The ALN, on the other hand, planted a few rebels in remote villages outside the French peace. The task of these rebels was to win over and indoctrinate the villagers, thus enabling the ALN to acquire recruits, food, and hiding places. From these initial “grease spots,” the penetration would move, in widening circles, to neighboring areas and eventually reach the settled outposts under French control. Here the French hold on the Muslim population would be broken (1) by rebel guerrilla and terrorist action (direct attacks on French troops; assassinations; bomb throwing; strikes; boycott of French goods, settlers, and Francophile Muslims; and economic sabotage) which would force the French administration to evacuate the area; or (2) as a result of the severity of French repression which generally followed such attacks and tended to cast the population into the rebel camp. In the urban centers and cities, which were mainly inhabited by settlers and which were strongly defended by French forces, terrorism alone was used.⁹¹ Terrorism aimed at Francophile Muslims, rural Muslim politicians, and settlers created an atmosphere of anxiety favorable to the FLN. It silenced the Francophile Muslims, drove a wedge between settlers and Algerians, and forced the French administration to adopt sterner security measures, which meant that more troops were tied down defending the cities and maintaining order.

In the early stages of the revolution, guerrilla action was generally uncoordinated. Small units of less than 20 men, armed mostly with shotguns and obsolete rifles, engaged isolated French patrols only for the purpose of seizing their weapons. The main concern then was to work out the organization of the future ALN. In *Wilaya I*, for instance, Ben Boulaid had launched the revolution with 150 men divided into five units. During the next few months, these units were withdrawn to the fastness of the Aures mountains, where the guerrilla organization took form and the “grease spot” strategy was put into effect. Ben Boulaid made contact “with two nomadic bandit groups on the fringes of the Sahara, and organized a southern supply line: from Egypt through Libya south of Tunisia, then up through a string of Saharan oases to the Aures.”⁹² By March 1955, the rebel stronghold in the Aures, extending some 2,000 square miles, included a special headquarters staff, a rudimentary liaison network, and a supply group. In April, ambushes once again broke out in *Wilaya I*. On April 13 a small French convoy was ambushed and 17 rifles and one machinegun were seized; 3 days later the occupants of a jeep—a major and a chaplain—were slain; and on April 24, the ambush of a convoy yielded the rebels 30 Muslim deserters and their weapons. Sallies of this type continued throughout the countryside, and by 1956 guerrilla activities began to be evidenced in the

environs of the major cities of the Aures. At the same time, the boycott of French goods in these cities indicated that the FLN had penetrated the urban centers.⁹³

This pattern of development characterized the formation of the other *wilayas*. The objectives remained the same: acquisition of arms, raising guerrilla units, and organizing the ALN. And in most of these *wilayas*, the successful application of the “grease spot” strategy brought the rebels into the environs of the major urban centers. The early success of the rebels was due in part to the inadequacy of the initial French countermeasures. The 55,000-man French Army which garrisoned Algeria in 1954, and which was eventually increased to 200,000 men in 1956, was too small to effectively defend the urban centers and track down the guerrillas at the same time. Moreover, the reluctance of the French Government to recognize the revolution for what it was, prevented the implementation of sound counterguerrilla tactics. In most instances the classical military operations initiated between 1954 and 1957 more often than not disrupted guerrilla activities but allowed the rebels to escape unharmed.

The initial French response consisted of four major types of ripostes: military posts; self-contained commando units or patrols sent out from these posts; isolated ambushes; and large-scale operations. In most cases these failed to achieve positive results. The military posts, built at great cost in zones to be pacified, had no *rayonnement* (did not cover large areas), and often the surrounding villages were heavily infested by the enemy. As a result, all post activities were carefully watched, noted, and reported to the guerrilla units operating in the area. Moreover, the fact that most of these posts were erected at strategic points to ensure the safety of essential lines of supply meant that the guerrillas could easily avoid them, while the large areas which separated them remained open to guerrilla activity.

The self-contained commando units or patrols that were sent out from the military posts to ferret out the guerrilla bands caused some uneasiness, but failed to accomplish their mission. For one thing, the patrols or units rarely exceeded 60 men in number, so they were too small to effectively engage the guerrillas. Second, the patrol was of short duration and the units constantly on the march. They did not stay in a given area long enough to afford the population any sort of protection. Hence, they were unable to destroy the guerrilla military-political organization because the inhabitants refused to risk retaliation for providing the French with necessary vital information. Finally, these patrols or commando units could not vary their itinerary, especially in difficult terrain. This proved to be detrimental to the purpose of the mission inasmuch as these units or patrols had to remain on well-known trails,

and therefore were vulnerable to prepared ambushes in force. The isolated ambushes suffered from the same inherent weakness. Guerrilla bands were warned well in advance by the population and were able to avoid the trap or even to lay a countertrap.

Large-scale operations, because of their very nature, yielded meager results. The massing of large numbers of troops generally preempted the element of surprise, giving the guerrillas time to disperse. In most instances these large-scale operations failed to encircle and destroy the enemy along with his political-military organization.⁹⁴

During 1957 a number of factors prompted the FLN–ALN to change its tactics from small, seemingly uncoordinated guerrilla actions to coordinated major engagements at the battalion level. For one, the ranks of the ALN had swelled and armament had become more readily available. This factor, along with the apparent weakness of the initial French reaction, had led certain *wilaya* commanders to believe that the time was ripe to step up the campaign from guerrilla warfare to a frontal-type war, similar to the latter stages of the war in Indochina. Second, with the internationalization of the Algerian conflict—the Algerian problem having been placed on the agenda of the United Nations—the rebels needed to demonstrate their power and the effectiveness of their organization. Third, the new French tactic of *quadrillage*,^j still in its initial stage of implementation, threatened to wrest from the rebels their initiative, the loss of which might have serious morale implications.

Major engagements thus took place in the Collo Peninsula, El Milia and Kabyle, Ouarsensis, and the southern section of the Department of Oran in late 1957 and early 1958. ALN battalions composed of three or four reinforced companies of 150 men armed with 60- and 81-mm. mortars, 50- and 30-caliber machineguns, BAR's, and a varied assortment of semiautomatic and ordnance rifles engaged French units of smaller or equal strength in continuous fighting. In these types of engagements, however, the French Army was able to bring to bear its overwhelming superiority in artillery, armor, and in the air, and severely maul the ALN units.

In the second half of 1958, the ALN reverted to what became known as the “mosquito war”—hit-and-run tactics “against the shifting fringe of French strength”⁹⁵ by units seldom larger than a company. Daylight and fair-weather combat, in which the overall superiority of the French forces could be brought to bear, were avoided. Guerrilla ambushes and attacks on French units, convoys, and outposts took place, in most instances, at night and during bad weather; and in almost every

^j See page 52 for definition of *quadrillage*.

engagement they were able to achieve surprise due to the help of the civilian population.

In every operation, the Algerians enjoy a basic advantage: their seemingly omnipresent civilian auxiliary, who serve as “human radar,” scouts, intelligence agents, and guides.⁹⁶

This reversion to hit-and-run tactics resulted from a number of factors: (1) the major engagements at the battalion level had proved to be too costly; (2) there were clear and definite indications that the Algerian conflict would be eventually settled by political negotiations on the basis of a formula which would recognize Algerian sovereignty; and (3) the French *quadrillage* tactics. When the French strongly garrisoned the urban centers, it soon became evident that it would be impossible for the ALN to dislodge them. At the same time, the 50,000 hand-picked men who the French Army selected to track down ALN units in the rural areas threatened, with the formidable support to which they had recourse, to eliminate the ALN from these areas unless it could adjust to this new situation. Therefore, the ALN was reorganized into small, self-sufficient units which were capable of marching more than 25 miles a day. They purposely avoided major contacts with the French Army, but reoccupied areas evacuated by the French. Strikes against French units were undertaken only when the ALN was assured of success, and dispersal was mandatory upon completion of such action. This, in essence, characterized ALN operations from 1958 to the end of the conflict on March 19, 1962.

The counterinsurgency device of *quadrillage*, used to such telling effect against the Algerian rebels, was first formulated by the French Army in 1956, and fully implemented in 1957. It enabled the French to stem the course of the revolution, and produced a favorable military stalemate by the middle of 1958. To facilitate fully coordinated military-civilian administrative operations, its hierarchical organization was based on the civil administrative structure. Thus the administrative department became a military zone, the *arrondissement* (district) a sector, and the canton a *quartier* (subsector). Most of the military activity took place at the sector level, and sector activities were coordinated by the zone commander. Basically, *quadrillage* tactics were utilized to isolate the guerrillas by denying them popular support, but included civic action to win over the population. At the sector level French troops garrisoned all major cities to assist the local police in combatting terrorism and prevent the underground from supplying the guerrilla units in the adjacent rural areas. In the rural areas, troops in diminishing force garrisoned all major and strategic villages, hamlets, and farms, living with the inhabitants. They organized the defenses of the places—erecting

barbed-wire fences, watchtowers, pillboxes, and other weapon emplacements, and recruiting the inhabitants in *harkis* (self-defense units)—moved in the inhabitants of neighboring villages, launched “police” operations to eliminate subversive elements, and issued new identity cards which entitled the holder to subsistence allowances. Medical treatment was provided, schools were built, and paid work was made available. With the organization of these defenses, especially at the village level, garrison troops were liberated to undertake patrols aimed at tracking down the guerrilla units operating in the village. Of battalion size, broken up into four infantry companies of 150 men each, able to travel on foot or by truck, these *troupes d’intervalle* (troops operating between one village and the other), were strong enough to engage guerrilla bands independently or in conjunction with other such units. Their mission was to destroy the rebel political organization in the sector, and to eliminate the guerrillas.

The zone commander performed two major tasks: (1) he coordinated all phases of the counterinsurgency operations at the sector level, coordinated inter- and intra-sector activity, established for each sector its plan of operation, gave precise directives concerning “police” operations in the villages, and ensured the organization and control of the population; (2) initiated major military operations which brought the war to the practically inaccessible *zones de refuge* (redoubts) of the rebels. The zone commander disposed of large zonal reserve troops, the *troupes d’intervention*, which could be reinforced by theater of operations reserves, so they could undertake counter guerrilla operations. Occasionally the *troupes d’intervention* assisted the *troupes d’intervalle* in larger than anticipated engagements at the sector level.⁹⁷

Recruiting

In the rural areas the guerrilla units acted on the population through persuasion and the use of terror. Their main targets were the recalcitrant communities; the local leadership, generally French-appointed and therefore presumed to be hostile, was eliminated by assassination, and the population was then forced to pay taxes, provide recruits and supplies, and participate in acts of terrorism and sabotage. Once compromised, these communities had no alternative but to make common cause with the FLN, providing the ALN units with safe bases of operations and necessary lookouts and informants. However, these units ingratiated themselves with the local population and gained their continued support and confidence by providing them with an efficient administration which settled their feuds, protected them from neighboring raiders, and in many cases, established elementary schools and

medical clinics.⁹⁸ Frequently the ALN units would strike an alliance with a particular tribe or hamlet against its rival, eliminate that rival by force of arms, and then rule the area through this tribe or hamlet.

Recruitment was not a problem since most of the guerrillas were natives of the area in which they operated, and their influence in that particular locale could always be counted upon to provide the ALN with the necessary manpower. It was more the shortage of arms that limited the potential of the ALN. Notwithstanding this shortage, the ALN devised a system of recruitment which assured it of vast reserves. Algerians who wished to join were never turned down. They were asked first to serve as auxiliaries in their own locale to prove their worth. Only when the need for additional men arose, either because of death on the battlefield or capture, were the auxiliaries enrolled as regulars in the ranks of the ALN. After 1957, when the French initiated their *quadrillage* tactics, many of the auxiliaries were sent to the East or West Bases to train as regulars in order to escape being interned in relocation camps.

Likewise, recruitment for the underground in the urban centers, limited in itself because of security regulations, proved to be no problem. The initial members of the underground were generally former members of the PPA–MTLD. When the need for additional members arose, it was not difficult to find willing Algerians in the labor or student unions. It was not uncommon for a particular member of the underground to seek the assistance of nonmember friends in the execution of missions. Once compromised, these workers, students, and friends became by force of circumstances members of the underground. Whenever certain members of the underground were suspected and sought by the French authorities, they were smuggled out of the urban centers and attached to the ALN units in the rural areas as regulars. Educated members of the underground whose identity became known to the police were sent out of the country and attached to the different FLN missions abroad.

Terrorism

Terrorism took the form of intimidation, assassination, and indiscriminate bombing. Francophile Muslims and rival nationalist leaders were at first warned by letters, bearing ALN letterhead and crest, to desist from cooperating with the French administration, or cease all political activity not in conformity with FLN directives. Those who persisted were then assassinated and the order of execution, bearing ALN letterhead and crest, was left on the victim. The nephew of Ferhat Abbas was executed in that manner in 1955, and an order for the execution of

Ferhat Abbas himself was found on the body of the slain executioner. By this method, the FLN silenced its opposition and weakened the position of the French administration by depriving it of the support of some of the Muslim population and leaders. At the same time, assassination enhanced the prestige of the FLN among the masses by affording tangible proof of the organization's effectiveness and intrepidity.

Indiscriminate bombing—lobbing of hand grenades into crowds and the placing of delayed-action bombs in streetcars, cafes, stadiums, etc.—was aimed at the European population. It created an atmosphere of anxiety and suspicion which deepened the cleavage between the two main communities and made cooperation almost impossible. It also forced the French to institute harsh repressive measures which further antagonized the Muslim population and necessitated the stationing of more troops in the cities, thus relieving some of the pressure on the ALN forces in the rural areas.

These two kinds of terrorist actions were planned and carried out by two different branches of the underground. Assassination of individuals and the indiscriminate shooting of Europeans were the responsibility of the military branch. In the case of political assassination, the habits of the individual to be assassinated were carefully noted and a plan which afforded the "executioners" the best chances of escape was devised. Two hard-core terrorists (the underground preferred to use two men because it improved the chance of success) were then selected, instructed as to the plan, and given the appropriate weapons. Weapons were issued just prior to the execution of the mission and the executioners were required to return them upon completion of their task. The indiscriminate shooting of Europeans generally took place in the areas closest to the Casbah, or Muslim section of the city. The executioners were instructed to empty their clips, mingle in the crowds, and make their way back to the Casbah with utmost haste.

Indiscriminate bombing, the responsibility of the special bomb network, was more complicated. In the initial stage of the revolution, the underground did not have the materials or technical knowledge needed for making bombs. Not to be outdone by the Communists, who enjoyed these facilities and who had joined the revolution on their own, the FLN underground struck an alliance with them. The Communists provided the bombs and the rebel underground deposited them in the desired places. By late 1955 and early 1956, however, the underground was able to function independently of the Communists. It had learned to make its own bombs; furthermore, explosives, detonators, and casings were more readily obtainable, both internally and from outside. Algerians who worked in drugstores, pharmacies, and agricultural centers were instructed to steal chemicals (e.g., potassium chlorate) which

could be used in making explosives. The compounding of explosives was generally delegated to chemists or chemistry students, while casings were entrusted to welders. Another group made the detonators—generally crude timeclocks attached to electric batteries—and yet another group assembled the weapons. Later, when modern explosives such as plastic and detonators began to be channeled in from the exterior, the necessity for the above process was almost entirely eliminated.⁹⁹

The placement of bombs was the responsibility of another group in the bomb network. Locale and time were carefully chosen to assure the maximum number of victims. The depositors were apprised of their mission just prior to its actual execution, and the bombs were timed to allow them to escape. The underground used a high percentage of women and juveniles for these missions because they were less likely to be suspected and almost never searched by French patrols.¹⁰⁰

Intelligence

The intelligence techniques of the FLN–ALN were rudimentary but effective. In the field, the ALN maintained a large number of civilian auxiliaries who acted both as quasi-military units and as intelligence agents. These auxiliaries “infiltrated French held villages, prowled ahead of regular ALN columns, and provided a steady stream of fresh information.”¹⁰¹ They were specifically instructed to note the number of French troops in their area, their respective armament, and their projected direction. They were, furthermore, briefed on how to distinguish between the different units and the variety of arms. These auxiliaries generally reported to the liaison and intelligence officer attached to the ALN unit operating in their area. Additional information was supplied by Muslim, and occasionally French, deserters from the French Army. The information was relayed to ALN headquarters and other units by courier or by radio.

In the major urban centers “the FLN instructed people to report on the daily activities of French police and armed forces.”¹⁰² It also used a large number of double agents to gather further information on French administrative measures, troop movements, and materiel. This information was passed on to higher echelons and the CCE by courier.

Propaganda: Media and Themes

Propaganda was given special consideration by the FLN in and outside of Algeria. Political officers were attached to the ALN at all levels of command to indoctrinate the soldiers and the public under its control. Special broadcasts, beamed from Tunis, Cairo, and Damascus,

and the constant distribution of leaflets, tracts, and the weekly FLN newspaper *El Moudjahid* constituted some of the other media used to influence the Algerian masses.

In its overseas efforts the FLN employed a variety of techniques. In France, particularly, it relied on sympathetic journalists and writers such as the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre for books and pamphlets supporting its cause. It made use of a number of church groups who were horrified at the repressive measures of the French Army. In the major capitals of the world, the FLN opened offices of information. Through them propaganda literature was made available to the public. Also, the staffs of these offices made every attempt to establish contacts with the press and important officials, and took every opportunity to expound the FLN cause in public speeches and debates. It was hoped that these influential groups would be able to exert pressure on their respective governments either to support the FLN directly or persuade France to negotiate.

Propaganda themes, as well as techniques, varied according to the target audience. In Algeria, great stress was placed on propaganda tasks that tended to elicit the support of the masses. To the educated Muslim, the FLN attempted to explain the causes of the revolution in historical, economic, social, and political terms. To the masses, the FLN represented the revolution as a holy war in defense of Islam and the Arab heritage. In the ALN, the propaganda officers used themes that were calculated to bring about a conscious awareness of an Algerian entity which would lead the soldiers to accept the sacrifices imposed by war. To the world at large, FLN themes tended to center on proving that the revolution was justified, that Algeria was not really part of France, and that it ought to be granted complete independence. Propaganda appeals to the French liberals, the main target audience in France, attempted to convince them that the war in Algeria was an unjust war, and that the FLN action arose from the same principles and aspiration that had led to the French Revolution. In the United States, a primary target because it was presumed that Washington exerted strong influence on France, the FLN tended to appeal to the masses on the basis that both the Algerian and American revolutions were prompted by very similar causes. The appeals, however, were moderate in that they sought to have Washington persuade France to negotiate a reasonable settlement. The United Nations was also an excellent target audience and provided "press coverage the FLN might not have had otherwise."¹⁰³

Another major target audience, to which the FLN paid particular attention, was big business. Emphasis was placed on the benefits which would accrue from an independent Algeria. Oil companies, in

particular, were asked for support, financial and other, in return for promises of concessions in a future independent Algeria.

Strikes and Demonstrations

Strikes and demonstrations were utilized by the FLN as a political weapon to draw outside attention to its cause and to create a cleavage between the Muslim and European communities. But their success was limited, and therefore they were resorted to infrequently. For the most part, FLN-sponsored strikes and demonstrations were called to accentuate political events, in and outside of Algeria, which had a direct bearing on the outcome of the war and were likely to influence it. The strikes in Algeria, on 20 August 1955, were timed to coincide with the demonstrations in Morocco which marked the anniversary of the ousting of France to give effective evidence of the solidarity of the North African people. The demonstrations and violence which erupted in September 1955, when the Algerian question was placed on the agenda of the United Nations, were organized to show that the Algerian people, and not simply the rebels, were opposed to French rule; the strong demonstrations in December 1960 were launched by the FLN to show the unified opposition of the Algerians to de Gaulle's early offer of an Algerian Algeria.

The demonstrations were also used to provoke severe repressions by the French. The technique used was as follows: a small number of FLN members organized a small demonstration. When the police or the army arrived on the scene to quell it, the FLN members fired on them and disappeared, whereupon the full retaliation was directed against the demonstrators and their families—which tended to alienate them and cast them into the rebel camp. Although successful in the early stages of the revolution, this method was abandoned when the French authorities refrained from firing on the crowds and took limited legal action against the participants and their families. It should be noted that most demonstrations took place in the urban centers and their environs, and were controlled by the political branch of the FLN underground.

Summary

The FLN–ALN employed tried techniques of guerrilla warfare and underground terrorism. The overall objectives were to keep the revolution viable by systematically attacking French outposts in the rural areas, and by attracting an increasing revolutionary following from the Algerians who found themselves the target of French repressions which

generally followed guerrilla attacks. Terrorism was aimed at Franco-ophile Muslims and European settlers.

Hit-and-run ambushes characterized guerrilla operations. The guerrilla units avoided head-on encounters with the French and usually attacked at night or during bad weather, when they were least expected. The civilian population furnished the guerrillas information on French positions and movements. Terrorism, which included assassinations and indiscriminate bombings, weakened the support of the French within the Muslim population and its leaders, and created anxiety within the European community. FLN propaganda offices were opened throughout the world, and propaganda themes brought the FLN inestimable prestige and support.

The French were caught by surprise when hostilities broke out and grossly underestimated the character and extent of the revolutionary movement. The initial French countermeasures were thus ineffectual: French units were too massive and heavy and unadaptable to the terrain and type of warfare that was being fought in Algeria. Combing operations, where a guerrilla-held area was encircled and flushed out by several French battalions, were typical of the French techniques at that time.

In 1956 the French adopted new measures—*quadrillage* tactics—which proved so effective that the FLN had to step up its terrorist activities in the cities in order to relieve the pressure on its army in the rural areas. Antiterrorist techniques were also very effective; by September 1957 Algiers was completely under French control and eventually terrorism in other major cities came to a halt. In 1958 the French effected a military stalemate.

Civic-action programs, instituted by the Specialized Administrative Sections in French-held rural areas and headed by Arabic-speaking French Army officers, included resettlement, rehabilitation, and construction projects. The SAS also set up self-defense units made up of local inhabitants to defend the Algerians won over by the French from guerrilla terrorism. These units protected their respective installations and often engaged in antiguerrilla operations.

ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN POWERS (ON BOTH SIDES)

Number of Countries Involved

In the wake of World War II, the Arab League, composed of the Arab countries of the Middle East, created the Maghreb Office to

further the cause of North African independence. Egypt in particular, and to a lesser extent Syria and Iraq, the three member states of the League most imbued with Arab nationalism and most directly concerned with the creation of the Pan-Arab State—from the Atlantic to the Arab (Persian) Gulf—were destined to play an active role in the planning stage. The Maghreb Office in its early days was more concerned with the Tunisian and Moroccan causes. Broadly based and anti-French nationalist movements had emerged in these two countries, whereas it was felt, particularly by the Egyptian leaders, that the “Algerians were not seriously enough engaged in the Pan-Arabic movement against colonialism.”¹⁰⁴ Thus Abdel Krim, the Moroccan leader of the Rif war, was granted asylum in Egypt in 1947 when he jumped the French ship which was bringing him back to Morocco from his Madagascar exile as it passed through the Suez Canal; some of the North Africans who he subsequently recruited were sent to commando schools in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. With the discovery and breakup of the OS in 1950, Cairo became the safe refuge of Algerian nationalists. In 1954, with the accession of President Gamal Abdel Nasser to power in Egypt, Ben Bella became the chief beneficiary of the Egyptian leader’s support. This was due, in all probability, to the fact that Ben Bella was of Arab origin—as opposed to Berber—and, therefore, most likely to accept Egyptian leadership. In any event, Majors Fathi el Dib and Ezzat Souleiman, of the Special Service Branch of the Egyptian Army, were assigned to work with Ben Bella in planning the Algerian revolution.

In this planning stage, Switzerland became unwittingly another center of Algerian revolutionary activity. To avoid growing Egyptian interference and supervision, which some former OS members resented, and because of its proximity to France where other former members were hiding or working, Switzerland was selected. It was in this country, in 1954, that the CRUA was created and attempts made to reconcile Messali Hadj and the Central Committee members of the MTLD. Yet evidence indicates that the Swiss Government was unaware of these clandestine activities.

With the outbreak of the revolution, Egypt became the principal military, political, diplomatic, and economic supporter of the FLN. The other members of the Arab League limited their support to financial contributions, and political and diplomatic support. After obtaining their independence in 1955, Tunisia and Morocco, because of common cultural and religious affinities, gave the Algerian rebels extensive diplomatic and political support, and limited military assistance. Yugoslavia became an active supporter in 1957, in that it supplied the FLN with military materiel and medical supplies. In general, political and diplomatic support came from three main sources: (1) the Afro-Asian

bloc; (2) former colonial territories; and (3) the Communist bloc. Some unofficial support came from elements within countries whose governments tended to side with France, and even from within France itself.

France received support from most of the NATO partners, the majority of the countries of the British Commonwealth as it was constituted at the outbreak of the revolution, and most of the Latin American countries.^k The inability of France to end the war and the reported cruelties that were being perpetrated caused a number of countries to either withhold or qualify their support. France came under increasing pressure by those who had originally supported her to end the war in a manner that would satisfy both sides.

Military Aid by Foreign Powers

Egypt and Yugoslavia were the two principal suppliers of military materiel. Estimates of the total value of this military aid are unavailable, although the value of some which the French authorities were able to intercept gives an idea of its magnitude. It is not known if arms were purchased outright from these governments or donated by them.

On October 16, 1956, French naval units intercepted the ship *Athos* off the Cap des Trois-Fourches, a point near the Algerian-Moroccan border, and confiscated 70 tons of arms, enough to arm 1,500 men and worth \$5,700,000. Two weeks later, the French representative to the United Nations presented the Security Council with the official protest of his government which charged Egypt with direct interference in the internal affairs of France. The protest alleged that the vessel had left the "port of Alexandria during the night of October 4-5, piloted by an officer of the Egyptian Navy, and bound for the military base of Alexandria, where seven carloads of arms and ammunition were on dock. . . ." ¹⁰⁵ The ship's log placed Italy as its final destination. In August 1957 the French Government claimed that the Yugoslavian ship *Srbija* had deposited at Casablanca "seven tons of arms and seventy tons of ammunition" destined for rebel use although the "bill of lading placed Saudi Arabia as the final destination." ¹⁰⁶ On the basis of this allegation, the French Navy intercepted another Yugoslavian ship, the *Slovenija*, 6 months later off Oran; the vessel was loaded with arms which the French again claimed were for rebel use.

The rebels did not limit themselves to official sources in their search for arms and ammunition. FLN purchasing agents traveled in all countries that would admit them seeking arms dealers who could provide them with arms at hand, or in many cases act as middlemen. In the

^k See section on United Nations, below.

early stage of the revolution, Libya and Tunisia became the principal targets of these purchasing agents. Usually they bought arms of World War II vintage which had been left on the battlefields of North Africa from tribes which had collected them. Later, when the need for modern equipment, especially transmitters and explosives became more pressing, these agents turned to arms dealers in Europe. In the case of the *Slovenija*, the “Zurich import-export house of Felix was involved.”¹⁰⁷ Military materiel was also purchased from Belgium, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries.¹⁰⁸

France’s industrial complex rendered her self-sufficient in supplying her military needs. Under the NATO agreements she also received substantial military equipment from the United States. The use of some of these weapons and equipment to quell the rebellion in Algeria—a fact which the FLN used in its propaganda to show that the United States was a supporter of colonialism, thereby forcing the U.S. Government to take a defensive position—caused uneasiness in Washington. It prompted Senator John F. Kennedy, in July 1957, to demand that the U.S. Government use its influence to bring about an equitable solution of the problem, and it led Senator Dennis Chavez, in considering the Defense Appropriations Bill, which included military assistance to France, to demand that the aid “be used for the purposes it is supposed to serve; but not for the purpose of killing Algerians in North Africa.”¹⁰⁹

Political Intervention

Diplomatic Pressure

The diplomatic support which the FLN received took a variety of forms. In most instances, the interests of the Algerian rebels were represented in the capitals of the world by one of the Arab states or by Tunisia or Morocco. In their travels, FLN representatives generally enjoyed the immunity of the diplomatic passport of one of these countries. The embassies of these states concentrated in creating (in the countries to which they were accredited) an atmosphere favorable to the FLN by disseminating FLN propaganda or by attempting to pressure the governments into adopting a less stringent, neutral, or more friendly attitude. Many times the Arab states of Tunisia and Morocco acted collectively to bring pressure on the governments of major powers. In 1957, “eleven Arab states asked the United States to stop supplying France with economic and military aid which was being used to suppress Algerian liberty.”¹¹⁰ At stake and underlying these requests were the interests of those major powers in the Arab world, and the fact that the anticolonial policy of the Communist bloc was reaping substantial ideological benefits. At the Afro-Asian and neutralist conferences

held at Bandung and Belgrade, Egypt was able to introduce and secure the passage of resolutions which bound the represented governments to support the Algerian revolution, particularly in the United Nations where the inscription of the “Algerian Problem” on the agenda of the General Assembly, in 1955, represented a major breakthrough for the FLN.

The diplomatic support which France received came from her NATO allies and other countries linked to the different members of NATO. This support was most evident in the voting on the “Algerian Problem” in the United Nations, which is discussed in the section that follows. The French Government went to great lengths to solicit the continued support of these nations when the prolonged war began to be embarrassing. The major target of these solicitations was the United States because of its influence. The French countered the demand submitted by the 11 Arab states by playing up the atrocities perpetrated by the rebels and their lack of unity, as evidence that the Algerians were not yet ready for independence. On the other hand, French propaganda magnified the proposed political, social, and economic reforms as an indication of the good intentions of France; they had the help of leading personalities from U.S. societies.

Pressure Through United Nations

On September 30, 1955, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted 28 to 27, with 5 abstentions,^a to include the “Question of Algeria” on its agenda, thereby reversing the recommendation of the Assembly’s General Committee. Thereupon France walked out of the General Assembly on the grounds that the question was one of domestic jurisdiction and, therefore, beyond the competence of the General Assembly. The request to include Algeria on the agenda had been submitted by 14 Afro-Asian countries in accordance with the resolution of the Bandung Conference of April 1955.

During the discussion period in the Assembly before the Algerian question was put to a vote, representatives from several countries defended France’s position. Antoine Pinay, the French delegate, had

^a The 28 countries voting to reverse the General Committee’s recommendation and inscribe the Algerian question on the Assembly’s agenda were: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., Paraguay, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

The 27 nations opposing the inscription of the matter were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.

Abstaining were: China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iceland, and Paraguay.

warned that a debate on the Algerian matter “would endanger the future of the United Nations,” for it would give the United Nations “the right to intervene whenever a racial, religious, or linguistic minority existed within the boundaries of a certain state,” and that “the territorial unity of any state old or new or treaties concerning frontiers, could be questioned.”¹¹¹ Further, the representative of France had claimed that the Muslim population of Algeria already enjoyed universal suffrage and representation in the Algerian Assembly, that the Muslims had the same rights as other French citizens, and that they were better off than peoples in other states which were France’s opponents. The representatives of Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States, Colombia, Norway, and the Netherlands rose to speak in support of the French case.

Paul-Henri Spaak, the representative of Belgium, emphasized his view that there can be “no responsible international life and no viable international organization if each country is entitled to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of other countries.” Before a country is admitted as a member to the United Nations, the other members should examine the domestic situation in the prospective member’s country to see if it is in accordance with the principles of the Charter, but once admitted, Spaak pointed out, the members’ domestic matters should not be questioned.¹¹²

Citing the legal connection between France and Algeria, the representative of the United Kingdom claimed there could be no “international” dispute between France and Algeria, and said that neither threatened international peace and security. In answer to charges of a violation of “self-determination of peoples,” it was pointed out by the United Kingdom that a legal right of “self-determination” had not been incorporated in the Charter. Henry Cabot Lodge, in stating the U.S. position, added that this was strictly a case of domestic jurisdiction as covered under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter, since Algeria was a part of France.

The 14 Afro-Asian nations that had proposed consideration of the Algerian question in the General Assembly claimed that France controlled Algeria solely by a show of force, that the Algerian situation was deteriorating and was creating a serious threat to peace in the Mediterranean, that a virtual state of war existed between France and Algeria, and that France’s sovereignty was never fully recognized or accepted by the Algerian people. The principle of self-determination of peoples was also cited by the proposing nations.

The representative of India, V. K. Krishna Menon, based his argument for support of the motion to include Algeria in the agenda on the inapplicability of Article 2, paragraph 7, to this matter. He said that

there was no violation of this clause because the motion did not call for collective action or impose sanctions against France, but rather an Assembly discussion which would allow some of the pent-up steam to be released without explosions. Menon, in putting forward his interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction clause, held that a debate on the question did “not *per se* constitute intervention.”¹¹³

Other speakers favoring the inclusion of the Algerian question said that the issue was mainly a colonial one that should be debated by the United Nations. The representative of Lebanon claimed that it was “the natural right of people to be masters of their own destiny.” The sponsors were motivated by the spirit of the Charter, Iraq stated, in desiring an association of Algeria with France based on “freedom, equality, and the free will of peoples themselves.” The main principles upon which the request of the 14 nations were based were “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, respect for natural cultures, and respect for basic human rights.”¹¹⁴

National interests, to a certain extent, explain the reasons behind some of the votes. The Middle East bloc of Muslim countries were interested in seeing the eventual independence of Algeria. North Africa was the only Muslim area of the world that had not achieved its full independence. The Arab League, with headquarters in Cairo, openly advocated the establishment of a Muslim state in Algeria. Pan-Arabism, a strong movement active throughout the Middle East, viewed with disfavor the dominance of the Arabs of North Africa by France and Spain. These reasons explain why Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen voted against France.

Burma, India, Indonesia, Philippines (to a lesser extent), and Thailand are anticolonial countries that may be expected to vote anti-colonial on every issue because of past experience or strong convictions. The votes of the Communist bloc of Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, and the U.S.S.R. reflected these countries’ opposition to the Western bloc. Greece’s vote was, in all probability, a reprisal to France’s earlier vote against debate on the Cyprus question.

Except for Greece and Iceland, which abstained, France’s NATO partners upheld her position. Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Canada voted against debating an issue embarrassing to their ally, by upholding France on purely jurisdictional grounds. With the exception of India and Pakistan, which were in the Afro-Asian bloc, the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations generally tended to vote as the United Kingdom voted, although South Africa was more concerned with possible future U.N. interference in her domestic race relations. The 12 Latin American states which voted with France probably did so

because some of them were dependent on the United States for foreign trade and economic aid, because some of their own domestic situations left much to be desired (e.g., the Dominican Republic and to some extent Nicaragua), or because some of them maintained strong cultural ties with France (Haiti).

The Algerians, it is clear, did not expect U.N. action to settle the issue. The submission of the Algerian question was part of an effort to internationalize their cause in accordance with their platform. They hoped eventually, through the resubmission of the question, to build enough support and favorable world public opinion to force France into negotiations. In this they were successful.

The Algerian question was submitted by the Afro-Asian bloc in all succeeding sessions of the United Nations. Although in most instances the draft resolutions failed to achieve marked results, the debate on the length of the war and its consequences and the failure of the French to implement their promised reforms put France and her supporters on the defensive. By 1958–59 a majority of the members of the United Nations, including some of France’s allies, were willing to vote for amended drafts which called upon both parties to negotiate. France came under increasing pressure to find an equitable solution, while the Algerians received increasing support. In 1961 when negotiations between the French Government and the Algerian Provisional Government took a turn for the worse, a draft resolution, submitted by the United Arab Republic and 30 Afro-Asian countries, calling upon the parties concerned to resume negotiations, was approved by a vote of 62 to 0, with 28 abstentions. This marked the last time that the Algerian question was submitted. Algeria received its independence on July 1, 1962.

Direct Military Intervention

Direct military intervention by other nations did not occur in the Algerian revolution. Although a number of ALN personnel were trained in Egypt and other Arab countries, these countries refrained from sending “advisers” or volunteers to fight alongside the ALN units in Algeria. In the latter phase of the revolution the People’s Republic of China offered the FLN the use of Chinese “volunteers.” This offer was dismissed as pure propaganda and the FLN wisely declined to accept the offer for fear of weakening their present and future status in Western circles.

Granting of Bases from Which to Operate

The FLN–ALN was able to establish two safe bases of operations: the East Base on Tunisian soil along the Tunisian–Algerian border; and the West Base on Moroccan soil in the vicinity of the border towns of Nador and Oudja. Whether the establishment of these two bases resulted from the tacit approval of the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments, or whether they simply represented mere acquiescence on their part to a *fait accompli*, remains to be determined. In all probability it represents a combination of both. It is safe to assert that the traffic in contraband arms was undertaken with the knowledge of these two governments. The establishment of these two bases seems to have been the result of circumstances. The implementation of the tactic of *quadrillage* by the French forces late in 1956 and early 1957 forced a number of ALN fighters and Muslim civilians to seek safety outside Algeria. Eventually, the number of refugees was to increase to 200,000 in Tunisia and 100,000 in Morocco. Sympathy for the Algerian nationalist cause, and the size of the ALN units—outnumbering their national armies—on their soil, forced these two governments to acquiesce. In any event it is clear that both Morocco and Tunisia viewed the existence of these bases with anxiety, especially after France invoked the doctrine of hot pursuit and the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef was bombed.

France was allowed to maintain her naval base at Bizerte by virtue of the independence treaty arrangement concluded with Tunisia. French naval units operating from the naval bases of Bizerte and Oran (Algeria) were able to maintain a close watch on all shipping in the North African sea lanes.

Permitting Revolutionary Propaganda to be Disseminated

Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria provided the FLN with the facilities with which to develop and maintain an efficient propaganda effort.

The FLN, through Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus, was able to keep the Algerians informed. Printing plants in Egypt and Tunisia published all of the FLN pamphlets, tracts, literature, and the weekly newspaper *El Moudjahid*. In the early phases of the revolution, dissemination of this propaganda material was undertaken by friendly embassies. Later a number of countries, including the United States, allowed the opening of Algerian Offices of Information.

France used her embassies abroad, more precisely the *Service de Presse et d'Information* attached to the diplomatic missions, to disseminate her own propaganda.

Summary

Both sides received support—military aid, political and diplomatic support, granting of foreign bases, etc.—from individual countries, power blocs, and international organizations. The revolutionary organization, with its extensive and effective propaganda machine, outdid France in soliciting support. Egypt and Yugoslavia were its principal suppliers of arms and ammunition. From Tunisia and Morocco, where Algerian rebel bases were established, came extensive military support and assistance; arms were smuggled across their borders into Algeria. Political and diplomatic support came particularly from the Afro-Asian bloc, former colonial nations, and the Communist bloc. The United Nations brought increasing pressure on France to settle its problems with the Algerian Provisional Government.

France, on the other hand, received most of its support from its NATO allies. Through this body France received military supplies from the United States. NATO support of France became embarrassing for the individual member nations; as the revolution wore on France found it increasingly difficult to solicit strong support within the NATO alliance and in the United Nations. The international situation became favorable to the idea of an independent Algeria.

PART III—EPILOGUE

THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF INDEPENDENCE

On March 18, 1962, after protracted negotiations, an agreement was concluded between the French Government and the FLN at Evian-les Bains, France. Both parties agreed to order a cease-fire on March 19, and France recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. By virtue of this agreement a transitional period was to follow the conclusion of the treaty, at the termination of which a national referendum was to be held to determine the future of Algeria. Until self-determination was realized, a provisional government and a court of public law were to be set up to administer and maintain law and order. A High Commissioner was to represent France and be responsible for the defense of the country and the maintenance of law and order in the last resort. Also included in the terms were provisions for a general amnesty, guarantees for individual rights and liberties, and clauses concerning future cooperation between France and Algeria, settlement of military questions, and settlement of litigations. On July 1, 1962, the national referendum was held in Algeria and the overwhelming majority of the population voted for independence.

Independence, unfortunately, brought to the surface two major latent differences within the FLN: collegial versus individual responsibility, and centralism versus regionalism. The emergence of these was precipitated by the lack, during the transitional period, of government continuity, "logical progression," and "tranquil transfer of power," which resulted from the OAS-inspired departure of qualified Europeans, the inability of the FLN to replace them with associational groups of their own, and the destruction of administration files, records, documents, and necessary equipment.¹¹⁵

The 1956 FLN Soummam Valley Congress had been convened by the internal delegation to settle the pressing issue of individual versus collegial responsibility. At the root of the question lay the fear which the growing power of Ben Bella evoked in the hearts of those who had strenuously opposed the divisive influence of Messali Hadj's absolute leadership. Subsequently, the decision to establish a collegial leadership was denounced by Ben Bella, but his capture and internment in October 1956 prevented him from making a direct bid for power. After his release during the transitional period, the question was reopened and became the major issue of the FLN Tripoli (Libya) Congress of June 1962. Ben Bella and his supporters favored the establishment of a single-party dictatorship which was to be led by hard-core revolutionaries who would best be suited to implement the FLN platform. Opposition to Ben Bella's bid for power came from Ben Khedda, head of the GPRA and a relative newcomer to the revolution, Krim, and Boudiaf. They tended to favor a parliamentary form of government in which the

FLN would become the dominant party without explicitly excluding or prohibiting the growth and participation of other parties.^a During the ensuing debates, Ben Khedda and his supporters walked out of the conference and returned to Tunis, seat of the Provisional Government, when it became apparent that Ben Bella would receive the necessary two-thirds vote. Anticipating an army coup inside Algeria, Ben Khedda then dismissed Colonel Houari Boumedienne, Chief of Staff and a strong supporter of Ben Bella, and two officers of the General staff on charges of conspiring against the “legitimate authority of the FLN.”¹¹⁶ The GPRA, without visible support except for a few *wilaya* leaders, became a shadow government devoid of the means of enforcing its decisions. A few days later it found itself facing the challenge of Boumedienne’s army—the external army, some 30,000 to 40,000 strong, which had been fenced out by the French electrified barricades—which was marching on Algiers from the East and West Bases. On August 2, 1962, without bloodshed Ben Khedda surrendered his powers to Ben Bella, and a six-man Political Bureau which was to ride Algeria until the election of a Constituent Assembly. With the civilian leadership of the FLN weakened by internal squabbles, the army emerged as the only organized and disciplined force in the nation.

One of Ben Bella’s first acts upon assuming power was to issue an order which effectively whittled down the power and authority of the guerrilla forces and their commanders, and which triggered the centralism versus regionalism crisis. The real causes were “a unique blend of historically-rooted ethnocentricities, personality clashes and narrow self-interests engendered by the struggle for liberation.”¹¹⁷ In its open manifestation “the challenge to the central authority was characterized as ‘willayaism’, i.e., the desire of certain wilaya chiefs, particularly in the Kabylie Berber region and the area around Algiers, to maintain virtual unrestrained control over their zones.”¹¹⁸ To placate these guerrilla commanders and the army, which for the first and last time had joined hands with the guerrillas in a bid to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the civilians, Ben Bella agreed to a list of candidates for the Constituent Assembly elections of whom 140 out of 196 were army officers, former army officers, or army nominees. When the commanders of *Wilaya III* and *Wilaya IV* sought to pressure the Political Bureau into further concessions, Ben Bella fled Algiers for Oran and Sétif where he sought once more the support of the army. In August–September 1962, Algeria faced the prospect of another civil war as the Algerian army battled guerrilla units. But a *modus vivendi* reached between Ben Bella, who

^a For a discussion of the role of the single-party dictatorship and the dominant party, see H. B. Sharabi, “Parliamentary Government and Military Autocracy in the Middle East,” *Orbis*, IV (Fall 1960), 338–355.

had slipped into Algiers ahead of the army, and the commanders of the insurgent *wilayas* put an end to the armed clashes. The army chose to disregard the cease-fire and Ben Bella's promise to make Algeria a demilitarized zone long enough to enter Algiers and assert its control. These crises left Ben Bella and the Political Bureau, and Boumedienne and the army, as the two principal forces in Algeria. In all probability, it was Boumedienne's lack of prestige (unknown until the crisis) which prevented the army from staging a virtual coup, if indeed coup was contemplated. But until the Political Bureau "reconstructs the FLN party structure real power will lie with the Army."¹¹⁹

On September 16, 1962, after several postponements and changes in the one-party candidacy list, the nation elected a 196-member Constituent Assembly. The election did not make allowance for competition from within or outside the FLN, and was "regarded as a request for a national vote of confidence in the Political Bureau."¹²⁰ Shortly thereafter, Ben Bella and his cabinet were invested by the Assembly, and the government settled down to fulfill the country's most pressing requirement: economic revival.

From an economic point of view the war had ravaged Algeria. Land had gone uncultivated for years. Farming machinery was left unattended and in dire need of repair. Food was in critical shortage. The departure of the Europeans—skilled labor, civil administrators, engineers, and entrepreneurs—deprived the new country of the qualified personnel which could have kept it a going concern. It also resulted in the shutdown of almost all industries, thereby contributing to the ever-increasing pool of unemployed which reached the 70 percent mark. Taxes had not been collected since March 1962, and the treasury was virtually bankrupt. To alleviate the economic crisis Algeria turned to France, the United States, and the West in general. The Algerian Government made lucrative offers to former European residents in order to lure them back, while borrowing \$400,000,000 from the French Government. The United States stepped up its shipment of surplus food, and in all likelihood will contribute financially to the economic recovery of the country. As trends develop, it is becoming clearer that the Algerian Government has decided that it can turn only to the West for the massive assistance which will be required in order to develop its economy.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX

INTRODUCTION

Three case studies were prepared on the Algerian (1954–62), Cuban (1953–59), and Vietnam (1941–54) Revolutions using a common conceptual framework and study procedures, in order to facilitate subsequent comparative analyses among the three. This appendix contains:

- (1) a summary statement of the conceptual frame of reference underlying the studies;
- (2) a general summary of the procedures used in preparation of the case studies.

At the same time, a case study of the situation in Guatemala between 1944 and 1954 is being prepared, using a different approach more suitable to that situation.

CONCEPTUAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

Revolution Defined

The word *revolution*^a is frequently used interchangeably with such terms as rebellion, coup d'état, insurgency, and insurrection. Various writers, *Webster's Dictionary*, and the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* disagree on a precise meaning of the word. Except in the natural sciences, "revolution" usually refers to any sudden change with far-reaching consequences, but may sometimes refer to a gradual change which has suddenly been recognized as having had far-reaching consequences. The particular change is usually indicated by adjectives such as cultural, scientific, economic, industrial, and technological. Used without a qualifying adjective, the word most often describes political revolution; it is so used in these three case studies.

More precisely, in the case studies *revolution means the modification, or attempted modification, of an existing political order partially at least by illegal (or unconstitutional) force used primarily by persons under the jurisdiction of the political order.* The terms *revolutionary dynamics* and *revolutionary effort* are both used to refer to activities of all kinds of revolutionary actors and organizations. *Revolutionary movement* is used generically to refer to all the revolutionary actors and organizations operating against a government during defined time periods, unless specific organizations or actors are identified in the text. Finally, *revolutionary situation* refers to a continuum of tensions within a country in which revolutionary

^a This definition appears in a longer discussion of definitions in the *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Seminary Accounts* (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1963).

conflict has emerged as a major problem requiring direct allocation of resources and effort by a government.

General Approach

A general, heuristic study model with two basic premises was adopted. It was assumed, first, that a revolution is a complex interaction of socio-economic-political factors (revolution-inducing factors) and organic factors of the revolutionary movement. It was also assumed that particular factors do not necessarily remain unchanged and that changes in the factors and in their interaction are significant.

On the basis of the previous SORO study of 23 revolutions and a review of other studies in the literature, a number of general and specific examples of these two kinds of factors were identified; they have been offered in the past by other writers as “explanations” of revolutionary phenomena, and they are discussed in the next two sections. All of these examples were treated as hypotheses for the three case studies and were tested for their applicability to each revolution. They were not judged *a priori* to be causes of revolutions. They were studied to determine their presence or absence in a revolution and to determine their operation in time. The latter determination was accomplished by submitting each factor to a crude trend analysis—that is, organizing the information relevant to each hypothesis through chronological periods.

A distinction between immediate causes of revolution and long range causes is not relevant to this type of approach to the study of revolution. The importance of historical circumstance as a precipitant of revolution is not denied; it is simply not accorded the central role here that some students of revolution have attributed to it. The operation of historical circumstance is discussed in terms of revolution-inducing factors and revolutionary movement factors. The trend analysis records the development of situations in which the potential for revolutionary warfare may be latent, but not primarily dependent upon historical circumstances. Thus, historical necessity is not implied by the trend analysis approach—changes in both the socio-economic-political environment and in the structure and function of revolutionary movements can occur depending upon the actors involved.

Factors Inducing Revolution

It is suggested that factors inducing revolution may be broadly categorized under three general hypotheses which may be descriptive of a prerevolutionary situation: economic maladjustment, social antagonism, and political weakness. While no attempt has been made to assign

relative weights to these various factors in a positive numerical sense, it appeared initially that political weakness as defined should rate highest on any scale devised to measure the revolutionary potential of a society. However, such conceptual refinements must await further analysis and are not reflected in the three case studies.

In the discussion below, each factor (and subfactor) is discussed as a conditional hypothesis regardless of evidence available concerning its validity. The purpose of the discussion is to describe briefly the hypotheses as used in the study of the three cases. It will be noted that the hypotheses are stated broadly to allow identification of all the information unique to each revolution and, consequently, an evaluation of the hypotheses.

Economic Maladjustment

The economy of a country may be considered to be a situation of maladjustment when one or more of the following conditions is present: foreign control of economic life, concentration of land ownership and a large population of landless peasants, lack of a diversified economy, and chronic unemployment or underemployment. These conditions may have concomitants that provide revolutionary motivations. They may affect the economic standard of living of the population in general, the distribution of wealth, and the form of the social structure.

Foreign control over the economy of a colonial or so-called semi-colonial^b country may entail certain socio-economic troubles for that country, even though, in a strictly economic sense, the relationship may appear to work to the country's advantage. Higher standards of living enjoyed by resident foreigners and by those natives who are affiliated with foreign economic interests may have a powerful demonstrative effect on the native population; resultant dissatisfaction with their lower living standards and their frustration over foreign influences in the economic life of the country may produce social antagonisms directed against both foreigners and native beneficiaries of foreign interests. If a native middle class is deprived of full participation in the economic life of the country, foreign control may drive the social element best prepared to assume the role of a political opposition into a revolutionary movement.

A system of land tenure in which "landlordism" predominates may be fraught with revolutionary potential. The national economy may suffer as a whole from the inefficiency in agricultural production

^b Semicolonial countries are politically independent states which are economically dependent on industrialized countries, as some Latin American countries have been economic dependencies of the United States.

sometimes associated with a high concentration of land ownership. The wealthy landlord may often be less interested in yields-per-acre than in rents and interest payments from his tenants and peasant debtors. The landless peasants may lack incentive to produce, since experience may have shown them little connection between efforts and rewards. Thus, poverty and low productivity can perpetuate themselves in a cyclical process.

A low level of purchasing power in a country may hinder the development of local industry and reinforce economic dependence on one or two cash crops or mineral products for export. The economic position of raw-material-producing countries in relation to exporters of industrial goods has tended to deteriorate over recent decades due to world trade conditions. A more diversified economy has thus become a matter of economic necessity for most raw-material-exporting countries. The lack of a diversified economy may subject a country to the vagaries of world market conditions and threaten its economic stability; the socio-economic effect usually is to narrow the range of economic opportunities, thus tending to perpetuate a paternalistic type of society.

Another condition indicative of economic maladjustment is chronic and widespread unemployment or underemployment. Such a situation may result from the impact of world market conditions on a single-crop economy or from the seasonal nature of the main cash crop. The socio-economic effects of unemployment may be more likely to reach a critical point when those out of work are urban workers or at least are living on a money economy rather than a subsistence economy. Generally, it can be hypothesized that the higher the level of industrialization the greater would be the revolutionary potential in a period of unemployment, for idle workers frequently make up the mass following of revolutionary movements. Native middle-class and intellectual elements tend to blame periods of unemployment on foreign control of the economy and on the lack of a diversified economy; this type of agitation around economic issues may be used to rally broad mass support for the revolutionary movement.

Social Antagonism

Tensions within the social structure, a demise of a traditional way of life, and the marginality of intellectuals may be regarded aspects of social antagonism which may be related to revolutions.

Tensions within the social structure may include conflicts between economic classes, clashes along ethnic, religious, cultural, and racial lines, and generational cleavages. Revolutionary potential may be greatest when those divisions happen to be superimposed on one another, as when one element of that population is defined along the same racial,

religious, and economic lines. Such is the case in colonial territories and in some semicolonial countries in which a nonnative population element dominates economic life. Social tensions in racially homogeneous societies may take the form of a so-called "class-struggle" between those in control of economic and political power and the out-groups. Economically underdeveloped areas may be particularly vulnerable to extreme social tensions between a dynamic and emergent new middle class and a static traditional elite. The introduction of Western education and modern mores into these areas may greatly exacerbate already existing generational cleavages.

The demise of traditional society, which many countries are experiencing as a result of urbanization and industrialization or of social and political revolution, may have important psychological implications for the growth of a revolutionary movement. Traditionally accepted social values and social attitudes which support the *status quo* tend to be undermined by such historical developments as de-colonization, the emergence of new nationalisms, and the expansion of the Sino-Soviet power bloc. One function of the demise of traditional society has been the emergence of a new class of Western-educated intellectuals^c to challenge the tradition-oriented older intellectual class.

These new intellectuals, many of whom find themselves in a condition of social marginality, may be a critical factor in the revolutionary process. Marginality in the sociological sense in which the term is used here implies a state of being "incompletely assimilated and denied full social acceptance and participation by the dominant [political] group or groups in a society because of racial or cultural conflict."¹ The marginal intellectual may tend to become spiritually disenchanted with, or alienated from, the prevailing ethos of the socio-political system to which he is denied access. Students of revolution have noted a correlation between the alienation of intellectuals from the ruling elite and the development of a revolutionary movement.²

The term intellectual when applied to underdeveloped areas generally has broader application than it has in more advanced countries. In the Cuban case study, the term is used in a narrower sense and is applied only to those who have had university education, or to middle-class professional groups. In the Algerian and Vietnam case studies, however, it applies to anyone with a secondary education or more.

This is in no way condescension toward the new states. It is only an acknowledgement of the smaller degree of internal differentiation which has until now prevailed within the educated class in the new states, and

^c In the Sino-Soviet bloc this new class is the Communist-educated class.

to greater disjunction which marks that class off from the other sections of the society.³

Thus the emergent middle class in colonial and semicolonial societies may be regarded as an intellectual class, since the members of this group have some familiarity with Western values and modern economic methods and, most important of all, are politically conscious.

Political Weakness

Included under this general heading are factors of political imbalance, political fragmentation, and inefficiency of governmental machinery.

The political system of a country may be regarded as being in a state of imbalance when the mass of the population is deprived of representation and participation in the government. Thus, colonial institutions may have an inherent weakness because of their inevitable discrimination against the native population in favor of metropolitan interests. Native participation in the administration of colonial government without native political responsibility may intensify revolutionary potential. If for any reason a country's political institutions fail to function as a clearinghouse for conflicting claims from all elements of society, then that country's political system may be in imbalance and a certain element of revolutionary potential present.

Political fragmentation, as the expression is employed here, refers to hostility among opposing elements in the political elite and the political opposition groups of such violent proportions that these elements are unable to operate within the normal channels of political compromise and coalition. The expression does not imply the type of loyal opposition that has been characteristic of Anglo-American political experience.

Governmental inefficiency may be regarded as a factor related to the development of a revolutionary movement and to the efficiency of the movement once started. It may not be enough for a governmental apparatus merely to maintain order and administer routine public services and utilities; perhaps it must function in a capacity of "honest broker" between conflicting elements in the society and the polity. Thus, political imbalance and fragmentation may seriously detract from the efficiency of a government, although on the surface it may appear to function quite efficiently. When normal administrative operations, such as police protection and communications services, become impaired, then the latent revolutionary potential generated by political imbalance and fragmentation may rise to critical proportions. The dynamics and timing of governmental response to the revolutionary movement may be of the utmost importance in the efficiency of that

response which may have to include political and institutional adjustment as well as restoration and maintenance of public order and governmental control.

Organic Factors of the Revolutionary Movement

For each revolution, historical and descriptive data have been collected under the following six aspects of revolutionary warfare: actors, strategy and goals, ideology and mystique, organization, techniques, and foreign influence. Within these categories data have generally been presented in chronological sequence. Since these are self-defining terms, it will only be necessary to point out some of the conceptual refinements and generalizations developed in the course of this study. A more elaborate delineation of these concepts must await further analysis.

Actors

The leadership cadre and the followers of that revolutionary organization which ultimately came into power in each situation is the group primarily treated under the category of actors. Thus, the actors of a revolutionary movement are defined by the results of the movement; the question of how one group of leaders gains control of a revolutionary movement to the exclusion of another group of revolutionists is not the main focus in this study but does receive some attention. Revolutionary actors are discussed in terms of (1) the socio-political composition of the leadership and mass following; (2) the historical continuity of personnel and the effects of a revolutionary tradition; and (3) the impact of conditions in the world at the time of the revolution, or the effects of the so-called *Zeitgeist* (spirit of the times) on the revolutionary actors.

Overall Strategy and Goals

The category of strategy and goals is concerned with the overall manner in which the successful revolutionary organization attempts to secure its revolutionary objectives. Strategy, which seems to be flexible and highly variable in most revolutions, is discussed within the context of time and circumstances rather than in terms of consistency with doctrinaire principles. This approach permits changes in strategy to be directly related to situational factors. These factors may be dependent upon purely local developments such as a change in the strategy and tactics of the security forces, or upon a major international development of a military, diplomatic, or political nature.

Revolutionary objectives, or goals, are discussed in terms of appeals for political change, socio-economic reform, or a combination of these,

often expressed in nationalist slogans—particularly in colonial revolutions. Where there are different appeals made to various segments of society, these are discussed and compared.

Ideology or Myth

It is generally accepted that an essential part of any revolutionary movement is its “social myth” or revolutionary ideology. Generally, ideology in a revolutionary situation functions as a synthesis embodying both a critique of prerevolutionary society and policy and a socio-political program for postrevolutionary development. In the discussion of ideology in these studies, particular attention is paid to (1) national orientation, (2) international orientation, (3) socio-economic emphasis, (4) religious emphasis, and (5) the “mystique.” What has been termed the “mystique of a revolution” is similar in many respects to *esprit de corps*, and is composed of intangible elements such as the revolutionary tradition of the country, the charismatic quality of the leadership, and the revolutionary movement’s prospects of success.

Organization

It appears from other studies that no specific organizational form is necessary to insure the success of revolutionary movements. They have included paramilitary units, regular military and auxiliary organizations, clandestine cells or an underground movement, legal and illegal political parties, labor organizations, social organizations, para-governmental organs of state power, governments-in-exile, or a combination of these. In each of the revolutions studied, attention has been focused on both the organizational and functional aspects of the above types of groups which made up the revolutionary organization ultimately coming to power.

Techniques

This category discusses the wide variety of techniques which revolutionists use, including: psychological, diplomatic, economic, and political warfare; conventional military operations and unconventional paramilitary operations; terror, sabotage, propaganda, strikes and demonstrations; and the recruitment and training of revolutionists. Because the specific techniques used by the revolutionists interact with the countertechniques used by the government or security forces, both are discussed within the same context.

Foreign Involvement

The question of foreign involvement is of crucial importance to the course of a revolution. Considerations related to this question may

affect both the strategy and the techniques adopted by the revolutionary actors. For instance, the advantages for a revolutionary movement of a sanctuary and of diplomatic, economic, and military support from a foreign power are well-known. The number of foreign powers involved, the extent of the aid, political intervention by states or international organizations, and direct military intervention are discussed under this category.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES

The procedures used to prepare the three case studies were straightforward and standard for each.

Development of Case Study Format

The first step, described in the previous section, consisted of the development of hypotheses and the preparation of a standard format for the organization of each case study.

Identification and Selection of Sources

As a second step, a systematic search for sources of information was conducted. This consisted of two parts: identification of the sources, and selection of sources. To identify sources, the SORO open-library files and Library of Congress files were reviewed, available bibliographies perused, and knowledgeable persons consulted. Sources were selected on the basis of their relevance, in terms of the information they contained, to the hypotheses formulated and on the basis of recommendations of the subject experts consulted. Selection was limited to unclassified secondary sources. However, some use was made of primary materials, when readily available, to fill in gaps in coverage. In the selection of sources every effort was made to obtain a "balance" among known political viewpoints of those who have written on the subject revolution.

Information Synthesis and Analysis: Drafting of Report

Information relevant to each hypothesis was systematically culled from the various sources, synthesized, and put in the standardized case study format. Generally speaking, attempts were made to use only information which appeared in more than one source independently; in practice, this independence was very difficult to ascertain. Conflicting

or inconsistent information was resolved by checking for consistency with other sources considered reliable.

Expert Reviews and Revision

As a final check on the substance of each case study, it was submitted separately to a number (2–6) of subject experts. Each consultant reviewed the study in terms of accuracy of facts and reasonableness of interpretation. Each study was then revised on the basis of a synthesis of the experts' comments. When conflicts in fact or interpretation could not be resolved through discussion, both viewpoints were presented in the text.

FOOTNOTES TO TECHNICAL APPENDIX

- ¹ Webster's *New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1961, p. 514.
- ² Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 41–52.
- ³ Edward A. Shils, "The Intellectual in Political Development," in *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism*, ed. John H. Kautsky (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 199.

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