


SECTION II THE COLD WAR YEARS 1946–1974





V. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ALASKA DISTRICT

INTRODUCTION

fter World War II, many Americans continued to view Alaska as a strategic stronghold against aggression. The creation of the Alaska District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1946 resulted from this perception. During the next three decades, the Corps carried out its mission to support military and civil projects in the milieu of the Cold War. While new employees faced the difficulties of settling in a remote, unfamiliar location, they remained aware of Alaska's significance to the nation's security. "There was a sense of urgency about protecting the country," recalled Phil Morrow, who served as a geologist and materials engineer in the Alaska District, prompting a "real sense of urgency about the projects. We'd do anything to get the job done."

Related to this sense of urgency was a feeling of excitement and optimism. In Alaska, the period following World War II proved to be one of rapid growth for the Corps' military and civil works projects, and employees witnessed the development not only of their agency but also of the territory and state. "You are about to become part of an enormous expansion," Alaska District Engineer Colonel P. V. Kieffer, Jr. informed them in 1958. "I anticipate this District will expand two, three, four-fold." Colonel Kieffer also observed the camaraderie of the Alaska District, noting that its "esprit de corps" was "unmatched."²

Anchorage, the headquarters of the Alaska District, exemplified the rapid growth of the Far North after the war. One observer recalled the city's "overwhelming sense of change and expansion," resulting from the influx of military



Street scene of 4th Avenue.

Anchorage was established in 1915 as a construction site for the Alaska Railroad, and the influx of military personnel at Elmendorf Air Force Base increased the city's population during the 1940s.



4th Avenue, Anchorage ca. 1951.

personnel and construction workers. By 1950, the larger metropolitan area of Anchorage boasted around 30,000 residents. "Youth and immaturity" were prominent characteristics of the city, along with "vigor and drive." "It's a much younger district than any of the other districts I've been exposed to," Morrow explained. "Of course, the state in general has a younger population than most states." Bill Oakes, Chief of Specifications during the 1990s, also noted that "people who came up here tended to be younger and more adventurous." The development of the Alaska District between 1946 and 1974 — a period of urgency and expansion — reflected this trend.

DEFENDING ALASKA DURING THE COLD WAR

In August of 1945, as the nation celebrated the end of World War II, excitedly awaiting the return of the troops, members of the House Committee on Territories toured Alaska. The committee investigated several military installations, and conducted hearings regarding conditions in the Territory. Its report to the House of Representatives, dated February 15, 1946, stated that World War II had "focused national attention on the Territory as at no time since the period of the gold rushes." The report further acknowledged that, as a result of the war, Alaska had been "recognized as one of the important strategic areas of the world." Consequently, the report asserted, the continued defense of Alaska, as well as the active encouragement of the Territory's development, constituted vital interests to the U.S.⁶

Captain John J. Teal, Jr., author of an article appearing in *Foreign Affairs* in October of 1948, similarly perceived that World War II had successfully "convinced Americans that their northern territory [was] not a worthless 'lump of ice.'" Teal reiterated Alaska's strategic importance in light of the new ascendancy of aerial warfare, another consequence of World War II. He maintained, as had the congressional committee, that Alaska's defense necessitated Alaska's development. In contrast to other important arctic locations, such as Greenland, the federal government in Alaska could promote economic stability while fortifying the nation's top shield: "In Alaska, we can do what we wish; and the extent to which we develop its possibilities will to a considerable extent determine our security."

The peace for which Americans had fought proved to be fleeting. Scarcely had the war ended in Germany and Japan when the differences in worldview and postwar security needs between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. emerged to produce the Cold War. Reflecting this tension, already heated by 1948, Captain Teal stressed that Soviet leaders, unlike American policy makers, had long recognized the strategic value of the arctic and had been actively promoting industrial development and population growth in the Soviet Union's vast northern lands. Essentially, Teal warned that the Russians were far ahead of the U.S. in preparing for war under arctic conditions. Mirroring as well the lesson of World War II, that nations must recognize and immediately quell aggression rather than attempt to appease it through diplomatic channels, Teal argued that Alaska's then "feeble defenses" unnecessarily tempted Soviet strategists to threaten an aggressive move against the U.S. through its northern Territory.⁸

Fergus Hoffman, a staff correspondent with the Seattle Post-Intelligencer who investigated defense installations in Alaska after the end of World War II, agreed with Teal's assessment that weak defenses incurred additional risks of invasion. Appearing before the Military Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in July of 1949, Hoffman described Alaska as "the most widespread collection of potential Pearl Harbors under the Stars and Stripes." Remembering the Japanese attacks at Dutch Harbor, Kiska and Attu, Hoffman charged that "Uncle Sam is asleep in the north again." Pointing out that in the postwar period, America's "defense axis" had pivoted "sharply to the north," Hoffman also encouraged the federal government to strengthen its northern bulwark with "permanent, modern bases and the men to man them." Hoffman, like members of the House Committee on the Territories and Captain John J. Teal, equated Alaska's defense with its economic and social development.

Territorial Governor Ernest Gruening also likened Alaska to Pearl Harbor. Pleading his case for Alaska's statehood, Gruening believed that expanding U.S. military capacity in Alaska, promoting economic development in the Far North, as well as granting statehood, would collectively create an adequate defense for both Alaska and, in turn, the continental U.S. Revealing the ideological aspects of the Cold War, Gruening envisioned Alaska both as a western bastion of defense and as a "fortress of the American way of life." ¹⁰

Geography and geo-politics had established Alaska's strategic significance as a western bastion or northern bulwark, but also influential in augmenting the Territory's importance were technological changes in modern warfare. The development of long-range planes, atomic weapons, and guided missiles increased the military emphasis on transpolar routes. After World War II,

strategists imagined a defense line that extended up from Okinawa, across Alaska and Northern Canada, to Greenland and Iceland.¹¹ The technological changes in aerial warfare and the new focus on short polar routes assured that Alaska would be "a battleground for airmen."¹² Large U.S. air bases, supported by ground troops, became the principal defense position in Alaska.

On December 14, 1946, President Harry Truman approved a unified command plan to reorganize the military in Alaska. This plan, presented to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created the Alaskan Command composed of the Alaskan Air Command and the Office of the Commander in Chief, Alaska. By late 1947, additional reorganization had occurred, and the Alaskan Air Command, the U.S. Army Alaska, and the Alaskan Sea Frontier, then comprised the unified command. The Commander in Chief, Alaska, who reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established his headquarters at Fort Richardson.¹³


During the immediate postwar period, the first priority of the military in the Far North was to deter any possible aggression from the U.S.S.R. Secondly, Alaska's terrain and arctic conditions offered a prime training environment for cold-regions combat preparation. Third, the job remained for the military to dismantle World War II bases and retrieve material and equipment still found in the Aleutians as well as throughout the Territory.¹⁴

Had the Cold War not developed so quickly after the end of World War II, it is conceivable that the spotlight on Alaska would have dimmed somewhat and that the intensive military build-up of Alaska during the 1950s would not have occurred. But the partition of Germany and the challenge to the principle of self-determination in Poland and other Eastern European countries, combined with escalating tensions in Turkey, Greece, and the Middle East, assured that the Cold War would divide the world in a polarized struggle between competing economic systems and styles of government. The initial U.S. atomic monopoly and the abrupt change in administrations following Roosevelt's death also contributed to the quick deterioration of the wartime alliance. "There is no peace," wrote one editor in August of 1946, adding that remobilization to deter aggression, although expensive, would ultimately prove less costly than fighting a third world war.¹⁵

Early postwar articles discussing statehood for Alaska focused on the realization that if the Soviet Union attacked the Territory, then Alaska "could provide a valuable steppingstone" for further assaults against the U.S. ¹⁶ With less than 60 miles separating Alaska from the U.S.S.R. across the Bering Strait, a

decision not to pour defense dollars into Alaska, in light of perceived Soviet aggression elsewhere, would result in a folly much greater than the one credited to Seward, nearly 100 years earlier. The new threats to national security, caused by the heightened tensions of the Cold War, in Alaska translated into new prospects for military construction. This expectation of increased military assignments, coupled with the already enlarged military presence in the Far North as a result of World War II, led to the creation of the Alaska District.

EARLY OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE ALASKA DISTRICT



These buildings served as the Alaska District Engineer Office, May 1946 to November 1947.


As early as January, 1946, the War Department contemplated establishing a new Engineer District in Alaska. This proposal was part of the War Department's decision to transfer responsibility for military construction in all overseas areas, which then included Alaska, to the Corps. Alaskan Department Engineer Colonel James Lang, when asked for his views on this proposal, noted that demobilization in the immediate postwar period had significantly reduced numbers of both key military and civilian personnel. Lang, however, felt confident that the remaining nucleus of engineers and administrative staff would prove sufficient for building a new District organization. On March 22, 1946, North Pacific Division Engineer Colonel Theron D. Weaver wrote to the Chief of Engineers to state his response to this proposal. Colonel Weaver supported the creation of the Alaska District, providing that, because of the shortage of personnel, its responsibilities would include only military construction while the Seattle District would remain in charge of civil works. 18

Less than one month later, the Secretary of War had authorized the establishment of the Alaska District. "General Order No. 6," dated April 9, 1946, delineated that the newly created Alaska District would have jurisdiction over "all military construction and military real estate functions within the territorial limits of Alaska." This order also stipulated that, until further notice, the Seattle District would "continue to be responsible for the supervision of civil works functions of the Chief of Engineers in Alaska."

The small group of 46 engineers and administrative staff, responsible for implementing "General Order No. 6," faced many difficult organizational challenges that reflected frontier conditions in Alaska at that time. Until permanent District headquarters could be built, Colonel Lang operated out of two "mobilization-style wooden buildings" that had been loaned to him by the Alaskan Department.²⁰ In 1947, Corps employees moved to their new headquarters at Elmendorf Air Force Base while tiles were still being laid on the floors.²¹

Severe housing shortages, both in Anchorage and on the base, hampered Lang's attempts to increase his staff. Initially, Corps personnel and their families lived in tar-papered temporary buildings whose heating and plumbing proved less than reliable. Lyman Woodman described this housing as a "two-room, one-string-pull-light-bulb-per-room situation with skimpy furnishings, horrendous heating, and problem plumbing." Woodman also recalled that, for a six-week period during the 1946-1947 winter, the low temperatures in the Anchorage area had hovered between 30 and 35 degrees below zero. This lack of adequate

housing and facilities, combined with the high cost of living and other problems caused by Alaska's remoteness, directly affected the District's organization by producing an inordinately high rate of turnover, occasionally as high as 80 percent during a single year.²²




"Old Miami quarters" — early housing for the Alaska District.

Phil Morrow, who came to work for the Alaska District in 1956, referred to these transient employees as "two-year people" who, by renting the "tarpaper shacks" for \$10 a week and eating in a mess hall, could save their wages and

then return to the Lower 48.23 Aurora Loss also recalled the high turnover of early workers. "Living conditions were quite primitive at first," she explained. Moreover, the lack of paved roads during the 1940s made local travel difficult. Loss remembered that "mud would squirt up through the holes in the bus." Still, she remembered that agency personnel "knocked themselves out to make things nice to try to keep us." The food was "wonderful," for example, and the new district organized parties and recreational activities to boost morale. Employed in statistical drafting, Loss characterized the initial Phil Morrow, June 1996. work force in the Alaska District as being very young. By the 1950s, an increasing number of families provided more stability.24

Additional features that affected the early years of the administration of the Alaska District stemmed from conditions that were more national in scope than specific to Alaska. For example, in response to growing fears about domestic Communist infiltration, President Harry Truman, on March 21, 1947, issued Executive Order 9835, announcing a "Security Loyalty Program." Lieutenant Colonel Menon Whitsitt of the Alaska District described this as a "comprehensive program designed to determine the loyalty to the United States of each Federal em-







Aurora Loss.

ployee through a review of his personal history." Because of this program, Corps employees, on the payroll as of September 30, 1947, had to complete forms regarding their individual history, and agreed to have their fingerprints submitted to the FBI.²⁵

Also reflective of the Cold War milieu was the reminder from the Alaskan Department in August, 1947 that the Alaska District must follow security measures. Corps employees would comply by "putting papers away at night, locking desks and monitoring their conversations" to avoid revealing any information that would "jeopardize the security of overseas Government offices." Discussing these security procedures at a staff meeting, employees complained





Constructing the new Alaska District Building.



that sometimes the effort to classify information had become excessive. As an example, they cited an order that had instructed them to classify a "simple permafrost report" as "secret."²⁶

Indicative of general postwar shortages, Alaska District employees also heeded "War Department Circular No. 175," dated July 3, 1947. This circular called attention to a critical shortage of paper and paper products. Efforts at the Alaska District to conserve paper products included salvaging used paper for "memorandum pads" and using both sides of paper for "all informal correspondence." The Alaska District Engineer also instructed employees to decide how best to substitute usable stocks of paper for specific jobs. The memorandum announcing this order added that "a very liberal view will be taken by all concerned as to what constitutes a usable substitute."²⁷

Loss recalled her employment in the Alaska District from 1946 to 1974 as a positive experience. Owing to shortages in personnel during the early years, most employees served in a variety of capacities. In addition to statistical drafting, for example, she functioned as a timekeeper and a janitor, sweeping the floors. "Everyone had to pitch in," she explained, and this necessity helped foster camaraderie and a "gung ho" attitude among early employees. According to Loss, a feisty and hardy nature proved to be a valuable asset during the first years of the Alaska District. Although during the war she had served as an aircraft dispatcher in California, the men who interviewed her initially wanted to focus only on her ability to type. "I can cook, too," she told them flippantly. To her surprise, they hired her anyway, and she remained employed in the Alaska District for nearly 30 years.²⁸

DISTRICT OFFICES AND WORKERS —
AFTER WORLD WAR II



Irma Ross (left) and Peg "Goldie" Foster (right) called their office machines "blunder busses."



Office scene.




Mail and Records Room.



Architects at work.



Cafeteria.



Cafeteria.

RECREATION IN THE ALASKA DISTRICT



Bowling league.



Ping-pong at noon.



St. Patrick's Day party.



Barbecue at Finger Lake.



Picnic at Wasilla Lake.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN ALASKA, 1946-1949

Although the bulk of military construction in Alaska occurred after the onset of the Korean War, the scope of construction work that the new District initiated during the immediate post-World War II period was also impressively large. This early construction plan focused on building housing, improving facilities, extending runways, and erecting hangars at the military installations near Anchorage and Fairbanks. The program reflected a decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discontinue maintenance of most of the air bases strewn along the Aleutians and coast in favor of building large bases in the interior. From these large bases, the Joint Chiefs reasoned, Alaska could best serve as a base for strategic warfare, execute aerial warfare and defend its huge land mass, as well as the air corridor to Canada and the Lower 48. As *Time* magazine reported, this theory stemmed from military strategists' view that rather than "make U.S. airplanes vulnerable by scattering them through the wilderness [of Alaska], ... let them range from bases in the heartland."²⁹

At Fort Richardson this meant construction projects to build housing for officers, enlisted men, civilians, and families. Work also included erecting mess halls, warehouses, fuel storage facilities, and a fire station, as well as providing general utilities. Plans further included rehabilitation of the hospital constructed during World War II. Another project was construction of the Alaska District office building. Plans additionally sought to extend and improve the runway at Fort Richardson to ensure that it could handle the B-36 bomber. ³⁰

At Ladd Field, near Fairbanks, construction projects followed similar lines. Here, as at Fort Richardson, the District focused on military and family housing, utility services, and hospital improvements. Near Ladd Field, the District began constructing Mile 26, which was first known as "Ladd Extension" and ultimately became Eielson Air Force Base.³¹

Mile 26, also intended to handle B-36 operations, required the construction of barracks for 1,000 men, a hangar and runway, roads and streets, basic utility facilities and fuel storage sites. The hangar, needed to house the B-36, encompassed 60,000 square feet; the length of the runway reached 10,000 feet. Additionally, the District's plans for Mile 26 included building a spur line from Fairbanks in order to connect the new airbase to the Alaska Railroad.³²

Another immediate postwar project was further development of the Army docks at Whittier. This involved improving the existing docks and utility services, as well as building a warehouse, motor pool, and dry cleaning plant. Additionally during this period, the District supervised improvements to the port of Anchorage done by the 925th Engineer Aviation Group.³³

Aside from the obstacles that typically plague construction in a location as remote as Alaska, with its harsh climate and short construction season, the District encountered specific additional problems during these early years. A postwar labor shortage in the continental U.S. increased the difficulty of finding sufficient numbers of construction workers who would come to the Far North. When those who were hired arrived, housing shortages and exorbitant living costs complicated their stay during the term of their employment. Occasionally, because of the need for high wages in the face of already high production costs, this resulted in labor-management disputes. A major shipping strike in 1947 added further to the problems confronted by the District during this first phase of construction as it became increasingly difficult to find even such basic materials as cement.³⁴

But the most fundamental problem vexing the new District was a budgetary one. On July 26, 1947, Congress adjourned without passing the military construction budget for fiscal year 1948. On July 30, the War Department officially notified the military command in Alaska of this hiatus in funding. As a result, the Corps dropped projects with lower priority, such as a planned B-36 base at Clear, in favor of higher priority jobs at Ladd, Fort Richardson, and Mile 26. At an August 7, 1947 staff meeting, Colonel Lang stressed the necessity of pursuing "all possible avenues of economy." In October, the Chief of Engineers similarly urged the Alaska District to pay strict attention to "economy and sound administration." The Chief of Engineers further informed the District then that, as part of the response to the budgetary changes, all future construction planning would employ lump-sum contracts rather than the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) methods then in use.³⁶

Although CPFF contracts usually resulted in higher project costs, the Chief of Engineers had justified the continuation of this contracting policy during the immediate postwar period because of the need to quickly expedite construction. Moreover, the initially small administrative staff at the Alaska District could more easily process the less complicated CPFF contracts. In addition, it had seemed unlikely that contractors would be willing to incur the risks involved in competitive lump-sum contracts, given the high costs in Alaska and the unstable price and wage conditions generally prevalent throughout the continental U.S.³⁷

In 1946, the Corps first contracted with Birch, Johnson, and Lytle, a joint venture, for the construction of housing and other facilities at Alaska's main military installations for an estimated \$23,500,000. Through various modifications and additions to the contract, its total cost eventually exceeded \$60 million. For much of the design work on these projects, the Alaska District had contracted with the architectural firm of Fay, Spofford, and Thorndike of Boston, Massachusetts, also on a CPFF basis.³⁸

Major General William E. Potter, who served as District Engineer for one year during this period (1948-1949), later recalled serious accounting problems that arose in the District because of CPFF contracting. Potter explained that it had been difficult to adjust from the "wartime philosophy of funds": "during the war you had to get things done, and you did things, and the hell with everything else." He noted that during the immediate postwar period, the District had continued to operate "on that basis, and as a result their accounts and their costs — well, their accounts were not believable and their costs were out of line."

Potter remembered that this had infuriated Congress to the point that it had curtailed appropriations to the District even though projects worth millions of dollars were underway.³⁹

As a result of Congress's actions, in June, 1948, the Chief of Engineers determined that all projects initiated with fiscal year 1946 funding "must be considered complete." This directive led to the curtailment of work on projects worth \$13.7 million at Fort Richardson, \$15 million at Mile 26, and \$9.2 million at Ladd. Uncompleted barracks, mess halls, warehouses, and other structures were simply left standing with exposed steel beams, leading Alaska District employees to refer to this as the "year of the skeleton monuments." At the end of that year, the District's accounts had returned to good order, and as Potter put it, "we knew what projects were costing." Regarding difficulties inherent in CPFF contracting, Potter added: "If you're on a cost plus fixed fee on both design and engineering and construction, you can almost defy anybody to tell you what something's going to cost."

When additional funding became available, the Alaska District published a "Prospectus of Construction to be Accomplished in 1948-1949" in order to advertise among outside contractors, as well as the few local contractors. Attaching a list of construction projects at various Alaskan locations, this pamphlet explained to potential bidders that these jobs "were started under a CPFF Contract and are partially completed. The work was stopped when the funds allotted became exhausted." The pamphlet further noted that the Alaska District was now soliciting bids for lump-sum contracts to complete these structures and to begin other new construction. 42

There remained much work to do. In the spring of 1949, General Dwight Eisenhower, after completing a tour of military bases in Alaska, informed Congress that the Territory's defenses were "in no shape to meet the potentialities of war." A March 10, 1950 pro-statehood editorial appearing in the *Salt Lake Tribune* claimed that "Alaska remains largely underdeveloped and vulnerable to attack 83 years after the Territory was purchased from Russia. The proximity of the peninsula to Russia dramatizes the urgency of making it as strong as possible militarily, with a complete democratic government." Adding to the importance of increasing defense spending in Alaska, the U.S.S.R. was perfecting its nuclear capabilities at this time. Cinching the decision to enlarge the military presence in the Territory was the beginning of the Korean War during the summer of 1950.

On September 10, 1950, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, then chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, announced that he had appointed a task force to visit Alaska, study conditions there, and report back to the subcommittee. The purpose of this task force was to determine if "everything was being done that should be done to provide for the defense of Alaska." Senators Lester C. Hunt of Wyoming, Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, and Wayne Morse of Oregon comprised the task force. In October, these senators arrived in Alaska and conducted hearings at several locations, including Anchorage, Whittier, Seward, Fairbanks, and Juneau. After this trip to Alaska, task force members directed additional staff studies of the Territory from their Washington, D.C. offices. 45

In its March 1, 1951 report, the task force indicated that, to date, the federal government had either appropriated or authorized the expenditure of approximately \$390 million to implement the planned military construction program in Alaska. The task force also noted that the completion of this consolidated program would require an additional \$542.3 million, estimating further that another \$102 million in miscellaneous projects would need future federal funding.⁴⁶


In its report, the task force reviewed the many factors that had contributed both to high costs and delays in construction. This investigation primarily focused on Alaska's remoteness, housing shortages, limited transportation and communication systems, and the general lack of industrial and economic development that then characterized frontier conditions in the region.⁴⁷ The Alaska District, beginning with only a small nucleus of engineers and administrative staff, initiated the government's early construction plans in the Territory. The Corps did so with few local sources of building materials and equipment and without the benefit of a large pool of local skilled labor. The agency also successfully made the transition from CPFF to lump-sum contracting, thereby growing in size and administrative complexity.⁴⁸

The Alaska District thus played an important role in the incipient economic development of Alaska, a role that would expand as defense and civil works spending dramatically increased in the Far North throughout the 1950s. Already, in 1950, during the nine months from April through December, the population of Anchorage more than doubled. Defense construction in 1951 accounted for nearly 15 percent of all private sector income in Alaska, compared to a national average of half that amount.⁴⁹ In 1951, the Senate task force recognized that "a


sound economy within the Territory would ease and expedite the handling of many defense problems." Senators Hunt, Saltonstall, and Morse also concluded that, given the alert and vigilant state of military forces that they had witnessed, there could be "no Pearl Harbor in Alaska." ⁵⁰

In his letter transmitting the task force's report, Senator Lyndon Johnson asserted that U.S. security required a fortified Alaska: "Our continental defenses can be no stronger than our Alaskan defenses. The security of every American home begins in the snows of Alaska." The defense of Alaska, however, also sharply necessitated its continued industrial and economic development. Here too the Alaska District would prove instrumental as it undertook the improvement of the region's many small harbors and began to investigate water resources in the area.


EARLY HOUSING IN THE ALASKA DISTRICT




Typical barracks building.



Street in construction camp area.



Engineer construction camp area - Anchorage in distance.




Richardson Vista, an apartment project.



Women's Quarters.



Women's Quarters.





Women's Quarters.

