DoD IG Publications

Announced Projects - Audit of the U.S. Army’s Budget Process for Civilian Pay (Project No. D2016-D000AG-0220.000)

Tue, 01 Nov 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of the U.S. Army’s Budget Process for Civilian Pay (Project No. D2016-D000AG-0220.000)

Announced Projects - Contract Oversight for the Audit of the FY 2017 United States Marine Corps General Fund Financials Statements and Related Footnotes (Project No. D2016-D000FS-0218.000)

Tue, 01 Nov 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Contract Oversight for the Audit of the FY 2017 United States Marine Corps General Fund Financials Statements and Related Footnotes (Project No. D2016-D000FS-0218.000)

Infomation Releases - Ten Additional Defendants Charged in $100 Million TRICARE Fraud Scheme

Fri, 14 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Ten Additional Defendants Charged in $100 Million TRICARE Fraud Scheme (.pdf 155KB)

Two Defendants, Owners of CCMGRX, LLC, Were Indicted Earlier this Year in This Scheme That Involved Claims for Compounded Pain and Scar Creams

Infomation Releases - Another Navy Officer Pleads Guilty in Expanding Bribery and Fraud Investigation

Thu, 13 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Another Navy Officer Pleads Guilty in Expanding Bribery and Fraud Investigation (.pdf 167KB)

SAN DIEGO – U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Gentry Debord pleaded guilty to a bribery charge in federal court today, admitting that he accepted cash, luxury hotels and prostitutes from foreign defense contractor Leonard Glenn Francis in exchange for proprietary Navy information that benefitted Francis’ company, Glenn Defense Marine Asia.

Audit Report - Consolidation Needed for Procurements of DoD H-60 Helicopter Spare Parts (Redacted)

Wed, 12 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-002)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
Consolidation Needed for Procurements of DoD H-60 Helicopter Spare Parts (Redacted) (Project No. D2016-D000AT-0076.000)

Objective

We determined whether DoD was effectively managing the procurement of H-60 helicopter (H-60) spare parts. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and U.S. Special Operations Command all fly different versions of the H-60 for troop transport and personnel recovery. We reviewed H-60 spare parts procured on 2,136 DoD contracts and purchase orders from February 2015 through January 2016. During this time, DoD procured 10,047 unique spare parts. DoD spent at least $394.9 million on H-60 spare parts.

Finding

DoD did not effectively manage the procurement of H-60 spare parts. Specifically, DoD did not consolidate its purchase of 2.9 million H-60 spare parts to maximize its market leverage, such as receiving quantity discounts. The lack of consolidation occurred because the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics did not ensure that the Army, Navy, U.S. Special Operations Command, and Special Operations Forces Support Activity fully executed Base Realignment and Closure Act 2005 Recommendation 176 by transferring H-60 spare parts procurements to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Recommendation 176 directed the Military Services to use DLA as the single, integrated procurement manager for spare parts, but that did not occur. In addition, DLA did not appropriately consolidate its H-60 spare parts procurements where practicable. Section 2384a, title 10, United States Code requires, where practicable, agencies to procure supplies in quantities that will result in the total and unit cost most advantageous to the United States. However, DoD officials procured the same H-60 spare parts on different contracts, often at different prices, which occurred or potentially occurred in 1,319 instances.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the procurement responsibility for all H-60 spare parts, including those procured under performance-based logistics and contractor logistics support contracts, should be transferred to DLA, as originally required by Base Realignment and Closure Act 2005 Recommendation 176. If the Under Secretary determines that H-60 spare parts procurement responsibility should be transferred to DLA, DoD should review and update its policy regarding spare parts procurements. If DoD determines it should not transfer the procurement responsibility to DLA, it should notify Congress of its decision and justification.

We also recommend that the Director, DLA, collect and analyze data related to the contracts and purchase orders used to procure H-60 spare parts and take steps to consolidate these procurements where practicable to take advantage of quantity discounts and reduce administrative costs.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, did not address the specifics of the recommendations to perform a cost-benefit analysis, review and update DoD policy, and notify Congress if needed. The Acting Assistant Secretary stated that Base Realignment and Closure Act 2005 Recommendation 176 does not apply to performance-based logistics and contractor logistics support contracts. In addition, cost-benefit analyses are required prior to the award of a performance-based logistics and contractor logistics support contract. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics does not plan to conduct a DoD-wide cost-benefit analysis or notify Congress that it will not transfer the procurement responsibility to DLA. We request that the Acting Assistant Secretary provide additional comments to describe what actions will be taken to perform a cost-benefit analysis and determine whether the procurement responsibility for all H-60 spare parts, including those procured under performance-based logistics and contractor logistics support contracts, should be transferred to DLA. Based on those actions, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should review and update DoD policy and notify Congress if needed.

The Director, DLA Acquisition, responding for the Director, DLA addressed all specifics of the recommendation to collect and analyze data related to H-60 spare parts contracts and purchase orders and take steps to consolidate spare parts procurements. No further comments are required.

Announced Projects - Announcement letter to PwC of Project No. D2017‐DAPOSA‐0026.000

Tue, 11 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Announcement letter to PwC of Project No. D2017‐DAPOSA‐0026.000

Announced Projects - Announcement Letter to RAND of Project No. D2017-DAPOSA-0026.000

Tue, 11 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Announcement Letter to RAND of Project No. D2017-DAPOSA-0026.000

Announced Projects - Contract Audit Follow-Up Monitoring (Project No. D2017-DAPOCF-0033.000)

Fri, 07 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Contract Audit Follow-Up Monitoring (Project No. D2017-DAPOCF-0033.000)

Administrative Investigations Report - REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: RONALD F. LEWIS MAJOR GENERAL, U.S. ARMY

Thu, 06 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Administrative Investigations Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-001)
Topic: SENIOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: RONALD F. LEWIS MAJOR GENERAL, U.S. ARMY (Project No. Case 20151113-034269)

Misuse of government travel charge card for personal expenses; false official statements regarding use of government travel charge card; and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

Infomation Releases - GAO Component transfers to Washington Headquarters Service

Tue, 04 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

GAO Component transfers to Washington Headquarters Service (.pdf 352KB)

On October 1, 2016 the DoD OIG Government Accountability Office Liaison and Follow-up functions were transferred to the Washington Headquarters Service. The new organization is now located in the Executive Services Directorate, Directives Division under the leadership of Mr. Edward Burbol. Mr. Bryan K. Kitchens serves as the new chief of GAO Affairs for Mr. Burbol and can be reached at 571-372-4042, ryan.k.kitchens.civ@mail.mil. The new GAO Affairs inbox is osd.mc-alex.odcmo.mbx.gao-affairs@mail.mil.

Announced Projects - Audit of Defense Information Systems Agency Controls Over Communications Service Authorizations (Project No. D2016-D000CL-0197.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Defense Information Systems Agency Controls Over Communications Service Authorizations (Project No. D2016-D000CL-0197.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of DoD Procedures for Securing Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment (Project No. D2016-D000JB-0183.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of DoD Procedures for Securing Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment (Project No. D2016-D000JB-0183.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of the Acquisition of the Army Common Infrared Countermeasures Program (Project No. D2016-D000AE-0199.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of the Acquisition of the Army Common Infrared Countermeasures Program (Project No. D2016-D000AE-0199.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of the Air Operations Center–Weapon System Increment 10.2 (Project No. D2016-D000AU-0217.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of the Air Operations Center–Weapon System Increment 10.2 (Project No. D2016-D000AU-0217.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of the Fresh Produce Contracts for the U.S. Pacific Command Theater (Project No. D2016-D000AJ-0186.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of the Fresh Produce Contracts for the U.S. Pacific Command Theater (Project No. D2016-D000AJ-0186.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile Program (Project No. 02016-D000AE-0198.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile Program (Project No. 02016-D000AE-0198.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of the Supply Chain Risk Management for the Ballistic Missile Defense System at the Missile Defense Agency (Project No. D2016-D000AG-0215.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of the Supply Chain Risk Management for the Ballistic Missile Defense System at the Missile Defense Agency (Project No. D2016-D000AG-0215.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of the U.S. Army’s Modernization of the H-60 Black Hawk Fleet (Project No. D2016-D000AT-0214.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of the U.S. Army’s Modernization of the H-60 Black Hawk Fleet (Project No. D2016-D000AT-0214.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of U.S. Pacific Command Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Designated Defense Articles (Project No. D2016-D000RA-0202.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of U.S. Pacific Command Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Designated Defense Articles (Project No. D2016-D000RA-0202.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of Under-Vehicle Force Protection Requirement for the Army Paladin Integrated Management Program (Project No. D2016-D000AU-0203.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Under-Vehicle Force Protection Requirement for the Army Paladin Integrated Management Program (Project No. D2016-D000AU-0203.000)

Announced Projects - Examination of the Defense Logistics Agency’s DoD Chief Financial Officer’s Statistical Sample Inventory Program (Project No. D2016-D000FI-0204.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Examination of the Defense Logistics Agency’s DoD Chief Financial Officer’s Statistical Sample Inventory Program (Project No. D2016-D000FI-0204.000)

Announced Projects - Followup Audit on DoD IG Report No. DODIG-2014-097, “Transfer of DoD Service Treatment Records to the Department of Veterans Affairs,” July 31, 2014 (Project No. D2016-D000XD-0201.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Followup Audit on DoD IG Report No. DODIG-2014-097, “Transfer of DoD Service Treatment Records to the Department of Veterans Affairs,” July 31, 2014 (Project No. D2016-D000XD-0201.000)

Announced Projects - Followup Audit on DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2012-017, “U.S. Naval Academy Officials Did Not Adhere to Contracting and Gift Policies,” November 7, 2011 (Project No. D2016-D000XD-0200.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Followup Audit on DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2012-017, “U.S. Naval Academy Officials Did Not Adhere to Contracting and Gift Policies,” November 7, 2011 (Project No. D2016-D000XD-0200.000)

Announced Projects - Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2017 Defense Logistics Agency General Fund Financial Statements (Project No. D2016-D000FE-0208.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2017 Defense Logistics Agency General Fund Financial Statements (Project No. D2016-D000FE-0208.000)

Announced Projects - Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2017 Defense Logistics Agency National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund Financial Statements (Project No. D2016-D000FE-0210.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2017 Defense Logistics Agency National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund Financial Statements (Project No. D2016-D000FE-0210.000)

Announced Projects - Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2017 Defense Logistics Agency Working Capital Fund Financial Statements (Project No. D2016-D000FE-0209.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2017 Defense Logistics Agency Working Capital Fund Financial Statements (Project No. D2016-D000FE-0209.000)

Announced Projects - Termination of the Audit of Defense Cash Accountability System Interface and Data Accuracy Application Level Controls (Project No. D2016-D000FS-0174.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Termination of the Audit of Defense Cash Accountability System Interface and Data Accuracy Application Level Controls (Project No. D2016-D000FS-0174.000)

Announced Projects - Termination of the Audit of Navy Utility Energy Service Contracts (Project No. D2016-D000CG-0107.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Termination of the Audit of Navy Utility Energy Service Contracts (Project No. D2016-D000CG-0107.000)

Announced Projects - Termination of the Contract Oversight for the Audit of the FY 2015 United States Marine Corps Schedule of Budgetary Activity (Project No. D2015-D000FT-0258.000)

Mon, 03 Oct 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Termination of the Contract Oversight for the Audit of the FY 2015 United States Marine Corps Schedule of Budgetary Activity (Project No. D2015-D000FT-0258.000)

Audit Report - Improvements Needed in Managing Scope Changes and Oversight of Construction Projects at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti

Fri, 30 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-141)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
Improvements Needed in Managing Scope Changes and Oversight of Construction Projects at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (Project No. D2014-D000RE-0157.000)

Objective

We determined whether DoD was constructing facilities in accordance with legislative authorities (Federal law) and if DoD was providing adequate quality assurance and oversight of military construction projects at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. We nonstatistically selected 2 of 17 projects, P920, Bachelor Enlisted Quarters and P220, Ammunition Supply Point, with combined estimated costs of $65.2 million, for audit. This is one in a series of reports on military construction (MILCON) projects at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.

Findings

Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Atlantic constructed the Bachelor Enlisted Quarters project in accordance with the Federal law. However, NAVFAC officials did not obtain Navy approval and initiate the congressional notification process for the Ammunition Supply Point project scope changes as required by Federal law and Navy guidance. The scope changes were needed because the project planner did not properly apply explosives safety standards when developing the DD Form 1391¹, which incorrectly combined the inert storage facility and receive, segregate, storage issue functions as one primary facility. The program manager stated that approval was not obtained and congressional notification was not initiated for the scope changes because she applied the Federal law and Navy requirements to the total Ammunition Supply Point project scope and not to the scope for each primary facility. Although the scope changes will ultimately result in a facility that meets mission requirements, unapproved scope changes to the other 15 FY 2010 through FY 2013 projects could result in construction of facilities that are not consistent with the intent of the Navy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. In addition, officials at NAVFAC Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, did not provide adequate oversight for the Bachelors Enlisted Quarters and Ammunition Supply Point projects. Specifically, the officials did not establish and implement adequate quality assurance oversight plans or maintain contract files in accordance with the Federal and Navy guidance. This occurred because the Facilities Engineering and Acquisition Division Director, construction managers, and quality assurance representatives stated that they did not see value in developing quality assurance plans and did not have procedures for archiving old contract files. The Director stated that maintaining contract files was secondary to construction completion.

As a result, there is an increased risk that construction will not meet contract requirements and that DoD will not receive what it paid for. Further, without complete contract files, DoD may not have adequate information in the event of disputes or litigation. Additionally, because of the constant turnover of contracting officials and QA representatives at Camp Lemonnier, the lack of complete contract files could limit the oversight ability of personnel subsequently assigned to manage and oversee contracts.

Recommendations

We recommend the Commander, NAVFAC Atlantic, submit a request for approval to reduce the scope of the inert storage facility; build the receive, segregate, storage, issue as a new primary facility; and initiate the congressional notification process for the Ammunition Supply Point scope changes. We also recommend that the Commander, establish local policies and procedures for contracting officials and quality assurance representatives to execute their roles and responsibilities and implement a process to consistently maintain complete contract files.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, responding for the Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic, did not address the recommendations to initiate the congressional notification process and request approval from Navy officials for the scope changes made to the Ammunition Supply Point project. Comments from the Commander addressed the recommendations to establish and implement a consistent process to maintain contract files; however, the Commander did not address the recommendation to establish procedures for contracting officials and quality assurance representatives in executing their roles and responsibilities. We request the Commander, NAVFAC Atlantic, provide comments in response to this report.

¹ DD Form 1391 is used to request military construction authorization and funds from Congress.

Technical Assessment Report - Military Housing Inspection - Camp Buehring, Kuwait

Fri, 30 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Technical Assessment Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-139)
Topic: Military Housing Inspection
Military Housing Inspection - Camp Buehring, Kuwait (Project No. D2016-D000PT-0058.000)

Inspected U.S. military facilities at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, for compliance with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical and fire protection systems. This project relates to the overseas contingency operation, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, and it was completed in accordance with our oversight responsibilities as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

Audit Policy and Oversight Report - Quality Control Review of the Dixon Hughes Goodman LLP FY 2014 Single Audit of Logistics Management Institute

Fri, 30 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Policy and Oversight Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-138)
Topic: Quality Control Review
Quality Control Review of the Dixon Hughes Goodman LLP FY 2014 Single Audit of Logistics Management Institute (Project No. Project No. D2016-DAPOSA-0078.000))

We are providing this report for your information and use. The Dixon Hughes Goodman LLP (DHG) single audit of Logistics Management Institute for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2014, contained quality deficiencies that affect the reliability of the audit results and require corrective action. We conducted this review in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE).

Infomation Releases - Tulsa Doctor Found Guilty Of Health Care Fraud

Fri, 30 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Tulsa Doctor Found Guilty Of Health Care Fraud (.pdf 128KB)

MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced that STEVEN WILLIAM DELIA, age 61, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, was found guilty of HEALTH CARE FRAUD by a federal jury on Thursday, September 29,2016. The jury also found that the defendant should forfeit $83,769.27 in assets as part of any sentence imposed.

Special Plans and Operations Report - Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF)

Thu, 29 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Special Plans and Operations Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-140)
Topic: Equipping and Training Iraq and Afghan Security Forces
Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF) (Project No. D2016-D00SPO-0054.000)

Objective

The objective of this project was to determine the extent to which the U.S. and Coalition had met its goal to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF) to conduct combat operations.

Results

The report contains five findings resulting in eight recommendations.

The five findings provide information in the follow areas:

The progress of NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A advisors toward their goal to train, advise, and assist the ANASOF to conduct combat operations.

Enforcement of Afghan Ministry of Defense and General Staff published policies

Afghan National Army (ANA) logistics support to the ANASOF

ANA Special Operations Command budget authority

Command relationships between ANA Corps Commanders and ANA Special Operations Command units present in their area of operations

Recommendations

The report contains recommendations to the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and the Commander, Resolute Support, including coordination with the Commander, NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan. The intent of the recommendations is to enhance the U.S. and Coalition mission to train, advise, and assist the ANASOF to conduct combat operations.

Infomation Releases - Six Men, Including Three Local Law Enforcement Officers, Charged with Trafficking in Contraband Cigarettes

Thu, 29 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Six Men, Including Three Local Law Enforcement Officers, Charged with Trafficking in Contraband Cigarettes (.pdf 125KB)

U.S. Attorney Kenneth A. Polite announced that JADALLAH SAED, age 30; ANWAR ABDELMAJID-AHMAD, a/k/a Tony, age 29, both of Gretna; ATALLA ATALLA, a/k/a Tommy, age 38, of Wilmington, North Carolina; JUSTIN BROWN, age 29; JOSHUA CARTHON, age 32, and GARRETT PARTMAN, age 31, all of New Orleans, were arrested yesterday in connection with the unsealing of an Indictment charging them with conspiring to traffic in contraband cigarettes and evading the federal excise tax imposed on tobacco; trafficking in contraband cigarettes, and interstate transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, in Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 and 1952(a)(3), respectively.

Audit Report - The Defense Logistics Agency Properly Awarded Power Purchase Agreements and the Army Obtained Fair Market Value for Leases Supporting Power Purchase Agreements

Wed, 28 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-137)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
The Defense Logistics Agency Properly Awarded Power Purchase Agreements and the Army Obtained Fair Market Value for Leases Supporting Power Purchase Agreements (Project No. D2016-D000CI-0128.000)

Objective

We determined whether the Department of the Army properly awarded and obtained fair market value for leases supporting energy production projects. We conducted this audit in response to an allegation reported to the Defense Hotline. The allegation stated that the Army and Navy leased land to utility companies to produce solar energy without using competitive procedures to select the lessee, and that the Army and Navy are not receiving fair market value for the land. This is the first in a series of audits related to leases supporting energy production projects and focuses only on the Army. We plan to review the Department of the Navy during the second audit in this series.

As of March 2016, the Army had awarded three leases supporting energy production projects. We selected two of the three for review—one at Fort Hood, Texas, and one at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The third project, at Fort Drum, New York, included a lease for less than an acre of land, so we did not review it.

Background

U.S. law¹ allows the Secretaries of the Military Departments to enter into a contract for up to 30 years for energy production facilities on DoD real property. These contracts are known as power purchase agreements and require a real‑estate transaction, such as a lease. In addition, U.S. law² allows the Secretaries of the Military Departments to lease non‑excess property. The same statute also requires that the Secretaries of the Military Departments use competitive procedures to select the lessees and that the lessees pay in cash or in-kind not less than the fair market value of the leased property.

Finding

We determined that Defense Logistics Agency Energy contracting officials awarded the two power purchase agreements at Fort Hood and Fort Detrick, using full and open competition, in accordance with Federal and DoD guidance. Specifically, the contracting officials properly issued requests for proposals, developed source selection plans, and evaluated proposals in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and DoD Source Selection Procedures.

In addition, the Army obtained fair market value for the two leases supporting the Fort Hood and Fort Detrick power purchase agreements. Specifically, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel appraised the leased land at Fort Hood and oversaw the appraisal at Fort Detrick to determine the fair market value of the land. Furthermore, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel ensured that the Army would receive lease payments in the form of in‑kind consideration or cash greater than or equal to the fair market value of the leased land.

Management Comments

We provided a discussion draft to Defense Logistics Agency Energy, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Army Office of Energy Initiatives on September 7, 2016. We considered management comments on a discussion draft of this report when preparing the final report.

¹ 10 U.S.C. § 2922a (2006), “Contracts for energy or fuel for military installations.”

²10 U.S.C. § 2667 (2015), “Leases: non-excess property of military departments and Defense Agencies.”

Announced Projects - Quality Control Review of the Defense Logistics Agency Audit Organization (Project No. D2016-DAPOIA-0223.000)

Tue, 27 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Quality Control Review of the Defense Logistics Agency Audit Organization (Project No. D2016-DAPOIA-0223.000)

Administrative Investigations Report - Defense Information School, Fort Meade, MD

Thu, 22 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Administrative Investigations Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-136)
Topic: DoD IG Administrative Investigations
Defense Information School, Fort Meade, MD

Infomation Releases - Five Defendants Face Federal Charges in Pain Management Clinic Kickback Scheme

Thu, 22 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Five Defendants Face Federal Charges in Pain Management Clinic Kickback Scheme (.pdf 156KB)

Baltimore, Maryland - A federal grand jury indicted five defendants on charges arising from a scheme whereby physicians and administrative personnel associated with a Maryland pain management practice agreed to refer urine specimens to a testing lab for evaluation in return for $1.37 million in kickbacks:

Sandeep Sherlekar, age 51, of Germantown, Maryland, Atif Babar Malik, age 46, of Germantown, Muhammad Ahmad Khan, age 43, of Pakistan, Mubtagha Shah Syed, age 49, of Jersey City, New Jersey, and Konstantin Bas, age 40, of Brooklyn, New York.

Announced Projects - Follow-up on DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2014-121, Military Housing Inspections -Japan (Project No. D2016-D000PT-0171.000

Thu, 22 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Follow-up on DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2014-121, Military Housing Inspections -Japan (Project No. D2016-D000PT-0171.000

Announced Projects - Assessment of DoD's Response to the August 2014 Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, Military Health System Review, Quality of Care

Wed, 21 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Assessment of DoD's Response to the August 2014 Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, Military Health System Review, Quality of Care

Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Report - Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance

Mon, 19 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-125)
Topic: The Nuclear Enterprise
Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance

Audit Report - Independent Auditor’s Report on the Agreed-Upon Procedures for Reviewing the FY 2016 Civilian Payroll Withholding Data and Enrollment Information

Mon, 19 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-135)
Topic: Financial Management
Independent Auditor’s Report on the Agreed-Upon Procedures for Reviewing the FY 2016 Civilian Payroll Withholding Data and Enrollment Information (Project No. 2016-D000FP-0096.000)

Infomation Releases - Five Indicted For Fraud Against The U.s. Government And Other Purchasers In “made In The Usa” Marketing Scheme

Thu, 15 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Five Indicted For Fraud Against The U.s. Government And Other Purchasers In “made In The Usa” Marketing Scheme (.pdf 31KB)

GREENEVILLE, Tenn. – On Sept. 13, 2016, a federal grand jury in Greeneville returned an indictment against Vincent Lee Ferguson, 65, of Knoxville, Tenn.; Matthew Lee Ferguson, 40, of Lenoir City, Tenn.; Kerry Joseph Ferguson, 35, of Houston, Texas; Matthew Harrison Martland, 32, of Knoxville, Tenn.; and Stephanie Lynn Kaemmerer, 44, of Knoxville, Tenn., for wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, major fraud against the United States, and smuggling goods into the United States.

Infomation Releases - Two Former Executives of Foreign Defense Contractor Charged in Expanding Fraud and Corruption Probe

Thu, 15 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Two Former Executives of Foreign Defense Contractor Charged in Expanding Fraud and Corruption Probe (.pdf 120K)

Two former executives of a foreign defense contractor have been charged in an indictment unsealed today with participating in a conspiracy to submit fraudulent information, price quotes, claims and invoices to the U.S. Navy in an effort to steal millions of dollars as part of a years-long corruption and fraud scheme.

Audit Report - The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment

Wed, 14 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-134)
Topic: Equipping and Training Iraq and Afghan Security Forces
The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment (Project No. D2016-D000JB-0104.000)

Objective

We determined whether the Army had effective controls for processing and transferring Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) equipment to the Government of Iraq. This is the third in a series of audits on property accountability in support of Operation Inherent Resolve.

ITEF, created by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, assists the Government of Iraq to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Examples of ITEF equipment provided to the Government of Iraq include body armor, navigation sets, magazine pouches, ambulances, and cargo trucks.

Findings

Army commands documented procedures for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Government of Iraq. However, the 1st TSC did not have effective controls to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment in Kuwait and Iraq prior to transfer to the Government of Iraq. Equipment visibility provides users with equipment location, movement, and status. Army Regulation 735-5 states that all property acquired by the Army will be continuously accounted for from the time of acquisition until the ultimate consumption or disposal of the property. However, the 1st TSC could not provide complete data for the quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including rolling stock and ammunition. Rolling stock refers to vehicles. Examples include Mine Clearance Systems, ambulances, and wrecker trucks. The 1st TSC did not have effective controls because it did not use centralized systems to maintain visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. Instead, the 1st TSC relied on multiple spreadsheets developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to provide it with visibility and accountability of equipment and did not consistently account for equipment in Iraq.

As a result, the 1st TSC did not have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq. Accurate, up-to-date records of equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq are critical for filling equipment requests. The process to contact multiple commands and reference multiple spreadsheets to determine equipment quantities and location could delay the fulfillment of a request or delay the development of future requests. In addition, not having accurate records of equipment on hand could result in duplicate equipment requests. Further, the use of manually populated spreadsheets increased the risk for human-error when inputting and updating equipment data.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Commander, 1st Theater Sustainment Command, use automated systems to account for and provide complete visibility of Iraq Train and Equip Fund equipment.

Management Actions Taken

During the audit we informed the Deputy Commanders, 1st TSC and Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command–Operation Inherent Resolve; the Commander, 336th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion; and officials from the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve of the lack of centralized visibility and accountability systems for ITEF equipment.

The Deputy Commander, 1st TSC, agreed with our findings and immediately initiated steps to implement corrective actions. As a short-term solution, 1st TSC developed a centralized equipment visibility tracker. The tracker, located on a shared drive, allowed the 1st TSC and commands associated with the ITEF program to have a centralized system to track ITEF equipment on hand at multiple locations and make changes to the tracker when ITEF equipment was processed through their locations. As a long‑term solution, 1st TSC is working towards using Army visibility and accountability systems to further increase its visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. The Deputy Commander, 1st TSC, anticipates full use of the systems in late 2016. The management actions taken addressed the concerns we identified; therefore, we are not making any additional recommendations.

Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Report - Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment Ground-Based Radars

Thu, 08 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-133)
Topic: The Nuclear Enterprise
Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment Ground-Based Radars

Infomation Releases - Fire Chief of the United States Air Force Indicted for Procurement Violation and Wire Fraud

Thu, 08 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Fire Chief of the United States Air Force Indicted for Procurement Violation and Wire Fraud (.pdf 96KB)

United States Attorney Gregory J. Haanstad of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, announced that on September 7, 2016, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against James E. Podolske Jr. (age: 59) of Panama City, Florida charging him with Procurement Fraud in violation of Title 41, United States Code, Section 2102 and Wire Fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

Testimony - Statement of Glenn A. Fine Principal Deputy Inspector General Performing the Duties of the Inspector General Department of Defense before the Subcommittee on National Security House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on “Oversight of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General’s Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations”

Wed, 07 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Statement of Glenn A. Fine Principal Deputy Inspector General Performing the Duties of the Inspector General Department of Defense before the Subcommittee on National Security House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on “Oversight of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General’s Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations” (.pdf 204KB)

Announced Projects - Audit of Army Operating Material and Supplies Subject to Demilitarization (Project No. D2016-D000FI-0193.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Army Operating Material and Supplies Subject to Demilitarization (Project No. D2016-D000FI-0193.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of Chemical Demilitarization–Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program (Project No. D2016-D000AE-0190.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Chemical Demilitarization–Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program (Project No. D2016-D000AE-0190.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of Contingency Planning for DoD Information Systems (Project No. D2016-D000RB-0184.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Contingency Planning for DoD Information Systems (Project No. D2016-D000RB-0184.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of Contract Oversight for Web-Based Military Information Support Operations Contracts (Project No. D2016-D000CN-0176.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Contract Oversight for Web-Based Military Information Support Operations Contracts (Project No. D2016-D000CN-0176.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of Controls Over Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Fuel Contracts (Project No. D2016-D000JB-0172.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Controls Over Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Fuel Contracts (Project No. D2016-D000JB-0172.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of Controls Over Kuwait Base Operations and Security Support Services Contract (Project No. D2016-D000JB-0188.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Controls Over Kuwait Base Operations and Security Support Services Contract (Project No. D2016-D000JB-0188.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of Defense Cash Accountability System Interface and Data Accuracy Application Level Controls (Project No. D2016-D000FS-0174.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Defense Cash Accountability System Interface and Data Accuracy Application Level Controls (Project No. D2016-D000FS-0174.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of Securing Army Electronic Health Records (Project No. D2016-D000RC-0187.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Securing Army Electronic Health Records (Project No. D2016-D000RC-0187.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of the Defense Information Systems Agency's Software Management Process (Project No. D2016-D000RD-0185.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of the Defense Information Systems Agency's Software Management Process (Project No. D2016-D000RD-0185.000)

Announced Projects - Audit of the United States European Command Integration of Cyberspace Operations Into Command Plans (Project No. D2016-D000RC-0189.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of the United States European Command Integration of Cyberspace Operations Into Command Plans (Project No. D2016-D000RC-0189.000)

Announced Projects - Termination of the Attestation of the Existence, Completeness, and Rights of General Property, Plant, and Equipment at Selected Other Defense Organizations (Project No. D2016-D000FP-0093.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Termination of the Attestation of the Existence, Completeness, and Rights of General Property, Plant, and Equipment at Selected Other Defense Organizations (Project No. D2016-D000FP-0093.000)

Announced Projects - Termination of the Audit of Defense Information Systems Agency Contract Awards (Project No. D2016-D000CL-0156.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Termination of the Audit of Defense Information Systems Agency Contract Awards (Project No. D2016-D000CL-0156.000)

Announced Projects - Termination of the Audit of the Department of the Navy’s Working Capital Fund Inventory (Project No. D2016-D000FS-0146.000)

Thu, 01 Sep 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Termination of the Audit of the Department of the Navy’s Working Capital Fund Inventory (Project No. D2016-D000FS-0146.000)

Infomation Releases - Federal Grand Jury Indicts 6 Explo Company Officials For Offenses Related To Camp Minden, Louisiana Ammunition Disposal

Wed, 31 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Federal Grand Jury Indicts 6 Explo Company Officials For Offenses Related To Camp Minden, Louisiana Ammunition Disposal (.pdf 117KB)

SHREVEPORT, La. – United States Attorney Stephanie A. Finley announced that a federal grand jury returned a 32-count indictment, unsealed today, charging six company officials of Explo Systems Inc. of defrauding the federal government and committing federal offenses relating to a munitions demilitarization contract with the U.S. Army.

Infomation Releases - United States Settles False Claims Act Allegations Against Coastal Spine And Pain For $7.4 Million

Wed, 31 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

United States Settles False Claims Act Allegations Against Coastal Spine And Pain For $7.4 Million (.pdf 120KB)

Jacksonville, FL – United States Attorney A. Lee Bentley, III announces today that Physicians Group Services, P.A., doing business as Coastal Spine and Pain (“Coastal”), has agreed to pay $7.4 million to the government to resolve allegations that Coastal violated the False Claims Act by performing medically unnecessary drug screening procedures.

Audit Report - Designation of Contracting Officer’s Representatives and Oversight Framework Could Be Improved for Contracts in Afghanistan

Tue, 30 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-131)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
Designation of Contracting Officer’s Representatives and Oversight Framework Could Be Improved for Contracts in Afghanistan (Project No. D2015-D000JB-0239.000)

Objective

We determined whether contracting officer’s representatives (CORs) were properly appointed and trained, and were able to effectively perform their oversight responsibilities for contracts performed in Afghanistan. A COR is an individual designated by a Government contracting officer to perform specific technical or administrative functions for Government contracts.

We performed this audit in response to a February 2015 U.S. Forces−Afghanistan policy memorandum requesting the DoD Office of Inspector General to review COR performance in the Combined/ Joint Operations Area−Afghanistan. We nonstatistically selected 16 contracts, some with multiple CORs.

Findings

We determined that CORs in Afghanistan generally met training requirements. However, we determined that CORs were not properly appointed after COR designation guidelines were revised. None of the 24 COR designation letters dated after DoD guidelines for designation letters were revised in March 2015 met the additional requirements included in the revised guidelines. Specifically, the designation letters did not include certification that the COR met qualification requirements, identify all required contractual information, address standards of conduct or conflicts of interest, and were not signed by the COR’s management. CORs were not appointed in accordance with DoD guidelines because the contracting activities did not update COR policies or standardized appointment documentation. As a result, CORs may not be fully aware of contract requirements and the importance of contract oversight to the requiring activity. The designation letter is the written notification from the contracting officer to the COR specifying the extent of the COR’s authority to act on behalf of the contracting officer, and the omission of the required elements may result in CORs being unaware of the responsibilities they are agreeing to perform.

CORs and in-country representatives¹ could effectively perform oversight on 12 of 16 contracts. However, for 4 of 16 contracts, the contracting activities did not establish an effective oversight framework to ensure contracted services conformed to contract requirements. Specifically:

A U.S. Naval Sea Systems contract did not have a quality assurance surveillance plan because the contracting officer did not follow Defense acquisition guidelines.

An in-country representative for a U.S. Naval Sea Systems contract did not receive guidance on oversight duties from the COR because the quality assurance surveillance plan did not specify oversight responsibilities for in-country representatives.

One COR assigned to two contracts for U.S. Army Contracting Command–Rock Island was also assigned to multiple other contracts and performed many other duties, and may not have had sufficient time to perform all COR oversight responsibilities.

Without a strong oversight framework, the contracting activities had limited assurance that these four contractors were meeting the performance standards required by the contracts.

Three contracting activities took corrective action as a result of our audit. Specifically, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Defense Contract Management Agency revised their instructions to ensure COR designation letters followed the revised DoD guidelines.

Recommendations

We recommend that officials from Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, update their contract management system and the COR designation sample template form to include all DoD requirements. We also recommend that officials from U.S. Army Contracting Command–Rock Island, U.S. Army Contracting Command–Aberdeen Proving Ground,² U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Naval Sea Systems develop guidance that requires contracting officers to review all future COR designation letters for contracts in Afghanistan for compliance with DoD guidelines before issuance. In addition, we recommend that all six contracting activities included in the audit review all their COR designation letters for contracts in Afghanistan produced since the issuance of revised DoD guidelines for designation letters and before the implementation of the activities’ revised contracting policies to confirm that the letters comply with DoD guidelines. We recommend that the activities issue updated designation letters to address all requirements in the revised DoD guidelines.

We recommend that officials from U.S. Naval Sea Systems issue guidance to contracting officers to obtain a quality assurance surveillance plan for all service contracts, and ensure that the plan includes specific oversight responsibilities for in-country representatives when the COR is based outside Afghanistan. Finally, we recommend that officials from U.S. Army Contracting Command–Rock Island coordinate with the requiring activities to ensure nominated CORs have sufficient time to perform oversight responsibilities.

Management Comments and Our Response

Comments from officials at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command, and U.S. Transportation Command addressed all specifics of the recommendations and no further comments are required.

The Executive Director, U.S. Army Contracting Command-Rock Island, and the Executive Director, U.S. Army Contracting Command-Aberdeen Proving Ground submitted comments on the draft report too late to include them in the final report. The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that these officials provide comments in response to this report.

¹ An in-country representative is a Government official who validates requirements for contract performance in his or her country of residence and coordinates with the requiring activity and the COR in the continental United States.

² Contracts for U.S. Army Communications–Electronics Command were managed by U.S. Army Contracting Command–Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Audit Report - DoD Officials Did Not Take Appropriate Action When Notified of Potential Travel Card Misuse at Casinos and Adult Entertainment Establishments

Tue, 30 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-127)
Topic: Financial Management
DoD Officials Did Not Take Appropriate Action When Notified of Potential Travel Card Misuse at Casinos and Adult Entertainment Establishments (Project No. D2015-D000CL-0221.000)

Objective

We determined whether DoD cardholders who used Government travel cards at casinos and adult entertainment establishments for personal use sought or received reimbursement for their charges. We also determined whether disciplinary action had been taken when personnel misused Government travel cards and if the misuse was reported to the appropriate security office.

This audit was a follow-up to a previous report we had issued, Report No. DODIG-2015-125, “DoD Cardholders Used Their Government Travel Cards for Personal Use at Casinos and Adult Entertainment Establishments,” May 19, 2015. In response to that report, the Senate Committee on Armed Services requested an additional review. We performed this audit in response to that request.

Finding

We determined that DoD management (cardholder’s commander or supervisor) and travel card officials did not take appropriate action when notified by the DoD OIG, during the previous audit, that cardholders had potentially misused their travel card. In this follow-up audit, we reviewed management’s actions for 30 nonstatistically selected cardholders with the highest dollar amount of high-risk transactions that had been referred to management in the prior audit. During this audit, we found that:

DoD management and travel card officials did not perform adequate reviews for the sampled cardholders;

DoD management did not take action to eliminate additional misuse;

DoD management did not initiate travel voucher reviews for cardholders with travel card personal use to determine whether there were improper payments; specifically, 22 of 29 cardholders (1 cardholder did not have travel vouchers during the period of review) sought and received reimbursements on 131 vouchers totaling $8,544 that directly reimbursed or indirectly may have reimbursed the cardholder’s personal use of the travel card (see Appendix D for DoD management collection efforts of overpayments); and

DoD management did not consistently consider the security implications of improper personal use of the travel card; specifically, only 2 of 30 cardholders (5 cardholders did not have security clearances) were reported to the appropriate adjudicative facility prior to this audit (see Appendix E for DoD management actions on security clearances).

This occurred because Defense Travel Management Office officials and DoD management for the 30 selected cardholders did not emphasize proper use of the travel card, and DoD policy did not sufficiently specify what actions DoD officials should take when misuse was identified. As a result,

the travel card program remained vulnerable to continued misuse;

DoD had less money available for legitimate travel expenses because of the travel overpayments;

DoD experienced potential national security vulnerabilities due to the untimely reporting or non‑reporting of derogatory information regarding misuse of Government travel cards to the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility, resulting in the delay or lack of adjudication (decision on security clearance eligibility) for cleared DoD cardholders with financial concerns or personal conduct issues; and

cardholders were not offered assistance for financial concerns and gambling addictions.

Recommendations

We made several recommendations to address these problems. See the Recommendations section of the finding in the report. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:

report travel card misuse under investigation to the appropriate facility and the report outcome of the investigation; and

report misuse of travel cards in a timely manner on individuals without a security clearance.

We recommend that the Director, Defense Travel Management Office, improve the identification of personal use of the travel card and disciplinary actions taken by revising the “Government Travel Charge Card Regulations.”

Management Comments and Our Response

The Director, Counterintelligence and Security, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, agreed with the recommendation, and addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Specifically, the Director stated the recommended requirements will be added to DoD 5200.02-R, which was converted to a manual and is expected to be published by December 31, 2016. Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Personnel Policy, responding for the Director, Defense Travel Management Office, agreed with the recommendations but did not address the specifics of the recommendations on what actions that the Defense Travel Management Office would take to update the “Government Travel Charge Card Regulations.” We request additional comments for these recommendations.

Audit Report - U.S. Army Contracting Command–Redstone Arsenal and U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity Properly Awarded and Administered Firm‑fixed‑price Level‑of‑effort Term Contract Actions

Tue, 30 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-132)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
U.S. Army Contracting Command–Redstone Arsenal and U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity Properly Awarded and Administered Firm‑fixed‑price Level‑of‑effort Term Contract Actions (Project No. D2016-D000CN-0069.000)

Objective

We determined whether Army Contracting Command-Redstone Arsenal (ACC‑RA) and U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity (USAMRAA), officials properly awarded and administered firm-fixed‑price level‑of‑effort term contracts in accordance with Federal and DoD regulations and policies. A firm‑fixed‑price level‑of‑effort term contract requires the contractor to provide a specified level‑of‑effort over a stated period of time on work that can be stated only in general terms and the Government is required to pay the contractor a fixed‑dollar amount. Firm‑fixed-price level‑of‑effort term contracts are suitable for investigations or studies in a specific research and development area.

During FY 2014 and FY 2015, ACC‑RA and USAMRAA awarded 73 FFP LOE term contract actions totaling $332 million. Of the 73 contract actions from ACC‑RA and USAMRAA, we non-statistically selected 15 contract actions for review (nine base contracts and six task orders). The 15 contract actions were for various research and development efforts for medical, software development, and engineering services.

Finding

ACC‑RA and USAMRAA contracting officials properly awarded firm‑fixed‑price level‑of‑effort term contracts and task orders in accordance with Federal and DoD guidelines.

Specifically, for the nine contracts and six task orders reviewed, ACC‑RA and USAMRAA contracting officials properly justified the use of the firm‑fixed‑price level‑of‑effort term contract type. In addition, ACC‑RA and USAMRAA contracting officials properly administered the reviewed firm‑fixed‑price level‑of‑effort contracts and task orders by designating qualified contracting officer’s representatives to monitor contractor performance and providing adequate contract surveillance. As a result, DoD Components benefited by using firm‑fixed‑price level‑of‑effort term contracts that allowed contractors the flexibility to develop innovative research and new technologies in support of the warfighter. Therefore, we are not making any recommendations.

Management Comments and Our Response

We provided a discussion draft to ACC‑RA, and U.S. AMRAA officials on July 12, 2016; however, they did not provide comments.

Audit Report - NSA Should Take Additional Steps in Its Privileged Access-Related Secure-the-Net Initiatives

Mon, 29 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-129)
Topic: Cyber Security
NSA Should Take Additional Steps in Its Privileged Access-Related Secure-the-Net Initiatives (Project No. D2016-D000RC-0072.000)

Audit Report - XM25 Schedule Delays, Cost Increases, and Performance Problems Continue, and Procurement Quantity Not Justified (Redacted)

Mon, 29 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-128)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
XM25 Schedule Delays, Cost Increases, and Performance Problems Continue, and Procurement Quantity Not Justified (Redacted) (Project No. D2016-D000AU-0004.000)

Announced Projects - Evaluation of Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Allocation Process Supporting Counterterrorism Operations in Afghanistan (Project No. D2016-DISPA2-0195.000)

Thu, 25 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Evaluation of Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Allocation Process Supporting Counterterrorism Operations in Afghanistan (Project No. D2016-DISPA2-0195.000)

Announced Projects - Evaluation of Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Process for Operation Inherent Resolve (Project No. D2016-DISPA2-0194.000)

Thu, 25 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Evaluation of Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Process for Operation Inherent Resolve (Project No. D2016-DISPA2-0194.000)

Audit Report - Improvements Needed in Managing the Other Defense Organizations’ Suspense Accounts

Thu, 25 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-126)
Topic: Financial Management
Improvements Needed in Managing the Other Defense Organizations’ Suspense Accounts (Project No. D2015-D000FE-0186.000)

Objective

We determined whether DoD had controls in place to record Other Defense Organizations’ (ODO) (Treasury Index 97) suspense account balances on the proper component-level financial statements. In addition, we determined whether the accounts were being used for their intended purpose and that transactions were resolved in a timely manner.

Findings

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) did not have controls in place to accurately record ODO suspense account balances on the proper component-level financial statements or to clear the suspense account transactions in a timely manner. DFAS personnel incorrectly concluded that suspense accounts were immaterial and did not develop adequate procedures to manage and account for the transactions in the ODO suspense accounts. As a result, DFAS reported inaccurate amounts on the consolidated ODO financial statements and could not support the balances with source documentation. In addition, the consolidated suspense account balances are material to most of the individual ODOs’ financial statements. Therefore, not allocating the consolidated suspense account balances to the individual ODOs could have a significant impact on the auditability of the individual ODOs’ financial statements. Further, unresolved transactions residing in the suspense accounts can conceal problem disbursements and improper payments.

DFAS incorrectly used the ODO suspense accounts to record collections generated from revenue programs and to temporarily hold Thrift Savings Plan and tax withholdings collected from civilian employees. DoD did not take the necessary action to implement the appropriate accounting treatment for the transactions. In addition, DoD guidance required DoD agencies to use the suspense accounts for purposes that were inconsistent with OMB and Treasury’s stated purpose of the suspense accounts. As a result, as of September 30, 2015, DFAS inappropriately included $17.9 million in transactions in the suspense accounts. Also, DoD understated its budgetary resources by not including the revenue-generating programs in an identifiable appropriation as available to spend.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Directors, DFAS–Indianapolis and DFAS–Columbus, perform regular and recurring reconciliations of the suspense account data and remediate any deficiencies that impact the accuracy of the balances. Further, the Directors, DFAS–Indianapolis and DFAS–Columbus, should develop an estimate using relevant, sufficient, and reliable information to record the consolidated ODO suspense account balances on the individual ODOs’ financial statements.

We also recommend that the Directors, DFAS–Indianapolis and DFAS–Columbus, coordinate with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to establish special and deposit fund accounts to more appropriately record and report on-suspense account transactions.

Management Comments and Our Response

Comments from the Director, DFAS Audit Readiness on behalf of the Director DFAS–Indianapolis and DFAS–Columbus, were generally responsive. However, DFAS did not present an actionable plan for removing the Intragovernmental Payments and Collections amounts from the suspense accounts in response to Recommendation A.1.c. As a result, we ask that the Director, DFAS Audit Readiness provide additional comments in response to this recommendation.

Audit Report - The Navy Needs More Comprehensive Guidance for Evaluating and Supporting Cost‑Effectiveness of Large‑Scale Renewable Energy Projects (Redacted)

Thu, 25 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-130)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
The Navy Needs More Comprehensive Guidance for Evaluating and Supporting Cost‑Effectiveness of Large‑Scale Renewable Energy Projects (Redacted) (Project No. D2015-D000RA-0195.000)

Objective

Our audit objective was to determine whether the U.S. Navy was adequately assessing the cost‑effectiveness of large‑scale renewable energy projects in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility.

Finding

Navy personnel conducted cost‑effectiveness assessments for the three U.S. Pacific Command large-scale renewable energy projects included in our audit: Solar Multiple Award Contract (Hawaii), Guam Photovoltaic Renewable Energy, and West Loch Photovoltaic Power (Hawaii). However, Navy personnel could not provide adequate documentation to support the assumptions and calculations made in their assessments. Without that documentation, we could not determine the accuracy of the assessments.

Navy personnel could not support the assumptions and calculations made in their assessments because Navy guidance does not include specific steps for evaluating the cost‑effectiveness of renewable energy projects and does not require that supporting documentation be maintained. As a result, the Navy lacks assurance that cost‑effectiveness assessments for its large‑scale renewable energy projects are accurate, and that appropriate investment decisions are made.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment:

develop new, or modify existing, Navy guidance to include comprehensive steps to evaluate and document the cost‑effectiveness assessments for large-scale renewable energy projects; and

once new or modified guidance is issued, determine whether approved renewable energy projects are cost‑effective based on those policies and procedures, and take appropriate action based on that determination.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment, responding for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment, agreed with the recommendations. However, the Principal Deputy’s responses only partially addressed the recommendation to develop new, or modify existing, Navy guidance. Specifically, his comments did not indicate that the updated guidance would include comprehensive steps to evaluate and document the cost-effectiveness assessments for large-scale renewable energy projects. We request that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment provide additional comments on how this recommendation will be fully addressed.

The Principal Deputy’s responses addressed all the specifics of the recommendation to determine whether approved renewable energy projects are cost-effective based on new or modified guidance and to take appropriate action based on that determination. The Principal Deputy stated that the Department of the Navy plans to establish parameters for a later review of renewable energy projects to provide data for analytical or business improvements. We obtained clarification from an official with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment, who stated that the Department of the Navy will oversee its renewable energy projects, including a review of renewable energy projects to confirm that the projects are cost-effective, and consider a full range of options if the Department of the Navy determines that any executed renewable energy projects are no longer in the best interest of the Government. No further comments are required for this recommendation.

We request that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment provide comments on the other recommendation by September 23, 2016.

Infomation Releases - Former MCC Construction Company Officer and Owner Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Defraud Government

Tue, 23 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Former MCC Construction Company Officer and Owner Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Defraud Government (.pdf 53KB)

WASHINGTON – Walter Crummy, a former officer and owner of MCC Construction Company (MCC), pleaded guilty to a federal charge of conspiring to commit wire fraud. Crummy also agreed to pay forfeiture in the amount of $105,618.

Infomation Releases - Former Executives of Military Contractor Sentenced to Prison for Illegally Exporting Weapons Parts

Mon, 22 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Former Executives of Military Contractor Sentenced to Prison for Illegally Exporting Weapons Parts (.pdf 98KB)

Four former employees of Sabre Defence Industries, LLC (“Sabre”), a defense contractor formerly based in Nashville, were sentenced Friday in connection with their role in illegally exporting firearm components and other defense items, announced David Rivera, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Tennessee.

Infomation Releases - Former Navy Range Manager Sentenced To 18-months For Accepting Illegal Gratuities

Mon, 22 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Former Navy Range Manager Sentenced To 18-months For Accepting Illegal Gratuities (.pdf 27KB)

RALEIGH – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of North Carolina announced that on Friday, August 19, 2016, in federal court, Chief United States District Judge James C. Dever III sentenced HARRY C. MANN, 80, of Manns Harbor, North Carolina, to an 18-month term of imprisonment, ordered him to pay $149,999 in restitution to the United States Defense Logistics Agency, and imposed a $75,000 fine.

Infomation Releases - Businessman Convicted of Offering Millions of Dollars to Department of Defense Procurement Official

Fri, 19 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Businessman Convicted of Offering Millions of Dollars to Department of Defense Procurement Official (.pdf 118KB)

ALEXANDRIA, Va. – Razak A. Dosunmu, 61, of Washington, D.C., was convicted yesterday by a federal jury on charges of offering illegal gratuities to a procurement official with the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) while Dosunmu was negotiating aviation fuel contracts with DLA worth over $1 billion.

Infomation Releases - California Woman Sentenced to 50 Months in Prison for Conspiring to Illegally Export Fighter Jet Engines and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to China

Fri, 19 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

California Woman Sentenced to 50 Months in Prison for Conspiring to Illegally Export Fighter Jet Engines and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to China (.pdf 93KB)

Wenxia Man, aka Wency Man, 45, of San Diego, was sentenced today to 50 months in prison for conspiring to export and cause the export of fighter jet engines, an unmanned aerial vehicle – commonly known as a drone – and related technical data to the People’s Republic of China in violation of the Arms Export Control Act.

Audit Policy and Oversight Report - DoD Freedom of Information Act Policies Need Improvement

Thu, 18 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Policy and Oversight Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-124)
Topic: FOIA
DoD Freedom of Information Act Policies Need Improvement

The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs requested that the DoD Inspector General determine whether noncareer officials were adversely affecting the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process at DoD between January 2007 and July 2015. Specifically, we evaluated whether noncareer officials in DoD unduly influenced the FOIA response process through unnecessary delays or withholding of information that would have otherwise been released absent the noncareer official’s involvement. We conducted this evaluation from July 2015 through May 2016 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations,” published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

What is New - Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2016-June 30, 2016

Thu, 18 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2016-June 30, 2016

Audit Report - DoD’s Policies, Procedures, and Practices for Information Security Management of Covered Systems (Redacted)

Mon, 15 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-123)
Topic: Cyber Security
DoD’s Policies, Procedures, and Practices for Information Security Management of Covered Systems (Redacted) (Project No. D2016-D000RC-0097.000)

Objective

We summarized DoD’s policies, procedures, and practices related to implementing logical access controls, conducting software inventories, implementing information security management, and monitoring and detecting data exfiltration and other cyber threats. We also assessed whether DoD Components followed logical access control policies, procedures, and practices. The DoD Office of Inspector General prepared this report in response to the requirements of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, section 406, December 18, 2015.

Results

The DoD has policies, procedures, and practices related to logical access controls, including multifactor authentication;¹ software and license inventories; monitoring and threat detection capabilities; and information security requirements for third‑party service providers. In summary:

The DoD issued logical access policies, including policies requiring the use of multifactor authentication. In addition, DoD network and system owners issued procedures for implementing logical access controls using the National Institute of Standards and Technology catalog of system and privacy controls. However, the DoD audit community identified instances of DoD Components not following logical access control requirements.

The DoD issued policies that require system owners to conduct inventories of software. However, the DoD did not have policy for conducting software license inventories. Officials with the DoD Office of the Chief Information Officer stated that they are establishing an agencywide policy for conducting software license inventories in response to a 2014 recommendation in a Government Accountability Office report. Although DoD did not have an agencywide policy, three DoD Components had policies for conducting inventories for software licenses.

The DoD uses nine capabilities for monitoring and detecting threats and data exfiltration. This includes the use of firewalls, host-based security systems, intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, and network analysis tools. All nine DoD Components reported using capabilities to monitor its networks and systems to detect threats and data exfiltration.

The DoD issued policies that require DoD Components to ensure third-party service providers implement information security management practices such as conducting software inventories and deploying threat monitoring and detection capabilities.

Recommendations

In this report, we identify recommendations from previous audits. Therefore, this report contains no new recommendations and is provided for information purposes only.

Management Comments

Because the report does not contain new recommendations, we did not request management comments.

¹ Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of a user or verifying the source and integrity of data. The Act defines multifactor authentication as the use of not fewer than two authentication factors, such as:

something known to the user, such as a password or personal identification number;

an access device provided to the user, such as a cryptographic identification device or token; or

a unique biometric characteristic of the user, such as fingerprints or face recognition.

Audit Policy and Oversight Report - External Peer Review Report on the United States Special Operations Command Office of Inspector General Audit Division

Mon, 15 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Policy and Oversight Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-122)
Topic: External Peer Review
External Peer Review Report on the United States Special Operations Command Office of Inspector General Audit Division

Administrative Investigations Report - Headquarters, Special Operations Command, Africa Stuttgart, Germany

Wed, 10 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Administrative Investigations Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-121)
Topic: Administrative Investigation
Headquarters, Special Operations Command, Africa Stuttgart, Germany

Audit Report - Joint Improvised‑Threat Defeat Agency Needs to Improve Assessment and Documentation of Counter‐Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives (Redacted)

Tue, 09 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-120)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
Joint Improvised‑Threat Defeat Agency Needs to Improve Assessment and Documentation of Counter‐Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives (Redacted) (Project No. D2015-D000AE-0222.000)

Objective

Our audit objective was to determine whether the Joint Improvised‑Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) effectively managed initiatives for rapid deployment on the battlefield. Specifically, we evaluated JIDA processes for identifying, validating, and prioritizing requirements for countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and for developing, demonstrating, and delivering solutions to the battlefield.

Finding

When followed, JIDA processes to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for counter-IEDs and to develop, demonstrate, and deliver solutions to the battlefield were effective. However, JIDA was unable to finalize conclusions on required assessments of 8 of 95 counter-IED initiatives because not enough data were available to analyze. The following factors contributed to the lack of data:

Joint Staff did not make sure Services and combatant commanders completed timely assessments of the adequacy of JIDA‐furnished equipment following initial delivery to theater for demonstration; and

Army Test and Evaluation Command terminated its in‑theater team’s collection and reporting on the operational capabilities and limitations of counter‑IED solutions because of in‑theater force management reductions.

As a result, for the 95 initiatives, valued at $1.6 billion, JIDA spent $112.5 million for eight counter‑IED initiatives without showing evidence that the solutions were proven to help the warfighter in countering IEDs.

Additionally, we determined that of the six non‑statistically selected initiatives we reviewed, JIDA personnel did not follow established policy to:

transfer one initiative to Army, the requesting service; and

obtain a program management agreement between JIDA and the managing Service or DoD Agency for all six initiatives.

This occurred because JIDA personnel did not complete and record all required initiative documentation in their centralized database, or make sure the Director, JIDA, provided a waiver from established policy where appropriate. As a result, JIDA spent $446.8 million on the six sampled initiatives without sufficient documentation to justify transferring and assigning program management responsibilities for initiative development to the requesting service.

Recommendations

We recommend the Director, Joint Staff, establish controls to make sure the sponsors for counter-IED solutions complete an assessment of operational effectiveness and post completed assessments to the Knowledge Management/Decisions Support repository. In addition, we recommend that the Director, JIDA, develop control procedures to make sure the required supporting documentation is completed and captured.

Management Comments and Our Responses

The Director, Joint Staff, and the Director, JIDA, agreed with all recommendations. However, their comments did not fully address what actions they planned to implement the recommendations. The Director, Joint Staff, did not state how he would make sponsors complete assessments of operational effectiveness within 6 months. Further, the Director, JIDA, did not specify the control procedures he would establish to make sure required documentation was completed. Therefore, we request the Director, Joint Staff, and the Director, JIDA, provide additional comments to this report by September 9, 2016.

Audit Report - Army Commands Need to Improve Logical and Physical Security Safeguards That Protect SIPRNet Access Points

Fri, 05 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-119)
Topic: Cyber Security
Army Commands Need to Improve Logical and Physical Security Safeguards That Protect SIPRNet Access Points (Project No. D2015-D000RC-0241.000)

Audit Report - Army Justified Initial Production Plan for the Paladin Integrated Management Program but Has Not Resolved Two Vehicle Performance Deficiencies (Redacted)

Fri, 05 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-118)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
Army Justified Initial Production Plan for the Paladin Integrated Management Program but Has Not Resolved Two Vehicle Performance Deficiencies (Redacted) (Project No. D2016-D000AU-0003.000)

Objective
We determined whether the Army effectively managed the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program during the production and deployment phase. Specifically, we evaluated whether program officials justified the low-rate initial production plan and whether test plans and results adequately prepared the program for full-rate production. This report is the first in a series of reports on the Army PIM program, which includes ammunition carriers and projectile-firing armored vehicles, called howitzers, for use in ground combat. During full-rate production, the Army will complete PIM vehicle production.

Finding
PIM program officials justified their plan to produce 133 initial production vehicles. The plan included 33 test vehicles and 100 production vehicles—the minimum necessary to maintain the production line and gradually increase production before full-rate production. Further, PIM program officials initiated system fixes to address seven of the nine performance deficiencies identified by the test community during the system development phase. PIM program officials also updated test plans to evaluate vehicle performance before full-rate production. However, Army Fires Center of Excellence, which developed PIM program operational requirements, and PIM program officials continued to address test community recommendations for deficiencies in the rate-of-fire requirement and the automatic fire extinguisher system (AFES). Army officials did not fully address two test community recommendations because:

Army Fires Center of Excellence officials were revising the maximum rate‑of‑fire requirement for different firing conditions in the capability production document; and

PIM program officials were exploring methods to fix the deficiency in the AFES in howitzer crew compartments after initially disagreeing with the test community recommendation.

As a result, Army Fires Center of Excellence and PIM program officials risk deploying vehicles that do not meet performance requirements and that could endanger crews. Additionally, PIM program officials may incur costly vehicle retrofits to address the deficiency in the AFES if not adequately addressed before full-rate production.

Recommendations
We recommend the Commander, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, include a clear maximum rate‑of‑fire requirement for different firing conditions in the capability production document before operational testing. We also recommend the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, evaluate and fix the deficiency in the AFES in howitzer crew compartments before deploying the first vehicles to minimize fire risk to soldiers and reduce retrofit costs.

Management Comments and Our Response
The Commander, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, responding for the Program Executive Officer, disagreed with the recommendation. The Deputy stated that adding more AFES coverage to the crew compartment will delay fielding—risking soldier safety and decreasing Army capabilities. However, the Deputy did not support that incorporating additional AFES coverage would delay fielding the PIM program or how the delay would impact the mission, readiness, or cost. Further, the Deputy did not take into account the results and recommendations of the AFES engineering project or include a specific timeline for planned corrective actions. Without addressing the AFES deficiency, the Army could deploy vehicles that endanger crews. Therefore, we ask that the Program Executive Officer fix the AFES deficiency before deploying the first vehicles. We also request that the Program Executive Officer provide an action plan and completion dates to address the results and recommendations of the AFES engineering project.

Announced Projects - Evaluation of Military Criminal Investigative Organization Death Investigations Which Concluded Suicide as the Manner of Death (Project No. 2016CO1O)

Fri, 05 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Evaluation of Military Criminal Investigative Organization Death Investigations Which Concluded Suicide as the Manner of Death (Project No. 2016CO1O)

What is New - Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2016-June 30, 2016

Fri, 05 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2016-June 30, 2016

Infomation Releases - Former Army Private Sentenced For Stealing Fellow Soldiers’ Identities

Tue, 02 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Former Army Private Sentenced For Stealing Fellow Soldiers’ Identities (.pdf 136KB)

TOPEKA, KAN. – A former private in the U.S. Army who was stationed at Fort Riley pleaded guilty and was sentenced Tuesday to two years in federal prison for stealing his fellow soldiers’ identities, Acting U.S. Attorney Tom Beall said today. In addition, he was ordered to pay more than $23,400 in restitution.

Announced Projects - Audit of Small Business Contracting at the Department of Air Force (Project No. D2016-D000CF-0177.000)

Mon, 01 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit of Small Business Contracting at the Department of Air Force (Project No. D2016-D000CF-0177.000)

Infomation Releases - Former Department of Commerce Employee Indicted on Bribery Charges

Mon, 01 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Former Department of Commerce Employee Indicted on Bribery Charges (.pdf 130KB)

ALEXANDRIA, Va. – Raushi J. Conrad, 42, of Bristow, was arrested today on charges of conspiracy to pay and receive bribes, and acceptance of bribes by a public official.

Audit Report - Navy Needs to Establish Effective Metrics to Achieve Desired Outcomes for SPY‑1 Radar Sustainment (Redacted)

Mon, 01 Aug 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-116)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
Navy Needs to Establish Effective Metrics to Achieve Desired Outcomes for SPY‑1 Radar Sustainment (Redacted) (Project No. D2015-D000AG-0109.000)

Objective
We determined whether the performance metrics included in the Navy’s AN/SPY‑1 Phased Array Radar (SPY‑1 radar) performance-based logistics contracts appropriately incentivized the support contractors. This audit is the second in a series on SPY‑1 radar spare parts.

The SPY‑1 radar is an advanced, automatic detect and track radar system. The SPY‑1 radar is one of 13 major subsystems in the AEGIS Weapon System that searches, detects, and tracks air and surface targets to support Anti-Air Warfare and Ballistic Missile Defense missions.

Findings
Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS) did not develop and incorporate appropriate performance metrics into the performance‑based logistics contracts used to sustain SPY‑1 radars. Specifically, the metrics did not effectively incentivize Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to achieve Navy warfighter requirements or reduce the total ownership cost associated with the 327 critical SPY‑1 radar parts supported by the contracts. This condition occurred because NAVSUP WSS personnel did not follow DoD guidance when developing the performance metrics. As a result, supply support and cost reduction objectives for SPY‑1 radar parts were not met. In addition, operational availability of the AEGIS Weapon System could be adversely impacted if parts needed to maintain the SPY‑1 radars are not transported to the warfighters when needed.

Furthermore, NAVSUP WSS personnel did not adequately assess the contractors’ performance against established metrics. This occurred because NAVSUP WSS did not have written procedures to evaluate contractors’ performance toward meeting the contract metrics. As a result, NAVSUP WSS paid the contractors $18 million during NAVSUP WSS performance reviews without deducting incentive fees for poor performance that was not found during these reviews.

Recommendations
We recommend that the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, require the Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support to follow DoD guidance when developing the performance metrics incorporated in future performance-based logistics contracts used to sustain the SPY‑1 radar. Specifically, the Commander should:

establish formal support agreements with Advance Traceability and Control and the operational commands used to supply SPY‑1 radar parts to fleet customers;

review the readiness and sustainment performance history and costs of the AEGIS and SPY‑1 radars, and use that data to identify the difference between existing and desired SPY‑1 radar performance outcomes;

breakdown system-level requirements into lower-level metrics that appropriately link contractor performance to the accomplishment of warfighter readiness and performance needs;

establish written procedures that clearly describe the process to conduct semiannual performance reviews for the performance-based logistics contracts; and

perform additional reviews of the completed semiannual reports for contracts N00104-12-D-ZD21 and N00104‑13‑D-ZD00, to determine if there is a change to the amount of incentives the contractors received and take corrective actions if appropriate.

Management Comments and Our Response
The Commander, NAVSUP, addressed the specifics of the recommendation that NAVSUP WSS consult with the Navy stakeholders when reevaluating the SPY‑1 radar’s product support strategy and designing performance metrics included in future performance-based logistics contracts. However, the Commander did not provide the date when those actions would be completed. In addition, the Commander did not adequately address establishing a formal agreement between the two NAVSUP organizations involved in supplying SPY‑1 radar parts to fleet customers.

The Commander, NAVSUP, agreed to:

review the AEGIS and SPY‑1 historical performance and costs to assess operational readiness;

review the PBL performance metrics that we determined were not adequate; and

assess whether the metrics need refinement.

However, comments from the Commander did not address all the specifics of the recommendations to use the data to develop lower-level metrics that incentivize the contractors to deliver the desired SPY‑1 radar performance outcomes.

The Commander agreed to develop written procedures for conducting semiannual performance reviews. The Commander also agreed to reexamine the completed reviews for accuracy. However, the Commander did not specify what actions the contracting officers would take in response to the review reassessment results. We request that the Commander, NAVSUP, provide comments in response to the report by August 31, 2016.

Audit Report - Marine Corps Installations National Capital Region–Regional Contracting Office Generally Implemented Recommendations

Fri, 29 Jul 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-117)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
Marine Corps Installations National Capital Region–Regional Contracting Office Generally Implemented Recommendations (Project No. D2016-D000CF-0155.000)

Objective

We determined whether the Marine Corps Regional Contracting Office–National Capital Region implemented the recommendations in Report No. DODIG-2015-095, “Small Business Contracting at Regional Contracting Office–National Capital Region Needs Improvement,” March 20, 2015. On October 6, 2015, the Marine Corps Regional Contracting Office–National Capital Region was renamed as Marine Corps Installations National Capital Region–Regional Contracting Office (MCINCR‑RCO). We will use the new name throughout the report.

Finding

In Report No. DODIG-2015-095, we determined that MCINCR‑RCO generally provided small businesses with the opportunity to compete for prime contracts; however, contracting officials did not ensure that prime contractors provided small businesses adequate subcontracting opportunities. We made four recommendations to the Director, MCINCR‑RCO, to address deficiencies in overseeing contractors’ subcontracting goals and ensuring there are no missed opportunities to recoup damages when subcontracting goals are not met.

MCINCR‑RCO contracting officials addressed all four recommendations in Report No. DODIG-2015-095 and, therefore, those recommendations will be closed.

Specifically, for three recommendations, MCINCR‑RCO contracting officials:

established policy requiring contracting officials to obtain adequate subcontracting plans from contractors when the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires subcontracting plans (Recommendation 1);

established policy requiring contracting officials to verify that contractors submit the required subcontracting reports to the Electronic Subcontracting Reporting System (Recommendation 2); and

provided training to ensure that contracting officials understand their Federal Acquisition Regulation subpart 19.7 responsibilities for evaluating and administering subcontracting plans (Recommendation 3).

For Recommendation 4, MCINCR‑RCO contracting officials determined that the contractors for contracts M00264-08-D-0001 and M00264-13-C-0019 made good faith efforts to meet the small business subcontracting goals in their subcontracting plans; however, they did not support their good faith effort determination.

We obtained information directly from the Electronic Subcontracting Reporting System for contract M00264-13-C-0019 and from the contractor for contract M00264-08-D-0001 through MCINCR‑RCO contracting officials. We determined that both contractors met their small business subcontracting goals. Therefore, no liquidated damages were due, and Recommendation 4 will be closed.

Management Comments

We provided a discussion draft of this report on July 14, 2016. No written response to this report was required, and none was received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

Infomation Releases - United States Sues Former Executives of Government Contractor for Making False Claims in Connection with Reconstruction Contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq

Thu, 28 Jul 2016 04:00:00 GMT

United States Sues Former Executives of Government Contractor for Making False Claims in Connection with Reconstruction Contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq (.pdf 125KB)

The Justice Department announced today that the government has filed suit under the False Claims Act against Derish M. Wolff and Salvatore J. Pepe, respectively the former CEO and CFO of Louis Berger Group Inc. (LBG), for conspiring to overbill the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other government agencies for costs incurred performing reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries, the Justice Department announced today. LBG is based in East Orange, New Jersey.

Audit Report - Actions Needed to Improve the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reporting of Operating Materials and Supplies

Tue, 26 Jul 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-114)
Topic: Financial Management
Actions Needed to Improve the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reporting of Operating Materials and Supplies (Project No. D2015-D000FL-0238.000)

Objective

We determined whether the Operating Materials and Supplies (OM&S)–Ammunition owned by the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force (the other Services) and held by the Army was accurately reported on each Service’s respective financial statements.

Findings

Army-held, other Services-owned OM&S–Ammunition was not accurately reported on each of the other Service’s financial statements. Specifically, Army and other Service personnel did not adequately reconcile their records for 65.9 million Army-held OM&S–Ammunition, valued at $1.7 billion. This occurred because the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group OM&S–Ammunition management policies and procedures did not require the Army and other Services to comply with the DoD guidelines that require records maintained by the Army, as custodian, and the other Services’ financial reporting records to be the same.

In addition, other Services’ personnel recorded $8.5 billion of OM&S–Ammunition to the incorrect OM&S categories; inaccurately reported $1.6 billion in Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable OM&S assets; and inadequately supported $57 million in financial statement adjustments. This occurred because Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD personnel did not provide adequate OM&S financial recording and reporting guidance, and the other Services’ personnel did not implement effective controls over the OM&S financial statement compilation processes.

Recommendations

We recommend that the:

Commander, Army Joint Munitions Command, as Chairman of the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group, develop and issue policies and procedures to require the Army and other Services to comply with the DoD guidelines that require Army’s records to be the same as the owner’s records. Specifically, develop policies and procedures that require the Army and other Services to perform complete, quarterly reconciliations and retain OM&S–Ammunition asset documentation in accordance with DoD and U.S. National Archives and Records Administration guidance.

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD provide adequate OM&S financial recording and reporting guidance, including guidance to ensure OM&S–Ammunition records are correctly categorized and Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable OM&S is accurately reported.

Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, Global Logistics Support Ammo and Deputy Chief of Staff Air Force Headquarters, A4, in coordination with the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller), comply with DoD criteria for ensuring OM&S–Ammunition records are correctly categorized.

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) reconcile amounts reported by field locations to General Accounting and Finance System–Re-Engineered on a quarterly basis and resolve differences.

Management Comments and Our Response

Comments on behalf of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller); Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller); Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Headquarters, A4; and Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, Global Logistics Support Ammo addressed all specifics of the recommendations, and no additional comments are required. However, comments from the Deputy Chief Financial Officer, responding on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, and the Executive Director for Ammunition, Army JMC, responding on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group, partially addressed their respective recommendations. The actions cited by the Deputy Chief Financial Officer did not completely address the specifics of the recommendation regarding disclosure of the valuation of Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable OM&S. The cited standard disclosure does not provide sufficient information on the basis for the valuation of Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable OM&S and does not inform the reader that this basis is not compliant with Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Standards. In addition, the actions proposed by the Executive Director did not completely address the development and implementation of policies and procedures to ensure:

identification of requirements for reconciliation of cited data fields and inclusion of both wholesale and retail data;

proper cataloging of cited data fields;

Army and the other Services validate reconciliation file completeness;

other Services specify and define the codes used to indicate ownership; and

retention of custodial record supporting documentation for at least 2 years after

asset disposal or removal from agency’s financial statement.

Therefore, we request the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, and Chairman of the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group provide additional comments to this report by August 25, 2016.

Audit Report - Army General Fund Adjustments Not Adequately Documented or Supported

Tue, 26 Jul 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-113)
Topic: Financial Management
Army General Fund Adjustments Not Adequately Documented or Supported (Project No. D2015-D000FL-0243.000)

Objective

We determined whether adjustments made to Army General Fund (AGF) data during the FY 2015 financial statement compilation process were adequately documented and supported. In addition, we assessed the internal controls over the compilation process.

Finding

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller) (OASA[FM&C]) and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Indianapolis (DFAS Indianapolis) did not adequately support $2.8 trillion in third quarter journal voucher (JV) adjustments and $6.5 trillion in yearend JV adjustments¹ made to AGF data during FY 2015 financial statement compilation.² The unsupported JV adjustments occurred because OASA(FM&C) and DFAS Indianapolis did not prioritize correcting the system deficiencies that caused errors resulting in JV adjustments, and did not provide sufficient guidance for supporting system‑generated adjustments.

In addition, DFAS Indianapolis did not document or support why the Defense Departmental Reporting System‑Budgetary (DDRS-B), a budgetary reporting system, removed at least 16,513 of 1.3 million records during third quarter FY 2015. This occurred because DFAS Indianapolis did not have detailed documentation describing the DDRS-B import process or have accurate or complete system reports.

As a result, the data used to prepare the FY 2015 AGF third quarter and yearend financial statements were unreliable and lacked an adequate audit trail. Furthermore, DoD and Army managers could not rely on the data in their accounting systems when making management and resource decisions. Until the Army and DFAS Indianapolis correct these control deficiencies, there is considerable risk that AGF financial statements will be materially misstated and the Army will not achieve audit readiness by the congressionally mandated deadline of September 30, 2017.

Recommendations

OASA(FM&C) should periodically review system-generated adjustments to understand the reasons for the adjustments and to verify the support for the adjustments. OASA(FM&C) and DFAS Indianapolis should provide resources to review system change requests to correct system deficiencies that caused errors resulting in JV adjustments, determine when the requests will be implemented, and develop new cost‑effective corrective actions if they will not be implemented; identify root causes of errors that result in unsupported JV adjustments, including system-generated adjustments; and develop corrective actions with milestones to correct the identified root causes. DFAS Indianapolis should revise the manual used to support system-generated adjustments, fully document the complete DDRS-B import process, and update the Army Report Data Type Management Report and Feeder File Inventory Control Report to ensure the information they contain is accurate and complete. See the full report for additional recommendations.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations), responding for the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller), and the Director, DFAS Indianapolis, agreed with the recommendations. Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary and the Director addressed all the specifics of the recommendations to provide the resources necessary to review system change requests, identify root causes of errors that result in unsupported JV adjustments, identify support for JV adjustments that cannot be eliminated and system-generated adjustments, and update system-generated reports. Therefore, we are not requesting additional comments for these recommendations. However, comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary and the Director did not address all the specifics of the other recommendations. The actions proposed by the Army and DFAS Indianapolis will not:

provide an understanding of the reasons for system-generated JV adjustments,

address the prioritization of system change requests for correcting system deficiencies resulting in JV adjustments, and

address the full scope of JV adjustments that may potentially be eliminated.

In addition, the Director, DFAS Indianapolis, comments do not address the DDRS-B import process for general ledger files. Therefore, we request that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller) and the Director, DFAS Indianapolis, provide additional comments to this report by August 25, 2016.

1 JV adjustments adjust errors identified during financial statement compilation; record accounting entries that, due to system limitations or timing differences, have not been otherwise recorded; and are used for month and yearend closing purposes.

2 Amounts are not cumulative and should not be added together.

Audit Report - U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan Did Not Implement Controls to Effectively Maintain Facilities at the Joint Training Center–Jordan

Tue, 26 Jul 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-115)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan Did Not Implement Controls to Effectively Maintain Facilities at the Joint Training Center–Jordan (Project No. D2016-D000JB-0101.000)

Objective

Our objective was to determine whether DoD is effectively maintaining facilities at the Joint Training Center (JTC)–Jordan.

JTC is a contingency base occupied by elements of the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and Allied partners. There are two types of U.S.-occupied facilities on JTC: JAF‑owned facilities and U.S.-built facilities. The U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan (ASE-J) pays a monthly utilization fee for the use of the JAF‑owned facilities. In March 2016, the ASE-J and JAF entered into an Implementing Arrangement (IA) to the U.S.-Jordan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, which outlined reimbursement for maintenance performed by the JAF for the JAF‑owned, U.S.-occupied facilities. However, ASE-J personnel stated the IA did not require JAF to provide maintenance to U.S.-built facilities on JTC.

Finding

ASE-J made significant life, health, and safety improvements throughout FY 2016 at the JTC. Specifically, the ASE-J replaced flooring in several housing units, rewired entire housing blocks, and purchased new housing units. However, A SE-J did not adequately coordinate with JAF to ensure U.S.‑occupied facilities were effectively maintained at the JTC. Specifically, in the past year, the JTC experienced:

non-operational street lights,

holes and soft spots in the floors of the housing units, and

water leaks in the latrines.

This occurred because, prior to March 2016, no formalized agreement existed between ASE-J and the JAF outlining how maintenance for JAF‑owned, U.S.‑occupied facilities would be reimbursed by DoD. In addition, ASE-J did not ensure the ASE-J Maintenance Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) contained sufficient detail to effectively maintain U.S.‑occupied facilities at the JTC. Further, ASE‑J did not develop a mechanism, such as a separate maintenance contract, to maintain U.S.-occupied facilities.

As a result, the health and safety of U.S. military personnel at the JTC are at increased risk. In addition, DoD is at increased risk for paying for repairs it made at the JTC instead of JAF.

Recommendations

We recommended that the Commander, U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan:

amend the existing Maintenance SOP to:

establish deadlines for repairs based on risk levels;

require all work orders to be tracked on the maintenance tracker;

include the method of calculating ASE-J’s costs for repairs;

include a process for reducing the monthly utilization fee for repairs that JAF does not make; and

award a maintenance contract to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC are effectively maintained.

Management Actions

On April 14, 2016, we informed the ASE-J Commander that insufficient controls existed to effectively maintain both the JAF‑owned and U.S.-built facilities at the JTC. Specifically, the Maintenance SOP did not contain sufficient details to effectively report, track, and seek reimbursement for repair requests sent to JAF for JAF‑owned facilities. In addition, ASE-J did not have a mechanism in place to address maintenance issues with the U.S.-occupied facilities.

The ASE-J Commander agreed with our observations and immediately initiated steps to implement our suggested corrective actions. The ASE-J amended its Maintenance SOP to include: repair deadlines based on the severity of the issue, maintenance request tracking requirements, and the paperwork and coordination required with the JAF financial representative to adjust the monthly utilization fee. Additionally, ASE-J decided to utilize a Base Life Support contract to maintain all U.S.-occupied facilities, including both the JAF‑owned and U.S.-built facilities. This contract, expected to be awarded in August 2016, will provide routine maintenance and address all future deficiencies of all U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC. The management actions taken during the audit addressed the concerns we identified; therefore, we are not making any additional recommendations.

Figure 1 shows the electrical panel at the JTC dining facility.

Audit Report - Army Officials Did Not Consistently Comply With Requirements for Assessing Contractor Performance

Mon, 25 Jul 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-112)
Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
Army Officials Did Not Consistently Comply With Requirements for Assessing Contractor Performance (Project No. D2016-D000CF-0045.000)

Objective

We determined whether Army officials completed comprehensive and timely contractor performance assessment reports (PARs) for nonsystems contracts as required by Federal and DoD policies. This is the third in a series of audits on DoD compliance with policies for evaluating contractor performance.

Background

The purpose of a PAR is to provide source selection officials with information on contractor past performance. Officials prepare PARs in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). We selected a nonstatistical sample of five contracting offices that prepared 56 PARs with a contract value of $1.5 billion. These 56 PARs were for nonsystems contracts that include contracts for operations support, services, information technology, and ship repair and overhaul.

Finding

National Guard Bureau (NGB); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineering Support Center, Huntsville (CEHNC); Army Contracting Command (ACC)–Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG); ACC–Redstone Arsenal (RSA); and ACC–Warren (WRN) officials did not consistently comply with requirements for evaluating contractor past performance when preparing 56 PARs.

Specifically, officials at all five offices did not prepare 21 of 56 PARs within the 120‑day required timeframe. Officials at all five offices also prepared 52 of 56 PARs that did not include sufficient written narratives to justify the ratings given, ratings for all required evaluation factors, or sufficient descriptions of the contract purpose.

These conditions occurred because:

Army organization-specific procedures did not consistently ensure timeliness or did not address timeliness;

assessors did not understand PAR rating or evaluation factor definitions;

assessors did not take CPARS Quality and Narrative Writing training; or

Army organization-specific procedures did not require reviews of PARs to ensure compliance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

Additionally, NGB, CEHNC, and ACC-RSA officials did not have a valid reason for not registering¹ 7 of 156 contracts in CPARS. This occurred because these offices did not have procedures for registering contracts. Also, NGB, CEHNC, and ACC-RSA officials did not complete PARs for 21 contracts for various reasons that are described in detail in this report.

As a result, Federal source selection officials did not have access to timely, accurate, and complete contractor performance assessment information needed to make informed decisions related to contract awards.

Recommendations

We recommend that Army officials develop, implement, or update procedures for:

preparing PARs within 120 days;

requiring that assessors take training for writing PARs;

evaluating PARs for quality; or

registering contracts.

We also recommend that Army officials prepare 21 overdue PARs.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting, NGB; and Commander, CEHNC, agreed with the recommendations and we do not require additional comments from them. The Deputy to the Commanding General, ACC, agreed with the recommendations, but his comments did not address all specifics of the recommendations. We request that the Deputy provide comments to this report by August 24, 2016.

1 The CPARS project manager stated that registering the contracts enables the assessor to prepare the PAR in CPARS.

Audit Report - DoD Effectively Synchronized Military Information Support Operations for Operation Inherent Resolve but Needs to Develop Formal Processes and Procedures for Web-Based Operations

Mon, 25 Jul 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2016-111)
Topic: Joint Warfighting and Readiness
DoD Effectively Synchronized Military Information Support Operations for Operation Inherent Resolve but Needs to Develop Formal Processes and Procedures for Web-Based Operations (Project No. D2016-D000CN-0098.000)

Infomation Releases - Former U.S. State Department Employee Convicted in $2 Million Government Contract Conspiracy

Mon, 25 Jul 2016 04:00:00 GMT

Former U.S. State Department Employee Convicted in $2 Million Government Contract Conspiracy (.pdf 46KB)

Kenneth Apple, 65, of Beaverton, Oregon, was convicted today by a federal jury on charges related to his role in awarding $2 million in micro-dairy contracts from the U.S. government for use in Iraq.