

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy
1951–1953**

**The Korean War
Part Two**

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General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (second from the left), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, holds a meeting in the Pentagon. Left to right: General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, US Air Force; General of the Army Bradley; Lt General Charles P. Cabell, Director, Joint Staff; General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, US Army; Major General Clyde D. Eddelman, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, US Army; Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations; Vice Admiral James Fife, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations); General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant, US Marine Corps; and Major General Walter W. Wensinger, Deputy Chief of Staff, US Marine Corps. 25 November 1952

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy

Volume III
1951–1953

The Korean War Part Two

James F. Schnabel
Robert J. Watson



Office of Joint History
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Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945 to 1952 and the Korean war, were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made available as official publications.

Volume III describes the participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Korean War; their other activities during the period are covered in Volume IV, except for activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. This volume was originally planned by Mr. Wilber W. Hoare, who developed an outline and drafted six of the first seven chapters. Following a lapse of some years, these drafts were revised and expanded by Dr. Walter S. Poole, under the direction of Mr. Kenneth W. Condit. Meanwhile, other chapters, or portions thereof, had been prepared by Miss Martha Derthick, Mr. Morris MacGregor, and Miss Barbara Sorrill. In 1968, Dr. Robert J. Watson was assigned as the responsible author. He reviewed existing drafts, carried out additional research, and wrote Chapters 1 through 9 in essentially their present form. When he was transferred to other duties, Mr. James F. Schnabel assumed responsibility for the volume and planned,

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researched, and wrote the remaining eight chapters. Subsequently, all of the chapters were reviewed and revised by both Mr. Schnabel and Dr. Watson. Final revision and historical editing proceeded under the supervision of Dr. Watson in his capacity as Chief, Histories Branch, and of his successor in that position, Mr. Kenneth W. Condit. Resource constraints have prevented further revision to reflect more recent scholarship.

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, DC
March 1998

DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
Director for Joint History

Preface

At the time it was fought, the war in Korea was unique in recent American military experience. Unlike World Wars I and II, which were vigorously prosecuted on the battlefield until the enemy surrendered unconditionally, the Korean conflict ended without clear-cut military victory for either side. It was fought with limited means for limited objectives. In fact, political efforts to resolve the conflict at the negotiating table predominated during the last two years of the conflict. During this period, neither side sought a decision by military means.

The conflict in Korea also was an important milestone in the "cold war" relations between the Communist and non-Communist nations. By launching an unprovoked attack on a militarily insignificant country located in an area where none of their vital interests were involved, the Communists appeared to leaders of the non-Communist states to be giving proof of their aggressive designs for world domination. As a result, the United States reversed the policy of reducing its military establishment and launched an impressive expansion of its armed forces. At the same time, the United States joined with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to create a military command for the alliance and to incorporate German forces in it. In the Far East, the United States also acted to shore up the defenses of the non-Communist world by entering into treaties with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Nationalist China.

The Korean War provided the first wartime test for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as part of the machinery set up by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment. In this capacity, they provided strategic direction to the United Nations (UN) forces in the field and were the agency by which President Truman exercised overall control of war strategy. When the focus shifted from combat to armistice negotiations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to play an active role. They participated in all the key decisions taken during negotiations, and they provided the channel of communications between the Government in Washington and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and his armistice negotiating team in Korea.

The focus of this volume is, naturally, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as they were not acting in a vacuum, it has been necessary to describe the context in which they functioned. To this end, the actions of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning overall military strategy and armistice negotiations have been described in some detail. In addition, the consequences of

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these actions, on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, have been sketched in broad outline.

The authors received help from many sources during the preparation of this volume and gladly acknowledge their indebtedness. A special debt is owed to Mr. Ernest H. Giusti and Mr. Vernon E. Davis, respectively Chief of the Historical Division and Chief of the Special Projects Branch during most of the time this volume was being written, for their support and encouragement. Without the research assistance of Mr. Sigmund W. Musinski and his staff in the JCS Records Information and Retrieval Branch, and of the Modern Military Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, the authors' task would have been far more difficult. Special thanks are due to CWO William A. Barbee and Janet M. Lekang of the JCS Declassification Branch for the many hours they devoted to reviewing and declassifying JCS documents cited in the volume. The maps were prepared by the JCS Graphics Branch. Mrs. Janet W. Ball, Editorial Assistant, made an invaluable contribution through her cheerful and efficient direction of all phases of preparing the original manuscript. We thank Ms. Susan Carroll for preparing the Index, and Ms. Penny Norman for performing the manifold tasks necessary to put the manuscript into publishable form.

JAMES F. SCHNABEL
ROBERT J. WATSON

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Seeking a Political Solution

Interlude

During the spring of 1951, while the national policy toward Korea was being aired and argued at the “MacArthur Hearings,” events and decisions in Korea and elsewhere greatly enhanced the possibility of a political solution to the war. General Ridgway’s accession to command and the success of allied arms against Chinese mass attacks had brought a greater confidence and a new unanimity among officials in Tokyo and Washington. “During early June,” Secretary Acheson later recalled, “the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Supreme Command in Tokyo found themselves united on political objectives, strategy, and tactics for the first time since the war had started.”¹

The administration’s view was that, given existing conditions, a solution to the Korean problem must now be sought through some form of negotiated settlement. UN Secretary General Lie reflected this sentiment when he announced on 1 June that a cease-fire approximately along the 38th parallel would fulfill the main purposes of the United Nations, provided it was followed by restoration of peace and security in the area.²

Concurrently, Secretary Acheson, testifying at Congressional hearings on the relief of General MacArthur, articulated the same point of view publicly. His remarks at this time, implying as they did a willingness to accept a settlement based on the 38th parallel, may have had the unfortunate effect of causing Communist leaders to assume that the United States would agree to a Korean settlement based on a cease-fire line at or near the 38th parallel. This assumption later became an obstacle in the negotiations.³

By now, the United States had grown wary of UN initiatives for a peaceful settlement. “It was incumbent upon us to devise our own,” Secretary Acheson later recalled, since “exploration through public procedures of the United Nations or through leaky foreign offices like the Indian would be fatal.” Accordingly, the United States instigated diplomatic initiatives with Soviet officials in France and Germany during May but with no success. An effort to approach the

Chinese Communist Government in Hong Kong met with failure. Further fruitless approaches were made through US and Swedish diplomats in Moscow. Finally, in mid-May Secretary Acheson turned to Mr. George Kennan, an authority on Soviet history and government, who was then on leave from the Department of State. Secretary Acheson did not ask him to negotiate but to make clear US purposes and intentions to Soviet officials, so that they would be aware of the direction events were taking and of the dangers to be encountered if this direction were not altered. After Mr. Kennan agreed to accept the mission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), according to Secretary Acheson, "let Ridgway know that an operation was on and that he should be prepared to advise on all relevant military matters and to conduct proceedings in the field as needed. He welcomed the development."⁴

Mr. Kennan chose Mr. Yakov Malik, Deputy Foreign Commissar of the Soviet Union and Soviet Delegate to the United Nations, as his point of contact. Responding to Mr. Kennan's overtures, Mr. Malik invited him out to his Long Island home on 31 May. Their first encounter was exploratory and produced no tangible result. But at a second meeting on 5 June, after the Soviet diplomat had had time to contact Moscow, he told Mr. Kennan that his government wanted peace and a peaceful solution in Korea as quickly as possible. But, said Mr. Malik, the Soviet Union could not itself take part in discussions of a cease-fire; he therefore advised Mr. Kennan "to approach the North Koreans and the Chinese. No doubt existed in any of our minds that the message was authentic," Secretary Acheson recalled. "It had, however, a sibylline quality which left us wondering what portended and what we should do next."⁵

Two weeks passed before Mr. Malik took the next initiative. On 23 June 1951, speaking on a UN-sponsored radio broadcast, he followed through on the Kennan approach by declaring that the Soviet peoples believed that the problem of armed conflict in Korea could be settled. As a first step, discussion should begin between the belligerents, aimed at a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel.⁶

To determine positively that Mr. Malik spoke for the Soviet Government and to find out more about the Soviet position, Mr. Acheson instructed the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union to approach the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow. From Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the Ambassador determined that Mr. Malik had indeed been expressing the official Soviet position. Mr. Gromyko elaborated only to say that he felt that military representatives of the belligerents in Korea should conclude a military armistice, limited to military matters. No political or territorial matters should be raised. He maintained that he knew nothing of Communist China's attitude on cease-fire talks.⁷

The ambassadors of the countries having forces in Korea unanimously favored negotiations. The State Department proposed to have negotiations conducted at the military level, as the Soviet Union had suggested. At a JCS-State meeting on 28 June, Assistant Secretary Rusk recommended that General Ridgway broadcast an invitation to the enemy commanders to send representatives to a conference. General Bradley and General Collins approved this recommendation. General Vandenberg, however, felt that it would put the UN Command in

the position of suing for peace. The burden of asking for negotiations, in his view, should be thrust upon the enemy. Ranging beyond the question of procedure, General Vandenberg challenged the wisdom of calling off the fighting at that moment, just as the enemy was being hurt "badly." His viewpoint, however, commanded no support, even among his JCS colleagues. General Collins believed that an armistice would be advantageous to the UN Command because its forces now stood upon a good defensive line. General Bradley foresaw difficulties in obtaining continued public support for the war effort in the United States and other countries if the UN Command failed to grasp this apparent opportunity to end the fighting. It was agreed that a working group should prepare a message to General Ridgway, incorporating the text of a broadcast to the enemy calling for the opening of negotiations.⁸

A message was at once drafted by the Director, Joint Staff (Admiral Davis), and Mr. U. Alexis Johnson of the State Department. It was quickly approved at a second JCS-State meeting and dispatched to General Ridgway for review. A revised version, reflecting General Ridgway's comments as submitted in a teletype conference, was approved on the morning of 29 June, passed up the line for Presidential approval, and sent to General Ridgway that same day. In accord with its provisions, CINCUNC, at 0800 on 30 June (Tokyo time), addressed the following radio message to the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea:

As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following:

I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.

Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor.⁹

Basic US Negotiating Policies

At the same time that they were working out the mechanics of getting negotiations started, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their State Department colleagues addressed a much broader subject, namely, the positions that General Ridgway should uphold when the peace talks started. Admiral Davis, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Rusk drafted a set of instructions to General Ridgway, which was discussed in a JCS-State meeting on 29 June. For reasons not indicated in available sources, General Bradley was absent from this meeting and the other JCS members, except General Collins, were represented by subordinates. The Air Force representative (Major General Thomas D. White, Director of Plans) told the meeting

that he had been instructed to express "grave doubts with regard to the policy that was being followed concerning an armistice." General Collins rejoined that this policy was settled and that the issue could not be reopened. At General White's request, however, the other conferees agreed to await the arrival of a higher ranking Air Force representative, General Nathan F. Twining, the Vice Chief of Staff. Upon his arrival, General Twining expressed "serious concern" over the idea of entering an armistice without "adequate guarantees as to what the other side would do." General Collins made it clear that no consideration was being given to an armistice that would not include provision for adequate observation of enemy compliance; General Twining then withdrew this objection. The draft instructions approved at this meeting were shown to the President that evening by General Bradley, Secretary Marshall, and Secretary Acheson, and, following the President's approval, were promptly sent to General Ridgway by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰

The instructions sent to General Ridgway embodied principles and policies that had been carefully developed during the past several months in Washington. They became the blueprint that CINCUNC followed for the next two years in negotiating with the enemy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed him that they did not intend to make these instructions public, as secrecy was essential, at least in the opening stages of negotiations.¹¹

The JCS message began by setting forth "general policy," as follows:

a. Our principal military interest in this armistice lies in a cessation of hostilities in Korea, an assurance against the resumption of fighting and the protection of the security of United Nations forces, as set forth in NSC 48/5. . . .

b. We lack assurance either that the Soviet Union and Communist China are serious about concluding reasonable and acceptable armistice arrangements or that they are prepared to agree to an acceptable permanent settlement of the Korean problem. In considering an armistice, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to reach agreements which would be acceptable to us over an extended period of time. . . .

c. Discussions between you and the commander of opposing forces should be severely restricted to military questions; you should specifically not enter into discussion of a final settlement in Korea or consideration of issues unrelated to Korea, such as Formosa and the Chinese seat in the United Nations; such questions must be dealt with at governmental level.

Purely in order to negotiate, General Ridgway was authorized to assume initial positions more favorable to the US side than the final, irreducible minimum conditions. He was cautioned, however, not to allow the talks to break down, except in case of enemy failure to accept his minimum position. He must avoid the appearance of over-reaching in a way that would cause international opinion to question the good faith of the UN Command. US prestige must not be engaged in any position to the extent that retreat to the minimum position would be impossible. Negotiating a settlement with the Communists would be very difficult, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured General Ridgway that this was "fully appreciated here."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then set forth the minimum US position. They specified that the armistice agreements:

a. Shall be confined to Korea and strictly military matters therein, and shall not involve any political or territorial matters.

b. Shall continue in effect until superseded by other arrangements.

c. Shall require the commanders concerned to order a cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea; shall require the establishment of a demilitarized area across Korea; and shall require all ground forces in Korea to remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear except that all forces which may be in advance of the demilitarized area shall be moved to positions in the rear thereof.

d. Shall provide for supervision over the execution of and adherence to the terms of the armistice arrangements by a Military Armistice Commission of mixed membership of (sic) an equal basis designated by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and by the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces. The Commission and teams of observers appointed by the Commission shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea and shall be given all possible assistance and cooperation in carrying out their functions.

e. Shall require the commanders concerned to cease the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing air, ground, or naval units or personnel during the armistice. This shall not be interpreted as precluding the exchange of units or individual personnel on a man-for-man basis.

f. Shall require the commanders concerned to refrain from increasing the level of war equipment and material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. Such equipment and material will not include those supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Commission nor the vehicles, ships, or aircraft used to transport such supplies.

Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Ridgway, the following "specific details" were considered "essential" to the armistice arrangements:

a. The Military Armistice Commission must be empowered to inspect to insure that the terms, conditions, and arrangements as agreed to are carried out by all armed forces, including guerrillas. It shall be provided with competent assistants designated equally by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea, in numbers sufficient to enable it to carry out its duties and functions.

b. The armistice arrangements should not become effective until the Commission has been organized and is ready to exercise its functions.

c. The demilitarized area shall be a zone on the order of 20 miles in width, to be determined by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea, based generally upon the positions of the opposing forces at the time the armistice arrangements are agreed upon. For purposes of negotiation your initial demand might be that the Communist forces must withdraw 20 miles or more along the entire front. If it becomes necessary for purposes of bargaining for you to agree to some withdrawal of United Nations forces, you may do so to the extent that your present strong military position and your ability to carry out your military mission are not placed in jeopardy. You may agree to continued Communist control of the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas for purposes of the armistice only. If the Communist Commander refers to statements attributed to United States Government officials that the United States is prepared to accept a settlement on or around the

38th parallel, you should take the position that such statements are not applicable to an armistice in the field but are properly the subject for governmental negotiation as to a political settlement. Further you should state that in any event the military arrangements you propose involve certain areas under Communist military control south of the 38th parallel and certain areas under UN control north thereof. The net result, while military in character, does not prejudice political and territorial questions which would be for further consideration by appropriate authorities.

d. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing ground forces in Korea. These forces shall respect the demilitarized zone and the areas under the control of the opposing force.

e. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing naval forces. Naval elements shall respect the waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone and to the land areas under the control of the opposing force, to the limit of three miles offshore.

f. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing air forces. These forces shall respect the air space over the demilitarized zone and the areas under the control of the opposing force.

g. Vehicles, naval units, and aircraft required for special missions authorized by the Commission shall be excepted from subparagraphs d, e, and f, above.

h. Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis as expeditiously as possible. Until the exchange of prisoners is completed, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can.

i. Organized bodies of armed forces including guerrillas initially in advance of the demilitarized zones shall be moved back or passed through to the area of their own main forces.¹²

On 1 July 1951 General Ridgway acknowledged receipt of these instructions. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Communists had not replied to his offer to negotiate but that he was proceeding with plans on the assumption that it would be accepted. As a first step he had chosen the officers who would negotiate on his behalf. To head the UN Command (UNC) delegation, he proposed to send Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval Forces Far East (COMNAVFE). Other members of the UNC delegation would be Major General Henry I. Hodes, USA; Major General Laurence C. Craigie, USAF; Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN; and Major General Paik Sun Yup, Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). At the same time, General Ridgway proposed a nine-point agenda reflecting the points set forth in his negotiating instructions.¹³ The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved his selection of negotiators, subject to review when the Communist delegation was named. They also approved his proposed agenda.¹⁴

The Communists' acceptance of the offer to negotiate was not long delayed. On 2 July General Ridgway reported a Communist radio broadcast that acknowledged his message and continued:

... We are authorized to tell you that we agree to suspend military activities and to hold peace negotiations, and that our delegates will meet with yours.

We suggest, in regard to the place for holding talks, that such talks be held at Kaesong, on the 38th parallel.

If you agree to this, our delegates will be prepared to meet your delegates between July 10 and 15, 1951.

The message was signed by Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of the Korean Peoples Army, and Peng Teh-huai, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers.¹⁵

Kaesong, in western Korea, lies a few miles south of the 38th parallel. It was at that time in no-man's land between opposing front lines, but was effectively under Communist control, since the Eighth Army line (KANSAS) was 10 miles away at its closest point. For that reason, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), while judging Kaesong "acceptable" as a site for armistice talks, warned that it would offer "definite political and psychological advantages to the enemy."¹⁶

But General Ridgway saw the greatest danger in enemy proposals to suspend military action when negotiations started. "I consider this wholly unacceptable and, unless otherwise instructed," he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "I shall categorically reject it." Among his reasons, CINCUNC underscored threatening intelligence indications that showed an increasing enemy offensive capability. The enemy would undoubtedly intensify his buildup if fighting were halted. "If negotiations so conducted," Ridgway stated, "we would be incapable of checking his military activities in Korea, particularly his preparation for major offensive by ground and air." If the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, General Ridgway would answer the enemy commanders, accepting Kaesong as the location, making provision for halting hostilities along the Munsan-Kaesong road and in the Kaesong area, and urging that the meeting date be advanced.¹⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not entirely agree with General Ridgway. On 2 July, with President Truman's approval, they forbade him to urge an earlier meeting. The wording of the reply to Communist commanders was spelled out for him. It included the statement that "agreement on armistice terms has to precede cessation of hostilities," thus discouraging any idea that fighting would be terminated during cease-fire talks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also cautioned him not to mention the 38th parallel, either in the military discussions or in referring to the proposed place of meeting. But they agreed, upon advice of State Department officials, to hold the meeting at Kaesong.¹⁸

General Ridgway thereupon worked out with the enemy commanders arrangements for liaison officers to meet at Kaesong to prepare for the opening of formal negotiations. The date of this meeting was set for 8 July.¹⁹

The Battlefield Scene, June 1951

While discussions of a cease-fire were under way, General Van Fleet's forces had occupied line KANSAS-WYOMING in strength and were fortifying extensively to hold it. The Eighth Army Commander fully expected another attack once the enemy retained his strength. Spoiling attacks to keep the enemy off balance were launched successfully at the cities on the apexes of the "Iron Triangle," Ch'orwon, Kumhwa, and P'yongyang, all of which were overrun, then abandoned on 13 June.²⁰

Across the entire peninsula, except in the west where defenses ran naturally along the Imjin River, UN forces stood north of the 38th parallel in sufficient strength to withstand any enemy assault but one massively reinforced from Manchuria. In General Ridgway's later judgment, "Now the first year's fighting was over and the United Nations Forces had accomplished the original objective—to free South Korea of the enemy and to re-establish and hold the boundary."²¹

General Ridgway took advantage of reaching the KANSAS-WYOMING line to describe for the Joint Chiefs of Staff "a concept of probable developments in Korea during the next 60 days." On 14 June he pointed out that the enemy's lines of communication (LOCs) were overextended. UN air attacks, heavy rains, and flooding had further complicated the enemy's logistics. UN forces, on the other hand, could be maintained adequately, provided no general advance beyond KANSAS-WYOMING was made in the next two months. While the enemy could launch at least one major offensive in the period, General Ridgway had confidence that the defense line, if organized properly, could be held. He would keep Eighth Army's forces on this line where they could continue to inflict maximum damage on the enemy through limited offensives.²²

From the Commander's viewpoint, the deployment of his major forces during a cease-fire became a paramount question. On the advice of General Van Fleet and with the counsel of his Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) planning staff, General Ridgway forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 June his best judgment on location of his forces during a cease-fire. Assuming that any demilitarized zone would be 20 miles deep centered along a cease-fire line, he reasoned that his forces would be required to withdraw 10 miles from the cease-fire line. General Ridgway wanted to hold the strongest possible defensive terrain during a cease-fire, and had selected line KANSAS-WYOMING as his main line of resistance (MLR). This meant that UNC forces must be at least 10 miles in front of the outpost line (OPL) based on KANSAS-WYOMING at the time the negotiators established the demilitarized zone, or 20 miles in advance of present locations. He had instructed General Van Fleet to prepare long-range plans for an advance to the line P'yongyang-Wonsan.²³

"In the event negotiations take place for a settlement," General Ridgway informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "I think it essential, from the United States military point of view, that the demilitarized zone be far enough in advance of line KANSAS to permit its being properly outposted. It is considered that the general outpost line should be up to 10 miles in advance of the main line of resistance."²⁴

General Ridgway pointed out one complication. His directives called for him to establish Republic of Korea (ROK) authority over all areas "south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administrative and military defense and in no case south of the 38th parallel. . . ." Occupation of line KANSAS isolated the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas, which were south of the 38th parallel, and left them in Communist hands. In the event of a settlement, therefore, it might be necessary to cede these two peninsulas to North Korea in return for the added territory south of the proposed cease-fire line that was north of the parallel. For this reason, General Ridgway recommended that

the center line of the demilitarized zone be shifted north and west to the confluence of the Yesong and Han Rivers, some 15 miles northwest of the western terminus of line KANSAS-WYOMING at the junction of the Han and Imjin. General Ridgway asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff modify their earlier position on a demilitarized zone to reflect this change.²⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not consider modification of General Ridgway's instructions either necessary or desirable. They assured him on 27 June that he was not required to reestablish ROK authority over the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas or any other part of Korea. Although "conditions favorable" might imply military control of all areas south of the 38th parallel, this was not intended if the tactical situation did not warrant it. They considered his current operations fully consistent with the requirements of his latest directive. Leaving the two peninsulas under Communist control would probably have an undesirable political effect on the ROK but this could not reasonably be avoided. "Specific areas of ROK authority will be determined in negotiations effecting a settlement of the Korean conflict," the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured him.²⁶

In spite of all his hopes for pushing beyond KANSAS to set up an optimum demarcation line, General Ridgway admitted, after a visit to the front with General Van Fleet on 26 June, that such a drive would be out of the question. "Van Fleet believes and I concur," he told Washington, "that advance to general line roughly paralleling and 20 miles beyond KANSAS, while tactically and logistically feasible at present, would entail unacceptable casualties."²⁷

CINCUNC's Directives

The directives sent to General Ridgway by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 May, as described in Volume 3 Part 1, had not been approved at higher level and were therefore tentative. These directives (one addressed to the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), the other to CINCUNC) "are now being cleared with the Secretary of Defense and the President," General Ridgway was told, "and you will be informed when final clearance has been obtained."

The heart of the directive to CINCUNC lay in the four main elements of his mission derived from the national policy decision of 17 May set forth in NSC 48/5. These called for him to create conditions favorable to a settlement of the Korean conflict that would: (1) bring about an armistice; (2) establish ROK authority over all Korea south of a line at least up to the 38th parallel; (3) provide for removal of all foreign forces from Korea; and (4) permit the buildup of ROK military strength to enable the nation to defend itself against North Korea. Regardless of the tentative nature of this directive it had been approved in principle by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Ridgway carried on his operations and planning within its framework.²⁸

Shortly after assuming office as CINCUNC, General Ridgway had cautioned the Eighth Army commander, General Van Fleet, that there was to be no major advance beyond KANSAS-WYOMING without his approval.²⁹ This restriction

had been written into the 31 May directive, which had instructed CINCUNC to obtain JCS approval before undertaking "any general advance beyond some line passing approximately through the Hwachon reservoir area." But as the enemy continued to build up in that area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had second thoughts about this restriction. On 20 June they asked General Ridgway if he wished that part of his directive be revised to give him freedom to conduct "such tactical operations as may be necessary or desirable to support your mission."³⁰

General Ridgway replied affirmatively, but at the same time he took exception to certain wording in the draft directive that seemed to imply a need to conduct operations to establish effective ROK control over the entire area south of the 38th parallel, including the territory west of the Imjin where the KANSAS-WYOMING line dipped below the parallel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly amended their directive so as to clarify this point. They approved a new paragraph that read:

With regard to ground operations you are authorized to conduct such tactical operations as may be necessary or desirable to support your mission, to insure the safety of your command, and to continue to harass the enemy. This includes authority to conduct guerrilla operations and limited amphibious and airborne operations in the enemy rear areas.³¹

With this single change, the interim instructions of 31 May were approved on 10 July by the Secretaries of State and Defense and then by the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at once transmitted them to General Ridgway.³²

The Opening of Negotiations

On the basis of arrangements worked out by the liaison officers on 8 July, the first meeting of the UN and Communist delegations took place on 10 July in Kaesong. Facing Admiral Joy and his negotiating party, the Communist delegation comprised General Nam Il, North Korean Army (NKA), chief delegate; Lieutenant General Tung Hua, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF); Major General Hsieh Fang, CCF; Major General Lee Sang Cho, NKA; and Major General Chang Pyong San, NKA.³³

In the first meetings at Kaesong the Communists made full use of the "psychological advantage" of which the JIC had warned, attempting to make it appear that the UN was suing for peace terms and that the UN delegation had come hat in hand to Kaesong at Communist sufferance.³⁴

The conferees disposed of the first order of business, agreement on an agenda, in only two weeks, an almost phenomenal performance in light of later developments. United Nations Command (UNC) negotiators put forth the nine-point agenda prepared earlier by General Ridgway; the Communists countered with a five-point agenda. The main controversies over the agenda stemmed from Communist insistence on including specific discussion of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line and of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. The

UNC refused to admit either of these as agenda items. The matter of the 38th parallel was resolved at the fourth meeting on 16 July, when the enemy agreed to an item on the military demarcation line that did not specifically mention the parallel. This did not mean that the enemy had given up on the parallel, only that it would not be listed on the agenda.³⁵

The issue of foreign troop withdrawal proved less readily soluble. The enemy's insistence that all foreign troops leave Korea became the main hindrance to agreement. Chou En-lai had listed foreign withdrawal as one of the peace conditions laid down during December and January. US officials in Washington and Tokyo held a different view, however, recognizing the danger of pulling UN forces out of Korea, leaving a powerful native force in North Korea and massive Chinese reinforcements in nearby Manchuria.

The Communist negotiators made it plain that they would not lightly yield their insistence on a specific troop withdrawal agenda item. General Ridgway sought some means, however, of offering them a graceful way to retreat from this inflexible stand. He proposed that Admiral Joy, while refusing to consent to inclusion of the item, offer to transmit Communist views through military channels to governments represented in the UNC.³⁶

Washington authorities thought otherwise. The President approved instructions to General Ridgway that informed him on 16 July that the United States wanted no impression given to the enemy that UN forces would soon be withdrawn. Such an unrealistic impression, if conveyed to the South Korean people, could have considerable deleterious effect. Nor was the UNC to become a transmittal agency for Communist political views. Once that door was opened the other side would quickly seize every chance to raise political matters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CINCUNC to point out firmly to enemy negotiators that troop withdrawal must be discussed at governmental level. Negotiators at Kaesong would discuss only military armistice matters.³⁷

Enemy negotiators would not let up on the withdrawal issue, however, and insisted on raising it repeatedly. US State Department officials foresaw that there might be no political solution in Korea, and therefore no settlement of the withdrawal issue at governmental level, for several years. Accordingly they proposed that General Ridgway establish, as a part of the armistice settlement, machinery for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea at some future date. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) feared the consequences of this proposal and urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oppose it. The Committee asserted that a permanent peace in Korea, as opposed to a temporary armistice, had to be arranged by the diplomats. If they failed, UN troops must remain on the peninsula.³⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had no intention of allowing political matters to intrude into the current talks. In coordination with the State Department they prepared and sent instructions to General Ridgway on 19 July, approved by President Truman, that defined the UN position on withdrawal of foreign troops. The basis of the position was that the United Nations could not leave Korea for a long time. The various forces, including Chinese, were there as the result of decisions by their governments. Their withdrawal must be decided by and among those governments in relation to final settlement of the Korean question.

At the same time, it was desirable to avoid a breakdown in armistice negotiations on this issue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General Ridgway, if necessary to prevent a rupture, to distinguish between force reduction and withdrawal. "You are authorized to agree, at the appropriate time in negotiations, that some military machinery representing opposing commanders might take up at some time in the future the question of mutual reduction of foreign forces in Korea," the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised him. But no reduction could be agreed or discussed prior to, or in connection with, an armistice. Before conceding this much, however, General Ridgway would try to get the enemy to agree to a broad agenda item that would not commit the UNC to discuss troop withdrawal but would permit the Communists to air their views unilaterally.³⁹

General Ridgway informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 July that he intended to have Admiral Joy tell the Communists that, unless they dropped their demands for an item on troop withdrawal and accepted the four agreed items as the agenda, the UNC would recess and await "something new and constructive" from them. Unless he heard to the contrary by 0700, 21 July, Tokyo time (1700, 20 July, Washington time), CINCUNC intended to take this course of action. He was convinced that the enemy would not "break off" talks over this issue.⁴⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were prepared to approve General Ridgway's proposed course of action. However, they decided to consult the State Department. In a meeting held only two hours before General Ridgway's deadline, Assistant Secretary of State Rusk told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposed actions might cause a break in the negotiations. They would also engage the Communists' prestige in a way that might make it difficult for them to concede. Further the actions might create an issue in which the enemy could, without really doing so, appear to the public to be making a major concession.⁴¹ Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interim message, instructed General Ridgway to withhold his statement on the recess until he received further orders.⁴²

Working separately, State officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared draft messages embodying their views. Then in a second meeting they combined these into a version that was approved by the President and sent to CINCUNC on 21 July. General Ridgway was assured of the complete backing of the US Government in his position on discussion of the withdrawal of foreign troops. But the message emphasized, "It is important that, if and when breakdown of negotiations occurs, the onus for failure shall rest clearly and wholly upon the Communists." In view of the strong stands by both the UNC and Communists on the withdrawal issue, there was danger that it could be the "breaking point." All three of the points made by Mr. Rusk were conveyed to General Ridgway in this message. It was then suggested that General Ridgway point out to the enemy that he would have an opportunity to express his views on troop withdrawal under item 3 of the revised UN agenda ("concrete arrangements for a cease-fire . . . which will insure against a resumption of hostilities. . ."). If the Communists remained adamant, General Ridgway might propose that the negotiators suspend the discussion of a complete agreement and move at once to consider various specific items like a cease-fire and the establishment of a demilitarized

zone. Last of all, he might, as they had indicated in their instructions of 19 July, seek agreement on a broadly worded version of item 3 that would allow the other side to air its views unilaterally without committing the UN. However, they suggested that he hold in abeyance the authorization given him on 19 July for eventual establishment of machinery to consider reduction of foreign forces.⁴³

UN delegates followed these JCS instructions at a meeting held on 25 July, following a recess caused by a flood. The Communist delegation indicated a willingness to drop their insistence upon troop withdrawal as an agenda item providing they were given assurance that the subject would be discussed at governmental level after the armistice. Following a quick exchange of messages with Washington, the UNC proposed at the next session, 26 July, to include a vaguely worded item: "Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides." The Communist delegation accepted this, although the UN negotiators made it clear that they were in no way committing themselves as to the nature of the "recommendations." Agreement on other items was likewise reached with unexpected celerity, and the full agenda was adopted on the same day, 26 July.⁴⁴

The final agenda, as agreed on by the two delegations, consisted of five items:

1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarization zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea.
3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice.
4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.
5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.⁴⁵

The difficulties encountered with the essentially political problem of troop withdrawal attested to the importance of being prepared to start the political and diplomatic settlement at the governmental level as soon as an armistice was signed. As early as 16 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had told the Secretary of Defense that they were "concerned, and have been throughout the discussions of a possible armistice, as to the dangerous effect of any delay in pursuing the negotiations on a governmental level leading to final settlement of the Korean problem." The danger would increase with any delay, no matter how effective the armistice.⁴⁶

Secretary of Defense Marshall sent these JCS views to Secretary of State Acheson with a strong endorsement. Secretary Marshall asked for assurances that steps were under way for implementation of political and diplomatic settlement of the Korean problem immediately after an armistice was arranged.⁴⁷

Secretary Acheson replied that he concurred in the importance of being ready for governmental level negotiations. The Department of State had the further diplomatic and political actions under constant study and the Defense Department would be kept well informed of all plans. "The Department of State wishes to point out," Mr. Acheson continued,

that a final settlement of the Korean problem will require agreement by the Communists, an agreement which will be difficult to achieve. For this reason . . . it is of the utmost importance that any armistice arrangement be acceptable to us over an extended period of time, in the event no progress is made, despite our efforts, in reaching an agreement on political and territorial questions.⁴⁸

In response to a suggestion from General Ridgway, the Secretary of State made a forceful public statement that UN forces would not withdraw from Korea until establishment of a genuine peace. To the same end, Secretary Marshall issued a similar statement, although emphasizing that withdrawal of foreign troops would “naturally follow” a satisfactory peace settlement.⁴⁹

Control of Negotiations

In response to the peculiar requirements of the Korean truce talks, US officials developed, during the first weeks of negotiation, a system of centralized control that was followed until the armistice was eventually signed. From the first signs of armistice talks, Washington had recognized that negotiations would be complex and difficult and that they would be of the greatest importance to the United States. The outcome of these talks, even interim developments, could affect the Nation’s international relations and domestic affairs. And yet these negotiations were not to be conducted at “the summit” between heads of state in convenient and suitable facilities, but by military officers of no particular diplomatic experience in almost primitive surroundings.

It was essential that a system for conduct of negotiations be developed that would be completely and swiftly responsive to the highest national authority. In order that the President’s policies could be carried out, everything that the UNC delegation said during negotiations must conform to those policies. And since policies were subject to change, conformity could not be assured by any amount of preliminary background briefing. The President had to control the negotiators personally, since they spoke for him, albeit from a considerable way off. Time and distance magnified the normal problems of control to formidable proportions. The enemy, of course, had the same problems and similarly kept his negotiators under tight control. As General Collins described the situation:

In the Korean negotiations the normal difficulties were enhanced by the fact that the negotiators were military men, meeting in the field, without final authority to determine anything except under instructions from their senior commanders, who were located some distance away and who in turn were subject to overriding political-military guidance that came on the one hand from Peking and on the other from Washington.⁵⁰

The means devised to assure centralized control of the UNC delegation relied on: (1) a basic broad directive; (2) advice from General Ridgway; (3) timely, coordinated staff work at both ends; (4) a clearly defined chain of command;

and (5) rapid and accurate communication. The initial directive to CINCUNC on 30 June, closely examined before approval by the President, expressed the national policy framework within which Admiral Joy and his team were to negotiate. Using this directive, General Ridgway had drawn up the initial proposed agenda and nominated the UNC delegation, but both had required Presidential assent.

General Ridgway was cast in the role of coordinator of UNC negotiating operations within the Far East. He was responsible for physical arrangements and support, for development of recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on substantive military matters bearing on the negotiations, and for transmission of directives and instructions to the UNC delegation. Beyond that he had little latitude in making decisions during the negotiations. Within his purview, however, he directed his Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) staff to study the various agenda topics in order to develop positions to support his recommendations. General Ridgway paid frequent visits to the UNC base camp at Munsan, and conferred regularly from Tokyo with Admiral Joy by radio.

At Munsan, General Ridgway's Deputy Chief of Staff, JSPOG, Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, supervised the UNC staff in preparation of plans for the negotiating team, examining all possible strategies and techniques that might be used and attempting to furnish negotiators with every possible way to counter enemy moves. The delegation followed a practice of "staffing" every formal statement to the enemy delegation before making it. Each day staff officers prepared a number of proposed statements for use by the delegates. These were fully considered and discussed by the delegates before going to the conference table. The statement finally chosen was seldom the work of any one individual but the product of editing by all delegates and approval by Admiral Joy.⁵¹

But nothing was done in the field without coordination with and approval of officials in Washington. Immediately after each session an analytical summary of the day's developments was furnished to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by radio, along with General Ridgway's comments and recommendations for further action. A verbatim transcript of the meeting followed. On other occasions, CINCUNC might point out a problem on his own volition, along with his recommendations.

Upon receipt in Washington, the problem raised or the recommendation made by General Ridgway was immediately taken under study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff met weekly with the representatives of the Department of State—in some crucial periods more often. At a lower level, an informal committee headed by Major General Eddleman, Deputy G-3 of the Army, and comprising of U. Alexis Johnson from State and Charles A. Sullivan, Defense, met almost daily to follow up on questions or suggestions from General Ridgway by preparing replies or solutions for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department representatives. In some cases General Collins or General Bolte met with one of the top State Department officials to draft position papers before the regular JCS/State meetings. If matters of special importance were being considered, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Marshall prior to going to the President with a proposed reply or position.⁵²

By the time a recommendation, whether on a procedural or substantive matter, reached President Truman, it had been closely analyzed and approved by the entire advisory team. In the President's own words, "No major steps were taken without specific approval of the President, even to the wording of announcements made by the Far East commander or the chief negotiator at crucial points."⁵³

Relatively swift and reliable communications had been set up between the Far East and Washington. Special measures ensured that important messages to and from Tokyo were expedited. Reports of the first Korean meetings reached Washington within four to eight hours following the end of the meetings. In some cases, messages from Washington to CINUNC were received within two hours of transmission, which included time for encryption and decryption. Nevertheless, on occasion the Joint Chiefs of Staff found it necessary to warn General Ridgway not to set a time limit for receiving instructions from them in anticipation of taking a particular action. The time required to process, study, and obtain a Presidential decision on a problem was unpredictable as was, in many cases, the message transmission time.⁵⁴

One troublesome problem that developed was the matter of press leaks through which newspaper accounts of UN negotiating strategy forecast instructions to the UN delegation. In some cases the press published policy decisions on the negotiations, attributed to "informal sources," before these same decisions had reached Tokyo or Munsan. This placed the enemy in the advantageous position of knowing at least the thrust of what the UNC delegation was going to offer or the limits of its authority in certain matters. General Ridgway objected strenuously to these leaks, and the Departments of Defense and State took action to prevent them insofar as possible.⁵⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were as concerned as was General Ridgway over these breaches of security. Possession of information on high-level considerations and decisions on the negotiations was not confined to the Department of Defense but was, of course, shared by officials of the Department of State. On 31 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged General Marshall to remind the Secretary of State of the problem, that he might take any necessary action to forestall any premature disclosure of information emanating from his Department. The Secretary of Defense did so on 6 August. On 17 August the Deputy Under Secretary of State assured the Secretary of Defense that the State Department was making every effort to prevent such disclosure. "All officers concerned," he stated, "have been instructed to make certain that no information is disclosed that might damage General Ridgway's position."⁵⁶

Agenda Item 2: The Demarcation Line

ImmEDIATE and deep disagreement marked the start of substantive talks on the demarcation line, Item 2 of the agenda, which began on 27 July. The Communist delegation demanded that the line be located along the 38th parallel, the

UNC that it be determined by the battle situation. The initial UNC proposal was sufficiently broad to afford ample room for negotiation. The UNC called upon the Communists to withdraw a considerable distance along the entire front, with a 20-mile wide demilitarized zone to be established in the vacated territory. Admiral Joy attempted to justify this proposal with the argument that the UNC should be compensated on the ground for a cease-fire in the air and on the sea, which were controlled by its forces. He contended that the realities of the combat situation included the sum total of the strength and capabilities of the three arms, ground, sea, and air. This proposal, as might have been expected, infuriated the enemy negotiators who rejected it angrily with much bombast and rudeness. Admiral Joy had, of course, put forward a position well in excess of the UNC minimum position. The UNC was actually prepared to settle for a narrower zone centered farther south on the line of contact. Such a zone would provide adequate security for Eighth Army's defensive positions along a diagonal line running from the Han-Imjin junction on the west coast, about 20 miles south of the parallel and passing just south of Yangpyong and Hwachon on the central front; in other words, line KANSAS-WYOMING.⁵⁷

The UNC absolutely refused to discuss the 38th parallel as a basis for a demarcation line. The Communists refused to discuss any other line. A forced recess in the meetings caused by a Communist violation of security arrangements, as described below, interrupted this impasse. But when the delegations reconvened on 10 August, neither had changed its attitude. Both sides showed the depth of their determination when delegates sat silently across the table from each other for two hours and 11 minutes at the 10 August meeting before adjourning.⁵⁸

Exasperated by enemy intransigence, General Ridgway informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 August that, unless told not to do so, he was going to have Admiral Joy deliver an ultimatum to the other side on the next day. He would inform them that the UNC flatly and finally refused further discussion of the 38th parallel as the line of demarcation; that the UNC delegation remained ready to discuss a line based on present military positions; that it was willing to move to the next agenda item, returning later to Item 2; that it would await notification of acceptance of one of these proposals; and finally that, failing to receive notification of acceptance within 72 hours, the UNC would consider the conference deliberately terminated by the Communists.⁵⁹

General Ridgway had made a proposal completely out of line with his instructions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not need a determination by higher authority and immediately cautioned him that he was not to break off meetings without Washington approval. "You should continue meetings until further guidance is received," General Bradley informed General Ridgway on 10 August.⁶⁰

While this warning should have sufficed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff obviously wanted to make absolutely sure that General Ridgway understood the national policy. A message, developed jointly by them with the State Department, was approved by the President and sent to CINCFE the next day. Its language was unequivocal:

It is basic to your present directives that you not break off armistice discussions without specific instructions to do so . . . ; also that you should not, without further instructions, recess talks indefinitely, to be reconvened on condition of Communist concession.

In view of possibility of communications delays and of necessity for highest level consideration, you should not set in motion any action contrary to above directives without prior JCS authorization. Termination of discussions is of such governmental importance as not to be left to exigencies of clearances or communications by some deadline hour.⁶¹

If the armistice talks failed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, the enemy must be clearly responsible. Any issue causing failure must be one that would ensure public support for the UNC. "It will not be enough for us to say that [the] Communists are at fault because they do not agree with us," the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned. "It must be abundantly clear that we have used persistence and patience to obtain agreement on terms which will appeal to world opinion as reasonable and just." They pointed out that there was good reason to suppose that earlier statements by Secretary General Lie and Secretary Acheson had misled the Communists who had fully expected the UNC to accept the 38th parallel as the demarcation line. Moscow and Peiping would need time to adjust and it could not be assumed that the difference in positions over the 38th parallel was the breaking point for the Communists. General Ridgway's instructions with respect to the 38th parallel would not be changed, but he must be patient as well as firm.⁶²

To find a way out, Admiral Joy proposed in mid-August that Item 2 be turned over to subdelegations which could work less formally toward a solution. After some footdragging, Nam Il agreed. On 17 August, subdelegations consisting of two delegates, one staff officer, and one interpreter from each side met to consider the demarcation line. A few days later, however, events outside the truce tent brought the talks to a prolonged recess.⁶³

The Negotiations Are Interrupted

The recess was prompted by the latest in a series of incidents that had marred the negotiations nearly from their beginning. On 12 July, because of Communist refusal to admit UN newsmen and attempts to limit the UNC delegation's freedom of movement, the UNC demanded full reciprocity of treatment or suspension of talks. With backing from Washington, General Ridgway informed the Communists that not only must a prescribed number of UN newsmen be admitted to the conference area, but that the arrangements for neutralization of Kaesong and approaches thereto must be agreed and observed. As a result of this insistence, liaison officers worked out arrangements, approved by both delegations, providing a five-mile neutral circle centered on Kaesong, with freedom of vehicular movement, under strict rules, to and from the area for both sides. Within the neutral zone the only armed personnel were to be a specified number

of military police. No armed personnel would approach nearer than one-half mile of the conference site.⁶⁴

Almost immediately, the Communists began accusing the UNC of violations. On 16 July they claimed that UN soldiers had fired toward Panmunjom and, five days later, that UN planes had strafed one of their trucks en route from Panmunjom to Kaesong. The UNC delegation denied both charges, but the stage was set for discord.⁶⁵

During the lunch recess on 4 August a fully armed company of enemy troops passed, within a hundred yards of the house assigned the delegation, and in plain view of the members. Returning to the table, Admiral Joy protested to Nam Il, pointing out that this violated the neutrality of the Kaesong zone in two respects; that no armed forces were to be within a half mile of the conference site, and that only military police were to be in the neutral area in any case.⁶⁶

General Ridgway became irate over this incident, which he and the delegation considered intentional, though to what end they did not know. He at once called for a teleconference with Washington officials. Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett headed the Washington contingent with General Ridgway present at the Tokyo end. General Ridgway proposed a very strong message to the Communists, demanding a prompt explanation, a statement satisfactory to him of the corrective action taken as well as acceptable guarantees against reoccurrence. The UN delegation would attend no further meetings until these were received. The President directed that General Ridgway not send such a strong message but tone it down to the point of agreeing to resume talks when the enemy gave a satisfactory explanation and agreed to comply with the rules.⁶⁷

On 6 August the Communists rendered a bland explanation of the "mistake," which they termed a minor incident. They promised that it would not happen again and called for an immediate resumption of talks. General Ridgway was far from satisfied with this reply. He described the Communist leaders to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in most unflattering terms and proposed to turn down their explanation. He wanted to refuse to resume negotiations until a joint inspection team was formed to prevent further violations. If the enemy did not agree, General Ridgway wanted a new site where "the United Nations Command can and will guarantee against violations of the neutral area."⁶⁸

The President disagreed. He considered that the Communists had in effect acceded to General Ridgway's terms. "To impose new conditions now would be difficult to justify in many important quarters," the Joint Chiefs of Staff told CINCUNC. They instructed him to send his team back to the table but to warn the enemy that any further violations would be interpreted as a deliberate Communist move to terminate negotiations.⁶⁹

In the next two weeks a spate of Communist charges of UN violations of neutrality erupted. The UNC refuted all of these. The most serious occurred on 19 August when an enemy military police patrol was fired on by a superior force in the neutral zone and the platoon leader killed. Investigation revealed that this force was probably a guerrilla unit not under control of the UNC. This explanation did not satisfy the Communists.⁷⁰

On 23 August the Communists peremptorily called off the meetings indefinitely, charging that UN planes had bombed Kaesong. The circumstances of this incident, which involved clumsily fabricated evidence, demonstrated clearly that the Communists were, probably for propaganda reasons, engaged in a calculated program to discredit the UNC through untrue charges.⁷¹

Strong UN denials and equally strong Communist charges and counter-charges ensued. Whatever the Communist motivation for falsifying these charges, truce talks were suspended for several weeks. Other incidents marked the period. The Communist side charged the UNC with several serious violations of the neutrality of the zone, all of which the UNC denied.

On 10 September a UN violation of the neutral zone did occur when a US plane strafed the Kaesong area in error. No casualties resulted, but the UNC apologized for the infraction. This brought from the Communists an almost friendly response and a proposal that negotiations resume immediately. General Ridgway was not ready to go back to the old site with the old rules which, in his view, would only invite more of the same troubles. He had asked Washington for authority on 2 September to refuse categorically any further negotiations at Kaesong but had been turned down. Washington officials sympathized with General Ridgway's view but wanted no action which would place on the UNC the blame for breaking off the talks. The matter was particularly sensitive because of the critical period of the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference then taking place in San Francisco. On 5 September, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General Ridgway to propose a new site in which security could be reasonably guaranteed. If the enemy refused, the Joint Chiefs of Staff might consider refusing to meet at Kaesong. General Ridgway continued to push the Kaesong issue. On 11 September he proposed that he tell the Communists that unless they met with his liaison officers within 24 hours of receiving his message, he would terminate the neutrality of the Kaesong area unilaterally, on the grounds that there were no meetings going on there and hence there was no reason why the area or its personnel should be immune from attack.⁷²

In the meantime the 10 September violation had occurred. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Ridgway that Admiral Joy's apology for this violation might give the Communists a face-saving way to suggest resumption of talks. They told him to await the Communist answer. If nothing happened within the week they would reconsider his proposal for terminating the neutrality of Kaesong.⁷³

After several exchanges of messages, liaison officers met again on 23 September. But this and subsequent meetings became entangled in selecting a new site and the details of neutralizing a truce zone. The Communists would not delegate to their liaison officers the authority for reaching agreements on these matters.⁷⁴

From the beginning of his negotiations with the Communists, General Ridgway had been skeptical of the enemy's sincerity. Only a week after the first meeting he had reported that "much evidence in contacts to date" revealed that the Communists believed that an armistice was merely a short way to the attainment of their unchanged objective at minimum cost. As the incidents in and around Kaesong proliferated and the attitude of enemy delegates grew harsher and even

more uncompromising, General Ridgway expressed frustration and impatience. The transcripts of meetings and the reports of his delegates were laced with examples of unnecessary enemy rudeness, verging on insulting behavior. Indicative of his desire to "get tough" was a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 August, in which he had pointed out that the language of diplomacy was "inappropriate and ineffective" in these military talks. "To sit down with these men and deal with them as representatives of an enlightened and civilized people," he declared, "is to deride one's own dignity and to invite the disaster their treachery will inevitably bring upon us." He advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he meant to tell his delegates to meet the enemy on his own terms and "to employ such language and methods as these treacherous savages cannot fail to understand, and understanding, respect."⁷⁵

The President and his advisors, while they appreciated General Ridgway's frustration, were farther from the scene and more sensitive to the overall implications of the talks. Determined to avoid a permanent rupture, Washington officials adjured General Ridgway not to go too far in blasting the enemy at the table or in issuing irrevocable ultimatums. By the end of September a major disagreement between CINCUNC and his superiors was in the making. General Ridgway had made clear that he was determined not to hold further talks at Kaesong unless so ordered. The administration was equally determined to avoid any action that would place on the UNC the burden of responsibility for a permanent breakdown in the talks.

Nor was Kaesong the only problem between CINCUNC and his superiors. They disagreed over the position that the UNC should take when full talks did resume. Washington favored a new and more lenient demarcation proposal, but General Ridgway argued that no concession should be made at the moment. Finally, they differed over the degree of enemy desire for a truce, a difference that perhaps accounted for the disagreement on negotiating tactics. General Ridgway's views at the end of September reflected a belief that the Communists, threatened by an unfavorable military situation and the approach of winter, urgently needed an armistice.⁷⁶

But the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State did not share this belief. Their views were influenced by General Ridgway's earlier warning that had pictured the Communists' military situation as favorable and had left the impression that the Communists were benefiting militarily from the truce talks, partly because of the immunity of the Kaesong area and partly because of the inevitable psychological letdown induced by the talks among US forces.

The divergence of views could not quickly be reconciled by messages alone. A closer personal consultation was needed. Accordingly the President sent General Bradley and Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the State Department, to the Far East. They arrived in Tokyo on 28 September and spent three full days with General Ridgway and Admiral Joy. They also visited General Van Fleet and his corps and division commanders. As a result the differences of opinion between Washington and Tokyo narrowed considerably.

Upon their return General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen reported that the military situation of the UN Command was more favorable than originally believed. All

of General Ridgway's commanders exuded confidence. General Bradley observed that he had rarely seen combat forces in better condition and readiness. On the other hand, reports indicated that the enemy would suffer heavily from shortages of food and clothing in the coming winter. Mr. Bohlen, who had left Washington convinced that an acceptable armistice was a matter of "real urgency" for the UNC, concluded after his visit that there was no great need to hurry the talks. Indeed, the military situation might justify drawing them out. The consensus among the conferees was that the talks should be kept alive, not only to progress toward an armistice and to keep allied public opinion favorable but also because, in General Bradley's view, a real breakdown might incite the US public to new and stronger demands for greater military action.⁷⁷

These meetings also brought agreement on a new demarcation line proposed by the UNC. The argument on this question had been on tactics rather than on substance. On 21 August General Ridgway had proposed that the Communists be asked to agree to a four kilometer demilitarized zone based on the line of contact. General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen had raised this matter again with General Ridgway, who agreed that this was still a suitable recommendation. However, both he and Admiral Joy felt that it would be wrong to reopen the talks on the demarcation line with this concession. It might show the enemy that he could profit from an arbitrary recess. But the Bradley-Bohlen argument was that for the UNC to renew its old offer would merely cause the enemy to revert to his first position on the parallel, while in the face of a new proposal he might be more flexible. This argument prevailed, and General Ridgway agreed to resume negotiations with the new proposal.⁷⁸

In his report to the Secretary of State, Mr. Bohlen observed that "there could be no question of forcing General Ridgway to return to that site under present conditions." General Ridgway had been led to believe that both the Washington visitors concurred in his views on Kaesong. When he cabled Washington on 4 October for a confirmation of this understanding, General Bradley replied that it was not intended to require him arbitrarily to return to Kaesong. But General Bradley warned CINCUNC that he should avoid announcing that he would not return under any circumstances.⁷⁹

Happily, no showdown developed with the Communists over Kaesong. On 7 October, three days after General Ridgway had asked them to suggest a site midway between the front lines, the Communists proposed: (1) that the talks be moved to Panmunjom, a tiny village about six miles east of Kaesong; (2) that the neutral zone be expanded to include Munsan as well as Kaesong; and (3) that both sides assume responsibility for maintaining neutrality.⁸⁰

Liaison officers of the two delegations negotiated on the basis of this Communist proposal. The issue that took the most time to work out was the size of the neutral zone, which the UNC wanted to keep at a minimum. The final agreement set up a circular conference site at Panmunjom with a radius of 1,000 yards, from which all armed personnel, except for military police, were excluded. Hostile acts within the zone were prohibited. The same rule applied to circles three miles in radius centered on the Communist delegation headquarters in Kaesong and on the UNC delegation base camp at Munsan. A neutralized strip 200 meters wide

on each side of the Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan road would allow access to and from the conference site by both delegations. After ratifying this agreement, the two sides resumed their arguments over the demarcation line.⁸¹

Military Developments

The fitful progress of negotiations during the last half of 1951 took place against an equally unsettled and uncertain backdrop on the field of battle. The war of movement that had marked 1950 and early 1951 had become virtually static, with both sides seeking more favorable positions but making no serious effort at substantial advances on the ground. Watching both the conference table and the enemy's terrain, each antagonist remained alert and ready for stronger action.

Even before the talks began, CINCUNC had shown concern at the possible effect on the morale of his forces. General Ridgway took exception to statements in the domestic press and radio intimating that the war was nearly over and that troops could soon be withdrawn. On 4 July he had sought the support of the Secretary of Defense in discouraging this type of thinking and in avoiding a repetition of "the disgraceful debacle of our Armed Forces following their victorious effort in World War II" (when public opinion had forced a precipitate demobilization). General Ridgway assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he fully understood his instructions on the armistice and was conscious of the issues. He made a special point of reminding Washington of the importance of staying on line KANSAS, saying, "Any position taken by our government which would compel me to abandon the KANSAS line or deny me a reasonable outpost zone for its protection would vitally prejudice our entire position in Korea."⁸²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff shared General Ridgway's view. Any impression that the fighting was over, that the Eighth Army could let down its guard, perhaps even leave Korea, might adversely affect US public opinion. They informed him on 11 July that action was being taken to make clear to the public the military requirements that would still exist even if fighting stopped in Korea. They allayed his fears on line KANSAS, reminding him that his instructions had been drafted on the basis that KANSAS would not be given up in any cease-fire arrangements.⁸³

Behind the battle lines enemy leaders continued to move in men and supplies, possibly preparing for another attack. General Ridgway was reluctant to allow this buildup to take place unhindered and on 21 July announced, "as part of my overall plan for unrelenting pressure on Communist forces," an all out air strike on P'yongyang, preceded by a leaflet drop to warn the population. The attack would take place after or on 24 July and would be aimed primarily at marshaling yards, supply dumps, troop billets, and other facilities. General Bradley and Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett considered the bombing of P'yongyang "questionable at this time." With Presidential approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCUNC that such a strike could have serious and far

reaching implications. They ordered him to defer the attack until further instructions reached him.⁸⁴

General Ridgway did not yield readily. On 23 July he warned that the enemy was undertaking a substantial buildup around P'yongyang, looking toward the failure of armistice negotiations. This buildup, he believed, had been taking place at an accelerated rate ever since the enemy started talking about an armistice. "Withholding of this attack, an element in other planned operations," he objected, "may therefore result in serious and avoidable losses." He asked again to bomb P'yongyang, pointing out that "the issue involves a fundamental in the responsibilities with which you have charged me, namely the security of UN Forces and the conservation of their lives." In a follow-up message, General Ridgway offered not to warn the population, noting that a warning would probably have no effect anyway. On the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the President's approval, authorized the strike on P'yongyang but warned that there should be no unusual publicity emphasizing the "mass nature" of the raid and no advance warning to the population.⁸⁵

The P'yongyang raid took place on 30 July. Bad weather, however, cut down its effectiveness. The results were considered "profitable but not decisive."⁸⁶

On the ground, UN forces carried out "limited objective" attacks between July and October to improve positions, trying to seize strategic high ground and in some cases, to straighten out UNC lines. These attacks, extremely costly in casualties to both sides, served also to keep the Communists off-balance and thereby prevent them from using their growing offensive capabilities.⁸⁷

On 6 August General Ridgway again pointed up the increasing enemy capabilities. He was convinced that the enemy was using the armistice discussions to gain time to prepare a major offensive. "Since collapse of his last offensive," General Ridgway stated, "the enemy has taken advantage of a prolonged period of stabilization to mount intensive effort to prepare his forces and reconstitute his logistic base for future offensive operations." Reports from prisoners and other sources showed that enemy commanders meant to attack when ready. Intelligence signs included large numbers of replacements, a high volume of vehicle sightings, increased artillery movement, and forward stockpiling of ammunition. General Ridgway estimated that within another month or six weeks the enemy could support a two-week offensive, as opposed to one of several days' duration a month earlier. He could attack at any time, possibly with limited attacks for local advantage, and, if successful, could expand his piecemeal attacks into a general offensive.⁸⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that the indications set out by General Ridgway concerned them also. But they were puzzled by his intimation that this buildup could be attributed to the armistice talks. They reminded him that his directives neither directed nor implied any new restrictions on his military operations.⁸⁹

General Ridgway assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had not meant to imply that the buildup was "in violation" of any agreements on negotiations. However, several conditions arising out of the armistice talks facilitated enemy

buildup. The de facto neutralization of Kaesong, for instance, hampered UNC operations against enemy buildup and involved a larger area than was specifically neutralized. "Psychologically," he stated, "the fact that negotiations are underway for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict has unquestionably exercised some moderating effect on the offensive attitude of our forces although every possible effort continues to be made to neutralize it." The enemy, General Ridgway felt, was going to do his best to keep the talking going until he was ready for a major attack. He was benefiting tactically from the negotiations and knew that, unlike himself, the UNC would be faithful to any armistice agreement.⁹⁰

Meanwhile General Ridgway had proposed aerial and naval attacks against Rashin, in the northeastern corner of Korea, attacks which had earlier been forbidden owing to the nearness of the port city to the Soviet Union. However, with the buildup in progress, General Ridgway now believed it essential that he be allowed to strike against the extensive transportation facilities and storage areas in and near Rashin, which he called a principal focal point for intensifying the enemy buildup in the battle area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully supported the proposed aerial bombing but not the naval bombardment, and so informed the Secretary of Defense. The President approved air attacks on Rashin on 10 August, but specified that no naval bombardment be employed and that every feasible measure be taken to avoid violation of the Soviet or Manchurian borders. No unusual publicity was to be given the attacks.⁹¹

The attacks were carried out on 25 August by 35 B-29 bombers under Navy fighter escort. Pilots claimed excellent results.⁹²

CINCUNC kept his own staff and Eighth Army constantly on the search for means to improve the UNC military position. On 18 August he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had turned down two Eighth Army plans, one for an amphibious landing near Wonsan, the other for a deep advance into North Korea because they involved unacceptable risk of failure. He had, however, accepted a plan, Operation TALONS, a close-in operation designed to straighten out Eighth Army's line in central and eastern Korea from Kumhwa to Kansong. The main force would be ROK but US Marines and Army forces would also take part in the attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had no objection to Operation TALONS, provided it were done with no publicity. Preparations for TALONS continued until 7 September but mounting casualties from operations in central Korea convinced General Ridgway that the cost of TALONS in the face of the growing enemy capability would probably be too great, and he cancelled the operation. The limited objective attacks in central and eastern Korea would continue, however, so long as they were useful.⁹³

After a visit to General Van Fleet and his corps commanders in Korea in late August, General Ridgway reported an alarming situation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Field commanders were convinced, although not unanimously, that the enemy had a capability for strong offensive action and would attack within the next few days. General Ridgway believed that the enemy was every bit as strong as he had been before the major offensives of April and May and that in some

respects he was better prepared. His logistic base would now provide a longer period of offensive support. He had more artillery and was more proficient in using it. The enemy now had a significant armored offensive capability. Most menacing of all, the enemy's air strength had increased and along with it his aggressiveness and proficiency in air operations. And for the first time the enemy had a capability for an airborne attack.⁹⁴

Alarmed by this ominous report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to provide CINCFE some additional support in the only feasible way available to them at the moment. They suggested to him on 14 September that he move one of the National Guard divisions from Japan to Korea in order to have at least a semblance of reserve ground force on hand should the enemy attack. The risk of an attack on Japan in 1951, they told him, was "more acceptable than [the] present danger to Eighth Army presented by powerful Communist forces now facing it."⁹⁵

General Ridgway reacted by reminding the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his "overriding mission" was defense of the Japanese main islands and that the Soviet threat to those islands was very real. His judgment of Eighth Army's situation had also apparently changed, since he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 September, "I do not share your concern for the security of Eighth Army." He stated that he had complete confidence in the ability of his ground forces, with naval and air support, successfully to conduct operations in Korea. Reinforcing Eighth Army by one division would be non-decisive and yet would increase logistical problems. Reserves for the Army were only one of several major factors in its current situation. Others, he noted, were

its greater capability for shifting forces, its superior firepower, the advanced state of organization of the ground, which now makes available to it a defensive zone of considerable depth between its front lines and the Kansas line with its ever increasing defensive strength, [and] the incalculably superior spiritual strength of the Eighth Army and its supporting naval and air services.

His primary need was for additional air and sea forces, in that order. As a minimum addition to his air force, he required two additional wings, one F-86 and one B-26.⁹⁶

In a final comment on the proposed transfer of forces from Japan, General Ridgway pointed out that "reduction of present defense forces in northern Honshu and Hokkaido might seriously alarm the Japanese people, who are well aware of Soviet capabilities and fear them. We wish to inspire them with confidence, not with apprehension."⁹⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted General Ridgway's analysis of the situation in the Far East Command, although they were unable to send him the fighter and bomber wings. As to naval forces, while no additional major forces could be allocated at this time, they reminded him on 21 September that major forces, including a carrier and a cruiser, training near Hawaii, could be quickly redeployed to his theater in emergency.⁹⁸

During this same period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefly considered the tactical use of atomic weapons to break the stalemate in Korea. On 26 June 1951 Gen-

eral Collins submitted to his colleagues an Army study of the possible effectiveness of atomic weapons in Korea. The conclusions of the study, endorsed by General Collins, were that no suitable targets for atomic weapons in Korea were known, but that they might be discovered by a search; that capabilities for delivering atomic weapons in Korea should be established; and that practice strikes should be undertaken, with simulated atomic weapons, to provide experience to US forces in using atomic weapons in support of ground operations.⁹⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred the matter to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC). The Committee concluded on 11 August 1951 that atomic weapons should be used tactically "if necessary to prevent disaster to our forces in the Far East," but only after full consideration of the dangers of an enlarged conflict. Delivery of atomic weapons on preplanned targets in Korea, using forces already available in the Far East, would present little difficulty, according to the Committee, if suitable targets could be located. However, the Committee saw a critical need to develop "tested methods and procedures" for providing tactical atomic support to forces engaged in ground operations. The Committee therefore recommended that simulated atomic strikes be undertaken for this purpose in Korea.¹⁰⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this recommendation and referred it to Secretary Marshall. They did not believe that Presidential approval was required, since, as they expressed it, "preparation and training for possible use of a capability is purely a military function." The Secretary did not agree, however, and referred the matter to President Truman, who gave his approval. Accordingly, during late September and early October, US forces carried out several simulated atomic strikes in support of limited UN ground offensives in Korea. The exercise, known as HUDSON HARBOR, was terminated on 15 October 1951.¹⁰¹

Item 2 Is Resolved

In accordance with the agreed security arrangements, facilities, including a large conference tent, were set up at Panmunjom and the two delegations met briefly there on 25 October. Following an exchange of amenities, discussion of Item 2, involving the demarcation line, was turned over to the subdelegations. At this level the UNC, after initial sparring on 25 October, submitted to the enemy a written proposal for a demilitarized zone that would be based on the line of contact. This proposal was accompanied by a map showing the northern and southern boundaries of the zone (though not the line of contact itself). Emphasizing an accommodation for the sake of the security and defense of each side's forces, the proposal provided for the withdrawal from the line of contact by UNC forces along the east coast and in the Kumsong area, and for enemy withdrawal around Kaesong.¹⁰²

The enemy delegation turned down this proposal on 26 October, presenting at the same time their own map and zone. In their version the UNC was to give up a good deal of favorable terrain in exchange for unfavorable terrain on the

Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas. Such a proposal was, of course, unacceptable to the UNC.¹⁰³

Despite this disagreement, the meeting of 26 October had a highly encouraging aspect. The enemy did not mention the 38th parallel as a basis for the demilitarized zone. The UNC demand for a cease-fire based on the line of contact had been tacitly accepted.

One of the main sticking points in the ensuing arguments over the demilitarized zone was the UNC insistence that the ancient Korean capital of Kaesong should be under its control or within the demilitarized zone. Kaesong had a symbolic significance to both the ROK and North Korea not only for its historic importance but because it had been the first major city to fall in 1950. From a purely military standpoint, General Ridgway felt it was strategically important that the region around the city, lying as it did across the approaches to Seoul, be either in UNC hands or effectively neutralized. His feeling was reinforced by the fact that he had deliberately given up efforts to seize the city in June 1951 because of the approaching armistice negotiations. General Ridgway had had battalion strength forces in Kaesong prior to the beginning of negotiations and had refrained from further advances to occupy it in strength only because he assumed that as the agreed site for negotiations it would be completely neutralized.¹⁰⁴

In late October the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned General Ridgway not to commit himself so rigidly to a particular demarcation line that compromise was ruled out. CINCUNC acknowledged the message by pointing out to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen, during their visit, had agreed that when the line proposed by the UNC, in the form of a map showing the demilitarized zone, was given to the Communists it would be, with minor changes, "our final offer." General Ridgway also understood that the JCS had approved this agreement. "I plan little change in our proposed zone," he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 October, "except to reflect further Eighth Army advances."¹⁰⁵

On 30 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with President Truman's approval, sent CINCUNC a message denying that anyone had approved the current UNC offer as "final" subject only to "minor changes." They considered that the final minimum position was maintenance of the security of line KANSAS. It would be possible to make minor adjustments and still maintain security if necessary to bring the enemy around. "We recognize," the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCUNC, "that it is difficult for the Field Commander to surrender hard-earned ground and do not consider that you should do so unless negotiations seem likely to fail on an issue which does not involve our minimum position."¹⁰⁶

Following further discussions at Panmunjom, the UNC on 1 November decisively rejected the line of demarcation proposed by the Communists. Although enemy negotiators had characterized their proposal as "final," the UNC delegation believed that the UNC demand for the Kaesong area was the crux of Communist objection to the UNC proposal and that "almost any compromise which does not require them to forfeit Kaesong would be acceptable."¹⁰⁷

General Ridgway's stand on Kaesong was not well understood nor particularly popular in the United States. The *New York Times* asked rhetorically why the

delegates were “backing and filling over a seeming trifle” when they had already agreed on “big issues” connected with a cease-fire line.¹⁰⁸

On 6 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that public sentiment opposed any breakdown in negotiations over Kaesong, particularly in view of recent concessions by the other side. Washington had consistently held that the demarcation line should be generally along the battle line, and the Communist delegates seemed to have accepted this principle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Ridgway’s proposal that the two sides agree in principle on the location of a demarcation line along the line of contact and then proceed to discussion of other items. But if the enemy flatly rejected this proposal and further negotiation appeared fruitless, General Ridgway was to yield on the Kaesong issue, provided the minimum US position, the battle line, had been met.¹⁰⁹

One important qualification remained. This latest Communist proposal would have the effect of curtailing further UN advances beyond the line of contact, a situation militarily unacceptable unless agreement on all other arrangements was reached shortly thereafter. Acceptance of the Communist proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Ridgway, must be contingent upon a time limitation for completion of all agenda items; if the deadline was not met, location of the zone would be subject to revision.¹¹⁰

On the next day the enemy proposed that the existing line of contact be the demarcation line and that both sides withdraw two kilometers to form a demilitarized zone. They wanted to start at once with the checking of the actual line of contact on maps. While their offer provided for revisions of the line corresponding to actual changes prior to the signing of the armistice, there were some hidden drawbacks to this. First, each side would have a veto over any adjustments proposed by the other; second, before the signing, each side would “reserve the right” to propose revisions corresponding to the actual line of contact, but no practical machinery for agreeing on such revisions was proposed. General Ridgway thereupon rejected this enemy offer. He explained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

I feel strongly the unwisdom of agreeing to the present line of contact as a permanent demarcation line subject only to minor adjustments, thereafter, with the provision that agreement is reached on all other agenda items within a definite period of time. To a certain extent this would constitute a de facto cease-fire for the period specified.

General Ridgway intended to stand inflexibly on the principle that the line of contact as of the effective date of the armistice must be the line of demarcation.¹¹¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned General Ridgway not to take a “no retreat” position. “We feel here,” they told him, “that early agreement on principles governing selection of line of demarcation satisfying our major requirements has considerable importance.” And they feared that the Communists, feeling that they themselves had made major concessions on the demarcation line, might, if rebuffed too strongly, revert to their original demand for the 38th parallel.¹¹²

Meanwhile, at the conference table, the enemy reacted vehemently against a UN proposal on 10 November to set the demarcation line as of the date of the signing of the armistice. They displayed anger and rudeness toward the UNC delegation. General Ridgway believed the enemy was seeking only a de facto cease-fire. The position taken by US negotiators indicated that General Ridgway had no intention of budging on the issue unless ordered to do so.¹¹³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that General Ridgway was being too intransigent. Their position was that the UN Command should accept the present line of contact, with the understanding that it must be renegotiated if other issues were not settled within a reasonable time—a month or so. After obtaining approval for this position from the Department of State and the President, they instructed General Ridgway on 13 November to press for an early settlement of the demarcation line on that basis. Such an arrangement, they added, would not imply a cease-fire; ground action would continue.¹¹⁴

General Ridgway's protest was swift and forceful. Asking for reconsideration of this new instruction, he declared that "premature acceptance of the present line of contact, under any conditions of adjustment, or requirements connected with completion of other agenda items, must inevitably delay the possibility of obtaining an acceptable and honorable armistice." He concluded:

I feel there is substantial probability that announcement to the Communists of the course you have directed will increase Communist intransigence and weaken our future positions on every substantive point. Having grown up with this developing situation, I have a strong inner conviction, admittedly based on the Korean as contrasted with the world situation, that more steel and less silk, more forthright American insistence on the unchallengeable logic of our position, will yield the objectives for which we honorably contend. Conversely, I feel that the course you are directing will lead step by step to sacrifice of our basic principles and repudiation of the cause for which so many gallant men have laid down their lives. We stand at a crucial point. We have much to gain by standing firm. We have everything to lose through concession. With all my conscience I urge we stand firm.¹¹⁵

But what General Ridgway did not know was that the JCS directive governing this matter was even then before the President for consideration and confirmation. On 13 November President Truman approved the directive, developed jointly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department officials. On the next day the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered CINCFE to agree to the Communist proposals, with a suggested period of about one month stipulated "without undue delay." They did not tell him that the directive came from the President.¹¹⁶

General Ridgway relayed the JCS instructions to his negotiators. Reluctantly, on 17 November, the UNC delegation informed the Communists that their proposal on the line of contact was acceptable, provided the one-month time limit was tacked on.¹¹⁷

The Communists did not accept the UN proposal in toto but insisted that the line not be revised, even after expiration of the one-month period, until after all other agenda items had been settled. The UN delegation held out briefly, but in view of their instructions, could only make a token effort. By 23 November staff

officers had begun tracing the line of contact on maps. Four days later the demarcation line was established.¹¹⁸

On 27 November both sides ratified an agreement stating that they: (1) accepted the principle that the line of contact would become the military demarcation line and that following completion of the armistice agreement, both sides would withdraw two kilometers from the line in order to create a demilitarized zone and (2) agreed that if the armistice was signed within 30 days, the line of contact, as already determined by Communist and UN staff officers, would become the demarcation line, no matter what changes in the line of contact during those 30 days. It was clearly stated that hostilities would continue during the 30-day period.¹¹⁹

The de facto cease-fire of which General Ridgway had warned did not materialize. But no sooner had the demarcation line agreement been ratified than press reports in the United States announced that the Eighth Army had been ordered to cease firing. This charge infuriated the President, who immediately called for an explanation from the field and almost simultaneously issued a strong denial. President Truman on 29 November labelled the press reports "fake" and stated: "I hope everyone understands now that there has been no cease-fire in Korea and that there can be none until an armistice has been signed. . . . Any premature slackening of our effort would cost more US casualties in the long run than need be lost."¹²⁰

By implication, General Ridgway attributed the press report to a misinterpretation of instructions that General Van Fleet had issued to his corps commanders. While ordering that UN forces be made aware that the hostilities would continue, General Van Fleet had also stated in his instructions that during the remainder of the armistice negotiations the Eighth Army would "clearly demonstrate a willingness to reach an agreement." This of course was a function entirely beyond Eighth Army's purview, as General Ridgway pointed out to General Van Fleet. Exactly who was responsible for the misinterpretation and the "leak" to the press was never determined, although evidence pointed to small unit commanders in the western sector.¹²¹

Ground action during the 30-day period following the agreement on the demarcation line was very light, although UN ground patrols were active. This was in accordance with instructions that General Ridgway had issued to General Van Fleet on 12 November telling him to assume the active defense, and to limit offensive action to the seizure of terrain required for defense of existing positions and for establishing an outpost zone of from 3,000 to 5,000 yards in depth.¹²²

The Situation in November 1951

The measure of agreement reached in the negotiations on 27 November 1951 had helped, during the course of its evolution, to clarify the relationship between the UN Command and the administration in Washington. It was crystal clear that neither CINCUNC nor the UNC delegation was empowered, on their

own authority, to lay down "final" positions at the negotiating table. On the other hand, the relationship had been somewhat strained. Having been overruled in Washington on the issue of the demarcation line, General Ridgway and the UNC delegation apparently developed a feeling, which was to be strengthened in ensuing months, that they could never be entirely sure that Washington would back them up. Admiral Joy later observed that "the delegation, and indeed General Ridgway, never knew when a new directive would emanate from Washington to alter our basic objective of obtaining an honorable and stable armistice agreement." He complained:

In such circumstances it is most difficult to develop sound plans, to present one's case convincingly, to give an appearance of unmistakable firmness and finality. It seemed to us that the United States Government did not know exactly what its political objectives in Korea were or should be. As a result, the United Nations Command delegation was constantly looking over its shoulder, fearing a new directive from afar which would require action inconsistent with that currently being taken.¹²³

General Collins later acknowledged that instructions to the UNC from Washington were sometimes "vacillating," and showed a "lack of firmness" that distressed General Ridgway and the delegation. "I must admit," he recalled in his memoirs, "that we members of the JCS occasionally had the same feeling in our consultations with the State Department and civilian leaders more directly responsible politically to the American people. Yet we had to admit that we could not guarantee the success of military courses that General Ridgway, or we ourselves, supported."¹²⁴

What General Ridgway and his delegation had not known, or at least had not considered, was the importance of settling the demarcation line issue as rapidly as possible owing to significant pressures then developing in Paris. Washington authorities, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department officials, were keeping an attentive eye not only on Panmunjom but on the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly, which had opened on 6 November. There, at the Palais de Chaillot, the United States was engaged in a free-swinging propaganda battle with the Soviet Union which, through the vituperative Andrei Vishinsky, was demanding that the United Nations declare the North Atlantic Treaty pact illegal. It was also demanding that there be a world conference on the prohibition of the atom bomb, a peace meeting among the Big Four and Communist China, and a Korean armistice along the 38th parallel. These events gave the President and his advisors a perspective on the Korean situation that could hardly be appreciated at Munsan or even in Tokyo.¹²⁵

Probably the most complex and difficult question raised by the decision to settle the demarcation issue mainly on Communist terms cannot be answered. Did the UNC concession sacrifice future bargaining strength and retard ultimate agreement on an armistice, as General Ridgway had predicted that it would? Certainly the hope in Washington that agreement would follow rapidly proved to be vain. The 30-day period passed uneventfully, invalidating the agreed demarcation line, and the negotiations dragged on. The Communists then, and

for months to come, remained intransigent, and it is impossible to say whether their attitude was fostered and encouraged by the decision to yield on the demarcation line.

The cost of the fighting had continued as the armistice negotiations lengthened. Between July, when talks started, and the end of November, when Agenda Item 2 was settled, the UNC suffered nearly 60,000 casualties, of which more than 22,000 were American. The enemy lost almost 234,000 casualties in the same period. Most casualties on both sides had been suffered in September and October, when Communist resistance to UN probing intensified and combat broke out intermittently all along the front, putting a bloody end to the mid-summer lull.

One combat development of great concern was the shifting of relative strength in the air. While UN ground forces had been strengthening their defensive positions all along the front, UN planes had been keeping up regular attacks against enemy supply and communications lines, troops, materiel, and airfields. But, beginning in September, this interdiction program began to encounter stronger and stronger resistance from Communist MIG-15s. In November the UNC was forced to stop daylight raids north of the Ch'ongch'on River, and enemy jet fighters were sighted on fields south of the Yalu for the first time. November also marked the entry into the war of the Soviet-made TU-2 twin-engine light bombers. These developments posed an increasing threat to the air superiority of the UN Command and to its security on the ground, and they played an important part in shaping JCS opinions in November on the question of what the United States should do in case the armistice negotiations collapsed completely.¹²⁶

The Developing Diplomatic Deadlock

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Make New Recommendations

By the middle of 1951 US policy toward Korea contemplated a solution to the war through “political means.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff had nevertheless warned General Ridgway on 30 June that they had no assurance that the Communist side was serious about concluding an armistice. Negotiations might fail and full-scale fighting resume; it was necessary to face this possibility and to decide what the United States would do in that event.

Within a few days following the start of negotiations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their own initiative, presented to the Secretary of Defense proposals for a broad range of military actions to increase pressure on the enemy should negotiations fail. In a memorandum on 13 July, they rejected actions likely to bring a general war with Communist China but urged the following steps if talks broke down irrevocably:

- a. Continue preparations to place the Nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on relatively short notice;
- b. Direct the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available;
- c. Remove all restrictions on advances into North Korea, at least to the neck of the North Korean peninsula;
- d. Remove all restrictions against attacks in North Korea, including [those] against Rashin, the Yalu River dams, and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River;
- e. Extend the area for pursuit and the air-to-air action in air engagements initiated over Korea by disregarding the border between Korea and Manchuria (loosely termed “hot pursuit”), such pursuit to include destruction of enemy planes after landing, and neutralization of opposing anti-aircraft fire;
- f. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed to:
 - (1) Aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea.
 - (2) Interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications.

- g. Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese defense forces; and
- h. Develop and equip dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming eventually the major responsibility for the defense of Korea.

Turning to the other countries providing military support to the UN effort in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that, if negotiations failed, these countries be "pressed" to support a naval blockade, to supply more forces, and to bring additional political and economic pressure to bear on Communist China in order to force withdrawal of its troops.¹

Secretary of Defense Marshall forwarded these recommendations to the President with a noncommittal note. "I am not ready to express an opinion at this time," he wrote.² No action was taken on the JCS recommendations at the moment, but they were to prove influential in shaping a new declaration of national policy toward Korea that emerged in December 1951.

The State Department Position

Foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and France were scheduled to meet with Secretary of State Acheson in Washington in September 1951. In preparation for this meeting, the Department of State on 18 August 1951 produced position papers addressed to two possible contingencies, the conclusion of an armistice in Korea and the failure of the negotiations. Both were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.³

Addressing the first paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to the State Department's recommendation that nonbelligerent nations, specifically Communist China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), be parties to the political conference that was to follow an armistice. They also insisted that it be made clear that the conference was to be "strictly limited to discussion of matters pertaining solely to Korea." Secretary Marshall endorsed their comments.⁴

Their objections to the second, or "no armistice," paper were, militarily, of greater substance. Here the State Department had set forth various contingency actions to be taken in case negotiations failed, including some that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended on 13 July. However, the actions were related to "hypothetical military contingencies" that depended upon enemy actions, and it was further specified that there was to be no major US military action until after consultation with other participating UN nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that such a course was "so dangerous militarily as possibly to jeopardize the security of United Nations forces in Korea." To base future actions on what the enemy might do or upon the outcome of consultations with other UN members in Korea would impose unacceptable limits upon US freedom of action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the measures they had recommended on 13 July and wanted none of them tied to enemy moves.⁵

In forwarding these JCS comments to the Secretary of State, Secretary Marshall endorsed them and thus gave his approval, which he had previously withheld, to the JCS recommendations of 13 July. He made an exception, however, for the proposal regarding "hot pursuit," reserving his position pending review of the matter by the National Security Council.⁶

The Department of State amended the "no armistice" paper in line with the JCS comments. However, the Department decided that a naval blockade would probably be "impracticable" and recommended instead an economic blockade, or embargo. On the other hand, in one respect the revised paper went beyond the JCS recommendations; it was proposed that, if the armistice talks failed, the United States should reexamine the possible use of Chinese Nationalist troops against the Chinese mainland and in Korea. In revised form, the paper was regarded by State as "approved" and was used in the tripartite Foreign Ministers' talks in September 1951.⁷

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given an opportunity to comment on the revised paper, they expressed concern over the fact that it was considered approved. They pointed out that it did not entirely reflect their views, nor had the Department of Defense concurred in it. With respect to Chinese Nationalist troops, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained opposed to their use in Korea, as they had indicated eight months earlier, though they agreed that the use of these troops against mainland China should be reconsidered. As for the question of a naval blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it a "practicable military measure"; they recognized, however, that the political problem of obtaining UN support might be insoluble. Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett forwarded these comments with his concurrence, asking that no US policy regarding the failure of armistice negotiations be adopted without further study.⁸

Secretary Acheson's meeting with Foreign Ministers Herbert Morrison of the United Kingdom (UK) and Robert Schuman of France took place from 10 to 14 September. Although the US position on courses of action in Korea had not been fully debated or clarified within the administration, this fact had little effect, since the discussions were concerned primarily with developments in the Mediterranean and Western Europe. Nevertheless the subject of Korea was touched on, in a manner that foreshadowed trouble for the JCS position on a naval blockade of China. According to a US observer, British officials expressed doubt that a blockade, or even an embargo, would be acceptable to their government.⁹

"Hot Pursuit" Resolved

The question of "hot pursuit," an action with a potential for trouble perhaps even greater than that of a naval blockade, had not been discussed at the Foreign Ministers' meeting. As already pointed out, Secretary Marshall had withheld his endorsement of the JCS views on this issue. On 4 September 1951 he referred the question to the National Security Council, pointing out that it would involve a change in basic national policy toward Korea as expressed in NSC 48/5.¹⁰

The NSC planned to consider "hot pursuit" on 26 September in connection with a State-Defense progress report on NSC 48/5. However, at that time General Bradley was scheduled to visit Tokyo in company with Mr. Bohlen of the State Department, as described in the preceding chapter. At General Bradley's request, the Council postponed discussion of the subject pending reconsideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, looking toward development of a new statement of national policy on Korea, the NSC directed the Senior Staff to explore "as a matter of urgency" other practicable courses of action in Korea.¹¹

General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen reached the Far East at a time when Communist air strength in Korea was undergoing a massive increase. Large numbers of MiG-15 fighters, superior to US aircraft in high altitude performance, made their appearance, and a major program of rehabilitation and construction of airfields was undertaken in North Korea. US airmen found their control of the Korean skies seriously challenged. Under these circumstances, the Yalu boundary was meaningless and the question of hot pursuit became academic. From Tokyo, General Bradley wired the Joint Chiefs of Staff that both General Ridgway and the Far East Air Force (FEAF) Commander, General Otto P. Weyland, USAF, no longer considered hot pursuit desirable. They now believed that the solution, in the event of massive air attacks from Manchuria or North Korea, lay in retaliatory strikes against enemy airfields, wherever they could be reached. "I concur in the forgoing appreciation," concluded General Bradley, "and recommend that we remove 'hot pursuit' as one of the actions to be taken."¹²

General Bradley's advice was accepted by his colleagues. In a statement of views that they sent the Secretary of Defense on 3 November, in connection with the NSC restudy of Korean policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the subject of "hot pursuit" receive no further consideration.¹³ Thus it never reached the NSC agenda.

Toward a New Policy

The decision of the NSC of 26 September 1951, postponing discussion of "hot pursuit" and launching a restudy of possible courses of action in Korea, was transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 October.¹⁴ They interpreted the NSC action as calling for a reappraisal of the Korean situation and a review of their recommendations of 13 July.

General Ridgway had meanwhile been doing his own contingency planning for a possible breakdown in negotiations, in line with the JCS recommendations. He set forth his conclusions in a message of 23 September. If negotiations broke down, he was considering an amphibious assault in the Wonsan area. But he warned that such an attack might cause "earlier full-scale Soviet military intervention." It would also lend credence to enemy propaganda and would create an ideal target for a Soviet atomic attack. If the armistice negotiations continued with no immediate prospect of a successful conclusion, he was considering either

the Wonsan operation or another landing not as far north, possibly in concert with a general offensive across the entire Eighth Army front. This attack would assure retention of the initiative and inflict heavy losses on the enemy. On the other hand, General Ridgway pointed out, these operations would cost the UNC approximately 10,000 casualties a month. The risk of Soviet intervention would also be increased in this case. General Ridgway was not in a position to assess the relative importance of these various considerations and requested guidance from Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered his message on 12 October and postponed action, partly because General Bradley was absent, partly because General Ridgway's proposed actions fell within the broader considerations that were under study by the NSC Senior Staff.¹⁵

On 3 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff rendered their reassessment of the Korean situation. They told the Secretary of Defense that they had reconsidered their recommendations of 13 July 1951 and remained convinced that, if armistice negotiations failed, it would be necessary to increase military pressure on the enemy. They recognized, however, that any such increase must be accommodated to the actual capabilities of the UN Command and to the existing situation. General Ridgway was in the best position to evaluate these matters, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that he should be accorded "a wide latitude of discretion" as to the "timing, nature, and extent" of any military operations necessitated by the failure of negotiations. They therefore amended the second item on their 13 July list of recommendations to say that CINUNC should be directed to increase the scale of military operations insofar as he judged feasible without "disproportionate losses" to his command. They also withdrew the restriction on advances into North Korea ("to the neck of the North Korean peninsula") that had been written into their third recommendation.¹⁶

As already noted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the subject of "hot pursuit" receive no further consideration. They pointed out, however, that it might be necessary for the United States, in order to counter the growing enemy air threat, "to employ its air forces unilaterally and on short notice to attack certain Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity is such as seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area."¹⁷

Subject to the above changes (and to the deletion of mention of the bombing of Rashin as an issue), the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the measures they had recommended on 13 July. These measures, they told the Secretary of Defense, would be "sufficient to maintain military pressure" provided the enemy did not expand the scale of his effort. They would not, however, achieve a "conclusive military decision." The Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered other ways of forcing a successful military decision, but all of these would call for the employment of "significant" additional forces and weapons. "From the United States military point of view," they stated, "the immobilization of United States ground, air, and naval forces in inconclusive operations in Korea over an indefinite period of time with the attendant attrition of manpower and materiel may become unacceptable." Too, if negotiations failed, public pressure for a military victory might become paramount. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were aware of the implications of

increasing US military involvement in Korea and pointed out that before any such increase took place there must be a review of the US position in the light of US objectives in Korea and elsewhere. A decision would have to be made as to whether it was in the US interest to expand the war into Manchuria and China, a move that would at least have to be considered by the other UN member nations active in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded with a recommendation that the National Security Council immediately review the Korean situation and determine what the objectives of the United States should be in the event that current negotiations failed.¹⁸

The JCS views were forwarded to the NSC with the concurrence of Acting Secretary of Defense William C. Foster. As NSC 118, they were circulated to the Senior Staff for use in connection with the study that had been directed by the Council on 26 September.¹⁹

The question faced by the Senior Staff was whether, in case negotiations failed, the United States should continue to seek by political means a unified and independent Korea as an ultimate objective, as stated in NSC 48/5, or should seek a "definitive military and political settlement to the Korean problem"—that is, a clear-cut military victory. The Senior Staff prepared a detailed study of the advantages and disadvantages of these two courses of action.²⁰

A complete military victory, bringing about the unification of Korea, would require the United States to send substantial ground and air reinforcements and to impose a naval blockade of Communist China, according to the Senior Staff. Use of atomic weapons might also prove necessary. The arguments against such a course, as developed by the Senior Staff, were overwhelming. Reduced to their essential elements, these arguments were three:

(1) The United States lacked the necessary resources and would continue to do so until well into 1952. The effort to generate major reinforcements for Korea would take considerable time and impose high costs. It would delay the planned buildup of forces in Europe, deplete the Army's general reserve, and result in maldeployment of US military strength.²¹

(2) Other countries would probably refuse to support any expansion of the war, and the Korean action would thus be transformed into a unilateral US effort rather than a cooperative one by the United Nations.

(3) An enlarged effort in Korea, even if it resulted in military victory, would greatly increase tension in the Far East. The expansion of US objectives in Korea and the use of a substantially greater degree of force there would probably be viewed by Communist China and the USSR as threats to their security and might lead to a "direct confrontation" between US and Soviet forces in North Korea.

It followed, therefore, that the only alternative (aside from abandoning the commitment in Korea, which the Senior Staff dismissed without serious consideration) was to continue a limited war in Korea while seeking an armistice. Admittedly this course also held serious dangers. It might mean that the United States would sacrifice the last opportunity to strike at Communist power in China without bringing on general war. It would involve steadily increasing risks to the security of UN forces in Korea because of the Communist air buildup, which might eventually constitute a threat so grave that the United States would

be forced to attack Chinese air bases. Limitation of the war might then prove impossible. Nevertheless the Senior Staff concluded that US national interests would best be served by a course of limited war.

Discussing the possibility of an armistice, the Senior Staff acknowledged the difficulties encountered in the negotiations and briefly considered various actions that might be taken in case they broke down entirely. At the same time, it was recognized that, even if an armistice were concluded, the danger of renewed aggression would remain and could not be obviated by any system of inspection. A much better deterrent would be a clear warning, by the United States and its allies, that any new attack would be met by reprisals, not merely in Korea, but against China itself. In the words of the Senior Staff:

The publicly expressed determination of the United States and our principal allies to retaliate against China in case of renewed aggression would serve notice on the communist world which they would regard with the greatest seriousness. It thus would become the "greater sanction," the strongest deterrent to aggression which we could devise, and therefore worth the risk.²²

Consultation with the British

Meanwhile, US authorities continued to keep in close touch with the British on Korea. At a meeting held at the American Embassy in Paris in November 1951 Secretary Acheson, accompanied by General Bradley, talked very frankly with UK Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and the British Chiefs of Staff about the problems facing UN negotiators in Korea. General Bradley pointed out that the UNC must insist on the most positive and thorough possible means of inspection. On the other hand past experience indicated strongly that the Communists would never agree to such open inspection. If, therefore, the UNC must accept an agreement that would depend on good faith and trust rather than adequate inspection procedures, the United Nations must let it be known in no uncertain terms that should the Communists violate the armistice terms "no hold would be barred." Mr. Eden was completely sympathetic with the US position on this matter, realizing the great importance of maintaining not only the security of the agreement but also of maintaining the security of the UNC forces.

That night Mr. Eden informed the UK Prime Minister that the thrust of US opinion favored drastic action against the Chinese Communists should they break an armistice agreement by a major attack. The United States was also anxious to have British agreement to an announcement warning of the serious consequences that would result from any major infringement of an armistice agreement. Secretary Eden informed Prime Minister Churchill that he had promised Mr. Acheson to let him and his colleagues know the British views on what actions should be taken as soon as he could possibly do so. "What they seek," Mr. Eden told the Prime Minister, "is to assure Ridgway that if he cannot get satisfactory

terms on supervision he is to work for an armistice none the less, keeping at the back of his mind that if the Communists broke the armistice by a major attack, drastic measures against China would be taken." He asked the Prime Minister to instruct the British Chiefs of Staff to examine and report: (1) on the actions that would be desirable (if the occasion should arise) against the Communist air forces and air bases north of the Yalu; and (2) on the implications of naval blockade. On his return to London Mr. Eden discussed the US proposals with the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff. As a result the British Government agreed that General Ridgway should be authorized to sign an armistice even though he was not satisfied with the supervisory arrangements. Once the armistice was signed the countries who had forces in the UNC would publish a statement in general terms warning the Communists that if they committed a serious violation it might not be possible to restrict hostilities to Korea.

British officials notified the United States that they would not support a naval blockade of Communist China. They did, however, favor the bombing of military targets north of the Yalu River in the event the Chinese violated the armistice terms by a major attack from beyond the Yalu River. The British attached to this agreement the condition that they be consulted in advance of the bombing. These decisions were taken in the full realization that the danger of major Communist attack following signing of an armistice was not imaginary but very real.²³

Secretary of State Acheson directed the US Ambassador to the United Kingdom to inform Secretary Eden that although some progress had been made at Panmunjom, it was by no means certain that the enemy would agree to accept adequate measures for inspection and confirmation of any armistice terms. The Communists had been very outspoken about their intent to carry out extensive airfield construction in North Korea during a cease-fire. Since inspection would be a weak reed, the United States attached great importance to the proposed warning statement, a draft of which was now in preparation and would soon be provided to British authorities.

As for measures to be taken if the enemy violated an armistice, Secretary Acheson agreed that it was difficult to decide at that time. "The decision can only be reached in the light of the circumstances then existing in the Far East and elsewhere in the world," he wrote. But there were minimum steps that should be agreed on at once. "We conceived these minimum steps," the Secretary stated, "to be aerial bombardment of Chinese military bases (not necessarily limited to air bases across the Yalu) and naval blockade of the Chinese coast. It is our view that nothing less than these measures could be considered as bringing any effective pressure to bear upon China itself."²⁴

NSC 118/2

On 11 December 1951 the Secretary of Defense asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views on a draft Korean policy statement to be considered by the NSC on 19 December and reflecting the conclusions of an earlier staff study. The

statement reaffirmed the desirability of limiting the war and seeking a settlement, as set forth in NSC 48/5, but presented new courses of action. Those advocated in the event of a breakdown of negotiations were essentially the ones proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except that consideration of a naval blockade had given rise to a split: the Defense Department favored it, the State Department advocated an economic blockade instead. The Senior Staff had been unable to resolve this disagreement. In the event of an armistice, the NSC draft recommended that the United States seek agreement with other participating nations to issue a joint warning to the USSR and Communist China that the consequences of any new aggression might not be confined to Korean territory.²⁵

Replying to the Secretary of Defense on 18 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took a generally favorable view of the NSC draft. They suggested relatively minor changes, largely to sharpen and clarify the wording. They noted that the paper might be read as altering NSC 48/5, which they believed was not intended, and recommended that it be made clear that the present draft did not "supersede or contravene" any provisions of NSC 48/5 except those relating to Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the Defense Department view regarding the desirability of a naval blockade; the State Department proposal for a mere embargo they branded as a "fainthearted initial action." The proper course of action in case negotiations failed, they said, would be to "apply pressure upon the major maritime powers to join in the imposition of a naval blockade on Communist China in order to bring about effective economic isolation of that nation from seaborne trade." Nothing less, they believed, would bar the importation of strategic materials into Communist China. The United Kingdom professed to have established controls over shipments through Hong Kong to Communist China, but these were "largely ineffective." As for the proposed joint declaration to follow an armistice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that, if other countries could not be induced to collaborate, the United States consider issuing a unilateral declaration. However, they added, the declaration should be so worded as to make it clear that there was no implied threat to the territory of the USSR.

One of the courses of action set forth in the NSC draft in the event that negotiations failed was to "Determine and take whatever measures in addition to the current mobilization effort would be required to meet the greater risk of general war which would then exist." The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this recommendation but proposed adding the clause, "and to support such additional military measures as might be required to attain the minimum settlement in Korea acceptable to the United States."²⁶

The NSC discussed the draft on 19 December and approved some, but not all, of the changes sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The disagreement over the two alternative actions, naval blockade and embargo, was left unresolved pending further study by the Senior Staff of their relative effectiveness. Secretary Acheson, commenting on the proposals in the draft to enlarge or broaden military operations if negotiations failed, set forth his understanding that CINCPAC would consult with Washington before undertaking any "major ground operations or advances in North Korea." Also, before US aircraft attacked air bases in

Communist China, the Department of State would, time permitting, inform key allies of this intention, but in such a way as to maintain security and surprise. General Bradley warned that, if it became necessary to broaden the scope of the war, "this may require more forces than are currently contemplated." Secretary of Defense Lovett transmitted the view of the Joint Secretaries that, in view of the Communist buildup in air strength, additional air forces should be sought from other countries, especially Canada. The Council took note of these various expressions of opinion, then approved the paper as amended. On the following day the President approved it as NSC 118/2.²⁷

US objectives in Korea, as defined in NSC 118/2, were very similar to those adopted earlier in NSC 48/5. They were as follows:

As an ultimate objective, continue to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. As a current objective, seek, through appropriate UN machinery, a settlement of the Korean conflict acceptable to United States security interests which would, as a minimum and without jeopardizing the US position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN:

- (1) Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements.
- (2) Establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and, in general, not south of the 38th parallel.
- (3) Provide for the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea as circumstances permit.
- (4) Permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed aggression by North Korean forces alone.²⁸

Until at least a minimum settlement had been achieved, military action in Korea would be continued, as well as economic and political sanctions against the aggressor. In any event, the United States would continue the effort to develop barriers against subversion or military aggression in Korea and to develop political and social conditions conducive to the "united, independent and democratic Korea" that was the US goal.

The heart of the new national policy in NSC 118/2 lay in the courses of action, which were designed to fit four possible contingencies. In the event of a successful armistice, the United States would:

- (1) Endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN Commission to undertake negotiations looking toward an eventual political settlement which would establish a united, independent and democratic Korea.
- (2) Maintain all existing political and economic sanctions against Communist China and exert vigorous efforts to persuade our allies to do likewise, at least until a minimum settlement of the Korean conflict is achieved.
- (3) Exert vigorous efforts to continue the contribution by UN members of forces to the UN Command in Korea so long as UN forces are required in Korea.
- (4) Intensify, to the maximum practicable extent the organization, training, and equipping of the armed forces of the ROK, so that they may assume increasing responsibility for the defense and security of the ROK.

(5) Seek agreement among the nations participating in the hostilities in Korea to the issuance of a joint declaration enunciating the responsibility of the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes for the strict observance of the armistice terms and warning that military action without geographic limitation will be taken to meet a renewal of the aggression. If agreement cannot be reached, the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China that future military aggression in Korea will result in a military reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic scope. Efforts should be made to the end that other governments, particularly the UK and France, take similar action.

(6) Endeavor to obtain in the Security Council or General Assembly a resolution calling upon all parties to the armistice agreement faithfully to observe its terms.

Courses of action prescribed in the event that the armistice negotiations "clearly" failed were essentially those that had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 July and 3 November (except for the matter of the naval blockade). As stated in NSC 118/2, these were:

- (1) Determine and take whatever measures in addition to the current mobilization effort would be required to meet the greater risk of general war which would then exist.
- (2) Increase the scale of military operations in the Korean area consistent with the capabilities of the forces available to the Commander in Chief of the UN forces whenever, in his judgment, such operation will contribute materially to the destruction of enemy forces and will not result in disproportionate losses to UN forces under his command.
- (3) Remove any restrictions against advances or attacks in Korea, including restrictions against air attacks on the Yalu River dams and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River but excepting attacks against areas within approximately 12 miles of the borders of the USSR.
- (4) Remove restrictions against the employment (unilaterally and on short notice, if the situation so requires) of United States air forces to attack Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity threatens seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area, such employment, however, to be specifically authorized by the President. . . .
- (5) Seek both within and without the UN the imposition on Communist China of additional political and economic pressures such as agreement by the maximum number of countries to the diplomatic isolation of Communist China.
- (6) [Here were included two alternative subparagraphs, one calling for embargo, the other for blockade, which had been referred back to the Senior Staff for review].
- (7) Exert vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from UN countries which have not yet contributed military forces.
- (8) Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed to:
 - (a) Aid to the maximum practicable to extent anti-communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and
 - (b) Interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications.

The same courses of action would be carried out "by stages" if it became clear that the Communists were deliberately "stalling" the negotiations while building up their own military strength. Finally, whether or not an armistice was reached

in Korea, the United States would develop ROK military strength as rapidly as possible, expedite the organization and equipping of Japanese defense forces, continue covert operations against Communist China and North Korea, and continue strengthening the ROK politically and economically, working through the UN wherever possible. Standing instructions to CINCUNC to deal with the possibility of massive Communist air attacks would be continued in force. If large numbers of Soviet "volunteers" appeared in Korea, consideration would be given to withdrawing UN forces immediately and to "placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war."

Negotiations on Concrete Arrangements: Item 3

While NSC 118/2 was evolving, negotiations in Panmunjom, as described in the preceding chapter, had brought agreement on a demarcation line (Item 2 of the agenda), qualified by a proviso that if the rest of the armistice were not reached within 30 days the line as approved on 27 November would no longer be valid. Three agenda items now remained: Concrete arrangements for the armistice, including methods of supervision (Item 3); disposition of prisoners of war (Item 4); and recommendations to be made by the armistice negotiators to their governments (Item 5). In fact, negotiations on these items had hardly gotten under way by the expiration of the 30-day limit specified in connection with Item 2.

The minimum US position on Item 3 had been given General Ridgway by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 June. The crux of the US position lay in the requirement for free inspection throughout Korea to ensure compliance with the armistice and for a cessation of the introduction of reinforcements of men and materiel (as distinct from mere exchange or replacement of units or personnel) into Korea. The other arrangements, such as those for a Military Armistice Commission (MAC), seemed to hold less potential for trouble.²⁹

On 4 October General Ridgway, anticipating the early onset of negotiations on Item 3, questioned the basic directive. It could be interpreted to require his negotiators to seek enemy agreement to "unlimited inspection," which, he pointed out, was neither necessary nor desirable and would never be accepted by the enemy. All that was essential was freedom of access to, and right of inspection in, enough areas outside the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to ensure against an enemy buildup that would change the military balance. As an initial position, therefore, CINCUNC proposed: (1) observation by joint observer teams at ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the two delegations, and freedom of movement for these teams over principal LOCs throughout all of Korea; (2) joint aerial observation and photo reconnaissance over all of Korea; (3) complete joint observation of the DMZ. As a final position, he would omit the second of these three proposals. He had discussed this subject with General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen during their visit and found that they agreed that the US position should be reexamined. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on

23 October agreed to accept General Ridgway's initial position, adding that the final position must be a matter for decision in Washington as negotiations developed.³⁰

Several weeks later, as the negotiations neared agreement on Item 2, General Ridgway appealed for a decision on his final position on Item 3. He had learned through experience, he noted wryly, that unless UNC negotiators could be confident as to "firm national policy," they would be at a disadvantage. Lack of authorization to take an unyielding stand on an issue was a great weakness in dealing with Communists, who became aggressive at the first sign of vacillation. "If national policy will not back this final position," he concluded, "it is requested that I be informed earliest as to the position in this regard which will be accepted as a final concession by the UNC."³¹

General Ridgway received little satisfaction from the reply of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They informed him on 16 November that, while both ground observation and aerial reconnaissance were highly desirable, neither was worth a rupture in negotiations. They considered that determination of a final position on Item 3 would be "premature" in view of the possibility of "alternatives to local inspections" as guarantees against renewed aggression in Korea. One such alternative, they added, was already being explored by the State Department: a joint announcement by all nations participating in the UN effort in Korea that "punitive action" would be taken against Communist China in the event of a "major violation" of armistice terms. This, of course, was the "greater sanction" statement proposed by the NSC Senior Staff.³²

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to consider the issue, and on 19 November General Bolte, on behalf of General Collins, asked CINCFE for further information. As General Bolte pointed out, in view of the possibility that the Communists might refuse to accept *any* effective inspection system and that the negotiations might breakdown over this issue, a "most careful assessment" of the US position was required. Basic considerations set forth by General Bolte were as follows: (1) it was not in the military interests of the United States to be tied up in Korea indefinitely; (2) the only real assurance against resumption of hostilities was to keep sufficient military power in and near Korea; and, (3) observation and inspection would provide some intelligence bearing on a possible resumption of hostilities. However, the advantages of observation and inspection must be weighed against the possibility of a breakdown of negotiations over the issue, the danger of serious friction with the Communists stemming from the process of inspection, and the likelihood that the enemy would obtain information on UN military dispositions.

General Ridgway was then asked for his recommendations regarding the number and location of key inspection points, the location of observer teams, means of preventing incidents and disagreements during the inspection process, methods of handling inspection reports, and means of checking on the rehabilitation of LOCs and airfields in North Korea. Also, on the assumption that the enemy rejected the initial position, General Ridgway was asked how UN security would be affected by accepting more restricted procedures, such as inspection in the DMZ only, joint aerial observation alone, periodic spot checks by the MAC in specified locations, or other means.³³

In reply to this query, General Ridgway fastened upon General Bolte's remark about not remaining in Korea "indefinitely," which seemed to hint at the possibility of US withdrawal. He protested that any withdrawal from Korea within 18 months after an armistice would result in "incalculable damage" to the US military position and to US prestige in the Far East. It would amount to a betrayal of the Korean people. Even a "premature substantial reduction" of US forces would risk heavy casualties if the enemy should launch a major offensive. "It seems conclusive therefore that we face a decision to maintain approximately our present military strength in Korea for the next 12 months, reviewing this decision as a changing situation may justify," he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It followed that, if UN forces were to stay in Korea as General Ridgway proposed, their security was the paramount consideration. Effective inspection could contribute to this security by providing timely intelligence of enemy preparations for a major offensive. General Ridgway was particularly concerned by the enemy air buildup, which posed an immediate threat to operations in Korea and a possible future danger to the security of Japan. The principle of inspection had already been firmly upheld in US negotiations with the USSR in atomic matters, General Ridgway pointed out, and to abandon that principle in Korea would weaken the basic US position. The "Korean problem" had "no separate solution"; it could be "solved only within a solution to the USSR problem."

General Ridgway informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the future bargaining potential of his negotiators had been greatly weakened by developments in connection with the demarcation line, when the UN delegation had been ordered to accept a position "more advantageous" to the Communists than the Communists' own proposal. It was therefore essential that he be given a clear-cut decision on Item 3, telling him how far he could go and still be assured of the support of the US Government. And if the US minimum position were rejected, "we should be prepared to break off negotiations." As for the disadvantages of joint inspection, General Ridgway thought that the intelligence obtained by the Communists in this manner would be of questionable value and pointed out that friction was an inevitable consequence of any dealings with Communists.

Responding to the detailed questions from General Bolte, General Ridgway proposed that inspection take place at 12 key points in North Korea and 11 in South Korea. A total of 40 joint teams would be required. Controversial matters and reports of violations would be referred to the MAC. Because railroads were linked with the civil economy, their rehabilitation was inevitable. Nor could repair of enemy airfields be avoided, owing to the principle of reciprocity.

"I consider unacceptable, from the viewpoint of the security of the UN forces, anything less than the 'final position' stated in . . . my message of 4 October," General Ridgway concluded. "I recommend approval of this minimum position as a final US Government position on which the UNC Delegation is authorized to break if rejected by the Communists."³⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assured General Ridgway on 28 November that there was no intention of "immediate withdrawal." However, they pointed out that under some circumstances it might be in the military interests of the United States to carry out a phased withdrawal. The primary goal nonetheless

was a satisfactory armistice. And they agreed that detailed inspection, of the type envisaged by him, was essential. They again instructed him to adopt the initial position that he had set forth in his message of 4 October. They assumed that before submitting any proposals for inspection he would have set forth under Item 3 the proposed agreements forbidding the introduction of additional military manpower or equipment, as prescribed in his basic directive of 30 June. They expressed some concern over the prospect of keeping North Korean airfields (numbering about 100) under adequate surveillance with ground observers only. But if General Ridgway was satisfied that it was possible to do so, he might stand on the final position outlined in his 4 October message, eliminating aerial observation and photo reconnaissance. If further study showed that aerial observation was needed to provide security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would consider changing this final position. And again they warned him that any decision to break off negotiations over this issue must be left to the other side.³⁵

It was under these instructions that the UNC negotiators faced the Communists at the conference table on 27 November, ready to argue Item 3.³⁶ The lines were quickly drawn. The enemy delegation spoke first and presented five proposals, broad and deceptively simple in appearance. These were that: (1) all fighting cease as soon as the armistice was signed; (2) all armed forces leave the DMZ within three days of the signing; (3) all armed forces withdraw within five days from rear areas, including islands and waters, to their own side of the demarcation line under threat of military action; (4) no armed forces enter or use armed force against the DMZ; (5) both sides designate an equal number of members for an armistice commission that would "be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangements and the supervision and implementation of the armistice agreement." Nothing was said about the procedures involved in this "supervision and implementation."³⁷

UN negotiators countered with a list of broad matters to be covered under Item 3, including establishment of a supervisory organization (with joint observer teams authorized to operate throughout Korea—matters that Nam Il later said were covered under the Communists' fifth proposal). The UNC then presented a specific list of principles, as follows:

(1) There shall be a cease-fire, effective within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice agreement, and adhered to by all forces of any type under the control of either side.

(2) There shall be established a supervisory organization, equally and jointly manned by both sides, for carrying out the terms of the armistice agreement.

(3) There shall be no increase of military forces, supplies, equipment and facilities by either side after the signing of the armistice.

(4) The military armistice commission, in carrying out its supervisory functions, shall have free access to all parts of Korea, for itself and for the joint observation teams responsible to the armistice commission.

(5) There shall be a withdrawal of forces of each side, air, ground, and naval, regular and irregular, from the territory controlled by the other side.

(6) There shall be no armed forces in the demilitarized zone except as specifically and mutually agreed by both sides.

(7) The military commanders shall administer their portion of the demilitarized zone in accord with the terms of the military armistice agreement.³⁸

It was readily apparent that the third and fourth items on this list constituted the difficulty, since they contained the two principles regarded as essential in the US position: a prohibition on the buildup of military forces or facilities after the armistice; and free movement of observers to make sure that the armistice terms were being observed. A lesser difficulty arose in connection with the fifth point: the UNC wished to make an exception to the withdrawal principle in order to retain certain small islands near the coast, in the rear of the Communist line, which were occupied by UN forces.

At the next several meetings, the Communists readily agreed to points 1, 2, 6, and 7 on the UN list, but differences over the remaining points hardened, especially 3 and 4. The UNC, while insisting on these, at the same time refused to consider withdrawing its forces from the offshore islands, as the Communists demanded. The Communist position, in summary, was that the withdrawal of all foreign troops must be discussed first and that, once decided upon, it would make the provisions on reinforcement, observation, and inspection unnecessary. Besides, they maintained, these matters were beyond the purview of concrete arrangements and should be discussed at a political conference following the signing of an armistice. In addition, the enemy negotiators made vehemently plain that they would accept no restriction on rehabilitation of facilities in North Korea, particularly airfields.³⁹

On 3 December, however, the enemy made an important move toward compromise. The Communist delegation proposed that: (1) in order to "ensure the stability of the military armistice" so as to facilitate a subsequent political conference, both sides would refrain from introducing any military forces or weapons "under any pretext"; (2) a supervisory organ from neutral nations, independent of the armistice commission, would be established to carry out inspection of ports of entry outside the DMZ. Thus two key UNC demands, non-reinforcement and inspection, were accepted in principle. At the same time, a new basis for disagreement arose in connection with the first of the two new Communist proposals. Questioning brought out that the prohibition upon the introduction of forces was absolute and would forbid rotation or exchange of units or weapons. This was contrary to the US position, which was that replacement must be allowed on a one-for-one basis. However, the matter was passed down to the subdelegation level for further exploration.⁴⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed of these developments, told General Ridgway on 5 December that they were pleased with the progress being made on Item 3. At the same time, they cautioned him against any act that might cause a regression at "such a crucial state." They noted that even "full Communist acceptance" of the US position on Item 3 would not guarantee the security of UN forces if the Communists decided to breach the armistice. Therefore, further consideration was being given to the kind of joint announcement mentioned in their message of 16 November; already the matter had been discussed with British representatives. Depending upon the development of these conversations as well as of the

negotiations in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff might desire to reconsider the final position on Item 3. Therefore, General Ridgway was to take no "irrevocable positions" on the remaining points at issue.⁴¹

By 7 December these points had been reduced to four. They were: (1) prohibition of the introduction of new forces (i.e., whether the prohibition was to be construed as forbidding the introduction of replacements); (2) rehabilitation of facilities, particularly airfields; (3) status of offshore islands; and (4) composition of observer teams (whether to be made up of neutrals, as the Communists desired, or jointly of representatives of the belligerents, as the UNC desired) and their relationship to the MAC.⁴²

In consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted instructions to CINCFE that would have told him, as a final position, to stand firm on the first of the above points, to accept the Communist view on the third and fourth, and to withdraw objection to rehabilitation of all facilities other than airfields. On 7 December they submitted these instructions to President Truman. The Chief Executive at once took issue with the proposed concession on facilities. He demanded to know

why we should allow rehabilitation of roads, railroads and other facilities except air fields. We have expended lives, tons of bombs and a large amount of equipment to bring these people to terms. They have been able to give us a bad time even in the crippled condition of their communications and they have been able to operate effectively even without air fields.⁴³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon explained to the President:

There is a strong feeling, particularly in the State Department, that a military armistice may be the only agreement we will have for a long time, and in fact we may not get a political settlement for some years. It would be impossible to deny for any appreciable time the right to rehabilitate those facilities upon which the economy of the country depends. Therefore, while on the short-term strictly military viewpoint denial of rehabilitation would be highly advantageous, particularly if hostilities were resumed, in the longer view we feel it would be impracticable to keep all of Korea in a state of devastation.

The reservation on airfields the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered necessary because of a "definite and observable" threat. But a stand against all rehabilitation, they believed, would mean a definite breaking point, and would preclude an armistice.⁴⁴

The President was convinced and approved the JCS positions. These were sent immediately to General Ridgway for his guidance:

A. Rotation must be permitted; accordingly, your present position should be your final position.

B. As a final position you should withdraw objection to rehabilitation of facilities other than airfields. (If and when rehabilitation of airfields becomes last obstacle to an armistice, refer matter to Washington.)

C. As a final position you should agree to withdraw from Korean islands generally North of Demarcation Line extended.

D. As a final position you should agree to neutral observer teams composed of personnel of nations whose armed forces are not participating in the Korean War, and mutually agreed to by both sides; however, these teams must be responsible to, and subject to direction and supervision of MAC.⁴⁵

Development of the Airfield Issue

The UNC delegation lost no time in presenting the revised principles, incorporating the new position on the neutral nations' supervisory organ and the MAC. The initial enemy reaction was hostile. In the next few sessions, the enemy offered to allow a 5,000-man monthly rotation if approved by the MAC, but the UNC rejected this concession. The Communists, for their part, branded the UNC stand on airfields as interference in "internal affairs," and called for withdrawal of UN forces from coastal waters and islands north of a line which they derived by extending the demarcation line eastward on the east and southwest from the west coast. They would not allow the neutral supervisory organization to be responsible to the MAC and introduced a new issue by refusing to allow the neutral observer teams to conduct aerial inspection. It became clear also that the enemy envisioned an armistice that would take effect immediately, without waiting for the inspection organization to be ready for operation. It appeared, therefore, that the two sides were drifting farther apart.⁴⁶

As the talks continued at the subdelegation level, General Ridgway became concerned that the 30-day period specified in the agreement on the demarcation line would soon end. On 18 December he warned that any extension of the period, other than a very short one in which an armistice was clearly imminent, would have a "harmful effect on the mental attitude" of his men and possibly on public opinion in the United States. He urged that Washington now set "final positions" on all matters and, if the enemy became too obdurate, that the UNC break off the talks. He had not forgotten his experience with Item 2. "Every time that the United Nations Command delegation abandons a position which it has strongly held," he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "its future position and bargaining strength are proportionately reduced."⁴⁷

General Ridgway then set forth his "final" positions, with the rationale for each, urging that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve them "without qualification" and that the UNC delegation be "authorized to announce them as such to the Communists and to the world at times of my choosing." In his view, the United States must insist upon the following:

(1) Prohibition against construction or rehabilitation of airfields. General Ridgway called this the "most important" part of the armistice. "The rehabilitation of enemy airfields is today the greatest potential threat to the security of our forces in Korea," he wrote. "Tomorrow it could be a similar menace to our forces in Japan."

(2) Neutral aerial observation and photo reconnaissance, without which the prohibition of rehabilitation of the 97 airfields in North Korea would have little meaning.

(3) Rotation and replenishment based on existing levels; anything less would mean withdrawal by attrition.

(4) Provision for mandatory action by the MAC and the neutral supervisory organ in carrying out the tasks assigned in the armistice agreement. Otherwise the enemy could veto any action by refusal to agree. With such a provision, it would not be necessary to have the neutral nations group under direction and control of the MAC.

(5) Location of neutral observer teams at major ground, sea, and airports of entry, with freedom of movement over major LOCs as required.

Finally, General Ridgway pinned down what he considered to be the key question, on which the fate of the armistice depended: whether or not the enemy would accept a prohibition on increasing his military capabilities during an armistice. "If the enemy will not accept, or will long delay an armistice which contains a prohibition against airfields," he stated, "the question arises why the enemy is so seriously concerned about airfields." The only way the question could be answered was to press the enemy to the "point of ultimate decision and choice—an armistice, or airfields."⁴⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff explained to General Ridgway that the military armistice, if achieved, would very likely be the "controlling agreement" in Korea for a very long time. Hence it must be of a nature to accommodate more than mere temporary military security. It must, for example, be appropriate to the Korean civil economy; its conditions must be enforceable over a long period of time, and must remain in effect until superseded by other arrangements. They believed that US public opinion firmly supported the goal of an armistice; it was only when the UNC negotiators appeared to be quibbling over minor details that the public grew impatient. As to positions on negotiating proposals, they refused to predict that any position would be absolutely "final," because the US position would be influenced by "new variations" that might be introduced by the Communists and by the degree of support that could be obtained from allied countries. They then presented their positions on the major issues, but warned that, while complete disagreement on all of these would be considered grounds for breaking off the talks, it could not be stated in advance that failure to reach agreement on only one, or even several, of these would be considered a breaking point.⁴⁹

Addressing each of the five major issues in turn, the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated the following positions:

(1) Airfields: In the long term, complete prohibition of the rehabilitation of all airfields would be impracticable to enforce. Nevertheless there must be a prohibition against airfields suitable for operation of jet aircraft. CINCFE was, therefore, authorized to agree to the rehabilitation of non-jet airfields, the number of which was left to his discretion.

(2) Aerial observation: This provision was desirable but not essential. In his final position, General Ridgway should yield on this point, even if ground observers were not in place.

(3) Rotation of Personnel: For purposes of negotiation, this issue should be separated from replenishment of supplies and equipment. There should be no monthly limit on rotation unless agreement could be reached on a limiting number that would satisfy General Ridgway's maximum rotation requirements. The

important point was that at no time should the overall level of personnel be greater than that existing at the time the armistice took effect.

(4) Replenishment of supplies and equipment: An agreement that supply levels would not be increased over those existing at the time of the armistice was desirable, but it would be difficult to monitor and was not of great importance, except in the matter of aircraft levels. On this point, CINCFE should be adamant in demanding that there be no increase.

(5) Observer teams and the MAC: General Ridgway's position on neutral observer teams (or "non-combatant" teams, as some potential contributing countries preferred) and the MAC was approved. No procedures should be accepted that would limit freedom of movement or restrict the right of reporting by teams or individual members. Observer teams must be located at major ground, sea, and airports of entry specified in armistice agreement, with freedom of movement as required to perform their duties.

With respect to the effective date of any armistice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it should be specified in the agreement and should be keyed directly to the presence of the MAC and some observer teams in Korea. It would not be necessary to have the teams in place. This latter provision presented some risk, which, however, was preferable to delay.

As for the 30-day deadline stemming from agreement on Item 2, General Ridgway was told that if progress was being made as the deadline expired, and depending on the status of the negotiations, he might propose or agree to an extension for a period not to exceed 15 days.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that, for the reasons they had given, the time had not yet arrived for him to announce the final positions he had promulgated in his 18 December message. Nor could they approve his request that the time of announcing these positions be left to his discretion.⁵⁰

Negotiations on Item 3 ran a stormy and fruitless course at Panmunjom as the year drew to a close. The 30-day limit fixed in connection with the agreement on Item 2 expired on 27 December with no armistice in sight. The new year brought no improvement. Enemy negotiators completely rejected a UN compromise proposal to allow rehabilitation of civil airfields, alleging that any restriction at all constituted "interference in internal affairs." On 29 December the UNC delegation tendered a compromise on another issue, offering to give up aerial observation if the enemy would accept the rest of the UNC proposal without substantive changes. The Communists characterized this offer as a "step forward" but would make concessions only in wording, not in substance. UNC negotiators then reminded the enemy that they had made major concessions in the matter of aerial observation, status of islands, nature of the supervising authority and the inspection teams, and airfield rehabilitation. They stated firmly that they would make no more concessions. The enemy negotiators rejected every offer, making it more and more clear that their side would never accept any prohibition on rehabilitation of airfields. Unwilling to offer real concessions, the Communists tirelessly reiterated the charge of "interference." Charges and countercharges proliferated until at last the UNC warned the enemy that the armistice itself was in jeopardy.⁵¹

Negotiations were tried at the staff officer as well as the subdelegation level, but nothing brought progress. It began to seem that the UNC delegate was correct when he told the Communists that they would grow old sitting at the table if they expected the UNC to change its stand on rehabilitation of airfields.⁵²

The “Greater Sanction” Statement

Part of the rationale for Washington’s greater flexibility on Item 3, as contrasted with the attitude of General Ridgway, was a conviction that no inspection process could guarantee against a renewed Communist attack and that, in the final analysis, the only real deterrent would be a warning of a “greater sanction”—a military reaction directed not merely against Chinese forces in Korea but against the territory of mainland China itself. The Senior Staff’s proposal for such a statement, to follow an armistice, was approved by the NSC and the President in NSC 118/2, as described earlier.

Support of other countries, especially the United Kingdom, was obviously desirable. Following informal conversations on the subject with the British Ambassador in Washington, Secretary Acheson, Secretary Lovett, and General Bradley pursued the matter further in Rome in November 1951 with Foreign Secretary Eden and representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff. The relation between Item 3 and the proposed warning statement was thoroughly explored. Secretary Acheson foresaw that it might be impossible to reach an armistice agreement that would provide for a really adequate inspection system. Secretary Lovett added that no inspection system limited to Korea could ensure against a renewed attack, since the Communists’ major bases were located north of the Yalu. Asked about the form of the statement that he had in mind, Secretary Acheson replied that he envisioned one issued jointly by the two countries or perhaps a US declaration supported by the United Kingdom; it was not intended to have the statement issued through the United Nations. The nature of possible reprisal actions was briefly discussed. The British were more sympathetic toward a bombing attack on Manchuria than to a blockade. No conclusions were reached, but the British agreed to consider the matter further.⁵³

In subsequent discussions the British agreed to the proposed declaration and it was decided to approach the other nations fighting on the UN side in Korea. On 19 December 1951 (the day the NSC approved NSC 118/2), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their message to General Ridgway setting forth positions on the disputed points under Item 3, informed him of the proposed “sanction” statement and of its role in Washington’s negotiating strategy. They told CINCFE:

It is our view that safety of UN Forces and the major deterrent to renewal of aggression must in the last analysis be dependent upon realization by Communists that a renewed aggression in Korea would result in a new war which would bring upon China the full retribution which the United States and her Allies deem militarily desirable. Every effort is being made to obtain agreement of countries participating in the military action in Korea to a declaration of this gen-

eral effect to be issued immediately following conclusion of an armistice. Preliminary discussions with the UK show her support of this concept and we are hopeful that other Allies also will endorse it. It is still our intention to convey this warning unilaterally if necessary.⁵⁴

General Ridgway, whose forces would be called upon to visit "full retribution" upon the enemy if the armistice was violated, replied on 7 January 1952 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently did not recognize the "potential consequences" of this proposal. He feared that the UNC would be directed to abandon the current position on rehabilitation of airfields and that, following an armistice, the enemy would greatly reinforce his air strength in North Korea. If those events occurred, and assuming that UN air strength would not be increased and atomic weapons would not be authorized for use, his command would be wholly unable to launch effective attacks upon China or Manchuria. As he described the situation:

Without a major increase in our air capability it is questionable if the nations which subscribe to the proposed declaration could offer an effective deterrent to Communist China's renewal of hostilities. . . . In my opinion the retributive potentiality of UN military power against Red China would be noneffective unless the full results of precipitating World War III were to be accepted, and the use of atomic weapons authorized.⁵⁵

General Ridgway's concern was well founded. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told him on 10 January that sufficient agreement had been achieved to ensure that the "sanction" statement would be issued, so that the question of rehabilitation of airfields assumed "less importance." General Ridgway's views had been given "careful and searching consideration," but "on balance, in light of all factors," it had been decided that he was to yield on the question of airfields if it became the "only unresolved point of issue" on the armistice agreement. He was not, however, to make this concession until it became clear that the issue was the "final and only breaking point." Hence they suggested that the UNC delegation seek to postpone further discussion of the airfield issue until agreement had been reached on all other outstanding questions on the entire agenda, including Items 4 and 5. If it proved necessary then to concede on airfields, the armistice should come into effect as quickly as possible after the concession. At that point, the "greater sanction" statement would be issued.⁵⁶

On the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General Ridgway the text of the proposed declaration, which had been drafted in the Department of State and approved by them. The operative portion was a warning by the nations participating in UN action in Korea that

if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the UN, we should again be united and prompt to resist. Consequences of such a breach of armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within frontiers of Korea.⁵⁷

In another message the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Ridgway that he should insist on a concurrent signing of the armistice agreement by the Communists as an essential condition for the UN concession on airfields, in order that the "sanctions" statement could be issued at once. Any intervening delay, no matter how small, would, they feared, be exploited by the Communists for propaganda advantage.⁵⁸

Upon seeing for the first time the text of the proposed statement, General Ridgway was more convinced than ever that Washington was on the wrong track. Although he had not been asked to do so, he reiterated his conviction "that with presently available military resources this command would be incapable of posing a threat to Communist China sufficient in itself to deter it from renewed aggression." As for the proposal to insist on concurrent signing of the armistice along with the UN airfield concession, this was "wholly impracticable." He reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his original instructions had been to see that the terms of the armistice agreement were set forth in the clearest and most detailed manner so as not to require the MAC to make substantive decisions. Among the detailed matters to be worked out were: numbers and locations of observation teams; their rights and privileges; the organization and functions of the MAC and the non-combatant supervisory organ; and the limit on rotation of personnel. It was, he said, impossible to forecast what delays would result from working out such details and it would be dangerous to proceed so rapidly that provision for implementation of the agreement was not set forth in sufficient detail to preclude endless arguments in the MAC.⁵⁹

General Ridgway doubted that the enemy would agree to defer discussion of the airfield issue and move on to other matters, since similar suggestions in the past had been rejected. However, the UNC delegation would submit the proposal "at an appropriate time in the near future." If it should be accepted, discussion of the details of the agreements on Items 2 and 3 would be turned over to staff officers while substantive discussion proceeded on Items 4 and 5.⁶⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that General Ridgway's comments had confirmed their doubts as to the practicability of the procedure they had themselves suggested, for signature of the armistice simultaneously with the airfield concession. But they insisted nonetheless that "all practicable steps" must be taken to minimize the time between these two events.⁶¹

Earlier, on 9 January 1952, the enemy had submitted a revised proposal that was a somewhat reworded version of the UNC proposal of 29 December, except that all reference to rehabilitation of airfields had been left out. It forbade the introduction of any "reinforcing" personnel or materiel but would allow rotation "within the limit agreed upon by both sides," under the supervision of the MAC. It provided for teams from "neutral nations" responsible for carrying out inspections at agreed ports of entry in the rear; they would be "accorded full convenience by both sides over lines of communication and transportation." Aerial inspection was not mentioned.⁶²

This proposal represented a concession on some of the minor sticking points and had the effect of focusing still more attention on the major stumbling block, the airfield issue. Because it offered no concession on that issue, the UNC perforce rejected it. The impasse continued, as insoluble as ever, with repetitious arguments from both sides. Meetings grew shorter and shorter as the subdelegates grew weary of saying and hearing essentially the same things.⁶³

Finally, on 25 January, in keeping with JCS instructions, the UNC proposed that staff officers from both sides assume the tasks of settling the details and drafting the wording of a document embodying the tentative agreements already reached under Item 3, setting aside the question of airfields. Contrary to General Ridgway's expectation, the enemy delegation agreed to this procedure on 27 January and staff officers went to work at once. The question of airfields would be held in abeyance until other issues were settled.⁶⁴

Item 4: Prisoners of War

By late November, the most important issue not yet faced at Panmunjom was Agenda Item 4, arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war (POWs). Enemy negotiators showed little disposition to attack this problem. When pressed, they replied only that they had the matter under advisement. Nevertheless it became obvious that a firm UNC position must be determined soon in anticipation of sudden enemy agreement to begin discussions on POWs.

Treatment of prisoners was a matter that engaged attention early in the Korean War. On 4 July 1950, General MacArthur had addressed a broadcast to the North Korean Government pledging that North Korean personnel captured by his forces would be treated in accordance with accepted humanitarian principles "recognized by civilized nations." He had warned that he would expect the same treatment for his captured troops. "I will hold responsible," he proclaimed, "any individual acting for North Korea who deviates from these principles or who causes, permits, or orders any deviation from such principles." This proclamation had been approved by President Truman, who had also instructed the Department of State to urge upon the ROK the same humanitarian standards.⁶⁵

On 5 July 1950, Syngman Rhee announced that the ROK Government was "proud" to be a signatory of the Geneva Convention and promised that it would "live up to the conditions of the Convention." Eight days later the Foreign Minister of North Korea, after being prodded by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), declared that his country, although not signatory to the Convention, would abide by its rules in its treatment of prisoners of war. There was clear evidence, unfortunately, that both Korean governments violated the letter and the spirit of the Geneva principles in the first year's fighting.⁶⁶

The American experience with POWs in previous wars gave little historical basis for dealing with the current situation. In giving General Ridgway the basic guidelines for negotiation on 30 June 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had told him only that: (1) prisoners would be exchanged on a one-for-one basis as expedi-

tiously as possible, and (2) representatives of the ICRC must be permitted to visit prisoner camps to render such assistance as they could.⁶⁷

Even before the first meetings at Kaesong, planners in Washington had begun to perceive pitfalls in this oversimplified approach toward the POW issue and found themselves rather suddenly facing questions of great complexity. What, for example, of the thousands of ex-Nationalist Chinese and ex-ROK soldiers captured by the UNC? Should these men be forced against their will to return to Communist control, where possible death or enslavement awaited them? What of the survivors from the thousands of ROK civilians, and the lesser number of UN civilians, captured by the North Koreans in the early days of the war? Should the UNC insist on their release along with POWs? What if the enemy refused to allow the ICRC to visit his POW camps? What if the enemy refused to settle for a one-for-one exchange, since the UNC held many more prisoners than he? That these were difficult and controversial questions was evident in the delay of Washington authorities in providing CINCUNC with answers.

A foreshadowing of trouble on the POW issue appeared at the first meeting at Kaesong on 10 July. At that time Admiral Joy asked the Communists to supply a list of their POW camps and to allow representatives of the ICRC to visit them. The enemy delegates were evasive, holding that the question of Red Cross inspections was not a military one. They did, however, insist that they had "observed international law as to the treatment of prisoners."⁶⁸

The Issue of Voluntary Repatriation

The United States had signed but had not ratified the Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 118 of which stated, "Prisoners of War shall be repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities." This clause was aimed directly at preventing a recurrence of Communist actions in keeping thousands of prisoners in slave labor camps for long periods after the end of World War II. The possibility that large numbers of prisoners might not desire to be repatriated was not dealt with in the Convention.⁶⁹

The idea of allowing prisoners a choice arose in Washington as a result of a suggestion by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, USA, the Army's Chief of Psychological Warfare. He proposed to General Collins that Chinese POWs who were former Nationalists and feared punishment by the Communists for having surrendered might be repatriated to Taiwan. General Collins passed this suggestion to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contending that it would be within the bounds of the Convention because Taiwan was still legally a part of China. He added a suggestion that, subject to adequate safeguards for the return of UN prisoners, no enemy POWs be forced to return to Communist-controlled territory without their consent. At the same time, General McClure queried General Ridgway about the possibility of classifying prisoners according to their wishes—obviously the first step in applying any policy of voluntary repatriation. He asked if it would be feasible to place POWs in the following categories: (1) those willing to return to

Communist control; (2) those Chinese willing to be placed under Chinese Nationalist control; (3) those Chinese who would prefer to be put ashore on the mainland coast clandestinely in the hope of making their way to their villages or to guerrilla held territory; (4) those Chinese and Koreans who would prefer to remain under UN control, even as prisoners.⁷⁰

General Ridgway judged this to be "an unrealistic approach." The major considerations in dealing with the POW question, in his view, were the earliest possible recovery of UN prisoners in enemy hands and the procurement of the maximum amount of strategic intelligence from enemy prisoners. To categorize prisoners as suggested by General McClure was infeasible. Any interviews of prisoners for this purpose would inevitably be revealed, with resultant adverse publicity and political effects on the UN cause. His own plan for recovering UN prisoners was to propose an initial exchange of POWs, on a one-for-one basis, for an estimated 12,500 UN soldiers missing in action (MIA) and for ROK POWs. Even including these latter, his proposal would give a bargaining advantage to the UNC, which held more prisoners than did the enemy. He believed that at least 25,000 enemy POWs, including a considerable number of Chinese, would volunteer for a one-to-one exchange, and he was already beginning to question prisoners to identify those willing to return to Communist control. In the event of a full peace settlement, he pointed out, the Geneva Convention would require the repatriation of all POWs; for that reason, he was preparing to screen, for release to the ROK Government, about 40,000 South Koreans being held by the UNC. These men had been captured and impressed into the NK Army before being captured by the UNC and were not regarded as prisoners by the ROK.⁷¹

General Collins' suggestion regarding former Chinese Nationalists had meanwhile been referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the members of which considered the possibility of combining this suggestion with General Ridgway's one-for-one proposal. The Committee drafted a message that was sent to CINCFE on 18 July 1951, asking his comments on the possibility of applying voluntary repatriation to those prisoners remaining after a one-for-one exchange was completed. Under this policy, the United States would not repatriate Chinese or North Korean POWs to Communist controlled territory without their "full consent." Chinese prisoners who so desired would be repatriated to Taiwan if found "acceptable" by the Nationalist Government. However, no effort would be made to carry out this policy if it threatened to jeopardize the speedy and safe return of UN POWs in enemy hands.⁷²

In reply, General Ridgway lauded the "humanitarian" aspects of this proposed course of action but pointed out that it would establish a precedent contrary to the Geneva Convention. It could conceivably prevent the return of US POWs following future wars and would provide propaganda for the enemy. Nevertheless he conceded that it might be "a desirable innovation in the law of nations, especially in the light of the present ideological conflicts between the Communists and the democratic world."⁷³

Despite General Ridgway's misgivings, the JSSC proposed, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, that the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners remaining after an exchange be submitted to higher authority. On 8 August 1951,

therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid before the Secretary the policy that they had outlined in their message of 18 July to CINCFE. The policy could be justified, they said, on the basis of "humanitarian considerations." It would hold inviolate the promise of the UNC that those surrendering voluntarily would be afforded safety and asylum. Future US psychological warfare programs would be greatly enhanced. "In light of the ideological struggle throughout the world for the minds of men," the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted, "and the despotic totalitarian methods employed by the Communists to force men to join with them, it would be of great value to establish in the free world not only the reliability of the promises of the United Nations Commander but also the principle of United Nations asylum from terrorism."

On the other side of the coin were several disadvantages, including those noted earlier by General Ridgway and the possibility that the enemy might react by breaking off negotiations. Most striking of all arguments against such a policy was inherent in the statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "the communists could claim justification for not returning United Nations armed forces personnel whom they now or may in the future hold as prisoners of war, and there would be no assurance that the retention of such personnel was in accordance with the freely expressed choice of the individual."

Because the policy involved matters that transcended purely military interest, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Secretary of Defense to submit it for consideration of the NSC, stating that they would not object to its adoption and that, on balance, they were "inclined to favor it."⁷⁴

Secretary Lovett sent the JCS proposal to the Secretary of State. Replying on 27 August, Secretary Acheson discouraged voluntary repatriation, pointing out that the overriding consideration was the prompt return of all UN and ROK prisoners held by the Communists. It might be advantageous from a psychological warfare standpoint to refuse to repatriate prisoners against their will, but any such refusal would come into conflict with the Geneva Convention. While neither of the enemy parties had observed the Convention thus far, it appeared to Secretary Acheson that

our best hope for alleviating the plight of United Nations and Republic of Korea personnel held as prisoners of war by the Communists and for obtaining their return lies in our continuing strictly to observe the terms of that Convention. In a broader sense, United States interests in this and future conflicts dictate, in my opinion, strict observance of the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

As an alternative to voluntary repatriation, Secretary Acheson suggested a possible program of parole, as provided by the Convention. Under this plan, certain individuals who had rendered "outstanding assistance" to the UNC, or whose return to Communist rule would be likely to result in their deaths, would be paroled and released before any armistice was signed, thus removing them from POW status. Secretary Acheson added that ROK personnel who had been impressed into the NK Army and subsequently captured should under no circumstances be returned; they should be released, in advance of the armistice, in consultation with the ROK Government.⁷⁵

The Secretary of Defense took no action to place before the National Security Council the JCS proposal for voluntary repatriation combined with one-for-one exchange. Like Secretary Acheson, he attached supreme importance to the return of UN prisoners. On 25 September he sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a comment on General Ridgway's plan for a strict one-for-one exchange. He recognized the military advantages of this plan, but, "at the same time," he pointed out, "these very advantages may well prevent the Communists from agreeing to anything but an overall exchange of POWs." In his mind, while the UNC must take into account humanitarian considerations, it must also avoid any solution which involved "bargaining with the welfare of our own prisoners." He requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider instructing CINCFE to seek initially the one-for-one formula but, failing that, to agree to an overall exchange. In such an exchange, of course, the "voluntary repatriation" of remaining prisoners would be impossible; there would be none remaining.⁷⁶

Although the Joint Strategic Survey Committee remained convinced that the JCS proposal should be studied by the NSC, General Collins changed his views after reading Secretary Acheson's opinion and persuaded his colleagues that it should be withdrawn. On his initiative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified Secretary Lovett that, while they were uncertain whether the enemy intended to observe the Geneva Convention, they did agree with Secretary Acheson that the best hope for getting back UN prisoners promptly in the Korean War, and in future wars, lay in a continuing firm adherence to the terms of the Geneva Convention. Moreover, they added, they fully concurred in his suggested amendment of General Ridgway's one-for-one proposal and would incorporate it in a forthcoming revision of CINCFE's instructions on the prisoner issue, which would also cover the release of captured non-Korean civilians. They no longer believed that the National Security Council need be consulted, since "appropriate policies concerning the particular matter under consideration can be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the State and Defense Departments, as have other decisions pertaining to the armistice negotiations." They therefore recommended to Secretary Lovett that the policy proposed in their 8 August memorandum be withdrawn "pending further consideration."⁷⁷

The issue of voluntary repatriation was fading rapidly into the background and General Ridgway did nothing to revive it. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff told him that they were now thinking in terms of an overall exchange following the parole or early release of certain selected enemy prisoners (as proposed by Secretary Acheson), General Ridgway agreed completely that the basic and most important objective was the early release of the maximum number of UN and ROK POWs. While a one-for-one exchange would be best, he was willing, if necessary for morale purposes and to get agreement on early release, to go along with bulk exchange, up to and including all-for-all. He sympathized with proposals to avoid forced repatriation and to secure early release of civilian internees. But he wanted to avoid any action that would jeopardize the basic objective.⁷⁸

UNC Policy on Prisoners

The UNC approached the prospect of negotiations on the POW issue handicapped by a lack of knowledge of the number of its soldiers in enemy hands. Neither the North Koreans nor the Chinese Communists had abided by the provisions of the Geneva Convention that required complete reporting of prisoners captured. The North Koreans had, early in the war, turned over 110 names to the ICRC in Geneva, but thereafter had furnished no information. The UNC, on the other hand, had submitted prisoner lists amounting to more than 100,000 to the ICRC in Geneva. General Ridgway estimated in October that the enemy held about 6,000 UN and 28,000 ROK POWs plus some UN and ROK civilians. As soon as negotiations on prisoners began, he hoped to press for disclosure of enemy-held POWs to "assist us in bargaining more effectively." But he was not too sanguine about the success of these efforts.⁷⁹

The fate of civilian captives of non-ROK origin—missionaries, personnel of neutral embassies, press correspondents, and others who had waited too long and had been swept up by the enemy in the invasion of South Korea—had already drawn the attention of Secretary Acheson. In his letter to Secretary Lovett on 27 August, he had suggested that CINCFE be instructed to make "whatever arrangements he considers feasible" for the release of these prisoners, without becoming involved in the question of the much larger numbers of Korean civilian prisoners held by both sides. The Joint Chiefs of Staff raised the subject with CINCFE on 13 October, telling him that they were considering including the problem in his armistice instructions.⁸⁰

The reaction from Tokyo was less than enthusiastic. CINCFE reminded his superiors that neither of the Geneva Conventions described civilian internees as POWs. To bring up the question of releasing civilians during negotiations for release of POWs could certainly muddy the already murky water. The enemy would object that this was a political question, out of place at a military armistice table. Even if the enemy did agree to consider civilian release, it would not be possible to confine the question to UN civilians. The ROK Government would surely press for the return of the thousands of its civilians who had been seized by the enemy and forcibly deported to North Korea. General Ridgway suggested that, if the subject of non-ROK civilians were to be broached, it should be on a name by name basis—and he had no specific names. He suggested that he be given names of the UN civilians and that the ROK Government be asked for the names of their missing civilians as well.⁸¹

Earlier, on 16 October, General Ridgway had notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the ICRC had agreed that some 41,000 prisoners of South Korean origin, who had been conscripted into the North Korean Army, might be reclassified as "civilian internees." After intelligence screening, these men, plus 350 North Korean civilian refugees, would be paroled to the custody of the ROK Government, which had requested their release; thus the question of their repatriation to Communist control would be obviated.⁸² General Ridgway now stated, however, that

he did not intend to follow through on this parole unless it was very clear that the action would not prejudice the armistice. As for paroling selected POWs, as suggested by the Secretary of State, this would be regarded by the enemy as a breach of faith. It would prejudice the bargaining position of the UNC delegation and endanger the recovery of UN POWs in enemy custody.⁸³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been preparing general instructions to CINCFE regarding the handling of prisoners, both military and civilian, in the approaching negotiations on Item 4. The President had by then entered the discussion. In a conversation on 29 October with Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb, the Chief Executive expressed the conviction that an all-for-all exchange would be inequitable in view of the huge disparity in the numbers of prisoners held by the two sides. Moreover, he feared that many of the prisoners—those who had willingly surrendered or had cooperated with the UNC—would be “immediately done away with” if sent back to Communist rule. With what proved remarkable foresight, Mr. Webb warned that a situation might develop in which the POW issue represented the last remaining obstacle to an armistice and pointed out that the Communists had always been obdurate in demanding return of all those who had escaped from the Iron Curtain. He foresaw also that the UNC might have a “real problem” in deciding what to do with any prisoners who were not exchanged. Nevertheless President Truman declared that he would not accept an all-for-all settlement unless the UNC received “some major concession which could be obtained in no other way.”⁸⁴

A draft of instructions for General Ridgway that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved on 14 November 1951 specified that CINCFE was to seek a one-for-one exchange if at all possible, but that he would agree to all-for-all if necessary to reach a settlement. The draft contained a list of 13 US civilians, mostly missionaries, known to be in enemy hands. CINCFE was directed to seek their release if possible. The Secretary of State, it was added, would be asked to obtain lists of civilians from the ROK and other countries who were believed to be in enemy captivity, for use in the negotiations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted this draft to the Secretary of Defense on 15 November. At the same time, they informed Mr. Lovett of General Ridgway’s proposal for handling ex-ROK prisoners and of his opposition to the parole of selected prisoners, implying their endorsement in each instance.⁸⁵

In forwarding the draft to the Secretary of State, with his concurrence, Acting Secretary of Defense Foster drew attention to another issue that would arise in the event of an agreement for a general exchange of POWs, namely, the disposition of prisoners accused of war crimes or of offenses committed after capture. To withhold such men from a POW exchange would invite the Communists to institute reprisals based on “trumped-up charges” against UNC or ROK personnel in their hands; on the other hand, to relinquish them without trial or punishment would mean abandonment of a principle of international law hitherto supported by the United States and would arouse public resentment. In a separate communication to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Foster asked them to comment on this problem.⁸⁶

Replying on 3 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that either solution—to return these accused prisoners without trial or to withhold

them—would have “undesirable consequences.” They pointed out that the “absence of a complete victory in Korea” limited the freedom of action of the United States “in adhering to the principles of international law with respect to war criminals.” Moreover, several considerations militated against any attempt to withhold such prisoners. The enemy might undertake reprisals, exploit the UNC decision for propaganda purposes, or even break off the negotiations. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that, if agreement were reached for all-for-all exchange of prisoners, those accused of crimes should be included in the exchange. The principal objective, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded the Secretary of Defense, was to secure the release of the largest possible number of UN and ROK prisoners; all other issues were secondary.

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again raised the question of the fate of those enemy prisoners who had voluntarily aided the UNC. Having no suggestions of their own, they would welcome suggestions from others whereby these men could be retained without jeopardizing the return of UNC prisoners. They agreed with CINCFE that the State Department parole proposal was “not an acceptable solution.” Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged approval of the directive that they had submitted on 15 November.⁸⁷

A decision on the JCS directive was pressing, since preliminary talks on the prisoner question had already been held at Panmunjom. On 27 November, when agreement on the line of demarcation (Item 2) was ratified, the UNC delegation suggested that both sides exchange the names, nationality, and identifying data of POWs, the location of POW camps, and the number of POWs of each nationality held. The enemy’s chief delegate, General Nam Il, simply “noted” this suggestion and passed to other matters.⁸⁸

On the next day, CINCFE notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “early consideration” of the POW issue seemed possible. As a first order of business he would insist that the enemy furnish names and locations of all UNC POWs. The Communists could easily hold back any names they wished to conceal, but a list was necessary as a basis for discussion. If pressed, the UNC delegation would furnish rosters of prisoners in UN custody.⁸⁹

Initially, General Ridgway would strive for a one-for-one exchange. If the enemy acceded, it would be possible for the UNC to withhold those prisoners whose retention seemed desirable. But if the enemy balked, CINCFE was ready to negotiate on an expanded ratio of exchange, up to and including all-for-all, in order to ensure the release of the maximum number of UN personnel. General Ridgway asked for authority to agree, if required, to an all-for-all exchange, even though it would mean turning over all POWs to include: (1) suspected war criminals and witnesses to war crimes; (2) intelligence prospects; (3) individuals voluntarily aiding the UNC; (4) all Korean POWs who resided prior to 25 June 1950 south of the 38th parallel and who had not been reclassified as civilian internees; (5) individuals not desiring to return to Communist control, including the majority of Chinese POWs, many of whom had submitted petitions claiming to be loyal ex-Nationalists impressed into Communist forces. General Ridgway asked for decisions quickly on these points and on any other related matters that would affect POWs.⁹⁰

Almost two weeks elapsed before General Ridgway received the guidance that he sought. In the interim, he proceeded with his proposed screening and reclassification of POWs who had resided south of the 38th parallel before 25 June 1950. By 5 December, 37,132 individuals in this category, plus 368 NK refugees, had been redesignated as civilian internees and placed in separate compounds, with all privileges of POWs. The UNC would no longer keep records on these people and would consider them as civilian internees under the terms of the Geneva Convention. Their names were to be provided the ICRC so that they might be removed from POW lists previously given the Communists.⁹¹

The JCS draft directive on POW negotiations was extensively discussed with representatives of the State and Defense Departments. Though President Truman was not directly consulted, all those concerned were aware of his great interest in the subject and his opposition to an all-for-all exchange.⁹² Of the several revisions undergone by the directive, the most important was the inclusion of a suggestion, offered for General Ridgway's comment, that if one-for-one exchange could not be obtained, CINCFE seek agreement for a screening procedure that would allow prisoners to express their wishes regarding repatriation. Here was the germ of the plan that was eventually to enable the UNC to salvage the principle of voluntary repatriation.⁹³

After obtaining the approval of both Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted the draft directive to President Truman. The Chief Executive approved with the understanding that before the UNC agreed to any overall exchange of prisoners, the matter was to be referred to him for decision. It was the President's "strong view" that UNC negotiators should "vigorously" uphold the one-for-one position. The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended the draft to include a statement to this effect.⁹⁴

The final directive, replacing the single brief paragraph in the JCS instructions of 30 June 1951, was sent to General Ridgway on 10 December 1951. The most important paragraphs were the following:

POW exchange on a one-for-one basis should be sought initially for purposes of negotiation and negotiations should vigorously maintain the one-for-one position as long as possible without precipitating a break on this issue. Your present planned procedure to attempt to obtain the disclosure of names and numbers, by nationality, of POWs held by the Communists should assist in this respect. However, if it appears necessary in order to secure the release of all, or a maximum number of, UN and ROK POWs, or to avoid unacceptable delay in their recovery, or to prevent a breakdown of the armistice negotiations, you will be authorized to agree to an exchange or release such as that discussed . . . below.

(1) Generally, POWs should be exchanged as expeditiously as possible. Until the exchange of prisoners is completed, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can.

(2) In implementation of any agreed exchange, it is recognized that the Communist authorities may attempt to exchange ROK prisoners, withholding other personnel temporarily or indefinitely. It is suggested, therefore, you insist that the exchange of prisoners be carried out on the basis of group-for-group, composed of mixed Chinese Communist forces (CCF) and North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) for mixed US/UN and ROK groups.⁹⁵

Foreseeing that the Communists might refuse to agree to one-for-one exchange, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed an alternative procedure, which would respect the desires of individual POWs. Under this procedure, all POWs would be screened by joint teams of belligerents prior to release. POWs asking not to be exchanged would remain under control of their captors. Such a procedure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "would be considered as fulfilling obligations of both sides under armistice agreement but would not involve any commitment on part of captor as to future disposition. . . ." The UNC would not, however, agree to this procedure unless the enemy submitted lists of UN and ROK POWs that conformed "satisfactorily" to "our best estimate" of the number held by the enemy.⁹⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked General Ridgway for his comments on the proposed alternative procedure. They had, they admitted, "no further suggestions," and "would welcome any solution of the problem which, while insuring return of maximum number of UN and ROK POWs in Communist hands, would also protect POWs in UN hands." The probability of a completely acceptable solution to this dilemma seemed doubtful, and the UNC might be forced to turn over some people it would have liked to keep, including "criminals we should like to prosecute" and individuals who had voluntarily aided the UNC. Discussion of the question of criminals "should be minimized" during the negotiations. Any arrangement for an overall exchange should "explicitly provide" for the release of all criminals, suspected or convicted.⁹⁷

As for the handling of civilians, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CINCFE, during negotiations for exchange of POWs, to consider the release of "certain specifically named civilian internees" (meaning those of non-ROK origin) on the same basis as POWs. At the same time, however, he was to avoid raising the issue of civilians taken from South to North Korea by NK forces or of refugees from North Korea. For use in discussion of this matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a separate message, furnished a list of 55 civilians from the United States or from European countries who were believed to be in enemy hands.⁹⁸

Commenting on the JCS proposals, General Ridgway called it "highly improbable" that the enemy would agree to any exchange based on individual preference. He believed that so many POWs in UN hands would refuse to return that it would amount to a large scale defection. Communist prestige would be at stake around the world. The enemy could not afford a serious loss of prestige and would not allow it. General Ridgway intended to follow his

original planned procedure of seeking a one-for-one basis of exchange, of demanding that ICRC be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can, of expediting the exchange of prisoners generally, and of insisting on a group-for-group basis of exchange to insure return of the maximum number of UNC and ROK personnel. However, I am strongly of the opinion that the issue of one-for-one exchange will meet with strong Communist opposition and that I may find it necessary to request authority to agree as a final position to an all-for-all exchange to include the forced exchange of those POWs not desiring return to Communist control.⁹⁹

General Ridgway opposed mixing the issue of civilian releases with the release of POWs and predicted that if the UNC delegation failed to include ROK civilians in the negotiation, the repercussions in South Korea would be loud and long. The ROK member of the UNC delegation had already informally indicated that unless every effort was made for the release of some 5,000 leading ROK citizens, he might be forced by his government to withdraw from the negotiating team. Although General Ridgway favored securing the release of civilians, he viewed it as a political matter more properly to be disposed of when the entire problem of civilian repatriation came under consideration.¹⁰⁰

Negotiation Begins on Item 4

From the beginning of talks on Item 3 on 27 November, the UNC delegation daily asked the Communist side to agree to concurrent discussions on prisoners, but without success. Since there seemed no other way to get action, the UNC on 10 December issued a press release, a copy of which was handed in advance to the enemy, blaming the Communists for delaying talks on the POW issue and thus placing them in an unfavorable light. The enemy reacted swiftly and on 11 December, Admiral Joy reported that, as a result of the press statement, the enemy had been "forced" to agree to a meeting of subdelegations on Item 4 that afternoon.¹⁰¹

Early discussions of the prisoner issue were unproductive. The enemy delegates had only one principle, upon which they insisted: that both sides release all POWs held by them immediately after signing of the armistice. The UNC delegation upheld the principle that "early regulated exchange of prisoners of war on a fair and equitable basis" was desirable and demanded as the first step in negotiations a full exchange of POW lists, plus visits by ICRC representatives to POW camps. The enemy refused to discuss these and all other "technical" matters unless the UNC accepted their principle. The real issue was, of course, "one-for-one" versus "all-for-all" exchange, but it had not yet been directly joined.¹⁰²

Although General Ridgway had objected that it would be a mistake to inject the release of civilians into the POW arrangements, compelling reasons forced Washington authorities to instruct him to do so. Not only did the US Government feel a moral obligation to make strong efforts to obtain the release of civilians, it was under pressure from groups at home and from other UN member nations to include civilians in exchange arrangements for POWs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Ridgway on 15 December that, while he might eventually have to agree to release all POWs regardless of the outcome on civilian release, he was to make no such agreement until he had at least introduced the question of the exchange of civilian prisoners. "Otherwise," the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, "we lose whatever bargaining position we have because of large number of POWs we have in comparison to Communist holdings." They instructed him to continue to insist that the enemy provide lists of prisoners and their locations. He should seek a one-for-one exchange as long as it seemed

advisable and continue his demands for visits by the ICRC. If agreement could not be reached on this basis, he might shift to an all-for-all exchange. But before moving to this position he should introduce the matter of exchange of civilians. The list of non-Korean prisoners already furnished him would be used, and Ambassador Muccio was attempting to develop a comparable list from the ROK Government of its missing civilians. "If, in your judgement," the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, "it is impossible to force an agreement which will include exchange of those civilians indicated . . . above, you will request authority from Washington before taking a final position to insure release of POWs only."¹⁰³

General Ridgway found it necessary to ask for clarification of the relation between the objectives of release of POWs and civilians. Discussions so far at Panmunjom, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 December, indicated that the best hope for early recovery of the maximum number of prisoners of war was "all-for-all exchange confined to military personnel only." Although the UNC had not yet disclosed its position, the Communists were assuming that the UNC would propose a one-for-one exchange and were already building up a case against it as a violation of the Geneva Convention. Therefore, General Ridgway believed that to submit a one-for-one proposal would probably have no result except to expose the UNC to an effective propaganda barrage. The only reasonable expectation of avoiding forced repatriation was to ignore civilians and to propose an initial one-for-one exchange until all POWs held by the Communists were recovered, then to release the remaining prisoners held by the UNC, repatriating those who desired to return. To confuse the issue by demanding the return of "selected civilians" would "almost certainly entail forced return of some personnel." Therefore, said General Ridgway, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must decide which had priority: "the return of selected civilians or adherence to principle of no forced return of POWs."¹⁰⁴

Assuming that release of civilians had priority, General Ridgway envisioned only one practicable procedure. The UNC would accept all-for-all exchange of prisoners provided the enemy included a "specified number" of selected civilians. The exchange would then take place on a one-for-one basis until one side had run out of exchangees. Thereafter, the side retaining prisoners (which would obviously be the UNC) would release them; those desiring repatriation would be paroled on condition that they would not again bear arms against their former captors.¹⁰⁵

Replying the next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not directly render a decision on the question posed by General Ridgway. They told him that they did not accord priority of civilians over POWs; nevertheless they authorized him to put forth at the negotiating table the procedure that he had proposed. If the Communists did not agree, he was to obtain approval of Washington before adopting a "final position" to secure release of POWs alone. On the question of civilians in general, he was to make a "strong effort" to obtain release of UN civilians and personnel of the ROK Government; remaining internees and refugees in Communist hands would be accorded a lower priority.¹⁰⁶

While these discussions were taking place, the first faint signs of progress on the prisoner issue became visible at Panmunjom. On 18 December the enemy del-

egation, yielding to the determined demands of the UNC delegation, agreed to exchange lists of prisoners and other data on POWs. The exchange took place the same day and was followed by several days of recess, to enable each side to examine the other's lists.¹⁰⁷

The lists furnished by the enemy differed ominously from what had been expected. They showed only 4,417 UN POWs (of which 3,198 were US) and 7,142 from the ROK, a total of 11,559. These figures were difficult to reconcile with the numbers of men on the UN side carried as MIA, which were 11,500 for the United States and 88,000 for the ROK. Particularly glaring was the discrepancy between this latter figure and the number of ROK prisoners admitted by the enemy—"a wholly unbelievable ratio under conditions of warfare in Korea," CINCFE noted. The enemy's own radio broadcasts had boasted of capturing 65,000 men in the first months of the war. One hundred and ten names had been reported by the Communists to Geneva in the fall of 1950; only 44 of these names showed up on the lists.¹⁰⁸

Analyzing the figures in the light of intelligence available in Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the enemy list contained only about 48 percent of the US military personnel believed to be alive and in the hands of the Communists. Moreover, they observed that the percentage of US and ROK MIA that showed up on the lists as prisoners was much too small in comparison with other nationalities: only about 25 percent of US MIA (3,198 out of 11,500), against 85 percent of British and 64 percent of Turkish MIA. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed General Ridgway to proceed cautiously in attacking the enemy's lists "so as to avoid creating an emotional atmosphere here or a situation from which neither side can withdraw." They forbade release of any detailed data to the press.¹⁰⁹

The list of POWs handed by the UNC to the enemy added up to 132,474 names, comprising 95,531 North Koreans, 20,700 Chinese, and 16,243 ex-ROKs. The latter had been residents of the ROK when the war started, then were captured by the enemy and impressed into the North Korean Army. The UN list was not without its discrepancies. In fact, the UNC had reported more names to the ICRC in Geneva than it had prisoners on hand. The bulk of this discrepancy was accounted for by the former ROK residents, some 37,000 in number, who had been captured while fighting for the Communists and, after having been reported to Geneva as POWs, had been screened and reclassified by the UNC, as already described. Other discrepancies resulted from the fact that more than 2,000 POWs had inadvertently been processed twice; since enemy prisoners refused to cooperate, it was difficult to rectify such errors. Also, some prisoners had escaped or simply disappeared.¹¹⁰

When meetings were resumed, the UNC delegation accused the enemy of withholding the names of at least 50,000 UN and ROK prisoners. Enemy delegates attributed the discrepancy to men who had escaped, had died in UN bombings, or had been released at the front to return home. They charged in turn that the UNC was withholding over 44,000 of their men. The UNC insisted that only a handful of prisoners had escaped the Communists and demanded full information about all those supposed to have been killed in air raids. The charges and

counter-charges reached a plateau on 26 December when the UNC called the Communist proposal for an all-for-all exchange “fraudulent and dishonest,” since it would have meant the release of fewer than 12,000 UN personnel as against 130,000 of the enemy. The Communists replied by demanding the return of the 44,000 men missing from the report made earlier to the ICRC (i.e., the reclassified ex-ROKs) and calling for an explanation of a discrepancy of the list given them on 18 December, which was 1,456 short of the total that had previously been stated by the UNC.¹¹¹

The UN Proposal of 2 January

While the negotiating teams were wrangling over prisoner lists, General Ridgway, working within the framework of the JCS instructions of 15 and 19 December, had evolved what he considered to be a “sound, practical position” in the form of a proposal for presentation to the Communists “when it appears desirable.” On 29 December he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had approved this position for use by his negotiators. The overall objective was “all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war and civilians with no forced repatriation,” to be achieved as follows:

(A) Exchange of POWs would be carried out on a one-for-one basis until one side had exchanged all its POWs who desired to be repatriated.

(B) The side thereafter holding POWs would repatriate all those remaining prisoners who expressed a desire to be repatriated, in a one-for-one exchange for foreign civilians interned by the other side and for civilians who on 25 June 1950 were bona fide residents of the territory under that side’s control but, at the time of the signing of the armistice, were in territory under control of the other side and who elected repatriation. Such POWs would actually be paroled to the other side with the stipulation that they would not again bear arms against the side releasing them.

(C) All POWs in custody of either side who did not choose repatriation would be released from POW status.

(D) After these actions were completed, all remaining civilians who were bona fide residents of the ROK and of the North Korean People’s Republic, respectively, on 25 June 1950 and who were, at the time the armistice was signed, in territory under control of the other side would be repatriated if they so elected.

(E) In order that the choice regarding repatriation might be made without duress, the ICRC would interview all POWs at the points of exchange as well as civilians of either side who were in territory under control of the other side at the time the armistice was signed.

(F) If agreement was reached on the above method of handling the problem of civilian internees and refugees, lists of selected UN and ROK civilians would be introduced into the negotiations at the earliest opportunity.¹¹²

On 30 December the UNC delegation shifted the emphasis of its attack slightly, raising the question of the exchange of foreign civilians along with the POWs. The enemy delegation replied that this was a matter beyond the scope of armistice talks but did not flatly reject the proposal.¹¹³

On 1 January, under the guise of seeking a more equitable exchange ratio, the UNC delegation again raised the question of exchange of civilians. In an opening statement the next day, the Communist negotiators accepted the principle that provision should be made in the armistice agreement to permit civilians to return to their homes.¹¹⁴

Meanwhile, convinced that his negotiators had gone about as far as they could profitably go along the track of POW lists for the moment, General Ridgway had instructed them to put forth the proposal that he had spelled out for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 December. Accordingly, on 2 January the principal member of the UNC subdelegation, Rear Admiral R. E. Libby, USN, submitted the proposal, explaining in detail the purpose and meaning of each of the provisions. This was the first time that the UNC had raised the principle of voluntary repatriation.

In making his presentation, Admiral Libby seized upon an aspect of the Communists' own position and turned it against them. He pointed out that their side had, according to their own statement, "released" a number of ROK soldiers who had then exercised an option as to whether they would return to South Korea or would choose to fight for the Communists. Thus the UNC was only proposing to recognize and extend the principle of freedom of choice, which had already been put into practice by the enemy—a principle "advanced and advocated by your side," as Admiral Libby said.

Spelling out the details of the proposal, Admiral Libby indicated that it would apply to the following groups:

- A. Approximately 16,000 ROK nationals who were "identified" with the NK Army or the Chinese "volunteers" and were held by the UNC as POWs.
- B. Approximately 38,000 ROK nationals who had initially been classified as POWs, but had since been reclassified as internees.
- C. All former ROKA soldiers who came into the custody of the NK or Chinese forces and were subsequently incorporated into the NK Army.
- D. All bona fide residents of the ROK who were inducted into the NK Army after 25 June 1950.
- E. Approximately 11,000 UN and ROK soldiers held as POWs by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists.
- F. Approximately 116,000 North Korean and Chinese soldiers held as POWs by the UNC.
- G. Foreign civilians interned by either side.
- H. All civilians who, on 25 June 1950, were bona fide residents of the territory under the control of one side but who, at the time the armistice was signed, were within territory controlled by the other side.¹¹⁵

The enemy delegates categorically rejected the UNC proposal on the next day. They branded this proposal, with its principle of voluntary repatriation, as a "shameful attempt" by the UNC to detain 160,000 of their POWs. Release and repatriation, they said, must not be a "trade of slaves." No amount of explanation by the UNC delegation could quiet the enemy objections.¹¹⁶

During the next few days the strength and depth of the enemy resistance to voluntary repatriation in any form became more and more clear. Communist

spokesmen at the subdelegation meetings on Item 4 attacked the UNC proposal from every conceivable angle. They charged that the UNC wanted to get its prisoners back first through one-for-one exchange; that it was using its surplus of prisoners as hostages to force the return of ROK personnel not in POW status. The enemy denied the charges of impressment of ROK soldiers, involuntary recruitment, and kidnapping of civilians. He refused to consider civilians and POWs together, to allow interviews by the ICRC, or to entertain any thought of parole. His charges were capped by an insistence that the UNC merely wanted to turn over part of the prisoners to a "certain friend" in the ROK and part of them to another "friend" in Taiwan.¹¹⁷

General Ridgway saw that one of the main weaknesses in the UNC position on voluntary repatriation was his inability to explain to the enemy what would be done with the Chinese Communist POWs held by the UNC who did not elect repatriation. There was, as well, the question of what would become of NK POWs in UNC custody who did not want to return to North Korea. General Ridgway had given interim instructions to the UNC delegation, if it became necessary to answer a "direct question" about transferring POWs to Taiwan, to emphasize that any agreement between the Chinese Nationalists and individual prisoners would be "based on mutual acceptance and upon the choice expressed in the interview in the presence of a neutral," and hence would be thoroughly in accord with the principle of voluntary repatriation.¹¹⁸

While it was not feasible to make an accurate estimate of enemy POWs who would refuse repatriation, General Ridgway informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 January that certain general categories were evident. First, there were the North Koreans not desiring repatriation. He had asked Ambassador Muccio to ascertain the attitude of the ROK Government toward keeping such persons for resettlement in South Korea following an armistice. Within the Chinese Communist POW category were three groupings: (1) those choosing return to Communist control; (2) those refusing return to Communist control, many of whom had expressed a desire to go to Taiwan; and (3) those who did not wish either to return to Communist control or to be resettled on Taiwan.¹¹⁹

"The disposition of those POWs not electing return to Communist control I do not consider to be within my scope of authority," CINCUNC stated. "This is a political matter that should be decided on a high governmental level." His main military interest, he said, was disposing of the POWs as soon as possible after an armistice in a manner that would gain support of the public and still give the enemy no chance to injure the UN cause. But because the question of disposition of prisoners would have a profound effect, involving as it did new principles of international law, he asked for instructions at the earliest possible time as to the agencies that would: supervise the administration and logistic support of ex-POWs prior to final resettlement; be responsible for coordinating resettlement, particularly with the ROK and the Chinese Nationalist governments; and assume the responsibility for those ex-POWs remaining after resettlement had occurred.¹²⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to General Ridgway on 10 January. They approved of his approach to Ambassador Muccio concerning the disposition of

Korean prisoners. With respect to the Chinese, the only “practicable” choice for them was between Taiwan and Communist China. It was envisaged that those Chinese who did not elect repatriation would be released in South Korea, where they would be supported in ROK territory for a period of about 90 days by the UNC. In principle, such Chinese ex-POWs would be permitted to proceed to any nation of their choice, provided that nation agreed to receive them. Those desiring but unable to obtain admission to some other country would be “obliged” to proceed to Taiwan. In furtherance of this policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCUNC, the US Government would approach the Chinese Nationalists to make arrangements for receiving such persons and would furnish necessary transportation. As to the agencies about whom CINCUNC had inquired, it was envisaged that appropriate UN agencies—the Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK) or the Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA)—would help the ROK Government in providing logistic support to former Korean POWs; the UNC would provide such support to former Chinese prisoners while in Korea.¹²¹

General Ridgway was highly concerned that any direct US dealings with the Chinese Nationalist Government would come to the attention of the Chinese Communists with very deleterious effect. It would, he believed, lead them to “further and conclusive objections” against voluntary repatriation. He suggested instead that the resettlement problem be left to an international organization such as the International Refugee Organization (IRO). “Admittedly,” he stated, “it will be difficult to secure Communist agreement to an international body for this purpose, but it is felt that this approach reduces the risk of ultimate abandonment of the concept of voluntary repatriation.”¹²²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with General Ridgway although they suggested the ICRC rather than the IRO as the appropriate international agency. On 15 January they instructed him, after consulting with the ICRC representative confidentially, to propose to the Communists that each side should cooperate with the ICRC in carrying out its responsibility for resettling POWs of both sides who did not wish to return. The UNC should assure the ICRC of its cooperation and logistic support in the disposition of POWs.¹²³

President Rhee informed Ambassador Muccio that he had no objection to absorbing North Korean ex-POWs but that he hoped the bulk of Chinese ex-POWs would be sent back to China. He did not want them sitting in the ROK indefinitely “just eating rice.” The US Ambassador to Taiwan, Mr. Karl L. Rankin, reported at about the same time that, although Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had approved the idea of granting a choice to Chinese POWs so that those who did not wish need not return to Communist control, he had not indicated any willingness to receive them in Taiwan.¹²⁴

On 12 January General Ridgway asked to be informed as to the final US position on the issues of exchange of civilians and voluntary repatriation.¹²⁵ The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that the final position, as approved by the President, was that the UNC would agree to an all-for-all exchange of military POWs, except that no forcible return of POWs would be required. Before taking this position at the negotiating table, however, the delegation should make certain that all other possibilities had been exhausted. They again warned General Ridgway that the

President must be informed before the UNC precipitated or accepted any termination of negotiations. It was possible, they pointed out,

that in face of pressures which could develop on this issue wherein loss of some 3,000 UN prisoners is balanced against the welfare of an indefinite number of Communist prisoners in our hands, the government might find it necessary to further modify our stand. Nevertheless, you should act as if current position were final position. . . .¹²⁶

Moreover, before adopting the final position, the UNC delegation should seek an agreement on return of selected UN and ROK civilians in Communist hands. And before accepting any all-for-all agreement, the UNC must try its best to make sure that lists provided by the Communists actually did contain the names of all UN POWs who could "reasonably be presumed to be alive" and all ROK POWs whose return could reasonably be expected. The mechanism of the exchange should provide some means to bar the release of POWs held by the UNC until satisfactory assurances were received that the Communists would in fact keep their promises to return their prisoners. Should General Ridgway finally judge that no agreement on civilians could be reached under Item 4, he should write a specific reference to the subject into Item 5 (recommendations to the governments by the armistice negotiators).

When every possibility had been exhausted for reaching an agreement on voluntary repatriation of civilians or, at the very least, of POWs only, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that General Ridgway transfer negotiations on all unresolved issues to full delegation meetings and tie in the prisoner issue with Item 3, linking a UNC concession on airfields (assuming it became necessary) with Communist acceptance of the final UNC position on POWs and, if feasible, on civilians.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then asked General Ridgway's comments on the possibility of having the ICRC supervise a poll of prisoners immediately to determine the approximate number who would definitely desire repatriation. The enemy could then be assured that at least that number would be returned. This might remove any genuine enemy misapprehension that the UNC was using voluntary repatriation as a pretext to retain all or most of the POWs in its hands.¹²⁷

General Ridgway's objections to this last proposal were strong and well-reasoned. The UNC, he pointed out, had proposed that each prisoner state his choice in person, in the presence of representatives of both sides and of neutral observers. The UNC delegation had consistently and vigorously denied Communist charges that it was attempting to coerce or influence prisoners in their choice. But any poll of prisoners by any agency whatever, including the ICRC, would lead the enemy to charge "intimidation and coercion" and to reject the results of the poll. Further, if a poll were taken and some POWs subsequently changed their minds, it would be very difficult not to turn over the number that the original poll had indicated. As an additional point, General Ridgway pointed out that to involve the ICRC in such a poll would tend to impugn its neutrality, at least in the Communist view. Finally, he did not believe that the Communists had any interest in the numbers who would choose not to return; it was the principle of

voluntary repatriation that was “anathema” to them, “since the question of the individual versus the state is the essential difference between democracy and Communism.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted General Ridgway’s comments but continued to keep the proposal under study.¹²⁸

Meanwhile the subdelegations at Panmunjom had continued to grapple unsuccessfully with the prisoner issue. On 8 January the UNC submitted a more detailed version of its proposal, intended to counter a Communist complaint that the original version had been vague in some respects. But since it did not differ in substance, it proved no more palatable to the Communists than had the original. The enemy delegation continued to assail the UNC position as a violation of the Geneva Convention and an attempt to use POWs as “hostages” for civilians.¹²⁹

Thus by the middle of January 1952, six months of negotiations had produced deadlock on two of the five items on the agenda. The negotiators had reached agreement on a number of minor items, but on the issues of airfield rehabilitation and of voluntary repatriation of prisoners, positions were strongly held and the nature of the issues appeared to make compromise difficult. Already the hopes for an early armistice had faded; it was clear that many weary days of acrimonious argument lay ahead. Even so, no one could foresee that the war in Korea would drag on for another 18 months before the negotiators finally reached agreement.

Narrowing the Issues

The Situation in January 1952

At the beginning of 1952 the negotiators at Panmunjom had succeeded in reaching agreement on a demarcation line as the basis for a demilitarized zone (Item 2 of the agenda). The line that they had approved on 27 November had had a 30-day time limit which had already expired, so that a new line would eventually have to be renegotiated. They had agreed on a number of “concrete arrangements” for a cease-fire (Item 3) but were hung up on the question of allowing rehabilitation of airfields after an armistice. On the matter of prisoners of war (Item 4), they had accomplished nothing except to exchange lists of prisoners held by each side—lists that had themselves become the subject of acrimonious argument. Discussion of Item 5 (recommendations to be made to governments) had not yet begun.

General Ridgway had drawn up a procedure for moving the negotiations off dead center, which he described to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January. Within a few days, if no progress had been made, he proposed to suggest to the enemy that discussion of the airfield issue be deferred and other matters under Item 3 be turned over to staff officers, while discussion of Item 4 continued among the subdelegations. If the enemy did not accept this plan, he would call for a plenary session and resubmit it at that level. In either case, he would propose that discussion of Item 5 be initiated at subdelegation level. Should the Communists remain adamant, he would submit in plenary session a complete text of an agreement on Items 3 and 4. He would thus highlight the key areas of deeply held disagreement, which could be argued out at high level while lower ranking personnel worked out the details of minor matters. This procedure appeared to be the only one, short of an ultimatum, that would “expedite the negotiation and offer any promise of an acceptable armistice agreement.”¹

CINCUNC remained sensitive to any advance revelation of UNC negotiating tactics. “There is in my opinion,” he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “a measurable chance of achieving real progress on acceptable armistice terms, providing there

be no slightest indication revealed to the Communists from any authoritative, or even normally reliable official source, that further United Nations or United States concession is forthcoming, or even under consideration." His delegation had suffered in that manner on several occasions and had, on one item, lost substantial gains that had been secured until the enemy learned of a possible concession and became obdurate. When the Communists learned that armistice negotiations were to be discussed at high Washington levels, they invariably waited to see what else might be conceded. He asked to pursue the program he had outlined on 22 January, "without further directed concessions, new instructions, or even the holding of high level conferences to discuss our negotiations. If this is done," he concluded, "and authoritative speculation concurrently eliminated, it might be the Communists would move in our direction." The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved his suggested procedure.²

Item 5: Recommendations to Governments

Item 5 on the agenda, "Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned," appeared largely a matter of form with little substance, but there was an important issue at stake. The Communists had accepted this item in return for giving up their demand that the agenda include discussion of the withdrawal of troops from Korea. The implication was that the "recommendations" would extend to the question of troop withdrawal and other political issues. The potentialities for disagreement were considerable, depending on how the Communists interpreted this item.

In early December General Ridgway had given Admiral Joy the wording to be sought in the discussion of Agenda Item 5. It was broad, recommending only that "respective governmental authorities . . . give consideration to the convening of a conference of . . . political representatives . . . to discuss appropriate matters . . . not resolved by the armistice agreement."³

Washington officials began to show some interest in the "Recommendations" item in mid-December, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General Ridgway a slightly different version of an initial statement, somewhat longer and more detailed:

The Military Commanders have not considered questions concerning a political settlement in Korea, including unification of Korea under an independent, democratic government and other questions arising from but not resolved by Armistice Agreement. The Military Commanders recommend to Governments and authorities concerned that early steps be taken to deal with these matters at a political level.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted that the reference to "unification of Korea under an independent, democratic government" had been inserted "for reasons of UN and Korean public opinion." If the Communists opposed it, they would suffer a "propaganda reverse." CINUNC was authorized, at his discretion, to

agree to omission of the phrase. He was warned to make no mention of the subject of troop withdrawal.⁴

The President wanted no commitment to a political conference, and on 24 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned General Ridgway to avoid any such commitment. He was to concede only a willingness to take part in discussions "at a political level," as they had already indicated. There should be no specific agreement on the form or forum of such discussions or on the identity of the participants.⁵

In discussing Item 3 (concrete arrangements), the negotiators also touched upon the issue of a political conference. One paragraph of the agreement on this item drafted by staff officers spoke of ensuring the stability of the armistice so as to "facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level."⁶ In compliance with the JCS guidance, the UNC delegation amended this passage to speak of facilitating "a peaceful settlement by action at a political level." This change evoked a strong reaction from the Communist delegates; they labelled it a "basic disagreement," in the same category with that over airfield rehabilitation. Unfortunately the UNC position was weakened by the fact that, during discussion of Item 3, the UNC delegation had stated, "we are just as interested in having a conference . . . as early as possible, as you are." General Ridgway therefore requested permission to return to the original wording of the staff officers' draft. He did not believe that the US position would be prejudiced by this action. Moreover, the resolution of this disagreement would set a precedent for the settlement of Item 5.⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the advantages of a return to the former wording. However, they feared that it might be interpreted by the enemy as implying US acceptance of a conference of the belligerents, whereas policy promulgated by the State Department called for handling Korean political questions through a UN commission. They pointed out that the UNC delegation had already made it clear that military commanders had no authority to discuss political questions, including the procedure by which such questions should be settled. Moreover, it was not for governments on "both sides" alone to settle these questions; many other governments had legitimate interests. Nevertheless they authorized a return to the old wording if the enemy remained stubborn on the issue, so long as it was made clear that this step would not compromise the US position on Item 5 that they had set forth on 19 December.⁸

The UNC was apprehensive that the enemy would insist on naming the "countries concerned," possibly among them the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that it was desirable to avoid naming any governments but did not object, if necessary, to specifying North Korea and Communist China on the one side and the UN organization, member states, and the ROK on the other. Should the question of the USSR arise, they indicated, General Ridgway was to reply that that nation was a member of the United Nations and hence was included along with other members.⁹

The enemy accepted the suggestion to open discussion of Item 5 concurrently with negotiations on Items 3 and 4. It was agreed to begin with a plenary session to reach agreement in principle.¹⁰ This session took place on 6 February. In their opening statement the Communists reminded the UNC that each side had

agreed explicitly that a political conference should be held quickly. They asserted that there was no need for foreign forces to remain after an armistice. They charged that President Truman had “publicly connected the war in Korea with other questions of the East” and had used the Korean War as a “pretext for a series of war-like measures in the East.” They proposed the following wording for Item 5:

In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, it is recommended that within three (3) months after the Korean armistice is signed and becomes effective, the opposing sides, the governments of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Peoples Republic of China on the one hand, and the governments of the countries concerned of the United Nations on the other hand, appoint five (5) representatives respectively to hold a political conference to settle through negotiation the following questions: (1) Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea; (2) Peaceful settlement of the Korean question; and (3) Other questions related to peace in Korea.¹¹

General Ridgway saw no cause to quibble over the proposal, which was not very different from the UN statement. Combining the original instructions with the Communist proposal, he had developed another proposed statement, which he asked permission to submit promptly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed.¹²

The new UNC statement altered the Communist version by recommending that “steps be taken” to settle matters by a political conference or by “such other political means” as the parties might deem appropriate. General Nam Il objected that these passages were vague and gave a basis for evading or delaying a political conference. Admiral Joy defended the statement, emphasizing that the UNC would not stipulate the form of political action nor agree to consideration of non-Korean matters, as the enemy obviously wanted. In spite of this the UNC proposed to eliminate most of the wording objectionable to the enemy and to retain the phrase “political conference.” After all, General Ridgway pointed out, this phrase could be interpreted to mean any form of UN activity.¹³

President Truman authorized these modifications.¹⁴ But before the UNC could present its new statement, the enemy delegation submitted a revised draft which read:

In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that within 3 months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiations the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.¹⁵

Admiral Joy proposed to accept the enemy draft, since it would allow “widest latitude” in its application and was consistent with the statement of the UNC. He would state for the record that CINCUNC would address the “recommendation” to the United Nations as well as the ROK; that “foreign forces” was understood to mean “non-Korean forces”; and that the concluding abbreviation “etc.” did not

mean matters outside Korea. Neither General Ridgway nor Washington authorities objected, and on 17 February the UNC accepted the enemy proposal, with the understandings noted above. The enemy asked for a recess.¹⁶

At a meeting two days later, 19 February, the UNC tried vainly to dispose of Item 5. The Communists demurred even though their proposal had been accepted in toto. General Nam Il criticized the understandings attached to the UNC acceptance and demanded that the matter be turned over to staff officers. The UNC saw no need for such a step but wearily agreed. In its final form, the statement appeared as agreed by the UN delegation on 17 February, with only two inconsequential changes in wording made by the staff officers.¹⁷

Negotiation of Item 3 (Concrete Arrangements)

In accord with the procedure that General Ridgway had outlined to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the UN subdelegation engaged in discussing Item 3 recommended to the enemy on 25 January that staff officers begin writing up the matters that had already been settled, temporarily laying aside the airfield issue. The Communists displayed no interest in this proposal.¹⁸ Consequently, on 27 January UNC delegates tendered their own draft of an agreement on this item, setting forth the UN position on matters still at issue, including the airfield question. The UNC draft would allow rotation of 75,000 men each month and establish 10 ports of entry in South Korea and 12 in North Korea. Neutral supervisory personnel would be allowed to operate freely for inspection purposes.¹⁹

Communist staff officers were surprisingly receptive, disposed to accept the format and much of the wording of the UN draft. Most changes proposed by the enemy were actually regarded by UNC staff officers as improvements. Some disagreement developed over five small offshore islands, south of the 38th parallel but on the enemy's side of the demarcation line and occupied by UN forces. After some argument, however, the enemy on 3 February agreed to UNC retention of these islands.²⁰

The Communists took a much firmer stand on rotation, expressing astonishment at the "enormous" ceiling of 75,000 men per month. The UNC offered to reduce this to 40,000 if rotation excluded personnel on temporary duty (TDY) and rest and recuperation (R and R).²¹ The enemy offered to go as high as 25,000 men per month TDY and R and R personnel included. Enemy officers also scoffed at the numbers of ports of entry proposed by the UNC. They maintained that three ports for each side were sufficient and emphasized that each side must assume the good faith of the other in bringing replacements through agreed ports, otherwise an infinite number of supervisory teams would be needed. The UNC offered to reduce the number of ports to eight on each side, but the Communists still regarded this figure as excessive.²²

General Ridgway informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 February that the minimum acceptable number of ports of entry, "based on the inspection necessary for the security of UNC forces and UNC logistical requirements," was six for

each side. As for rotation, 40,000 (exclusive of TDY and R and R) was a "marginal minimum, based on present rotation authorizations and anticipated requirements for all US and UN troops." General Ridgway urged that these two figures be accepted as final, believing that further concessions on minor issues would jeopardize the UN position on the two major issues, airfield rehabilitation and voluntary repatriation of POWs. "I believe that if we adopt an unequivocal position on these two points, the Communists will concede," he wrote. "I further believe that maintenance of an unshakeable stand on these points will strengthen our final positions relative to voluntary repatriation and airfields. But I must in our national interests be certain that my position will be supported."²³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved his request but cautioned again against stating the position as an ultimatum. "Before accepting a breakdown in negotiations on these issues alone," the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed him, "you will seek further instructions here."²⁴

Another matter requiring discussion in connection with Item 3 was a definition of "coastal waters." The Communists proposed a 12-mile limit. Upon UNC objection that this was much too broad, the enemy suggested that no limit was needed, since there was no reason for armed forces of the other side to be operating just outside the 12-mile limit anyway. General Ridgway pointed out that to define "coastal" waters as those within 12 miles from shore at mean low tide might establish a precedent with possible international implications at a later date. He believed, however, that if it were specified by the UNC that this would apply only to the armistice terms, such implications might be limited. He asked to be authorized to agree to a 12-mile limit if necessary to arrive at an agreement.²⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed him to attempt to obtain agreement on a three-mile limit. Failing that, he should attempt to omit any definition of coastal waters. As a final position, he might accede to the 12-mile limit with the stipulations that he had proposed.²⁶

A New Issue: The USSR and the NNSC

The facade of reason and apparent desire for progress on Item 3 crumpled in mid-February when staff officers ran head on into an issue that at first appeared deceptively simple: the membership of the proposed neutral organization that would supervise the process of inspection to ensure against violations of the armistice.

In December 1951 General Ridgway had asked guidance concerning the nations that should be asked to contribute observers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consulted representatives of the Department of State, who suggested Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway. All three countries, when approached, agreed to provide members for the teams. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCFE to nominate these three nations at an appropriate time. As for the enemy's probable choices, the USSR was not acceptable and there was no basis for preference among the satellite countries. It was not necessary that an equal

number of countries be nominated by each side, the Joint Chiefs of Staff added, but the total number of observers from each side must be equal.²⁷

The question of membership in the neutral organization came up in the negotiations on 1 February. For the body that would oversee the observer teams, the Communists proposed the title that was eventually adopted, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). On the same day, UNC staff officers submitted their three nominees for the NNSC: Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway. The Communists were not prepared at that time to name their choices. But on 16 February they nominated Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, proposing simultaneous acceptance of the nations named by both sides. The UNC accepted Poland and Czechoslovakia but rejected the Soviet Union.²⁸

Although this rejection could hardly have surprised them, the Communists reacted angrily. "The Soviet Union," they proclaimed, "is one of the United Nations which is not only most strictly opposed to intervention in the Korean War but also is most strongly in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. If the Soviet Union could not be nominated as a neutral nation, there would be no neutral nation at all existing in the world." The UNC pointed out that it had been agreed that the neutral nominees must be acceptable to both sides.²⁹

Rejection of the USSR made it necessary for the UNC to decide whether to explain its reasons or simply to stand on the agreed principle of mutual acceptability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Ridgway that it was "inadvisable" to state that the UNC did not consider the USSR a neutral. Proof of Soviet participation in the war would be difficult to substantiate. They suggested either that no reason be given or that the UN delegation explain that nations in close proximity to Korea should be excluded from the NNSC.³⁰ However, as General Ridgway noted on 18 February, Washington's unwillingness to disclose the real reason for excluding the USSR left the enemy free to make propaganda statements lauding the Soviet Union which the UNC could not refute.³¹

A sustained impasse quickly developed over the USSR issue, creating another major stumbling block to match voluntary repatriation and rehabilitation of airfields. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered a firm stand on the principle of mutual acceptability, suggesting at the same time that CINUNC might ease the situation by offering to omit or replace one of the nations proposed by the UNC in exchange for removal or replacement of the Soviet Union. But when the UNC did so, offering to drop Norway in exchange for the omission of the USSR, the Communists made it clear that regardless of the number of nations to be nominated by each side, the Soviet Union must be one of them.³²

The strength of the UNC stand against the Soviet Union was revealed in a message to CINCFE on 27 February, drafted by the Department of State and approved by the President. General Ridgway was authorized to make it "entirely clear" that the UNC refusal to accept the Soviet Union was "absolutely firm and irrevocable." There was "no propaganda problem in regard to our position on this question," continued the message, and hence there was no need to amplify the basis of the UN rejection of the USSR.³³

Enemy delegates demonstrated that their position was equally firm and ridiculed suggestions for compromise solutions. "No matter what kind of cunning formula you adopt," the enemy spokesman declared, "no matter how you advance what formula, our side is adamantly opposed to your opposition to the nomination of neutral nations which our side, by our proposal, is prepared to invite on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. . . ." Attempts to reach agreement failed, and the matter was temporarily laid aside after 16 March, when the UNC told the enemy delegates that the burden of settlement now lay with them.³⁴

A degree of success, however, attended efforts to settle other disputed points. In a surprise move on 20 February, UNC staff officers proposed a rotation figure of 35,000.³⁵ The Communists had by then come up to 30,000 (both figures excluding TDY and R and R personnel). Two days later, the UNC offered to accept only five ports of entry per side. On 23 February the enemy made a "final offer" to accept the 35,000 rotation figure but with only five ports. The UNC at first continued to insist on six, but it was apparent by this time that both sides were tired of these two issues and were so close that it would be ridiculous to become deadlocked over a difference of one port of entry. On 7 March General Ridgway authorized Admiral Joy to accept the figure of five ports if he believed that such action would facilitate settlement of other issues.³⁶

In the meantime several minor differences had been building up, suggesting that the Communists were deliberately creating issues for bargaining purposes. The enemy objected to a UNC proposal that would have prevented inspectors from looking closely at classified equipment and, additionally, refused to accept wording that would definitely limit the terms of the armistice agreement to Korea. But Communist delegates hinted during early March that they would yield on these issues if the UNC would accept five ports of entry.³⁷

At a staff officer's meeting on 15 March the UNC agreed to accept five ports if the enemy would accept the UNC proposal on inspection procedure and agree that the armistice applied only to Korea. This offer was contingent upon agreement being reached on the selection of ports of entry and the areas involved in each; otherwise it would be automatically withdrawn. The enemy accepted the proposal. Over the next 10 days ports were specified and all details of port areas were worked out between the two sides. The ports selected were: for the Communist side, Sinuiju, Chongjin, Manpojin, Hungnam, and Sinanju; for the UN side, Pusan, Inch'on, Kangnung, Kunsan, and Taegu.³⁸

On 26 March the UNC delegation reported that the enemy seemed anxious to clear up all odds and ends and to return to subdelegation meetings to discuss the issues of Soviet membership on the NNSC and rehabilitation of airfields. Subdelegations accordingly began meeting on 3 April. Unfortunately the sessions proved farcical and unproductive. Most lasted less than ten minutes, a few less than one minute. Finally, exasperated and at the end of their resources, the subdelegates agreed on 19 April to turn Item 3 back to the staff officers. Neither side was prepared to budge on the two tough issues of the USSR and airfields. By the end of the month the meetings of staff officers on Item 3 had dwindled to brief convocations with no progress in sight.³⁹

Item 4: Negotiations Continue

On the question of prisoners of war, the two sides remained deadlocked throughout most of January. General Ridgway's statement that voluntary repatriation was "anathema" to the Communists was amply demonstrated. A subdelegation meeting on 23 January, lasting almost three hours, centered on the question of repatriation and "produced no significant developments," according to Admiral Joy.⁴⁰

During the next few days, the Communists seized the initiative by exploiting the discrepancies in the lists furnished by the UNC. Enemy delegates demanded to know when the UNC would deliver additional data on the POWs it held. They wanted ranks and unit designations added to the original lists; they wanted 1,456 names not on the original lists but shown in a numerical recapitulation of POWs held; they wanted the 44,000 names taken from the Geneva lists but not included in the original lists submitted by the UNC. The UNC promised to meet the first two demands but rejoined that delivery of the third list was contingent upon the Communists' accounting for 50,000 missing UNC POWs.⁴¹

On 28 January the UNC gave the enemy revised POW rosters listing 20,720 Chinese and 111,360 Koreans. This total of 132,080 contained 394 fewer names than the POW list of 18 December. These 394 were civilian internees in POW camps on 13 December who had been transferred to civilian internment camps in the interim. The UNC spokesman then offered to provide all data needed to constitute a complete list in exchange for similar information from the Communists. The enemy delegates ignored this offer and again assailed the principle of voluntary repatriation.⁴²

Thereupon the UNC subdelegates introduced a complete draft agreement covering Item 4, embodying the voluntary repatriation plan they had submitted on 2 January.⁴³ The Communists characterized it as not worth discussing, but on 3 February they submitted their own version, which, as expected, called for all-for-all exchange. To create a better atmosphere at the negotiating table, the UNC subdelegation greeted this draft with a degree of warmth, praising it as a "forward move." They found some of its features acceptable—for example, those relating to the machinery by which prisoners would be exchanged. With a limited basis of agreement thus established, it was possible on 6 February to assign Item 4 to staff officers, while the subdelegations recessed.⁴⁴

On the same day, General Ridgway sent Washington an appraisal, based on comments from his delegation, of the negotiations on Item 4. UNC negotiators believed that the Communist POW list named all US/UN POWs that the enemy would ever admit were alive and all ROK POWs (except those captured after 30 November) whose return it was reasonable to expect. They believed it would be possible to get an agreement that would ensure the return of all POWs held by the Communists before the UNC gave up its prisoners, and that would secure the return of ROK civilians who had resided south of the demarcation line. However, obtaining the return of other ROK nationals in North Korea (many of whom should have been listed as POWs) was believed "negotiatorially impossible." General Ridgway therefore asked that he be permitted to drop

demands for the return of these people. The delegation had found no feasible way to obtain Communist agreement to guarantee the return of civilians and recommended against any attempt to require each side to account for all civilians by means of lists. The UNC delegation had advised General Ridgway that if their suggestions were approved, it would be possible to work out an agreement at staff officers level covering all features except voluntary repatriation.⁴⁵

Without reference to the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the requested modification, subject to a proviso that some agreement be reached, if only in principle, on repatriation of civilians of both Korean and other nationalities. It was desirable that, if possible, repatriation of UN civilians be written into the armistice agreement. There was to be no change for the moment, they added, in CINCUNC's instructions on voluntary repatriation, but this question was under review "at the highest level."⁴⁶

Staff officers moved ahead swiftly. Enemy officers accepted as a basis for discussion a UNC version of the Communist proposal of 3 February. In this draft, the UNC had substituted the phrase "no forced repatriation" for "voluntary repatriation," in the hope of making the principle more palatable to the enemy. Minor points of agreement were reached over the next few days. In a session on 13 February, the enemy conceded that there was now no difference in principle on Item 4 between the two sides except with regard to voluntary versus forced repatriation.⁴⁷

A draft introduced by Communist staff officers on 14 February reflected further concessions. For example, it would specifically authorize teams composed of Red Cross personnel from the belligerent nations to visit POW camps to minister to prisoners and to assist in their repatriation. It was also clearer on the subject of repatriation of civilians, though it did not go so far as the UNC desired. All-for-all exchange was retained and forced repatriation was implied. The UNC objected to this provision and to the use of the word "repatriation" to apply to all prisoners. Discussion brought out the fact that part of the difficulty arose from the slightly different meaning of the word "repatriation" in English as contrasted with the corresponding words used in Chinese and Korean; those words simply connoted "return" to some location, not necessarily "return to the homeland." The UNC suggested, and the enemy accepted, wording intended to clear up any confusion.⁴⁸

The UNC tabled another draft on 22 February which represented another step toward agreement on minor matters. But the question of forced repatriation remained. Enemy staff officers insisted that unless the UNC conceded on this issue, there could be no agreement "even if another 70 days are spent in discussion." After another week, it became clear that the staff officers had done all they could. Discussions were accordingly returned to the subdelegation level on 29 February. There wrangling continued over the principle of voluntary repatriation and the discrepancies in the POW lists.⁴⁹

General Ridgway forwarded a report from Admiral Joy on 27 February that progress on Item 4 had reached a point where the only remaining issue was voluntary versus forced repatriation. Failure of the UNC to take an aggressive stand in pursuing this matter would be interpreted by the enemy as a weakening

resolve. Renewed argument on this issue would be reflected in the press and place it again in the limelight. "It is obviously undesirable to re-stress this issue if there is any likelihood that we are not going to stand firm to the breaking point if necessary," the chief UNC delegate stated. "Furthermore, if concessions are to be made it is preferable to make them on the staff level before the issue is again highlighted." Admiral Joy deemed it "imperative" to have an early decision from Washington "to adopt an unalterable final position on this POW question."⁵⁰

Meanwhile in mid-February, General Collins' deputy, General John E. Hull, USA, and Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson had visited the Far East.⁵¹ In discussions with General Ridgway in Tokyo, General Hull and Mr. Johnson raised the possibility that prisoners in UNC custody who were "violently" opposed to repatriation might simply be released. Apparently disturbed by this suggestion, General Ridgway, in a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 February, asserted that any such "subterfuge" to avoid forced repatriation would nullify efforts thus far and discredit UNC prestige. It would destroy any chance of the safe return of prisoners held by the Communists and increase the difficulty of reaching an agreement on an armistice. CINCUNC recommended adhering to the present planned procedure in negotiations, which was to reduce areas of disagreement as quickly as possible and focus on the remaining two, voluntary repatriation and airfield rehabilitation. Once this was done the UNC delegation, according to General Ridgway's plan, would submit a "package" agreement to the enemy, trading airfield restrictions for voluntary repatriation. This move would make clear "beyond any reasonable doubt" the Communists' stand on voluntary repatriation, a stand that General Ridgway was positive would be irrevocable rejection. At that time, he concluded,

the UNC delegation must announce the UNC decision, namely, [that] we will or will not agree to forced repatriation and we will be prepared to break negotiations rather than concede on this forced repatriation issue. . . . I therefore strongly urge that I be given my final position on the POW question now, thus allowing me to press for my final objective with vigor and without deviation.⁵²

In Washington, the issue of voluntary repatriation had been intensively debated during the month of February. The basic decision was pronounced by the President: that the United States would not accept an agreement requiring the use of force to repatriate POWs whose lives would be endangered thereby. "Just as I had always insisted that we could not abandon the South Koreans who had stood by us and freedom," wrote President Truman later, "so I now refused to agree to any solution that provided for the return against their will of prisoners of war to Communist domination."⁵³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted this decision to General Ridgway on 27 February, in reply to his message received earlier that day. It was, they said, the "final US governmental position." Moreover, they believed that this position "can be maintained without use of any subterfuge." Accordingly, they directed General Ridgway, after submitting his proposed package deal (and assuming that the enemy did not agree to a trade), "at a time and by a method considered

appropriate by you," to remove from POW status those who, he believed, would be fearful of their lives if they were returned to Communist control and would be expected violently to resist repatriation. This operation should be done so as to minimize disorder in the POW camps. Persons thus reclassified would be retained in UNC custody but held separate from other prisoners, and their names would be removed from the POW lists given the Communists. The Communists would then be informed that the UNC was ready to agree to an all-for-all exchange based upon these revised lists, and that the UNC considered that this course of action had been forced because of their failure to accept voluntary repatriation on a fair basis.⁵⁴

An Injurious Incident: 18 February

Nine days before this JCS message was sent, an almost unparalleled incident, severely detrimental to the UNC position on the POW issue, occurred on Koje-do Island, where enemy prisoners were being held. In one of the compounds, those who had been reclassified from POW to civilian internee status were being rescreened to correct errors and to identify those willing to accept repatriation. Suddenly a group of Communists attacked US troops. In the ensuing melee, 217 internees and 39 soldiers were killed or wounded. The results were immediately apparent at Panmunjom, where enemy negotiators protested in strident terms, placing the UNC on the defensive and setting back efforts to secure agreement on a formula for "no forced repatriation."⁵⁵

The roots of the Koje-do incident ran back to the early days of the Korean War and the capture of the first North Korean prisoners by the UNC. In August 1950 UN forces held fewer than a thousand prisoners. But by November the Inchon landing and subsequent operations into North Korea had raised the number of captive North Koreans to more than 130,000. While the care and custody of such a large body was a fairly heavy logistic burden, security was not a major problem. The POWs were dispersed throughout South Korea, supplies to care for them were sufficient, and in contrast to their later behavior they were, if not cowed, at least not troublesome.

The Chinese invasion that sent UN forces reeling back down the peninsula changed this situation. As it fell back, the UNC concentrated prisoners in the area around Pusan. This created a security hazard and hampered logistic operations in the area, which, with the fall of Inchon, became the primary UNC entry area for sea supply and reinforcement.

On 3 January 1951 General MacArthur had informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that because of the Chinese invasion he was forced to move the prisoners (numbering about 137,000) from stockades in Korea to some other location. He asked for authority to ship all POWs to the United States. "POWs have been docile, cooperative, and ready to work at all assigned tasks," he pointed out. Since they were not accustomed to the same standard of living as Americans,

the POWs could, he asserted, be maintained in modest facilities and fed less than "occidentals."⁵⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 10 January that prisoners would not be moved to US territory. They authorized CINCFE to dispose of the POWs so as to interfere least with current operations. He might place them on off-shore islands or release any or all of them. "If you think it advisable," the Joint Chiefs of Staff added, "as a basis for possible exchange of UN prisoners in NK or Chinese hands, you are authorized to retain an appropriate number of selected NK and Chinese POWs, confining them on an island in the Ryukyus south of Okinawa."⁵⁷

"What we were faced with and what had me worried," General Ridgway recalled later, "was the presence close to the fighting zone of some 140,000 prisoners of war whom we had to feed, water, guard, and care for. It took a substantial fraction (which we could ill spare) of our armed forces just to guard the compounds and it took much of our scanty transportation to carry supplies to feed and clothe and house them." In his capacity as Eighth Army Commander, he decided, once the threat of forced evacuation had faded, to move most of the prisoners from the mainland to the island of Koje-do as quickly as provision could be made for them. Koje-do, a few miles off the southern tip of the mainland, was about 150 square miles in area, barren and rocky with almost no flat ground suitable for construction of camps or dispersal of prisoners. It was already occupied by more than 200,000 natives and refugees. General Ridgway saw Koje-do as "a choice between evils," for there was no other suitable site for the prisoners.⁵⁸

Construction of four barbed wire enclosures, each divided into eight compounds, began in January 1951, and by the end of the month, 50,000 prisoners had been relocated to Koje-do. Each of the 32 compounds was originally intended to house from 700 to 1,200 men, but all were soon overloaded to as much as five times their capacity. Even the space between compounds was eventually used for prisoners. Thus thousands of men were packed into small areas with nothing but barbed wire between compounds.⁵⁹

The potential for real trouble was created by this overcrowding. In addition, shortages of guards and a generally poor caliber of those assigned to Koje-do (most of them ROKs) aggravated the situation. By the fall of 1951 more than 130,000 Korean and 20,000 Chinese prisoners were crammed into the compounds of Koje-do.

Violence began about this time, much of it caused by enmity between the ROK guards and North Korean prisoners. After several prisoners had been killed by guards, the Commanding General, 2d Logistic Command (Brigadier General Paul F. Yount, USA), asked for more US troops, charging that the caliber of available guards was entirely too low. A battalion of US troops reached Koje-do in November 1951, but by the end of the year only 9,000 US and ROK troops had been sent to the island, although 15,000 had been requested.

Screening of Korean prisoners caused the outbreak that occurred in February. In November and December more than 37,000 had been screened. When it was decided in January 1952 that a rescreening was necessary, the stage was set for violent resistance. By mid-February all Korean prisoners had been screened

except for 5,600 inmates of Compound 62. The prisoner leaders of this compound, all Communists, vowed to resist any screening.

Early on the morning of 18 February, as already described, US troops entered Compound 62 to secure it preparatory to screening. These troops were attacked by between 1,000 and 1,500 Korean prisoners wielding homemade but effective weapons, ranging from steel-tipped poles through rocks, knives, and flails. In suppressing this attack, US troops suffered one man killed and 38 wounded. Among the prisoners, 55 were killed outright and 22 others died later, while 140 were wounded.⁶⁰

On 23 February the Communist delegation protested against "the sanguinary incident of barbarously massacring large numbers of our personnel." The UNC rejected enemy protests on the grounds that the Koje-do incident was an "internal affair," since it had involved civilian internees, not prisoners of war. This reply infuriated Communist negotiators, who continued to protest loudly over the "massacre."⁶¹ Clearly the incident had placed UNC negotiators at a serious disadvantage. General Van Fleet replaced the camp commandant with a new appointee, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd. But riots and incidents continued; General Dodd himself was to be the victim of the most serious of these less than three months later.⁶²

The Package Proposal

By the beginning of March, the deadlock that had developed over Items 3 and 4 of the agenda led Admiral Joy to conclude that the time had come to present the enemy with a "take it or leave it" offer, backed by a threat of force. He so informed General Ridgway on 9 March, pointed out the difficulties of negotiating with the enemy, and stated that his delegates had no idea whether the enemy was serious in the negotiations. Admiral Joy suggested that a complete armistice agreement be handed the Communists for signature, incorporating concessions on minor issues but none on the major ones. This might be presented to the enemy with an ultimatum that the negotiations would be ended and hostilities resumed if the enemy did not sign within a certain time limit. Alternatively, no ultimatum would be presented but the enemy would be warned that the offer was final and that there would be no more concessions, except perhaps in phraseology.⁶³

General Ridgway did not accept Admiral Joy's plan, which went beyond his authority. But some of Admiral Joy's ideas were reflected in a message that he sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 March. He told them that he had discussed the problems of the negotiations at length and in detail with Admiral Joy, the other delegates, and senior members of the delegation staff. None professed to know whether the enemy desired an armistice or what the enemy intended with respect to the issues on which he was balking. Not only were the Communist negotiators growing more stubborn on remaining major issues but their demeanor was "increasingly arrogant and threatening" and their language "intemperate."

The delegation was being placed in a position approaching a humiliation “derogatory to the national dignity.” There were, said General Ridgway,

two courses of action, either of which may arrest this deterioration, restore some measure of bargaining power to our delegation and relieve these honorable, high-principled representatives of the United States of America who compose the delegation of the rankling humiliation of having their government, the United Nations, and the principles for which both stand, daily subjected to vituperative venom and falsehood.⁶⁴

The first course was to stand fast on the stated minimum position on each major issue, at the same time impressing on the enemy US determination to hold these positions. This would clarify the intent of the Communists toward an armistice. The US positions would be strengthened if its principal allies could be induced to support them publicly.

The second course of action was to apply force—“the one influence which the Communists the world over recognize.” This was a course of last resort, and General Ridgway was not yet ready to submit detailed views on how it should be carried out.

General Ridgway called the first course of action imperative if the “very evident” deterioration in the UN negotiating position was to be halted. The issue of Soviet membership on the NNSC must be removed before the two other major issues, voluntary repatriation and rehabilitation of airfields, could be resolved on the basis of a trade. He thereupon recommended that the US Government announce at once, with concurrent announcements by its principal allies, its decision to reject irrevocably the USSR as a member of the NNSC.⁶⁵

In Washington, these views were generally endorsed by General Collins, who, however, characterized them as amounting to a “piecemeal” approach. A more effective way, he told his colleagues, would be to present the Communists with a “single package” stating the UNC minimum positions, not only on Soviet participation but on POWs and airfields as well. His plan, set forth in a draft message for CINCFE, involved settlement of all remaining minor issues at subdelegation level as a first step. Then in plenary session, or possibly at a special meeting between General Ridgway and Kim Il Sung, the Communists would be presented with a final, irrevocable UNC position on each of the three major issues, comprising a package that must be accepted or rejected in toto. Simultaneously, the President would make a nationwide radio broadcast outlining the positions and declaring them to be final. Allied governments would be pressed to issue similar statements in support of the UNC “package.” This plan was essentially that of Admiral Joy with high-level political pronouncements substituted for threats of force. General Collins had discussed it with Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, of the State Department, who had told him that Secretary Acheson was “favorably impressed” with the idea of an “overall approach” such as was embodied in the plan. General Collins recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it.⁶⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did so on 13 March. After State and Defense Department agreement, the proposal was presented to the President, who approved it on 14 March. On 15 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed General Ridgway

to prepare to put the plan into effect. They informed him that it was felt in Washington that this package approach would have greater impact on the enemy attitude and, if rejected, would place the UNC in a favorable position with respect to international public opinion and support should the enemy then break off negotiations.⁶⁷

The progressive stages proposed by General Collins were explained to CINCUNC with the admonition that any minor points not cleared up at sub-delegation level should be added to the package proposal. As soon as it appeared that subdelegation meetings were no longer making any progress and CINCUNC was ready to begin segregating and reclassifying POWs, negotiations would be moved to plenary session. Once it was determined there that the enemy delegation had no new proposals for settling issues, Admiral Joy should propose a meeting between General Ridgway and Kim Il Sung.

The "final and irrevocable" positions on major issues that CINCUNC would set forth at the meeting were stipulated as follows:

1. On airfield rehabilitation, the UNC would be willing to agree that there would be no restrictions in the armistice agreement on reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfields. (In this connection, the joint "sanctions statement" would be issued in Washington concurrently with the signing of the armistice.)

2. On Soviet appointment to the NNSC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented three acceptable alternatives, which, they said, should be presented concurrently:

- a. The "neutral" designation would be eliminated and the supervisory organization and inspection teams would be constituted from nations selected by each side regardless of their combatant status in Korea or acceptability by the other side. Thus, if the USSR or Communist China were named by the other side, the UNC would nominate the United States.

- b. The commission would be composed of "neutral" (noncombatant) nations acceptable to each side, in which event UNC refusal to accept the Soviet Union as a member of the commission was absolutely firm.

- c. Inspection would be carried out by teams composed equally of representatives of the belligerents responsible to the Military Armistice Commission (the original UN proposal).

3. On prisoners of war, there would be an all-for-all exchange based on lists revised by having removed from them those POWs reclassified and segregated in accordance with the JCS instructions of 27 February.

The effect of this proposal would be that the UNC would yield on airfields and would expect a matching concession on voluntary repatriation. On the third issue, the enemy would have his choice of yielding (abandoning the USSR as a member of the supervisory organization) or accepting a compromise that would add the United States as a member.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted these final positions presented to the enemy in such a way that they were inseparably linked and would not be discussed individually. "Positions should also be presented," they informed General Ridgway, "so that it will be clear that they do in fact represent our final and irrevocable positions. However, in so doing you should also present these positions as fair and reasonable reconciliation of opposing points of view in interest of

prompt attainment of armistice." General Ridgway was to express willingness to sign at any time on this basis and to remain flexible in meeting and cooperating with the enemy toward this end. He would not be drawn into prolonged debate on the package, however. Should the enemy flatly reject the package proposal, CINCUNC would refuse to debate individual points. The package must not become a point of departure for negotiation of individual issues.

If the enemy refused to meet at the Commanders' level, General Ridgway was to carry on the same program at plenary sessions of the armistice delegations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assured him that he would be accorded the full political and diplomatic support of the US Government, although the details of this support had not yet been developed. They asked for CINCUNC's comments on their proposal.⁶⁸

General Ridgway replied on 17 March, strongly protesting that the primary goal must be the return of all UN prisoners reported by the enemy. It had not yet been determined "positively" that the Communist position on repatriation "is in fact unalterable." To change negotiating strategy at that moment, before exhausting every possibility of an agreement on voluntary repatriation, might jeopardize the safe return of the prisoners.⁶⁹

General Ridgway wanted no meeting with the Communist Commanders in Chief. Such a meeting, he said, would imply "authority on the part of Communist commanders which we believe does not exist." Also, it would establish another, inevitably obstructive negotiating level.

Reclassification and segregation of POWs, preparatory to offering all-for-all exchange, were basic to the JCS plan. Before these steps were accomplished, however, General Ridgway wanted assurance that all other possibilities had been considered. These were irrevocable steps that might destroy all chances of safe return of UNC/ROK prisoners held by the enemy. The JCS proposal amounted to requiring the Communists to yield on two issues (the USSR and voluntary repatriation) as against one concession by the UNC (airfields); this demand might well jeopardize the chance of an agreement.

Regarding Soviet membership on the NNSC, CINCUNC professed great reluctance to reverse the "irrevocable" stand already taken by the UNC. "I feel we should never concede on this point," he said. He saw a "strong possibility" that the enemy might yield on this issue if the US position were made "crystal clear" through a public announcement at governmental level. As evidence, he pointed to the effect of Secretary Acheson's statements in the summer of 1951 on the questions of the 38th parallel and the troop withdrawal issue, statements that had been followed by enemy concessions.

There was a danger, too, that a package agreement might become a mere point of departure for further negotiations on individual issues. This must be avoided by a prior US Government decision, communicated to the enemy, that Communist refusal to accept the package in a reasonable time would be grounds for termination of negotiations.

Summing up, General Ridgway urged continuance of the present effort to eliminate the USSR issue and thus reduce to two the number of major unresolved issues. He therefore repeated his recommendation of 11 March that the United

States issue a public announcement that the Soviet Union would not be accepted on the NNSC.⁷⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred "fully" that the UNC should exhaust every "reasonable possibility" of obtaining agreement to an exchange that would return the prisoners promptly without involving forced repatriation. They were prepared to give "full consideration" to any proposals that General Ridgway might have in this regard. It was not the intent of their "package" proposal to preclude other attempts to reach an agreement. General Ridgway himself, they pointed out, had implied that further negotiation under existing conditions was "intolerable" and that further progress could be secured only by standing rigidly upon the final US position on the three remaining major issues. "If you now feel that there is possibility of progress without adopting inflexible final positions, we have no objection," they wrote. They deferred to General Ridgway's judgment in the matter of meeting with the Communist commanders. However, they found it necessary to correct his misunderstanding of the US position on the Soviet issue, which General Ridgway had spoken of as an "irrevocable" stand. The finality of the US position applied only to the unacceptability of the USSR as a supposedly "neutral" nation; there was no objection to Soviet membership as such, provided the fiction of neutrality was not maintained. Any difficulty caused by having Soviet representatives in South Korea would be offset by the presence of US representatives in North Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the three constructive alternatives that they had sent General Ridgway for possible solution of the USSR issue would strengthen the UNC position.⁷¹

General Ridgway retained his objections to Soviet membership, on any basis, in a supervisory organization. He charged that the presence of Soviet personnel in a privileged status in UNC rear areas would present an intolerable problem in control. He felt that the UNC should never concede on this point and thought that there was an "excellent possibility" that the Communists might yield if the US position was made clear by a public statement, as he had suggested on 11 March. He admitted that it might be necessary to resort to a package proposal but pointed out that the fewer the issues involved, the greater the chances of enemy acceptance. He would therefore, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, continue to seek resolution of as many of the issues as possible. There the discussion rested for the moment.⁷²

The Prisoner Issue Again

Meanwhile at the conference table in Panmunjom, the subdelegations meeting on Item 4 had been debating heatedly but had made no progress on the main issue, voluntary repatriation. Subsidiary issues, including exchange of sick and wounded prisoners and delivery of Red Cross packages to Communist-held prisoners, were introduced and discussed. The enemy negotiators rejected UNC proposals out of hand, charging the UNC with delaying the meetings and avoiding the real issue, all-for-all repatriation. Again and again the enemy returned to

the Koje-do incident. "This uniquely clear sanguinary incident," said General Lee on 3 March, "lays bare all the lies which your side has been telling at this conference table about the good treatment of our captured personnel." The UNC reply remained the same: "The incident involved nationals of the Republic of Korea. . . . It is no concern of yours."⁷³

When the UNC presented a detailed description, based on intelligence data, showing exactly how and in what units ROKA prisoners had been impressed into the NKA, the Communists branded it "fabricated and false." "How can you know things about my army which I don't know myself?" demanded General Lee. And in exchange the enemy delegation again blasted the UNC for Koje-do and the general treatment of prisoners in the UNC POW camps.⁷⁴

Many of the POWs and civilian internees in the camps at Koje-do and Pusan had, on their own volition, adopted drastic means of demonstrating their resistance to Communism. Prisoners had staged hunger strikes, circulated petitions written in their own blood, and tattooed themselves with anti-Communist slogans. All of this had been reported to the enemy. The Communists reacted at the conference table with repeated charges that the UNC was employing agents of Chiang Kai-shek's Government to intimidate prisoners, tattooing them and generally coercing them into anti-Communist actions. The Communist accusations were accompanied by such terms as "scoundrels from Taiwan," and "your hangman friends of South Korea." The UNC replied in equally colorful terms, such as "outrageous agglomeration of misstatements of fact, groundless accusations and thinly veiled threats." The UNC also accused the enemy, again on the basis of intelligence information, of sending UN and ROK prisoners to mainland China, a charge that the enemy vehemently denied.

The UNC cause was not helped on 13 March when another incident, ready-made for Communist use, occurred on Koje-do. A detail of cooperative North Korean prisoners was marching past a compound filled with hostile North Koreans, preceded by a ROK Army detachment not connected with the detail. As both groups passed the compound, showers of stones hurled by the prisoners from within pelted the prisoner detail and soldiers alike. Without orders to do so, the ROK soldiers began firing on the compound, killing 10 POWs outright, mortally wounding two, injuring 26 who had to be hospitalized, and injuring a passing US officer. In an effort to avert repercussions as much as possible, the UNC delegation reported this to the enemy delegation, which lodged a formal official protest over the "barbarous massacre."⁷⁵

Throughout all these events the enemy kept demanding an accounting of the 44,000 prisoners reported by the UNC to Geneva but not reported in its prisoner lists. The UNC repeated its explanation that this group consisted largely of men reclassified as civilian internees because they were ROK citizens who had been impressed into the NK Army, then captured a second time by the UNC. For its part, the UNC delegation pressed almost daily for information on 50,000 ROK soldiers whom the enemy had boasted of capturing during propaganda broadcasts in the first nine months of the war but whose names had never appeared on lists submitted either to Geneva or to the UNC. The enemy denied all knowledge of or responsibility for these men.⁷⁶

With no progress being made, the UNC proposed that negotiations be returned to the staff officer level, where the implications of each side's position could be further explored. The enemy agreed, and on 16 March the staff officers again took up the discussion of Item 4.⁷⁷

Thus far General Ridgway had hesitated to take advantage of the authorization given him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 February to remove from POW status those who would violently resist repatriation. He wished first to be certain beyond any doubt that the Communists would never abandon their insistence on forced repatriation. But on 17 March he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decision to return the talks to the staff officer level had "opened a remote possibility" of an agreement on adjusting lists of POWs held by the UNC so as to allow an all-for-all exchange without requiring forced repatriation. By such an agreement, selected persons would be removed from the POW lists and designated by some term such as "special refugee." A list of those civilian internees who wanted to return to Communist control would also be furnished to the enemy. Any proposal of this nature would of course be made in terms that would ensure beyond doubt the return of the 11,559 prisoners known to be held by the enemy in exchange for all POWs in UNC hands who would not "violently oppose" repatriation. General Ridgway believed that such an agreement should satisfy the Communists' insistence on the "letter" of the principle of repatriation of all POWs, while remaining consistent with JCS policy, which allowed all-for-all exchange so long as no forced repatriation was involved.⁷⁸

Should the enemy show an interest in this proposal, the UNC would at once undertake to screen both POWs and civilian internees, segregating those who wanted to return to the Communist side. New lists would then be prepared for submission to the Communists. General Ridgway repeated his conviction that any covert plan to screen and segregate would not only fail but would be detrimental. He admitted too that it would be impossible in screening to determine those who would resist to the point of self-destruction from those who merely expressed a choice under the influence of existing circumstances. The best estimate, admittedly based on guesswork, was that about 73,000 POWs and civilian internees would oppose return to the enemy. Screening and segregation to get a more precise figure would take about five days.

The possibility of obtaining enemy agreement to this proposal was tenuous at best, but General Ridgway felt it was worth a try. It would at least provide a measure of the enemy's "resistance to any plan to circumvent forced repatriation." He proposed to submit the proposal in staff officer sessions, where, even if it were rejected, it would not disrupt existing plans for a final stand at higher levels.⁷⁹

With approval from the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Ridgway that they saw some promise that his plan might lead to agreement. And even if the enemy rejected it, the UNC would have lost nothing. On the other hand, if the enemy accepted it, a new danger would arise: that the Communists might seize the opportunity to retaliate by revising downward their own lists. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked whether General Ridgway was satisfied that the list of 11,559 POWs submitted by the enemy included all non-Korean personnel actually in enemy hands, as well as the "greatest majority" of Koreans.

If the Communist position on forced repatriation was in fact unalterable, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, then no plan would work. If it was not, the tactics they had outlined on 15 March, in forwarding their “package deal” (which had included a proposal for screening followed by all-for-all exchange) would seem to be preferable to anything yet suggested. Their plan, they pointed out, would not force the enemy to accept voluntary repatriation in principle, and it embodied concession or compromise on the other major issues; at the same time, it would demonstrate, through the prior screening and reclassification of POWs, the determination of the UNC on nonforcible repatriation. “However,” they told General Ridgway, “if you feel that there are clear advantages in making known to Com-mies our intent to reclassify and segregate POWs who would violently object to repatriation prior to or at the time action is taken, we should have no objection.”⁸⁰

General Ridgway saw no real disagreement in principle between himself and Washington authorities on the package deal and the POW issue. The basic difference in plans, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 March, “is one of approach.” He assured them that he would accept no substantial reduction in the list of POWs already submitted by the enemy. Under his plan, lists would be carefully checked before being accepted as a basis for exchange, so that the Communists would be unable to revise their list downward. The JCS proposal had contained no such provision. The UNC delegation, according to General Ridgway, felt that the Communists might agree to an exchange based on revised lists; they would never accept a *fait accompli*, such as was envisioned in the JCS plan—elimination of a portion of the prisoners followed by an offer to exchange those remaining.⁸¹

CINCUNC granted that the Communists might be holding a few UNC POWs who had not been reported. But they would never admit to having more than the 11,559 POWs on the list, except for those captured after lists were exchanged on 18 December. In other words, the figure of 11,559 must be accepted as substantially the total of prisoners whose return could be expected.

The enemy would quickly learn of any screening of prisoners, General Ridgway pointed out, no matter how carefully it might be concealed. For the safety of POWs in Communist hands, the UNC should seek prior enemy agreement to such screening. Any arbitrary action by the UNC could well endanger POWs held by the enemy.

General Ridgway also criticized the JCS “package deal” because it might lead to acceptance of the USSR on the supervisory organization. He repeated his objection to any such arrangement and again expressed the view that the enemy might give way on this issue if the United States issued a strong public statement on the subject. Conceding that, as a last resort, the “package deal” approach might have to be taken, he insisted that the number of issues must first be reduced. In the hope of breaking the deadlock on Item 4, he meant to go ahead and seek agreement, at staff officer level, to a downward revision of the prisoner lists. He interpreted the recent JCS message as authorization to do so.⁸²

Upon seeing this message from General Ridgway, President Truman authorized him to go ahead with his plan. The President was particularly impressed with the General’s comments on the unacceptability of the USSR.⁸³

The Secretary of Defense, however, had already decided that Presidential approval was not necessary in replying to CINCUNC, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had drafted a reply and cleared it with State and Defense. Their message would tell General Ridgway that there was no objection to further efforts to obtain agreement with the Communists on an acceptable basis for POW exchange, but that it seemed desirable first to explore the enemy position fully. An informal approach, perhaps through private meetings or conferences, seemed preferable initially to the submission of a specific, formal proposal. Hence, their instructions were not to be construed as granting approval for CINCUNC's plan unless these exploratory talks indicated that his plan offered a chance of settlement without the dangers of which they had warned. Meanwhile, they were withholding final decision on General Ridgway's other recommendations and on their own proposed "package" approach.⁸⁴

When the unsolicited Presidential approval arrived in the Pentagon, some confusion ensued. The President was informed of what had occurred and was advised that the Secretaries of State and Defense believed the proposed JCS reply was consistent with the President's policy and would provide greater flexibility in negotiations than the procedure proposed by CINCUNC. The President was persuaded and approved dispatch of the message without change. It was sent to General Ridgway on 22 March.⁸⁵

By this time, staff officers at Panmunjom had been discussing Item 4 for nearly a week, with results that were by no means unpromising. On 22 March enemy officers intimated that real progress might be made if the talks went into executive (closed) session. At the same time, in discussing prisoner lists, they admitted that there might be "special cases" among the POWs. Their remarks were interpreted by the UNC as suggesting that the enemy might agree to allow the UNC to retain civilian internees as well as those POWs who were of ROK origin and might even be willing to allow the POW lists to be adjusted by removal of those prisoners of North Korean origin who opposed repatriation, substituting civilians (or perhaps POWs of ROK origin) who desired to go to North Korea. There was, however, no indication of enemy willingness to adjust similarly the list of Chinese POWs.⁸⁶

After three more days of maneuvering, the staff officers went into executive session on 25 March. At this meeting the UNC, following up the hints given by the enemy on 22 March, cautiously raised the possibility of revising the lists along the lines of General Ridgway's plan. The enemy conceded that there might be a "special situation" with regard to "persons who were former residents in the area of your side" (i.e., South Korea) but was unrelenting in the matter of prisoners from North Korea or China.⁸⁷

Over the next few days, enemy staff officers showed that they were fully aware that the UNC had not abandoned the principle of "no forced repatriation." Nevertheless both sides made a genuine effort to negotiate within the narrow limits imposed by their higher authorities. During these talks both sides were more frank and laid out their real requirements more openly than had been done in the prior sessions on Item 4, which had been going on for more than 100 days by late March. The UNC promised unequivocally to return all prisoners "except

those who will forcibly resist repatriation." The enemy in turn explicitly affirmed their willingness to apply the principle of voluntary repatriation to the 44,000 ex-ROKs who had been reclassified. This removed one issue, since the enemy had previously demanded an accounting of this group. The Communists agreed also to apply the principle to approximately 16,000 of the 132,000 POWs on the UNC list whose original home had been in the ROK.⁸⁸

But these concessions represented the limit of the enemy's willingness to compromise, and in the next few days the exchanges grew more heated as positions solidified. The Communists insisted that there could be no thought of failure to repatriate captured Chinese in UNC hands. The UNC, they charged, wished to turn these prisoners over to the "Chiang Kai-shek brigands" on Taiwan.⁸⁹

In their eagerness to move the enemy off dead center, UNC staff officers on 1 April made what proved to be a costly tactical error. With the enemy insisting on some sort of "round figure" estimate of the number of men who would be returned upon agreement, the UNC proffered an estimate of a "possible 116,000." This was approximately the number of prisoners of North Korean and Chinese origin (132,000 minus 16,000 from South Korea); it also reflected an estimate prepared by the UNC Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Doyle O. Hickey, USA, that probably no more than 16,000 prisoners would forcibly resist repatriation.⁹⁰

Intrigued by this relatively high number, the enemy pointedly suggested that screening might be in order as a step in preparing final lists of prisoners to be exchanged. "In the interest of progress . . .," said the Communist spokesman, "we would . . . recommend that instead of spending time on argument over the principles, we may as well be realistic and enter immediately into the work of checking the lists, and that discussions of principle be resumed after the lists have been checked." On 4 April the UNC accepted this proposal, and it was agreed that the two sides would recess until the UNC had a more accurate "round figure" to present. An agreement seemed near; it appeared that any repatriation figure over 100,000 would satisfy the Communists and lead to an armistice.⁹¹

Screening and Segregation of Prisoners

In line with these developments, General Ridgway on 3 April asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for authority "as a matter of urgency" to begin screening. He told them:

Discussions with the Communists on the POW question have reached the point where we are convinced that no further progress is possible unless and until we can give them a reasonably accurate estimate of how many POWs would be returned to them under our proposal. The Communists understand that the development of such a figure requires screening of UNC held prisoners of war and civilian internees. Their insistence upon a round figure for use in further discussion and their proposal of a recess to develop such a figure implies their tacit acquiescence in the screening process. In view of this and the fact that the question of the numbers and nationalities of the POWs to be returned rather

than the principles involved appears to be the controlling issue, I believe that the screening and segregation of all POWs and civilian internees should begin at the earliest possible date which we estimate to be within five days.

The following aspects of the proposal, continued General Ridgway, must be clearly understood and approved by the US Government:

A. Screening and segregation once accomplished are final. Prisoners having once chosen to identify themselves with one group or another, thereafter cannot be permitted to change their minds, or to remingle. Therefore it must be accepted that forced repatriation might be unavoidable in some cases.

B. Once a figure has been given to the Communists the UNC must be prepared to deliver substantially the number reported. Major downward revisions of this figure could not be made.

C. The US must accept responsibility for continued custody and support of POWs who are not to be returned at least until such time as the UN, through the US as its executive agent, reaches a decision as to their ultimate disposition.

Screening and segregation of prisoners, General Ridgway pointed out, were inevitable under any solution other than the unconditional return of all POWs, and the longer the operation was delayed, the greater the danger of serious outbreaks on Kojedo, where, he said, "a potentially explosive atmosphere now exists." Measures to remove this danger, such as breaking up the camp and dispersing the prisoners, were beyond the capabilities of his command. The armistice conference, in his judgment, was "at a stage requiring decisive action." Until the results of the screening were known, further discussions with the enemy on the POW issue would be fruitless.⁹²

Without delay, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved screening of prisoners. On 5 April CINCUNC accordingly directed the Commanding General, Eighth Army, to begin the process as of 8 April, under a plan designated Operation SCATTER. North Korean and Chinese POWs were to be screened so as to make available for return to Communist control the "maximum number," segregating only those who presented "reasonable evidence," in General Van Fleet's judgment, that they would forcibly resist return. It was evident that the UNC wanted to come as close as possible to meeting the figure of 116,000. ROK POWs and civilian internees would merely be asked if they desired to return to North Korea.⁹³

During orientation of NK and Chinese prisoners, UNC personnel went out of their way to emphasize the disadvantages and personal dangers that would result from refusal to return to their homelands. In spite of this effort, cumulative results of screening by 13 April showed that of 106,376 prisoners and internees screened, only 31,231 would return to Communist control without force. Some disorders took place during the screening, and 44,000 POWs and internees on Kojedo either refused screening or could not be screened without undue violence. In addition, about 12,000 POWs and civilian internees in the prison hospital at Camp 10, Pusan, had not yet been screened.⁹⁴

These interim results alarmed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who foresaw that the large number of prisoners opposing repatriation would stiffen the enemy's resistance to an agreement. They suggested to General Ridgway that the enemy be

offered an all-for-all exchange of those willing to return, with a provision for rescreening of the remainder by some international body after the armistice went into effect.⁹⁵

General Ridgway replied that his best estimate, based on definite replies and extrapolation of estimates for those not yet screened, was that only about 70,000 prisoners would be available for return to the enemy side. This was a far cry from the figure of 116,000 given the enemy and boded trouble for the settlement of the POW issue. He was considering some rescreening in the hope of picking up a few more prisoners who might change their minds, but there was little prospect that the figure of 70,000 would be materially increased. He proposed to reconvene the staff officer meetings and submit this figure, making every effort to convince the enemy that the UNC had encouraged the maximum possible number of prisoners to return. If the Communists reacted unfavorably, the UNC would offer to permit rescreening either by a neutral international organization like the ICRC or by joint Red Cross teams. Should the enemy remain intractable, the UNC would propose that discussions be shifted to plenary sessions and would then introduce a new package proposal that General Ridgway had outlined on 3 April, involving all-for-all exchange of prisoners based on revised lists, removal of restrictions on airfield reconstruction, and withdrawal of the USSR and Norway as nominees for the NNSC.⁹⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Ridgway's proposed rescreening, suggesting that, if time permitted, it be done before any figure was given to the enemy. Also, "the most stringent criteria" should be applied to weed out those who would not forcibly resist repatriation. As for his other proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were inclined to favor neutral rescreening after an armistice, as they had suggested, rather than before one. However, they authorized General Ridgway, at his discretion, to follow the procedure that he had outlined.⁹⁷

Because rescreening would take too long and because he sensed a growing enemy impatience, General Ridgway sent his staff officers back to the negotiating table on 19 April after a two-week recess. These officers presented to the Communists a figure of 70,000 who would return to their control without being forced to do so. The effect on the enemy delegates was profound. They had not been prepared for such a drastic reduction from 116,000. They immediately called for a one-day recess. As Admiral Joy reported, the "obvious efforts" of the principal enemy staff officer, Colonel Tsai, to maintain composure indicated that his instructions "did not encompass the possibility of an estimate in this low range." On the following day the enemy announced that it was "completely impossible" to consider the figure of 70,000. Meetings continued over the next few days, but on 24 April the Communists declared that this figure had "completely overthrown the basis of negotiations" on Item 4, and on 25 April they unilaterally abrogated the staff officer executive sessions.⁹⁸

Observing the enemy's reaction, General Ridgway had warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 April that the UNC might be forced to introduce a package proposal very soon, before the enemy had worked himself into a completely irreversible position. He recommended that at the time such a proposal was presented, authoritative statements of support from the US Government and from as

many other UN nations as possible be issued simultaneously. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that, in view of the relative success of executive sessions of staff officers on Item 4, Washington officials were inclined to think that the package proposal should be introduced in an executive session of plenary delegates, in which case public statements would not be appropriate.⁹⁹

As soon as the Communists abrogated the staff officer sessions, Admiral Joy, acting on General Ridgway's instructions, requested, and the enemy agreed, that a plenary session be scheduled for 27 April at 1100 (Far East time). The purpose was to introduce the UNC package. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were of course informed of these developments. However, General Ridgway had not indicated whether the plenary meeting would be an open or an executive session. The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained convinced that executive sessions would offer the "most favorable atmosphere" for introducing the package proposal, and "urged" that a proposal for executive sessions be made at the opening of the plenary meeting.¹⁰⁰

This message reached General Ridgway on the morning of 27 April, only a few hours before the scheduled opening of the plenary session. Interpreting it as an order, General Ridgway at once relayed it to the UNC delegation. However, both he and Admiral Joy were deeply disturbed; a proposal for executive sessions did not fit in with the negotiating strategy that they had worked out. After receiving an "urgent telephone request" from the Admiral, General Ridgway authorized him to request a postponement of the scheduled plenary session, so that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might be asked to reconsider their instructions.¹⁰¹

Later that day, General Ridgway forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a very strong protest from Admiral Joy against the requirement for executive sessions. Admiral Joy argued that to submit the UNC proposal in a closed meeting would suggest a desire to conceal its contents and would be inconsistent with the goal of avoiding substantive discussion of its elements, since the entire purpose of executive discussions was to encourage discussion. The Communists, in abrogating the staff officer sessions, had already demonstrated their intent to try the POW issue "in open forum before world public opinion"; a refusal to meet the enemy on his chosen ground would prejudice the UNC negotiating position. There was no guarantee that the enemy would agree to executive sessions; he had no particular inducement to do so, since if he accepted the UNC package its contents would at once be publicized as part of an armistice agreement. But merely to make the request would weaken the UNC position, according to Admiral Joy. It would suggest a fear of public reaction if the proposal became generally known and would deprive the UNC of the public support that could be expected if its contents were stated in open session. In any case, all the individual elements of the proposal had already been publicized, so that nothing would be gained by secrecy.¹⁰²

General Ridgway fully supported these arguments, adding the opinion that the requirement for executive sessions "would gravely prejudice such chances as exist for the successful accomplishment of our mission." He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

All our actions had been carefully planned, coordinated and approved with the clear recognition that each was an essential link in one strong chain connecting our principles with our package proposal. To me delay or hesitation at this stage would expose us to grave loss of confidence by our friends and ridicule by our foes.

I therefore urge with all earnestness that you at once grant me full authority to proceed with action as planned, reported and approved prior to receipt of your 907347.¹⁰³

Looking at the matter from a wider perspective, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were constrained to overrule General Ridgway's emphatically worded protest. They told him that, although they had given "most careful consideration" to his objections, they considered that the advantages of at least proposing executive sessions of plenary delegates were "overriding." The chances that the Communists would accept the UNC package proposal were admittedly questionable, but in the JCS view, prospects for agreement would be slightly enhanced by presentation of the proposal in an executive session. As for the propaganda aspects, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that if the Communists turned down the request for an executive session, or if they accepted and subsequently violated secrecy in a search for a propaganda advantage, they would bring upon themselves a "clear onus." The result in either case would be to facilitate an important objective, namely, "maintaining allied unity and support" for the elements of the package proposal, as well as continued allied support of US policies in the event that negotiations were suspended or broken off by the enemy. Hence the Joint Chiefs of Staff again directed CINCFE to have the UNC delegation propose executive sessions. If the Communists refused, however, General Ridgway was authorized to present the UNC package in open session. In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the importance of having the plenary session as soon as possible.¹⁰⁴

Presentation of the UNC Package

As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ridgway lost no time in arranging for a plenary session of the delegates for 1100 on 28 April. When the session opened, Admiral Joy spoke first and announced that the UNC would propose an "overall solution of the problems remaining to be settled." He then proposed that the delegates go into executive session, and the Communists agreed.¹⁰⁵

Admiral Joy next presented the package in the form set forth by General Ridgway on 3 April. He recounted the three remaining major issues: airfield reconstruction, prisoner exchange, and composition of the NNSC. He declared "categorically" that the UNC would not accept the enemy position on all of these, nor did he expect the enemy to yield on all of them. He accordingly challenged the enemy to "join us in seeking a compromise solution which both sides may

accept." Then, in the following words, he laid before the Communists the UNC proposal:

In the interest of reaching an early armistice agreement, we are willing to accede to your stand that no restriction be placed on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of airfields.

I must make it absolutely clear, however, that our acceptance of your position regarding airfields is contingent upon your acceptance of our positions regarding prisoners of war and the composition of the neutral nations supervisory commission. As you know, our position regarding prisoners of war is the exchange of 12,100 prisoners of war of our side for approximately 70,000 of your side. You also know that our position regarding the neutral nations supervisory commission is that this commission shall be composed of representatives from the four neutral nations which are acceptable to both sides.

In conclusion, Admiral Joy submitted a draft armistice agreement incorporating agreements already reached, plus the UNC proposals regarding the three major issues.¹⁰⁶

This proposal, the fruit of weeks of careful planning and of intensive discussions between the Far East and Washington, "created as much stir as a pebble dropped into the ocean."¹⁰⁷ After a short recess to study the proposal, General Nam Il pronounced that "our side fails to see how your proposal of this morning can really be of help to an overall settlement of all the remaining issues." Admiral Joy replied that the offer was "final and irrevocable," and General Nam Il proposed an indefinite recess. Summing up the meeting, Admiral Joy reported that the Communists had given "no noticeable reaction" to the UNC proposal.¹⁰⁸

The next meeting was held on 2 May at the request of the Communists. At that time, General Nam Il made a lengthy statement assailing the UNC position, but ended by making an important concession. He offered to accept the UNC proposal on the composition of the NNSC, thus abandoning the Communists' hitherto rigid insistence on the presence of the Soviet Union. However, he tied this offer to a condition: that the UNC accept what he described as a "reasonable compromise" on the POW issue. This "compromise" actually amounted to a demand that the UNC exchange 132,000 prisoners for 12,000; the only concession was the willingness to forget about the 44,000 ex-ROKs reclassified as civilian internees. Admiral Joy replied that the UNC offer had constituted an "integrated whole," with its individual elements not subject to bargaining and formally rejected the enemy proposal.¹⁰⁹

The effect of this proposal by the Communists was to reduce the issues to a single one. Suddenly the only obstacle to the conclusion of an armistice was the question of forced repatriation of POWs. But this issue was one on which neither side was prepared to yield.

Following the meeting of 2 May, General Ridgway informed Admiral Joy that the UNC, having proposed executive sessions, should not be quick to seek their abandonment and that they should continue for at least two more days. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, supplementing this instruction, directed CINCFE to inform Washington before suggesting to the enemy that executive sessions be ended; however, they authorized him to agree if the Communists made such a

proposal. General Ridgway accordingly told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4 May, following another fruitless session the day before, that he had authorized Admiral Joy to propose the termination of executive sessions on or after 6 May, at his discretion.¹¹⁰

A meeting held on 5 May, which lasted only 11 minutes, attested to the immovability of each side on the remaining issue. On 6 May, therefore, Admiral Joy proposed resuming open plenary sessions; the enemy agreed on the following day. With secrecy at an end, General Ridgway at once released a public statement, already cleared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explaining the package proposal and charging that the responsibility for peace in Korea now rested with the Communist leaders. At the same time, in Washington, President Truman issued a statement expressing full US Government support for the proposal that had been given the enemy and lauding the UNC negotiators for their patience and fairness. "We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery," said the Chief Executive.¹¹¹

It was at this point that another crisis in the prisoner camps at Koje-do threatened to undermine even more seriously than the February incident the position of the UNC at the negotiating table.

The Kidnapping of General Dodd

General Ridgway had reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the status of the screening program on 29 April. He warned at that time that any attempts to screen or segregate prisoners in the compounds not yet processed at Koje-do would meet with "violent resistance." As he described the situation:

These compounds are well organized and effective control cannot be exercised within them without use of such great degree of force as might verge on the brutal and result in killing and wounding quite a number of inmates. While I can execute such forced screening, I believe that the risk of violence and bloodshed involved, both to UNC personnel and to the inmates themselves, would not warrant such course of action.

He intended to omit screening of these compounds and to list all prisoners in them as willing to return to Communist control. In the hospital compound at Pusan, Number 10, over half the prisoners had been screened. But with more than 3500 remaining to be screened, General Van Fleet had reported a need for immediate action to establish firm control and to protect the sick and wounded. "Such action," General Ridgway warned, "may involve force and possible loss of life."¹¹²

Although told of the serious situations existing in the prison camps in Korea, neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor any other authority in Washington saw reason to direct specific action. They told General Ridgway on 6 May that they appreciated the difficulties facing him and approved his plan to list inmates not screened as eligible for return to Communist control.¹¹³

At this time, as the result of a Presidential decision, General Ridgway was preparing to relinquish his several commands in the Far East to General Mark W. Clark. General Ridgway had been selected to become Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to replace General Eisenhower, who was then preparing to campaign for the Presidency of the United States.¹¹⁴

General Clark arrived in the Far East on 7 May, scheduled to assume command on the day of General Ridgway's departure, 12 May. Just as he arrived, the routine nature of the command turnover was unpleasantly interrupted by a startling occurrence.¹¹⁵

On the afternoon of 7 May, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, USA, Commanding General of the POW camp on Koje-do, was seized by a group of prisoners at the gate of Compound 76 and borne as a prisoner into the compound. Immediately thereafter the prisoners sent word demanding that representatives from other compounds be sent in to take part in a general conference. This demand was duly granted by camp authorities, and two POW representatives from each of the other compounds were sent to Compound 76 that evening.¹¹⁶

On the following day, 8 May, the prisoners made several demands, principally that they be allowed to establish a formal association. General Yount, Commanding General of the 2d Logistic Command, refused and countered with another demand, which the prisoners ignored, that General Dodd be released. General Van Fleet had meanwhile appointed Brigadier General Charles F. Colson, USA, formerly Chief of Staff, I Corps, to replace General Dodd as camp commander. General Ridgway and General Clark flew to Korea and conferred with General Van Fleet and Admiral Joy. They agreed that any temporizing would be interpreted by the Communists as evidence of surrender. General Ridgway thereupon authorized General Van Fleet to "take necessary action to bring about the release without delay of General Dodd," using "whatever degree of force that may, in your judgment, be required."¹¹⁷

Out of concern for General Dodd's life, General Van Fleet did not move swiftly or forcefully, although armored units were moved to Koje-do on the night of 9 to 10 May. On the following morning the prisoners holding General Dodd agreed to release him if the UNC would agree to: (1) stop its "barbarous behavior," including "threatening, confinement, mass murdering, gun and machine gun shooting, using poison gas, [and] germ weapons"; (2) stop "illegal and unreasonable volunteer repatriation" of prisoners; (3) stop "forcible investigation (screening)"; and (4) permit formation of a POW association. If force were used to free General Dodd, his life would be forfeited. Upon being informed of these demands and of the fact that no force was being used to release General Dodd, General Ridgway fired off a strong message to General Van Fleet warning him that acceptance of these POW demands, particularly on gas and germ warfare, "would result in incalculable damage to the UN position in world opinion." Not knowing exactly what was going on, General Ridgway nevertheless added that if there had not been a material change for the better by daylight of 11 May his directive to take all necessary forceful action against the prisoners must be implemented.¹¹⁸

General Dodd was released on the evening of 10 May after he, on behalf of General Colson, had negotiated a highly damaging statement, in which he agreed to prisoner demands and implied that he accepted the charges of mistreatment made by the prisoners. The statement admitted that POWs had been killed and wounded by UN forces, promised to give POWs humane treatment in the future according to the principles of the Geneva Convention, promised an end to forced screening, and approved the formation of a POW organization. The prisoners' second demand, regarding voluntary repatriation, was beyond General Colson's authority to promise. General Colson had drafted the entire statement along lines demanded by the prisoners, and General Yount had approved it.¹¹⁹

General Clark, who had by now replaced General Ridgway, at once denounced the Colson agreement as the fruit of "unadulterated blackmail." He denied the fantastic accusations made by the prisoners in connection with their first demand. He pointed out that prisoners had been killed only as a result of violence that their own leaders had instigated, and that the provisions of the Geneva Convention were already being scrupulously followed at Kojedo, where POW compounds had been freely visited by representatives of the ICRC and of the press.¹²⁰

The consternation in Washington occasioned by these developments can readily be imagined. The potential effects on the negotiations, and on the US and UNC position before the world, were serious. On the evening of 12 May (Washington time), General Bradley, with appropriate officials of the Departments of Defense and of the Army, discussed the situation with General Clark via telecon. The conferees debated the possibility of repudiating the Colson agreement, which General Clark's statement had not gone so far as to do. General Clark recommended that he be authorized to take such action at his discretion, depending upon the findings of an investigation of the incident that was then under way. General Bradley replied that the question of repudiation was already under study by "higher authorities."¹²¹

On 14 May the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having obtained the President's approval, told General Clark that it was desirable to avoid using the word "repudiate." They sent him the text of a statement to be released by him, declaring that the exchange of communications between General Colson and the prisoners "has no validity whatsoever," since it took place under circumstances "of duress involving the physical threat to the life of a UN officer." The entire affair at Kojedo, according to the statement, "was carefully prepared to manufacture propaganda for [the] purpose of beclouding the whole prisoner-of-war issue." General Colson had had no authority "to purport to accept any of the vicious and false charges upon which the Communist demands were based." General Clark issued this statement the following day.¹²²

Earlier, General Clark had relieved General Colson and appointed Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, USA, assistant commander of the 2d Division, to command the POW camp. He also strengthened the garrison on Kojedo, which, at the time of the Dodd incident, consisted of 6,114 US troops and 4,525 others, mostly ROKs. General Clark ordered an immediate reinforcement and by 20 May had moved the 187th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and one tank

battalion to the island, raising the size of the US force to 10,295 and the overall total to 14,820.¹²³

General Boatner proved fully equal to the task of remedying the festering sore of Koje-do. Meanwhile, however, the UNC delegation at Panmunjom had to face the consequences of the Dodd incident. Admiral Joy, upon learning of General Dodd's capture, had been "absolutely flabbergasted." "I'm certainly going to take a beating over this at the conference table," he told General Clark.¹²⁴ He was right. The Communists did not use the affair as a reason for breaking off the negotiations, but they made the most of it in their statements. "The endless series of bloody incidents occurring in your prisoner of war camps clearly proves that your so-called screening is only a means of retaining forcibly captured personnel of our side," said General Nam Il on 9 May. The next day he denounced the UNC for "systematically taking a series of barbarous measures to attain your long-deliberated objective of forcibly retaining our captured personnel." Admiral Joy replied that such statements were "transparent, false propaganda" serving to cloak the enemy's unwillingness to move toward a settlement.¹²⁵

One more aspect of this unfortunate affair remained to be settled. A board of investigation appointed by General Yount found Generals Colson and Dodd blameless, and praised General Colson for his "coolness and excellent judgment" in bringing about General Dodd's release. General Van Fleet did not concur in these conclusions and recommended that both officers be reprimanded. General Clark, however, went much further. "It is beyond my comprehension," he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 May, "how the board could have arrived at such conclusions in the face of the obviously poor judgment displayed by both of these officers." He recommended administrative action to reduce both to the grade of colonel and an administrative reprimand for General Yount, who had known of the damaging passages in General Colson's letter to the POW leaders but had done nothing to have them removed. General Clark's recommendations were passed on to the President with the endorsement of General Collins and Secretary of the Army Pace; the President also approved them, and the actions were carried out.¹²⁶

The UN Command in the Middle

General Clark took up his new command as several longstanding, broad problems approached critical stages. The sensitive balance of negotiations, a barely stabilized military stand-off, the explosive situation surrounding the POW camps, and precarious relations with the ROK Government constituted the most serious matters facing the newly arrived commander. Of these, the continuing unpredictable and capricious attitude and actions of the Syngman Rhee government were particularly frustrating. They affected negotiations adversely and complicated them quite unnecessarily. At one point President Rhee's actions actually endangered the military position of the UNC.

President Rhee Opposes an Armistice

As a matter of national policy, the Republic of Korea, mainly in the person of its President, had consistently opposed negotiating with Communists. In a letter to the US Government before negotiations started, the ROK Government had warned that it would oppose any armistice agreement that did not provide for: (1) complete withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea; (2) disarmament of North Korea; (3) UN commitment to prevent any third party support of the North Korean Communists; (4) ROK participation in any international consideration of any aspect of the Korean problem; and (5) preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Korea.¹ During the first month of armistice talks, General Ridgway protested to President Rhee, first through Ambassador Muccio and, later, through the ROK Ambassador to Japan, over his interference with and contradictory orders to the ROK member of the UNC delegation. Obviously President Rhee feared that the UNC was going to settle the war at the 38th parallel. General Ridgway had tried without success to reassure him that the United States and the UN remained committed to the goal of a free and united Korea. In late July 1951 Dr. Rhee wrote President Truman asking his pledge that

UNC negotiators would not be allowed to agree to a division of Korea along any line. In furtherance of this initiative, President Rhee had arranged mass meetings and demonstrations urging UN forces to move "On To The Yalu." President Truman replied a few days later, chiding Dr. Rhee and calling for his cooperation but making no pledge.²

The ROK President toned down his attacks on the armistice temporarily, but on 20 September, during the recess in the talks, he vigorously renewed them. In a radio broadcast he declared that the Communists should never be allowed to occupy Kaesong. "Everyone" realized, he said, that the Communists were using these talks to discredit the United Nations in the eyes of the Communist world. He intimated that his government would agree to resumption of talks only if: (1) all Chinese forces were withdrawn from Korean territory; (2) North Korean Communists were disarmed; (3) North Korea was granted full and equal representation in the ROK National Assembly through an election to be observed by the United Nations; (4) the UNC set a time limit, perhaps 10 days, within which the Communists must agree to these terms or talks would be terminated.³

Ambassador Muccio pointed out to Secretary Acheson that Rhee's blast reflected no change in "his basic adamant dislike [of] any cease-fire settlement." He suspected that President Rhee's motives were to sabotage the negotiations and prevent resumption of the talks.⁴

Talks resumed, however, despite President Rhee. By early November the establishment of the demarcation line along the line of contact was being considered. At this point Ambassador Muccio called on President Rhee to explain to him the reasons behind the compromise. Dr. Rhee seemed resigned to this but did remonstrate briefly that it would be difficult to have Communists south of the 38th parallel and that it was "stupid" to believe that they would honor any kind of settlement. While careful not to oppose the armistice too strongly, ROK leaders nevertheless continued in November and early December to make public statements showing great anxiety that an unfavorable armistice would eventuate. Mass meetings took place and official press releases poured forth statements in opposition to leaving "millions" of Koreans north of the line of contact. There were expressions of "unalterable opposition" to bringing "additional unfriendly national representatives" into Korea. South Korean spokesmen called for the release from the North Korean Army of all impressed ROK soldiers, and insisted that there be no exchange of any forcibly impressed Koreans, and that all kidnapped ROK civilians be returned. These demands were of course completely in line with UNC policy.⁵

At the beginning of 1952 Ambassador Muccio again reported to the Secretary of State on President Rhee's behavior, saying that the Korean President "becomes increasingly exacerbated at each indication [that] armistice may eventuate." His anger was increased by a lack of public response to his calls for "spontaneous" demonstrations against a cease-fire. When a prominent US Catholic dignitary, Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York, visited Korea, President Rhee enjoined him in the presence of Ambassador Muccio and General Van Fleet to "ask every Catholic in the United States to pray that there will be no cease-fire."⁶

Secretary Acheson reminded President Rhee in January of the importance of mutual UN/ROK cooperation. President Rhee protested to Ambassador Muccio that there had never been any doubt of ROK cooperation but that the ROK had to have a voice in any decision affecting its future. He could not simply turn Korea over to the United Nations. As a result, Mr. Muccio cautioned Washington that it would be better to try to inspire and lead the ROK than to try to drive it.⁷

In a letter to the US Secretary of State on 16 January, the ROK Foreign Minister expressed strong opposition to the forced repatriation of any Korean or Chinese POWs. Among North Koreans, he added, only “indoctrinated Communists or incurable Communist sympathizers” should be surrendered. The Chinese should be given a choice of returning or going to Formosa for economic reasons. South Korea could not support them indefinitely. He concluded by pledging full support to the United Nations and the United States.⁸

President Rhee continued to denounce the prospective armistice. In a public address on 28 January in Seoul he blamed General Walker for “our withdrawal” from North Korea in late 1950. General Walker had avoided fighting, President Rhee charged, because he had feared that resistance might cause the outbreak of a third world war. Turning to the armistice talks, he declared that the UNC was trying to end the war by making concessions and that Korea would have no assurance of peace or security until the Chinese forces were completely expelled from Korean territory. The Korean people must fight until this was accomplished—just as they had succeeded in defeating all attempts to impose trusteeship on them following their liberation in 1945.⁹

Elements of the ROK Government normally considered moderate and responsible, according to Ambassador Muccio, began joining in the antiarmistice chorus. On 13 February, Acting Prime Minister Ho Chong, in a press conference, charged that the UNC had displayed a “humiliating attitude” and had made a series of concessions, “yielding to arrogance and insults of the traitorous Communists.” At the same time the ROK National Assembly adopted a resolution calling on General Ridgway to “correct” the “inexcusable concessions” that he had already made (in yielding control of the mouth of the Han River and in failing to insist on the exchange of ROK civilians) and warning him not to accept forced repatriation.¹⁰

The ROK point of view was communicated to Admiral Joy at close quarters on 17 February when General Yu, the ROK member of the UNC delegation, predicted that the Communists would merely sign the armistice, then build up their air force and bring in Chinese from Manchuria again to try to conquer the ROK. His thesis was that with a little more effort the UNC could drive the enemy back to the Sinanju-Hungnam line. He added that the UNC had already made too many concessions, notably with respect to the demarcation line.¹¹

Because the statement came from a member of his own delegation, Admiral Joy was particularly concerned. “While it is believed that General Yu’s statement was made primarily for self-protection and in order to place himself on the record, his attitude appears to be indicative of that of the officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea,” the Admiral noted. Fearful that public statements of this nature might endanger the negotiations, he suggested to

General Ridgway that pressure be brought "at the highest level" to prevent such occurrences.¹²

In fact, methods of influencing the ROK President were already under consideration. On 14 February, representatives of CINCUNC and Eighth Army met with Ambassador Muccio to discuss ways of counteracting ROK propaganda against the armistice. As a result of their deliberations, Ambassador Muccio recommended to the State Department that the UN Secretary General be asked to address a letter to President Rhee on the general subject of ROK cooperation, to be followed by a strong letter of support from the Secretary of State.¹³

Secretary Acheson responded that it was not considered advisable to involve the Secretary General of the United Nations at that time, since it would hardly be appropriate for him to criticize a Head of State. Too, such action might denigrate ROK prestige in the eyes of many member nations and lessen their willingness to continue supporting the ROK. The Department of State favored instead a firmly worded letter from President Truman. If this did not work, however, the approach through the Secretary General might be tried.¹⁴

Ambassador Muccio had taken action on his own initiative to dissuade the ROK President from his arbitrary and one-sided course against the armistice. At a meeting in mid-February he accused President Rhee of instigating supposedly "spontaneous" demonstrations against a cease-fire. The ROK President became "hot under the collar" and insisted that his government would never accept a cease-fire, adding that President Truman should be told that he was "mistaken" in trying to negotiate with the Communists.¹⁵

From Tokyo, General Ridgway warned that the activities of the ROK Government, if continued, might "gravely endanger" the attainment of an armistice or handicap subsequent political discussions. Some of President Rhee's statements, he continued, sounded like threats to withdraw ROK forces from the UN Command if an armistice were concluded. General Ridgway pointed out that the original assignment of ROK forces to CINCUNC's operational control had been limited to "the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities," and he wanted a firm agreement with the ROK Government ensuring control of ROK forces while the armistice was in effect. He did not believe that a letter from President Truman would bring the ROK Government around, unless it reached a sufficient number of high ROK officials or was publicized. "ROK reaction to hysteria of leaders could precipitate a crisis in Korea," General Ridgway stated.¹⁶

In a reply prepared by the State Department and approved by President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured General Ridgway on 27 February that Washington officials were agreed that ROK compliance with any armistice agreement was vital. But they were not inclined to raise the question of control over ROK forces mainly because of the highly emotional and unstable state of ROK opinion. "We feel," the message continued, "that [the] most effective way of handling the problem is to intensify efforts to keep ROK in line during armistice negotiations, to present ROK with armistice as a *fait accompli*, and then take strongest measures to ensure ROK compliance." The most effective such measure would be to make it clear to President Rhee that keeping his forces under the UNC was the price of continued UN support.¹⁷

A letter of warning from President Truman to the ROK Government was drafted by officials of the Department of State, who conceived the idea of having it delivered in person by a special representative of the President, a man of commanding prestige. They suggested for this purpose the choice of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, who had commanded the US Pacific Fleet during World War II, then became Chief of Naval Operations, and, after his retirement, had served the United Nations in an effort to settle the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when consulted, recommended against the choice of a military man, and the President therefore decided to transmit the letter through Ambassador Muccio.¹⁸

In his letter dated 4 March, President Truman was explicit. Regretfully, he told President Rhee, he found it necessary, as Chief Executive of the nation charged by the UN with exercising the unified command in Korea, to bring up again a matter dealt with in his previous letter of August 1951. The "increasing frequency" of attacks by ROK officials upon the efforts of the UNC to bring the fighting to an "honorable and satisfactory conclusion," wrote President Truman, portended the "most serious consequences." He gave assurances that the UN action in Korea had been motivated by the "deepest concern" for the security of that country and that this would continue to be the aim of the US Government. But he added the following warning:

The degree of assistance which your Government and the people of Korea will continue to receive in repelling the aggression, in seeking a just political settlement, and in repairing the ravages of that aggression will inevitably be influenced by the sense of responsibility demonstrated by your Government, its ability to maintain the unity of the Korean people, and its devotion to democratic ideals.¹⁹

Other means were also used to induce the ROK to moderate the campaign against the armistice. General Ridgway, in a letter to the ROK National Assembly, defended the UNC against the charges made by that body. The agreement on Item 2, he pointed out, had specified that the entire Han River would be open to the shipping of both sides; repatriation of ROK civilians from NK territory remained an objective; and there would be no question of surrendering the 40,000 or so ROK citizens who had been drafted into the NK Army and then captured by the UNC. He went on to chide the South Korean legislators for "the lack of confidence which seems to prevail among responsible circles in your country with respect to the UN armistice negotiators who represent me at Panmunjom."²⁰

A representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Andrew W. Cordier, called upon President Rhee in mid-March. He was told that the ROK desired a security guarantee similar to those given by the United States to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan. President Rhee himself related to Ambassador Muccio the substance of this conversation. In doing so, he created the impression that he was quite pleased by evidence that he was succeeding in keeping other countries guessing. Near the end of March, however, the Ambassador reported that efforts to modify President Rhee's behavior had been at least temporarily successful; for the past two weeks there had been no "intransigent or distorted"

ROK statements on the armistice. But, he added, efforts should continue, since in the past the ROK Government had been quiet about the armistice during periods when negotiations appeared deadlocked.²¹

That the letup in attacks on the negotiations was indeed temporary became evident on 10 April, when, according to a newspaper report, a "high-ranking ROK Government official" announced that the ROK would veto any armistice signed under "dishonorable circumstances." He charged that the ROK delegate at the armistice did not actually represent his country, since his appointment had been decided by the UNC and the ROK Government had given him no instructions.²²

President Rhee himself spoke out again on 14 April. "I cannot understand the sentiments of those who believe cease-fire talks will succeed," he said. "I am still opposed to any cease-fire which leaves our country divided. No matter what arguments others may make, we are determined to unify our fatherland with our own hands."²³

Political Crisis in South Korea

While the ROK attitude toward the armistice was troublesome, it did not match in seriousness the sudden political storm that broke in South Korea shortly after General Clark assumed his commands. This crisis, which for a time threatened not only the armistice but even the conduct of military operations, was caused almost entirely by President Rhee. The volatile ROK President would tolerate no political opposition. Yet such opposition not only existed, it persisted. President Rhee's autocratic methods were deeply resented by many Koreans, particularly by the members of the nation's only legislative body, the National Assembly, which, under the ROK constitution, elected the President. Facing another election in the summer of 1952, President Rhee realized that his chance of reelection by the Assembly was slim. Characteristically, he decided to change the constitution to provide for a popular general election, hoping that he could be elected through his ability to sway public opinion. When his substantial opposition in the National Assembly refused to agree to the constitutional change, President Rhee declared martial law in the Pusan area, where the seat of government lay, and arrested some members of the National Assembly on obviously false charges of treason and complicity with the Communists. In declaring martial law and suspending civil rights, he pleaded military necessity and claimed the support of General Van Fleet, whose forces had recently been fighting guerrillas in the area. President Rhee also fired key members of his cabinet. The US Army provided asylum for the deposed Prime Minister in a hospital, while the former Vice President was granted refuge on a US Navy hospital ship.²⁴

These arbitrary actions drew protests from the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). President Rhee, however, replied firmly that he stood for the "will of the people." General Clark was also seriously alarmed and urged General Van Fleet to visit the ROK President and try to persuade him to moderate his actions and policies. In a message to

Washington on 27 May, General Clark denied that General Van Fleet had suggested the imposition of martial law in Pusan. He added that there was evidence that President Rhee intended to request the withdrawal of ROK troops from combat for use in the Pusan area. "Such a request will not be honored by Van Fleet," General Clark promised.²⁵

President Truman demonstrated his displeasure by calling home Ambassador Muccio for consultations. Following Mr. Muccio's departure on 25 May, General Van Fleet called upon President Rhee, accompanied by General Lee Chong Chan, Chief of Staff of the ROK Army. The ROK General protested to the President over the actions that had been required of ROK troops in Pusan under the control of the commander there. General Lee balked at having his forces used "for political purposes as a private army." President Rhee accused his Chief of Staff of disloyalty and threatened to relieve him but relented when General Van Fleet pronounced such action "absolutely unacceptable." The President insisted, however, that martial law must remain in effect "a short while longer."²⁶

About the same time, UNCURK officials also visited the ROK President to demand the lifting of martial law and the release of imprisoned assemblymen. Dr. Rhee informed them that he had obtained agreement from General Van Fleet that martial law should be continued. Questioned on this matter by the Acting US Ambassador, General Van Fleet denied that he had agreed; on the contrary, he asserted, he had strongly urged the lifting of martial law.²⁷

To be ready for contingencies in the Pusan area, General Clark alerted one Army RCT and one Army infantry regiment in Japan for emergency movement to Korea "to maintain order and to ensure the continuity of supply to Eighth Army." One US battalion in the Pusan area was alerted to protect US installations, and plans were made to use all US service troops in an emergency. General Clark also considered sending US Navy ships to Pusan harbor if the situation became critical in southern Korea. He authorized General Van Fleet to "take such action as necessary to ensure the free and uninterrupted flow of supplies" to his forward units.²⁸

US Embassy officials, after seeing the ineffectual nature of UNCURK's protests, took the "firm position" that even if martial law were lifted, assemblymen would still be at the mercy of high-handed government action or mob violence. They were convinced that further protestations by UNCURK or by US military or diplomatic officials would have no effect. They favored much stronger measures, including an ultimatum demanding release of assemblymen and full protection of them and their families from mob violence, with protective action to be taken by UN forces if the ROK Government did not accept the ultimatum. Embassy officials also suggested that the Department of State "needle" the UN Secretary General to give full support to UNCURK.²⁹

The Department of State was not yet ready to support such drastic action. On 30 May the Embassy, acting on instructions from Washington, delivered a brief note to the ROK Government supporting UNCURK and urging the lifting of martial law. But stronger measures were under discussion in Washington, and on the following day General Clark received further instructions from General Collins. State and Defense officials, according to General Collins, were "seriously

disturbed" by the crisis in South Korea and wished to give complete support to the efforts of UNCURK and of the US Embassy to end the crisis and restore constitutional processes. Accordingly, General Clark or, at his discretion, General Van Fleet, in consultation with the embassy, was to discuss the situation with Syngman Rhee "within the next few days" if the embassy had not meanwhile received a satisfactory reply to the note of 30 May. General Clark was to "bring home to Rhee in [the] strongest terms" the serious effect of the crisis upon the military operations of the UNC. He would warn the South Korean President that other member nations, in protest against his actions, might withdraw their support and render the situation intolerable for the UNC. General Clark would further protest martial law as unnecessary and harmful, and point out his serious concern over the impact of the continuing disunity on antiguerrilla operations in the Pusan area.³⁰

In accord with these instructions, General Clark decided to call on President Rhee, in company with General Van Fleet, on 2 June in Pusan. Informing Washington officials of his intention on 31 May, he warned that it might be necessary "to tolerate actions by Rhee which are abhorrent and to endure embarrassing political incidents precipitated by him." CINCUNC did not want to become involved with official protests against nonmilitary actions, which should be handled by other departments of the US Government. When, however, President Rhee's actions did begin to affect the military situation, he was fully prepared to take whatever steps were required. There were two possible courses at present: (1) continue to urge Rhee to moderate his action in the "forlorn hope" that he would listen to reason or (2) take over and establish some form of interim government. General Clark intended to follow the first course for the time being; if the second became necessary, further guidance from Washington would be required.³¹

Forecasting possible contingencies, General Clark postulated that President Rhee might try to use the ROK Army and the National Police for his own political purposes. CINCUNC planned to assure the Chief of Staff, ROK Army, that under such circumstances the UNC would support him completely in keeping the ROK Army on its primary combat mission. If individual units defected, he would withdraw their logistic support and block their movement, although for such action the Eighth Army would require immediate and strong reinforcement. The only combat troops immediately available were in Japan, and there were no military government specialists in the theater. Under existing rules, General Clark could not remove troops from Japan for use in Korea. Even if the rules were changed, removal of more than one RCT would jeopardize his primary mission, the defense of Japan. But even if President Rhee ignored the US Government and the United Nations and shattered "some of the democratic ideologies which we hold dear," the UNC must not take hasty action or make idle threats. "We do not," General Clark concluded, "have the troops to withstand a major Communist offensive, to regain uncontested control of prisoners of war on Koje-do, and to handle major civil disturbances in our rear at the same time." Therefore, the UNC must swallow its pride until President Rhee, through his "illegal and diabolical actions," had created a militarily intolerable situation. At that

point General Clark would muster all his forces, establishing martial law or military government if necessary, and take steps, as directed by the US Government, to correct the situation.³²

The Rhee government continued to be defiant. In a bitter reaction to UN criticism, a spokesman for the ROK threatened that UN agencies would be ousted from Korea unless they stopped "interfering" in his country's internal affairs. Korea, he added, was not a "stooge" for the United Nations. On the morning of 2 June, President Rhee met with his cabinet and told them that unless the assembly approved his constitutional amendment, he would dissolve it by noon of the next day. At the same time, he sent a formal reply to UNCURK, charging that "well-known Communist underground leaders" who had recently been captured had "confessed that some of the Assemblymen are in league with the Communists."³³

On the afternoon of 2 June, Generals Clark and Van Fleet met with President Rhee as planned. CINCUNC pointed out the dangers of the situation and warned that the enemy might well take advantage of the existing confusion by launching a major attack. In reply, President Rhee, as General Clark reported later, "positively assured us most emphatically that there would be no disturbances nor would he permit any action to be taken that would jeopardize the battle in any way." He defended his actions, however, on the grounds of his duty to "comply with the will of the people," and spoke of a Communist plot which he had forestalled. He expressed fear that the United States might be building up the Japanese Army to "take over in Korea" after US troops were withdrawn. Following this unproductive meeting, General Clark advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that

until such time as we are forced to take drastic military action, pressure should be exerted on Rhee through diplomatic channels. I am also convinced that I cannot take any partial action such as offering protection to National Assemblymen without causing an upheaval which might require us to assume complete control, which we can ill afford to do.³⁴

On 3 June President Truman addressed another letter to his South Korean counterpart in which he expressed anew his deep concern. "I am shocked at the turn of events during the past week," he wrote. It would be, he continued, a "tragic mockery of the great sacrifices" made in Korea if changes in the political structure of the ROK could not be "carried out in accordance with due process of law. Therefore, I urge you most strongly to seek acceptable and workable ways to bring this crisis to an end." Referring to President Rhee's threat to dissolve the National Assembly, President Truman asked that no irrevocable action be taken before Ambassador Muccio returned to Korea.³⁵

President Truman's letter did prevent President Rhee from going ahead with his plans for dissolution of the assembly.³⁶ But he denied that there was any real problem. "The current political disturbance here is not as serious as a small group of opponents . . . are endeavoring to make it appear," he wrote President Truman on 5 June. There was, he admitted, some danger of a confrontation between the general public and the members of the National Assembly, "some of

whom insist on electing the President by themselves." But even though he was under great pressure from the people to dissolve the National Assembly, he was still seeking means to avoid having to do so. "I humbly beseech you to be more patient," he concluded.³⁷

Although President Rhee backed down from his threat to dissolve the assembly, he continued to achieve his purpose through maintenance of martial law, keeping the members in prison and threatening more arrests and physical violence to them. Members were afraid, with good cause, to come out of hiding and no quorum of the assembly was possible. The functions of the body were effectively suspended.³⁸

More important for the military situation, the President through his Defense Minister, relieved five top-ranking officers of the ROK Army on 5 June. General Van Fleet, concealing his knowledge of President Rhee's involvement, protested the dismissal, making clear that the United States was not prepared to accept such an arbitrary and far-reaching action, which would have a serious effect on military operations. President Rhee disclaimed any knowledge of the matter and assured General Van Fleet that the officers would be reinstated. General Van Fleet believed that the ROK Army leaders would remain loyal to the UNC if real trouble developed.³⁹

General Clark, in his message to Washington on 31 May, had indicated his conviction that, as the UN Commander, he should not attempt to put pressure on the ROK President except on matters that affected the military situation. In a message to General Clark on 4 June, in which they examined the issues involved, Secretaries Acheson and Lovett agreed that political issues should be corrected by political means if possible. But in the present crisis, they wrote, political and military factors were "clearly interrelated." Admittedly the main burden of dealing with President Rhee must rest with UNCURK and with diplomatic representatives. However, they considered it "imperative" that CINCUNC's "prestige and influence" be used to the "greatest extent feasible in presenting strong unanimity of views." President Truman's recent letter, they believed, had created a situation in which "continued firm representation" to the ROK President might bring about a solution of the crisis through "compromise reconciliation between groups," which was the immediate objective of US policy. Care must be taken, however, to avoid any impression of a divergence between US political and military officials, which President Rhee would be quick to exploit. "We hope you will continue close and active cooperation and consultation with the United States Ambassador in Korea and with UNCURK in order to advise them and provide them with full support, short of active military intervention," concluded the Secretaries.⁴⁰

After Ambassador Muccio returned to Korea early in June, he met with President Rhee and urged him to agree to a compromise, as did the members of UNCURK. All efforts were unsuccessful, however. The President continued to insist on a change in the constitution, repeated his charges of a Communist plot, and refused to release the assembly members. Mass demonstrations in support of his position continued.⁴¹

With the situation worsening, Ambassador Muccio proposed on 14 June that Generals Clark and Van Fleet take a more active part in bringing pressure to bear on President Rhee. Apparently he believed that the time had come for a threat of UNC military intervention. Reporting this suggestion to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Clark indicated his disagreement. Both he and the Eighth Army Commander had given full support to diplomatic efforts and would continue to do so. But until the situation deteriorated "to the point where military operations might be placed in jeopardy," General Clark believed that "no direct threat of UNC military actions" should be made or implied. Such a threat might adversely affect the attitude of the ROK Army, which thus far had been unwavering in its loyalty to the UNC.⁴²

But the prospect of military intervention was moving closer, as neither the President nor his opponents showed any inclination to compromise. On 18 June Ambassador Muccio warned the State Department that intervention would have to be "seriously considered" if any of the following occurred: an "irrevocable political act," such as the dissolution of the assembly or further mass arrests of its members; President Rhee's sudden mental or physical incapacity; attempts by the police to take control of the country; any interference with the ROK Army; or an outbreak of serious violence. If intervention became necessary, it should be carried out by the ROK Army on orders from the UN Command, transmitted through Eighth Army. It was essential that both the military and the political authorities have a complete understanding of objectives and tactics in case of intervention, and the Ambassador recommended that he and General Clark discuss these matters.⁴³

General Clark believed that he was not authorized to hold such discussions with the Ambassador, since he had received no clear guidance on the nature of emergency action to be taken. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Clark that these proposed discussions came within the intent of guidance furnished in the State-Defense message of 4 June and expressed the view that such talks might be beneficial.⁴⁴

The possibility of intervention was considered in Washington and on 25 June a directive prepared by the State Department, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and cleared by President Truman was sent to CINCUNC and to the US Ambassador. The two officials were instructed to confer "earliest" to prepare and submit plans for military and political action if intervention became necessary in order to prevent interference with UN military operations. Whether or not to involve UNCURK in this planning was left to their discretion. It was expected that implementation of any intervention plan would normally be by decision of the President, but if emergency required, CINCUNC would be authorized to act on his own initiative. A general outline of the plan was presented, beginning with a demand to be served upon President Rhee jointly by CINCUNC, the Ambassador, and UNCURK. If the demand was rejected, CINCUNC would direct the ROKA Chief of Staff to assume command of all ROKA forces and to take control of the Pusan area. The authority and functions of the ROK Government would be preserved insofar as possible, and preservation of constitutional government and early restoration of civil power were basic to the plan. Use of

UN (non-ROK) forces was authorized if the situation required. In a separate message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCFE to use one division of the garrison of Japan for service in Korea.⁴⁵

General Clark had already instructed General Van Fleet to prepare a military plan for seizing control and establishing interim military government in Korea. He so informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 June, after receiving their directive, and suggested that, for the purposes of secrecy, coordination of his plan with the Ambassador be accomplished through meetings of staff officers. On an encouraging note, CINCUNC added that both he and General Van Fleet believed that the ROK Army and its Chief of Staff would be "completely loyal" to the UNC in the event of a showdown.⁴⁶

On 5 July General Clark notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he was having a plan prepared along the following lines: President Rhee would be invited to Seoul on a pretext. The UNC would then move on Pusan, seize his key supporters, set up protection for vital installations, and take control of the existing martial law through the ROK Chief of Staff. President Rhee would then be asked to proclaim the end of martial law, thus permitting freedom of action by the National Assembly. If he refused, he would be held incommunicado in protective custody, and the desired proclamation would be issued by the Prime Minister, who was expected to be cooperative.⁴⁷

Already, however, the situation in South Korea was improving, and General Clark was able to report that he did not expect to have to carry out his plan. The principal reason for the improvement was that the ROK President had obtained his goal; the National Assembly on 3 July had approved the constitutional amendment providing for popular election of the President. At once Dr. Rhee began releasing those assembly members who had been imprisoned. Martial law was ended on 28 July. The election was held in August, and Rhee was reelected by a landslide vote. He continued to pose a problem for the United Nations Command, but the immediate crisis faded away.⁴⁸

Strengthening ROK Forces

The continuation of combat, with the consequent drain on US manpower, and the prospect of an eventual cease-fire, followed by departure of UN forces from Korea, encouraged a careful study of the ROK armed forces and their future development. It was obviously desirable, if possible, to enlarge and strengthen these forces, especially the ROK Army, so that they could assume a larger share of the fighting or take over full responsibility for South Korea's security after an armistice. But the record of the ROKA had been spotty at best. Moreover, too rapid expansion would overtax the supporting resources of the South Korean economy and outstrip the supply of military leaders. It was probably these considerations that had led General MacArthur, shortly before he was relieved, to express opposition to the creation of additional units for the ROKA. Soon thereafter, however, the ROK Government, undaunted, sought US assistance in dou-

bling the size of the ROKA, from 10 to 20 divisions. South Korea's UN representative passed to General Bradley a request that the United States arm and equip 10 additional divisions, to be commanded by US officers. President Rhee transmitted a similar request to President Truman on 24 April 1951.⁴⁹

Apparently as a result of these requests, General Collins on 26 April 1951 questioned the new CINCUNC, General Ridgway, on the availability of ROK military manpower, the possibility of training and organizational changes to improve ROK Army effectiveness, and the feasibility of placing American officers in command of ROK units. General Ridgway, whose experience as Eighth Army commander had given him little confidence in the fighting qualities of the ROK Army, took a negative stand. He told General Collins on 1 May that the long-range expansion of the ROK Army was under study, but that no additional ROK divisions should be given US equipment until existing units had improved their battlefield performance. Neither he nor General Van Fleet wanted US officers commanding ROK units because of the language barrier and because they would have no inherent authority to administer discipline to troops of another country. The basic problems in expanding the ROKA were lack of proper training and the complete absence of qualified ROK military leaders. Creation of a truly effective ROK officer corps would be a time-consuming process, but it was, said General Ridgway, "the first and prime consideration."⁵⁰

Nevertheless, the national policy toward Korea approved by the President on 17 May 1951 looked toward an expansion of the ROK armed forces. One of the provisions of NSC 48/5 proclaimed that the United States should "develop dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of the UN forces there."⁵¹ This policy was only a few days old when President Rhee issued a startling announcement that if the United States would only equip his already well-trained army, US troops could be withdrawn from Korea. CINCUNC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were distressed by this misleading—indeed, mendacious—statement and urged action to prevent any repetition. At Secretary Marshall's behest, the Department of State instructed Ambassador Muccio to convey to President Rhee "in the strongest terms" the concern felt by the United States over such utterances.⁵²

In mid-July US Army authorities again queried General Ridgway on the methods and the length of time required to make the ROK Army "completely effective." CINCUNC had not changed his view that the ROK Army was deficient in competent military leaders, commissioned and non-commissioned. An officer corps of professional competence was the "absolute sine qua non" of any military organization. None existed in the ROK Army, and the creation of such a corps would be lengthy and difficult. General Ridgway warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States could not afford to get into an arms race against the Soviet Union by trying to build up a satellite army to match the Communists. "We can never," he stated, "equip and continually support enough ROK divisions to enable them to be completely effective against the numbers of North Korean, Chinese Communist or Russian divisions which can be pitted against them."⁵³

To make the existing 10 ROK Army divisions “completely effective,” General Ridgway believed, would require at least three years—perhaps only two if the fighting stopped and a comprehensive and costly training system were set up. General Ridgway emphasized the need to modernize training for the ROK Army at all levels and to increase the number of US advisors. Equally important, continual pressure must be placed on the ROK Government to eliminate the “incompetent, corrupt or cowardly” ROK officers and government officials, at the same time not interfering with accepted Oriental methods of military discipline, which often appeared harsh and incomprehensible to Western leaders.⁵⁴

Even as he was pointing out these deficiencies and requirements, General Ridgway was suiting his actions to his words by intensifying efforts within his command to improve the training and supervision of ROK forces. The Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) had established within the ROK Army a Field Training Command. The slackened pace of fighting in Korea by mid-1951 made possible a more systematic and thorough training of individual soldiers and of organized units. The success of the program encouraged the establishment of three additional training camps, and specialized branch training was stepped up for artillery, infantry, and signal troops. A consolidated school, the Korean Army Training Center, opened in January 1951, provided training for 15,000 troops simultaneously. Heavy emphasis was placed on leadership skills. In the same month, the Korean Military Academy, to train and motivate company grade officers, had been opened. A Command and General Staff School for senior officers was established during 1951. Selected ROKA officers were sent to the United States for advanced military training. These measures were taken under the close supervision of KMAG. Increased requirements led to an expansion of KMAG by more than 800 spaces, to a total strength of 1,800 officers and men on 1 November 1951.⁵⁵

In July 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had urged upon the Secretary of Defense the importance of making ready for the political and diplomatic maneuvering that would probably follow an armistice in Korea.⁵⁶ Secretary Marshall had agreed wholeheartedly that this would be very important to a permanent settlement. On 18 August, in order to develop a US position on the military aspects of a posthostilities political settlement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (through the Department of the Army) called upon CINCUNC to furnish them more information on the buildup of both ROK forces and the forces of North Korea. Their questions were: (1) what should be the ultimate size and composition of the posttreaty armed forces of North Korea and of the ROK?; (2) what should be the timing for the two Korean forces to reach these objectives?; (3) how should US training assistance be provided to the ROK and to what extent?; (4) to what extent must the United States provide logistic support to ROK forces?; and (5) what should be the formula for timing in the withdrawal of CCF and UN forces?⁵⁷

General Ridgway waited almost two months before answering. His reply assumed the necessity for keeping a “tenable” UN position in Korea, following a cease-fire, until the enemy had shown beyond doubt that he had an “honorable intention” to keep the armistice. If a settlement was reached, the ROK must have forces strong enough to fight a successful delaying action against any new Com-

munist aggression until UN reinforcements arrived. General Ridgway foresaw no need for an increase in the ROK Army, estimating that the 10-division, 250,000-man force that he had previously recommended would be sufficient. The ROK also had a 66,000-man national police force which should be maintained at present strength pending stabilization of the internal situation of the ROK. There seemed no requirement for a postwar ROK Air Force; it should be integrated into the ROK Army to provide a close air support capability. Nor did General Ridgway believe that the ROK needed a Marine Corps in its peacetime structure. The ROK Navy might be needed for a time after the departure of US forces; ultimately, however, it should be converted to a coast guard. As for the forces of North Korea after a settlement, General Ridgway considered that the NK Army and police should be smaller than those of South Korea, reflecting the difference in population between the two countries, and that the NK Air Force should have no more aircraft than the number of planes in the ROKA.⁵⁸

The timing for reaching the ultimate size of ROK and NK armed forces could not be predicted. General Ridgway did stipulate that there should be no precipitate reduction of the ROK armed forces or of their supporting labor units; the rate of demobilization should be geared to the withdrawal of UN forces. Logistic support for all ROK forces would have to be furnished by the United States, except for food and clothing. KMAG should continue training assistance at about the current level. To withdraw all UN forces from Korea, even though ROK forces were built up, would be unwise. Representative UN forces should remain as a deterrent to the Communists.⁵⁹

Regardless of these practical objections to the quick expansion of the ROK Army, the possibility in late 1951 that an armistice might be achieved moved Washington authorities to press the issue. While the nature of posthostilities arrangements was uncertain, it was entirely possible that most UN forces would be withdrawn from Korea, leaving the main responsibility for defending against renewed Communist aggression to the ROK armed forces.

Acting Secretary of Defense William C. Foster renewed the issue on 10 November 1951 in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Although the decision has been made that there will not be a program of military assistance for Korea in the FY 1953 Mutual Security Program," he noted, "it would be helpful to me if I had your views concerning the nature of post-hostilities military forces for the Republic of Korea." He asked for their recommendations regarding the missions, size, and composition of these forces, based on the assumptions that: (1) hostilities in Korea would either have ended or be at a low level by FY 1953; (2) Korea would remain divided and at least some UN forces would still be in Korea by the end of FY 1953; (3) there would have been no political settlement; and (4) substantial quantities of military materiel would have been turned over to the ROK.⁶⁰

Presidential decisions of 20 December 1951 in NSC 118/2 gave new impetus to the ROKA issue. This new statement of national policy specified that, if an armistice was achieved, the United States would "intensify to the maximum practicable extent the organization, training, and equipping of the armed forces of the ROK, so that they may assume increasing responsibility for the defense and security of the ROK." If no armistice was achieved, the United States would

“develop and equip dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming eventually responsibility for the defense of Korea.”⁶¹

These were ambitious but by no means unattainable goals, in view of the relative strengths of the forces of the ROK and of North Korea. A comparison of the two (prepared in February 1952 by the JSPC) showed the ROK with an army of 250,000 men organized into 10 divisions, which it was hoped would eventually approximate US divisions in equipment and organization. The NK Army had about 225,000 men organized into 23 divisions, including one tank division; many of these, however, were understrength and when fully ready would approximate only two-thirds of one US division.

The ROK Navy had 16,000 men and 50 vessels—patrol boats, minesweepers and amphibious harbor craft. The North Korean Navy was described by the JSPC as “negligible.” One Marine division of 8,000 men formed part of the ROK Navy; the North Koreans had no comparable organization.

The ROK Air Force of 4,000 men had 17 F-51s, plus 29 other types of aircraft—light reconnaissance, cargo, and training. The NK Air Force was equipped with 90 YAK and LA fighters and 20 IL-10 light bombers.⁶²

General Ridgway reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 December 1951 that current planning as to the role of the ROK armed forces had to be based on some assumption as to what the United States would do if the Communists took advantage of a postarmistice withdrawal of UN forces by again attacking South Korea. He proposed that planning be based on the concept that the United States would intervene in Korea unless the Soviets attacked Japan. The reply from Washington was delayed and revealed some uncertainty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not concur that CINCFE could rely on US intervention. He was told to base his planning for ROK forces on NSC 118/2, which involved a decision that the United States might, but would not necessarily, renew its intervention in Korea if the enemy violated the armistice by military attacks. A firm decision would be made by the US Government at the time an attack occurred, they told him. CINCFE was “encouraged” to base his planning on the assumption of renewed US intervention.⁶³

On 23 January 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to Acting Secretary Foster’s memorandum of 10 November. They assured him that ROK forces were being retrained and equipped as rapidly as could be. When ready, existing ROK forces would constitute a “considerable deterrent” to any new assault by NK forces after an armistice. They would have the interim mission of delaying the attack until outside help could arrive. This limited interim mission was, in light of circumstances that would probably exist in FY 1953, more suited to ROK capabilities than more ambitious missions, such as deterring or repelling by themselves a renewed aggression by North Korean forces, or eventually assuming full responsibility for the defense of Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that ROK force goals for FY 1953 should be “on the general order” of those already in existence.⁶⁴

This JCS recommendation against a major increase in ROK forces was supported by a study of ROK requirements following an armistice that was carried

out by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. The JSPC concluded that, while the existing 10 divisions could be equipped with materiel already in Korea, worldwide requirements for US military equipment made it inadvisable to equip a larger force. Disagreeing with CINCFE, however, the JSPC recommended retention of the ROK Marine division and of the ROK Air Force as a separate service. Even a token air force would provide a basis for expansion if necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the JSPC conclusions to CINCPAC and CINCFE as "a planning study."⁶⁵

The study received a cold reception in Tokyo. General Ridgway, on 27 March 1952, reiterated his stand against supporting a ROK Marine Corps and ROK Air Force in the posthostilities period. "To keep up a Marine Corps and an Air Force cannot be supported by the ROK economy nor justified as a charge against ours," he asserted. Political reasons might justify a Marine element at present but it was certainly not essential after the fighting ceased, and it would duplicate existing ROK Army overhead and support provided at US expense. A ROK Air Force maintained at its current strength would be "ineffectual and extravagant." The Communists could train a North Korean Air Force outside of Korea that would be vastly superior to anything the ROK could achieve. If a new attack occurred, the ROK should rely on the US Air Force for close ground support. Money and equipment would be better expended on the USAF in the Far East than on the ROK Air Force.⁶⁶

CINCUNC firmly believed that the United States should tell the ROK that US military assistance was to be "confined to the exact purposes which we have specified." He recalled that, before the outbreak of the war in Korea, the United States had provided support for a 65,000-man army, but that the ROK had spread this out to achieve a force of 95,000 men. He now had received reports that the Chief of Staff of the ROK Air Force was intending to press for one-third of the total military budget of the ROK in order to attain a 300-plane force by 1955. Such an action would defeat the US purpose by providing a general way in which the ROK could get around US decisions and intentions. "All such support, whether direct military or indirect financial, comes from the US pocketbook and therefore both should be coordinated," General Ridgway concluded.⁶⁷

About the same time, however, the ROK received a burst of support from an unusual source. General Van Fleet told Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball, who was visiting Korea, that he favored doubling the size of the ROK Army by adding ten divisions. When Secretary Kimball reported this fact to the Army Policy Council, Army officials were puzzled by General Van Fleet's change of view and asked General Ridgway for an explanation. Himself surprised, CINCUNC sought an explanation from the Eighth Army commander, who explained that he now felt that the ROK was able and willing to supply the necessary manpower. Moreover, the United States could support ROK troops in Korea at less cost than its own. General Van Fleet concluded by referring General Ridgway to a recent magazine article in which, through an interview with a reporter, he had expressed his views on the ROK Army.⁶⁸

General Van Fleet's views notwithstanding, General Ridgway remained opposed to any 10-division increase for the ROK Army. The ROK, he believed, could not sustain these extra forces economically. The United States should give

priority to the development of Japanese forces. The new and intensive training program being conducted by KMAG had not yet begun to show results; thus it would be months before any new ROK divisions were effective, and meanwhile the United States would be bearing an unnecessary financial burden. As for the views of General Van Fleet, General Ridgway expressed high regard for that officer but added the conviction that his outlook reflected almost exclusive focus on the Korean situation, without proper consideration of the relation between aid programs for the Republic of Korea and for other Asian countries.⁶⁹

General Clark, who succeeded General Ridgway in May 1952, was firmly committed to an expansion of ROK forces. As he later described his viewpoint:

At the very first briefing conference I was given in Washington after my appointment to the command in the Far East, I got the feeling that we should build up the ROK Army to its maximum capability. I favored a military establishment in which the ground forces were predominant, but also believed we should do everything possible to create the nucleus of a navy and air force and expand them as technical skills of the Koreans permitted and as equipment became available.⁷⁰

This view was reflected in recommendations submitted by General Clark soon after his arrival in Tokyo. He endorsed the expansion of the ROKA to 362,946 men, in order to enable it eventually to assume the entire defense of Korea. "This expansion," he stated, "is based on military necessity, irrespective of ROK ability to support its own forces and irrespective of unilateral ROK plans." It was not intended, he added, to undertake a further increase in ROK strength after the armistice.⁷¹

On 19 June General Clark sought immediate approval to support 92,100 bulk ROK personnel (a part of the projected increase to 362,946), plus 19,458 additional men for six light infantry regiments to supplement the national police in maintaining internal security. He pointed out that the replacement system was turning out trainees faster than they could be used, as a result of the lower attrition rate following a slackening of combat activity. Also, some 30,000 disabled men were being carried on army rolls because the ROK had no organization to care for veterans. For various reasons, General Clark did not desire to cut back the capacity of the replacement system. He had already felt it necessary to activate some units not on the authorized troops list to augment the national police.⁷²

Four days later, General Clark, after a careful survey of the battlefield situation and discussions with General Van Fleet, recommended a further expansion of the ROK Army to 415,046, with two additional divisions. He had found his defensive lines very lightly manned in some sectors, and an expansion of the ROKA seemed to provide the only hope for building up his reserves. "These additional forces," he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "not only would substantially increase the number of Asiatics fighting Communism and effect a corresponding reduction in American casualties but would considerably increase the flexibility of Eighth Army for subsequent operations." General Clark had been "favorably impressed" with the individual ROK soldier and with the performance of ROK units. The ROK replacement system was fully adequate to support a 12-division

force. The proposed increase would apply to wartime strength only, he added; there would be no change in the proposed peacetime troop basis.⁷³

On 30 June 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after considering another report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, reaffirmed the existing posthostilities goals for the ROK: An Army of 10 divisions and 250,000 men and other Services (Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) of approximately their present size.⁷⁴ Neither they nor the Department of the Army took any action at that time on General Clark's requests for an immediate wartime increase in the ROK Army. These, however, were to be approved several weeks later, following another visit to Korea by General Collins.⁷⁵

Biological Warfare Charges against the UNC

Early in 1952 it became apparent that the Communists, having been balked at the peace table, had decided to step up the intensity of their propaganda activities. The opening round in this new campaign was fired by Soviet Ambassador Malik, in a speech before the UN General Assembly in Paris on 2 February. He assailed the "Anglo-American bloc" for having actually started a third world war. In the course of his tirade, he seized upon and repeated a charge made earlier by North Korea that UN forces had used "toxic gases" spread by "bullets."⁷⁶

Insofar as the charge of gas warfare had any basis in fact, it may have stemmed from precautionary instructions given the UNC several months earlier by General Ridgway to prepare for defense against chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) attack. In any event, the accusation was taken seriously in Washington, where it was considered a possible warning that the enemy himself was preparing to use poison gas. In point of fact, the UNC could not have launched gas warfare at that time; strict orders against keeping deadly gases in the Far East Command (FECOM) had long been in effect.⁷⁷

Scarcely had the alarm over this incident faded when another equally false and disturbing charge—one that was to receive much greater emphasis and to gain far wider credence—was launched against the United States. Official broadcasts from P'yongyang and Peking in late February accused the United States of systematically dropping large quantities of bacteria-carrying insects in North Korea between 28 January and 17 February. The charge was quickly picked up by the Communist press throughout the world, with variations added to the theme. The United States was accused of firing bacterial agents by artillery and of dropping infected flies, diseased snails, and rodents by plane. The UNC took note of the charges and, in a bulletin issued on 27 February, characterized them as "fallacious."⁷⁸

By the first week in March the enemy propaganda mill had moved into high gear and Secretary of State Acheson felt compelled to dignify Communist charges with a denial. He told a press conference on 6 March that the Communist accusations were "entirely false." He ascribed them to a plague of epidemic pro-

portions in North Korea which the enemy, unable to control, wanted to blame on a handy scapegoat, the United States.⁷⁹

On the next day the Peking radio reported that in the week from 28 February to 5 March more than 400 US planes, in 68 separate flights, had dropped insects and diseased vermin over Manchuria along the frontier and in the Liaotung Peninsula in an effort to spread cholera, typhus and bubonic plague. Chinese Premier Chou En-lai took to the air waves on 8 March to broadcast a special "warning" to the United States. In effect, he served notice that US pilots who invaded China and used "bacteriological weapons" would be treated as war criminals. The United States, he said, must bear full responsibility for invasion of Chinese territory, the use of biological warfare, and the murder of Chinese people by indiscriminate bombing and strafing attacks.⁸⁰

General Ridgway told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4 March that, while the charges of germ warfare had started as general propaganda, they were now being reduced to specific charges. He suggested three possible motives for this unusually vitriolic propaganda program. The enemy might merely be manufacturing propaganda, either for home consumption (to arouse his people against the United Nations) or to sway world opinion. He might be putting up a smoke screen to conceal his inability to control epidemics in his territories—recurrences of diseases that had always existed there. Most ominously of all, the enemy might be establishing justification for biological warfare when it appeared advantageous. There had been no intelligence indicating enemy intention to employ biological warfare, but it was known that both the USSR and China had the necessary capabilities and had carried on extensive research in the field. General Ridgway added that, whether or not the issue of biological warfare was raised at the conference table, no statements on the subject would be issued from his theater without his clearance.⁸¹

From Washington, there appeared "increasing indications" that the Chinese Communists were becoming wrapped up in their own propaganda and that responsible officials in China were giving credence to their own false charges. Representatives of other Asian nations in Peking were also tending to believe the charges and the propaganda was now having some effect in Asia outside China. For these reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Ridgway on 7 March to make "prompt, vigorous and categorical denial" of germ warfare if the question arose at Panmunjom. Moreover, while they approved of his plan to have all public statements on the subject issued by his headquarters, they suggested that he instruct subordinate commands to issue "categorical denials" to inquiries on the subject, instead of taking refuge in noncommittal "no comment" replies.⁸²

In a letter to the Chairman of the ICRC in Geneva, Secretary Acheson denied that the United States was engaging in biological warfare and asked the ICRC to investigate the epidemic in North Korea. The ICRC agreed and on 12 March offered to the North Korean and Chinese Governments a full scientific investigation of health conditions in North Korea, provided it were given free access to that country. In the meantime the ICRC had received official protests from the national Red Cross societies of Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.⁸³

Almost concurrently the Secretary General of the United Nations received an unsolicited offer from the World Health Organization (WHO), pointing out that a plague in North Korea threatened other countries as well and offering technical assistance in controlling any such epidemic. Washington officials saw this offer as a good chance to put the enemy on the spot. If he refused he would be discredited, his charges would appear false, and it would appear he did not consider the welfare of his own people; if he did accept the offer, it might afford a chance to get medical aid to UN prisoners. However, in order to avoid injecting the issue into the truce negotiations, the State Department proposed to suggest that WHO communicate directly with North Korea and Communist China, as the ICRC had done; the UNC would express its support and agree to facilitate the entry of WHO teams into North Korea if the Communists accepted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred this proposal to CINCUNC, who concurred. Accordingly the United States informed the Secretary General that it supported the WHO offer, which was then made through appropriate channels to the Chinese and North Korean Governments. Neither, however, acknowledged the offer.⁸⁴

In the meantime Ambassador Malik kept up a sustained tirade against US "germ warfare." With reference to the role of the ICRC, he ridiculed that body as a Swiss national group that could not be relied upon for an impartial investigation. The US Ambassador, Warren Austin, labeled Malik's charges as "monstrously false."⁸⁵

Photographs in the *Peiping People's Daily* on 15 March purporting to show evidence of US germ warfare were widely disseminated. They showed handfuls of "diseased" insects dropped by the United States. Another portrayed what was asserted to be a "germ bomb." Scientific and military experts refuted these claims as "completely fraudulent," noting that the "germ bomb" was, in fact, the same type of bomb used by the US Air Force to drop propaganda leaflets on North Korea.⁸⁶

Premier Chou En-lai's threat to try US airmen for war crimes was a matter of serious concern in Washington. General Vandenberg, who was particularly alarmed, suggested that General Ridgway be directed to issue a strongly worded denial of the germ warfare charges coupled with a warning that the Communist would be held responsible for fair treatment of prisoners. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this suggestion and secured the approval of the Department of State and the President. They then discussed it with General Ridgway, who drafted a statement to be used for the purpose. This was approved, with some changes, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; they sent the final version to General Ridgway on 20 March, authorizing him to release it. On the following day, however, General Ridgway pointed out that, during a recent press conference in Korea, he had issued a vigorous denial, "authorizing direct quotes." His words had been widely disseminated, and it appeared "pointless" to make further statements. He recommended instead that the proposed statement be sent to the US delegation at the United Nations, where it could be used at an appropriate time to counter any further Soviet allegations. He himself planned no personal statements on the subject unless ordered to make them.⁸⁷

During April the ICRC again appealed in vain to North Korea and Communist China to allow an investigation in their territories of the charges they had made. The enemy meanwhile had expanded his campaign by alleging that the United States had tested its germ warfare weapons on Communist prisoners at Kojedo.⁸⁸

The Communists played their trump card on 5 May when they produced confessions from two US flyers, shot down the previous January, that they had dropped "germ bombs" over North Korea. Secretary Acheson promptly lashed back with a verbal counteroffensive, calling the germ warfare charges a "crime." The wording of the confessions, he pointed out, made it obvious that they had been dictated by the Communists and signed under duress. Nevertheless the enemy continued to trumpet the charges. President Truman felt it necessary to enter a personal denial on 28 May, saying that "there isn't a word of truth" in the accusations. Several days earlier, General Ridgway, addressing a joint session of Congress before traveling to the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), to take over his new command, had castigated the Communists. "No element of the United Nations Command has employed either germ or gas warfare in any form at any time," he told the assembled Congressmen.⁸⁹

In a vain attempt to call the Communist's bluff, the Deputy US Representative to the United Nations, Ernest A. Gross, presented a draft resolution to the Security Council on 18 June that would bring a full investigation of germ warfare charges by the ICRC and international scientists. The Soviet veto in the Security Council on 3 July made the fate of that resolution a foregone conclusion.⁹⁰

By this time the Communists had apparently decided that the germ-warfare theme had served its purpose and had begun to subordinate it to a new charge, that of UNC "atrocities" against POWs. Nonetheless the magnitude of the enemy propaganda campaign created difficulties beyond the capability of the UNC to handle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized this fact in a message to General Clark on 5 June 1952. They described the Communists as engaged in a worldwide "hate America" campaign of an "intensity, ferocity, and vulgarity" comparable to that directed at Germany at the height of World War II. The new dominant theme, mistreatment of prisoners, was falling on "receptive ground" owing to the effect of the news of the Kojedo incidents and the deadlock in peace negotiations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that two measures had been tentatively approved in Washington to assist the UNC:

(1) An interdepartmental watch committee would be established, to provide the UNC with a flow of information on trends in Communist propaganda and its effect on public opinion around the world, and to receive and evaluate suggestions from the UNC regarding public statements or other actions that might be taken in Washington.

(2) Two high-ranking specialists in psychological warfare, one from State, the other from Defense, would be loaned to the UNC as temporary advisors.⁹¹

General Clark welcomed these suggestions and asked that they be carried out as soon as possible. Accordingly, on 13 June the Department of the Army informed him that the interdepartmental committee had already been established and that the two psychological warfare specialists would soon depart for the Far

East. The committee began operating on 16 June, sending daily cables of information and advice to UNC. It was made up of members from the Department of State (one of whom served as chairman), Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, which was concerned with psychological and unconventional warfare), and the psychological warfare branches of the three Service Departments.⁹²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained concerned over the Chinese threat to try captured pilots as war criminals. On 20 June they repeated to General Clark a suggestion made earlier to General Ridgway, that he be prepared to issue a statement demanding humane treatment for UNC prisoners. The text of such a statement was agreed upon by General Clark and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but fortunately the enemy threat was never carried out.⁹³

Confrontation on Repatriation and the Package Proposal

In the armistice negotiations, the UN package proposal of 28 April and the enemy's counterproposal of 2 May, as described in the preceding chapter, had narrowed the disagreement to a single issue. The UNC had conceded on the question of airfield rehabilitation; the enemy had agreed to yield on the composition of the NNSC, but only on condition that the UNC abandon the principle of voluntary repatriation. Thus the question of repatriation was the only obstacle to an armistice. The UNC was committed too strongly to nonforcible repatriation to change its course. Unfortunately, the Communists seemed committed just as strongly in opposition. There was little room for maneuver on the issue; each side was reduced to petty tactical ploys of little real substance, while watching for shifts or weakening in the other side's position. An important element of each side's negotiating strategy appeared to be to influence world opinion through propaganda. The UNC counted heavily on the moral issue of nonforcible repatriation; the Communists sought to profit from the violence and turmoil within the POW camps, where their fanatical captives seemed deliberately to invite martyrdom.

The plenary delegations had been meeting in executive session since 28 April, but by mutual agreement they shifted to open sessions on 8 May. The Communists at once seized the opportunity to castigate the UNC for "measures of mass massacre" allegedly perpetrated in POW compounds and ridiculed the "so-called screening" carried out there.⁹⁴

Washington officials recognized the danger that the enemy might gain a propaganda advantage in these sessions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff specified on 9 May that the UNC delegation should present the UNC position "in clear, emphatic terms," in an endeavor to keep the enemy on the defensive. At each session, the delegation should reaffirm its willingness to allow an impartial screening of POWs, as provided in the 28 April package proposal, and should emphasize the "reasonableness" of this proposal. Such a course of action, they believed, would

afford the UNC a "strong and positive issue commanding worldwide support and forcing the enemy into an increasingly weak position propaganda-wise."⁹⁵

CINCUNC at once objected that to restate the UNC position and argue in its favor would "lead to substantive discussion of the POW issue" and would be interpreted by the enemy as weakness and willingness to compromise. So far, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the UNC delegation had scrupulously followed earlier JCS instructions to avoid substantive discussion of the individual elements of the package. General Clark recommended that the UNC delegation be allowed to continue this practice and that propaganda be conducted through the press and other media.⁹⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceived no conflict between their earlier instructions and their directive of 9 May and believed that the intent of the latter had been misinterpreted by General Clark. Instructions to avoid debate on individual points of the package proposal were still in effect, they told him. These instructions did not mean, however, that the delegation could not—and indeed it should—restate its firm position, in whole or in part, whenever appropriate. To reiterate the proposal for impartial rescreening would not, in their opinion, strike the enemy as a sign of weakness and would, in fact, capitalize on the strongest aspect of the UNC position. The delegation need not engage in substantive debate of the entire POW issue.⁹⁷

Admiral Joy reported to General Clark on 12 May that the Communists evidently had no intention of accepting the UNC package any time soon and that they were using the meetings "solely as a propaganda vehicle." In effect, the enemy had "laid down a challenge" to the UNC, either to back up its statement that the package proposal was "final" or to compromise the POW issue. It was time to face the challenge squarely, he believed. "A determination must be arrived at to risk the onus of a possible breakoff of negotiations in a final effort to achieve an armistice," wrote Admiral Joy. He urged that he be authorized to "announce unilaterally" a suspension of the meetings until the enemy was ready to accept the 28 April proposal without substantive change. General Clark agreed completely with this recommendation and asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to grant him the authority to suspend the talks.⁹⁸

Washington officials turned down this request. In a message on 16 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the possible advantages of a unilateral suspension of the talks. However, they added, the disadvantages of such action were "overriding in terms of need for continued domestic and international support for UNC." This support had already been "confused and unsettled" by UNC handling of the prison camps, and a breakoff in the negotiations could not be risked. Moreover, unilateral suspension would place the enemy in the position of having to take the initiative to resume the talks and would inevitably make it more difficult for him to concede to the UNC position on the POW issue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw a continuation of the negotiating sessions as providing an "excellent opportunity" to force the Communists increasingly onto the defensive and to exploit the "present strong worldwide support" for the UNC position. The UNC should exploit the enemy's vulnerability through "full and appropriate statements at every session," emphasizing the following themes: (1) screening had been

entered into in good faith with the tacit approval of the Communists, and screening procedures had been scrupulously fair; (2) the impartial UNC rescreening proposal was a direct refutation of Communist accusations of forceful retention of POWs; and (3) the Communist were seeking to compel the UNC to jeopardize the lives of POWs by insisting on the use of force and violence to return prisoners against their will.⁹⁹

Almost immediately, developments occurred at the negotiating table that appeared to bear out Admiral Joy's warning. On 17 May Admiral Joy, in accord with the JCS instructions, reviewed the proposal of 28 April in the "sincere hope" that further explanation might advance the negotiations. It was quite apparent, he said, that the enemy did not "understand the nature or the fairness" of the proposal. The enemy delegation replied by assailing the proposal and returned to the favorite theme of "inhuman" treatment of prisoners by the UNC. Nevertheless Admiral Joy detected a reaction of "gratification and relief" that the UNC had "apparently relaxed its firm and adamant attitude." He was convinced that the UNC faced a long period of enemy propaganda releases. Admitting that he was not in position to appraise the political problem of retaining the support of public opinion, the Admiral believed that the only way to convince the Communists of the finality of the UN position was through a "display of determined strength," (i.e., suspension of the meetings). However, since this course had been rejected, the next best alternative was to avoid substantive discussion of the package proposal and continue to extol the fairness of the UNC position. Admiral Joy's conclusions were passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who replied on 18 May that they were being considered at the highest level.¹⁰⁰

Plans for Communist Prisoners

Meanwhile the continuing crisis in the UNC prisoner of war camps that was furnishing Communist negotiators with such valuable propaganda was far from over. Koje-do, the principal camp, held some 80,000 prisoners, including hardcore extremists. Should they try seriously to break out, the present enclosures were not strong enough to hold them, nor were there enough security troops on the island. General Clark feared that his nullification of General Colson's agreement might cause the Communist high command to order a general uprising inside the prison camps. "I consider that the Koje-do situation is highly sensitive and potentially dangerous," General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 May. He was that day deploying the 187th ABN RCT to Koje-do as a "necessary precaution." He intended to gain uncontested control of the island and the RCT loomed large in plans then being made for this action by General Van Fleet.¹⁰¹

Of the prisoners on Koje-do, 39,484 wanted to return to Communist control, while 43,403 remained unscreened. Pusan Enclosure 10 held 3,500 unscreened prisoners. General Clark, through prison officials, had informed prisoners that he was preparing a roster of those to return to Communist hands; there would be no

screening, and unless prisoners turned themselves in voluntarily they would be returned. As of 16 May only four prisoners had surrendered to guards to avoid repatriation.¹⁰²

The plan for gaining control of the prisoners, developed by the Eighth Army commander and approved by CINCUNC, called for dispersing those on Kojedo by building new enclosures there and on another island (Cheju-do), and also on the mainland if necessary. The enclosures would hold 4,000 prisoners each, in eight separate compounds, and would be adequately separated and protected. Movement to new enclosures would begin in about two weeks and be completed about three weeks thereafter. General Clark anticipated prisoner resistance ranging from simple disobedience to serious violence. His forces would use measures of increasing severity, up to the use of non-toxic gases and physical force, to overcome any resistance to the dispersal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this plan. They suggested that, for political reasons, he consider the use of an international force of POW guards but left the decision to him.¹⁰³

General Clark's plan for breaking the deadlock in negotiations, as described to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 May, was to give up individual screening and to inform the Communists as soon as possible, through liaison officers, that approximately 80,000 prisoners would be returned to them and that rosters containing at least that many names would soon be available. If the Communists accepted the 80,000 figure, he would go ahead and submit rosters. If both sides accepted the revised rosters, the UNC would then repatriate all POWs and civilian internees (CIs) whose names had appeared on the lists submitted to the enemy. General Clark wanted to release a statement clarifying the UNC screening procedure at the same time that he gave the 80,000 figure to the enemy. He asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve his plan.¹⁰⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff refused to do so. To tell the Communists that they could expect 80,000 prisoners instead of 70,000 (the figure given earlier) would not, in the JCS view, better the chances of an agreement and would strengthen enemy allegations that the initial screening had been improper. The Communists would probably delay even longer, waiting for a further increase. The "strong general support" for the UNC on the POW question would be weakened by the doubt cast on the validity of the initial screening. They instructed General Clark to tell the enemy that 70,000 was the best available estimate of those who would voluntarily return to his control; that the UNC had no desire to keep any prisoner who wished to return, and any prisoner who, after an armistice, stated his desire to return would be allowed to do so; that the UNC had repeatedly offered to allow impartial rescreening after an armistice, but it would never agree to use force to repatriate prisoners.¹⁰⁵

In the light of these instructions, General Clark informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 May that he was holding his plan in abeyance and would go ahead and complete the screening of POWs on an individual basis. The relocation of prisoners to smaller compounds under close UN control would, he hoped, make it possible to complete the process without difficulty and thus to compile a final, definitive list of prisoners willing to be repatriated.¹⁰⁶

CINCUNC and Washington Ponder Strategies

Admiral Joy was still not happy with daily meetings. On 19 May the senior negotiator warned General Clark that the UNC "could not make a worse tactical error than to continue daily plenary sessions." He again asked authority to suspend negotiations, reasserting his belief that the unwillingness of the UNC to take this step had convinced the enemy that the UNC position was not really firm.¹⁰⁷

Before a reply could be made to this request, Admiral Joy's tour of duty came to an end. He was detached to take an assignment as Superintendent of the US Naval Academy. His replacement was Major General William K. Harrison, Jr., USA, who had been a member of the delegation since January. At the last session he attended, on 22 May, Admiral Joy told the enemy delegation: "After 10 months and 12 days I feel that there is nothing more for me to do. There is nothing left to negotiate. I now turn over the unenviable job of further dealing with you to Major General William K. Harrison who succeeds me as Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command delegation. May God be with him."¹⁰⁸

On the following day the new senior delegate, General Harrison, after a fruitless exchange of statements, proposed a recess. The Communists agreed and insisted that the UNC set a date for the next session, whereupon he suggested 27 May. Following the meeting, General Harrison told a reporter that the UNC had taken the position "for some time" that daily meetings at Panmunjom were not needed unless the Communists "offered something constructive instead of bitter denunciation."¹⁰⁹

Did General Harrison's action violate the JCS instructions of 16 May forbidding the UNC unilaterally to suspend the talks? General Clark, after reading the record of the meeting of 23 May, acknowledged that the "spirit and intent" of the instructions appeared to have been violated. But, he added, "in light of the negotiating position in which the UNC delegation found itself at the time, it is believed General Harrison's act was to the best interests of future negotiations." The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this conclusion and authorized similar action in the future if the circumstances so required, provided that an interval of not more than three or four days resulted between sessions.¹¹⁰

General Clark had in fact already given General Harrison interim authorization to propose a three or four days' recess if placed in a position where the UNC had to set the date for the next meeting; however, he added, an effort should be made to avoid this situation. Reiteration of the firmness of the UNC position at subsequent meetings "should be as emphatic as applicable instructions will permit. . . . The difficult negotiator [sic] position in which applicable instructions place the delegation is appreciated," concluded General Clark.¹¹¹

Resumption of talks on 27 May brought only more propaganda and invective. The enemy proposed to recess until the next day and General Harrison agreed. Thereafter, at the suggestion of the enemy, daily sessions were resumed.¹¹²

Typical of what the UNC had to endure was a statement by the enemy delegation on 29 May charging the UNC with "inhuman, brutal and barbarous methods, including maltreatment, confinement, starvation, torture, shooting, strafing,

forced writing of blood petitions, forced tattooing and forced fingerprinting," in addition to four large scale massacres. The Colson letter was cited in support of the charges. "Our side firmly rejects your sanguinary and barbarous proposal of April 28," Nam Il stated.¹¹³

General Harrison continued to press for a change in his directives. In a message to General Clark, he again stressed that continuation of daily sessions led the Communists to conclude that the UNC position was not firm, besides affording them an opportunity to issue propaganda. Statements in rebuttal extolling the UNC stand, released in conformity with JCS instructions, had no visible effect on the enemy; moreover, being repetitious, they had no news value and thus had little effect on public opinion. The themes prescribed for these statements were purely defensive in nature and hence were hardly likely to enhance public support. In sum, concluded General Harrison,

I not only consider that our propaganda role is inimical to the early attainment of an armistice but I consider that our continuous meetings provide the Communists with opportunity to prolong the stalemate indefinitely while using the plenary sessions as a forum for disseminating vicious propaganda whose purpose is to create dissension among the United Nations and discredit the UNC position.¹¹⁴

General Clark backed his senior delegate completely. On 31 May he insisted that "the only hope for an armistice on our present terms lies in convincing the Communists that our position is firm and final," by accepting the enemy's "challenge" to terminate the negotiations. Current procedures had failed to produce an armistice, and there was no evidence that they would ever succeed. The Communists had a decided propaganda advantage in the form of a controlled press through which they issued charges, slanders, and false statements. The UNC replied with factual statements, but repeated arguments in support of the established UNC position had no news value and thus accomplished nothing toward building public support. They could only be given suitable impact by being publicized at governmental level.¹¹⁵

The entire UNC delegation, continued General Clark, agreed that the time had come to make "firm plans for unilateral suspension of the talks." He proposed to continue sessions as at present, meeting as infrequently as possible, during the preparation of a "firm, final, and accurate figure" of POWs and CIs to be returned to Communist control. The rosters might be compiled either by completing the screening of prisoners or simply by listing for return all those prisoners in compounds controlled by the Communists. The new figure would then be presented to the Communists and to the press, with a statement that it did not represent a "new proposal" but merely replaced the "previous approximate figure of 70,000." If, within one week thereafter, the enemy did not agree to the package proposal, the UNC would unilaterally declare a recess awaiting enemy acceptance. General Clark asked to be allowed to follow this course of action at his discretion.

If the proposed procedure did not succeed, General Clark considered it "doubtful whether any further progress could be made at this level." As a final

effort, however, he saw a possibility of using "circuitous channels" to plant the idea that the UNC might agree to sign an armistice on presently agreed terms, excluding the repatriation issue. If the enemy could be induced to make such a proposal, the UNC would agree to turn over responsibility for prisoners, including their ultimate disposition, to a group of neutral nations.¹¹⁶

Replying on 5 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged General Clark's analysis as "most helpful." As before, however, diplomatic considerations led them to withhold approval of his recommendations. They laid out in detail Washington's main considerations in formulating courses of action for future negotiation. While the United States continued to receive strong support domestically and internationally (notably from India) for its stand on nonforcible repatriation, the outbreaks on Kojedo had undermined allied confidence in the validity of the earlier screening. Some allies had suggested that "pressure factors" on individual POWs had operated to inflate the number opposing repatriation. Even before Kojedo had erupted, some countries had pressed the United States to change its offer of an impartial screening after the armistice to a prearmistice screening, with both sides agreeing to abide by the results. The US reply had been to the effect that such a proposal would be disadvantageous for the UNC and that the Communists would probably not agree, but that if the timing of the screening became a major barrier to agreement the United States would consider prearmistice screening. Regardless of the "logic and reasonableness" of the UNC position, it seemed clear, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that "our principal allies" would not support a unilateral suspension of negotiations until the United States had made and the Communists had rejected an offer of prearmistice screening or until "some other new element" had been introduced into the situation.¹¹⁷

Moreover, any unilateral UNC suspension would be seized upon by the Soviet Union to exploit wavering opinions among US friends and allies. It might allow the USSR to move negotiations into the Security Council, which would be under Soviet chairmanship during June. It would provide a means to link other questions with a Korean settlement, thus confusing and dividing those nations supporting the US position on Korea. As a final factor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Clark of faint hints through diplomatic channels that the Chinese might agree to resolve the POW issue if they were assured of a figure of about 100,000 repatriates. Clearly, the number of Chinese POWs to be returned was much more important to the Communists than the number of North Korean POWs.

Any future measures taken by the UNC, continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should aim to accomplish two goals: (1) contribute toward achievement of an armistice or, if negotiations failed, make unmistakably clear that the issue involved was nonforcible repatriation, not the "entirely subsidiary question" of the validity of UNC screening methods; and (2) restore allied confidence in the validity of UNC screening, to retain allied support for US policy if an armistice was not achieved. One line of action under serious consideration involved an impartial, sample screening by neutral nations, either with or without Commu-

nist participation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed ways in which this might be done and the consequences that might ensue. In any case, the admitted disadvantages of prearmistice screening, as compared with the UNC proposal for rescreening after an armistice, did not outweigh the desirability of achieving an armistice.

Pending General Clark's comments on the suggestion for neutral rescreening, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deferred a decision on the procedure he had suggested on 31 May. However, they had no objection to meeting only every three or four days. Even if the enemy did not agree, the UNC delegation might occasionally tell the enemy, without explanation that it would be unable to meet for two or three days.¹¹⁸

General Clark conceded in reply that rescreening by neutral nations offered a "possible chance" to get a fair armistice. He was insistent, however, that such action not endanger early completion of the initial screening that had been interrupted by the prisoner outbreaks. He had begun action on 10 June to gain uncontested control of Kojedo, with first priority being the separation of anti-Communist and Communist prisoners. The completion of initial screening of all POWs and CIs would allow him, if the Communists accepted the UNC package proposal, to proceed at once to an exchange of prisoners on the basis of a final roster, which at present did not exist. Moreover, the UNC would have a "final accurate figure" of the number to be repatriated. It was possible that this figure would be significantly higher than the original estimate of 70,000 and thus more acceptable to the enemy. Finally, completion of the initial screening program would in no way jeopardize agreement on a subsequent rescreening by neutrals. General Clark had made preparations for completing the initial screening as soon as Kojedo came under control, and he asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve his program.¹¹⁹

As for rescreening by neutral nations, General Clark saw no objection. Of the alternative methods suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Clark favored those that did not provide for Communist participation in any role. He doubted, however, that the enemy would accept neutral rescreening as a basis for an armistice. He believed that the Communists were "fully aware" that the UNC screening had been impartial and that the 70,000 figure was not likely to be modified by any subsequent rescreening. Moreover, they had repeatedly denounced the very idea of screening, and had thus worked themselves into a position from which they would find it difficult to agree gracefully to any kind of screening.

General Clark then set forth his thoughts on how the rescreening should be handled if it were undertaken. The UNC would propose in plenary session that a group of observers from neutral nations, designated on a bilateral basis, observe the process. Before it began, both sides would agree to abide by the result and to conclude an armistice on that basis; a cease-fire would be declared; and the MAC and NNSC would be established. Both sides would have observers during the rescreening. Safeguards would be provided to ensure the return of the maximum numbers of UN POWs held by the Communists.¹²⁰

On 13 June the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the light of the prospect that the prisoner compounds would soon be brought under control, authorized General Clark to complete the initial screening program. He was to do so, they added, without regard to the possibility of subsequent rescreening by neutrals.¹²¹

At the conference table, meanwhile, the UNC delegation had taken advantage of the permission granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recess the talks and continued to do so throughout the month of June. The Communist side objected strongly to these actions. On the first such occasion, on 7 June, when General Harrison announced that his delegation would not return to the table until 11 June, the enemy sent a letter of protest to General Clark, who referred it to Washington. In a reply drafted by General Collins and approved by the State and Defense Departments as well as by President Truman, CINUNC informed the Communist commanders that there was no requirement for daily meetings; if either side desired a recess, there was no reason for the other side to object unless it had some new proposal to present. The UNC would continue to meet "at such times as practicable," and always when the other side indicated there was some hope of making progress. "My delegation will be available at all times to examine with your delegation any honorable means which will ensure that no POW of either side is forcefully repatriated against his freely expressed will," General Clark concluded.¹²²

Following subsequent "walk-outs" by the UNC delegation on 17 and 27 June, General Clark assured General Harrison that his conduct of the negotiations "meets with my complete accord." He asked, however, that if possible, he be informed in advance before the UNC declared a unilateral recess. In accord with his policy of allowing the delegation "maximum leeway," General Clark removed his previous requirement for a 7 to 10 day interval between unilateral recesses. He added that this action did not imply a desire for more frequent recesses; it was simply a means of giving General Harrison "additional latitude in your commendable conduct of the negotiations."¹²³

During the negotiations between recesses, the UNC delegation deployed a new verbal weapon intended to blast the enemy out of his entrenched defense of the literal application of the Geneva Convention. On 21 June General Harrison told the Communist negotiators that the principle of voluntary repatriation had been put into practice by "a nation for whom your governments have upon occasion expressed great admiration." On two occasions during World War II—at Stalingrad in 1943 and at Budapest in 1944—Soviet military commanders had promised that German troops, if they surrendered, would be allowed to return to their own country or to any other country of their choice. Moreover, continued General Harrison, the second of these instances had later been praised as "an act expressing the highest act of humanitarianism" by the prestigious Institute of Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Momentarily shaken by this attack from an unexpected quarter, the enemy delegates fell back on a stubborn restatement of their position and a counterattack in the form of a repetition of the "atrocities" charges. In subsequent meetings, they dismissed the Soviet examples as inapplicable in the present situation.¹²⁴

Release of Civilian Internees

The United Nations Command was holding about 27,000 ex-POWs who had been reclassified as civilian internees and so reported to the ICRC. All of these had stated that they did not wish to return to Communist control. In February 1952 General Ridgway had told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he meant to hold these people until the plan for their release could be included in the overall plan for releasing all prisoners.¹²⁵ General Clark, however, saw no reason for retaining them and some advantages to releasing them. He consulted his senior delegate and General Van Fleet, who agreed with him. The principal arguments advanced against release of civilian internees—that it might disrupt the negotiations or lead to retaliation against US/UN prisoners in Communist hands—were considered invalid by General Harrison. Statements by enemy negotiators suggested to him that the reclassified prisoners were of relatively little interest, and if the enemy really wanted an armistice, General Harrison believed that the 70,000 prisoners included in the 28 April package proposal would by themselves constitute sufficient incentive for the release of the 12,000 UN prisoners. The enemy would certainly use the release for propaganda purposes, but General Harrison believed he had plenty of material for his machine anyway and could manufacture more at will.¹²⁶

Informing the Joint Chiefs of Staff of these views on 5 June, General Clark added that President Rhee had repeatedly made “strong representations” for the release of the civilian internees. Their continued imprisonment had been a constant source of irritation to the ROK people and Government. Too, their release would reduce the logistic burden on the UNC and free personnel for other duties. General Clark was even then preparing a plan to accomplish the release of these civilian internees. He considered that he had full authority to do so without Washington’s approval but told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “in view of the effect such action might have on armistice negotiations request your views soonest.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in principle with the release but stipulated on 10 June that they wanted to review his plan before he carried it out.¹²⁷

Two days later CINCUNC submitted the general plan for release of the civilian internees. About 10 days after the go-ahead had been given to Eighth Army, release of about 27,000 civilian internees located at Yongch’on and at Enclosure 10 at Pusan would begin. The release schedule would be coordinated with the ROK and would depend largely on the ability of the ROK to receive the internees. General Clark envisioned that at least 60 days would be required to finish the job in an orderly manner. The Commanding General, 2d Logistical Command, would be responsible for transporting the internees to release points and with supporting them en route. The UN Civil Affairs Command (UNCAC) in coordination with the ROK Government would furnish each released person rations for 30 days. General Clark cautioned that release of these men, if started before the completion of the contemplated screening, could influence a greater number of unscreened POWs and other civilian internees to remain with the UNC in the hope that they too might obtain early release. Therefore he would aim, if possible, to complete the screening program prior to the release of the

civilian internees. He concluded by asking for approval of immediate implementation of his plan. This was granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 June "when you deem appropriate." However, they added, the Department of State had suggested that no public announcement be made and that publicity be held to an absolute minimum.¹²⁸

The suggested suppression of news on the release struck General Clark as "wholly unrealistic." Newsmen would turn to the ROK Government for their information, he predicted, and would file stories that were distorted and filled with half-truths. Wide ROK propaganda press coverage could certainly be anticipated and might result in stories from US newsmen that could prove embarrassing or even detrimental to the armistice negotiations. General Clark urged that he be authorized to issue official press releases and to allow normal press coverage. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved his request on 16 June.¹²⁹

On the next day CINUNC instructed General Van Fleet to carry out the release plan, nicknamed Operation HOMECOMING, as soon as practicable. A press release explaining exactly what was being done, and why, was distributed by the UNC on 22 June. Release of the first civilian internees was accomplished on 30 June, when a shipment of 1,800 internees left Yongch'on for their homes in South Korea. The enemy delegation at Panmunjom had been told that the CIs would be released and had made protests, which were ignored.¹³⁰

Control and Screening of Communist Prisoners

Steps to establish firm control over the prisoners went into effect on 10 June when movement of prisoners from pro-Communist compounds began on Koje-do under the direction of the newly appointed Camp Commandant, Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner. There was some resistance, centering in Compound 76, which had to be overcome by US troops armed with tear gas and concussion grenades. One soldier was killed and 14 wounded; casualties among the prisoners amounted to 31 killed and 139 wounded. When Compound 76 was finally cleared of its 6,000 prisoners, the other compounds were segregated without further resistance or violence. The extent of the prisoners' preparation was shown by an inspection which uncovered homemade weapons including 3,000 spears, 1,000 gasoline grenades, 4,500 knives, and a large number of clubs, hatchets, barbed wire flails, and the like. In one compound, the bodies of 16 murdered POWs were discovered. By the end of the month, however, all the prisoners had been dispersed into new compounds holding only 500 men each. In July a new command, Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ), was activated and relieved Eighth Army of responsibility for POW camps and other rear area activities.¹³¹

After the unruly prisoners were brought to heel, it was possible to complete the screening process to determine the precise number willing to be repatriated. On 22 June General Clark reported to Washington the procedures that would be used. Each compound would receive a complete orientation on what was to happen. All unscreened prisoners would report for identification and headcount but

none would be forced to answer questions on repatriation unless he desired to do so. After fingerprinting and positive identification, each prisoner would be asked if he wished to answer questions on repatriation. If he declined, no questions would be asked him. If he assented he would be questioned to determine whether or not he would forcibly resist repatriation. All prisoners would be informed again of the Communist amnesty offer made on 6 April over Radio P'yongyang. Upon completion of interviews, each prisoner would immediately be placed in the group of his choice, those refusing to answer questions going to the group for return to the Communists.¹³²

The process began on 23 June and was completed four days later without incident. By that time, a total of 169,944 prisoners had passed through the screening program since its inception. The results were as follows.¹³³

	<i>Willing to return</i>	<i>Unwilling to return</i>
North Koreans	62,347	34,196
Chinese	6,550	14,251
South Koreans	4,689	11,622
Civilian Internees	10,136	26,153
Total	<u>83,722</u>	<u>86,222</u>

The number of those willing to be repatriated—83,722—was approximately 20 percent higher than the preliminary estimate of 70,000 that had been submitted to the enemy. It remained to be seen whether the difference was great enough to induce the Communists to accept the UNC package proposal—to settle for the return of the 83,722 and apply the principle of “no forced repatriation” to the 86,222 others.

The Search for Feasible Options

The Military Standoff, 1952

Armistice negotiations continued against a backdrop of relatively static combat conditions during most of 1952. After the limited UN offensives of July–October 1951, action died down and both sides began to dig in, influenced probably by a belief that an armistice was not far off—a belief sharpened by the agreement reached in November 1951 on the line of demarcation. The absence of heavy offensive action persisted even after the expectation of an early peace was disappointed. Commanders on both sides realized that ground fighting on a scale sufficient to change the battle lines materially would cost too much. They therefore contented themselves with probing and patrolling on the ground, meanwhile consolidating and strengthening their defenses. By the end of the winter of 1951–1952 the lines had been fortified in depth, and the war had settled into a pattern somewhat resembling that of World War I. The most significant ground action during these months was carried out by the ROK Army against guerrillas in southern Korea, an action that broke the back of the guerrilla movement. UNC air and naval forces also remained active. But these UNC operations had little effect on the bargaining positions at the negotiating table.¹

The attitudes of the Eighth Army commander and CINCFE toward expansion of tactical operations were reflected in an assessment by General Van Fleet at the end of 1951. General Ridgway had asked for his plans for tactical operations during the next few days. He had no plans for such operations, General Van Fleet replied. His defensive positions could be held “under armistice conditions,” but General Van Fleet concluded that “benefits to be gained from minor attacks will not, in my opinion, justify the cost.” Unspoken was the assumption that major attacks were out of the question with the resources then available.²

The UNC air interdiction program had slowed enemy logistics operations, lengthening the time necessary for him to move supplies and troops to combat areas. UNC air attacks had destroyed thousands of enemy vehicles and pieces of railway stock and forced diversion of large forces to protect LOCs. They had

placed increased demands on Soviet and Chinese production facilities. But interdiction had not kept adequate supplies from reaching enemy front line units. Nor, in General Ridgway's judgment, could it do so in the future, given his own limited air resources. He warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early January 1952 that the enemy could in time accumulate a stockpile of supplies in the forward areas. Improving enemy countermeasures and repair capabilities would increasingly nullify the UNC air interdiction program. Eventually enemy commanders could build up enough supplies to launch a major offensive, unless forced to use them in defensive actions. Should the interdiction program be discontinued or reduced, the enemy could within a relatively short time stockpile enough supplies to launch and maintain a major offensive.³

On 1 March 1952, General Ridgway, attempting to anticipate US governmental decisions in the event negotiations failed, analyzed his capabilities for major ground offensives. He considered only operations that would cause substantial damage to the enemy and inflict a severe defeat. "Seizure of terrain as an objective in itself," General Ridgway stated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "is not recognized as providing justification." His conclusions were as follows:

a. A major ground offensive in Korea, having as its objective large scale destruction of hostile personnel and materiel, would require acceptance of a serious risk of successful enemy counter-offensive, which could inflict heavy materiel and personnel losses on our own forces.

b. Even if our operations were successful and hostile counter-offensive, if launched, were defeated, the operations would still exact heavy United States battle casualties.

c. Employing all Theater forces available for this effort, except two United States divisions which I would retain in Japan, the operation, even though successful, could do no more than deal a hard blow to Communist Forces in Korea. It could not inflict a decisive military defeat.

d. Without substantial organizational reinforcement, a major ground offensive would offer too marginal a chance of success to justify its undertaking.⁴

General Ridgway's judgment, which was accepted by his successor and by their superiors in Washington, provided the rationale for limiting UNC military activity throughout the remainder of the war. It was buttressed by a study of enemy military capabilities completed in April 1952 by G-2, Department of the Army. Outlining the substantial improvements that the Chinese and North Koreans had made in their military capabilities since the armistice negotiations began, Army intelligence officials pointed out that from July 1951 to April 1952 the enemy had increased his military strength from about 500,000 to more than 860,000. This increase had been accompanied by significant qualitative improvements in armor, artillery, and unit firepower. The enemy had taken advantage of the long period of fairly static operations to improve his logistical position greatly. "As a result," the intelligence report stated, "the supply position, despite continued air and naval attacks, is far better than at any time since the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea." Enemy ground forces could now launch a major attack with little warning and sustain it for five to ten days.⁵

Whereas in July 1951 the Communists had had only 35 divisions in the forward and immediate rear areas, by April 1952 they were maintaining 51 divisions there. In the same period, enemy artillery delivery capability rose from 8,000 rounds to 43,000 rounds daily. When the negotiations began the enemy had virtually no armor in Korea; in April 1952 there were two CCF armored divisions, one NKA mechanized division and one NKA armored division, with a total of 520 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Enemy air strength had undergone a similar transformation, rising from a total of 500 aircraft to a total of 1,250 aircraft. Jet fighters had increased from 450 to 800, not counting 400 aircraft deployed in south and central China. From airfields in Manchuria, the enemy was capable of launching an air attack that could inflict "substantial damage" on UN forces and LOCs in Korea.⁶

Six weeks later, a report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee pointed out that enemy ground forces in the Far East amounted to a Chinese Communist Army of more than 3,600,000; an NK Army of 250,000 troops plus numerous irregular forces; and 33 Soviet divisions that could be employed in event of general war. Of these forces, more than 350,000 were in contact on line with UN forces, with an additional 154,000 being within operational distance of the front lines. Another 340,000 CCF or NK troops were believed to be in the enemy rear areas. UNC ground forces comprised six US Army divisions and one US Marine division, with supporting troops, for an aggregate of 259,400 men; 10 ROK divisions with limited organic artillery amounting to about 250,000 men; and 23 infantry type battalions, with supporting troops, furnished by other UN nations, amounting to 33,700 men.⁷

In late June General Van Fleet submitted to CINUNC a proposal to launch a limited objective attack by IX US Corps to seize a new line, DULUTH, extending across the Corps front north of P'yongyang, in central Korea. The purpose would be to occupy favorable terrain and to destroy enemy forces and materiel. General Clark turned down the plan on 25 June, citing "the sensitivity that attaches to the armistice negotiations and the probable number of friendly casualties." Too, it would be "unprofitable" to penetrate the enemy's heavily fortified line without subsequent exploitation. And finally, few reserves were available against the heavy counterattacks that would almost certainly follow.⁸

Bombing the Power Complexes

Seeking offensive measures within the power of the UNC if armistice negotiations failed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early April asked the Chief of Staff, USAF, to study the possibility of bombing the North Korean electric power complex. General Vandenberg passed the request to the Commanding General, Far East Air Force (CG FEAF), General O. P. Weyland, along with the results of a preliminary analysis that had pinpointed 11 electric power stations and two transformer and switching stations as the essential targets. The attack on these appeared feasible, General Vandenberg added; however, the existing JCS ban on

attacking targets along the Yalu would have to be removed (except for those within 12 miles of Soviet territory).⁹

General Weyland replied on 29 April that the attacks should be carried out in order to complement the air interdiction program. Destruction of power facilities would curtail the operation of many small enemy factories and repair shops scattered throughout North Korea, delay the rebuilding of the North Korean economy, and damage enemy morale. At the same time, however, General Weyland forwarded contrary views held by CINCFE, whose intelligence showed that the power complexes were used primarily for North Korea's civilian economy rather than for military purposes and that their destruction would not induce the enemy to accept an armistice. General Ridgway believed that these targets should not be attacked until the armistice negotiations had been broken off or were hopelessly deadlocked.¹⁰

General Ridgway spoke directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the matter on 3 May, when he pointed out that his forces were continuing photographic coverage of the hydroelectric installations but had not yet reached a firm opinion on their worth to the enemy. "I can see no unusual circumstances bearing on a decision to attack these North Korean hydroelectric installations which would necessitate the Joint Chiefs of Staff directing their attack," General Ridgway observed. The normal procedure would be for him to initiate a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "I recommend that no action be taken concerning the attack of these installations," he concluded, "unless recommended by me as a result of my continuous surveillance of these targets." The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that General Vandenberg's message (sent at their instigation) had been purely exploratory and that they contemplated no action except on CINCFE's recommendation.¹¹

When General Clark assumed command as CINCUNC, he reversed General Ridgway's stand. Searching for some means to place greater pressure on the enemy to break the deadlock on the prisoner issue, General Clark on 17 June instructed COMNAVFE and CG FEAF to attack all major hydroelectric facilities in North Korea (except for those on the Yalu, which of course could not be attacked on his authority). The attack was to be made as soon as possible, with CG FEAF as coordinating agent.¹²

Upon seeing General Clark's instructions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff not only raised no objections but went at once to the Secretary of Defense for permission to extend the attack to the Yalu River installations. On 19 June they told him:

In connection with operations in Korea, CINCFE has now ordered attacks against all major electric power installations in North Korea except for those located on the Yalu River. Inasmuch as the installation at Suiho, on the Korean side of the Yalu River, is the largest and most important of all North Korean hydroelectric plants, it is believed necessary that this installation also be attacked in order to effectively neutralize the entire system. . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the restriction on attacks against the Yalu River hydro-electric power installations be removed immediately in order that CINCFE may integrate attacks against the Suiho plant with operations against other North Korean electric power targets, if he so desires.¹³

The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President approved this request and on the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Clark he could bomb Yalu targets at his discretion, observing only the restrictions against attacks near Soviet territory. "Reasonable precautions will be effected," they added, "to minimize the danger of inadvertent bombing [of] Manchurian territory."¹⁴

Commencing on 23 June, US Navy and Air Force planes carried on a three-day intensive bombing of the North Korean hydroelectric power system, including the power plant at Suiho. Over 1,400 sorties were launched in these attacks. Suiho was badly damaged and 10 other plants put out of commission temporarily. A power blackout in North Korea lasted for two weeks and power supplies were only gradually restored.¹⁵

These attacks on North Korean power plants, especially on Suiho, raised a furor among US allies that surprised General Clark and Washington authorities. Secretary Acheson encountered French and British criticism at a trilateral meeting of foreign ministers in London, which he was attending at the time. Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France told of unfavorable public and legislative opinion in his country in the wake of the attacks. It was "highly desirable," in his opinion, that the conflict be contained within Korea, and he expressed concern over a recent statement by Secretary of Defense Lovett implying that the conflict might be extended. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden appeared upset because his government had not been notified in advance. The British Defense Minister, Lord Alexander, had visited General Clark only recently, but had been told nothing about these impending attacks. (Actually, Lord Alexander had left Korea before the attacks were authorized.) Sir Anthony pointedly noted a need for closer consultation on military actions that had "political intent" and suggested some sort of machinery to provide political guidance to the UNC.

Secretary Acheson replied that the electric plants were legitimate military targets and that extreme secrecy had been necessary to protect the UN forces involved in the operation. He assured the others that there had been no change in US policy. Secretary Lovett, he explained, had said only that if it became necessary to bomb beyond Korean borders to protect the security of UN forces, the decision would be made in Washington. The British Foreign Secretary accepted these assurances but added the hope that there would be "no more surprises."¹⁶

Whatever its military effects, the bombing of the hydroelectric plants did produce deleterious effects politically, serving to isolate the United States even further from its allies and from "neutral" members of the United Nations. There were open expressions of concern that the United States was committed to a policy of military irresponsibility. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, was "disturbed at the thought that the future of the United Nations and of war and peace might be decided without proper consultations, and might ultimately depend on the discretion of military commanders who would naturally think much more of local military objectives than of large questions affecting the world." The British Labour Party also criticized the attack. "I think it will lessen the chances of an armistice and may lead us dangerously nearer to a general conflagration in the East," said former Prime Minister Clement Attlee.¹⁷

Sir Anthony Eden's suggestion that CINUNC needed better political guidance was not pursued. The possibility of closer British association with the UNC had, however, been under discussion even before the attack on the power plants. On 9 June 1952 Lord Alexander, while in Hong Kong en route to Tokyo, had suggested in a press interview that a British representative be added to the armistice team. General Clark learned of this remark and requested guidance from Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consulting higher authority, answered on 11 June that the US Government did not favor the proposal but desired closer collaboration with the British, and they asked for his suggestions. In reply, General Clark submitted a proposal that he had already discussed with Lord Alexander (who had by then reached Tokyo), that a British general officer be assigned to the staff of UNC Headquarters. This suggestion was followed up and was approved by the US and British Governments. Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced to the House of Commons on 1 July that a British officer would be appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the UN Command. With the concurrence of CINCFE and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major General Stephen N. Shoosmith of the British Army, was chosen for the post; his appointment was announced in London on 28 July.¹⁸

Regardless of unfavorable reactions, and ignoring violent Communist protests, the United Nations Command continued and in fact accentuated the air attack on North Korean targets as a primary means of bringing military pressure on the enemy. During July and August, heavy raids against the North Korean capital of P'yongyang, for example, reduced that city to military worthlessness. Targets along the Yalu and, in one case, an oil refinery within eight miles of the Soviet border, were bombed during the summer and fall of 1952.¹⁹

Increasing Reliance on ROK Manpower

The continuing heavy drain on US manpower, and the need for sustaining or increasing the front line and reserve combat strength of UN forces, enhanced the importance of building up the strength of the ROK Army. In June 1952 General Clark had recommended a significant increase of the ROKA above its current authorized strength of 10 divisions and 250,000 men. He had urged expansion to 415,046, including 92,100 bulk personnel and enough additional men to activate two more divisions and six separate regiments.²⁰

These requests were held in abeyance until after General Collins paid another visit to the Far East in July 1952. Following his return, he authorized General Clark to provide logistic support for the 92,100 additional bulk personnel (consisting largely of patients and trainees). The remaining increases he referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for study. "I consider that every effort should be made," wrote General Collins, "to make it feasible to permit the augmentation of the ROKA as requested by CINCFE."²¹

Before a decision could be reached, General Clark added two more requests. Early in September he asked for an increase in the ROK Marine Corps from

12,376 to 19,800 and for an expansion in the numbers of Koreans attached directly to US units (known as Korean Augmentation to the US Army, or KATUSA). General MacArthur had authorized the KATUSA program in 1950, beginning with 100 South Koreans for each US company or battery. General Collins, on his recent visit, had authorized an increase to 2,500 KATUSAs for each US division (a total of 20,000). No action had been taken, however, to authorize US logistic support for these men. General Clark now asked that the number be increased to 28,000 and that logistic support be authorized.²²

The expansion of the ROK Army was briefly discussed at a conference held by the President with his principal advisors (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff) on 15 September 1952. General John E. Hull, USA, the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, who was attending in place of General Collins, reported that trained South Korean troops were being produced at the rate of 600 to 700 each day and that recent fighting experience had shown that these men, when properly led, were "very good" soldiers. No decision was reached at this meeting; the subject was incidental to the main purpose, which was to discuss the deadlock in the negotiations.²³

General Clark's requests added up to a total strength of 463,000 for the ROK Army and Marine Corps, to be supported at US expense. In addition, the United States would have to supply equipment for the additional divisions and regiments. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, studying the matter, pointed out two important considerations: (1) the drain on available US equipment would aggravate the US Army's current inability to meet its worldwide commitments; and (2) ROK forces could not be deployed outside Korea, hence the desirability of giving them equipment must be carefully weighed against that of using the same equipment for additional US forces that could be deployed as circumstances might require. Specifically, the proposed expansion would require a continuation of the existing 50 percent ceiling on critical items for US units in the United States; it would come at the expense of other approved aid programs, including those for NATO countries; it would require diversion of 105mm howitzers and other key equipment destined for NATO. Some critical items would have to be drawn from mobilization reserve stocks.²⁴

Despite these difficulties, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee concluded that the proposed expansion of the ROK forces should be approved. It would permit General Clark to reinforce his thin defensive lines and to provide essential reserves. It would counteract to a degree the Communist buildup that had taken place since negotiations started. It would lead to a reduction of US casualties. Additional ROK forces would be useful—indeed, essential—if offensive operations were undertaken. And an increase in the number of Asiatics fighting Communism would be psychologically useful. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the JSPC conclusions and so informed the Secretary of Defense on 26 July. "Notwithstanding the logistical implications," read their memorandum, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this augmentation of ROK forces essential. Accordingly they recommend that you secure the necessary approval to authorize US support of a ROK Army of 12 divisions and 6 separate regiments and an over-all ROK Army and Marine personnel ceiling of 463,000."²⁵

Upon learning of this JCS action, General Clark forwarded a lengthy message urging a prompt decision on his requests, some of which had been pending for over three months. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had temporarily allowed an increase in the number of ROKA personnel beyond the figure authorized by Washington. The rapid flow of trainees combined with the low casualty rate resulting from the battlefield stalemate had made it necessary either to carry an overstrength or to cut back the training program, and General Clark considered the latter alternative undesirable. It was "imperative," in his opinion, that an "early decision be reached" that would provide him the means of implementing the national policy in NSC 118/2, which called for building up the ROK forces to enable them to assume responsibility for defending their own country. If, "for reasons of importance at national level," this increase was considered infeasible, General Clark asked to be notified at once so that he could cut down the flow of replacements to the attrition level.²⁶

Before rendering a decision, Deputy Secretary of Defense William C. Foster asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more complete information on the effects on other US military aid programs—those for NATO, the Japanese National Police Reserve, Southeast Asia, and Nationalist China—if equipment and supplies were diverted to the ROK Army and Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately provided the results of an analysis by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC), which showed that the diversion of equipment and supplies to the ROK as they proposed would delay the delivery of 105mm and 155mm howitzers and 75mm recoilless rifles to NATO, to the Japanese and to the countries of Southeast Asia by about two months. If a decision were also made at this time to equip two Chinese Nationalist divisions, a further delay of two months would ensue. The restrictions on supplying equipment to US units in the Zone of the Interior (ZI) would have to be extended until January 1954. Critical categories of artillery ammunition were hardly adequate at the moment to meet FECOM requirements. Only limited quantities were now being shipped to Europe or being used for training in the ZI. All shipments of ammunition had been suspended to Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) countries except those of Southeast Asia. Obviously, any substantial consumption by additional combat units in Korea would prolong these conditions.²⁷

The administration was at that time engaged in formulating the military budget for FY 1954 and was striving to keep down expenditures for both manpower and materiel. With the war in a stalemate, the pressures for economy were again operating. There was of course no thought of a return to the cramped defense budgets that had preceded the war, but Secretary of Defense Lovett had given instructions that every effort was to be made to minimize costs in drawing up the 1954 budget.²⁸

The impact of the budgetary situation was evident in a message that General Collins sent to CINCFE on 9 October 1952. "It is becoming increasingly apparent," wired General Gollins, "that the success of FECOM in expanding ROK Forces and the improved performance of these forces in battle will develop strong pressure to reduce American Forces engaged in Korea and the overall strength of the US Army." To head off any "arbitrary or precipitate reductions," it

was essential to have a “phased plan” for making use of ROK troops so as to reduce the demands on US manpower and the number of US casualties. Requests now pending for augmentation of the ROK forces, if approved, would involve a “very considerable outlay of US resources,” though the resulting enlarged force would represent a “material augmentation” of UN military strength. As the “combat capability and reliability” of the ROKA increased, it appeared reasonable, according to General Collins, to expect a “progressive reduction” of US personnel in Korea, through one or more of the following methods:

(1) Extension of the KATUSA program so as to reduce the manning levels of US units.

(2) Creation of additional ROK units (regiments or smaller) to be attached to US units.

(3) Formation of additional ROK divisions, with their supporting units, enabling US divisions to be withdrawn.

For the development of a phased plan, General Collins asked General Clark to comment on the following possible courses of action:

A. Reduction of the FECOM personnel ceiling by 50,000 men by the end of FY 1953, to reflect the growing ROK capability.

B. Removal of 2 US divisions to reserve positions in Korea or Japan by the end of FY 1953 (assuming approval of pending requests for larger ROK forces).

C. Creation of enough additional ROK divisions to assume entire defense of the front line by the end of FY 1954.²⁹

Replying on 28 October, General Clark rejected two of the three methods suggested by General Collins for reducing US manpower in Korea. To enlarge the KATUSA program beyond the 28,000 ceiling that he had recommended was inadvisable, owing to difficulties of language and leadership. The same considerations applied to the creation of regimental or smaller units to be attached to US divisions, which General Clark characterized as a “piecemeal” method of reducing US requirements. It followed, therefore, that the best alternative was to create additional ROK divisions. However, cautioned CINCFE, this alternative could accomplish the objectives set forth in General Collins’ message only if two assumptions proved true: that the United States would furnish complete and timely logistic support, including delivery of equipment, for the expansion of the ROKA, and that the stalemate in Korea would continue, with no substantial enlargement of enemy forces.

General Clark then presented two plans, one for doubling the ROK Army by creating 10 additional divisions, the other for a more moderate augmentation of two divisions and six regiments (as he had already proposed). Under the first plan, the additional 10 divisions would be established at intervals of approximately one month between 15 November 1952 and 19 August 1953. This action would require a total ROKA strength of 639,194, including support units and noneffectives, to be supported by the United States. General Clark estimated that as the new ROK divisions were formed, US units could be withdrawn, beginning with one US division in May 1953, followed by a corps headquarters in July 1953 and another division in December of that year. This would allow a reduction of

some 40,000 by 31 July; the projected reduction of 50,000 by 30 June was not feasible. After 30 June 1954 another division could be withdrawn, plus a second corps headquarters and some service troops.

General Clark had not considered in this plan the international implications of withdrawing US forces from Korea, but he did point out that other UN units would probably be withdrawn also. The result would in some degree accomplish communist objectives by causing the impairment of UN prestige, the disintegration of the common effort, the reduction of the war to the status of a local civil conflict instead of a fight against communist aggression, and the decline of ROK morale. There were other disadvantages too. The plan would deliver into ROK hands huge quantities of US materiel that could never be recovered and might be lost to the Communist forces. It would adversely affect the buildup of Japanese defense forces and might impair CINCFE's primary mission of defending Japan. The departure of US ground forces from Korea would jeopardize the USAF units that would remain. The contemplated ROK forces, when ready, could take over the front line under existing conditions of stalemate but could not stave off a full-scale attack by the combined enemy forces; hence US forces would have to be kept in reserve in the FECOM, ready to reenter the war on short notice. A 20-division ROK force would not, because of the lack of leaders and of technical know-how, possess the same relative combat efficiency as the present 10-division force.

Viewing these disadvantages, General Clark preferred his less ambitious alternative. The additional two divisions and six regiments should at once be approved. Any further expansion should then be implemented as US logistical capabilities would allow, emphasizing the development of sound forces rather than savings in US personnel. He recognized the importance of the latter consideration, but, in his view, "a decision to implement this plan which is predicated primarily on relieving US forces from combat duty may result in far reaching and ultimately disastrous consequences."³⁰

Three days before this reply was received, Secretary of Defense Lovett had informed President Truman that, in line with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he favored granting all the ROK force increases recommended by CINCFE. President Truman agreed. On 30 October 1952 the Chief Executive formally approved the increase of the ROK Army to 12 divisions and six separate regiments, with an overall ceiling for the ROK Army and Marine Corps of 463,000 men. He directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take "appropriate implementing action." The Joint Chiefs of Staff at once notified CINCFE of the decision.³¹

Possible Use of Chinese Nationalist Forces

The persistent problem of acquiring sufficient manpower in Korea also led to a review of the US policy toward the use of Chinese Nationalist Forces during 1952. Although President Truman had earlier turned down Chiang Kai-shek's offers to furnish troops there, the idea of making use of Nationalist capabilities for

offensive purposes, in Korea or elsewhere, was very much alive. In February 1952 the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on Taiwan (Major General William C. Chase, USA) reported that the Chief of the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces General Staff had told him that his government was still “amenable” to providing an army for service in Korea. This offer was not accepted at the time. However, on 18 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General Chase to enlarge the current training programs to provide for a Chinese Nationalist army of two divisions that could be employed in areas outside of Taiwan.³²

On 14 May 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), to determine “for planning purposes” the operational and logistic support that would be needed to allow some Chinese Nationalist forces—either the two-division force or, as an alternative, an army of 10 divisions—to fight in Korea or elsewhere outside Taiwan.³³

General Clark had been in command barely two weeks when he made a strong bid for use of Chinese Nationalist troops. On 27 May he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he was concerned over the limited size of the forces available to him for his two missions, defense of Japan and prosecution of the war in Korea. His concern was enhanced by the facts that he had had to withdraw combat units to guard prisoners and that no armistice seemed to be in prospect. Aware that the employment of Nationalists was under discussion, General Clark recommended that the Nationalist Government be asked to offer an army of two divisions “for service in Korea at the earliest practicable date.” In General Clark’s view, this move would have the advantages of: (1) employing a greater number of Asiatics in Korea, further emphasizing “the resolve of free Orientals to resist Communist aggression”; (2) lifting the morale and combat effectiveness of the UNC units by allowing rest and rotation of divisions from the front lines; (3) augmenting Eighth Army’s reserves and enhancing its capability for protracted combat operations; (4) improving the training and morale of Chinese Nationalist Forces; (5) possibly weakening the “will to fight” of Chinese Communist troops and causing some defections; and (6) enabling a gradual redeployment of US forces to Japan and thus an increase in CINCPAC’s strategic reserves. General Clark had not considered political aspects, such as the attitude of the ROK Government toward the presence of Chinese Nationalists, but he did not believe that President Rhee would object. The provision of equipment for the Nationalists, he added, should be “without prejudice” to the expansion of the ROKA or of the Japanese defense forces.³⁴

On the day following this message, the Chief of Naval Operations asked CINCPAC for precise information about the availability of a two-division Nationalist force and the additional equipment that might be required to make it ready for combat in Korea. An answer came directly from the Chief of the MAAG, General Chase, who recommended the 67th Nationalist Army, consisting of the 32d and 67th Divisions. It was available for shipment at any time, but lacked much equipment and would not be ready for combat for at least 90 days after reaching Korea. The principal difficulty, however, was to secure top-level approval. Chiang Kai-shek “has offered twice and has been turned down or ignored,” according to General Chase. “I have heard him say that he must be asked for troops and then

will think it over." General Chase recommended against any immediate move of Nationalist units to Korea. It would be better, he thought, to complete all equipping, training, and reorganization before they left Taiwan.³⁵

Upon reading this message, General Clark informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he could provide the supply and equipment needed by the two Chinese Nationalist divisions without diverting equipment from the UN forces, the Japanese Police Reserve, or the ROK Army. "From both a strategic and economic viewpoint," he declared on 1 July, "I cannot urge too strongly greater emphasis on the use of Oriental forces to combat Communist attacks in Asia. I feel that the US rearmament program should be reviewed and expanded to divert an increased share of the program to the building up of strong forces which can assist US and United Nations forces with this burden in the Far East." He emphasized that he meant not merely financial support, but arms, equipment, and logistic support "in far greater volume than hitherto contemplated." Such support must come from the United States, since the one industrialized nation in the Far East, Japan, could not alone provide arms for the great manpower strength of friendly Asiatic nations.³⁶

General Clark was high in his praise of the military potential of Far Eastern countries:

The Oriental can be developed into an excellent combat soldier. The great improvement which a year's training and leadership development have accomplished in the ROK Army is evidence that fighting ability is not a prerogative of a so-called aggressive race like the Japanese, but can be developed in ROK, Chinese, and Japanese alike. The cost of developing and maintaining such Oriental forces is fractional compared with US forces. I am, therefore, not only in agreement with the use of Chinese Forces as contemplated . . . but I also urge serious consideration of a greater diversion of the rearmament program at home for this and for still greater Oriental manpower utilization.

In the allocation of supplies, General Clark recommended the following order of priority: first, the National Police Reserve of Japan; second, the ROK Army; and third, the Chinese Nationalist Forces.³⁷

Accepting the conclusions of a JSPC study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary of Defense Lovett on 5 August 1952 that the 67th Chinese Nationalist Army could be "advantageously employed" in Korea if provided additional training and equipment. They recommended immediate action to secure the approval of the US Government, of Chiang Kai-shek, and of other countries contributing troops to the UNC, in order that the Nationalist force could be sent into combat as soon as it attained readiness.³⁸

Following an NSC meeting on 6 August, President Truman discussed these conclusions with several of his advisors. General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence, supported the JCS recommendations. He emphasized the psychological importance of the use of Nationalist forces in Korea and pointed out that Nationalist troops on Taiwan were a "wasting asset" unless used. Citing the number of troops there, he expressed the view that the removal of two divisions would not materially weaken the defenses of Taiwan, especially since the

US Seventh Fleet would remain as a major bar to invasion. The President went only so far as to authorize "additional study" by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, and the Director for Mutual Security. After a "firm plan" was developed, he wanted the matter referred to him again. Secretary Lovett at once relayed this decision to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking that he be provided "as soon as possible with an appropriate report as a basis for further consultation with the President."³⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the subject with representatives of the Department of State on 13 August and found them firmly opposed to the sending of Nationalist forces to Korea. Such a step, they believed, would destroy any chance of an armistice agreement. News would inevitably leak out as soon as Chiang Kai-shek was informed of the plan. The introduction of Chinese into Korea would aggravate existing difficulties with the ROK Government. Finally, the subject would become an issue in the 1952 Presidential election. The State Department officials favored the alternative of expanding the ROK forces (which was still under consideration), suggesting that it would be cheaper. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with this suggestion. The initial costs of equipping the Nationalists would be less, since they were already partly equipped, but the ultimate cost of using and supporting them would probably be greater.⁴⁰

These tentative conclusions about relative costs were substantiated by a study conducted by the Department of the Army, probably as a result of the JCS-State discussion. The study showed that the cost advantage of initial equipment possessed by the two Chinese Nationalist divisions would be more than offset by higher costs of transport and administration (primarily medical services).⁴¹

While the issue was still unresolved, the Marine Corps Commandant (CMC), General Lemuel C. Shepherd, recommended on 19 August that the Joint Chiefs of Staff augment their previous recommendation by proposing the deployment also of a regiment of the Chinese Nationalist Marines. The Chinese Nationalist Marine Corps had a strength of 14,000 and was, according to CMC, "well trained" and "among the most effective" forces on Formosa. The Marines could be used in Korea to enhance the UNC's amphibious capability. This recommendation was endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Fichteler.⁴²

Not until 21 November did the Joint Chiefs of Staff reply to Secretary Lovett's request for an "appropriate report" on the use of Nationalist forces. They told him that, "from a military point of view only," it would be "feasible and desirable" to employ the Nationalist 67th Army, or an equivalent, in Korea within the foreseeable future (or alternatively, against Communist forces in Southeast Asia). However, equipping this force, in addition to the new ROK units recently approved for activation, would delay delivery of certain items to NATO and to the Japanese defense forces for about four months. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also approved the use of the Chinese Nationalist Marine Corps in Korea. They added that, if political considerations should bar the use of Nationalist forces outside of Taiwan, the US military assistance program to the Nationalists should nevertheless continue.⁴³

By this time, however, the question had been shelved. The 1952 Presidential election had been won by the Republican candidate, General Dwight D. Eisen-

hower. It was hardly likely that President Truman's "lame duck" administration would institute such a drastic reversal of policy as would be involved in introducing Chinese Nationalist troops into the Korean War. The matter was left for the incoming administration to settle. After his accession, President Eisenhower apparently gave no serious consideration to the use of Nationalist forces in Korea.⁴⁴

The POW Issue: The Chinese Initiative

In the search for an armistice, UNC and Communist negotiators remained at odds over the disposition of prisoners of war. The UN Command, in line with policy determined by President Truman, was determined that no prisoner would be forced to return to Communist rule against his will. At the end of June 1952 the UNC had completed the lengthy process of interviewing prisoners to ascertain their desires and had found that 83,722 were willing to be repatriated. It was hoped that this figure, when given to the enemy in place of the earlier estimate of 70,000, might induce him to accept a settlement; after all, the Communists would receive almost seven times the number of UNC prisoners (approximately 12,000) that they would surrender.⁴⁵

While the screening was in process, there were hints that Communist China might be softening its stand. On 15 June the Indian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Dr. Panikkar, reported that Premier Chou En-lai had expressed a willingness to consider two alternative solutions. The first of these (Alternative A), which the Prime Minister apparently considered the more acceptable, would be to settle on the basis of a round figure of 20,000 Chinese and 90,000 Koreans to be repatriated—or perhaps even a total of 100,000, provided 20,000 Chinese were included. This solution would eliminate any necessity for an agreement in principle. However, the numbers mentioned by Premier Chou (which included all the Chinese prisoners in UNC hands) were of course appreciably higher than the numbers of prisoners who had indicated to the UNC that they would accept repatriation.

Alternative B would require an agreement in principle by the UNC that all prisoners might return home at the conclusion of an armistice. Those who elected not to do so, however, would be brought to Panmunjom and interviewed there by a committee from neutral states plus Red Cross representatives from both sides. Communist China and North Korea would abide by the prisoners' decisions at these interviews. Obviously this alternative was preferable from the UNC point of view.⁴⁶

This initiative had been preceded by other indications that the Chinese, using the Indian Government as an intermediary, were in their own way attempting to bring about a solution in Korea through rather circuitous diplomatic processes. The Indian Government was convinced that the Chinese really wanted an armistice in Korea and that, if some way could be found of saving Chinese "honor," the deadlock could be broken.⁴⁷

Through the British Foreign Office, the United States let it be known to the Indian Government that Chou's Alternative B was "interesting" and seemed to have possibilities for progress on the prisoner issue. It was suggested that the Indian Government explore the matter further through its own channels.⁴⁸

More talks between Chinese and Indian officials took place and on 12 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Clark of additional developments. According to Indian reports, the Chinese considered that the ideas they had put forth should be taken up at Panmunjom; they were not suggesting that the talks be transferred to Peking. They were, they said, now waiting to see if their proposals on "reclassification" were accepted by the UNC. If so, they professed that they would be willing to take "the next step." This statement was interpreted by Washington to mean that the Chinese might be willing to go along with some solution similar to their Alternative B. It appeared, however, that they were still adamant in demanding the return of all Chinese prisoners. The UK Foreign Office believed strongly that the Indian channel had contributed to a "resuscitation" of the negotiations and should be kept open, without expecting too much of it.⁴⁹

Unfortunately, this glimmer of encouragement proved illusory. On 14 July the British Foreign Office reported that the Chinese, when pressed to clarify their proposals, had informed the Indian Government that they were interested only in Alternative A and would not negotiate on the basis of Alternative B. While this reply had its encouraging aspect (it was the first time the Chinese had put anything in writing), it closed the door on the present initiative. The British representative in New Delhi was informed that the Indian Government saw nothing to do but to await the outcome of further negotiations at Panmunjom.⁵⁰

The Soviet Initiative

Almost concurrently a diplomatic move by the USSR occupied the attention of Washington authorities. At a dinner of the UN Security Council on the evening of 27 June, a Soviet official in the UN Secretariat, Constantin E. Zinchenko, approached Mr. Ernest A. Gross, of the US delegation, and opened a discussion of Korea. He suggested that the two sides find a formula that would allow each to apply its own interpretation of the Geneva Convention. This would mean acceptance "in principle" of general repatriation, coupled with an understanding that "difficulties" in applying the principle would be "taken into account" and that a group made up of representatives from various national Red Cross societies would supervise the "application." In reply to a question, Mr. Zinchenko "unhesitatingly" stated that the Communists really wanted an armistice in Korea. Mr. Gross thought the conversation was "deliberate and pre-arranged." The Department of State judged it "interesting and perhaps significant" that the Zinchenko proposal resembled Premier Chou's Alternative B, as

reported by Ambassador Panikkar but decided not to pursue the initiative at that moment, to prevent crossing wires with the Indian-Chinese channel.⁵¹

After that channel proved unproductive, discreet attempts to follow up the Soviet initiative failed; Mr. Zinchenko refused to talk further with Ambassador Gross. At Panmunjom, meanwhile, the enemy had maintained an unyielding attitude. Accordingly, the Department of State asked Ambassador Kennan's advice about the advisability of opening a discussion of the POW question with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, in order to put it bluntly to the Soviet Government as to whether there would be peace in Korea. The Department outlined a proposal that might be made to the Soviets, under which the UNC would exchange the 83,000 POWs who had elected repatriation for the 12,000 held by the Communists; the remaining enemy prisoners would be brought to the DMZ and interviewed again under the supervision of India or some other impartial country, to give them a further opportunity to return to their homelands if they desired.⁵²

This proposal drew opposition from General Clark, who had no doubt that the Soviets were the controlling influence in the Korean War but felt that a diplomatic appeal to their leaders would be viewed as a sign of weakness. Moreover, the USSR by stalling could delay the armistice indefinitely. Only after all efforts had failed at Panmunjom would it be advisable to approach the Soviet leaders, either formally or informally. A "clear, forceful, and non-conciliatory" approach to Premier Stalin himself or to Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky might at that time prove useful; it would strengthen the UN case, merit the support of allies, and reduce the likelihood of a propaganda advantage to the Soviets. But there should be no actions that might be construed as weakness. It was necessary, said General Clark,

that we be firm on the battlefield, with continued emphasis on aerial attack of North Korean military targets, firm in our statements and firm in our actions at Panmunjom, and that this firmness be fully supported by appropriate statements and actions taken at governmental level both by ourselves and more particularly by our allies.⁵³

General Clark's recommendation was that the proposal outlined in the State Department message to Ambassador Kennan should be introduced in the negotiations at Panmunjom. If it should be rejected, he then desired to submit a proposal that he had set forth in a message of 7 July, providing for immediate release of those prisoners desiring repatriation, with others to be placed in the custody of a neutral body and interviewed by representatives of each side in an effort to persuade them to return.⁵⁴

From Moscow, Ambassador Kennan also advised that he judged it undesirable to approach the Soviet Government at that time. The Department of State accepted his and General Clark's advice and laid aside the idea.⁵⁵

Deadlock on Prisoners

Without permission from Washington, General Clark did not feel authorized to reveal to the enemy delegation at Panmunjom the results of the screening of prisoners. On 28 June he recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the full count of prisoners willing to be repatriated be given to the Communists as soon as possible in open plenary session and simultaneously released to the press. Four days later he submitted a draft of a statement to be made to the Communists when the figure was released. At the same time he noted that the Eighth Army was giving the figures a final recheck to reflect deaths, escapes, or last-minute changes of mind by the prisoners.⁵⁶

As would be expected, the recheck altered only slightly the earlier findings; the principal effect was a decrease in the number of prisoners willing to be repatriated, from 83,722 to 83,071. The revised breakdown was as follows:

	<i>Willing to Return</i>	<i>Unwilling to Return</i>
North Koreans	62,169	34,373
Chinese	6,388	14,412
South Koreans	4,560	11,744
Civilian Internees	9,954	26,338
Total	<u>83,071</u>	<u>86,867⁵⁷</u>

Meanwhile General Harrison, in a plenary session on 1 July, had made a statement, conciliatory in tone, in which he spoke of the desire of both sides for peace and pointed out that, except for minor details, the two delegations had agreed on the entire text of the armistice agreement and that only the paragraph on prisoners of war still embodied an unresolved issue. The draft of this paragraph (Article 51) read as follows:

All prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible. The release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be effected in conformity with lists which have been exchanged and have been checked by the respective sides prior to the signing of this armistice agreement.

General Harrison pointed out that this wording was a concession to the Communists. "It seems to us that the wording of this historical document is one on which we can agree," he said, "although we would have preferred one quite different." He urged that, in accordance with this article, a prompt agreement be reached providing for the exchange of prisoners "in accordance with lists which are to be exchanged" (meaning, of course, lists containing only the names of those willing to be repatriated). The Communists asked for a recess to study his words.⁵⁸

Although General Harrison had told the Communists that "we are not making a new proposal," it became evident at the next meeting, two days later, that they believed that he had done just that. "In your statement of 1 July," said Nam Il, in a remark the significance of which was not at once grasped, "your side

alters the attitude which you have adopted for the last two months. . . . Our side welcomes this negotiating attitude," he added. As for Article 51, "Our side not only agrees to the principle but also agrees to the wording." He went on to urge "that the war prisoners of both sides be reclassified in accordance with their nationalities and area and the lists be checked so as to facilitate the total repatriation as stipulated in paragraph 51." In conclusion, he proposed that the delegation go into executive session the following day for further discussion of the exchange of prisoners.⁵⁹

The Communists' response to General Harrison's statement of 1 July was notably lacking in the harsh propaganda utterances by which their conduct had been marked in preceding weeks.⁶⁰ Apparently influenced by this fact, General Harrison sent an optimistic report to General Clark after the meeting of 3 July. The Communist statement that day, he declared, "in my opinion offers hope of early armistice. Communists accept not only principle but wording of para 51. This is a new concession on their part and recognizes that at time of signing of armistice we will repatriate only those held in custody at that time as prisoners of war." In fact, nothing in Nam Il's statement had indicated any such recognition. General Harrison stated that he intended to agree to executive sessions, beginning on 4 July. He recommended that he be authorized at once to release the latest screening results to the Communists, and that final rosters of prisoners to be repatriated be furnished him "as soon as possible."

General Clark relayed this message to Washington. He professed himself unable to share General Harrison's optimism, which he thought might be the result of having observed Nam Il's manner and demeanor in the meetings. General Clark indicated that he would grant approval only to the recommendation to meet in executive session, and he asked for a prompt decision of his request for authority to release the final screening figures.⁶¹

In an immediate reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed that they too viewed General Harrison's cheerful report with considerable skepticism. A "literal reading" of Nam Il's statement did not suggest to them any "basic change" in the Communists' position. "It may in fact be," they remarked, "that our bringing up subject of wording of Article 51 has been misinterpreted by Commies as indicating change in UNC position"—a remark that was soon to be shown true. It appeared obvious, continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the principal obstacle to an agreement was the disposition of the Chinese prisoners. For this problem they had "no clear solution," but invited suggestions for a solution within the framework of the principle of nonforcible repatriation. If the disposition of the Chinese POWs appeared as the "final and only bar" to agreement, they suggested that a commitment not to send them to Taiwan might satisfy the enemy.⁶²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed General Clark that the UNC delegation should proceed cautiously, exploring the enemy position and seeking an agreement on the interpretation of Article 51 before making any "firm commitment as to lists or numbers." They agreed that executive sessions would offer the most favorable climate for such exploratory conversations. The best chance of an agreement, they thought, might lie in avoiding any discussion of numbers or any reference to "screening" or "rescreening," while leading the negotiations directly

to the exchange of lists by each side; thus the Communists would not have to go on record as accepting the principle of non-forced repatriation or acknowledging the “relatively small” number of prisoners willing to return. In presenting the UNC list, the UNC delegation should represent it as a “full compilation” of prisoners available for repatriation, avoiding emphasis on its “finality,” but also avoiding any impression that the list was subject to bargaining. If these tactics failed, and the Communists insisted upon discussing numbers either before or after an exchange of lists, the UNC delegation was authorized, at General Clark’s discretion, to submit the new figures of POWs available for repatriation. Should the Communists reject these, the UNC delegation was to express ready willingness to consider any “reasonable proposal” for verifying the figures, either before or after an armistice.⁶³

In accord with these JCS instructions, the UNC delegation agreed to executive sessions on 4 July. Almost at once it became evident in these sessions that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had assessed the situation more accurately than had General Harrison. The phrase “all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side,” as used in Article 51, was interpreted by the Communists to mean all those named in the lists exchanged on 18 December 1951, excluding only those who had lived below the 38th parallel before the war. For the UNC, the phrase meant prisoners remaining after the lists had been purged of those who had indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation.⁶⁴

At the meeting of 6 July, the Communists raised the issue of numbers. They made it clear that they expected substantially all the NK and Chinese personnel in UNC custody to be on the “reclassified” lists. In particular, all of the 20,000 Chinese prisoners must be so included. They mentioned a total figure of 110,000—the figure that had been included in Premier Chou’s Alternative A. “If only the checked lists produced by your side present a figure approaching reality and include the 20,000 captured personnel of the Chinese People’s Volunteers,” said Nam Il, “the question of repatriation of war prisoners will be settled.” General Harrison replied that the UNC would not “force anyone physically to return to your control.” On the following day the UNC delegation attempted to seize the initiative by pointing out that the 18 December lists were “woefully out of date” and that the Communists’ list had omitted more than 50,000 prisoners of whose capture they had boasted. But the Communists still insisted that the 18 December lists must be used.⁶⁵

Immediately after the 7 July session, and on the same day, General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, since the Communists themselves had introduced the question of numbers, he proposed to authorize the UNC delegation to submit, in round figures, revised estimates of those to be repatriated, plus those who would be released in South Korea. The total would be 121,000, consisting of 82,900 listed for repatriation as a result of the final screening (76,500 North Koreans and 6,400 Chinese) and 38,100 former residents of South Korea, of whom 11,700 were POWs and the remaining 26,400 civilian internees already being released. General Clark would ask for a similar accounting of UN prisoners. He would have General Harrison reiterate UNC proposals to permit nonrepatriates

to be interviewed by neutral or joint teams, with both sides agreeing to abide by the results.⁶⁶

Since the Communists had made very clear that the important thing to them was that 20,000 Chinese prisoners be repatriated, General Clark expected that the enemy would reject his proposal. In that event, General Clark asked authority to submit a new plan, the features of which were as follows:

(1) An armistice would be signed on presently agreed terms, except for the paragraphs pertaining to the repatriation of POWs.

(2) These paragraphs would be modified to provide for the repatriation and release, upon the signing of the armistice, of all POWs who expressed a desire to be repatriated or who could be released and proceed directly to their homes (i.e., former residents of South Korea). The supervision and control of the remaining prisoners, and the responsibility for determining their ultimate disposition, would be passed to a group of neutral nations. Both sides would agree to abide by the decision of that group as to the disposition of nonrepatriates, with the stipulation that no Chinese POWs would be permitted to pass under control of the Chinese Nationalists. A time limit would be set for determining the fate of these prisoners. Under supervision of the neutral group, both sides would be allowed to try to persuade prisoners to return. Both sides would deliver to each prisoner in dispute an authenticated amnesty agreement to ensure his safety and that of his family.⁶⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceived a possibility that the Sino-Indian conversations, which were then in progress, might result in a favorable proposal from the enemy. Since Nam Il's remarks on 6 July bore a similarity to Chou En-lai's Alternative A, it was possible that they might presage a proposal along the lines of Alternative B. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore told General Clark that it would be "premature" to present new POW statistics to the enemy at that time. As for his other proposal, they promised that it would be carefully studied in Washington.⁶⁸

General Clark pressed the issue of statistics, however, pointing out that the Communists had already indicated the specific number (20,000) of Chinese prisoners they wanted returned. He believed that the UNC should let them know now the extent of the difference between what they wanted and what was being offered. Too, there was danger of a premature press release of the screening results that could bring charges of bad faith against the UNC. As General Harrison had said, "The longer we sit on the 83,000 figure the more explosive it becomes." And the enemy had, in recent meetings, shown a desire to negotiate, which General Clark felt should be encouraged. He again recommended that he be allowed to inform the Communists of the "round number" of persons to be repatriated, along with an assurance that the UNC was not receding from its position.⁶⁹

In a change of position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 July 1952 approved this recommendation, perhaps because they were beginning to lose faith in the outcome of the Chinese discussions with India. The presentation of statistics would, as General Clark had recommended on 7 July, be accompanied by a renewed proposal to permit individual prisoner interviews. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

instructed General Clark that in submitting this proposal, the UNC delegation should use the term "impartial" rather than "neutral" agency, since the UNC had already accepted Poland and Czechoslovakia as "neutral" nations in the NNSC. The word "impartial" might allow the United States greater latitude to select countries more acceptable than Soviet Russia's European satellites.⁷⁰

Accordingly, the UNC delegation on 13 July presented the Communists with a round figure of 83,000 prisoners to be repatriated to their side, including 76,600 Koreans and 6,400 Chinese. General Harrison emphasized that these figures were based on valid individual interviews and that after the signing of an armistice, the enemy would be allowed to interview prisoners under supervision of an acceptable impartial agency in an attempt to persuade unwilling ones to return. The enemy delegation reacted by calling for a recess. When they returned to the conference table five days later, enemy spokesmen pronounced the UNC proposal "absolutely unacceptable"; the 83,000 figure was far below the number on the original UNC list (132,000) and failed to include the full number of 20,000 Chinese. At the same time, the enemy chief delegate took note of the "wanton bombings" of the hydroelectric systems and of P'yongyang. "I shall tell you clearly," Nam Il declared, "that in face of such brutal bombings by your side the Korean and Chinese peoples and their armed forces will only fight more courageously and grow stronger but will never yield to your unfair and unreasonable proposal. What your side cannot gain on the battlefield, your side absolutely will not gain at the conference table."⁷¹

The procedure that General Clark had recommended on 7 July, involving immediate release of repatriates with placement of remaining POWs in neutral custody for subsequent interviews, was still under consideration in Washington. Still another alternative suggestion was passed to CINCUNC by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 July whereby the UNC would offer to release all Chinese POWs, allowing the Communists to send representatives to UN POW camps to attempt to persuade these Chinese prisoners to accept repatriation. The enemy would not be allowed to use force in this procedure, which would be under the observation of a "non-participating" nation such as India. Prisoners refusing repatriation would be placed in the status of refugees or displaced persons awaiting the final disposition. It would be made clear that the same procedure would be acceptable if applied to US prisoners. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that if the enemy rejected this offer, it would place him in an "increasingly weak" propaganda position. Too, the Communists would be forced either to make a counteroffer or else to demonstrate "unmistakably" their lack of desire for an armistice.⁷²

General Clark had "serious doubts" that this plan was feasible, though he added, "I am willing to try any approach that may produce an honorable armistice." First of all, he did not believe the enemy would accept any plan that did not assure the return of the bulk of the Chinese POWs. Mainly, however, his objection stemmed from his experience following World War II in Austria, when, as US occupation commander, he had been directed to allow Soviet representatives into the displaced persons camps so that they might "persuade" inmates to return to their homes in the Soviet Union. General Clark recalled that the Russian representatives had caused such disruption and resistance among the inmates,

and had engaged in espionage to such an extent, that he had been forced to order them from the US zone. He foresaw a possible repetition in Korea. He still advocated the formula that he had suggested on 7 July.⁷³

General Clark also objected to the role proposed for India, fearing that that country might be willing to compromise the principle of nonforcible repatriation for the sake of an early settlement. His final conclusion, however, was that if the new JCS plan represented "the only feasible means of achieving an armistice," he would "make every effort to secure Communist agreement . . . and to reduce to a minimum the possible difficulties and complications which I feel certain will develop." The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no reply at the moment.⁷⁴

Following a number of futile meetings, enemy negotiators recommended on 25 July that the plenary delegates shift to open sessions and that staff officers meet concurrently to go over details of the wording. General Harrison at once accepted the first of these recommendations and took the second under advisement. He told General Clark that he intended to agree to meetings of staff officers even though, as he had said to the Communists, there was little left for these officers to do until a basic agreement was reached on the armistice itself.⁷⁵

State Department representatives agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in noting this enemy move with some apprehension; they feared that the Communists were working toward a propaganda advantage. The fact that the move came on the eve of a convention of the International Red Cross, scheduled to open in Toronto, Canada, on 26 July, suggested that it might be part of a broader Communist propaganda plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it important to keep the negotiations from returning to the "propaganda level" and instructed General Clark that, even in reply to enemy propaganda statements, the UNC delegates should confine themselves to "factual and dispassionate" summaries of the UNC position. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised no objection to a return to open plenary sessions, although they saw "no useful purpose" in holding such meetings every day. Prolonged recesses, they thought, might unsettle the enemy and convince him that the UNC stand was firm; meanwhile daily meetings of staff officers would serve to discredit enemy charges that the UNC was trying to disrupt or terminate negotiations. In line with this reasoning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCUNC to propose a seven-day recess in the plenary sessions as soon as he wished, or to declare such a recess unilaterally if the enemy rejected the proposal.⁷⁶

Armed with this authority, General Harrison met the enemy delegation in open session on 26 July. He announced that the UNC would agree to staff officers' meetings. But, continued General Harrison, the UNC delegation saw "no good reason for continuing plenary conferences at this time, either in open or executive sessions." He thereupon proposed a seven-day recess. When the Communists refused, he and his colleagues rose and left the tent, announcing that they would return on 3 August.⁷⁷

During the ensuing month, the delegations met only four times: on 3, 11, 19, and 27 August. Each time the UNC delegation, after listening to a propaganda harangue, requested a seven-day recess, to which the enemy reluctantly agreed.⁷⁸

Staff officers meanwhile occupied their time somewhat more productively, working through the draft to clear up details of phraseology. After meeting every day from 27 July through 5 August inclusive, they turned over their draft to interpreters to smooth out linguistic difficulties in the three versions (in English, Korean, and Chinese), which, it was agreed, would be equally authentic. This task was completed on 29 August.⁷⁹

In a message to General Clark on 8 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff disposed of his negotiating proposal of 7 July as well as the alternative that they had proffered on 17 July. They first informed him that the proposed approach to the Soviet Government had been laid aside. They went on to agree with his earlier statements that the United States had not yet exhausted all possibilities for “positive” action at Panmunjom and that firmness was essential. While the enemy probably wanted an eventual armistice, it appeared that none of the factors that might be exerting pressure on him were sufficient to make the armistice a “matter of urgency.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw little advantage, therefore, in putting forth any new substantive proposals at the moment. Unless the other side came up with a worthwhile suggestion for solution of the POW impasse, the UNC should continue its present tactics for the next four weeks, meeting no more than once a week in plenary session and recessing unilaterally whenever necessary. Meanwhile, they instructed General Clark to “continue, within existing directives, to make maximum practicable use [of] available air strength in attacks upon all military targets in NK.” It was important, however, to avoid public statements describing the air offensive as bringing “pressure” on the enemy to accept an armistice; such statements might engage the enemy’s prestige to a degree that would make it difficult for him to accept an armistice.⁸⁰

By this time the armistice talks had been in progress for over a year—far longer than even the most pessimistic expectations.⁸¹ The situation existing at that time is summed up in the following words by an official Army historian:

As the era of the one-week recesses began, three months of frustrating bargaining ended. The 28 April proposal had resulted in narrowing the three outstanding issues to one, but settlement of the prisoner of war problem was no closer in July than it had been in April. . . . Many troublesome questions had been dealt with through compromise, but now both sides had maneuvered themselves into positions that severely limited negotiations. Yet the search for a solution continued, for the pressures to conclude the Korean conflict increased as the war dragged on indecisively and the casualties continued to grow.⁸²

The Proposed Presidential Initiative

The draft armistice agreement worked out by the staff officers in August 1952 contained 63 paragraphs. Two of these embodied the disagreement over prisoner repatriation that still separated the two sides.⁸³ It was perhaps inevitable

that someone should suggest that the two sides stop the shooting immediately on the basis of the large area of agreement reached and postpone until later the question of what to do with the prisoners. The first to put forth this suggestion, it appears, was Mr. Vincent W. Hallinan, a candidate for the Presidency nominated by a left-wing splinter group (Progressive Party). In the summer of 1952 he addressed letters to the two principal candidates, General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, suggesting that they join him in proposing an immediate cease-fire in Korea on the basis of the agreed demarcation line, with the question of POWs to be resolved later by civilian representatives of both sides. This plan, coming from a somewhat surprising source, was to send armistice discussions off in a new direction.⁸⁴

Officials of the Department of State saw promise in this proposal and in fact pushed it a step further. Why should not an immediate armistice include an exchange of those prisoners desiring repatriation? This would considerably reduce the magnitude of the residual problem to be settled after the cease-fire. State Department officials drafted a proclamation to be made by President Truman putting forth this basis for ending the war.

The proposed proclamation was discussed at a JCS-State Department meeting on 27 August 1952. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to refer it to CINCFE for comment, and did so on 29 August, reassuring him that there was no thought that any "subsequent negotiations" for disposition of prisoners would lead to forcible repatriation. They added that Ambassador Kennan had seen the proposal and had judged it an excellent one, "apt to arouse divergent and possibly conflicting reactions" in the USSR and in Communist China. These two countries were at that time conducting discussions in Moscow, which the Ambassador felt must be at a "difficult and delicate" stage, hence any action must be taken quickly.⁸⁵

General Clark, however, advised against the Presidential statement, mainly on the ground that it would simply postpone instead of settling the problem of disposing of the POWs. It was not clear, he pointed out, whether the "subsequent negotiations" would be part of the political conference that, according to the agreement reached on Agenda Item 5, was to follow the armistice. To bring up the prisoner question at this conference would be most unwise, in General Clark's view, since it would give the Communists an opportunity to try to dislodge the United States from its position on "no forced repatriation." It would be "far preferable" to have discussions on the POW question conducted by representatives of impartial nations, "separate and distinct from those nations to be represented at the political conference." The armistice should specify that both sides would abide by the decision of these impartial nations, and that the disposition of prisoners would be in accord with their individual choices and would be settled within a specified time.⁸⁶

General Clark doubted that the Communists would accept the proposal as presented; he thought it more likely that they would reply with a counterproposal for a percentage exchange, allowing them to keep some UN/ROK prisoners as hostages to ensure the return of all their prisoners. Such an arrangement would be difficult for the UNC to reject but would bring severe criticism from the US public and from allies if accepted, since there would be no way after the

armistice to force the eventual return of these prisoners. Moreover, to sign an armistice agreement on this basis would relieve the heavy bombing pressure then being placed on the enemy, which, according to intelligence, was having a "material effect" on the enemy. The Communists might succeed in building up their strength to a point where they could, on the pretext of controversy over prisoners, resume hostilities when they chose. Finally, General Clark saw in the proposal a certain amount of Soviet instigation. He believed that the Soviet Union must feel that "the course of Communism will be furthered by achieving an armistice which refers the unresolved POW question to future negotiations. I consider that we should avoid falling into what appears to be an obvious trap." At the least, the proposed Presidential statement should be held up pending an attempt to reach agreement on the basis of new proposals that he was submitting. Meanwhile, the UNC should continue "the heavy bombing to which the Communists are being subjected and which is apparently undermining [the] morale of the people of North Korea and their ability to wage and support a war."⁸⁷

General Clark's message containing his alternative proposals was forwarded the same day (1 September). They were five in number and were designed either to lead to a settlement or to unmask the enemy's real intentions regarding peace in Korea. All five were to be contingent upon the prior signing of an armistice. As a preliminary step, before any of the alternatives were submitted, General Harrison would present a strong, well-reasoned statement, assailing the enemy's position and reviewing the various proposals that the Communists had rejected. He would then present the following alternatives:

(1) Delivery of nonrepatriated prisoners, in groups of appropriate size, to the DMZ, where, at a mutually agreeable location, they would be released from military control and, without interview or screening, be free to go to the side of their choice. The process would take place, with or without military representation from each side, under the observation of one or a combination of the following: the ICRC, joint Red Cross teams, observers from impartial nations, or joint military teams.

(2) Delivery of nonrepatriates to the DMZ, where they would be freed from military control and the responsibility for their disposition would be turned over to representatives of impartial nations, with both sides agreeing to abide by the decision of those nations.

(3) Agreement by both sides that, upon signature of the armistice, the supervision and control of all POWs who had not previously been repatriated or released, and the responsibility for their ultimate disposition, would be passed to a group of impartial nations.

(4) Agreement by both sides to sign an armistice and to retain all nonrepatriates in protective custody until their ultimate disposition was determined by a group of mutually acceptable impartial nations.

(5) Delivery of nonrepatriates to the custody of a body of mutually agreeable impartial nations at an acceptable location, either inside or outside of Korea, with each side agreeing to abide by the decision of that body as to the eventual disposition of the nonrepatriates.

Having presented these alternatives to the enemy, General Harrison would ask that they consider his statement carefully. He would then recess, with or without Communist consent, for a period of about 10 days in which the enemy would have time to analyze what was being offered. Should the enemy, at the reconvening of plenary sessions, reject all alternatives, it would be apparent that he did not wish an armistice on terms that were acceptable to the UNC and General Harrison would be authorized to recess indefinitely, to reconvene only if the enemy submitted, in writing, the text of any further proposals they might have. "This unilateral recess I consider essential if we are to retain the dignity and firmness of our position," General Clark maintained. He concluded:

At the time we recess unilaterally, it is my firm conviction that for all practical purposes, the military aspects of the negotiations will have been completed. Further discussion on a military basis by the UNC would be pointless and would in fact further contribute to the serious loss of prestige which we have already suffered in dealing with the minor forces of Red China and North Korea on an assumed equal footing. Unless military force in excess of that now available to me were to be applied to secure agreement to our armistice terms, it might then be logical to remove the question of peace in Korea from the hands of the United Nations Command.⁸⁸

General Clark's alternatives were discussed at a JCS-State meeting on 3 September 1952. The conferees agreed that they should be given detailed study. They agreed further that the proposed Presidential statement should not be made, but that other methods should be considered for putting forward the substance of the proposal contained in the draft statement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted this decision to General Clark on 4 September 1952, authorizing him meanwhile to continue his current tactics at the negotiating table.⁸⁹

Variations on a Theme

During the next three weeks, officials of the State and Defense Departments and of the White House intensively discussed various alternatives that had been put forth to break the deadlock at Panmunjom. A consensus emerged that the United States should, as General Clark had urged, force a showdown by presenting a proposal for settlement, then recessing if it was rejected. But the nature of the proposal and the duration of the recess—whether indefinite or of fixed and fairly short duration—were questions on which the President's civilian and military advisors disagreed.

The discussion extended to a new plan suggested by President Miguel Aleman of Mexico, in a letter to the UN Secretary General on 2 September 1952. Under this plan, all POWs so desiring would be repatriated without delay. Each UN member approving the plan would guarantee to receive a certain number of the prisoners who resisted repatriation, to grant them immigration status, and to allow them to find work. When "normalcy" returned to the Asiatic con-

tinent, these states would facilitate the return of the temporary immigrants to their homes.⁹⁰

Within the administration, the judgment on this new proposal was that, while it probably would not in itself offer a "clear resolution" of the POW issue, the public attention that it would draw when it became known would provide an "excellent opportunity" for a Presidential proclamation requesting an immediate cease-fire. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Clark of these conclusions on 8 September 1952. They went on to explain the advantages of a Presidential proclamation, in a rebuttal to his message of 1 September in which he had opposed the idea. As far as the content of the proclamation was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that it would not require the enemy to accept publicly the principle of nonrepatriation in advance of an armistice. They believed that it would have more impact and would provide a more acceptable degree of "face-saving" if it came from the Chief Executive, rather than being "simply another item thrown on [the] table at Panmunjom." However, added the Joint Chiefs of Staff, once the President made his statement, the UNC delegation should follow up by presenting the plan at the table in executive session. Should the Communists reject the proposal, the fact that it was being offered shortly before the opening of the UN General Assembly on 14 October would increase UN support of the UNC position. The form of "further negotiations" had been purposely omitted from the draft statement to allow the enemy to make a counterproposal on this matter which, in turn, could lead to more productive discussions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the possibility that the enemy might renew the fighting after a political conference but pointed out that he could easily find a reason for doing so without using the POW question as a pretext.⁹¹

After cautioning CINCUNC not to make any public statement that might destroy the "face-saving aspect" of the proposed Presidential statement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proceeded to set forth, for General Clark's consideration, two alternative proposals to be laid on the table at the time the statement was made. In this connection, they revised in slashing fashion the plan submitted by CINCUNC on 1 September, involving five alternatives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved the last four of these because they involved a willingness by the UNC to accept the decision of other nations regarding the disposition of non-repatriates—a willingness that might be interpreted as a retreat from the basic UNC principle. CINCUNC's first alternative was amended to make it more acceptable to the Communists. Each side would agree that nonrepatriate POWs would be brought to the DMZ and there checked against the agreed lists; with the completion of this process, they would be considered as repatriated. However, those who desired to return to the side that had been detaining them would be allowed to do so; they would no longer be considered prisoners and would not take part in any further hostilities.

The second alternative presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff involved delivery of prisoners to the DMZ followed by interviews by representatives from each side, under the observation of the ICRC, joint Red Cross teams, joint military teams, or some combination of those; the prisoners would then be free to go to the side of their choice, as indicated in the interview.

If both alternatives were rejected, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to General Clark that the UNC state its readiness to put off the question of nonrepatriation and immediately to sign an armistice on the basis of the exchange of 83,000 Communist POWs for the 12,000 UN/ROK POWs, with other prisoners to be the subject of "further negotiations." Should the Communists question the nature of the forum envisaged for these negotiations, the UNC reply might suggest the MAC or the political conference mentioned in the agreement on Item 5. If the enemy refused all suggestions, the UNC, under the plan put forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would declare a recess for not more than three weeks.⁹²

The JCS message of 8 September 1952 to CINCUNC was the result of discussions with officials of the Department of State, who had in fact originated the first draft. From them had come the suggestion for a recess not exceeding three weeks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had favored an indefinite recess, but the diplomats were not yet ready for such a step. The JCS members had also indicated that, like General Clark, they had misgivings about the desirability of a Presidential proclamation or of an armistice that would merely postpone the disposition of nonrepatriated prisoners.⁹³

On 9 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General Clark the text of a revised Presidential proclamation, again drafted by the Department of State. Like its predecessor, it would call for an immediate armistice on the basis of articles already agreed upon, with exchange of prisoners on a basis of 83,000 for 12,000 followed by further negotiations on the disposition of remaining prisoners. The proclamation would then go on to cite the Mexican proposal as "one possible basis which could be considered in such negotiations," but would add that "there are other ways in which this matter could be dealt with without the use of force."⁹⁴

General Clark had not changed his mind on the dangers of leaving the POW question to "subsequent negotiations." He replied on 11 September that

to achieve an armistice which would release the Communists from the pressure of present military operations, particularly heavy air and naval bombardment, and at the same time leave a major issue unresolved has many disadvantages from a military point of view. There are increasing indications that the cumulative effects of our air operations are having increasingly severe results on the enemy; they can be expected to multiply as the intensity of our attacks remains unabated. I believe that to leave the decision as to disposition of non-repatriates to subsequent negotiations may well result in an armistice which would ultimately prove to our disadvantage.⁹⁵

If the President opted for the statement proposed by the Department of State, General Clark wanted it delayed until after he had had a chance to submit his proposal of 1 September, or those parts of it that had JCS approval. As for the two alternatives outlined in the JCS message of 8 September, the first, as General Clark pointed out, had already been offered and had been rejected by the enemy. The first would require each prisoner to state his preference at the time he was checked against the lists and was therefore similar to proposals involving screening or interviewing that had also been turned down by the Communists. Accordingly, General Clark proposed a revised version under which prisoners would be

taken to the DMZ and left free to go to the side of their choice, "without questioning, interview, or screening." If the enemy rejected this proposal and also the one subsequently to be offered in the Presidential statement, General Clark wished to declare a recess unilaterally for an indefinite period. "It is my strong personal conviction, shared by the UNC delegation," wrote General Clark, "that such a unilateral recess is absolutely essential to the firmness and dignity of the UN and US positions."⁹⁶

General Clark's continuing opposition to an immediate armistice, which would abandon the unrepatiated prisoners to the later decisions of some unspecified body, was shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their superior, Secretary of Defense Lovett. The Department of State, on the other hand, was convinced that the time had come for the President to announce a definite offer of armistice on the basis of postponement of the disposition of prisoners. Following the receipt of General Clark's message of 11 September, Secretary Lovett apparently discussed the issue with Secretary Acheson and found that he supported his State Department subordinates.⁹⁷ Only the President could settle the issue.

The Department of Defense case was laid before President Truman on 15 September 1952. The President had called a conference with his principal military advisors to discuss the prospects for an armistice in Korea.⁹⁸ Probably he knew nothing at that time of the disagreement between the two Departments; in any case he obviously did not expect to discuss it at that time, otherwise he would have had State Department officials present.⁹⁹

The meeting was attended by Secretary Lovett and his deputy, Mr. Foster; General Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler, JCS members; the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, General John E. Hull, representing General Collins; the Service Secretaries or their representatives; and Admiral Libby, recently returned from Panmunjom. Secretary Lovett first summarized the situation in the light of recent discussions with General Clark. He quickly led up to the question at issue, namely, whether or not the President should publicly announce an offer to settle the war on the basis of agreements thus far reached, with an immediate exchange of prisoners desiring repatriation, leaving the disposition of other prisoners to be settled later. It was the "unanimous feeling," said Mr. Lovett, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, Mr. Foster, and himself, that no such offer should be made. To do so would be interpreted as evidence of weakness and would undermine the advantage being gained by increased military pressure; it would be unlikely to move the Communists, who were influenced only by force.

The President turned to the military men for an assessment of military possibilities in the current situation: to Admiral Fechteler and General Vandenberg on the prospect of exerting pressure through naval and air action, and to General Hull on the expansion and strengthening of ROK forces. As the discussion continued, the conferees warned the President that any evidence of a US willingness to go on negotiating indefinitely would lead the Communists to anticipate further concessions. They pointed out further that, if an immediate armistice were obtained, there would probably be pell-mell pressure to "bring the boys home," as at the end of World War II, and the United States would lose its remaining leverage in the subsequent negotiations.

According to Secretary Lovett's account, President Truman expressed complete agreement with the sentiments he had heard expressed. He admitted that he saw "no real prospect of getting an armistice" except by continuing the present course of action and increasing military pressure. He would not, he said, advance any such proposal as was advocated by the Department of State. It was necessary to "do our best" to see whether "additional military effort" would force the enemy to accept the "reasonable proposals" that had already been submitted. Admiral Fechteler pointed out that General Harrison was operating under instructions that required him, when proposing a recess, to propose at the same time a date for a subsequent meeting, thus giving the Communists the impression that further concessions could be expected at the later meeting. He and Admiral Libby urged approval of General Clark's request for authority to declare indefinite recesses. The President gave his approval.

On the following day the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted a message instructing General Clark to present before the enemy the two proposals in their message of 8 September as well as the alternative in his message of 11 September and to declare an indefinite recess if all three were rejected. They discussed this message with representatives of the Department of State, making no mention of the previous day's meeting with the President. Not surprisingly, the State Department representatives refused to accept the JCS draft message and submitted one of their own. It provided that the two JCS proposals of 8 September would be submitted; if they were rejected, the President would issue a statement calling for an immediate armistice and prisoner exchange and General Harrison would introduce such a proposal at the negotiating table. The State Department draft moved toward the JCS position in one respect: if the Presidential proposal were rejected, General Harrison would be authorized to recess "for an indefinite period." The rest of the draft, however, was unacceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who at once reported the disagreement to Secretary Lovett, asking that it be brought to Secretary Acheson's attention.¹⁰⁰

Accompanied by Admirals Fechteler and Libby, Secretary Lovett met on 17 September with Secretary Acheson and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson. They discussed the advisability of a proposal for an armistice that would postpone for later consideration the disposition of nonrepatriates, as the State Department desired. The question of a possible Presidential proclamation was secondary and hardly figured in the discussion.¹⁰¹

Secretary Acheson stressed the importance of the approaching session of the UN General Assembly. For the United States to continue receiving support of other countries in the General Assembly, he said, it must be in position to say that it had exhausted every possibility of reaching an armistice. If the "Mexican proposition" had not been put forth in the negotiations, Secretary Acheson felt certain that the Assembly would direct that this be done.¹⁰² The question, then, was whether the United States should offer the Mexican proposition voluntarily or wait until directed to do so. Secretary Acheson felt that nothing would be lost by making the offer. If it was rejected, the US standing in the General Assembly would be improved; if it was accepted, the disputed prisoners would still be in

US custody and, if the negotiations dragged on indefinitely, they could be released as “political refugees,” thus disposing of the issue.

Secretary Lovett, supported by the two Admirals, upheld General Clark’s position that the UNC should make no more offers. The offer envisioned by the State Department would, in their opinion, amount to an alteration of the package proposal of 28 April. They reminded Secretary Acheson that the UN concession on the airfield issue in the 28 April package had been contingent on Communist acceptance of the principle of nonforcible repatriation but that the Communists were now treating the airfield issue as settled. Mr. Lovett thought that the United States should not offer the “Mexican proposition” and that if some other country did so, the United States would still be in a better position—free to accept or reject the offer—than if it had itself introduced the offer.

For Admiral Libby, the danger in State’s proposal was that the Communists might accept it, thereby placing themselves in position to drag out indefinitely the subsequent negotiations on the POWs while building up their military strength. They would also use the negotiations as an opportunity to try to “pressure” the United States on other important Far Eastern matters, including the seating of Communist China in the United Nations and the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from the Strait of Taiwan. Secretary Acheson asked about the military effect of accepting an armistice with the POW question still outstanding; it seemed to him that the enemy would in any case be free to make a build-up after an armistice. Admiral Libby replied that the situation would be “vastly different.” If the enemy agreed to the present UNC position on POWs it would mean he wanted an armistice “badly.” Probably many of the Chinese forces would return to China. On the other hand if the POW issue were left unsettled during an armistice the chances of an ultimate peace settlement would be greatly reduced, and probably neither side would cut down on its military forces in Korea. Admiral Fechteler warned that, if the POW issue were left unsettled, the Communists would, “with justification,” feel entitled to maintain or augment their military strength in Korea pending final settlement of the issue. In the United States, however, conclusion of an armistice would bring pressure from the US public to bring US forces out of Korea, leading to a deterioration in the UNC capability to a point where the remaining forces would be highly vulnerable. Admiral Fechteler called this risk “militarily unacceptable.”

The two Secretaries finally agreed to discuss the matter further. If these discussions were held, they failed to settle the question, which had to go to President Truman for a decision.

Release of South Korean POWs

While the question of the “Mexican Proposition” remained unsettled, General Clark launched a process that disposed of some of the prisoners in UNC hands, though it did not bring the issue any closer to solution. There were in UNC custody approximately 16,000 POWs of South Korean origin, of whom

11,000 had stated they did not want to return to Communist control. While information on their backgrounds was insufficient to justify reclassifying them as "civilian internees," it had been established that they were bona fide nationals of the ROK. In this group were ex-ROK soldiers, civilians impressed by the North Korean Army, and others who had been swept up by mistake in the UNC dragnet at a time when many infiltrators in civilian clothes were threatening the security of the UNC rear areas. President Syngman Rhee had for some time been pressing CINCUNC to release these men.¹⁰³

On 25 August 1952 General Clark asked Washington for authority to release these 11,000 South Koreans. "In my opinion," he wrote, "the further retention of this group of anti-Communists can no longer be justified." Their release would relieve some of the administrative and logistical burden on the UNC and release some security forces for combat. More importantly, it would "impress upon the enemy the firmness of our stand at the conference table." Release could be effected in conformity with the Geneva Convention, which specified that a "competent tribunal" could examine and resolve the status of "doubtful" POWs. General Clark proposed for this purpose to set up a joint ROK-US tribunal. The entire process could be accomplished within 70 days if Washington authorities approved.¹⁰⁴

General Collins was inclined to favor General Clark's plan, although he saw no reason why the South Korean prisoners could not immediately be reclassified as civilian internees and released without the cumbersome procedure of a tribunal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the matter with State Department officials, who had some reservations in light of the Sino-Soviet talks then in progress and the projected Presidential statement based on the Hallinan and Aleman proposals. Decision was held up while the Department of State consulted Ambassador Kennan. He gave his judgment that the release should not be made if the Presidential statement was to be issued.¹⁰⁵

Despite this advice, the Department of State decided not to object to the release. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 September, State Department officials stipulated only that the process must take place before any offer based on the "Mexican" proposal was submitted to the enemy.¹⁰⁶ The Joint Chiefs of Staff included this caution in a message that they drafted to General Clark, authorizing him to proceed with the release. Unless he had some objection, they instructed him to announce at once that the prisoners had been reclassified as civilian internees and then to handle them like the earlier civilian internees who had been released, instead of going through the procedure of examination by tribunals. They sent this message to General Clark on 15 September, after the President had approved it.¹⁰⁷

At Panmunjom, the delegations were still meeting at eight-day intervals; the next session was scheduled for 20 September. General Clark decided to withhold the announcement until after that session, to avoid giving the enemy an opportunity for propaganda in the meeting. Accordingly, as soon as the meeting had ended (following the usual fruitless exchange of denunciations), the UN Command announced that approximately 11,000 South Koreans in UN custody had been reclassified from POW to civilian internee status and would be released to

the ROK beginning on 1 October. A subsequent letter of protest from General Nam Il was ignored.¹⁰⁸

The Department of Defense Is Upheld

Following the Lovett-Acheson meeting on 17 September, a week elapsed before President Truman settled the disagreement between the Departments of State and Defense. Meanwhile on 23 September General Clark, sensing that a decision was near, submitted the drafts of statements to be made by General Harrison in introducing the various proposals that were under consideration.¹⁰⁹

The President's decision came at a full-dress meeting with his civilian and military advisors, held on 24 September 1952. Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster attended in place of Mr. Lovett. General Hull again represented General Collins, while General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, sat in for General Vandenberg. General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler were there, as were the Service Secretaries. The State Department contingent consisted of Secretary Acheson and several key officials of the Department. Others present included the President's Special Adviser, Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman, and General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence.¹¹⁰

At President Truman's request, Secretary Acheson spoke first and gave a summary of the differences between the two Departments, pointing out that the extent of the differences should not be exaggerated. Both Departments, he said, were agreed that the UNC delegation should make a strong statement to the Communists supporting the 28 April package proposal and, if the enemy again rejected it, should call for an indefinite recess. During this recess the United States would "bring to bear such additional military and other pressures as we might be able to develop." But, warned Secretary Acheson, this course of action might have certain undesirable consequences. It might displease other countries and lead to a movement, in the forthcoming General Assembly, to establish some sort of UN commission to take over direction of the Korean War—a step that would "make it impossible for us to fight a war there effectively." The State Department was already drafting plans to head off any such development in the Assembly. The call for an indefinite recess, the Secretary continued, would have domestic repercussions. Some would see it as evidence that the administration was at a loss to know what to do in Korea. The "impatient element," who had been advocating that the United States "shoot the works" in Korea (and who had been losing ground according to recent public opinion polls), might undergo a resurgence.

The Secretary of State then summarized the "so-called Mexican proposal," that is, immediate armistice on the basis of exchange of the 83,000 Communist prisoners desiring repatriation for the 12,000 UNC prisoners held by the enemy, with the fate of the remainder left to further negotiations. He recognized that any such proposal, if presented, must be accompanied by unequivocal evidence that the UNC was not weakening its stand on forced repatriation. The Secretary

pointed out quite objectively the reasons why State supported this proposal and why the Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Clark, opposed it. Mr. Acheson acknowledged the validity of JCS reasons for opposition and conceded that "subsequent negotiation" would complicate the political discussions and generate strong pressures within the United States for withdrawal of its troops from Korea.

President Truman stated that the United States was faced with the question of whether "we should do anything in the world to get an armistice in Korea." He was not willing to get an armistice "just for the sake of an armistice," particularly if it would leave Communist China in a position to renew the fighting. Not for this had he worked for seven years to avoid a third World War. Securing an armistice of the type involved in the State Department proposal would place the United States in the same position it had been in September 1945, when "we tore up a great fighting machine" at the very time it should have been kept intact. He did not wish to be placed in a position where the United States would lose the gains it had made since 25 June 1950. After these remarks, which showed that he had not altered his opinions since 15 September, the President asked for the "bedrock" opinions of the others.

Speaking first for the Defense Department, Acting Secretary Foster pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the field commanders opposed any armistice that did not "wind up the whole thing." They believed that the United States should increase the military pressures until a real armistice could be obtained and that to put off the POW issue for political discussions would be most unwise. Means of exerting pressure included more intensive bombing, further expansion of the ROK Army, use of Chinese Nationalist forces, and amphibious landings in Korea. "Everybody in Defense," continued Mr. Foster, believed the time had come to inform the enemy that no further concessions would be made—to make it plain that there would be no yielding on the issue of forcible repatriation. General Harrison should state the final terms and give the enemy ten days to think it over, as General Clark had proposed in his message of 23 September (which the President had read). If the Communists rejected these terms, the United States should indefinitely recess the negotiations, at the same time increasing military pressures.

General Bradley underscored the JCS view that if the United States held firm on no forced repatriation it could exert a "strong deterrent effect" elsewhere, since the Communists might worry about losing a large number of men through desertion. If the United States gave in, on the other hand, and allowed the prisoner issue to go to political discussions, the result might be to delay rather than to expedite an eventual settlement, because the Communists would expect further concessions in the subsequent negotiations. He asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be allowed to authorize General Clark to proceed with actions he had outlined in his 23 September message.

In answer to a question by the President, General Smith, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said that there were definite signs that the Chinese were feeling the economic pressures of the war and that it appeared they wanted to find a solution in Korea. In the CIA view, a mere armistice would not

solve the real problem. There could be no real peace in Asia so long as the Communist Chinese had the "potentiality for further devilment." General Smith agreed that every means of putting pressure on the Chinese should be exploited.

Under Secretary of the Air Force Roswell L. Gilpatric assured the President that the Air Force had an increased capability for action in Korea and could deliver some "very telling" blows. Secretary of the Army Pace stated that the opposing armies were well dug in and that if either side undertook a major offensive, it would suffer heavy casualties. General Bradley and General Hull agreed. Admiral Fichteler judged that the Navy could, if necessary, enforce a blockade of China. He went on to summarize the conclusion of Admiral Libby that the Communists would never yield on the POW issue if military pressure was lifted and that it would be extremely difficult to confine any subsequent negotiations to the subject of Korea. General Smith drew attention to the potential value of Chinese Nationalist forces, which, he said, constituted a "pistol at the head" of the Chinese Communists.

After hearing these views, the President announced a decision in favor of the Defense Department position. He directed that General Harrison sum up the situation for the enemy and again lay the package proposal on the table, allowing ten days for reply; if the proposal was rejected, the United States would then declare an indefinite recess and "be prepared to do such other things as may be necessary." The President emphasized that his decision ruled out any deferral of the POW issue for later political discussions and directed that the additional pressures would be brought to bear immediately upon the declaration of an indefinite recess.

On the following day, 25 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted the President's decision to General Clark. They instructed him that General Harrison should, preferably at the next scheduled meeting (28 September), submit three alternative proposals for settling the prisoner issue. General Harrison was not to accept an immediate enemy rejection but was to propose a ten-day recess to allow time for the proposals to be studied. If, at the next session, the Communists rejected all three and offered no counterproposal, the UNC delegation was authorized to recess indefinitely, indicating willingness to reconvene only after the Communists had submitted new proposals in writing. Appropriate statements would at that time be issued by the UNC and in Washington, backing up the UNC delegation. "Also, within your capabilities," directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "you should maintain unrelenting military pressure on the enemy, particularly through air action. No major ground offensive action should be contemplated at this time."¹¹¹

The three alternatives authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the two outlined in their message of 8 September plus the one in General Clark's message of 11 September. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that these were very similar but believed there was enough difference to warrant presenting them as "new" proposals, in order to emphasize the many efforts of the UNC to solve the POW issue and the enemy's obduracy. They instructed General Clark to submit for their approval the text of the statement that General Harrison planned to make in connection with the indefinite recess. The statement, they pointed out,

required "most careful consideration"; it should have "maximum impact" on the enemy negotiating position but should minimize any impression that the UNC had "unilaterally and irrevocably" broken off the negotiations. Coordination with supporting statements to be issued at the same time in Washington was also necessary.¹¹²

President Truman added his personal touch to these instructions when he told General Clark on 26 September:

You have received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff my approval of a course of action to be followed at Panmunjom. I hope that the initial statement by our delegation can be made in meeting on 28 September, that it be [sic] presented with the utmost firmness and without subsequent debate, and with insistence that the Communists reply be given at a meeting to be held on or about 8 October.

If this latter meeting does not produce the results we seek, it then must be made unmistakably clear to the Communists, first, that having made a firm proposal for a fair and just armistice, we declare an indefinite recess of the meetings; and second, that we are willing to reconvene when and if the Communists express a willingness to accept our proposal. It is essential of course that throughout this coming period the military pressure which you are so effectively applying against the enemy should not be lessened.¹¹³

The Recess at Panmunjom

At a plenary session on 28 September 1952, General Harrison opened with a short statement, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then submitted the three approved proposals, which were:

(1) Transfer of all prisoners to the DMZ, where they would be identified and checked against agreed lists, at which time they would be considered as having been fully repatriated, except that any prisoner who indicated a desire to return to the side by which he had been detained would be allowed to do so.

(2) Transfer to the DMZ of those prisoners opposing repatriation, where they would be interviewed by members of a neutral group to determine their wishes.

(3) Transfer of these same prisoners to the DMZ, where they would be released and would be free to go to the side of their choice.

Urging the enemy to give "mature and careful consideration" to these proposals, General Harrison suggested a recess until 8 October. The enemy countered with a request for a recess until that afternoon, which the UNC granted. When the delegations reassembled, General Nam Il indicated that he found nothing new in any of the proposals but agreed to the proposed ten-day recess.¹¹⁴

While he awaited the all-important session of 8 October, General Clark forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the draft of a statement to be made by General Harrison and one to be released by him simultaneously, if the Communist answer was negative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed these carefully, discussed them with the Department of State, and approved them with minor changes. They instructed General Clark that, when the time came, he should avoid speaking of an "indefinite recess," and if queried on this point, should

reply that the recess was "indefinite" only insofar as its duration was up to the Communists.¹¹⁵

The delegations assembled again at 1100 on 8 October 1952. General Nam Il spoke first and described the three UNC proposals of 28 September as being "run through by your unreasonable demand of forcible retention of war prisoners." They were therefore, he said, "unacceptable." After a short exchange, General Harrison delivered the lengthy formal statement that had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He summarized UNC efforts to settle the POW issue and assailed the enemy's stand as unreasonable, inconsistent, and inhumane. He concluded:

The United Nations Command has no further proposals to make. The proposals we have made remain open. The United Nations Command Delegation will not come here merely to listen to abuse and false propaganda. The United Nations is therefore calling a recess. We are not terminating these armistice negotiations, we are merely recessing them. We are willing to meet with you again at any time that you are ready to accept one of our proposals or to make a constructive proposal of your own, in writing, which could lead to an honorable armistice. Our liaison officers will be available for consultation and for transaction of their customary duties.

The meeting ended at 1203.¹¹⁶

In Tokyo, General Clark promptly released his prepared statement, in which he declared that the UNC had "striven earnestly and patiently for 15 months to end grievous costs in Korea," but that the enemy had refused to allow the POW issue "to be resolved in accord with moral dictates which most of humanity holds to be fundamental." "We continue ready to conclude an armistice acceptable to the conscience of free peoples," he concluded. "It is up to the Communists to show whether they want such an armistice."¹¹⁷

At the same time, Secretary of State Acheson released a statement in Washington affirming US adherence to the principle of voluntary repatriation. As he stated:

We have said and will continue to say that we shall not compromise on the principle that a prisoner should not be forced to return against his will. For us to weaken in our resolve would constitute an abandonment of the principles fundamental to this country and the United Nations. We shall not trade in the lives of men. We shall not forcibly deliver human beings into Communist hands.¹¹⁸

Three days later, the UNC delegation received from General Nam Il a "strong protest" against the breaking off of negotiations. General Clark passed this to Washington, pointing out that, in his view "military aspects of the armistice negotiations have been completed." However, he proposed to make a brief reply to the enemy's note restating his willingness to reconvene as soon as the Communists gave evidence of a relaxation of their stance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this proposal, again cautioning General Clark not to use the phrase "indefinite recess." Also, while they agreed that the "military aspects" of the armistice "may in fact prove to be completed," they told General Clark that the UNC should avoid any implication of a desire to have the negotiations trans-

ferred to some other forum. The UNC reply was delivered to the Communists via liaison officers on 16 October.¹¹⁹

Three hours after delivering this reply, General Harrison received a longer letter signed by the two top-ranking enemy military commanders, Kim Il Sung of the North Korean People's Army and Peng Teh-huai of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The letter assailed the UNC stand and urged that the negotiations be resumed and that an armistice be concluded promptly on the basis of total repatriation of prisoners. General Clark drafted a reply that would dismiss the enemy letter as containing "nothing new or constructive" and as not providing "a valid basis for resumption of delegation meetings." However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consulting the Department of State, told General Clark on 18 October that the enemy letter, while it admittedly held nothing new, was "so speciously presented and appears so reasonable" that it had "raised doubts in some friendly quarters" as to the correctness of the US position. They therefore added to General Clark's proposed reply a statement that the enemy letter was simply the "same old package containing your time-worn demand that [the] UNC drive unwilling prisoners back to your custody." The delivery of this reply on 20 October 1952 ended the incident.¹²⁰

Thus the negotiations ground to a halt, 15 months after they had begun, and almost six months after the UNC had delivered its "final" package proposal on 28 April 1952. It was left for liaison officers to maintain contact between the delegations. Diplomacy seemed to have reached a dead end, except for some futile efforts at settlement that were made in the United Nations. Six more months were to elapse before a new and ultimately successful chapter in the negotiations opened in the spring of 1953.

Problems and Progress

Korea as an Issue in 1952

A groundswell of feeling that the Korean War, which was costing the United States heavily in casualties and in money, had dragged on too long, grew more and more evident among Americans by mid-1952. Mounting demands for ending the war gave the administration good cause to fear that further deterioration of public support might force the UNC into an unfavorable position in the negotiations and prevent it from gaining its objectives. Although this fear was not borne out, the mere possibility had some influence on courses of action on the battle front and at Panmunjom.

The national policy toward Korea came under intense scrutiny as a major issue in the campaigns of the two principal candidates for the Presidency in mid- and late 1952. From the time of the nomination of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Republican candidate on 11 July 1952, administration policy toward Korea drew increasingly severe criticism from Republican spokesmen, including the candidate himself. The Democratic candidate, Governor Adlai Stevenson, on the other hand, loyally defended the administration's record. Yet both candidates professed to seek an end to the fighting by political means. Neither talked of clear-cut military victory. In view of the election year atmosphere that fostered partisan criticism of the administration's policies and the possibility of a change in the direction of the war if the Republicans won the election, caution in action, if not in rhetoric, characterized late 1952.

General Eisenhower did not question President Truman's decision to intervene in Korea, but he made much of the charge that Secretary Acheson, by his speech in January 1950 outlining the US defense perimeter in the Far East, had virtually invited the North Koreans to attack South Korea. The General also criticized the subsequent decision to negotiate, saying in one of his speeches that the United States had walked into a Soviet trap and that "for 15 months now, free world diplomacy has been trying to climb the walls of a bear pit. . . ."¹

At one juncture, General Eisenhower expressed doubt that “there is any clear-cut answer to bringing the Korean War to a successful conclusion.” As the campaign progressed and he became more aware of the importance of the Korean War as an issue, the Republican candidate became more specific. One of his principal recommendations was that the ROK forces be built up to replace US forces in the battle line. On 2 October, General Eisenhower proclaimed:

There is no sense in the United Nations, with America bearing the brunt of the thing, being constantly compelled to man those front lines. That is a job for the Koreans. We do not want Asia to feel that the white man of the West is his enemy. If there must be a war there, let it be Asians against Asians, with our support on the side of freedom.

The climactic point of the campaign came in a speech in Detroit on 24 October, when General Eisenhower committed his prestige to an end to the war. The first task of a new administration, he said,

will be to review and re-examine every course of action open to us with one goal in view: To bring the Korean War to an early and honorable end. That is my pledge to the American people. . . . A new Administration . . . will begin with its President taking a simple, firm resolution. That resolution will be: To forego the diversions of politics and to concentrate on the job of ending the Korean War—until the job is honorably done. That job requires a personal trip to Korea. I shall make that trip. Only in that way could I learn how best to serve the American people in the cause of peace. I shall go to Korea.²

In the end, General Eisenhower and his running mate, Senator Richard M. Nixon, were elected by a substantial electoral majority (442 votes to 89), with a margin of approximately 5–4 in popular votes.³ Thus one of the two key figures of the Cold War—Harry S Truman—left the world stage. His great protagonist, Josef Stalin, was to disappear four months later.

Inevitably, the impending change of administration introduced a note of uncertainty into US foreign relations and specifically into the problem of the Korean War and the armistice negotiations. Despite General Eisenhower’s use of the conflict as a campaign issue, he had not made his position entirely clear, particularly on the all-important issue on nonforcible repatriation, on which the Truman administration had accepted the risk of indefinitely suspending the negotiations. Uncertainty on this point was removed on 19 November 1952, when Republican Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, a member of the US delegation in the UN General Assembly, assured the press, on the basis of a recent conversation, that the President-elect emphatically opposed forced repatriation.⁴

The UN General Assembly Enters the Picture

As the US Presidential campaign was moving toward its climax, UN delegates gathered in New York for the seventh session of the General Assembly,

which was scheduled to open on 14 October. Only six days earlier, armistice negotiations had been broken off at Panmunjom, with no prospect of immediate resumption. In the light of this deadlock, it was inevitable that the delegates should try to take into their own hands the responsibility for ending the war, which was now well into its third year.

The Department of State drafted a resolution intended to rally support in the Assembly for the US position. The resolution would approve the efforts made by the UNC delegation to reach a settlement; would point out that only one issue blocked the way to peace; and would urge the enemy to accept the UNC stand on voluntary repatriation and to end the bloodshed on that basis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the draft resolution and generally accepted it but thought that it should contain a statement explicitly disavowing any settlement that would leave the disposition of nonrepatriates to be determined after an armistice.⁵

The JCS recommendation was not accepted; the resolution in its original form was submitted to the First Committee (Political and Security) of the General Assembly, in accord with established UN procedure. Secretary Acheson made the submission, accompanying it with a lengthy review of the conflict and its background and of the course of the negotiations. "We must not and we cannot buy peace at the price of honor," he warned his hearers.⁶

During the next two weeks a number of other proposals were advanced. The Mexican delegation introduced a resolution based on the proposal advanced earlier by President Aleman (described in the preceding chapter), to resettle nonrepatriated prisoners temporarily in UN member countries. Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky proposed a commission to seek a general settlement of the Korean problem, to be composed of the "parties directly concerned" and also of "states not participating in the war." This suggestion for a UN commission was taken up in resolutions formulated by Peru, Indonesia, and Iraq, all of which would empower the commission to seek a settlement of the POW issue or to assume the responsibility for supervising nonrepatriated prisoners. The principal US delegate, Ambassador Warren Austin, noted on 6 November that these and other proposals, some in rather vague form, reflected an emerging consensus that it was up to the Assembly to set up some sort of machinery both to settle the war and to dispose of prisoners. But, he added, this consensus also included a conviction that prisoners should not be repatriated by force.⁷

Earlier, Secretary Lovett had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to amplify their objection to an armistice that would postpone until later the disposition of nonrepatriates. A full exposition of the military viewpoint on this question was desired, he indicated, for use by the US delegation in opposing any such proposals. Replying nearly three weeks later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the package proposal of 28 April 1952 had provided unequivocally that UNC acceptance of the Communists' position on airfield rehabilitation was contingent upon the enemy's acceptance of the UNC stand on POWs and on the composition of the NNSC. The UNC offer had been final; no substantive changes would be accepted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the concession on airfields so important that it would be warranted only if there were a final, complete settle-

ment of the POW question, with no residual military issues remaining. Anything less would breach the package and be "extremely damaging to the prestige of the United States." Air superiority over North Korea gave the UNC its main military advantage and, along with the naval blockade of Korea, had enabled the UNC to hold its position on the ground in the face of superior numbers. Should the UNC sign an armistice without adequate safeguards the enemy could, during the truce, build up his air power and pose a dangerous threat to South Korea. If the POW questions were not fully resolved before an armistice the enemy would have a ready pretext to renew hostilities whenever he was prepared. Moreover, since the Communists had thus far refused to accept the principle of no forced repatriation while they were under military pressure, it was most unlikely that they would do so in negotiations after an armistice. It was more than likely, in the JCS view, that the Communists would "prolong their intransigent tactics while improving their military facilities in North Korea." On the other hand, with the POW issue remaining unresolved, "it is probable that the United States representatives would come under increasing pressure for settlement of this problem on the Communist terms in order to reduce the threat of a renewal of hostilities under conditions favorable to the Communists."⁸

Secretary Lovett fully approved the JCS views and so informed the Secretary of State on 18 November, adding some considerations of his own. If the disposition of nonrepatriated POWs were left for settlement in a postarmistice political conference, Secretary Lovett foresaw that Communist delaying tactics would force the United States to maintain or perhaps even to increase the number of troops in Korea. Alternately, pressure in the United States to "bring the boys home" might force a weakening of US strength while the Communists "engaged in a substantial military buildup." The US Government might ultimately find itself forced to abandon its position on repatriation or to purchase the Communist agreement by yielding on other important issues.⁹

India Complicates Matters

During the first half of November 1952, while the First Committee was discussing various possibilities, a new plan formulated by the Indian delegation took shape and soon overshadowed all others. This plan would establish a face-saving procedure that might be acceptable to the Communists while offering a way to avoid forcible repatriation. In its final form, as submitted to the First Committee, the Indian proposal called for a four-nation Repatriation Commission to take charge of all prisoners. It would be staffed by representatives from the four countries already named to the NNSC in the draft armistice agreement (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland) or, alternatively, from other nations nominated by the two sides, excluding members of the UN Security Council and countries participating in the fighting. Deadlocks in the Repatriation Commission would be resolved by an umpire. All prisoners would be released

from military control and turned over to the commission. Those desiring to return home would be allowed to do so. Each side in the conflict would be given access to the prisoners and allowed to "explain" their rights to be repatriated. The fate of those who, after 90 days, still opposed repatriation would be decided at the postarmistice political conference.¹⁰

This proposal was of capital importance, containing as it did the substance of the plan that was ultimately to be adopted. The United States regarded it as highly unacceptable, particularly in its original and somewhat vague form. Secretary Acheson viewed it as an effort "to transfer the writing of the armistice terms from Panmunjom and the United Nations Command to New York and the General Assembly under the leadership of India and the Arab-Asian bloc." He described some of the objectionable features of the plan to President Truman and the other members of his Cabinet on 18 November. The proposed repatriation commission would, he said,

repatriate those [prisoners] willing to return and hold the others captive. The only escape from captivity would be repatriation. Certain results would flow from this: we would be justly viewed as having repudiated our own principle; we would have to use force to turn over the prisoners to the commission or hold them for its disposition; and we would have a precarious armistice, which would deprive us of observation behind the enemy's line and ability to break up concentrations and supply lines and would carry the constant threat of riots in the rear of our army.¹¹

The Indian plan nonetheless won widespread support, notably from the United Kingdom, Canada, and France. Moreover, India's prestige with the "non-aligned" or "neutralist" countries—those comprising what was later to be called the "Third World"—made it necessary for the United States to exercise a certain caution in expressing opposition. Secretary Acheson and the members of the US delegation strove to head off the Indian initiative or, at the least, to mitigate some of its less desirable aspects. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not drawn into this effort, but on 16 November Secretary Lovett and General Bradley traveled to New York to meet with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and his opposite number from Canada, Mr. Lester B. Pearson, both of whom were supporting India. Secretary Acheson hoped that an explanation of the military dangers inherent in the plan might have an effect, but he was disappointed; the meeting accomplished little.¹²

The United States succeeded in having the Indian draft resolution modified to include a statement that force was not to be used against prisoners "to prevent or effect their return to their homeland." Secretary Acheson strove without success, however, to delete the proposal to leave the fate of nonrepatriates to the political conference; he pointed out to Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Pearson that this idea had been thoroughly examined in Washington and rejected on the unanimous recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary was also unhappy with the machinery of the repatriation commission, fearing that it would be paralyzed by deadlocks that could not be removed or overcome by the proposed "umpire."¹³

After the Indian resolution was introduced into the First Committee on 17 November,¹⁴ Secretary Acheson sought amendments that would establish a time limit for retention of nonrepatriates by the proposed commission and would give the commission a neutral chairman with executive powers. His efforts were unwittingly assisted by Mr. Vishinsky, who on 24 November “publicly and harshly” denounced the resolution. In the end, the United States won concessions on both points. The resolution was amended to provide that the umpire would function as a chairman of the commission and that if no umpire were chosen within three weeks after the establishment of the commission, the matter would be referred to the General Assembly. The political conference would be allowed 30 days to decide what should be done with nonrepatriates; thereafter the responsibility for the care, maintenance, and subsequent disposition of these former prisoners would be transferred to the United Nations. Thus amended, the resolution was approved by the First Committee on 1 December and by the full Assembly two days later.¹⁵

In his capacity as president of the General Assembly, Mr. Pearson on 6 December transmitted the resolution to Communist China and North Korea, urging them to accept it as the basis for an armistice. Ten days later, Communist China flatly rejected the proposal; North Korea followed suit soon afterwards.¹⁶ But the ideas embodied in the resolution were by no means dead.

Difficulties with Communist Prisoners

When the UNC delegation suspended negotiations on 8 October 1952, the Communists at once stepped up their propaganda. The favorite charge of murders and other atrocities against Communist prisoners was heard once more. Unfortunately, during late 1952 and early 1953, rioting and lesser disorders resulted in the slaying and wounding of prisoners by UNC guards, giving some credence to Communist charges. As if under orders from P’yongyang and Peking, the prisoners defiantly courted the harsh measures needed to control them. The Communists, through their liaison officers at Panmunjom, lodged a series of vehement complaints. On 1 November they made a “serious protest” over the mass murder of prisoners, following this in November with five other “serious protests.” The UNC replied to none of these.¹⁷

A particularly bloody incident occurred on the small island of Pongam-do, where Communist civilian internees staged a well-planned uprising on 14 December. In the ensuing battle between guards and prisoners, 85 civilian internees were killed and 113 wounded seriously. Charges stemming from this incident were particularly virulent and received international publicity. At the General Assembly, the Soviet Union sought the condemnation of the United States for the “mass murder” of prisoners of war at Pongam-do. The Soviet bid was defeated, however, by a vote of 45 to 5 with 10 abstentions.¹⁸

General Nam Il charged on 30 December that since the beginning of negotiations the UNC had killed or wounded more than 3,000 prisoners in its custody.

These figures were based on the UNC's own reports and on those of the ICRC. "The heroic and undaunted resistance of our captured personnel," proclaimed Nam Il, "and the open confession of your former prisoner of war commandants, Dodd and Colson, have long since exposed before the people of the whole world the brutal features of your side in carrying out slaughters of war prisoners for the purpose of retaining them."¹⁹

General Clark recognized these Communist accusations for what they were but, nevertheless, did not like what was going on in the camps, even though prisoners were being kept under much tighter control than before his arrival. He held no illusions that the prisoners were acting on their own or that they were being mistreated. In general, when a prisoner was shot or injured it was a direct result of his deliberate defiance of authority. CINCUNC was, however, concerned that there might be cases where UNC guards were overreacting and that some of the prisoner casualties, especially killings for relatively minor violations such as breaking curfew, could have been avoided. He directed the Commanding General, Korean Communication Zone (Major General Thomas W. Herren, USA), who was responsible for the prisoner camps, to minimize deaths and injuries among prisoners and to avoid undue harshness. General Herren replied that every possible step was being taken to avoid killing or wounding prisoners and that disciplinary action had already been taken against some guards for offenses against prisoners. On 9 January 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed confidence in the measures that General Clark was taking to maintain control over the prisoners.²⁰

General Clark had for some time been seeking authority to bring to trial prisoners who committed crimes while in captivity. The absence of this authority was a severe handicap, since he could administer only minor non-judicial punishment such as limited solitary confinement. In July 1952 General Clark asked to be authorized to appoint a UN military commission, as provided under the Geneva Convention, to try POWs charged with committing serious crimes after capture. On 18 August, having received no reply, he renewed his request, citing recent violence within the camps. Lack of a judicial system, he pointed out, weakened the disciplinary power of the camp commanders to such a degree that they could hardly be held responsible for the breakdown of internal order.²¹

From Seoul, Ambassador Muccio objected. He told the Secretary of State on 22 August that, "after living through months of unfavorable propaganda centered on Koje-do," it would be "most unfortunate" to take any action that would expose the UNC to a new barrage. He thought that the problem was manageable without the authority that General Clark was requesting. Discipline could be maintained by promptly apprehending troublemakers and subjecting them to "close confinement consistent with [the] magnitude of [the] crime," followed by segregation from the rest of the prisoners. The only advantage in bringing prisoners to trial would be to make possible a sentence of capital punishment, which, however, was in no case desirable. If a decision were made to go ahead with the proposed trial authority, Ambassador Muccio urged that priority be given to minor offenders and that the prosecution deliberately forego any demand for the maximum penalty.²²

General Clark took exception to the Ambassador's views. In an immediate letter to General Bradley, he objected to the idea of trying lesser cases first and insisted that he must be left free to determine the priority of trials. He proposed to give precedence to important offenders, particularly the leader of the May 1952 revolt in which General Dodd had been captured. The Department of the Army supported General Clark but was unable to obtain concurrence from the Department of State, where opinion was divided. President Truman, after consulting the Secretaries of State and Defense, agreed that the timing of the proposal was bad in view of current developments in the negotiations. General Clark was so advised on 2 September by General Collins, who concluded, "It is doubtful that a decision will be reached in the immediate future."²³

The significant upsurge in disorders, riots, and killings in the POW camps following the October recess impelled General Clark again to seek permission to try postcapture offenders. "Without authority for proper judicial action and with only limited disciplinary punishment available to each camp commander," he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 January, "it is almost impossible for camp authorities to impose standard punishments effectively. The pro-Communist prisoners know this and as I have previously stated, I believe it stimulates their enthusiasm to incite incidents." He dismissed as invalid the State Department objections to prisoner trials and reported that he had 35 cases, 27 of them involving murder, ready for trial if authority were granted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while agreeing that a UNC military commission would improve the situation, foresaw "many serious legal and political implications." They informed General Clark that they had recommended to the Secretary of Defense that he ask the President to name a high level interdepartmental committee to study the entire problem of prisoners of war and to submit recommendations.²⁴

In an effort to nullify the enemy's continuing propaganda charges, CINCUNC released on 28 January an intelligence study, "The Communist War in POW Camps," charging that the enemy was actually conducting a planned campaign among the prisoners, personally directed by General Nam Il and his deputy, General Lee Sang Jo. These two, the report showed, had master-minded the mutinies on Koje-do and Cheju-do in the previous spring.²⁵

General Clark renewed his petitions for POW trials on 4 February when he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the continued failure to exercise proper disciplinary measures against fanatical Communists was "embarrassing to me and unexplainable to our troops and the public." Attacks by prisoners against UNC guards had increased. One American soldier had been beaten to death by prisoners but CINCUNC had no authority adequately to punish the murderers.²⁶

After discussing this new request with officials of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 February recommended to the new Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, that CINCUNC be authorized to appoint a military commission to bring to trial those POWs charged with "post-capture acts of violence against members of UNC security forces." Secretary Wilson approved after clearing the matter with the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the authorization to CINCUNC on 20 February 1953.²⁷

This limited grant of authority did not satisfy General Clark, who wanted to take action also against prisoners guilty of crimes against their fellow prisoners. It was, he pointed out, difficult to distinguish between crimes of violence against UNC personnel and those against prisoners held by the UNC. Consequently, on 27 February the Joint Chiefs of Staff extended their earlier grant to include authority to try POWs charged with acts of violence against other prisoners that had occurred after the relocation and segregation of prisoners, also those who fomented or took part in riots subsequent to the receipt of the authorizing message.²⁸

Military Operations and Plans

As described in the preceding chapter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 25 September 1952, had authorized CINCFE to recess the negotiations indefinitely if the Communists did not accept the UNC offer to be made on 28 September. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed him, in the event of a recess, to “maintain unrelenting military pressure on [the] enemy, particularly through air action.” But, they added, “no major ground offensive action should be contemplated at this time.”²⁹

These contingent instructions automatically went into effect on 8 October, when the Communists rejected the UNC offer and General Harrison walked out. But already the intensity of the conflict had escalated. In September and early October the enemy launched a series of local offensives, obviously intended to improve his position before winter set in. General Van Fleet, in response, sought permission on 5 October to strengthen his defenses by seizing the hills of the “Iron Triangle” north of Kumhwa. Eighth Army had developed a plan for this purpose (Operation SHOWDOWN) using two battalions of US troops, one battalion of ROK troops, 16 battalions of artillery and 200 fighter-bomber sorties. With this force, General Van Fleet was confident that he could seize the objective in about five days at a cost of some 200 casualties. To bolster his argument, the Eighth Army Commander pointed out that “Our present course of defensive action in the face of the enemy initiative is resulting in the highest casualties since the heavy fighting of October and November 1951.”³⁰

General Clark approved the plan on 8 October, and the operation began six days later. The Communists reacted much more violently than anticipated. During the next six weeks a series of fierce see-saw battles for control of the Iron Triangle complex inflicted 9,000 US and ROK casualties and 19,000 casualties on the enemy. When the attacks and counterattacks dwindled out on 18 November, the results from the UNC standpoint were disappointing. Only a slight improvement had been made in the UNC military position and the cost in lives was excessive. Operation SHOWDOWN merely underscored the futility of attacking the enemy on the ground in the absence of overwhelming force at the line of battle.³¹

As for stepped-up air warfare, there was little that could be done over and above what FEAF was already doing. However, FEAF undertook a wide-ranging

attack on various military targets in connection with a deceptive operation—a simulated amphibious landing at Kojo, on the east coast about 25 miles below Wonsan, which, it was hoped, would lure enemy forces out of their fixed defenses and expose them to air and naval attack. The operation was carried out on 15 October by the 8th Cavalry Regiment, but the results were disappointing; enemy forces were not decoyed out of position. Whether the enemy saw through the plan or merely lacked the mobility to react promptly was not known.³²

Within the JCS organization, the consequences of a possible failure of the negotiations had been under study for some time. As early as February 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to consider courses of action to be adopted in Korea in the event that the negotiations were prolonged indefinitely or broke down altogether. Taking a broad view the Committee concluded that the Korean War was essentially a part of the larger problem of Chinese Communist aggression in Asia and that US-Asian policy should be reviewed to determine the extent to which the United States should commit military resources against Communist China. As for the specific question at hand, the Committee recommended that a study be undertaken of operational plans and force requirements to achieve a conclusion to the Korean War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation and on 30 April 1952 directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to make the necessary study.³³

Three weeks later the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave the JSPC a new assignment. The Committee was to recommend military courses of action under three alternative policies, as follows: (1) to clear all of Korea of enemy forces, "in order to attain a clear-cut military decision"; (2) to accept the status quo in Korea indefinitely; and (3) to accept "not less than the status quo" in Korea, simultaneously taking "all practical military measures" against North Korea and Communist China "in order to weaken their capacity for aggressive action."³⁴

In response to this new directive, the JSPC on 29 August 1952 submitted JCS 1776/310, recommending various military actions under the three assumptions. The Committee had calculated the additional US forces required under each assumption. The maximum, for the first assumption, was 11 more divisions (10 Army, 1 Marine), 54 warships, and 22 1/3 Air Force wings. In any case, the Committee believed, it would be necessary to authorize the use of atomic weapons against military targets in the Far East.³⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed this study on 5 September and sent it back to the JSPC. They decided that it had placed too much stress on the use of atomic weapons and wanted this question studied more carefully. They also wished a reconsideration of the proposed force increases. The JSPC asked for a new directive that would consolidate this assignment with the study that had been ordered on 30 April 1952 (though not yet completed). The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly issued a revised directive on 7 October 1952 directing the JSPC, in collaboration with the JLPC and JIC, to prepare an estimate of the situation in Korea and to recommend military courses of action. The product of this new study became available several months later and proved of value in connection with a review of Korean policy undertaken by the new administration.³⁶

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sought the advice of General Clark. They told him on 23 September that they were considering future operations in the Far East in the event that negotiations failed. They foresaw that it might prove necessary to remove current operating restrictions except for attacks against the USSR and use of atomic or chemical weapons. Under consideration were: (1) amphibious, airborne, or ground offensives to increase pressure on the enemy and possibly to secure the "waist" or other areas of Korea; (2) air attacks on airfield complexes; (3) blockade of China combined with air attacks on its transportation centers, providing additional forces were made available; and (4) air attacks on communication centers in northern and central China and Manchuria. They asked his views on these options under three different assumptions as to forces to be available: (1) those now available to him in Korea; (2) all forces under CINCFE command, in Korea and elsewhere; (3) these forces plus the 82d Airborne Division, one additional Marine division and air wing, plus two ROK divisions, six ROK regiments, five Air Force wings, 49 naval vessels, and amphibious lift for one third of a division.³⁷

Replying on 29 September, CINCUNC asserted that the United States had failed to get an armistice because it had not placed enough military pressure on the enemy. He admitted the difficulties. The UNC faced an enemy far stronger in numbers, with high morale, dug in solidly in depth with ample logistical support. Under these circumstances, it was not feasible for the UNC to attempt a major attack with the forces then available and under the existing limitations on the scope of its military activity. Even if restrictions were removed, force limitations would make it impossible to exploit possible gains. On the other hand, even a larger force would have to pay prohibitive costs for any gains unless operations restrictions were loosened.³⁸

CINCUNC had already directed a study to determine the extent of aggressive action that would be needed to compel the enemy to seek or accept an armistice on US terms. He had laid down the following planning assumptions, which, he said, "have the force of my convictions": (1) that the Communists would not accept an armistice on present terms in the present military situation; (2) that the UNC would not yield on the forcible repatriation of POWs; and (3) that the actions contemplated would not cause the USSR to enter the hostilities. This study was expected to produce an outline plan that would be ready to present to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by about 20 October. Preliminary study had led him to the conclusion that, using only the forces then available, it would be infeasible to expand the ground war. It would be feasible to bomb targets north of the Yalu, although this would not achieve the desired military objective. If coupled with a naval blockade of China, attacks on targets in Manchuria and China might cause enough damage to force the enemy to accept armistice terms. Even if more forces were made available, these actions should be taken before a major ground or amphibious offensive were launched.

General Clark stressed the difference between simply exerting military pressure and winning a military victory. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that

it appears unwise to me to commit the resources, both human and material, and accept the losses inherent in offensive action or pressure that does not contemplate the destruction of hostile forces. An advance to the narrow waist of Korea (generally from P'yongyang to Wonsan) that failed to encompass a concept aimed at major destruction of enemy materiel and forces would not be worth the cost and would be disadvantageous to the UNC since a battle line there, though shorter, would not be as strong for a considerable period of time as our main defensive position as presently organized. Therefore I feel that any contemplated course of action must include provision for carrying the battle all the way to the Yalu in the event that a military victory cannot be achieved short of that line.³⁹

In a personal letter to General Collins on 9 October, General Clark repeated his conviction that, because of the enemy's favorable defensive dispositions and his "numerically superior" forces, positive aggressive action, designed to obtain a military victory and achieve an armistice on our terms, was not feasible. He believed, however, that his operational plan, which was now completed, would compel the enemy to seek or accept an armistice "on our terms." He had not included use of tactical atomic weapons in his planning but recommended that he be given authority to do so. He advised General Collins that he was sending a team of his officers to Washington to brief the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the plan, the concept of operations, and a statement of the forces required.⁴⁰

CINCUNC's plan (OPLAN 8-52) called for a drive to the line Wonsan-P'yongyang in three phases, each to last about three weeks. It comprised enveloping attacks to destroy maximum numbers of enemy forces and materiel, a major amphibious assault, airborne assaults on targets of opportunity, air and naval attacks on targets in China and Manchuria, and a naval blockade of China. A considerable increase of forces would, however, be required: three additional US or UN divisions, two divisions of the ROK Army and two of Chinese Nationalists, plus 12 battalions of artillery and 20 of antiaircraft artillery.⁴¹

The plan had been thoroughly discussed with General Van Fleet and with General Clark's air and naval component commanders, all of whom endorsed it. Whatever Washington's decision might be, General Clark was now prepared. "I knew we had to be ready with the plan," he wrote later, "if the turn of events called for a more vigorous prosecution of the war."⁴² The need was the greater in view of the possibility of a new administration in Washington, headed by an experienced military commander who might well be looking for fresh ideas.

OPLAN 8-52 was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 October 1952. In an accompanying letter, General Clark drew attention to the fact that the plan made no provision for use of atomic weapons but urged that "serious consideration" be given to removing the restriction on their employment. He believed these weapons would be essential if he was to make the most effective use of his air power against targets of opportunity and to neutralize enemy air bases in Manchuria and North China.⁴³

But while CINCUNC was pressing for a more vigorous conduct of the war in the hope of forcing a decision, a civilian official in the administration in Washington was counseling against such a course. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace

warned the Secretary of Defense on 16 October that an escalation of military action was irreconcilable with budgetary and manpower constraints. "Any course of action involving the extensive use of UN ground troops for forcing a decision in Korea," he wrote, "will not only prove unrealistic when measured against the availability of additional UN forces, budget requirements and our present mobilization base, but any prospect of implementing such a plan prior to 1954 is simply out of the question." Addressing the subject of increasing the ROK Army (which was then under active consideration), Secretary Pace favored such a step but warned that it would make possible a reduction of US manpower requirements only if military operations remained at their present level of low intensity. "It is in this connection," he concluded, "that I believe it is imperative that an early decision be reached with respect to our future policy in Korea particularly as it concerns any projected ground operations."⁴⁴

Following a briefing given the Joint Chiefs of Staff by CINCUNC's team of officers, General Collins informed CINCUNC on 7 November that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were studying OPLAN 8-52 and would consider his views on the use of atomic weapons. However, concluded the Chief of Staff, "our worldwide commitments for personnel and logistical support are extremely heavy, and I cannot give you any indication at this time as to what action may be taken. . . ."⁴⁵ This was of course only three days after the election of the new President. It was hardly likely that any decision would be forthcoming until the incoming administration had taken office and had a chance to study the Korean problem.

President-Elect Eisenhower Visits Korea

Fulfilling his campaign pledge, General Eisenhower flew to Korea less than a month following his election. The newly designated Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, accompanied him, along with General Bradley, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet), and others.⁴⁶

The party reached Korea on 2 December and remained for three days. General Clark and General Van Fleet conferred with the President-elect and conducted him on tours of the combat zone and the rear areas. He visited five frontline divisions, one reserve division in training and two corps headquarters. At Eighth Army headquarters he met all other division and corps commanders as well as the commanders of all UN combat units. General Eisenhower also visited President Rhee, who attempted to make political profit from their meeting.

Among the subjects on which General Eisenhower was briefed were the cost of augmenting ROK forces, the possible use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea, and personnel and ammunition shortages affecting UN forces. With respect to the first of these, a wide divergency appeared in cost estimates. But all agreed that the ROK Army should eventually be increased to 20 divisions. The use of Chinese Nationalist forces was generally deemed advisable "from a military point of view," but all admitted there were many political factors to be taken into account. General Chase, head of the MAAG on Taiwan, who had come to

meet the President-elect, reported that Chiang Kai-shek felt that "he should be asked again" to send forces to Korea.⁴⁷

General Clark informed General Eisenhower that US units were understrength by a total of 7,000 personnel. He needed a "large contingent now" and suggested that US troops might be withdrawn from another theater. Most serious of his present problems was a shortage of ammunition in almost all calibers.

Just before leaving Seoul on 5 December, General Eisenhower told a press conference that he had "no panaceas, no trick solutions" for the conflict. "As far as I know no decisions [were] reached," reported General Bradley after departure, "but great interest [was] shown in how these problems might be solved."⁴⁸

Despite the range of subjects discussed, General Clark found no opportunity to describe to the next President his OPLAN 8-52 for achieving victory in Korea. This fact, for General Clark, was "the most significant thing about the visit of the President-elect. . . . The question of how much it would take to win the war was never raised. It soon became apparent, in our many conversations, that he would seek an honorable truce."⁴⁹

Growing Danger to the UNC Military Position

Six weeks after returning from Korea, General Eisenhower assumed the mantle of the Presidency. At once he and his advisors plunged into a study of Korean policy and other major problems. Meanwhile the enemy carried out a reinforcement in Korea that caused considerable alarm to General Clark, who drew the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the changing situation on 11 February 1953. From one to three additional Chinese Communist armies, he reported, had entered Korea or were believed to be en route thereto. Even more threatening, however, was the enemy's growing air capability. The Chinese had now added Soviet IL-28 jet bombers to their air arsenal, together with additional early warning and ground controlled intercept (GCI) facilities, all of which strengthened both their offensive and defensive capabilities. The overall result, General Clark pointed out, was to cast serious doubt on the feasibility of OPLAN 8-52, which was now four months old. And the launching of attacks "on any appreciable scale" was wholly impractical with the forces available to him. The weather would favor enemy offensive operations up until the spring thaw in the middle of March and again from early May until early July, and a full-scale enemy offensive could be sustained for about two weeks. General Clark's own troops were understrength by some 21,000 men, or almost 7 percent of their authorized strength. It was important that his command be brought up to full strength, fully equipped and backed up by an adequate stockpile. "In summary," he concluded, "I desire to emphasize that increasing enemy capabilities, particularly ground and air, make it imperative that personnel, equipment and munitions be maintained at full strength at all times to ensure that, with forces available, a strong defensive capability can be maintained."⁵⁰

Two days later General Clark elaborated on the enemy air threat. A major air attack, he explained, was possible either alone or in coordination with a ground offensive, and even without assuming that the enemy would operate from bases in the Soviet Union, which General Clark did not believe he would do. Aside from the Soviet Far East air forces, the enemy had at that time 830 jet fighters, 250 piston fighters, 220 piston light bombers, and 90 jet bombers all in striking distance of targets in South Korea. About 90 percent of the total force could be mounted in an initial attack. To counter such an offensive, General Clark believed it "mandatory" that enemy capabilities be reduced in advance. For this purpose, a "maximum effort attack would be required against air bases in Manchuria." He therefore recommended that he be authorized to attack these bases "when in my judgment the scale of enemy air operation threatens the security of UNC forces in Korea."⁵¹

General Clark was also greatly concerned by the enemy's blatant use of the supposedly neutralized area of Kaesong as a major advanced military base. The enemy was using Kaesong to stage and resupply his forces on the entire western front. Large concentrations of troops, supplies, artillery and armor, and even command posts of several Chinese armies were located in the sanctuary area of Kaesong. General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if the Communists launched an offensive out of Kaesong, he would no longer feel obligated to observe the agreement of October 1951 regarding the neutralization of Kaesong. He strongly recommended that he be given "authority at once to abrogate the security agreements for the conduct of armistice negotiations at Panmunjom at such time as I become convinced that a major Communist offensive is in the making."⁵²

General Clark's messages regarding the air threat and the enemy's abuse of the Kaesong sanctuary were brought to the attention of President Eisenhower, who directed General Bradley to brief the National Security Council on both matters. After hearing General Bradley on 11 February 1953, the Council agreed that it would be desirable to notify the Communists that the arrangements for neutral zones around Kaesong and Munsan were abrogated. However, they approved a suggestion by the new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, that the agreement of allied countries should first be obtained.⁵³

In an interim reply on 13 February, following consultation with representatives of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred that if the Communists launched a division-sized offensive that was "clearly supported" from the Kaesong restricted area, the fact could be interpreted as abrogation of the security agreement and CINCUNC would have authority to strike back. It appeared impossible, however, to obtain authority for CINCUNC to abrogate the agreements governing the restricted zones merely because an attack appeared to be imminent. As an alternative, they suggested that he consider notifying the enemy that as of a specified date, the UNC no longer considered itself bound by the October 1951 agreement and would no longer regard Kaesong and Munsan as immune to attack but would continue to respect the neutrality of the roads leading from those places to Panmunjom. Complete abrogation of the agreement, added the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would have "adverse

political implications," especially in the light of the impending meeting of the UN General Assembly on 24 February.⁵⁴

On 19 February General Clark concurred in the JCS alternate plan and submitted the text of a letter that he proposed to send to the enemy commanders announcing the course of action that the UNC proposed to follow. He would make it clear that the UNC action was temporary and that the neutrality of Kaesong and Munsan would again be respected when the main delegations returned to full plenary sessions at Panmunjom.⁵⁵ Because of developments occurring soon afterward that pointed to resumption of negotiations, this letter was never sent; the entire subject was dropped.

With regard to Manchurian air bases, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified General Clark on 18 February that automatic authority to attack could not be granted. When the scale of enemy air operations threatened the security of UN forces and indicated a need to attack air bases outside Korea, General Clark was to report the facts at once to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with his recommendation for action.⁵⁶

A New Look at ROK Forces

The continuing problem of how and to what extent the United States should build and maintain active ROK military forces remained under intensive study both in Korea and in Washington. President Truman on 30 October 1952 had approved an increase in the ROK Army from 10 to 12 divisions. A much larger proposed expansion to 20 divisions was laid aside.⁵⁷

In the closing days of the Truman administration, Secretary of the Army Pace raised with Secretary of Defense Lovett the question of implementing the 20-division plan. Mr. Pace pointed out that this plan "transcends the capability and the responsibility of the Department of the Army" and for that reason he was referring it to the Department of Defense. In his view the ultimate goal should be ROK capability "to man the entire battle line in Korea just as soon as the trained manpower, leadership, and equipment" could be generated. He urged the Secretary of Defense, "after consultations with appropriate governmental agencies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff," to issue a directive prescribing force goals, priorities, and fiscal support to be accorded the desired program for the ROK forces.⁵⁸

On 5 December Secretary Lovett sent Secretary Pace's memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking them to consider and comment on the following specific matters:

1. The ultimate goal for expansion of the ROK Army.
2. The possible difficulties involved in increasing ROK forces for use in the Korean War beyond the force goals planned for the postwar period.
3. The prospect of withdrawing US forces from Korea, in view of the uncertain military situation which appeared likely to continue.
4. The time required to build ROK forces to the ultimate goals planned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. The probable effect of this buildup on Military Assistance Programs elsewhere and on the US war reserve strength.⁵⁹

Meanwhile the President-elect, following up his campaign statements and his Korean trip, had expressed considerable interest in the ROK buildup. On 17 December General Collins gave a detailed briefing on the subject to Secretary of Defense designate Charles E. Wilson. General Collins explained that the expansion of the ROKA to 20 divisions (640,000 men) was under study and probably could be accomplished within 18 months if the stalemate in Korea continued and if logistical support were available. The existing 12 ROK divisions, however, would suffer some loss in combat efficiency if cadres were withdrawn for divisions. Moreover, continued General Collins, a 20-division ROK Army would contribute little to US security interests apart from the immediate problem of Korea. Current US war plans envisioned a strategic defense in the Far East and from a long-range view, it would be better to emphasize Japanese forces. Also, unless additional funds were provided immediately, the expansion of the ROK Army to 20 divisions might result in a delay of at least a year in deliveries to other military aid recipients. General Collins described in detail the efforts being made to provide a flow of trained manpower in the ROK Army and to improve leadership.⁶⁰

From Korea, General Clark called for authority to activate two more ROK divisions immediately (raising the total to 14), in order to accommodate the outflow of trained South Korean manpower. Unless this step were authorized, it would be necessary to curtail induction, with harmful results later. Cadres and replacements for the two new divisions were already available. General Clark admitted there were some logistic difficulties, but he was willing if necessary to draw down theater stocks below the 60-day supply level if he could be sure of prompt replacements. "I feel that the increasing ROK potential is too valuable to jeopardize by a stop-and-go program," he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "and I therefore recommend that a long-range program of support be adopted without delay."⁶¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for a decision by the Secretary of Defense on 19 January, two days before the new administration took over. They recommended approval of General Clark's proposal as a part of the long-range program that they were preparing in response to his memorandum of 5 December. The new manpower strength for a 14-division army would be 507,880 (including KATUSAs) for all the ROK forces; the ROK Army would rise from 415,120 to 460,000. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed General Clark to proceed with provisional formation of the two new divisions, on the assumption that this step would be approved. Their assumption was correct; President Eisenhower gave his approval on 29 January.⁶²

On 11 February the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Wilson their recommendations for a long-range program for ROK forces. The ultimate wartime size of ROK forces, they observed, must depend on the overall objective of the buildup, the determination of which was beyond their purview. They had made the assumption that it was desirable to expand ROK forces so that they could eventually assume "increasing responsibility for the ground defense of Korea," thus

permitting either a withdrawal of as many US troops as possible or an intensification of military operations to force a military decision. The United States had made “substantial progress” toward meeting the recommendations in NSC 118/2 for expansion of the ROK forces and had succeeded to an extent in reducing the burden upon US forces in Korea but not to the extent of being able to withdraw any US troops. Nor was it likely that other nations would make any major increases in their forces in Korea. On the other hand, the South Koreans, despite their shortcomings, had displayed “commendable determination” to absorb an increasing share of the defense of their country.

After these preliminary remarks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned to the questions raised in Secretary Lovett’s memorandum of 5 December. Their replies were as follows:

1. They recommended a total ROK force of 689,000 men, including an army of 640,000 men and 20 divisions and a Marine Corps of 30,000 men and one division. The other two Services should remain at about their present strength: 9,000 for the ROK Air Force and 10,000 for the Navy. The ROK had sufficient manpower to support these goals.

2. The expansion would mean tying up some US materiel resources in the Far East and would thus adversely affect the deployment of forces if global war broke out. Moreover, reduction to the peacetime ROKA objective (10 divisions), after the Korean War ended, might involve some difficulty. The major disadvantage of the proposed expansion, however, was its potentially serious inflationary effect on South Korea’s economy. US financial support would be needed to avert this danger.

3. It was difficult to determine the extent to which expansion of the ROKA would facilitate US troop withdrawal, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that a phased redeployment of 4 divisions by July 1954 “may be possible.”

4. The ROKA expansion should be phased over a period of 18 months.

5. The expansion would affect critical items of ammunition and artillery needed for other MDA programs. Deliveries of critical items for NATO would be extended by about one year. The current Indochina MDAP, second in priority to Korean operations, would not be materially affected, nor would plans for equipping the 4-division Japanese National Safety Force. However, the ROKA increase would cause an indefinite continuance of the 50 percent ceiling on critical items for CONUS units and would preclude support for any new MDA programs “without a proportionate increase in current production.”

Turning to other matters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated the initial cost of the ROKA expansion at \$400 million, with \$850 million to \$1 billion as the subsequent annual maintenance cost. This money had not been included in the original FY 1954 budget; the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that it be provided in the revised budget, then in preparation, or in a supplement to be prepared later. It would also be necessary to accelerate the production of critical military items, in order to meet the anticipated drain on MDA programs and on US mobilization reserve stocks.⁶³

The JCS recommendations were in keeping with the desire of the new administration to extricate the United States from the Korean conflict—to let it become,

as General Eisenhower had said, a war of "Asians against Asians." But the requirement for additional money ran afoul of the administration's determination to reduce expenditures, including those for military purposes. The problem was thus extremely acute.⁶⁴

After discussing the JCS memorandum with the Armed Forces Policy Council, Secretary Wilson returned it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 March, asking that they reconsider their recommendations on the basis of two assumptions: (1) that the present military stalemate in Korea would continue indefinitely; (2) that UN forces would launch an offensive in Korea to gain a military victory. "Particular attention should be given to the extent to which it might be feasible to substitute ROK for US divisions under either of the foregoing assumptions," Secretary Wilson directed.⁶⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no reason to change their recommendations and so informed the Secretary of Defense on 25 March 1953. Expansion to 20 divisions was the best course under either assumption. If the stalemate continued, withdrawal of as many as 4 US divisions from Korea might be possible, as they had already suggested; however, they had been cautioned by General Van Fleet that to withdraw any US forces from Korea before a military decision had been reached would "collapse the ROK effort." If military victory were sought through a renewed offensive, no US units could leave Korea until the fight was won; on the contrary, there would have to be "considerable augmentation" of US forces, including stepped-up mobilization. Moreover, an increase in ROK forces would in no case affect the requirement for US air and naval forces in Korea or for US logistic support. In light of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their conclusions of 11 February, except with regard to the strength figure for the ROK Marine Corps, which they proposed to reduce from 30,000 to 23,500 in accordance with a recommendation from General Clark.⁶⁶

The decision was delayed while the administration wrestled with the revision of the FY 1954 budget. In Korea, meanwhile, the ROKA training program continued to pour out military manpower. General Clark reported on 7 April that the actual gross strength of the ROK Army had reached 513,249, excluding KATUSAs; the net strength (exclusive of trainees) was 438,280 and the weekly increase was 7,200, so that the authorized strength of 460,000 would soon be exceeded. He therefore recommended that the ceiling be raised to the figure that would be required for a 20-division army, which he estimated to be about 655,000. General Clark also felt that it would be advantageous if he were given authority to activate the additional divisions. However, the equipment for these divisions would have to be sent from the United States; he had already dipped into the theater reserve to activate the two most recent divisions.⁶⁷

If the situation remained stable and without any US effort to gain a military decision, General Clark believed he could withdraw one US division to Japan at the time the 17th of the 20 ROK divisions had reached the halfway mark in its training. He would prefer that any strength reduction be made by removing individual soldiers rather than combat units. In fact, any elements withdrawn would probably be "units" in name only, since it would be desirable that their

equipment be retained in the Far East and most of the personnel would be due for discharge.⁶⁸

Two days later, CINCUNC, pointing out that it would be “highly desirable” to have the maximum number of ROK divisions in being before any armistice was signed, asked for authority to announce the activation on paper of two more ROK divisions, with minimum personnel and equipment. At the same time, he urged that all equipment already on requisition be sent as soon as possible. The draft armistice agreement allowed General Clark to form additional ROK units but not to introduce additional weapons or combat vehicles into Korea; he was therefore hoping to bring the maximum amount of such equipment into Korea before the armistice.⁶⁹

No matter what the outcome of the negotiations, General Clark made it clear that he wanted the 20-division program carried out. It would, if the war continued, provide the means to seek a military decision or, alternatively, make possible the withdrawal of some UN forces. If the war ended, the 20-division force would suffice to ensure the independence of South Korea.⁷⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that CINCUNC’s request for two more divisions (for a total of 16) be approved and that the ROKA personnel ceiling be increased from 460,000 to 525,000. The President approved this recommendation at a meeting of the National Security Council on 22 April. At the same time, he agreed to authorize a total of 20 ROK divisions but stipulated that none of the remaining four divisions would be activated without his specific approval.⁷¹

On 13 May Secretary of Defense Wilson authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan for the increase to 20 divisions, with a personnel ceiling increase from 525,000 to 655,000. He noted that authorization for increases beyond 16 divisions was subject to specific approval by the President. At the same time, he approved the personnel ceilings sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the other ROK Services: 23,500 for the Marine Corps, 9,000 for the Air Force, and 10,000 for the Navy.⁷²

The Secretary’s action was partially overtaken the same day, when, during a discussion in the National Security Council of courses of action in Korea, President Eisenhower announced a decision that CINCUNC would be allowed to activate the remaining divisions. General Collins immediately notified General Clark, indicating that the activation of the last four divisions was to be done at his discretion. He was warned, however, that some critical items of equipment, such as artillery, might not be supplied in time to meet his activation schedule.⁷³

The New Administration Appraises Old Policies

When General Eisenhower took office as President, the governing directive for policy toward Korea (NSC 118/2, approved in December 1951) was more than a year old. During the intervening months, a number of developments had occurred that bore upon the war, directly or indirectly, and pointed to a need

for a reexamination of policy. These included the uneven course of the armistice negotiations; the increase in military capabilities of the Communist forces, combined with some loss of effectiveness in US forces (resulting from rotation and the military stalemate), but offset to some degree by improvement in the ROKA; the increasing availability and destructiveness of atomic weapons; and changes in US public opinion and in the attitudes of US allies.⁷⁴

Still another event, occurring less than two months after the new President was inaugurated, was potentially the most significant of all for US relations with the entire communist world, in Korea and elsewhere. On 5 March 1953 Premier Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, of the USSR, died of a cerebral hemorrhage.⁷⁵ The effects of his passing were likely to be profound, in view of the tight control that he had exercised over Communist parties in most of the world. As President Eisenhower later wrote, "The new leadership in Russia, no matter how strong its links with the Stalin era, was not completely bound to blind obedience to the ways of a dead man."⁷⁶

The JCS contribution to the review of US policy in Korea was already under way as a result of the directive given the JSPC on 7 October 1952 to study possible courses of action. The Committee's first report (JCS 1776/354) was submitted 12 February 1953 and was split, with the Air Force favoring somewhat more aggressive action than the other Services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore sent it back to the JSPC for revision, with additional guidance. Finally, on 27 March 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved and sent to Secretary Wilson a list of six possible courses of action in Korea, with an accompanying background study.⁷⁷

The JCS estimate of the Korean situation was based on the following underlying assumptions:

(1) Current armistice negotiations would either be broken off or it would be determined that they were being "deliberately delayed indefinitely" by the Communists.

(2) There would be no substantial additional forces for Korea except what could be furnished by the United States and the ROK, although the use of Chinese Nationalist forces would be considered.

(3) Any additional equipment would have to come from existing or programmed production, including the current MDAP.

(4) Chemical, biological, and radiological weapons would not be used except to retaliate. (The use of atomic weapons was not the subject of an assumption; it was discussed in the body of the study.)

(5) No "appreciable" reduction would be made in force levels in Europe in order to strengthen Far Eastern forces.⁷⁸

In addition, certain "guidelines" were used in preparing the estimate, as follows:

(1) The primary US military objective in the Far East would be to maintain the security of Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Ryukyus, consistent with the overall security of US forces.

(2) Deployment of additional US forces to the Far East would affect the ability to implement the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan, but this fact should not alter the decision regarding this deployment.

(3) Unless a global war occurred or the USSR intervened, withdrawal from Korea was an unsatisfactory course of action.⁷⁹

The objectives of Communist China and the USSR, according to a recent National Intelligence Estimate, were believed to be to eliminate Western power and influence in Asia, to prevent Japanese rearmament, to increase Communist military potential in Asia, and generally to advance communism by dividing and confusing non-Communist nations. US objectives in Korea, as set forth in NSC 118/2, were ultimate unification and, more immediately, a settlement of the conflict without jeopardizing the US position regarding the USSR, Taiwan, or Chinese Communist membership in the UN.⁸⁰

The forces available to the two sides in and near Korea were carefully weighed. In North Korea the enemy was believed to have 836,000 Chinese and 294,000 North Koreans, totalling 1,130,000 men. Across the Yalu in Manchuria, 225,000 additional Chinese troops stood ready. In China proper and Tibet were an estimated 1,331,000 men. Soviet ground forces in the Far East comprised 427,000. Against these were arrayed a total of 737,000 men under the UN Command, consisting of some 256,000 US troops (with 14,500 KATUSAs attached), 433,000 ROKs, and 34,000 from other UN countries. Two additional US divisions (30,000 men) were located in Japan. The 375,000 Nationalist Chinese troops on Taiwan were another possible UN resource.⁸¹

Enemy strength in the air consisted of about 1,460 Chinese aircraft in Manchuria, including 1,000 jet fighters and 100 jet bombers, with another 900 in China, of which 400 were jet fighters. The Soviet air force in the Far East totalled about 5,600 planes, with 1,700 jet fighters, 320 jet light bombers, and 220 conventional medium bombers. The US Air Force in the Far East consisted of 3 medium bomb wings, 6 fighter bomb wings, 4 1/3 fighter interceptor wings, 1 tactical reconnaissance wing, and 4 troop carrier wings. Also available were 6 carrier air groups, 5 Navy patrol squadrons, a Marine Corps air wing, and 53 miscellaneous aircraft furnished by other countries.⁸²

The naval strength of Communist China and North Korea amounted to a total of about 130 patrol craft and other small vessels for both countries combined. The UNC had available the following vessels from the United States and other countries: 1 battleship, 7 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers, 51 destroyers and destroyer escorts, 9 smaller escort vessels, 4 submarines, and 22 minesweepers. The Soviet Navy in Eastern waters, however, boasted 400 combat ships, including 2 heavy cruisers, 51 destroyers, and 100 submarines.

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the six major courses of action that the United States might follow in order to bring the Korean War to a successful end were:

Course 1: Continue aggressive air and naval action and maintain the defense along the approximate current Ground Position in Korea for an indefinite period, while developing the capability of ROK forces to assume increasing responsibility for the defense of Korea.

Course 2: Continue aggressive air and naval action while increasing the tempo of ground operations in Korea.

Course 3: Extend and intensify military operations by exerting increased pressure by stages directly against Communist China and Manchuria; and if required, increase the tempo and scale of military operations in Korea.

Course 4: Extend and intensify military operations against Communist China and Manchuria in coordination with a phased intensification of military action in Korea.

Course 5: Employment of Chinese Nationalist forces in operations against Communist China in coordination with military operations in connection with Korea.

Course 6: Continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations designed to cause maximum enemy casualties and depletion of his supplies, followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist.

The first two courses had been developed under an assumption that present geographical restrictions would be retained but that all other restrictions, except for use of CBR weapons, would be lifted. In the last four courses, present restrictions and limitations would be lifted except on operations within 12 miles of Soviet borders and on the use of CBR weapons. Under each course of action the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained to the Secretary the scope and effects, the military objectives, the estimated forces required, the casualties that could be expected, and the political, logistic, and other implications.

With regard to the use of atomic weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff listed the possible advantages and disadvantages and presented the following conclusion:

The efficacy of atomic weapons in achieving greater results at less cost of effort in furtherance of U.S. objectives in connection with Korea points to the desirability of re-evaluating the policy which now restricts the use of atomic weapons in the Far East. In view of the extensive implications of developing an effective conventional capability in the Far East, the timely use of atomic weapons should be considered against military targets affecting operations in Korea, and operationally planned as an adjunct to any possible military course of action involving direct action against Communist China and Manchuria.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no effort to choose among the various courses of action. As they told Secretary Wilson in their accompanying memorandum, any choice would be "dependent on governmental decisions after consideration of such matters as national objectives in Korea, costs in personnel and materiel, and time factors." To aid the NSC in making a choice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary furnish not only the course of action but the amplifying material as well, to the NSC Planning Board. This advice was accepted and the entire study was sent to the Board in connection with its review of NSC 118/2, which was already underway.⁸³

The Planning Board incorporated the substance of the JCS study into its own report, NSC 147, which was circulated on 2 April 1953. The Board revised the

JCS courses of action, tying each to a particular objective and deleting reference to the use of Chinese Nationalists. As set forth in NSC 147, the courses of action were as follows:

Course A: Continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up ROK forces, with a view to possible limited redeployment of US forces from Korea.

Course B: Increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the United States.

Course C: Continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line, followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and materiel in Korea and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course D: Extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by stages, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and if required, increase ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that a favorable settlement of the Korean war might be achieved.

Course E: Undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and materiel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist, and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course F: Undertake a coordinated, large-scale offensive in Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of the bulk of the communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean war on the basis of a unified, non-Communist Korea.

The Planning Board set forth in some detail the advantages, military and political, of each course of action, and recommended that the Council make a selection among the courses as the basis for a new policy directive on Korea, to supersede NSC 118/2. In discussing the prospects for an armistice, the Board declared that it was "out of the question" for the United States to abandon the principle of non-forcible repatriation but believed it "hopeless" to continue the search for a mutually agreeable formula for disposing of nonrepatriated prisoners.⁸⁴

A resurgence of optimism that the armistice negotiations might be successful in bringing about a cease-fire after all arose from the resumption of talks at Panmunjom and some encouraging signs of a possible change in enemy attitude. As a result, the Council took no action on the Planning Board's recommendations during April. At the end of the month, however, the Secretary of Defense, responding to a Council initiative, instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a

study of the means that could be used to convince the Chinese Communists and their North Korean allies that the UNC was getting ready to launch an offensive against them if the armistice negotiations broke down. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their reply to Secretary of Defense Wilson on 4 May 1953, giving particular emphasis to the military practicability of attempting such an action involving US forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that "deceptive or psychological warfare" measures not directly related to an actual buildup of UNC offensive capabilities would fool the Communists, even briefly. Any attempt to impress the Communists should be made only in light of a prior decision actually to carry out the threat if negotiations broke down. "Under such conditions," they said, "considerable use could be made of psychological measures to augment the psychological effect of improved offensive capabilities." On the other hand, failure to follow up a breakdown in negotiations with an offensive would, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "inevitably have an adverse effect on the UN position in the Far East."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff went on to list the US forces that could be made available to carry out an offensive against the enemy in the event of a breakdown. One Army division (82d Airborne), one reinforced Marine division with an air wing, one Marine Corps amphibious troop headquarters, two medium bomber wings, and two troop carrier wings were available for deployment at once. A fighter-bomber wing and three fighter interceptor squadrons were also immediately available but were scheduled for transfer to Europe or North Africa after May-June 1953. Other forces that could be made available in the near future were a combat command of the 1st Armored Division (August 1953), a 280mm Field Artillery (FA) battalion (July 1953), and an aircraft carrier and three destroyers which could reach Japan by 9 June 1953. Dispatch of these forces, however, would reduce capabilities for offensive operations elsewhere, while the actual movements would require added funds and personnel.⁸⁵

General Bradley presented the JCS conclusions to the National Security Council on 6 May 1953. The Council took no action and gave no further consideration to the possibility of a deceptive operation. Turning to broader matters, the members agreed that at the next meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should present a briefing on "feasible military courses of action in Korea," together with their choice of the most advantageous course for the United States to follow. At the same time, the Department of State was to brief the Council on the probable effects of such courses of action on other nations, especially US allies.⁸⁶

This NSC decision amounted in effect to a request for JCS review and comment on NSC 147. The next meeting of the Council was held a week later, but time had not permitted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare their recommendations.⁸⁷ Consequently, at the meeting, General John E. Hull, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, and Major General J. S. Bradley, USA, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Strategic Plans, simply presented, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a briefing on "feasible" military courses of action in Korea, while Secretary of State Dulles commented on the possible diplomatic effects of each. The Council gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff another week to complete their assignment.⁸⁸

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which carried out the preliminary analysis of NSC 147 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declined to single out any one course of action but chose a combination of Courses D, E, and F. The members disagreed over the exact nature of this combination. The Air Force member favored expanded air and naval operations to be combined with a ground offensive “as required.” The other Services favored a coordinated offensive of all arms—ground, sea, and air.⁸⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the majority JSPC position in the recommendations that they sent to Secretary of Defense Wilson on 19 May 1953. They pointed out that Course A was in accord with the objectives in NSC 118/2 and had been followed since the negotiations began. Courses C and E, they continued, both envisioned establishment of a line at the “waist” of Korea, but such a line should not be regarded as a restraint; UNC forces should be free to operate beyond the line to carry out “maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and materiel,” which was proclaimed as an objective in both courses. Course C said nothing of operations beyond Korea, but if it were adopted, extension of the war into Manchuria would probably be necessary, in order to destroy enemy air forces which would be within striking range of advancing US/UN or ROK forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw that any of the courses, except A and possibly B, would require the use of atomic weapons “on a sufficiently large scale to ensure success. A piecemeal or limited employment, with the attendant risk of failure, or at best limited success, is not recommended,” they told the Secretary of Defense.⁹⁰

Because NSC 147 did not clearly emphasize the risks involved in carrying out the various courses of action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that the Secretary point out to the NSC that if the Korean War were enlarged to gain a successful decision, the following risks would have to be faced:

- a. We may become involved with a larger, long-term, costly war with Communist China.
- b. We may also become involved in a war with the Soviet Union in Asia.
- c. We may also be risking the outbreak of global war. . . . From a military viewpoint, if a course of action is selected which risks any or all of the above, then preparations must be made.
- d. We may lose some of our allies in Korea.
- e. Our enlarging the war in Korea may have a detrimental effect on our relations with our allies in other areas, including the North Atlantic Treaty area.
- f. Most of these offensive actions will cost many casualties.
- g. All of these courses of action except “A” will call for a greater industrial and military mobilization, and will necessarily enlarge the military budget, not only for current operations but for the larger forces needed in view of the larger risks we are taking in the Far East.⁹¹

Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their recommended course of action, to be adopted if armistice negotiations failed and it was determined to extend the war in order to seek a decision. This course, which combined Courses D, E, and F from NSC 147, was as follows:

Extend and intensify military action against the enemy, to include air and naval operations directly against China and Manchuria, a coordinated offensive to seize a position generally at the waist of Korea and be prepared for further operations as required in order to:

- a. Destroy effective Communist military power in Korea.
- b. Reduce the enemy's capability for further aggression in Korea and the Far East.
- c. Increase possibility of enemy acceptance of an armistice on US-UN terms.
- d. Create conditions favorable for ROK forces to assume increasing responsibility for operations in Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that the timing of implementation of this course of action was important. All the necessary operations, including "extensive strategic and tactical use of atomic bombs," should be undertaken so as to obtain "maximum surprise and maximum impact." To undertake a gradual escalation, beginning perhaps with a naval blockade and working up to a ground offensive, would minimize the prospect of success.⁹²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff appeared before the NSC on 20 May 1953 and presented their conclusions orally. It was the sense of the meeting that, if conditions arose requiring more positive action in Korea, the course of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be adopted as a general guide.⁹³

Because the JCS Course of Action would require a revision of force requirements contained in CINCUNC OPLAN 8-52 as well as consideration in that plan of the use of atomic weapons, CINCUNC, CINCPAC, and the Commander, Strategic Air Command, were all notified of the JCS recommendation. Pertinent staff papers affecting the operations of each command were forwarded with the injunction to observe special security precautions in handling them. General Clark was instructed to coordinate with the other two in revising OPLAN 8-52.⁹⁴

Beginning of a Thaw: Operation LITTLE SWITCH

In December 1952 the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies, meeting in Geneva, enacted a resolution urging both sides in the Korean conflict to end the war and, as an initial "goodwill gesture," to take immediate action to repatriate sick and wounded prisoners, as specified by the Geneva Convention. The resolution passed by a vote of 15-2, with only the Soviet and Chi-

nese Communist delegates opposed. This little-noticed event was soon to have important consequences.⁹⁵

In Tokyo, General Clark read a news account of this action and set forth his thoughts in a message to Washington on 21 December. The UNC had earlier proposed an exchange of sick and wounded POWs which the enemy had rejected, but General Clark thought there would be some propaganda advantages in renewing the offer, although it would probably be turned down again. Moreover, the enemy could be expected to make propaganda capital out of the most seriously wounded of the returning prisoners, citing them as "examples of UNC savagery."⁹⁶

General Clark's suggestion drew no action for almost two months. However, in February 1953, as the opening date for the UN General Assembly drew near, the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned from the Department of State that the Red Cross resolution might be introduced in the Assembly. They therefore instructed General Clark, unless he perceived "serious objections," to forward to the enemy a letter proposing an immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. General Clark concurred, although he doubted that the enemy would agree, and sent the letter on 22 February.⁹⁷

The enemy made no reply for several weeks. In the interim occurred the death of Premier Stalin, as already described, followed by certain signs that the new government of Premier Georgi M. Malenkov was indeed somewhat more flexible and conciliatory than its predecessor. The evidence was obscure but, taken together, appeared significant. The Soviet radio publicly admitted, for the first time since the end of World War II, that US and British forces had contributed to the victory of the allies; the Soviet Government agreed to assist in seeking the release of British diplomats and missionaries interned in North Korea; when the West German parliament ratified the European Defense Community treaty, the Soviets' reaction was relatively mild.⁹⁸ To what extent this new attitude affected Communist Chinese and North Korean decisions on Korea is problematical. At all events, a major break in the deadlock was in the offing, as events soon showed.

On 28 March the enemy commanders, Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai, replied to General Clark's letter of 22 February. They accepted the offer of an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. But, going further, they added that this step should lead to a settlement of the entire POW question and thus to an armistice, "for which people throughout the world are longing."⁹⁹

General Clark proposed to answer the enemy by suggesting a meeting of liaison groups to make detailed arrangements for the exchange. He warned that it would be a mistake to accept any conditions, such as the resumption of negotiations, as a prerequisite to exchange. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. They instructed General Clark to proceed on the "public assumption" that the enemy letter implied a willingness to meet substantive UNC positions if armistice negotiations were resumed. In fact, they inserted a statement to this effect in General Clark's proposed reply to the enemy. Thus amended, CINCUNC's letter was delivered to the enemy on 31 March. Two days later the Communists agreed to a meeting of liaison officers to discuss the proposed exchange and suggested a date of 6 April.¹⁰⁰

By that time, however, a much more significant reply to General Clark's letter of 22 February had come from a very authoritative source. In an extraordinary proposal broadcast over Radio Peking on 30 March, Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China, speaking for the North Korean Government as well as his own, approved the limited exchange of prisoners and urged that it be extended to accomplish a settlement of the war. He said:

A reasonable settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war clearly has a very significant bearing upon the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war. It is, therefore, our view that the time should be considered ripe for settling the entire question of prisoners of war in order to ensure the cessation of hostilities in Korea and to conclude the armistice agreement. . . .

[Delegations should] immediately start negotiations on the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war during the period of hostilities, and should proceed to seek an over-all settlement of the question of prisoners of war. . . .

The Chinese leader went on to propose a settlement of the repatriation issue that was very similar to the Indian resolution approved by the General Assembly (and denounced by Communist China) a few months earlier. "A reasonable solution can only lie in the release and repatriation of war prisoners without delay after the cessation of hostilities," said Premier Chou, thus reaffirming his side's established position. But he went on to suggest that, after all prisoners desiring repatriation had been exchanged, the remaining prisoners be handed over "to a neutral state so as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation." Premier Chou expressly denied that there were any Communist captives who really opposed repatriation. There were, however, some "who, under the intimidation and oppression of the opposite side, are filled with apprehensions and are afraid to return home." These would be handed over to the neutral state and "explanations" would be given them, "thus insuring that the question of their repatriation will be justly settled and will not obstruct the realization of an armistice in Korea."¹⁰¹

On the following day the Chinese proposal was telegraphed to the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Pearson, and was endorsed in a statement by Kim Il Sung, speaking in his capacity as Premier of North Korea. On 1 April Moscow radio broadcast a statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov, praising the "entire fairness" of the proposal and offering to cooperate in carrying it out.¹⁰²

The Chinese statement raised several important questions. What was the "neutral" state contemplated by the proposal? The United States would not accept a Soviet satellite. If custody of prisoners was to be taken in Korea, a state such as Sweden or Switzerland would be the preferred US choice. Did the Communists intend that the prisoners would be physically taken to a neutral state or left in Korea? What was meant by the term "hand over"? There would be serious problems in moving prisoners out of Korea to another country. Under what rules

would the "neutral state" determine the disposition of prisoners? What was a "just solution" to the question of repatriation?¹⁰³

In spite of these unanswered and important questions, the United States was interested in following through on Chou En-lai's proposals. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised General Clark on 1 April that exploration of these proposals would be much more desirable at Panmunjom than at UN Headquarters. The burden should rest on the enemy to explain in more detail what he had in mind before any UNC commitment to accept the proposals were made. If the enemy showed good faith in the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to go ahead with further discussions of the Chou En-lai proposals during the exchange. The next day, President Eisenhower made public his interest in pursuing the Chinese overture. In response to a press conference question on the Chou En-lai proposal, he said that the United States "should take at face value every offer that is made to us."¹⁰⁴

General Clark remained extremely suspicious. "I consider," he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 April, "that it would be completely naive on our part not to anticipate any and every form of chicanery in their apparently straightforward proposal." He opposed discussing resumption of negotiations until the enemy had demonstrated a willingness to accede to UNC proposals on sick and wounded prisoners and had faithfully carried out his end of the bargain. He then forwarded a proposed reply to the enemy accepting 6 April as the date for a meeting of liaison officers and suggesting that, after they worked out details for exchanging sick and wounded prisoners, the liaison officers discuss resumption of armistice negotiations.¹⁰⁵

On 4 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Clark that they approved his proposed reply, provided it was amended to include a request for further information about Chou En-lai's proposal. They also directed that every precaution be taken to avoid any public statement in conflict with the spirit of the President's press conference remarks.¹⁰⁶

General Clark's letter, as amended, was delivered to the Communists on 5 April. They accepted its terms, and liaison officers met on 6 April as agreed.¹¹⁰ Within five days they had worked out arrangements for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. The enemy was prepared to return 450 Korean and 150 non-Korean prisoners who qualified as sick or wounded. For its part the UNC would transfer 700 Chinese and 5,100 Korean prisoners. On 11 April, it was agreed that the exchange would commence at Panmunjom on 20 April. The enemy would deliver 100 a day, the UNC 500 a day in groups of 25.¹⁰⁷

Operation LITTLE SWITCH, as the UNC named the exchange, took place as smoothly as possible under the circumstances. By 3 May the operation was essentially complete. The final totals exchanged were somewhat higher than the initial figures; the UNC surrendered 6,224 POWs (5,194 North Koreans and 1,030 Chinese) and 446 civilian internees, and received 684 prisoners in return.¹⁰⁸

As Operation LITTLE SWITCH was in preparation, giving some evidence of enemy sincerity, General Clark received from General Nam Il a response to his 5 April request for details of Chou En-lai's proposal. The reply was not very

informative, repeating essentially what Chou En-lai had already said and addressing none of the fundamental questions.¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed General Clark to suggest a meeting with Communist leaders to discuss reopening plenary sessions and to make it clear that he assumed that the enemy was prepared to accept UNC proposals on POWs or to submit constructive alternatives as a basis for resuming the meetings. In writing the enemy, General Clark was to offer the following comments on the Chou plan: the neutral state should be a "nation such as Switzerland, traditionally recognized as appropriate in matters of this kind"; POWs not directly repatriated should be released to the custody of the neutral state within Korea; prisoners thus held should be detained no longer than 60 days for explanation and determination of their attitude, after which the neutral state should make arrangements for "peaceable disposition" of those remaining. A letter along these lines was delivered to the Communists by General Harrison on 17 April.¹¹⁰

General Clark had earlier informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, should plenary sessions be resumed, he meant to replace General Harrison as Chief of the UNC Armistice Delegation with Major General Bryan L. Milburn, USA. General Harrison would become Chief of Staff, GHQ, in place of General Hickey, who was retiring. General Milburn had been G-1 and J-1, GHQ since May 1951, and General Clark considered him very well qualified for the post of Chief UNC delegate. On 15 April, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Clark that "in light of [the] crucial stage into which negotiations are entering," it was desirable to keep General Harrison at Panmunjom. General Milburn could attend plenary sessions, if resumed, in preparation for succeeding General Harrison at an "appropriate time in [the] future."¹¹¹

After several days of discussion, liaison officers agreed to resume plenary sessions on 26 April. With regard to the points raised in General Harrison's letter, enemy officers simply cited Nam Il's reply to General Clark's letter of 5 April.¹¹²

In anticipation of renewed talks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General Clark a statement of the latest US policy on negotiations approved by the President. Within this general policy outline, General Clark was granted broad latitude in negotiating. He would refer questions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for decision only when he considered it desirable or necessary to obtain governmental approval or when specifically required to do so by his instructions. He was enjoined to call upon the CINCFE political advisor, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, for any necessary political advice.¹¹³

Two general considerations had been passed on from the previous administration; that it was in the US interests to obtain an acceptable armistice; and that the United States would never compromise on forced repatriation. A new principle, reflecting President Eisenhower's statement of 2 April 1953, was that the United States would accept all Communist proposals at face value "until proved to the contrary." The United States would not "countenance prolonged and inconclusive negotiations." No specific time limit was set, however. General Clark would not unilaterally recess negotiations without authority from Washington. General Harrison's letter of 17 April had given the UNC the initiative,

which should be retained if possible. Any of the various solutions to the POW question already put forth by the UNC would be acceptable. With respect to Chou En-lai's proposal, certain understandings would have to be accepted by the Communists:

(1) Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its satellites would be acceptable as a neutral nation. General Clark was directed to press for Switzerland or Sweden in that order. Failing in these he would ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for further instructions.

(2) The neutral state must accept custody in Korea. Physical movement of nonrepatriates from Korea could not be considered.

(3) Nonrepatriates would be held by the neutral state only for a specified time. General Clark was to press for 60 days, but might agree to 90 days.

(4) Safeguards must be set to prevent force or coercion against nonrepatriates.

(5) If a nonrepatriate changed his mind, the neutral state must repatriate him promptly.

(6) The neutral state would be the final authority on whether or not a prisoner desired repatriation.

(7) The nonrepatriate would be set free at the expiration of the agreed time limit with arrangements made by the neutral state.¹¹⁴

Resumption of Negotiations

The full delegations of both sides returned to the negotiating tent at Panmunjom on 26 April 1953—the first time they had done so since 8 October 1952. Much had changed in the intervening six months. The United States and the USSR were both under new leadership, and the enemy high command in Korea was giving evidence of a more flexible attitude. Whether or not this changed attitude betokened a real concession on the POW issue was, of course, the question on which the success of the revived negotiations hung. A new and threatening factor had also entered the picture with the growing and outspoken opposition of President Rhee to an armistice. The ROK leader had made known his intentions not to accept an armistice on presently contemplated terms and to “go it alone” against the Communists if he must. His actions were a source of considerable embarrassment to the UNC delegation in its dealings with the enemy negotiators.¹¹⁵

At this first session the Communist chief delegate, General Nam Il, offered a six-point proposal which he claimed would implement Chou En-lai's statement of 30 March. In brief, the Communists wanted all nonresisting prisoners repatriated within two months of the effective date of the Armistice agreement; all other prisoners would be sent to a “neutral state” within one month after completion of direct repatriation; each belligerent would have six months to convince its prisoners to return; those not wishing repatriation would be disposed of through consultation at the political conference.¹¹⁶

This proposal ignored the conditions set forth in General Harrison's letter of 17 April and reaffirmed the JCS instructions: that Switzerland be chosen as the neutral nation, that prisoners be handed over to neutral custody while in Korea, and that a reasonable limit, such as 60 days, be set during which belligerents would be allowed access to prisoners for persuasion. The Communists rejected designation of Switzerland on the ground that that nation had already been nominated by the UNC as a member of the NNSC; they did not offer a nomination of their own.¹¹⁷

The deadlock over these aspects of the enemy proposal quickly set the stage for subsequent meetings, and the talks bogged down. During the next two weeks, the selection of a neutral nation constituted the central issue. The Communists refused to name their choice, beyond indicating a preference for an Asian country. General Clark believed that they intended to wait until other matters had been settled, hoping that public opinion would then force the UNC to accept their nominee in order to dispose of the last remaining issue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this assessment of the situation and instructed General Clark to insist on settlement of the neutral nation issue before proceeding to any other matter.¹¹⁸

On 2 May 1953 General Nam Il, while declaring it "inappropriate" to nominate a specific neutral country until other matters had been decided, mentioned India, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan as possibilities. "Can you possibly say that these neutral nations are not suitable?" he asked. General Clark had already asked for authorization to nominate India or Pakistan at a time of his choosing; he now enlarged this request to include Indonesia and Burma.¹¹⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General Clark to ask the Communists if they were prepared to accept any one of these four Asian countries. If the answer was affirmative, the UNC would then nominate Pakistan. No other Asian country would be acceptable except in combination with Switzerland or Sweden. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Clark to give no consideration to moving prisoners to a neutral state. They authorized him, however, "if absolutely necessary and as a final position, to agree to a four-month access period."¹²⁰

On 4 May General Harrison, without waiting for an affirmative answer from the Communists as stipulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nominated Pakistan. The enemy delegation ignored the nomination and continued to talk about the physical disposition of nonrepatriated prisoners. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that General Harrison's move was "at variance with our instructions." Congressional leaders had been consulted in preparation of these instructions and the President had approved them. For these reasons they asked General Clark to explain why their instructions had not been followed.¹²¹

General Clark replied on 5 May that General Harrison, Ambassador Murphy, and he had decided that the best approach was to take the initiative and to nominate Pakistan without waiting for prior enemy agreement. He had not considered JCS instructions an order but merely a suggestion. He continued:

I feel that the judgment of our negotiator on the spot should be supported whenever possible and consider my action to be fully in accordance with the guidance provided me . . . which accorded me broad negotiating latitude. . . . In our assumption that this was a suggested action, we were not acquainted with the fact that it had been discussed with Congressional leaders and approved by the President. It would be helpful if such information could be included in future guidance.¹²²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no reply, and events took a sudden new turn on 7 May, when the Communists introduced an important proposal. They abandoned their demand that nonrepatriates be transported out of Korea and accepted a period of four months, rather than six, for access to nonrepatriates. Moreover, the idea of a single neutral nation was dropped; the enemy now proposed the establishment of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), similar to the one envisioned in the Indian resolution of a few months earlier. Members of the NNRC would be Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, and India, each of which would provide equal numbers of armed personnel. The NNRC would take custody of nonrepatriates in the camps where they were presently held. The enemy still insisted that when the four-month limit expired, remaining nonrepatriates must be subject to disposition by the political conference.¹²³

On the following day General Clark, in a long message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the enemy's new proposal was the first important concession since the negotiations had reopened and would cause many observers to believe that the enemy really wanted an early armistice. His own view was that the proposal should be "examined with great care." "It is apparent that the Communists are attempting to devise another system designed to ensure the eventual return of all their POWs or [to] confront them with the alternative of continued and indefinite detention," he warned. The enemy proposal offered no final solution to the POW problem, since there was no limit to the time allowed by the political conference to dispose of nonrepatriates. It amounted to a resurrection of the Indian proposal with India in the position of "umpire" on the NNRC; whether India would be acceptable in this position, or even as a member of the commission, must be carefully considered, likewise the proposed membership of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The ROK Government would violently oppose the plan, since it would mean placing armed personnel from Communist satellites in South Korea. General Clark suggested that he be allowed to present a single, concrete counterproposal that would set forth the complete terms of reference for the repatriation commission and would include all the safeguards necessary to protect vital principles.¹²⁴

The importance of the Communist proposal was fully appreciated in Washington. Immediately upon learning of it, President Eisenhower met with Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson, and General John E. Hull, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to discuss it. Their consensus was that the enemy had shifted position significantly and although his proposal had some disadvantages, it did offer the basis for negotiating an acceptable agreement. General Clark was accordingly instructed to seek clarification from the Commu-

nists of their proposal, especially as it concerned disposition of nonrepatriates should the political conferees fail to agree.¹²⁵

Accordingly, General Harrison on 9 May put a number of questions to the Communists. He asked them how their proposal would cure the "defect" of leaving nonrepatriates to be disposed of by the political conference and how they would have the NNRC reach decisions. Replying the next day, the Communists defended as "utterly reasonable" their proposal regarding the political conference and indicated that the NNRC would decide matters by majority vote. General Harrison's other questions, they said, concerned "detailed arrangements" which could readily be settled after agreement was reached on their proposal.¹²⁶

More complete instructions for responding to the enemy's new offer were forwarded to CINCUNC on 10 May. Speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Collins told General Clark that the 7 May proposal would be accepted for negotiations if suitably modified. The required modifications provided that: (1) the five nation commission would operate on a basis of unanimity except on procedural matters (so that the principle of nonforcible repatriation could not be overridden in the Commission by India aligning with Poland and Czechoslovakia); (2) if the political conference did not decide on prisoners within 30 days, prisoners would be released and given civilian status; (3) the commission must take custody of nonrepatriates at places designated by the detaining power; (4) India would provide all armed forces and operating personnel to assist the commission and would provide the chairman of the commission, who would also be its executive agent.

All five nations nominated by the Communists were acceptable to the United States, General Collins told CINCUNC. Earlier, General Clark had sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his version of terms of reference for the neutral nations. He had done this because he feared that if specific instructions were not laid down in advance, the enemy would use any and every means to force the return of the absolute maximum number of their personnel. The Joint Chiefs approved the terms of reference at this time.¹²⁷

General Clark incorporated these instructions into a counterproposal that he drew up and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 May. He planned to present this to the enemy the next day and to ask for continuous morning and afternoon sessions in order to hasten agreement. He had prepared two versions of the counterproposal, one initial and one final. In the initial version, there was no reference to the political conference and no provision for belligerents to have access to POWs; explanations to prisoners were to be made by the neutral commission and were to be completed within 60 days, after which remaining nonrepatriates were to be released. The final version allowed access to the POWs by the belligerents, gave the commission 90 days to dispose of nonrepatriates, and specified that those remaining after that time would be disposed of by the political conference, which would be allowed a 30-day period for this purpose. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Clark's counterproposal with minor changes, principally a stipulation that the initial version must include right of access by belligerents to POWs, since agreement with this principle had been implied in General Harrison's letter of 17 April to the Communists.¹²⁸

Before the counterproposal was laid before the enemy, it was further modified through the influence of the ROK Government. Agitation in South Korea against the prospective armistice had reached such an alarming degree that General Clark flew to Korea on 12 May to confer with Syngman Rhee. He found the ROK President "in dead earnest" in refusing to have Korean nonrepatriates released to another state or group of states, especially one controlled by the Communists. Moreover, President Rhee did not consider India neutral and did not want Indian troops in South Korea. In light of this attitude, General Clark recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his counterproposal be modified to specify that all nonrepatriated Korean POWs would be released as soon as the armistice became effective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this modification as part of the initial UNC position, pending further consideration.¹²⁹

Following a delay occasioned by General Clark's hurried trip to Korea, General Harrison on 13 May introduced the UNC counterproposal in its initial form. The enemy curtly rejected it as a "step backward." There followed a period of unproductive argument and a recess until 25 May.¹³⁰

During this period General Clark and his negotiating staff drew up another plan to present the enemy with a virtual ultimatum. The new meetings had been dragging on for almost a month and there had been no indication that the enemy would accept the UNC position. On the basis of his instructions (which he fully endorsed) that the United States would not "countenance prolonged and inconclusive negotiations," General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the time had come to take "positive steps" either to secure the agreement of the Communists or to "force them to demonstrate to the world that they are acting in bad faith in seeking an armistice only on their own terms by exacting forcible repatriation of POWs."¹³¹

General Clark then gave a proposal "in a final spirit of compromise" that would revert to the original position of having either Switzerland or Sweden accept custody of nonrepatriates, at the same time asserting willingness to accept one of the Asian nations mentioned by the enemy. The neutral nation nominated by the UNC would take custody of the Korean prisoners in Korea, while the Communists' nominee would take custody of non-Koreans (i.e., Chinese POWs). A 90-day period would be allowed for verification and explanation; thereafter all nonrepatriates would be released as civilians. On other items the UNC position remained the same. General Harrison would present this position and then recess for a week. General Clark would inform both Chinese and North Korean commanders that this was the final UNC offer. If the enemy rejected it the UNC would call a unilateral recess and await written word from the enemy that he accepted the UNC solution of September 1952 or that of 13 May 1953, or else that he had developed a written proposal that would warrant resumption of negotiations. CINCUNC would unilaterally release North Korean POWs within 30 days and would begin "increased military pressures" on the enemy.¹³²

General Clark had outlined these "military pressures" for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 May. He had pointed out that while an eventual armistice appeared probable, it was only "common prudence" to anticipate the possibility of another deadlock. If this occurred he would continue to exert "maximum military pres-

sure" within his means. He had no authority to launch a major ground attack, but this fact was more or less academic since his present forces were inadequate and such an attack would undoubtedly result in heavy UNC casualties. He intended, he said, to conduct a "strong defense" on the ground, to increase guerilla operations, and to expand air operations as much as possible. During any recess, he would continue heavy air attacks on such critical targets as Suiho, Yangsi and P'yongyang. In addition, he intended, should a recess occur, to attack numerous dams in North Korea whose destruction would cause widespread flooding of rice crops. He would want to attack Kaesong also after giving the Communists 24 hours' warning, since their military use of Kaesong violated the spirit of the 22 October 1951 agreement. In late fall, after the rice paddies froze, he would order Eighth Army to carry out a limited offensive, using armor, from Kumsong northeast to the coast, combined with an amphibious envelopment, to destroy part of the North Korean army in that area and to shorten the front line. "A longer term pressure which can be brought to bear is an all out offensive which might create military conditions necessary to obtain an honorable armistice," observed General Clark. "My plan 8-52 is under constant revision with respect to concept and force requirements."¹³³

The proposal to attack irrigation dams, and thus to cut off the food supply for enemy soldiers and civilians alike, was of course a sensitive one. FEAF planners had had the idea under study for some time. General Weyland, Commanding General of FEAF, and General Clark believed that such a drastic measure should be used only if negotiations collapsed. They decided, however, that attacks on dams would be legitimate where the primary result was to flood railroads and highways and thus to cut the enemy's lines of communication. The first such attack had in fact been carried out on 13 May. A dam near Toksan, north of P'yongyang, was successfully bombed; the resulting floodwaters destroyed or damaged over six miles of railway lines, five railway bridges, and two miles of a major highway (as well as five square miles of ricefields). During the next ten days, two other dams were destroyed or damaged, but by then the Communists had devised an effective defense; they simply lowered the water level in the reservoirs, thus preventing floods. General Clark did not ask permission of Washington for these attacks, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised no objection.¹³⁴

General Clark's proposals on negotiation were scarcely reflected in the final plan that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to him on 23 May 1953. They agreed that the time had come to bring the negotiations to a head. However, they continued, the United States now appeared committed at least to the principles, if not to the exact provisions, of the Indian resolution approved by the General Assembly in November 1952; the US vote in favor of that resolution implied such a commitment, and allied countries were exerting "intensive pressure" on the United States to adhere to these principles. Under these conditions, it appeared futile and undesirable to seek any substantially better terms. Any minimum US position must therefore be "in general consonance" with the resolution, subject to protection of the principle of nonforcible repatriation. Then, making it clear that

they spoke for the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth the final US position, as follows:

a. The United States would accept a five-nation custodial commission, subject to a condition that all armed forces and operating personnel be provided exclusively by India.

b. Upon the effective date of the armistice, nonrepatriated Koreans would be turned over to the custodial commission in the same manner as the Chinese (in other words, the Koreans would not be released, as originally contemplated).

c. The commission would act on a basis of majority rather than uniformity (another important concession in what had been the US position).

d. The terms of reference of the custodial body must retain all provisions needed to assure that the Communists could not use threats or coercion against prisoners in neutral custody. These included:

(1) Limitation of the number of staff assistants allowed to the member nations of the custodial commission (except India), General Clark to set the limit.

(2) A similar limitation on the number of representatives of the belligerent countries who were allowed to see prisoners.

(3) Requirement that all interviews with POWs be in the presence of representatives of each member nation of the commission.

(4) Validation, by majority vote of commission members, of all certificates submitted by POWs indicating desire to be repatriated.

(5) Access to the entire operation by representatives of the press.

(6) Limitation of the period of access to 90 days.

(7) Disposition of remaining nonrepatriates by the political conference (to be accepted as a last resort). However, the conference must dispose of them within 120 days after they had first been turned over to the custodial commission (that is, the conference would be allowed 30 days in addition to the 90 days allowed the commission). Otherwise the matter would be referred to the UN General Assembly, with the commission retaining custody until the Assembly reached a decision.

A proposal embodying these points was to be presented at the 25 May meeting of delegates, preferably in executive session if the Communists would agree. The UNC delegation should make it clear that the position was "final" but should avoid any appearance of an ultimatum. After submitting the proposal, the UNC delegation was to recess for a week, unilaterally if necessary. If the Communists then rejected the proposal and offered nothing in its place, General Clark should at once report the fact to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would "be prepared to act expeditiously." It would be better, in the JCS view, to terminate the negotiations rather than merely to recess them. If this step were taken, General Clark was authorized to take the military actions he had proposed, to inform the enemy that all agreements on the neutral zones were void, and to set free all nonrepatriated POWs.¹³⁵

Coping with ROK Opposition

As relations of the UNC with the Communists moved toward a showdown, those with South Korea were deteriorating. Willing cooperation of the ROK Government in a peace settlement appeared less and less likely.

From time to time, President Rhee had given evidence of his tendency to pursue his own separate objectives rather than those of the UN Command. Early in 1953 he had sought to assert ROK sovereignty over parts of North Korea occupied by UN forces. He had conferred with the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea on this matter and ROK National Assembly had recommended that the ROK Government negotiate with UN authorities to transfer control of the areas in question to the ROK. Press reports indicated that the ROK Government had completed plans for administering these areas. Reporting these developments on 24 February, General Clark made clear his conviction that it was "essential" that CINCUNC retain supreme authority in occupied parts of North Korea, subject to JCS instructions, until those areas were secure from aggression.¹³⁶

General Collins shared General Clark's views, as did his JCS colleagues, State Department officials, and Secretary of Defense Wilson. On 27 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified CINCUNC that he would retain authority in occupied areas "until conditions of stability are established."¹³⁷

Much more alarming than this matter, which President Rhee did not pursue, was the growing threat to the negotiations that he created. Although he had been outspoken in the past and had obstructed the negotiations, mainly through lack of cooperation, his actions in the spring of 1953 became even more obstructive, threatening to upset all that had been so painfully and slowly achieved at the negotiation table. No amount of logic, persuasion, or protest by the United States or the UNC was able to move the obdurate President Rhee from his single-minded and potentially suicidal course.

President Rhee's position, stated forcefully many times both in person and through his spokesmen, was, in essence, that he would never agree to an armistice settlement that did not: (1) require the withdrawal of all Chinese Communist forces from Korea; (2) require the disarming of North Korea Communist forces; (3) stipulate clearly that no "third power" could assist the North Koreans in any international conference considering any phase of the Korean problem; and (4) fully recognize and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the ROK.¹³⁸

These public statements were reinforced by rallies and demonstrations which became more frequent and larger as the negotiations at Panmunjom made visible progress. President Rhee began exhorting his people in ever more bombastic terms, calling for unilateral action, if necessary, in ringing phrases. On 5 April, for example, he proclaimed that "regardless of what happens at Panmunjom, our objective remains the same—our permanent objective is to unify Korea from the south to the Yalu River. . . . you must continue to fight until we have reached the Yalu." General Clark warned that serious effects could result from this ROK opposition to negotiations. President Rhee might withdraw his representative

from the UNC delegation or, at the worst, he might try to withdraw elements of the ROK Army from UN control and ROK Government officials from UN "influence." "I recommend that the State Department take such action as is appropriate to influence the ROK Government to conform to the actions taken by the United Nations," General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4 April.¹³⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that they shared General Clark's concern. The Department of State had instructed the US Ambassador to talk to President Rhee about his obstructive actions, and Secretary Dulles had complained to the South Korean Ambassador in Washington. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested General Clark to coordinate his actions, as well as his recommendations, with the US Ambassador.¹⁴⁰

General Clark forwarded to Washington on 16 April a joint assessment of the ROK situation prepared by the US Ambassador and the Commanding General, KCOMZ. This assessment noted that "clear and unequivocal" ROK opposition to the armistice stemmed from: (1) a strong desire for national unification; (2) memory of the 1950 aggression from the north; (3) recognition of Russo-Chinese power and political pressure; and (4) fear that US support would not be forthcoming in a future aggression. If President Rhee believed he could achieve his long-range objectives by using his forces independently, he would do so. He was dangerous because of his general unpredictability and his tendency to act on occasion "without adequate prior consideration of [the] consequences." The situation was urgent, but Rhee might be pacified by assurance of a bilateral US-ROK security pact, which he seemed to desire, perhaps combined with promises that the United States would supply postwar economic aid, support ROK participation in the political conference, and continue to seek Korean unification by peaceful means.¹⁴¹

General Clark opposed a bilateral security pact with the ROK, which would conflict with the primary mission given the Far East Command in current emergency war plans. As to the possible removal of ROK forces from the UNC and their independent use, General Clark realized that this might happen but did not recommend raising again the question of a definite agreement for UN control of ROK forces.¹⁴²

The ROK National Assembly on 21 April passed a resolution calling for support of President Rhee's objective of unifying Korea by an actual invasion of North Korea. Three days later President Rhee informed President Eisenhower that if the UNC agreed to allow Chinese Communist forces to remain south of the Yalu, he would withdraw his forces from UN command. He would fight on alone if he had to.¹⁴³

Upon learning of this statement by President Rhee, which amounted to an ultimatum, General Clark immediately sought permission to call on the ROK President and find out "exactly what he means as to the time at which he intends to implement his threat and to learn as much as I can as to his future intentions." General Clark believed that President Rhee was bluffing, although he was apparently carrying his bluff to extremes.¹⁴⁴

Receiving Washington's permission, General Clark called on Dr. Rhee on 27 April. He extracted a promise that ROK forces would not be withdrawn from the

UN Command except as a last resort and after full discussion. General Clark also felt that he had succeeded in making clearer the distinction between the military armistice agreement being negotiated and the agreement that would ensue from the political conference. He still believed that Dr. Rhee was bluffing and that he wanted a strong commitment from President Eisenhower to support Korea militarily if the armistice were violated.¹⁴⁵

Earlier, the US Ambassador to South Korea, Mr. Ellis O. Briggs,¹⁴⁶ had given President Rhee a letter from President Eisenhower, replying to one written by President Rhee on 9 April. The US President pointed out that the United Nations had accomplished the purpose of intervening in Korea—the repulse of the aggression—and that it would therefore be indefensible to refuse an honorable armistice. The United States and United Nations remained committed to Korean unification, but through peaceful means, and efforts to deal with the problems confronting Korea would be “entirely nullified” if the ROK Government took any action that the United States or the United Nations could not support.¹⁴⁷

Despite these assurances, President Rhee did not change his stance even after the introduction of the enemy offer of 7 May, which abandoned the demand that prisoners be moved out of Korea. The focus of objection now was to the stationing of troops of Communist countries and of India on foreign soil. In fact, the ROK member of the UNC delegation, General Choi Duk Shin, tendered a plan of his own specifying that Switzerland would chair the repatriation commission and would furnish all of the custodial forces, which would be restricted to the island of Cheju-do.¹⁴⁸

When General Clark flew to Korea on 12 May to overcome ROK opposition to an armistice, as described earlier, President Rhee took the opportunity to make a plea for larger ROK forces and for a US commitment to a security pact. General Clark replied that he had given full support to the goal of a 20-division army and that the question of a treaty was one to be discussed at governmental level. “Rhee realizes that, in spite of some of his stated objections, we will go ahead and obtain an armistice if we can get one that does not sacrifice the principle of no forced repatriation,” General Clark reported on 13 May. “He is bargaining now to get a security pact, to obtain more economic aid, and to make his people feel he is having a voice in the armistice negotiations.”¹⁴⁹

US officials who drew up the final position to be presented to the Communists on 25 May realized that it would be highly unpalatable to President Rhee. The demand that Korean nonrepatriates be released as soon as the armistice took effect had been dropped; this was not an essential part of the US stand on repatriation, and it was not a matter on which the UNC could allow the negotiations to break down. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted the elements of this new position to General Clark on 23 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed him to visit Rhee and explain them before presenting them to the Communists. “For security reasons,” they warned, “we believe it undesirable [to] inform Rhee that we intend [to] terminate negotiations if [the] Commies reject UNC proposals.”¹⁵⁰

On the morning of 25 May, an hour before the delegates were scheduled to meet at Panmunjom, General Clark and Ambassador Briggs described to President Rhee the terms that were to be offered the enemy. They sought to soften the

impact by assuring him that if he cooperated in carrying out the armistice agreement, the United States would support him militarily, economically, and politically. Also, to deter any renewed aggression, the nations supporting the UN military effort in Korea would, as soon as a cease-fire took effect, issue the so-called "greater sanctions" statement, warning of the grave consequences of a new attack on South Korea.¹⁵¹ But, they added, the United States considered that a bilateral mutual security treaty was undesirable because it would weaken the "greater sanctions" statement and would detract from the UN character of the action in Korea.

The two US officials sought from President Rhee "firm assurances" that he would stop his opposition to the armistice; that he would cooperate in implementing the armistice agreements; that ROK armed forces would remain under operational control of CINUNC until both the US and ROK Governments agreed it was no longer necessary. If the ROK took unilateral action, the United States might be compelled to take "all necessary measures" to ensure the security of its forces.

After listening to the US envoys, President Rhee's first comment was "I am deeply disappointed." The Korean people, he went on, would never accept the new terms even if he told them to do so. Indian troops would never be allowed in ROK rear areas. All Chinese Communist forces must be withdrawn. Visibly affected by what he had heard, President Rhee concluded:

You can withdraw all UN Forces, all economic aid. We will decide our own fate. We do not ask anyone to fight for us. We made our mistake perhaps in the beginning in relying upon democracy to assist us.

Sorry, but I cannot assure President Eisenhower of my cooperation under the present circumstances.¹⁵²

Following the meeting, General Clark, in a message that turned out to be prophetic, cautioned Washington authorities that President Rhee could release the nonrepatriate Korean prisoners in South Korea without warning and that the UNC could do little to prevent him from doing so, since most of the guard force was supplied by the ROK Army. In such an event, the Communists would undoubtedly charge the UNC with duplicity, and the charge would be widely accepted even by US allies. He had ordered his subordinate commanders to take all feasible steps to prevent any unilateral release.¹⁵³

Speculating on what else President Rhee might do to disrupt the negotiations, General Clark foresaw that, before the armistice was signed, he might offer a separate ROK proposal to the Communists; withdraw the ROK delegate; and announce that he would not comply with any provisions of the armistice, if signed; withdraw ROK forces from control of the UNC; or inspire riots and demonstrations. After the signing, President Rhee was capable of refusing to withdraw from the DMZ; removing his forces from UN command; attacking Communist positions with his own forces; conducting guerrilla raids; or refusing to allow any foreign personnel, particularly Communists, into the ROK to carry out armistice terms.¹⁵⁴

ROK public opinion lined up solidly with President Rhee against the latest UNC proposals, all of which he leaked to the press. In reaction, General Clark authorized General Harrison to withhold all classified information from General Choi, the ROK member of the UNC delegation, who had refused to promise to comply with security rules.¹⁵⁵

Preparation for the worst possible contingency—that the ROK Army might be withdrawn from the UN Command—were made up in Washington and in the Far East. Eighth Army drew up Plan EVERREADY, which envisioned three contingency situations, as follows: Condition I, in which ROK forces were not responsive to UNC directives; Condition II, in which ROK forces took independent action; and Condition III, the most extreme, in which ROK forces and the populace became openly hostile to UN forces. It was assumed under all conditions that UN dispositions had not changed nor had the Communist threat diminished. Faced with Condition I, preparation would begin for withdrawal of US/UN forces to protect vital areas and installations around major cities. Naval and air forces would go on alert, the level of supply in forward areas would be reduced, and intelligence coverage of the ROK Government and Army would be increased. Under Condition II, some withdrawals to protect installations would be made, nonessential installations would be closed, ROK security units would be disarmed and relieved, strong security would be set up at all vital installations and communications centers, and movement of civilians would be restricted. In the most drastic case, Condition III, UN and dependable ROK forces would be withdrawn to defensive positions. Under any of the three conditions, other increasingly severe measures would be taken if necessary. These included proclamation of martial law in the name of the UN; seizure of dissident military and civil leaders; and proclamation of military government. The plan also provided for the logistic support to ROK forces remaining loyal to the UNC, with phased withdrawal of support to dissident units.¹⁵⁶ General Clark forwarded this plan to Washington on 22 May 1953.¹⁵⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred it to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which was already studying measures to be applied if the ROK forces were withdrawn from the UNC. This study had been directed immediately after the Joint Chiefs of Staff received General Clark's account of his meeting with President Rhee on 27 April.¹⁵⁸

On 29 May the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with officials of the Department of State to discuss the problem of the ROK Government and also to consider EVERREADY. The conferees approved a memorandum for the President describing the situation and the steps that General Clark was proposing to meet any emergencies. Later that day, the memorandum was submitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, neither of whom approved it as written, probably because they felt that it went too far. Realizing the dangerous urgency of the situation, State and Defense officials agreed to send interim instructions to CINUNC at once. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched a message authorizing him to take any necessary preliminary measures to ensure the security of his command. Moreover, if any action by the ROK Government should cause a "grave emer-

gency," he was authorized to "act as necessary to ensure the integrity of your forces." No decision had been reached regarding a mutual defense pact with the ROK. However, General Clark was empowered, if he considered that such action might avert an emergency, to inform the ROK President that Secretary Dulles was "strongly recommending" to President Eisenhower that the United States enter into such a pact.¹⁵⁹

On the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to draw up urgently a list of units by which the US forces in Korea could be augmented without delay. They also called for evaluation of the adequacy of atomic weapons capabilities for immediate support of CINCFE.¹⁶⁰

On the morning of 30 May the Joint Chiefs of Staff received from CINCFE a reply to their message of the preceding day. General Clark expressed the opinion that President Rhee probably would not take "serious unilateral actions" without giving specific advance warning. As to placating the ROK leader by offering him a security pact, General Clark observed:

If Rhee could be told at the appropriate time that the President is now willing to enter into such negotiations, he may feel that such action is coming late. Nevertheless, I believe it would improve our relations with Rhee and the ROK Government materially and diminish active opposition to the new UNC armistice proposal.

To make the offer therefore seemed worthwhile even though it would probably not remove all of Rhee's opposition to an armistice—opposition centering upon his demand for prompt release of Korean nonrepatriates and his unwillingness to place these men at the disposal of Communist "indoctrinators" for a lengthy period. Of course, added General Clark, an offer of a security pact should be contingent upon guarantees that Rhee would "fall in line on the UNC armistice proposal and on such other matters as retention by UNC of complete control of ROK forces." These views had the concurrence of Ambassador Murphy.¹⁶¹

This message was available to the officials who gathered in Washington on the morning of 30 May to discuss relations with the ROK. Those at the meeting included Secretary of State Dulles; Secretary of Defense Wilson; General Collins, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Major General C. D. Eddleman, USA; and other officials of the State and Defense Departments. The conferees discussed Plan EVERREADY and agreed that they could not concur in that portion of it that would establish a UNC military government. They also agreed to recommend to the President that he authorize an offer to the ROK Government of a mutual defense treaty, along the lines of those with the Philippines and the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) alliance. The offer was, however, to be conditional upon ROK agreement to accept an armistice along lines proposed by the UNC, to cooperate in its implementation, and to leave ROK forces under CINCUNC. Following the meeting, the conferees called upon the President; Secretary Dulles presented the gist of their recommendations, and the President promptly approved them.¹⁶²

General Collins at once notified General Clark of the decision to negotiate a treaty with the ROK Government, subject to the necessary assurances. The timing of the approach to Rhee was left to the discretion of General Clark and Ambassador Briggs. In a separate message, General Collins informed CINCFE that Washington did not concur in that part of Plan EVERREADY that envisioned a UNC military government. Otherwise, General Clark, as the "responsible military commander," was authorized to "take whatever other steps you deem appropriate to safeguard the integrity and security of your forces."¹⁶³

General Clark replied on 31 May that he and the Ambassador agreed that the approach to President Rhee on the mutual security treaty "must wait until the situation had been clarified." There the matter rested for the time being.¹⁶⁴

The Agreement on Repatriation

Following an eight-day recess, UNC and Communist delegations met at Panmunjom at 1100 on the morning of 25 May 1953. General Harrison proposed that they shift to executive session; Nam Il agreed. Then, General Harrison presented the terms that had been approved by President Eisenhower. He drew attention to the four important concessions in the new UNC position: withdrawal of insistence that Korean nonrepatriates be released on the effective date of the armistice; a 90-day (rather than a 60-day) period for prisoners to remain in the custody of the neutral organization; acceptance of the political conference as the body to dispose of nonrepatriates remaining after the 90-day period; and willingness to allow the custodial commission to operate on the basis of majority vote. But, continued General Harrison, the new UNC position was contingent upon agreement by the Communists on certain other matters: that the terms of reference of the custodial commission guarantee that no force or threats would be used against prisoners; that all armed forces and operating personnel be provided by India; that a limit of 90 days be accepted for "explanations" to the prisoners; that if the political conference could not agree within 30 days on the disposition of remaining nonrepatriates, they would be released or their fate would be referred to the General Assembly. The Communists, after a brief recess, returned to criticize the UN proposal, but in relatively mild fashion; they did not immediately reject it. The delegates then recessed, to reconvene on 1 June.¹⁶⁵

In the interval before the next meeting, General Clark, after clearing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed a letter to Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai on 28 May, urging them to accept the UNC proposal in the interests of an early armistice. He received a conciliatory reply praising the proposal as "conducive to the progress of the negotiations" and expressing the view that "peace in Korea can be achieved."¹⁶⁶

The delegates met again on 4 June, following a postponement requested by the Communists. The atmosphere was promising. "We basically agree to the new proposal which your side put forward on 25 May," said General Nam Il. He then presented a complete draft agreement on repatriation, which departed from the

UNC position in one respect. The General Assembly was given no role in connection with nonrepatriates; those not disposed of by the political conference would simply be released. In Washington, however, the enemy draft was approved as the basis of an armistice subject to clarification on a few points. The Joint Chiefs of Staff so informed General Clark on 5 June, and on the following day General Harrison announced this decision to the enemy delegation.¹⁶⁷

Over the next few days, messages passed between Washington and the Far East to settle the final details. At the same time the Department of State forwarded the draft terms of reference for the NNRC to the governments of Sweden, Switzerland, and India. On 8 June General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that final agreement was imminent.¹⁶⁸

The agreement on repatriation, incorporating the terms of reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, was signed at 1424 (Far East time) on 8 June 1953. It provided that all prisoners of war who wished to return home would be allowed to do so within 60 days; no threat of force would be used either to effect or to prevent repatriation. After 60 days, those who had not chosen repatriation would be turned over to the NNRC. For 90 days thereafter, nations to which prisoners belonged would be allowed to send representatives to "explain" their right to return home. The explanations were to be conducted in the presence of representatives of each member nation of the NNRC and of a representative from the detaining side. When the 90-day period expired, the fate of remaining nonrepatriates would be turned over to the political conference, which would have 30 days to reach a decision. Those that still remained after that period would be declared to have civilian status; if they wished to go to a neutral country, the NNRC would assist them to do so.¹⁶⁹

The long dispute over the principle of voluntary repatriation, which had delayed peace for more than a year, was over. The United States had won. It now appeared that the only matters to be settled before an armistice was concluded were to set up the NNRC and its sister organization, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to renegotiate the demarcation line to reflect changes in the military situation since November 1951. Discussion of these matters began at once. But before these minor matters could be disposed of, one last serious obstacle was to arise—an obstacle created by the unpredictable President of the Republic of Korea, Dr. Syngman Rhee.¹⁷⁰

Finale: Suspense to the End

Rhee's Continuing Defiance

Although the Eisenhower administration had decided to offer Syngman Rhee a mutual security pact in the hope of winning his cooperation, the offer was not at once revealed. General Clark's advice on 31 May that the moment was not opportune was accepted in Washington.¹

The wisdom of not appearing overeager was made apparent by a message that President Rhee sent to President Eisenhower by cable on 2 June 1953. The ROK leader declined to give a public pledge to accept the armistice and tendered a new proposal which, he said, he had already made orally to General Clark and Ambassador Briggs. This proposal called for simultaneous withdrawal of Communist and UNC forces from Korea on condition that a US-ROK mutual defense pact was concluded first. Such a pact must provide for continuing US military aid and for immediate military intervention if the Communists resumed aggression and must specify that US air and naval forces "will remain where they are" as a deterrent to a new attack.²

Commenting on this message, CINCFE observed that, on the basis of information available to him, US policy would allow Dr. Rhee to be given assurance on all these demands except that for withdrawal of Communist forces. General Clark was at that time awaiting the enemy's reply to the UNC offer of 25 May.³

Depending on the nature of this reply, General Clark thought that it might be possible to put forward in the negotiations a proposal for simultaneous troop withdrawal by both sides; however, it should be made clear to President Rhee that this issue would not be allowed to become a "breaking point." If the Communists rejected the proposal (as General Clark thought they would), the best that could be done then would be for the UNC to announce publicly that mutual withdrawal would be supported in the political conference. In any event, General Clark remained convinced that no offer of a security pact should be made to the ROK Government until after the next session at Panmunjom (scheduled for 4 June), at which the Communists would reply to the 25 May

offer. If their reply promised further progress, General Clark and Ambassador Briggs had agreed that they would meet with President Rhee on 5 June and give him assurances regarding the desired security pact, the continuance of US aid, and the retention of US air and naval forces in the area. In reply, General Collins, speaking for the State and Defense Departments, approved the meeting and authorized CINUNC to give the proposed assurances.⁴

When the Communists accepted the UNC proposal on 25 May, General Clark and Ambassador Briggs, as planned, met on 5 June with President Rhee and acting Foreign Minister Pyun Yung Tai. The two US officials urged that the ROK Government associate itself with the armistice, which now appeared imminent. They promised "close and vigorous collaboration" in the forthcoming political conference and, subject to suitable assurances of ROK cooperation, military and economic aid and maintenance of US forces in the Western Pacific on a "long-time basis." President Rhee was not swayed; he denounced the prospective armistice terms, stressed the need for Chinese withdrawal, and thought it "only fair" that he should be allowed to put forward and to publicize his mutual withdrawal plan. When the subject of a security pact came up, General Clark and the Ambassador asked whether, assuming it "might be possible" to negotiate such a treaty at an appropriate time, the ROK Government could be counted on in return to support the armistice. Dr. Rhee evaded an answer, even though the question was repeated several times. General Clark concluded, on the basis of this meeting, that the ROK President was determined to "speak his piece" regarding his withdrawal plan, but that he was "proceeding cautiously and carefully" and had probably not decided what to do next.⁵

As General Clark had predicted, President Rhee on 6 June released a statement calling the UNC proposal of 25 May "unacceptable" and calling for mutual withdrawal of UNC and Communist forces, preceded by a US-ROK mutual defense treaty. "If this proposal is unacceptable, however, we must be allowed to continue the fighting," said the ROK President ominously. "We prefer to fight on to any divisive armistice or peace."⁶

In Washington on 6 June, General Collins cabled to General Clark a reply from President Eisenhower to Dr. Rhee's message of 2 June. The US President defended the terms of the proposed armistice, pointing out that it would leave the ROK actually with more territory than before the war and that it would guarantee political asylum to anticommunist POWs. It was his "profound conviction," under these circumstances, that the United Nations and the Republic of Korea were morally obligated to accept the armistice. He went on to promise that the United States would take three steps:

(1) Continue to seek, by peaceful means, the unification of Korea, making this "our central objective" in the political conference.

(2) Negotiate, "promptly after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice," a mutual defense treaty like those with the Philippines and with Australia-New Zealand. This was the first time that a clear assurance on this point had been given the ROK Government. President Eisenhower did not specify any conditions for such a treaty, except insofar as conditions might be implied by the phrase "acceptance of an armistice."

(3) Continue economic aid after the war.

In conclusion, the US President urged the importance of unity between the two countries. "Even the thought of a separation at this critical hour would be a tragedy," he wrote.⁷

In forwarding this message, General Collins had authorized CINCFE, in agreement with the Ambassador, to deliver it at his discretion and had suggested that General Clark might first sound out President Rhee in private on the subject of a mutual security treaty. In line with this suggestion, General Clark conferred privately with the ROK President on 7 June. He found Dr. Rhee "in lower spirits than I have ever seen him before," and made "absolutely no progress" in persuading him to take a "reasonable approach to the armistice terms." General Clark stressed that the United States was determined to achieve an armistice on the basis of the 25 May proposal, no matter how unacceptable to the ROK Government. When he asked cooperation in the matter of Korean prisoners, Dr. Rhee refused to listen. He countered with a statement that the United States was "making a great mistake" in adopting "tactics of appeasement"; that the ROK Government would never accept the present armistice terms but would fight on "even if it meant suicide"; and that hereafter he would feel free to take whatever steps he considered appropriate. Asked if his statement meant that he would withdraw his forces from the UN Command, he replied evasively. When General Clark introduced the subject of a mutual defense treaty, President Rhee showed no interest; it was "too late," he said, and Korea could not survive if the Chinese Communists remained on Korean soil.

Soon after this discouraging conference, General Clark returned with Ambassador Briggs, and the two presented the message from President Eisenhower. As before, however, President Rhee was uninterested. He declared again that he "could not permit Indian Troops in his country" and that Korean prisoners would not submit to "indoctrination" by Communist "persuaders." In short, as General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Rhee was utterly unreasonable and gave no ground whatsoever. He himself is the only one who knows how far he will go but undoubtedly he will bluff right up to the last." General Clark saw no solution except "to await developments."⁸

On the heels of these events, the ROK Government ordered the immediate return of all ROK officers from the United States, took what it called "pseudo-extraordinary security measures," and recalled the ROK delegate from the UNC Armistice delegation. Unprecedented evidence of anti-American feelings began to appear throughout Korea. Patriotic anti-armistice demonstrations increased in number and size. President Rhee and other ROK officials continued to utter threatening or denunciatory remarks.⁹

In the light of these conditions, it was inevitable that US officials should reexamine the advisability of continuing to underwrite the expansion of the ROK Army from 16 to 20 divisions, as had been planned. A message from the Department of State to the US Ambassador in Tokyo on 22 May had warned that the United States was "not prepared to make a commitment to the expansion of ROK forces beyond [the] present level" if the ROK continued its "agitation against the armistice" and its "non-cooperative attitude."

This message appeared to conflict with the authorization given General Clark on 14 May 1953 to activate the four remaining ROK divisions at his discretion.¹⁰ On 10 June, General Clark asked for clarification. He was prepared to activate the four divisions at once with small cadres, leaving the question of further expansion to be determined in the light of "subsequent developments."¹¹

In a joint State-Defense message on 12 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied any intent to abridge CINCFE's authority to activate these units. The purpose of the State Department message of 22 May, they said, had been to make it clear to the ROK Government that its attitude toward the armistice would have a "definite influence" on US willingness to assist further ROKA expansion, and that continued agitation against the armistice might lead to the conclusion that further expansion was contrary to US interest. They reassured General Clark that he was authorized to act "at his discretion," but added that, if he decided to form the new divisions at that time, he must impress upon President Rhee that the action was being done on the expectation of future cooperation. General Clark took no action for the moment.¹²

As relations with South Korea deteriorated, Secretary of State Dulles decided to take a more active part. On 12 June he wrote to President Rhee and invited him to come to Washington for a meeting with President Eisenhower, ostensibly for the purpose of concerting plans for the political conference. The ROK President evidenced pleasure at this invitation but replied that he could not leave at the moment and countered with an invitation to Secretary Dulles to come to Korea. The Secretary was forced to decline in his turn owing to the press of business. However, he proposed to send the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Walter S. Robertson, to clear up "misunderstanding as to our post-armistice policies." On 17 June President Rhee told Ambassador Briggs that he would be happy to receive a visit from Mr. Robertson.¹³

Later that same day, Dr. Rhee handed the Ambassador his reply to President Eisenhower's message of 6 June. He expressed a desire to maintain friendly relations with the United States as well as appreciation for the US promise of support. At the same time, however, he reaffirmed South Korea's opposition to an armistice that would allow Chinese troops to remain in Korea. "To accept such an armistice is to accept a death warrant," wrote President Rhee. His country had "constantly" sought a security treaty, but he added, "if it is tied up with the armistice, its efficacy would be diminished almost to a vanishing point."¹⁴

The friction between Washington and Seoul had not affected the situation at Panmunjom, where the two delegations worked to prepare a complete armistice settlement. After the repatriation issue was disposed of through the agreement of 8 June, the largest remaining problem was to revise the demarcation line. This was turned over to staff officers on 10 June. It was complicated by a new offensive launched by the Communists, obviously to improve their position at the last moment. Nevertheless the staff officers reached agreement on a new line, which was ratified by the plenary delegations on 17 June. As of that day, the delegations had reached agreement, subject to final checking of wording by interpreters, on all but two paragraphs of the complete agreement.¹⁵

The Prisoner Release

General Clark had warned Washington on 25 May 1953 that President Rhee was capable of releasing those North Korean prisoners who had indicated their intent to resist repatriation and that the UN Command could do little to prevent such an action. These prisoners, numbering slightly over 35,000, were housed in camps on the Korean mainland. Each camp had a US commanding officer with a small US administrative and technical staff; however, the overwhelming majority of the guard force consisted of ROKA troops. General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had considered replacing the ROKA guards with US troops but had decided that any attempt to do so “would only irritate an already sensitive situation.”¹⁶

The tension within these camps rose after the signing of the repatriation agreement of 8 June, which, despite UNC assurances, enhanced the apprehension of many prisoners that they would be forcibly shipped back to Communist rule. Since the beginning of June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been receiving from CINCUNC a daily report on the situation in the ROK, including information on the prisoner situation furnished by the Commanding General, KCOMZ, General Herren. These reports attested to a general danger of some violent action among the anticommunist prisoners, but none conveyed a specific warning that action was imminent. On the contrary, CINCUNC reported on 8 June that “there are no indications of organized plans for mass breakout.” Nine days later, on 17 June, it was reported that “ROKA Security Forces continued to be cooperative with US camp commanders.”¹⁷

General Clark had also instructed component commanders to be prepared to carry out Plan EVERREADY, which dealt with possible noncooperation of the ROK Government and Army with UNC directives.¹⁸

This plan, however, contained no specific measures for preventing a breakout of prisoners. General Clark had already discussed this contingency with his subordinates. He had given orders that every possible source of intelligence be used to keep track of the temper of the prisoners and to develop plans to counter any action. If it became necessary to use force to keep order, “normal” riot control measures might be used, including the use of non-toxic gases. However, cautioned General Clark, “small arms will not be used directly against prisoners, and every precaution will be taken to ensure that there is no loss of life.” Orientation programs in each camp were to stress that under no circumstances would any prisoners be forced to return to North Korea and that those who so desired could expect to be released in South Korea within a “reasonable period” after an armistice.¹⁹

The stage was set for an action by Dr. Rhee that was to surpass all his previous efforts to hinder and disrupt the armistice negotiations. On the night of 17–18 June, thousands of Korean prisoners broke out of the four major prison camps, at San Mu Dai, Nonsam, Masan, and Pusan. They did so with the full connivance of ROK security guards, who did nothing to prevent the escapes. US camp commanders and administrative personnel, overwhelmingly outnumbered, were utterly unable to stem the tide. General Herren immediately notified the ROK

Chief of Staff, General Paik Sun Yup, who ordered ROK troops to round up the prisoners, but his orders were promptly countermanded by instructions apparently emanating from President Rhee. General Herren ordered US troops to replace the ROK guards and to begin recapturing as many prisoners as possible. By the afternoon of 18 June (Far East time), 25,131 prisoners had escaped, of whom 971 had been recovered.²⁰

Over the next few days, escapes continued on a smaller scale, but gradually the situation was brought under control. General Herren concentrated the remaining prisoners in a few compounds guarded by US troops. To recapture those who had already escaped, however, was hopeless in most cases. The prisoners, with the assistance of ROK authorities, simply merged with the local population. By the end of the month only 8,600 North Korean nonrepatriates remained in UNC custody.²¹

President Rhee was both prompt and frank in admitting his complicity in the prisoner escapes. In a statement that he released on 18 June, after the first breakout, he proclaimed defiantly:

I have on my own responsibility ordered the release of the anti-Communist Korean prisoners on this day, June 18th, 1953. The reason why I did this without full consultation with the United Nations Command and other authorities concerned is too obvious to explain. The governors and police officers in the various provinces have been instructed to take care of these released war prisoners to their best ability. We trust all our people and our friends will cooperate in this so that there will be no unnecessary misunderstanding anywhere.²²

On the same day, General Clark released a statement of his own stressing the evidence of ROK collusion and making it clear that US personnel at the camps had striven in vain to prevent the escapes. He also fired off a private letter charging that the action of the ROKA guards in permitting the prisoners to escape was a "clear violation" of the authority of CINCUNC and a "unilateral abrogation" of President Rhee's own commitment to leave ROK forces under the command of the UNC.²³

President Rhee had already written to General Clark defending the prisoner release and warning that he would withdraw ROK forces from the UN Command rather than accept the armistice on its present terms. In a separate letter, the Foreign Minister and Acting Prime Minister, Pyun Yung Tai, reminded General Clark that the ROK Government had always maintained that those Korean POWs not desiring repatriation should be released to civilian status and that such a provision had been included in the proposal presented to the enemy on 13 May, though it had subsequently been abandoned by the UNC. The repatriation agreement of 8 June, according to Mr. Pyun, had removed the "last ray of hope" that the Korean nonrepatriates would ever be freed.²⁴

In Washington, President Eisenhower and his advisors were seriously concerned over the irresponsible action of the ROK Government. On 18 June, following a condemnation of this action by the National Security Council, the President dispatched a letter to Dr. Rhee, reminding him of the original promise to place ROK forces under UN Command and of his recent "unqualified assurance" to

General Clark that he would not take unilateral action without prior consultation.²⁵ The letter continued:

Your present order and the action thereunder constitutes [sic] a clear violation of this assurance and creates an impossible situation for the UN Command. If continued, such a course of action can only result in the needless sacrifice of all that has been won for Korea by the blood and bravery of its magnificent fighting forces.

Persistence in your present course of action will make it impractical for the UN Command to continue to operate jointly with you under the conditions which result therefrom. Unless you are prepared immediately and unequivocally to accept the authority of the UN Command to conduct the present hostilities and to bring them to a close, it will be necessary to effect another arrangement. Accordingly, the UN Commander in Chief has now been authorized to take such steps as may become necessary in the light of your determination.

You will appreciate that if the present conditions continue the assurances contained in my letter of June 6, 1953, must become inapplicable. These assurances had as their primary objective the preservation and strengthening of your government and the ultimate unification of Korea. I am certain that it will be impossible to attain these objectives if the division of authority and lack of mutual confidence created by your action are allowed to continue.²⁶

Secretary Dulles added a brief letter of his own informing President Rhee that the proposed visit by Assistant Secretary Robertson would be postponed "pending further clarification which I pray you to consider most earnestly." He also released a statement criticizing the ROK action and declaring that the UNC had been acting in good faith in negotiating for an armistice.²⁷

The South Korean Prime Minister, Paik Too Chin, happened to be in Washington at the time. He met on 18 June with Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary Robertson, and others, taking a conciliatory stand. President Rhee, he thought, was being misled by his advisors. Mr. Paik was shown the Eisenhower letter and agreed with the position set forth therein. Following a visit with President Eisenhower, he cut short his visit and hurried back to Korea.²⁸

On the following day, (19 June), in Seoul, Ambassador Briggs delivered President Eisenhower's letter. Upon reading it, President Rhee showed no visible effect but restated his position. Even if South Korea's present course proved suicidal, "that is our privilege," he said. To leave Chinese forces in Korea would be a "death warrant" for South Korea. Both President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun, who was present, denied that the ROK Government had ever promised to leave its forces under UN Command. When pressed for the unequivocal assurances that President Eisenhower wanted, Dr. Rhee replied, "Please inform the President that I cannot change my position. Signing of the armistice will automatically mean withdrawal of the ROK forces from the UNC."²⁹

From Tokyo, General Clark on 19 June described for the Joint Chiefs of Staff the measures he was taking to restrain the remaining prisoners: concentrating them in fewer compounds and bringing in US troops as guards. He also restated his belief that it was desirable to avoid using "maximum force" against the prisoners but asked for instructions on this point. "I feel I am entitled to your approval and support of the action to avoid use of fire arms with inevitable

bloodshed and high loss of life," he wired. The Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly indicated their approval of the actions taken by General Clark thus far.³⁰

On 20 June General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had received reliable information that another attempt would be made, perhaps that night, to release the remaining Korean nonrepatriates "by force if necessary." This was a dangerous prospect, since at that time ROK forces at the prison camps still outnumbered US forces by a 3-1 margin. General Clark had therefore issued new instructions to General Herren that, if called upon by ROK commanders to release prisoners, he should refuse and should warn the opposing commanders that it was in the best interests of all to avoid a clash. Each camp commander was authorized, on the basis of his individual judgment, to withdraw US forces when it was apparent that the ROKA meant to attack in overwhelming numbers and that the camp could not be held without considerable bloodshed. Camp commanders were to have "complete authority" to evaluate each situation on the spot and to determine the best course of action. The hope was that these commanders would be able to bring about a "definite show of force" that would deter a clash and avert bloodshed. "At this delicate time, faced with the continuing Communist capabilities for offensive action anywhere across the front," wrote General Clark, "I cannot afford to utilize more UN combat troops at these widely scattered POW camp locations." The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no reply and thus tacitly approved General Clark's revised instructions. Fortunately no clashes developed.³¹

Following a conference with the Eighth Army Commander, Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA,³² who delivered General Clark's letter of 18 June, President Rhee sent two letters to General Clark explaining his actions. He was, he said, seeking to avoid "a clash between Koreans and the foreign pro-Communist troops that you propose to bring in." He had issued orders to the ROK forces not to aid in further prisoner escapes, but he could not take the responsibility to keep the prisoners indefinitely. The prospective armistice, continued the ROK President, had altered the relationship between his Government and the UNC. "I do not see, then, how the ROK forces can remain under your command," he wrote. But, "as a friend to a friend," President Rhee renewed his promise to notify General Clark before withdrawing his forces.³³

On 21 June Prime Minister Paik landed in Tokyo and met with General Clark and Ambassador Murphy. He promised that, when he reached Seoul, he would do everything possible to "smooth out" the situation. He agreed completely with General Clark's view of the "overriding necessity" of avoiding any actions that would produce a clash between US and ROK forces.³⁴

In Washington, the administration decided to go ahead with the proposed mission of Assistant Secretary Robertson. On 22 June Secretary Dulles instructed Ambassador Briggs to tell President Rhee that Mr. Robertson would proceed "immediately" to Korea, probably arriving about 25 June, and that he possessed the full confidence of the President and the Secretary.³⁵

Mr. Robertson left the same evening, without waiting for a reply from President Rhee. He carried with him a strongly worded letter from Secretary Dulles, pleading for unity between the two countries and asserting that the ROK had no

right to jeopardize by independent action the prospective armistice that had been achieved by so many sacrifices. General Collins accompanied Mr. Robertson for the purpose of discussing the military situation with General Clark.³⁶

The Impact on the Armistice Negotiations

The initial escape of prisoners on the night of 17–18 June did not immediately affect the attitude of the Communist delegation at Panmunjom. Staff officers met on 18 June and agreed on the entire text of the armistice document. The agreement was subject to checking by interpreters, who, however, were progressing so rapidly that General Harrison thought it possible that the entire process might be completed by that evening.³⁷

Later that day, General Harrison, adopting a policy of complete frankness, delivered to Communist liaison officers a letter describing the prisoner escape and making clear the complicity of the ROK Government and ROK security guards. He assured the Communists that US troops were taking over guard duty at the POW camps and that efforts were being made to round up the escapees.³⁸

The first enemy reaction came on the following morning, 19 June. The Communists called off a meeting of interpreters and another of staff officers charged with working out details of maps of the DMZ. They requested a meeting of the plenary delegations on 20 June and the UNC agreed.³⁹

When this meeting was held, the enemy delegation presented a letter from the Communist commanders, Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai. This letter charged that the UNC had deliberately connived with the Rhee “clique” in releasing the prisoners. More significantly, however, the enemy commanders set the theme for communist actions of the next weeks by asking the same obvious questions then in the minds of US officials. “Is the United Nations Command able to control the South Korean Government and Army? If not, does the armistice in Korea include the Syngman Rhee Clique? If it is not included, what assurance is there for the implementation of the armistice agreement on the part of South Korea? If it is included, then your side must be responsible for recovering immediately all 25,952 prisoners . . . and must give assurance that similar incidents will not recur in the future.”⁴⁰

General Clark advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the answer to the first two questions raised by the enemy must be an “unqualified no.” The UNC could not control the ROK Government or Army and the armistice did not at that time include the Rhee government. As to whether he could assure ROK cooperation in observing an armistice, General Clark believed that the UNC could promise only that it would make every effort. He asked for guidance.⁴¹

In a personal message to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the same day (20 June), General Clark sketched his plans should the prisoner release prove a “definite and prolonged stumbling block in negotiations.” He proposed to offer to meet with Generals Kim and Peng at Panmunjom. He would hope for a frank exchange to determine if they meant to go ahead with negotiations in view of

UNC inability to control President Rhee's actions. General Clark would explain candidly what had happened and would point out other ways that President Rhee might obstruct the armistice. He would then outline the courses open to the UNC against further ROK moves, such as withholding tactical and logistic support from ROK forces. If the enemy appeared willing to proceed with the armistice, he would assure the Communists of "our earnest determination to implement its provisions to the best of our ability," and would propose that the armistice be signed "at an early date."

In his conversation with the enemy commanders, General Clark would avoid making or implying any threats. But if it became evident that the enemy was using the escape for propaganda, General Clark proposed to make it clear that should the enemy refuse to conclude an armistice, the UNC had no alternative but to resume hostilities, with no guarantee that the fighting would be confined to Korea. General Clark believed that his proposed course of action would end the situation in which the United States was being "blackmailed" by Dr. Syngman Rhee. "If an armistice could be signed under present conditions," he concluded, "with the understanding by both parties that Rhee had the capability of violating some of its provisions, we could confront Rhee with a *fait accompli*, and proceed as best we can thereafter."⁴²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff denied General Clark's request to meet with enemy commanders, "particularly at this time." Also, they saw no immediate compulsion to reply to the questions raised by the enemy, at least until the situation with regard to the ROK had been clarified.⁴³

General Clark met again with Dr. Rhee on 22 June. The South Korean President was tense but insisted that he was "trying to work together" with President Eisenhower. General Clark informed him bluntly that the United States meant to reach an armistice agreement "under honorable terms" and was not prepared to eject Chinese Communist forces from Korea or to make their presence an issue in the armistice negotiations. He did, however, outline an arrangement for moving Korean nonrepatriates to the DMZ before they were turned over to the NNRC; thus Indian troops attached to the NNRC would not have to set foot on South Korean soil, and one of Dr. Rhee's objections to the armistice would be removed. The ROK President expressed interest in this plan but was noncommittal. The two men agreed on the importance of preventing fighting between US and ROK troops. President Rhee promised to cooperate in guarding both Chinese and Korean prisoners. He reiterated that it would be impossible for him to sign the armistice since it would mean the division of his country. He conceded, however, that he could "support" an armistice.⁴⁴

Assistant Secretary Robertson arrived in Tokyo on 24 June, accompanied by General Collins. They at once met with General Clark, Ambassador Briggs, and Ambassador Murphy. All agreed that it was "most desirable" to conclude an armistice as soon as possible. They agreed further that if President Rhee remained intransigent, Mr. Robertson should tell him that the United Nations would get out of Korea. This would imply complete readiness to make an agreement with the Communists, independently of the ROK, for withdrawal of all UN forces and for the release by the Communists of US/UN POWs in their custody.

These officials believed that if President Rhee was convinced that the United States meant business on withdrawing he might change his attitude.⁴⁵

This agreement in the Tokyo conference amounted to a change in US policy and, as such, required careful consideration in Washington. General Clark's report of the Tokyo meeting was discussed at the White House on 25 June, in a conference attended by Secretary of Defense Wilson, Secretary of State Dulles, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (with General Hull representing General Collins). President Eisenhower decided that General Clark, as the man on the spot, was best qualified to make decisions on the situation in Korea. He therefore directed that broad authority be given General Clark, who, he said, had his full confidence.⁴⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Clark at once:

Your are authorized at [a] time considered appropriate by you to proceed with negotiations toward conclusion [of an] armistice. You are further authorized [the] widest latitude in specific terms of [the] armistice and [in] handling [the] problem [of the] ROK attitude toward the armistice. You may negotiate such changes in the present draft armistice agreement that you may consider necessary or desirable in light of forced repatriation and undertake no obligation to the Communists, expressed or implied, legal or moral, to use force against [the] ROK to ensure their compliance with [the] armistice terms.⁴⁷

President Rhee, continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was to be informed of the US intention to proceed with the conclusion of an armistice. A reply to the questions raised by the enemy in the letter of 20 June was left to General Clark's discretion. In no case would the CINCUNC commit the UNC to total withdrawal from Korea, but he was left free to take actions that might lead ROK leaders to believe that the UNC was prepared to withdraw if they did not comply with the armistice. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assured General Clark that the US Government was prepared promptly to empower him to sign an armistice if the Communists were also prepared to sign under the conditions stated. But, they added, if assurance of ROK compliance was not forthcoming before the armistice was signed, it would "not be possible" to induce the other nations taking part in the Korean War to agree to the issuance, simultaneously with the armistice, of the so-called "greater sanctions" statement warning against the possible consequences of a renewal of the attack.⁴⁸

General Clark replied on 26 June that he was "grateful" for the positive authority and responsibility that had been passed to him. He was going next day to see Rhee in company with Ambassador Robertson and depending on this interview, would reply to the Communist letter. "I am convinced that the sooner we sign an armistice, with or without Rhee's support, the better our position will be to handle Rhee when we are not worried about a Communist attack," CINCUNC stated.⁴⁹

President Rhee meanwhile was continuing his efforts to bring pressure on the UNC at lower levels as well as at the top diplomatic echelons. On 21 June he ordered surveillance of all Koreans working for or associated with UN personnel. As a result, US counterintelligence agencies found their sources of information

suddenly dried up. President Rhee also ordered that English speaking linguists be drafted into his army, thus further hindering intelligence efforts. Operations at ports of Pusan and Inch'on were curtailed as Koreans suddenly stopped working for the UNC. Korean drivers of Embassy vehicles feared to drive US vehicles unless accompanied by US soldiers because of the danger of arrest by National Police as draft dodgers. Koreans engaged in housekeeping tasks for US units were intimidated. And on 25 June, anniversary of the 1950 invasion, large-scale and stormy demonstrations were staged throughout Korea.⁵⁰

Assistant Secretary Robertson, in his capacity as President Eisenhower's personal envoy, paid a courtesy call on President Rhee on 25 June. On the following day, serious discussions between the two men began. Mr. Robertson delivered the letter from Secretary Dulles; Dr. Rhee read it without comment, but he appeared to be impressed. The US envoy described the unfortunate impressions created in Washington and elsewhere in the world by the release of the prisoners. The talk then turned to the proposed armistice. After some discussion, President Rhee indicated that he could accept the armistice agreement subject to four stipulations, as follows: (1) The remaining anti-Communist Korean prisoners would be moved to the DMZ to be taken over by the NNRC (as General Clark had suggested earlier). (2) A time limit (perhaps 90 days) would be placed upon the political conference. (3) The United States would provide economic aid to the ROK and would continue assistance in building up the ROKA to 20 divisions. (4) The United States would at once guarantee a mutual defense pact.⁵¹

These stipulations were quickly referred to Washington, and on 27 June Ambassador Robertson and General Clark delivered President Eisenhower's reply. The substance of it was as follows: (1) If logistically feasible, the remaining Korean nonrepatriates would be moved to the DMZ. Chinese nonrepatriates would be turned over to the NNRC on Cheju-do Island. (2) The United States could not impose a unilateral time limit upon the political conference but would be willing to consider withdrawing at the end of 90 days, in concert with the ROK, if it was clear that no progress was being made. (3) The United States would furnish economic aid and assist in reaching the 20-division goal. (4) The United States would be willing to negotiate a mutual defense treaty, similar to that with the Philippines, but the President could not "guarantee" it, since the consent of the US Senate would be required.

President Rhee's response was almost congenial. "Well, the President has met all of my views," he remarked. At his request, Mr. Robertson and General Clark reduced President Eisenhower's offer to writing in the form of an aide-memoire which they sent to the ROK President after the meeting. They stipulated the conditions that must be met in return: the ROK Government must accept the authority of the UNC to conduct or conclude hostilities, must observe the armistice, and must leave its forces under UNC control until a contrary agreement was reached by mutual consent.⁵²

The same evening, Ambassador Robertson and General Clark returned to the Presidential palace for dinner. They were disconcerted when President Rhee indicated that the aide-memoire did not entirely satisfy him. On the following day, 28 June, he sent the US negotiators an aide-memoire of his own in which he

raised new demands. The United States must not only aid in building up the ROKA to 20 divisions but must, "if necessary," undertake a further buildup of ROK forces to match them with those of "an immediate neighbor in view." Chinese as well as North Korean anti-Communist POWs were to be moved to the DMZ before being placed in custody of the NNRC, and the questioning of Korean prisoners was to be completed within one week. If the political conference failed to reach agreement within 90 days, the United States would at once join the ROK in withdrawing from the conference and in resuming military operations, without consulting any other country. In return, the ROK would leave its forces under the UNC "so long as the UNC cooperates and supports the ROK G[overnment] in its efforts to promote the common cause by settling the war with victory," and the UNC would be given advance notice before ROK forces were withdrawn.⁵³

General Clark and Mr. Robertson at once reported this alarming new development to Washington. "It is our considered opinion," they wired, "that we have made the maximum effort possible at this stage to enlist Rhee's cooperation in the implementation of an armistice." Dr. Rhee's purpose in injecting "extraneous matters," not previously discussed with Ambassador Robertson, was evidently to prolong the negotiations. During the past 20 days, while the ROK President had been "deliberately impeding the conclusion of an armistice for reasons best known to himself," the UNC had suffered approximately 17,000 battle casualties, of which 3,333 had been killed. Since the UNC was not prepared to implement a threat of withdrawal from Korea, the only way to bring Dr. Rhee around, according to General Clark and Ambassador Robertson, was to go ahead with the conclusion of an armistice. Already the reply to the Communists' letter of 20 June had been "delayed too long." Consequently, General Clark proposed to send a reply urging the Communists to resume negotiations, while Ambassador Robertson would meet with President Rhee and inform him that this step was being taken. This course of action had the concurrence of Ambassador Briggs, Mr. Murphy, and General Collins.⁵⁴

Bringing Rhee Around

In accord with this agreed plan, General Clark on 29 June delivered a letter to the enemy commanders, calling on them to renew plenary sessions so that an effective date for the armistice could be established. He assured the Communists that the UNC would "make every effort" to obtain the cooperation of the ROK Government and would, where necessary, "establish military safeguards to ensure that the armistice terms were observed." General Clark pointed out that it would be impossible for the UNC to recover all the escaped prisoners; however, the armistice agreement would leave these men free to return to North Korea if they desired.⁵⁵

On the same day, General Clark and Ambassador Robertson again conferred with President Rhee and rejected his aide-memoire. They denied his contention

that it merely recorded an agreement already reached and added that it was so inaccurate and irrelevant that it could not form a basis for discussion. Mr. Robertson explained anew the nature of President Eisenhower's offer, and President Rhee agreed to revise his aide-memoire to bring it into line with the US position. General Clark then informed the ROK President that the UNC intended to proceed with an armistice and was therefore replying to the enemy letter of 20 June; he expressed the hope that the ROK Government would cooperate. President Rhee indicated that he desired to do so but added that he must first obtain clarification on certain points. He promised to send his revised aide-memoire as promptly as possible.

Reporting this interview to Washington, General Clark and Assistant Secretary Robertson admitted that the results were disappointing. But, they continued, President Rhee and his advisors, Prime Minister Paik and Foreign Minister Pyun, who had been present, had "registered some shock, which we believe healthful," at the US rejection of the ROK aide-memoire and the "vigorous explanation" given them by Mr. Robertson. They hoped that this reaction, plus the effect of the announced intention of the UNC to resume armistice negotiations, would "exercise a sobering and helpful effect on Rhee."⁵⁶

Following receipt of this message in Washington, President Eisenhower again discussed the ROK problem with his advisors. As a result, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roger M. Kyes, sent revised instructions to General Clark on 30 June. These instructions included the following:

(1) The Communists remained the real enemy; this fact must be kept in mind in planning a course of action.

(2) General Clark retained the authority given him on 25 June to make decisions at his discretion regarding the armistice negotiations and the handling of the ROK situation.

(3) The security of UNC forces remained the overriding consideration.

(4) There was no intention to withdraw from Korea.

Mr. Kyes then went on to submit for General Clark's approval some ideas that had been expressed at the meeting. It seemed likely that President Rhee would "continue to bluff and to temporize" as long as he thought that by doing so he could extract additional concessions. Hence, the "most promising line of action" appeared to be to create the impression that the United States would withdraw from Korea if Dr. Rhee "sabotages an armistice." Such an impression might be created "quietly and adroitly" by taking various actions suggesting preparation for withdrawal, such as concentrating US and UN forces, consolidating depots, shipping excess supplies from Korea to Japan, or perhaps even halting the flow of US replacements into Korea. In conclusion, Mr. Kyes asked General Clark to appraise the probability that the ROK Army might, if necessary, take action to prevent President Rhee from sabotaging an armistice.⁵⁷

General Clark agreed with the premise on which these suggested actions were based. "Rhee," he predicted in a message on 2 July, "will continue to bluff, to delay, to embarrass and impede the conclusion of an armistice by all means at his disposal until it is made firmly and irrevocably clear to him that my government has made its maximum concessions." Ambassador Robertson, on the other

hand, did not believe that Dr. Rhee was bluffing. "I consider it inadvisable to make a threat of withdrawal unless [we are] willing to carry it out," warned Mr. Robertson. "Rhee is a zealous, irrational and illogical fanatic and might well call our bluff." General Clark acknowledged the truth of this judgment on Rhee but believed that a threat to withdraw, properly disseminated and coordinated with overt actions, might be advantageous. However, the methods suggested by Mr. Kyes were not entirely practical. General Clark pointed out that he had recently moved additional forces from Japan to Korea to cope with the crisis caused by the prisoner release. Also, anticipating an armistice, he had accelerated personnel movement to Korea to have on hand 100 percent when the armistice took effect and had stockpiled supplies to equip additional ROK divisions; to move these supplies back to Japan now would be self-defeating. As for concentrating forces, all but two US divisions were already concentrated on the western front and he did not wish to move them. However, General Clark was withholding the announcement of the planned activation of the remaining four ROK divisions and thought it might prove helpful to drop a hint that the activation might be cancelled. He also proposed to have meetings with senior ROK commanders at which General Taylor would suggest, in the light of "President Rhee's oft expressed thought that the UNC may have to withdraw," that the time was approaching for the ROKA to formulate plans to take over the entire front. Finally, as to the possibility of ROKA intervention against President Rhee neither General Clark nor General Taylor thought that even the most reliable ROK commanders would be willing to "risk their necks" by taking such action unless given much stronger assurance of US support than could be provided by CINUNC.⁵⁸

Three days later General Clark described additional measures that he had taken in order to create an impression of impending withdrawal. These included conferences with high level US commanders, consolidation of nonrepatriate Korean POWs into fewer compounds, slowdown of shipments of supplies and equipment to Korea to maintain only normal levels, and halting of shipment of equipment for the four remaining ROK divisions. He proposed also to continue delaying the completion of the 20-division program; to survey sites for new installations along routes leading from the combat zone to Pusan; to begin immediate distribution of relief supplies; to reduce the use of indigenous labor by the UNC; to suspend military construction; to prepare clandestine plans for withdrawal; to use covert means to induce speculation among ROK Government officials as to UNC intentions; to release some ROK personnel from clandestine activities; to redeploy naval vessels, including amphibious units, to Pusan and Inch'on; and to initiate conferences at which General Taylor would discuss with ROK commanders plans for various contingencies, including rejection of the armistice by the ROK. General Clark believed that these actions were consistent with the security of his forces, besides being likely to produce a suitable reaction. All could, if necessary, be "logically explained or plausibly denied."⁵⁹

Earlier, on 1 July, Ambassador Robertson had received a letter from President Rhee that was apparently intended to constitute the revised aide-memoire that had been promised. "Your friendly and frank discussions with us have cleared up a lot of doubts and misunderstandings," the letter began. But the concessions

offered were few. Dr. Rhee agreed not to insist on withdrawal of Chinese forces prior to an armistice and to cooperate in moving POWs to the DMZ so as to obviate entry of the NNRC into ROK territory. On the other hand, he continued to insist that the United States “walk out” of the political conference after 90 days and resume military action if the conference had not succeeded. “Let me be frank and say that [the] US had a hand in [the] division of Korea [and] is now honor-bound not to leave it divided indefinitely,” charged President Rhee. His conclusion was apparently intended to be conciliatory:

We are very near to an agreement not to obstruct the armistice, provided the US definitely pledges to resume fighting with us, in case of a failure of the political conference, until the unification of Korea is accomplished. If this cannot be done, I do not see how I can comply with your request in the armistice, for I have no means to convince the Korean people who are definitely opposed to the truce terms as they are now.⁶⁰

Ambassador Robertson of course had no authority to give a pledge of automatic renewal of military action—a pledge that would in fact exceed the constitutional authority of the President. After consulting the State Department, Mr. Robertson drafted a new and comprehensive aide-memoire on 2 July. This document made clear that the United States was prepared to undertake the following actions:

(1) To conclude a mutual defense treaty along the lines of the existing one with the Philippine Republic. Negotiations could begin at once, but ratification must await the advice and consent of the US Senate.

(2) To aid the ROK in building and maintaining its armed forces for defense against attack, at a level of about 20 divisions, together with naval and air forces. This promise was subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation.

(3) To begin an integrated program of economic assistance to help the ROK improve its standard of living, sustain its armed forces, and progress toward economic self-sufficiency, subject again to Congressional approval.

(4) To confer with President Rhee, after signing of the armistice, on common objectives at the political conference.

(5) To agree that the political conference should seek promptly and vigorously to obtain a unified Korea and the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces. If after 90 days the conference proved fruitless and the Communists were exploiting it for propaganda purposes or to embarrass the ROK, the United States would be prepared with the ROK to withdraw from the conference and to consult regarding further measures aimed at the unification of Korea.

In return, according to the aide-memoire, the ROK would be expected:

(1) To cooperate with the UNC in moving prisoners to the DMZ, there to be turned over to the NNRC and questioned in the presence of representatives of the ROK and of the UNC. After this questioning, Korean prisoners would be released and allowed to go to either North or South Korea, depending on their choice. Chinese nonrepatriates would be turned over to the NNRC for disposition in accord with the agreement of 8 June.

(2) To agree to leave its forces under the UNC, recognizing the authority of the UNC to conduct and conclude hostilities to support the armistice agreements

and to continue its armed forces under the control of UNC until the arrangement was terminated by mutual consent.⁶¹

Ambassador Robertson delivered this new aide-memoire to President Rhee on 3 July 1953. In an accompanying letter, he reminded the ROK President that President Eisenhower could not legally make a commitment to resume fighting if the conference failed; however, he again declared that the United States would be willing in that event to withdraw from the conference and to discuss with the ROK possible future steps. "I earnestly hope," concluded the US envoy, "that it will be obvious to you that you would be in a much stronger position to achieve your objectives for a unified, independent Korea working with us as your ally than you could possibly be in carrying on the struggle alone." President Rhee promised to look over the US document.⁶²

On the following day Mr. Robertson submitted a draft mutual defense treaty to President Rhee and Foreign Secretary Pyun, assuring them that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were confident that the treaty would have wide Congressional support. Dr. Rhee indicated interest, but Mr. Pyun suggested that the signing of the armistice be postponed until after the treaty had been signed and ratified. Mr. Robertson replied that such a delay in the armistice could not be considered. However, he pledged the good faith of the United States in moving to complete the treaty as soon as possible. After the meeting, he told the State Department that, in his opinion, "Rhee is now nearer agreement than he has ever been."⁶³

This hopeful assessment proved premature. On 6 July Mr. Robertson found President Rhee indignant over broadcasts from Tokyo (which he described as "threats") revealing tentative US plans to withdraw US forces from the battle line after an armistice, with or without ROK cooperation. Dr. Rhee went on to criticize the aide-memoire of 2 July, to which, he said, he was preparing a reply. Mr. Robertson responded that no reply was necessary, since the aide-memoire represented the final US position. Dr. Rhee then introduced another proposal, which had been discussed earlier, that Chinese as well as Korean prisoners be brought to the DMZ to be turned over to the NNRC. Mr. Robertson pointed out that this suggestion violated President Rhee's earlier agreement, as embodied in the aide-memoire of 27 June, which had specified that the NNRC would take custody of Chinese prisoners on Cheju-do. Dr. Rhee replied that he had not intended to make any such agreement. Turning to the mutual defense treaty, he again urged that it be "rushed through the Senate," to which Mr. Robertson rejoined that the armistice could not be held up for the treaty.⁶⁴

President Rhee's reply to the US aide-memoire was delivered on 7 July. In it, he pronounced Point 1 (the offer of a mutual defense treaty) acceptable despite the uncertainty of Senate ratification; it would be "more acceptable," he added, if the ROK was given assurance that the Senate would act during the current session. Points 2 and 3, regarding military and economic assistance, were in accord with previous agreements, though the target for ultimate ROKA expansion should, in his opinion, be flexible instead of being fixed at 20 divisions. Point 4, on post-war objectives, was also acceptable. As for the political conference (Point 5), Dr. Rhee accepted the US offer to withdraw if it failed. However, he still

believed that the United States should either join in a renewed fight or, at the least, provide "moral and material support" to the ROK in resuming a military conflict aimed at unifying the country.⁶⁵

In a message to President Rhee on the same date (7 July), Secretary Dulles went about as far as was legally possible in giving assurance on the mutual security treaty. At the direction of President Eisenhower, said the Secretary, he had met with Senate leaders and found them willing to ratify a treaty if the ROK Government cooperated in the armistice and in the subsequent political conference. The United States was prepared to begin negotiating the treaty without waiting for the political conference, and would seek "prompt ratification" when Congress reconvened, unless the attitude of the ROK Government made such action impossible.⁶⁶

Ambassador Robertson delivered this message to the ROK President on 8 July, in a meeting that brought the two sides closer together. President Rhee denied ever having entertained any intention of removing ROK forces from the UNC; to do so, he said, would be "childish." Nor had he intended to refuse to pull back ROK troops from the DMZ after an armistice. However, the ROK, as a sovereign nation, retained the *right* to withdraw its forces from the UNC in case of a disagreement over Communist intentions. Ambassador Robertson told the ROK President that General Clark believed it possible to get the Communists to agree to the movement of Chinese as well as Korean prisoners to the DMZ; he offered to include this provision in the US aide-memoire of 2 July. But Mr. Robertson stressed that the concessions offered in that document were contingent upon satisfactory assurances from the ROK.⁶⁷

The climax of the Rhee-Robertson negotiations came on 9 July. First, the two men held a private meeting, in which Dr. Rhee protested Ambassador Robertson's expressed intention to leave on the following day, saying that they were nearing agreement. He explained why he could not agree to keep his troops under UN Command for a fixed period of time; however, he added, he had not rejected the armistice and he "contemplated" leaving his troops under the UNC so long as it was in the interests of the ROK to do so. Mr. Robertson reiterated that US offers of support and cooperation were contingent upon a suitable *quid pro quo*. The meeting ended with the ROK President promising to set down his exact position in writing before the end of the day. Summarizing the results of the meeting, the Ambassador told Washington that, in General Clark's opinion, a commitment by Dr. Rhee to accept the armistice and to leave ROK troops under the UNC without specifying a time limit would be "worth a million dollars." It would provide a breathing spell during which the armistice could be put into effect; thereafter, General Clark thought it would be extremely difficult for President Rhee to make up his mind to renew the fight alone.⁶⁸

Ambassador Robertson planned to return later the same day for another meeting in company with General Clark. During the interval, he received a personal message from President Eisenhower to be delivered to Dr. Rhee. The US President told his ROK colleague that he was encouraged by the progress of the conversations with Mr. Robertson. He expressed sympathy with the ROK goals, but warned against pursuing them through methods that might "sacrifice the

achievements of the past and the friendship and confidence of the American people." Mr. Robertson forwarded this message to President Rhee to be read in time for their second meeting.⁶⁹

When this second meeting was held, it was brief, lasting only a half hour and was devoted entirely to the question of the movement of nonrepatriate prisoners. General Clark reaffirmed his willingness to move both Korean and Chinese nonrepatriates to the DMZ, despite the "terrific" logistical problems involved in doing so, and expressed the belief that the enemy delegation would agree to such a proposal. President Rhee again insisted that no Indian troops be allowed to enter South Korea; General Clark thought that they could be flown directly into the DMZ.⁷⁰

After this conference, Ambassador Robertson on the same day (9 July 1953) received a letter providing the clarification that President Rhee had promised earlier, together with a revised draft of a mutual defense treaty. In the letter, President Rhee, summarizing the progress of the talks so far, noted that his government had agreed to the following: to abandon the demand that Chinese troops withdraw and that Korea be unified before an armistice was signed; to accept a three-month period of activity for nonrepatriate POWs (instead of demanding that they be released at once); and to cooperate with the UNC in transporting these prisoners to the DMZ. The two latter concessions, however, were subject to an understanding that no foreign troops (from India or any other country) would be landed in South Korea and that after the three months of questioning and screening all Korean POWs who so desired would be released south of the DMZ and all Chinese who refused repatriation would be transported to Taiwan. President Rhee expressed his understanding of the problem of getting the mutual defense pact ratified and agreed that ratification at the next session of Congress would suffice. Finally, he put into writing the oral assurances he had given Ambassador Robertson regarding the armistice. Although he could not sign it, he said, "We shall not obstruct it, so long as no measures or actions taken under [the] armistice are detrimental to our national survival." He would also "endeavor to cooperate fully and earnestly in [the] political and peaceful achievement of reunification of our nation, which is our most fundamental national objective and necessity."⁷¹

Mr. Robertson at once forwarded these documents to Washington via dispatch, along with his own analysis. He pointed out that President Rhee's letter indicated "retreat from many of his previously declared positions." Only a few points remained to be settled. Although the ROK President had abandoned the demand that the United States resume hostilities if the political conference did not succeed within 90 days, it was not clear what action he expected the United States to take in that contingency. He had also failed to give a clear-cut statement to leave his forces under the UN Command. Also his draft security treaty contained two questionable articles. One "reaffirmed" that the "lawful jurisdiction" of the ROK extended to the Yalu. The other using language drawn from the North Atlantic Treaty, specified that an armed attack on either party would be considered an attack on the other, whereas the US-Philippine mutual defense

treaty, which the United States proposed to use as a model, merely provided for consultation in the event of an attack.⁷²

Secretary Dulles replied on 10 July that, while President Rhee's letter was "not entirely satisfactory," it was probably all that we will be able [to] obtain from him at this time." The Secretary therefore instructed Ambassador Robertson, provided that both he and General Clark approved, not to engage in discussion on the basis of the letter but rather to consider it "tacitly" as a "satisfactory basis for entering into [an] armistice," leaving for later discussion the "detailed problems which it raises." Mr. Robertson was also to inform the ROK President that the draft treaty was being given "careful study" in preparation for discussions to be conducted at a "high level meeting" after the armistice.⁷³

In accord with these instructions, Mr. Robertson held a final meeting with President Rhee on 11 July. He handed Dr. Rhee a letter stating that "misunderstandings and differences" had been "largely clarified" and that both countries could "look forward with confidence to a satisfactory solution of the few remaining problems which require further clarification." In view of the wide area of agreement that had been attained, said Mr. Robertson, his mission was now ended and he was returning to Washington. President Rhee raised no objection, and the meeting ended on a "note of utmost cordiality."⁷⁴

On the morning of 12 July, Far East time (11 July in Washington), Mr. Robertson and General Collins left Seoul to return home. Simultaneously, in Seoul and Washington, the two countries released a communique stressing that the Rhee-Robertson talks had reached agreement on arrangements for a truce in Korea, for the handling of prisoners, and for future collaboration. At the same time the Department of State, in a separate announcement, declared unequivocally that Dr. Rhee had agreed to an armistice in Korea. The ROK President had already written to President Eisenhower commending Mr. Robertson and repeating his basic pledge: "As you know, I have decided not to obstruct, in any manner, the implementation of the terms in deference to your requests."⁷⁵

During these days of early July 1953, while the United States was bargaining with its South Korean ally almost as with an enemy, the negotiations with the Communists at Panmunjom had remained in recess. The Communists were apparently pondering General Clark's letter of 29 June. Finally, on 7 July, they requested a meeting of senior liaison officers for the next day. The UNC agreed, and on 8 July the Communists tendered a letter to General Clark from their commanders. It was critical of the UNC and of the "Syngman Rhee clique," but its final paragraph accepted General Clark's proposal that the negotiations be resumed:

Although our side is not yet entirely satisfied with the reply of your side, yet in view of the indication of the desire of your side to strive for an early armistice and in view of the assurances given by your side, our side agrees that the delegations of both sides meet at an appointed time to discuss the question of implementation of the armistice agreement and the various preparations prior to the signing of the armistice agreement.

A meeting of plenary delegations was accordingly set for 10 July 1953.⁷⁶

A problem that could be expected to arise in the renewed negotiations was the agreement made by the UNC, during the discussions with President Rhee, that nonrepatriates, both North Korean and Chinese, would be moved to the DMZ before the NNRC took custody of them. The repatriations agreement of 8 June had been vague on this point. It merely stated that the NNRC would "take custody in Korea" of those prisoners who had not "exercised their right to be repatriated."⁷⁷

It would obviously be necessary, however, to have a clear understanding with the Communists on the precise location involved. General Clark's preference, as he explained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 July, was simply to inform the Communists in the forthcoming plenary session that the UNC would raise the issue in meetings of the MAC and to ask for assurance that the UNC position would be favorably considered in the MAC. If the Communists refused to give such assurance, General Clark would then propose that the armistice agreement be amended to allow nonrepatriates to be delivered to the NNRC in the DMZ. A third possibility—to ignore the subject for the moment and leave it to be brought up in the MAC—was rejected by General Clark as likely to give rise to "misunderstandings," though his political advisor, Ambassador Murphy, favored it. General Clark assumed that the authority already given him would allow him, if necessary, to sign the armistice agreement with the amendment that he had described, but he asked for assurance on this point.⁷⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied at once, confirming General Clark's authority and specifically approving his proposed course of action. At the same time, they pointed out that the wording of the enemy's letter of 8 July, agreeing to resume negotiations, appeared to be designed to draw from the UNC a promise to "use force" on the ROK Government to ensure compliance with the armistice. They reaffirmed their instructions of 25 June that CINCUNC was to make no such commitment.⁷⁹

General Clark responded that his plan was to tell the Communists that the UNC would "make every effort" to abide by the provisions of the armistice agreement and would "continue to do everything within our power" to see that the ROK Government cooperated, although it could give no guarantees on this point. If the enemy pressed for information about what the UNC proposed to do to prevent ROK violations, General Harrison would reply that the UNC would withdraw "all logistical and military support" from any ROKA unit that violated the armistice. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that CINCUNC had already, on 25 June, been given authority to withdraw logistic support. They explicitly confirmed this authority, but added that it was "inadvisable" to give the Communists any assurance on this point. Instead, General Clark was merely to assure the enemy that the UNC "will not give support during any aggressive action of units of ROKA in violation of the armistice."⁸⁰

The stage was now set for the final phase of the negotiations. A few more obstacles were to present themselves: a final Communist military offensive, pressure from the Communist delegation for assurances regarding ROK compliance, and a final flurry of trouble with the ROK Government resulting from matters left unclear by the "Rhee-Robertson Agreement" (as the tacit understanding

between those two men came to be called). But the armistice was now only a matter of time.

Policy Revision: NSC 154/1

On 15 June 1953 the Executive Secretary of the NSC circulated a report (NSC 154) recommending policies to be pursued towards Communist China in the event of an armistice in Korea. Basic to its conclusions was the stated conviction that an armistice in Korea would not indicate that the Chinese Communists had abandoned their willingness to use force in seeking their objectives, so that it would be important for the United States to continue political and economic pressure against Communist China. The Planning Board then set forth "interim courses of action" to be pursued during the political conference after the armistice and until a complete review of US policy toward China and Korea could be carried out. These actions included continued recognition and support of the Chinese Nationalist Government, maintenance of the existing embargo on US trade with Communist China, and retention of US military forces in Korea, subject to the terms of the armistice. The "greater sanctions" statement, warning against any new aggression on Korea, should be issued immediately after the signing of the armistice, in order to demonstrate the unity of the 16 nations supporting the military action in Korea. It was also recommended in NSC 154 that, assuming that the ROK cooperated in observing the armistice, the United States should continue to develop ROK military forces and should conclude a treaty guaranteeing the "political independence and territorial integrity" of the ROK.⁸¹

The provisions of NSC 154 regarding relations with the ROK drew criticism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They recommended that NSC 154 be amended to make it clear that US willingness to enter into a mutual defense treaty with the ROK was contingent upon the prior receipt of guarantees of cooperation. This was the US position embodied in the instructions sent to General Clark and Ambassador Briggs on 30 May 1953 and reaffirmed in President Eisenhower's letter of 6 June 1953 to Dr. Rhee. Moreover, a "guarantee" of the independence and territory of the ROK was "undesirably broad" and might result in overextension of US military forces. Any treaty with the ROK, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, should follow the pattern of those with the Philippines and the ANZUS-nations, which obligated the United States only to "consult" with the other signatories in case of an attack. The other provisions of NSC 154 were judged acceptable by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁸²

Giving heed to this latter JCS recommendation, the National Security Council on 2 July amended the relevant passage in NSC 154 to state that the United States would "undertake with respect to the security of Korea commitments (with or without reciprocal undertakings on the part of the ROK) similar to those undertaken by the US under the treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand." The President approved the revised version (NSC 154/1) on 3 July 1953.⁸³

Negotiations Move toward Culmination

Plenary delegations met at Panmunjom at 1100 on 10 July 1953. General Nam Il at once charged the UNC with the “unrelievable responsibility” for recovering all the prisoners who had escaped. He then addressed a series of sharp questions regarding the prospect that the ROK Government and Army would observe the truce and the intentions of the UNC in the event of a violation. General Harrison, in accord with his instructions, merely replied that the UNC would “do everything within our power” to ensure the cooperation of the ROK Government. He briefly introduced the proposal to move prisoners into the DMZ to be turned over to the NNRC, adding that the UNC would raise this subject in the MAC. His statement on this point was “noted” by General Nam Il.⁸⁴

The enemy attitude at this meeting, according to General Harrison, was “calm, matter of fact and not aggressive.” Nevertheless, General Clark felt that the UNC delegation was unduly hampered in responding to questions about possible violations by the ROK. He urged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorize General Harrison to tell the enemy that the UNC would if necessary withdraw support from the ROKA. As already described, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed General Harrison merely to state that the UNC would not support any “aggressive action” that violated the armistice.⁸⁵

At the next meeting, on 11 July, General Nam Il described as evasive and unsatisfactory the replies he had received the day before. General Harrison pointed out that the UNC had offered to bind itself to the terms of the draft armistice agreement; how it proposed to meet this responsibility was an “internal affair” of the UNC. Violations of the armistice could be brought before the MAC; if they could not be settled there, the injured side could abrogate the armistice terms and take such military action as it considered necessary. In conclusion, however, General Harrison gave the assurance authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “The UNC,” he promised, “will not give support during any aggressive action of units of the Republic of Korea Army in violation of the armistice.”⁸⁶

When the Rhee-Robertson Agreement was announced, General Harrison at once seized the opportunity to translate this into further assurances to the enemy. He told the Communists on 12 July:

In consequence of negotiations just completed with the Government of the Republic of Korea, we have received suitable assurances from the Republic of Korea Government that it will during the post hostility period work in close collaboration for our common objective. . . . You are assured that the United Nations Command, which includes the Republic of Korea forces, is prepared to carry out the terms of the armistice. In view of this fact, there seems to be no reason for delaying further the completion of the details of and arrangements for signing the armistice agreement.⁸⁷

The enemy delegation remained unsatisfied, however, and continued to press for more specific assurances and to demand the return of the escapees. General Harrison’s difficulties were enhanced by an injudicious public statement by the seemingly incorrigible Dr. Rhee, in which he denounced the armistice and

boasted that the only concession that he had made to Ambassador Robertson had been a promise that he would not obstruct the armistice for 90 days. This statement was published in a Washington newspaper on 11 July 1953. The Communists at Panmunjom seized upon it and demanded further assurances. General Harrison replied that the word of the UNC delegation outweighed uncorroborated newspaper stories.⁸⁸

Following a meeting on 14 July, General Harrison informed CINCUNC that the Communists were getting "farcical." Replies to their questions simply led to further "frivolous" questions apparently intended only to delay, perhaps in order to await the outcome of the Communist offensive that was then underway. General Clark concurred in this judgment and proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, on the following day, General Harrison be authorized, after reviewing the assurances already given, to declare a recess (unilaterally if necessary) of up to three or four days. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this request. Accordingly, at the meeting of 15 July, General Harrison unilaterally declared a recess of one day.⁸⁹

After studying the record of the 15 July meeting, General Clark decided that the Communist position had some merit. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the enemy questions could in essence be reduced to a single one, which General Nam Il had posed that day in the following words:

We would like to know whether your side assures that the South Korea Government and forces will abide by all the provisions of the armistice agreement for the entire period when the armistice will be effective in accordance with the agreement or only assume [sic] that Syngman Rhee will only temporarily abide by the armistice agreement within a certain time limit.

"The Communists have requested that we give [an] explicit and definite answer to this question," wrote General Clark, "and I consider they are entitled to such an answer." The UNC, he pointed out, had not yet capitalized on the success of the Robertson mission in obtaining assurance from President Rhee that he would not obstruct the armistice. General Clark then set forth the text of a proposed statement by General Harrison, giving categorical assurance that the ROK Government would comply with Article 62 of the draft agreement (which specified that the armistice would be in effect until superseded by mutual agreement), and urging the enemy to accept this assurance instead of being misled by news stories. After making this statement, General Harrison would propose a two-day recess to allow the Communists time to study it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the statement, amplifying it somewhat to make it more emphatic.⁹⁰

On 16 July the Communist delegation beat General Harrison to the punch by themselves proposing a recess until 18 July unless, they said, the UNC was prepared to offer further "clarification" of the replies to their earlier questions. Thereupon General Harrison delivered the statement that had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

The United Nations Command has clearly and unequivocally stated to you that it is prepared to enter into and abide by all provisions of the armistice agree-

ment including Article 62. The United Nations Command would not enter into such an agreement unless it was satisfied that it was able to carry it out. This should be sufficient assurance for your. . . . However, I again assure you we have received from [the] Republic of Korea Government necessary assurances that it will not obstruct in any manner the implementation of terms of draft armistice agreement. I will have nothing further to say on this. If you sincerely desire an armistice there is no reason why you should not, here and now, accept these assurances from the United Nations Command Commander instead of attempting further to delay the armistice upon the basis of misinterpreted press accounts which have no official standing whatever and prolong needlessly [the] fighting and dying.

General Harrison then agreed to a two-day recess.⁹¹

This sweeping statement apparently served its purpose. When the delegates assembled again on 19 July,⁹² Nam Il reviewed at some length the answers given by the UNC to the questions that had been raised and characterized these answers as satisfactory. But he continued: "Our side is, nevertheless, prepared to discuss with your side immediately the various preparations prior to the signing of the armistice agreement." With regard to the unrecovered prisoners, he warned that if the UNC was still unable to recover them after the armistice, the Communists reserved the right to raise this issue in the political conference. As for the proposal to hand over nonrepatriates to the NNRC in the DMZ, this matter should be settled before the armistice was signed, according to Nam Il, instead of being left to the MAC as the UNC had proposed.⁹³

With this concession by the Communists, the delegates were able to move at once to a discussion of final preparations for the armistice. The enemy at first proposed that the signature wait upon revision of the military demarcation line and the DMZ to reflect the recent advances scored by Communist forces. General Harrison, however, urged that the date of signature be fixed immediately without waiting for revision of the line. He suggested a date of 24 July, with the armistice to take effect 12 hours after the signature; this date, he pointed out, would allow time for the NNSC to be ready to function immediately after the armistice was signed. The enemy accepted this proposed date. The full delegations then adjourned, turning over to their liaison officers the task of working out details.⁹⁴

The Enemy's Last Offensive

During the winter of 1952–1953 General Clark had warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the enemy was building up his military strength in an alarming manner.⁹⁵ His forebodings proved justified in March 1953, when, after some months of relative quiet, the enemy launched attacks that gained some ground along the western sector of the line. These died down in April, but another series of attacks in the same area began on 25 May—significantly, the day the UNC submitted its "final offer" in the armistice negotiations. There seemed little doubt

that the Communists were making a final effort to improve their position before a truce took effect.⁹⁶

The scale of the enemy attacks alarmed General Taylor, the Eighth Army commander. On 2 June General Clark sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a warning from General Taylor that the Communists appeared to be trying to bend the western half of the UNC line southward, by driving the US I and IX Corps (which held that part of the line) back behind the broad valley of the Imjin and its southern tributary, the Hant'an; they would thus gain possession of valuable rice lands before the fighting ended. General Taylor had already mounted a major air reconnaissance effort and planned an air offensive against any suspected assembly areas. UNC defensive positions north of the Imjin had not been chosen for their strength; they simply represented the "high water mark" of the UN advance in 1951. Consequently, General Taylor warned, the enemy could "force us to give ground at a time of his own choosing and present us with the alternative of conceding territory prior to an armistice or making costly counterattacks to restore the position."⁹⁷

Contrary to General Taylor's expectations, however, the enemy switched his attention to the central part of the line, where ROK divisions held a shallow bulge, some 8 to 10 miles wide, thrusting toward Kumsong. After the signing of the repatriation agreement of 8 June, which appeared to remove the last obstacle to an armistice, the Communists' attack increased in intensity. By 18 June the attack had slackened and the situation had been stabilized, but the ROK troops had been driven back an average of 3,000 meters in this sector.⁹⁸

The enemy also made intensive efforts during the spring of 1953 to repair his airfields in the face of UNC bombing and to bring in high performance aircraft to have them in place before the armistice. On 11 June, with the enemy ground offensive in progress, General Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the rainy season was hampering US air operations, creating an opportunity for the enemy to slip in additional air units during breaks in the weather. Two key airfields in the North Korean complex, continued General Clark, were located below the Kusong and Toksang dams, which had been successfully bombed a few weeks earlier. General Clark believed he could isolate the two fields by again bombing and breaching these dams, thus washing out rail lines to the fields. "I realize that attacks on these dams may cause a reaction on the part of our allies," he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "but I consider this factor to be outweighed by the intensified offensive operations recently undertaken by the Communists." He felt the action would have no effect on the armistice negotiations and asked for permission to attack these two dams. The Joint Chiefs of Staff granted his request on the same day. The missions were carried out between 13 and 18 June but with limited success; the enemy, as he had done earlier, prevented flooding by draining the reservoirs.⁹⁹

After another short period of quiescence, the enemy inaugurated a new round of attacks on 24 June on the eastern and central sectors, concentrating again on the Kumsong bulge. The offensive reached a climax after 10 July, when negotiations were resumed. On 14 July General Clark reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that elements of five Chinese armies, with a total strength of six divisions, had

practically destroyed the ROK Capitol Division and much of the 3d ROK Division. General Taylor was moving US units into the threatened sector in an effort to restore the line.¹⁰⁰

The situation was serious enough to require major troop redeployments in the Far East. Shortly after the offensive of 24 June began, General Clark moved the 24th Infantry Division and the 187th Airborne RCT from Japan to Korea. The RCT was committed to combat; the 24th Division took over guard duty at the POW camps, releasing units of the Eighth Army for return to the front.¹⁰¹ General Clark made these redeployments in accord with the authorization given him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1952, during the political crisis in South Korea, to use one division of the garrison of Japan for service in Korea.¹⁰²

With the departure of the 24th Division, only the 1st Cavalry Division remained in Japan to meet CINCFE's primary mission, which was to maintain the security of that country. General Clark feared that the 1st Cavalry Division might also be needed for combat in Korea. On 15 July he reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had already alerted one of its RCT's for possible movement to Korea. Eighth Army faced a serious situation; action was continuing on a 20-mile front, with a penetration of 4 1/2 miles at the deepest point. General Clark was aware of his primary mission, but it was his "considered opinion" that the deployment of this RCT would not increase the vulnerability of Japan to attack. He therefore requested to be relieved of the one-division restriction imposed by the JCS message of June 1952. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in reply authorized General Clark, at his discretion, to use the entire 1st Cavalry Division in Korea. They added that the 3d Marine Division and a Marine air group were being alerted for possible shipment to the Far East from the US mainland and from Hawaii.¹⁰³

In the end, the 1st Cavalry Division was not needed. Eighth Army's front was stabilized with the aid of troops shifted from quiet sectors; ROK forces mounted a counterattack and regained some lost ground. By 19 July the Communist offensive had spent its force, and the final week before the armistice saw only light actions. The enemy had succeeded in eliminating the Kumsong salient, and thus had some basis for his claim of victory. But he paid a price. Eighth Army intelligence estimated that the fighting during June and July cost the Communists over 108,000 casualties, compared with 53,000 for the UNC.¹⁰⁴

The performance of ROK units during the final enemy offensive was uneven, with the quality of leadership apparently being the determining factor. When Generals Taylor and Clark explained to Dr. Rhee the poor showing made by ROK II Corps and the reason therefore, the ROK President retorted that the attack would never have occurred if the UNC had long ago destroyed the Communist forces through an all-out attack.¹⁰⁵

Some Final Details

At a meeting of liaison and staff officers on 20 July, the enemy revealed that the advance parties of Polish and Czech personnel for the NNSC had

arrived in Peking. Both sides exchanged maps as a preliminary to renegotiation of the demarcation line. The enemy gave the UNC a jolt by declaring that, in view of the ROK attitude, the supreme commanders of the two sides should not be present for the signing; instead in the enemy view, they should sign at their own headquarters, then send the agreements to Panmunjom to be countersigned by the senior delegates. General Clark authorized General Harrison to reject this plan. As he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the armistice document was of sufficient importance to warrant simultaneous signing by the commanders concerned.¹⁰⁶

On the next day the liaison officers made progress. They exchanged proofs of the armistice agreement and agreed on final corrections, as well as proofs of a common map (on which however, the final demarcation line had yet to be traced). The enemy delegation, without questioning the agreed target date of 24 July for signing the armistice, recommended that it not take effect until seven days later, in order to allow ample time for personnel of the NNRC to be on station. The UNC wanted the armistice to become effective immediately. The Communists again raised the question of the manner of signing and the UNC rejected their proposal under which the senior commanders would not be present. General Clark believed that the enemy would yield on this point but informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he would not hold up the armistice on the question of signing procedures.¹⁰⁷

Informing the enemy of the number of prisoners it expected to return, the UNC stayed with round numbers to avoid any complication owing to prisoners changing their minds. The UNC notified the Communists on 22 July that it would return 69,000 Koreans and 5,000 Chinese to their control. Nonrepatriates numbered 14,500 Chinese and 7,800 Koreans. When the enemy requested exact figures, the UNC replied that these would be made available to the NNRC and the MAC. The Communists themselves indicated that they would return 12,764 prisoners, including 3,313 US and 8,186 Korean personnel. This total approximated the advance UNC estimate, and on General Clark's recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to accept this figure.¹⁰⁸

The locale where prisoners would be delivered to the NNRC and retained in custody during the period of explanations remained to be determined. The Communists had not objected to the UNC proposal to use the DMZ for this purpose; the UNC in turn acceded to the Communist view that this matter should be settled before the armistice, instead of being left for determination by the MAC. On 20 July General Harrison proposed an amendment to the draft armistice agreement that would allow the UNC to designate an area in the southwestern part of the DMZ for receipt of prisoners and to construct the necessary camp facilities there. The enemy countered three days later with a draft of a separate supplementary agreement covering this subject, which specified that the Communists would also be allowed to designate a site, north of the demarcation line, for the turnover of prisoners in their custody who might oppose repatriation. General Clark told General Harrison to accept this proposal subject to the "understanding" that only the personnel of each side would be permitted in the area designated for the use of their side and that the number of guards moved into the

DMZ with the prisoners would be limited. The Communists agreed, and a text of the supplementary agreement was approved by both sides on 25 July.¹⁰⁹

Rhee's Last Ditch Stand

As an armistice appeared more imminent, dissenting voices were again raised in the ROK Government. Foreign Minister Pyun, emerging as even more extreme than President Rhee, objected strongly to General Harrison's reassurances to the enemy that the ROK would comply with the armistice and publicly announced that South Korea was "reconsidering her position" as a result of these statements. In an attempt to mollify the ROK leaders, Secretary Dulles explained that statements by the UNC chief delegate were on the behalf of the UN military command and could in no way be considered as political remarks binding upon a government. The Secretary indicated that the US Government contemplated an economic aid program for South Korea involving some \$1 billion over a period of four or five years. Moreover, Ambassador Robertson had discussed the mutual defense treaty with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the United States was prepared quickly to begin negotiations. Secretary Dulles himself was ready to meet with President Rhee promptly after signing of the armistice to decide on joint policy and tactics at the political conferences.

These assurances proved only partially effective. Speaking to Ambassador Briggs, President Rhee expressed disappointment at the difference between what Mr. Robertson had said to him and what General Harrison had told the Communists; he thought that he had been given a commitment that the United States would at least consider providing support to South Korea if the fighting was renewed. However, added the ROK President, the Dulles message should be helpful in allaying public fears that South Korea had conceded too much in the Rhee-Robertson Agreement. But Foreign Minister Pyun told newsmen that unless the ROK received "satisfaction" it would no longer be bound by its promises not to obstruct the armistice.¹¹⁰

Such statements at this late date angered General Clark. On 21 July he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

During recent weeks we have been constantly on the defense in our dealings with Rhee. A great portion of our time has been spent anticipating what the UNC counteraction could be to his efforts to interfere with an armistice. I believe it is time we paid less attention to saving Rhee's face and more time in protecting our own interests.

If President Rhee withdrew the assurances of cooperation that he had given, General Clark wanted the United States to challenge him in a "strong statement" and to refute any further misleading statements by President Rhee or his spokesmen.¹¹¹

Owing to administrative problems in readying the final armistice arrangements, the tentative date of 24 July for signing the armistice was not met. But on that day, President Rhee sent a message to Secretary Dulles implying that his government had not yet decided which way to move. "We understand," he wrote, "that [the] truce is about to be signed." Before deciding upon his position, he needed the answers to two "vital questions," as follows:

First, in [the] proposed mutual security pact, may we count upon inclusion of a provision for immediate and automatic military support in case [the] ROK should be attacked by an external enemy? . . .

Second, when the political conference fails in 90 days, may we count upon US joining us to resume military efforts to drive the Chinese Red invaders from our land: If this joint effort to achieve our common objective is beyond your present ability to promise us, can we count upon US for moral and material support, in addition to general economic assistance, for our own military efforts to eject the invaders from Korea?¹¹²

Answering President Rhee on the same day, Secretary Dulles minced no words. Both he and President Eisenhower, he said, were satisfied that President Rhee's questions had already been answered. Moreover, "we believed, and we were surely entitled to believe, that the attitude of your government toward a truce was already decided." The Secretary continued:

I believe that the many assurances of cooperation which have been given you and which go to the limit of our governmental power should be a complete demonstration of the sincerity our purpose and the strength of our determination. Never in all its history has the United States offered to any other country as much as is offered to you. . . . You did not find us lacking in the past and you can, I believe, trust us for the future.¹¹³

President Rhee received this letter from the hand of Ambassador Briggs, who noted that he seemed impressed but that he remained noncommittal on his future action. "We shall now consider our situation," he told the Ambassador.¹¹⁴

New ROK Divisions

During June and early July, as President Rhee's statements and actions jeopardized the prospect of an armistice, General Clark had moved cautiously in the matter of increasing the ROK forces. As it became apparent by mid-July that an armistice was very near, he became even more cautious, since by then the completion of the 20-division ROKA program might appear to conflict with the spirit of the agreement and thus raise trouble with the Communists. On 21 July General Clark told General Collins that in view of the possible early signing of the armistice he did not think it wise to activate the remaining four ROK divisions. To do so just before the armistice might appear as "an act of duplicity" and imply collaboration with and approval of President Rhee's unilateral actions,

thus further delaying the signing. The armistice as written apparently would not forbid the later induction of ROK manpower needed to activate the additional four divisions. It did, however, bar the introduction of "reinforcing military forces or weapons," and thus forbade the importation of equipment for these divisions. Most of the necessary equipment, therefore, would have to be drawn from US divisions redeployed from Korea. General Clark's plan was to activate and train the four new divisions only when the necessary equipment could be made available from "resources inside Korea."¹¹⁵

In Washington, this plan was modified, probably because it was felt that the United States had given an implicit commitment to complete the 20-division program. After consulting the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 July 1953 instructed General Clark to activate the four additional ROK divisions "at minimum cadre strength" before the armistice was signed. His proposal to train and equip them as material became available was, however, approved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned that there were to be "no ceremonies of any kind or any publicity whatsoever" concerning the activation of the new units.¹¹⁶

The Armistice Is Signed

At Panmunjom, one of the remaining obstacles to the armistice was disposed of on 23 July. Staff officers reached agreement on the final demarcation line (see map on page 259), following a flurry of argument over the exact trace of the line in the vicinity of the recent fighting.¹¹⁷ But enemy delegates continued to introduce last-minute complications. On 24 July they insisted that if the armistice were to be signed by the top commanders at Panmunjom, newspaper correspondents from the ROK and from Nationalist China must be barred. General Clark instructed General Harrison to insist that all correspondents accredited by the UNC be allowed to attend. Otherwise, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 July, "I will not be a party to attending a signing ceremony by commanders at Panmunjom with such strings tied thereto." Instead, he would have the armistice documents flown to Tokyo to be signed by him. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consulting the Department of State, approved most of General Clark's plan, but added that President Eisenhower desired him to sign the armistice agreement on Korean soil.¹¹⁸

The enemy refused to yield on this point and the UNC did not make an issue of it. On 26 July General Clark reported that all arrangements had been made to have the armistice signed by the senior delegates at Panmunjom at 1100 the next morning, after which General Clark would sign at his advance headquarters at Munsan-ni. The cease-fire would take effect 12 hours later, at 2200 (Far East time) on 27 July.¹¹⁹

General Clark ordered UNC forces, effective at 1000 local time 27 July 1953 and for 12 hours thereafter, to confine their operations to maintenance of positions and ensuring their own integrity with the exception of certain preplanned

air and naval operations. At 272200, all hostilities were to cease and withdrawal from the demilitarized zone would begin.¹²⁰


When General Clark called upon President Rhee on 26 July, after announcing that agreement had been reached with the enemy, he found himself being congratulated by the ROK President "on having finally obtained an armistice." He reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the meeting was extremely satisfactory and the atmosphere pleasant. General Clark asked President Rhee to get word to the Korean prisoners reassuring them against forced repatriation. President Rhee replied that first he must get word to his people that "we will cooperate with the armistice."¹²¹

In ceremonies marked by frigid politeness, the plenary armistice delegations convened for the last time at 1000 on the morning of 27 July. Two documents awaited signature: the lengthy armistice agreement (with its annex, the "Terms of Reference" for the NNRC, signed earlier on 8 June), and the brief supplementary agreement authorizing the turnover of nonrepatriates to the NNRC in the DMZ. Each of the two senior delegates, Generals Harrison and Nam Il, signed nine copies of the documents prepared by his own side; then copies were exchanged and each man signed the other side's copies. The task was completed at 1012, and the two men walked out. Several hours later, General Clark countersigned the agreement at Munsan-ni, in the presence of General Taylor and of the Navy and Air Force commanders in the Far East, Vice Admiral J.J. Clark and General Otto P. Weyland. Meanwhile, the enemy commanders, Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai, also signed. Artillery fire and air and naval action continued until 2200, when the armistice took effect; then both sides stopped firing and began their pullback from the demarcation line. Thus ended the fighting that had ravaged Korea for more than three years.¹²²

News of the signing at Panmunjom had been immediately flashed to Washington, where it was then 2112 on the evening of 26 July. At once President Eisenhower revealed the news to the American people in a nationwide address. His speech was brief and appropriately solemn in tone, ending with a hope that the armistice would be superseded by a lasting peace. Secretary of State Dulles followed with another speech in which he stressed the political gains secured by the conflict and the settlement: the successful repulse of aggression and the recognition of the principle of political asylum for prisoners of war.¹²³

On the following day (27 July in Washington), the Joint Chiefs of Staff extended their "congratulations and appreciation" to General Clark for bringing about an armistice in Korea. "Your skillful diplomacy and perseverance throughout lengthy negotiations were most commendable," they wired. "Well done."¹²⁴

In Seoul, President Rhee issued a statement on 27 July in which he gave a qualified pledge of compliance. Out of a desire to cooperate with the United Nations, and especially with the United States, he had decided, he said, to observe the armistice in order to see whether the United Nations could, in a "limited time," persuade the Chinese Communist forces to leave Korea. If this attempt failed, he promised his people that the United Nations "will join us" in the task of unifying the country.¹²⁵ These ambiguous but alarming words signified that, even with the armistice in effect, South Korea's cooperation could not be taken for granted.



The “greater sanctions” statement by the nations fighting for the UN in Korea, which was designed to deter any renewed aggression, was signed in Washington on 27 July, but it was not made public for more than a week, a fact that robbed it of some of its intended impact. Initially the United States had planned that this statement would be signed and publicly released as soon as possible after the armistice, in order to give it maximum deterrent effect.¹²⁶ But this plan became a casualty of Syngman Rhee’s campaign of agitation and recalcitrance, which raised second thoughts about the wisdom of giving any sort of pledge to the Republic of Korea. On 23 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Clark that several governments, notably those of the UK and other members of the Commonwealth, had questioned the desirability of signing the statement and especially of publicizing it widely. The United States was insisting that the statement be signed but had agreed that its publication might be postponed and accompanied by a minimum of fanfare. Consequently, the plan now was that the statement (its title watered down to “Joint Policy Declaration”) would be signed and dated immediately but would not be released until it could be transmitted to the United Nations as part of a “special report” by the UNC. The agreed text of the declaration was the same as that approved in January 1953, except for the addition of a concluding sentence warning against aggression anywhere in Asia, not merely in Korea.¹²⁷

This plan was followed. The Joint Policy Declaration was signed on 27 July, but the world was not aware of the fact until 7 August. On that date the acting US representative in the UN, Mr. James J. Wadsworth, transmitted to the UN Secretary-General a special UNC report which summarized the terms of the armistice and recapitulated the history of the negotiations. The Joint Policy Declaration constituted four paragraphs near the end on the first section of the report. The significant portions of the declaration read as follows:

We the United Nations Members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms. . . .

We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek out a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.¹²⁸

The Aftermath

The armistice signed on 27 July 1953 was intended to be only a temporary arrangement, to be superseded by a general political settlement on Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State had foreseen that a political settlement would prove very difficult and had warned that the armistice might remain in effect for a number of years.¹²⁹ Their foresight was soon justified. From the beginning, the machinery set up to police the armistice was hampered by the mutual suspicion and dissension that was to destroy the hopes of an agreement at governmental level.

Under the terms of the armistice, overall supervision was the responsibility of a Military Armistice Commission composed of five representatives from each side, assisted by Joint Observer Teams. The MAC was established immediately, and held its first meeting at Panmunjom at 1100 on 28 July.¹³⁰

It performed some useful work, for example, in supervising the withdrawal of troops from the DMZ and the removal of mines and other hazards. Within a few weeks, however, it became the scene of charges and countercharges that destroyed the initial atmosphere of cooperation. The MAC remained nominally in existence but accomplished little.¹³¹

To enforce the prohibition against any new military buildup in Korea was the task of a four-nation NNSC. Its 10 inspection teams were stationed at designated ports of entry in North and South Korea. Very quickly, the UNC became convinced that the enemy was violating the agreement by bringing men and equipment through other ports of entry. Efforts to verify this suspicion were prevented by the noncooperation of the Polish and Czech members of the NNSC and by the refusal of the North Korean authorities to allow free inspections. Meanwhile the armistice was strictly applied in South Korea. This one-sided situation continued throughout 1953 and for several years thereafter. Finally the UNC was driven to announce in 1957 that it would ignore the prohibition against the importation of military material in South Korea and would proceed with the modernization of the Eighth Army and the Republic of Korea Army.¹³²

None of the provisions of the armistice agreement attracted as much public attention as those regarding the exchange of prisoners—the issue that had blocked agreement for so many months. One group of prisoners, those that had expressed a desire for repatriation, presented no problem. The exchange of these—Operation BIG SWITCH, as it was called—began at Panmunjom on 5 August under the supervision of the NNRC and was completed on 6 September 1953. The UNC repatriated 75,823 prisoners, of which 70,183 were North Korean and 5,640 Chinese. The enemy in turn surrendered 12,773 men, including 3,597 US, 7,862 South Korean, and the remainder from other nations.¹³³

Far more difficult and time-consuming was the disposition of those prisoners who opposed repatriation. Under the terms of the armistice, they were to be placed in the custody of the NNRC while representatives of each side “explained” to them the advantages of repatriation. The UNC was holding 22,604 men in this category, of whom 14,704 were Chinese and 7,900 North Korean. They were turned over to the NNRC in the DMZ on 23 September. The next day

the Communists in turn delivered 359 nonrepatriates (mostly South Koreans) from the UNC. Explanations by the Communist side to their former compatriots began on 15 October, after a delay caused by Communist complaints of inadequate facilities. The task proceeded slowly, partly owing to difficulties raised by the mass of anticommunist prisoners, partly because the Communists' lack of success in winning over the recalcitrants apparently led them to stall while seeking new tactics. As a result, by the time the 90-day limit for explanations drew to a close on 23 December, only 3,190 of the 22,604 Communist nonrepatriates had been interviewed. Of these only 137 (90 Chinese and 47 North Koreans) had changed their minds and opted for repatriation during their interviews (although 138 others had told the Indian custodial troops that they now desired to be repatriated).¹³⁴

The question then arose: What should be done with the 19,414 Chinese and North Korean prisoners who had not been interviewed? The armistice agreement specified that the fate of any nonrepatriate remaining after the 90-day explanation period was to be determined by the postwar political conference, which was allowed 30 days to make this decision; thereafter the prisoners would revert to civilian status. But the conference had not yet met, and there was no prospect that it would do so in the next 30 days. In this situation, the NNRC split. The Polish and Czech members declared that the armistice provisions could not be implemented and that the disposition of prisoners should therefore be referred back to the two military commands. The Swiss and Swedes on the NNRC upheld the US view that any prisoners whose status remained undetermined at the expiration of the 30-day period allotted for a decision by the political conference should automatically be considered civilians. The Indian chairman voted with the Poles and Czechs, and as a result, the prisoners were returned to the two military commands. Thereupon the UNC, over strong Communist protest, simply released its prisoners. Most of the Chinese went to Taiwan; the Koreans were taken over by the ROK. With its task accomplished the NNRC on 1 February 1954 voted to dissolve.¹³⁵

The political conference called for in the armistice agreement should have been held within three months, that is, by 27 October 1953. But the agreement had said nothing about who should convene the conference or who should take part. These matters were taken up by the UN General Assembly in August 1953 and produced immediate disagreement. The countries of the Communist bloc favored a large "roundtable" conference that would include the Soviet Union and would discuss a broad range of Far Eastern problems. The United States, standing upon the letter of the armistice agreement (which spoke of a conference "of both sides"), desired a two-sided conference with participation on the UN side limited to nations that had shared in the fighting and insisted that if the USSR was to participate it must be as a clearly identified member of the "other side." The Communist view commanded wide support from other nations, including India and the United Kingdom. Eventually however, the United States secured assent to a resolution favoring a two-sided conference to be held not later than 28 October 1953. A special US representative, Mr. Arthur H. Dean, went to Panmunjom to discuss conference arrangements with representatives of North Korea

and Communist China. He soon found, however, that these spokesmen insisted upon reopening the question of the composition of the conference, which the United States regarded as settled by the Assembly resolution. The talks deadlocked; the deadline of 28 October passed with no agreement; finally, on 12 December, Mr. Dean abandoned the discussion.¹³⁶

In January 1954 the question of a conference on Far Eastern affairs was reopened during a meeting of the Big Four Foreign Ministers in Berlin. Though the purpose of this meeting had been to discuss the status of Germany and Austria, its only result was an agreement to hold a wider conference, to include Communist China, for discussion of Asian affairs. This decision was taken at the instigation of France, which was seeking a way out of the Indochina war. The upshot was a conference that opened in Geneva on 26 April 1954 and is remembered in history for the partition of Vietnam that ended the first Indochina war. Unification of Korea was discussed at length but no agreement was reached. The Communist powers refused to consider any method of unification that would involve genuinely free elections; they insisted upon proposals that, in the Western view, would enable Communist strongarm squads to dominate the electoral process.¹³⁷

Meanwhile, Dr. Syngman Rhee had been pacified by the conclusion of a US-ROK mutual defense treaty, which provided that both parties would "act to meet the common danger" in case of attack. This treaty, signed on 1 October 1953, was sent to the Senate for ratification in January 1954, after the ROK President had given what were considered satisfactory assurances that he would not act unilaterally. When the Geneva Conference was announced, President Rhee agreed to participate but expressed the hope that "if and when" the conference failed, the United States would join his country in "employing other means to drive the enemy from our land." After the conference did in fact fail to reach agreement on Korea, there was real alarm in Washington that Dr. Rhee might actually attack North Korea. But the alarm passed. An agreement reached during 1954 specified a detailed program of US military assistance for the Republic of Korea, in return for which Dr. Rhee agreed to limit himself to the pursuit of unification through "peaceful means."¹³⁸

Concluding Reflections

The immediate outcome of the Korean War was a compromise that prevented either antagonist from gaining a clear-cut victory. Nevertheless the United Nations, while unable to impose its will on the Communists by force of arms, had repelled the invasion of South Korea and had driven the enemy back to the starting line; in fact, the final settlement found South Korea occupying slightly more territory than it had before 25 June 1950. The confusing and ambiguous UN resolution of October 1950 that had proclaimed the "unification" of Korea as a desirable objective had offered General MacArthur an opportunity to attempt to unify Korea by military means. He had failed to do so. But the only political

objective clearly enunciated by the United States had been restoration of the status quo ante, and that objective had been achieved.

The Communists had failed in their initial announced objective of bringing all of Korea under the rule of Kim Il Sung. On the other hand, North Korea and Communist China had thrown back an advance by the UN Command toward the northernmost boundaries of Korea and had ensured the survival of the P'yongyang regime. Moreover, Communist China had gained considerably in prestige through its victories in the winter of 1950–1951 and its subsequent success in fighting UN forces to a stalemate. The price of the enemy success had been paid principally by North Korea, which had seen its cities shattered, its industry destroyed, and its original army smashed.

The Republic of Korea and the United States had furnished the great bulk of the forces that carried the war to a conclusion. An international flavor was supplied by the forces of 15 other countries. At the time the war ended, these countries accounted for about 4 percent of the total UNC ground strength (39,145 out of 932,539 men). Some of these countries also furnished air or naval units or both. Since all forces, by decision of the UN Security Council, were placed under US command at the outset, the disputes likely to arise in the conduct of coalition warfare were avoided. But the United States could by no means ignore the wishes of its fellow UN members, either in prosecuting the war or in negotiating for peace.¹³⁹

Because the creation of the Republic of South Korea had been sponsored by the United Nations, the invasion by North Korea constituted a challenge to UN authority and prestige—a challenge that, if shirked, might have led to a repetition of the melancholy history of the League of Nations before World War II. The United States led the United Nations in its successful response and thus gained in moral stature. At the same time, a measure of US attention was perforce drawn away from Western Europe, which had previously been considered the region most in need of US protection. The necessity to shore up the defenses of the noncommunist world in the Far East (as those of Western Europe had been strengthened by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) led the United States, during the war and shortly thereafter, to enter into treaties with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Nationalist China.

The recognition of the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war, for which the United Nations Command had held out during the negotiations, could be accounted a victory for the United States and the noncommunist world generally. The same could be said of the Communists' loss of face through the demonstration that thousands of their soldiers were glad to seize an opportunity to escape from Communist rule. Offsetting this development, of course, was Communist China's gain in military prestige, already noted. Moreover, both Communist China and North Korea achieved a sort of de facto diplomatic recognition by forcing the United States to negotiate with them, while they in turn conceded no recognition to the governments of South Korea or Nationalist China.

Yet another result of the Korean War was to reverse the trend, which began immediately after World War II, toward a smaller US military establishment. During 1949 and early 1950 Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, carrying out pol-

icy laid down by President Truman, had imposed rigid limits on military manpower and money, claiming that he was merely eliminating waste without reducing actual military strength. This claim was exposed as false in the first few weeks of the Korean conflict. An impressive expansion in the size and quality of US armed forces was essential, to avoid defeat in Korea and to maintain military strength for possible emergencies elsewhere in the world. The end of the Korean War saw an inevitable retrenchment, and the Eisenhower administration imposed its own economy program on the military establishment between 1953 and 1960. But the number of men in uniform remained appreciably larger than in June 1950.¹⁴⁰

The Korean War provided a test of the machinery set up by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment. This legislation gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff a legal basis for the first time, created a separate Air Force and a Secretary and Department of Defense, and provided a mechanism (the National Security Council) to coordinate military and political objectives. In general, this machinery served its purpose. President Truman made use of the NSC to bring his military and political advisors together; he exercised overall control of war strategy through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (who in turn used General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, as their executive agent to direct operations in the theater). Only once was there a glaring failure to adjust military policy to an attainable political objective; this was in connection with General MacArthur's invasion of North Korea, when the administration failed to enunciate a clear-cut political goal and to insist on compliance by the Far East Commander.

Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff team in existence at the beginning of the war, two of the four members saw the conflict through to the end. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, the JCS Chairman, and General J. Lawton Collins, USA, Chief of Staff, US Army, both took office in 1949 and retained their positions until August 1953, when President Eisenhower brought in a complete new JCS team. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, retired because of ill health a few weeks before the war ended; his replacement was General Nathan F. Twining, USAF. Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN, the Chief of Naval Operations, who played a prominent role in the crisis of the winter of 1950–1951, died unexpectedly on 22 July 1951 and was succeeded by Admiral William M. Fechteler, USN.¹⁴¹

The most active period of JCS involvement in the Korean War was of course the first year, when military action was most intense. When negotiations began in 1951 and the front became stabilized, diplomatic objectives assumed primary importance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a channel for communications between CINCFE and his negotiating team on the one hand, and civilian authorities in Washington on the other hand: the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President. Nonetheless the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted in all the key decisions taken during the negotiations.

In many ways, the JCS organization that existed during the Korean War was closer to that of World War II than to the one that evolved after President Eisenhower's reorganization plan of 1958. The purpose of that plan was to impose a much greater degree of unification upon the US military forces. The reorganiza-

tion greatly strengthened the role of the Secretary of Defense, downgraded the importance of the military Services, and enhanced the authority and prestige of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was this new and more highly unified organization that was called upon to direct another war in the decade that followed—a war fought under conditions that were radically different from, and in many ways much more difficult than, those prevailing during the Korean War of 1950–1953.

Appendix 1

Text of the Armistice Agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA.

P R E A M B L E

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

ARTICLE I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).¹¹

¹ The originals of these maps, large-scale in size, are deposited with the signed original Agreement in the archives of the Department of State where they are available for reference.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).¹¹

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map (Map 2).¹¹ Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their

¹ The originals of these maps, large-scale in size, are deposited with the signed original Agreement in the archives of the Department of State where they are available for reference.

assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

ARTICLE II

CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

A. GENERAL

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to ensure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and

the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124°40'E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N, 124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3.)¹¹

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, dam-

¹ The originals of these maps, large-scale in size, are deposited with the signed original Agreement in the archives of the Department of State where they are available for reference.

aged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (See Map 4),¹⁾ and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

¹⁾ The originals of these maps, large-scale in size, are deposited with the signed original Agreement in the archives of the Department of State where they are available for reference.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to ensure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29"N, 126°40'00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. GENERAL

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The

Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to ensure a more effective armistice.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly ensure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command		Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers	
INCHON	(37°28'N, 126°38'E)	SINUJU	(40°06'N, 124°24'E)
TAEGU	(35°52'N, 128°36'E)	CHONGJIN	(41°46'N, 129°49'E)
PUSAN	(35°06'N, 129°02'E)	HUNGNAM	(39°50'N, 127°37'E)
KANGNUNG	(37°45'N, 128°54'E)	MANPO	(41°09'N, 126°18'E)
KUNSAN	(35°59'N, 126°43'E)	SINANJU	(39°36'N, 125°36'E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).^[1]

¹ The originals of these maps, large-scale in size, are deposited with the signed original Agreement in the archives of the Department of State where they are available for reference.

3. GENERAL

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to ensure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

ARTICLE III

ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, " 歸還 " (SONG HWAN) in Korean, and " 交還 " (CH'EN FAN) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side ensures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while

en route from prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to ensure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58a hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volun-

teers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

ARTICLE IV

RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a

higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

ARTICLE V


MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.


Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.



KIM IL SUNG
Marshal, Democratic
People's Republic
of Korea
Supreme Commander,
Korean People's Army




PENG TEH-HUAI
Commander,
Chinese People's
Volunteers



MARK W. CLARK
General, United States
Army
Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations
Command

PRESENT



NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's
Army and the Chinese People's
Volunteers



WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States
Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation

ANNEX

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR
NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION
(See Sub-paragraph 51b)

I

GENERAL

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its headquarters within the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

2. *Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph shall be limited to military police type small arms.*

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.

II

CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

III

EXPLANATION

8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:

a. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a total of five (5);

b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-

mission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this Paragraph;

e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) communications personnel.

9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

IV

DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Confer-

ence recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands.

V

RED CROSS VISITATION

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VI

PRESS COVERAGE

13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall ensure freedom of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriating prisoners of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere or exert influence.

VIII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX

PUBLICATION

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

X

MOVEMENT

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.

XI

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice becomes effective.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's
Army and the Chinese People's
Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United
States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command
Delegation

TEMPORARY AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

In order to meet the requirements of the disposition of the prisoners of war not for direct repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in pursuance of the provisions in Paragraph 61, Article V of the Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, agree to conclude the following Temporary Agreement supplementary to the Armistice Agreement:

1. Under the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, Article II of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the United Nations Command has the right to designate the area between the Military Demarcation Line and the eastern and southern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone between the Imjin River on the south and the road leading south from Okum-ni on the northeast (the main road leading southeast from Panmunjom not included), as the area within which the United Nations Command will turn over the prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated and whom the United Nations Command has the responsibility for keeping under its custody, to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. The United Nations Command shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, inform the side of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war held in its custody.

2. If there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have the right to designate the area in the vicinity of Panmunjom between the Military Demarcation Line and the western and northern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone, as the area within which such prisoners of war will be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After knowing that there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers shall inform the United Nations Command side of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war.

3. In accordance with Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, Article I of the Armistice Agreement, the following paragraphs are hereby provided:

a. After the cease-fire comes into effect, unarmed personnel of each side shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to enter the above-mentioned area designated by their own side to perform necessary construction operations. None of such personnel shall remain in the above-mentioned areas upon the completion of the construction operations.

b. A definite number of prisoners of war as decided upon by both sides, who are in the respective custody of both sides and who are not directly repatriated, shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to be escorted respectively by a certain number of armed forces of the detaining sides to the above-mentioned areas of custody designated respectively by both sides to

be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After the prisoners of war have been taken over, the armed forces of the detaining sides shall be withdrawn immediately from the areas of custody to the area under the control of their own side.

c. The personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies, the armed forces of India, the Red Cross Society of India, the explaining representatives and observation representatives of both sides, as well as the required material and equipment, for exercising the functions provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to have the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the above-mentioned areas designated respectively by both sides for the custody of prisoners of war.

4. The provisions of Sub-paragraph 3 of this agreement shall not be construed as derogating from the privileges enjoyed by those personnel mentioned above under Paragraph 11, Article I of the Armistice Agreement.

5. This Agreement shall be abrogated upon the completion of the mission provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

KIM IL SUNG
Marshal, Democratic
People's Republic
of Korea
Supreme Commander,
Korean People's Army

PENG TEH-HUAI
Commander,
Chinese People's
Volunteers

MARK W. CLARK
General, United States
Army
Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations
Command

PRESENT

NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's
Army and the Chinese People's
Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States
Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation

Appendix 2

Contributions of Military Forces to the United Nations Command

Ground Forces (Personnel)¹

	30 Jun 51	30 Jun 52	31 Jul 53
United States ²	253,250	265,864	302,483
Republic of Korea ³	273,266	376,418	590,911
Australia	912	1,844	2,282
Belgium ⁴	602	623	944
Canada	5,403	5,155	6,146
Colombia	1,050	1,007	1,068
Ethiopia	1,153	1,094	1,271
France	738	1,185	1,119
Greece	1,027	899	1,263
India ⁵	333	276	70
Italy ⁵	0	64	72
Netherlands	725	565	819
New Zealand	797	1,111	1,389
Norway ⁵	79	109	105
Philippines	1,143	1,494	1,496
Sweden ⁵	162	148	154
Thailand	1,057	2,274	1,294
Turkey	4,602	4,878	5,455
United Kingdom	8,278	13,043	14,198
Total	554,577	678,051	932,539

1. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 513.

2. Includes Marine and Navy Personnel under operational control of US Army.

3. Includes KATUSA, ROK Marines and civilian trainees.

4. Includes 44 men from Luxembourg.

5. Contributed non-combatant medical units only.

Air Forces (Squadrons)⁶

	30 Jun 51	30 Jun 52	30 Jun 53
United States ⁷	58	67	66
Australia	1	1	1
Canada	1	1	1
South Africa	1	1	1
Total	61	70	69

Naval Forces (Ships)

	30 Jun 51	30 Jun 52	30 Jun 53
United States ⁸	186	195	261
Republic of Korea ⁹	34	67	76
	15 Jan 52 ¹⁰	15 Oct 52 ¹¹	
Australia	4	4	
Canada	3	3	
Colombia	1	1	
Denmark	1	1	
Netherlands	1	1	
New Zealand	2	2	
Thailand	2	2	
United Kingdom	22	22	

6. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea*, p. 644. *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1952, pp. 214-215.

7. Includes USAF and US Marine air forces (average strength, 7 squadrons).

8. Information furnished by Naval Historical Center, Dept. of the Navy.

9. *Jane's Fighting Ships*, 1950-1951, p. 262; 1951-1952, p. 390; 1952-1953, p. 315.

10. *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1951, pp. 249-251.

11. *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1952, pp. 214-215.

Appendix 3

Prisoners of War

*Repatriates*¹

Nationality	LITTLE SWITCH	BIG SWITCH	Total
North Koreans	5,640 ²	70,183 ³	75,823
Chinese	1,030	5,640 ⁴	6,670
Total	6,670	75,823	82,493
US	149	3,597	3,746
ROK	471	7,862	8,321
UK	32	945	977
Turks	15	229	243
Filipinos	1	40	41
Canadians	2	30	32
Colombians	6	22	28
Australians	5	21	26
Frenchmen	—	12	12
South Africans	1	8	9
Greeks	1	2	3
Netherlanders	1	2	3
Belgians	—	1	1
New Zealanders	—	1	1
Japanese	—	1	1
Total	684	12,773	13,444

1. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 514.

2. Included 446 civilian internees, of which 3 were female, and 18 female POWs.

3. Included 60,788 male POWs, 473 female POWs, 23 children, and 8,899 civilian internees.

4. Included 1 female POW.

Prisoners of War—Continued

*Nonrepatriates*⁵

Held by United Nations Command

Disposition	Chinese	Korean	Total
Returned to Communist control	440	188	628
Escaped and missing	2	11	13
Died in custody of Custodial Forces of India (CFI)	15	23	38
Went to India with CFI	12	74	86
Returned to UNC control ⁶	14,235	7,604	21,839
Total	14,704	7,900	22,604

Held by Communists

Disposition	US	UK	Korean	Total
Returned to Communist control	21	1	325	347
Went to India with CFI	—	—	2	2
Returned to UNC control	2	—	8	10
Total	23	1	335	359

5. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 515.

6. Final action completed on 19 Feb 54.

Appendix 4

Plenary Members of the Armistice Delegation¹

United Nations Command Delegation

Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, USN	10 Jul 51–22 May 52
Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, USA	10 Jul 51–17 Dec 51
Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, USN	10 Jul 51–11 Dec 51
Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie, USAF	10 Jul 51–27 Nov 51
Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, ROKA	10 Jul 51–24 Oct 51
Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, ROKA	24 Oct 51–06 Feb 52
Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, USAF	27 Nov 51–05 Jul 52
Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, USA	17 Dec 51–06 Feb 52
Rear Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, USN	11 Dec 51–23 Jun 52
Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., USA	06 Feb 52–27 Jul 53
Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung, ROKA	06 Feb 52–28 May 52
Brig. Gen. Frank C. McConnell, USA	22 May 52–26 Apr 53
Brig. Gen. Lee Han Lim, ROKA	28 May 52–26 Apr 53
Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris, USAF	05 Jul 52–26 Apr 53
Rear Adm. John C. Daniel, USN	
Brig. Gen. Ralph M. Osborne, USA	23 Jun 52–27 Jul 53
Brig. Gen. Choi Duk Shin, ROKA	26 Apr 53–16 May 53
Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn, USAF	25 Apr 53–20 Jun 53
Brig. Gen. George M. Finch, USAF	20 Jun 53–27 Jul 53

North Korean and Chinese Communist Delegation

Lt. Gen. Nam Il, KPA	10 Jul 51–27 Jul 53
General Teng Hua, CCF	10 Jul 51–24 Oct 51
Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, KPA	10 Jul 51–27 Jul 53
Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang, CCF	10 Jul 51–26 Apr 53
Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, KPA	10 Jul 51–24 Oct 51
General Pien Chang-wu, CCF	24 Oct 51–26 Apr 53
Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan, KPA	24 Oct 51–28 Apr 52
Rear Adm. Kim Won Mu, KPN	28 Apr 52–11 Aug 52
Maj. Gen. So Hui, KPA	11 Aug 52–26 Apr 53
General Ting Kuo-yu, CCF	26 Apr 53–27 Jul 53
Maj. Gen. Ghang Chun San, KPA	26 Apr 53–25 May 53
Maj. Gen. Tsai Cheng-wen, CCF	26 Apr 53–27 May 53
Admiral Kim Won Mu, KPA	25 May 53–17 Jun 53
Maj. Gen. Kim Dong Hak, KPA	17 Jun 53–27 Jul 53

1. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 539. In this appendix the tour of duty of a delegate is concluded on the date that his replacement is officially accredited in a plenary session, even though in many cases the delegate may have been relieved and reassigned while the meetings were in recess.

Appendix 5

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and United States
CBR	chemical, biological, and radiological
CCF	Chinese Communist Forces
CFI	Custodial Forces of India
CG FEAF	Commanding General, Far East Air Forces
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CIs	civilian internees
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMNAVFE	Commander, Naval Forces Far East
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
FA	field artillery
FECOM	Far East Command
GCI	ground controlled intercept
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IRO	International Refugee Organization
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JLPC	Joint Logistics Plans Committee
JSPC	Joint Strategic Plans Committee
JSPOG	Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee
KATUSA	Korean Augmentation to the United States Army
KCOMZ	Korean Communications Zone
LOCs	lines of communication

Appendix 5

MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Military Armistice Commission
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MIAs	missing in action
MLR	main line of resistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKA	North Korean Army
NKPA	North Korean Peoples Army
NNRC	Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
OPL	outpost line
POWs	prisoners of war
R and R	rest and recuperation
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
TDY	temporary duty
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNCAC	United Nations Command Civil Affairs Command
UNCACK	United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea
UNCURK	United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNKRA	United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO	World Health Organization
ZI	Zone of the Interior

Appendix 6

Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief

Harry S. Truman 12 Apr 45–20 Jan 53
Dwight D. Eisenhower 20 Jan 53–20 Jan 61

Secretary of State

Dean G. Acheson 21 Jan 49–20 Jan 53
John Foster Dulles 21 Jan 53–22 Apr 59

Secretary of Defense

Louis A. Johnson 28 Mar 49–19 Sep 50
George C. Marshall 21 Sep 50–12 Sep 51
Robert A. Lovett 17 Sep 51–20 Jan 53
Charles E. Wilson 28 Jan 53–08 Oct 57

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Stephen T. Early 10 Aug 49–30 Sep 50
Robert A. Lovett 04 Oct 50–16 Sep 51
William C. Foster 24 Sep 51–20 Jan 53
Roger M. Kyes 02 Feb 53–01 May 54

Secretary of the Army

Frank Pace, Jr. 12 Apr 50–20 Jan 53
Robert T. Stevens 04 Feb 53–20 Jul 55

Secretary of the Navy

Francis P. Matthews 25 May 49–30 Jul 51
Dan A. Kimball 31 Jul 51–20 Jan 53
Robert B. Anderson 04 Feb 53–02 May 54

Secretary of the Air Force

Thomas K. Finletter 24 Apr 50–20 Jan 53
Harold E. Talbott 04 Feb 53–13 Aug 55

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley 16 Aug 49–15 Aug 53

Chief of Staff, US Army

General J. Lawton Collins 16 Aug 49–15 Aug 53

Appendix 6

continued

Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman 02 Nov 49–22 Jul 51
Admiral William M. Fechteler 16 Aug 51–16 Aug 53

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg 30 Apr 48–30 Jun 53
General Nathan F. Twining 30 Jun 53–30 Jun 57

Commandant, US Marine Corps

General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. 28 Jun 52–31 Dec 55

Commander in Chief, Far East

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 01 Jan 47–11 Apr 51
General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 11 Apr 51–09 May 52
General Mark W. Clark, USA 09 May 52–05 Oct 53

Commanding General, Eighth US Army

Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA 03 Sep 48–23 Dec 50
Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 26 Dec 50–14 Apr 51
Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, USA 14 Apr 51–11 Feb 53
Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA 11 Feb 53–25 Mar 55

Commanding General, Army Forces, Far East
(Held by Commander in Chief, Far East)

Commander Naval Forces, Far East

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN 27 Aug 49–21 May 51
Vice Admiral Robert C. Briscoe, USN 04 Jun 52–02 Apr 54

Commanding General, Far East Air Forces

Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF 26 Apr 49–21 May 51
Lieutenant General Earle E. Partridge, USAF 21 May 51–10 Jun 51
General Otto P. Weyland, USAF 10 Jun 51–31 Mar 54

Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 15 Aug 45–11 Apr 51
General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 11 Apr 51–28 Apr 52

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 08 Jul 50–11 Apr 51
General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 11 Apr 51–09 May 52
General Mark W. Clark, USA 09 May 52–05 Oct 53

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN 30 Apr 49–10 Jul 53
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN 10 Jul 53–31 Jul 58

Commander, Seventh Fleet

Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN	19 May 50–28 Mar 51
Vice Admiral Harold M. Martin, USN	28 Mar 51–28 Mar 52
Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, USN	28 Mar 52–20 May 52
Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, USN	20 May 52–01 Dec 53

Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN	10 Jul 51–22 May 52
Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, USA	22 May 52–27 Jul 53

US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea

Ambassador John J. Muccio	07 Apr 49–08 Sep 52
Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs	25 Nov 52–12 Apr 55

*Political Advisor to the Supreme Commander,
Allied Powers, Japan*

Ambassador William J. Sebald	03 Dec 45–25 Apr 52
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Notes

Chapter 1. Seeking a Political Solution

1. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (1969), p. 529.
2. *NY Times*, 2 Jun 51, p. 1.
3. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 531, 535–536. Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (1956), pp. 455–456. Hearings, *Military Situation in the Far East*, S. Coms on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 82d Cong, 1st Sess, pt 3, p. 1782.
4. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 531–532. No record of this action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or of GEN Ridgway's reaction has been found in the official files.
5. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 533. (C) Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea*, pp. 483–486 and 507–511.
6. (U) Dept of State *Bulletin*, 9 Jul 51, p. 45. On 24 June (Tokyo time) GEN Ridgway sent a message to his principal commanders saying, "You will have heard by now the statements of the USSR representative. . . . Up to this moment you share all the info I have on this subject." He found the prospect of cease-fire negotiations "not unwelcome." (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 65667 to CG Army Eight (ADV) Korea et al., 24 Jun 51, DA IN 7465. Mathew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (1967), p. 181.
7. (S) Msg, State 831 to Moscow, 25 Jun 51; (TS) Msg, Moscow 2181 to State, 27 Jun 51; copies of both in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 50.
8. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 533–534. Memo of Conversation by Dir, Ofc of NE Asian Affairs, Dept of State (Johnson), 28 Jun 51, (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 566–571. According to Acheson (loc. cit.), "the military" were reluctant to have peace negotiations conducted at the military rather than the diplomatic level. No evidence has been found in JCS files to support this statement, which may be based on a misreading or mistaken recollection of GEN Vandenberg's position as described above. On the other hand, there is evidence that some JCS members feared that State might abdicate its responsibilities and, by default, make the JCS responsible for post-armistice events. These members did not believe that State had a clear objective in view.
9. (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 583–587. (U) Msg, JCS 95174 to CINCFE, 28 Jun 51. (TS) DA TT 4890, 29 Jun 51 (in CJCS book of outgoing messages to CINCFE, Jun 1950–Jun 1951). (U) Msg, JCS 95258 to CINCFE, 29 Jun 51 (giving text of message as quoted above). (U) Msg, CINCFE C 66046 to JCS, 29 Jun 51, DA IN 9558.
10. Memo of Conversation, Dept State (Johnson), 29 Jun 51, (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, p. 597. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 458. Admiral Sherman, the CNO, was represented at the 29 June meeting by his Vice Chief, Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, USN.
11. (U) Msg, JCS 95354 to CINCUNC (Personal for Ridgway), 30 Jun 51.
12. (U) Msg, JCS 95354 to CINCUNC (Personal for Ridgway), 30 Jun 51.
13. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 66160 to DA for JCS, 1 Jul 51, DA IN 10033. General Ridgway had selected Admiral Joy; then in consultation the two men chose the other members of the UNC delegation. Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (United States Army in the Korean War) (1966), p. 17, footnote 10.
14. (U) Msg, JCS 95438 to CINCFE, 2 Jul 51.
15. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 66183 to DA for JCS, 1 Jul 51 (2 Jul, Washington time), DA IN 10130.
16. (U) JIC 581/1, 2 Jul 51, CCS 383.21 (3–19–45) sec 51.
17. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 66188 to DA for JCS, 2 Jul 51, DA IN 10135.
18. (U) Msg, JCS 95438 Personal for CINCFE, 2 Jul 51; the original draft of this message bearing the notation "OK, H.S.T." is filed in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 51.
19. (U) Msg, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 030429Z Jul 51, DA IN 78785; (U) Msg, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 042330Z Jul 51, DA IN 79498; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 66371 to DA for JCS, 5 Jul 51, DA IN 11098; (U) Msg, CINCFE to CGRYCOM et al., 060300Z Jul 51, DA IN 79934.
20. John Miller, Owen J. Carroll, and Margaret E. Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*, p. 111. (In his memoirs, President Truman confuses P'yonggang with P'yongyang, the capital of North Korea, and erroneously states that the latter was temporarily captured by UN forces: *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 455.)
21. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 180–181.
22. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 64976 to JCS, 14 Jun 51, DA IN 3981.

23. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65529 to JCS, 20 Jun 51, DA IN 6910. (TS) Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, "Location of EUSAK during a Cease-fire (Military Viewpoint)," 9 Jun 51; (TS) Ltr, CINCFE to CG, Eighth Army, "Planning Directive," 19 Jun 51; both in Cmd Rpt, GHQ FEC/UNC, Jun 51, G-3 Annex.
24. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65529 to JCS, 22 Jun 51, DA IN 6910.
25. *Ibid.*
26. (U) Msg, JCS 95125 to CINCFE, 27 Jun 51.
27. (U) Msg, CINCFE C65800 to JCS, 26 Jun 51, DA IN 8109. Although he did not say so at the time, GEN Ridgway later believed that the Eighth Army could have driven the enemy back across the Yalu—provided that the United States was willing to pay the price in lives. He tempered this belief, however, with the knowledge that such a victory would probably not have been worth the cost, particularly in view of the lack of a definite and clear national policy on what would be done once Korea was cleared. General Ridgway later stated, "Seizure of the line of the Yalu and Tumen would have been merely the seizure of more real estate. It would have greatly shortened the enemy supply lines and greatly lengthened our own. It would have widened our front from 110 miles to 420, and beyond that front would lie Manchuria and the whole mainland of Asia, in which all the wealth and manpower of this country could have been lost and dissipated." Matthew B. Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace, the Korean War," *Saturday Evening Post*, (February 25, 1956), p. 130.
28. (U) Msg, JCS 92831 to CINCUNC, 31 May 51. See pt. 1 Ch. 9 for fuller discussion of these directives and of NSC 48/5.
29. See pt. 1 Ch. 9.
30. (U) Msg, JCS 94501 to CINCFE, 20 Jun 51.
31. (U) Msg, CINCFE C65529 to JCS, 22 Jun 51, DA IN 6910. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, "Revision in Directive to CINCFE for Operations in Korea," n.d. [filed under date 20 Jun 51, but actually subsequent to 22 Jun]; (U) App A to JCS 1776/234, 27 Jun 51; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 50.
32. (U) Memo for Record, O.N.B. (General Bradley), "Proposed Changes in Directive to CINCFE," n.d. [10 Jul 51], same file, sec 52. (U) Msgs, JCS 95977 and 95978 to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.
33. These Communist negotiators had been carefully selected for what Admiral Joy has referred to as "force of intellect." Nam Il, the nominal head of the Communist delegation, was dominated by the Chinese Major General Hsieh Fang, whom Admiral Joy calls the "*de facto* chief." C. Turner Joy, *How Communists Negotiate* (1955), pp. 10-13. See also, Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front (United States Army in the Korean War)* (1966), p. 23.
34. The details of the various ways by which the Communists tried to achieve this propaganda effect are told in Joy's book cited above, *passim*, and in Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, Chapter 2.
35. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 048 to DA for JCS, 10 Jul 51, DA IN 13145; (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 096 to JCS, 15 Jul 51, DA IN 14877; (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 098 to DA for JCS, 15 Jul 51, DA IN 14955; (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 104 to DA for JCS, 16 Jul 51, DA IN 15086.
36. (U) Msg, CINCFE HNC 096 to JCS, 15 Jul 51, DA IN 14877.
37. (U) Msg, JCS 96421 to CINCFE, 16 Jul 51.
38. (TS) Memo, JSSC to GEN Bradley, "Injection of Political Matters into Current Armistice Negotiations," 18 Jul 51, seen in CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 54 (cannot now be located).
39. (U) Msg, JCS 96802 to CINCFE, 19 Jul 51.
40. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 67390 to JCS, 20 Jul 51, DA IN 16821.
41. (TS) State Dept, Division of Historical Policy Research, "Agenda Item 5 of the Korea Armistice Negotiations: The Disposition in the Armistice Talks of the Question of a Korean Political Settlement," Research Project 342, Aug 53, copy in JCS Hist Div files.
42. (U) Msg, JCS 96836 to CINCFE, 20 Jul 51.
43. (TS) State Dept, Research Project 342, cited above. (U) Msg, JCS 96930 to CINCFE, 21 Jul 51.
44. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67521 to DA for JCS, 23 Jul 51, DA IN 17623; (U) Msg, JCS 97220 to CINCFE, 25 Jul 51; (U) Msg, CINCFE HNC 142 to DA for JCS, 26 Jul 51, DA IN 18986.
45. (U) Msg, CINCFE HNC 142 to DA for JCS, 26 Jul 51, DA IN 18986.
46. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Instructions to General Ridgway," 16 Jul 51, Encl A to JCS 1776/242, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 53.
47. (TS) Ltr, Sec Marshall to Sec Acheson, 20 Jul 51, Encl B to (TS) JCS 1776/242, 25 Jul 51, same file, sec 55.
48. (TS) Ltr, Sec Acheson to Sec Marshall, 27 Jul 51, App to Encl to JCS 1776/243, 1 Aug 51, same file, sec 56.
49. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 105 to JCS, 16 Jul 51, DA IN 15062. State Dept *Bulletin*, 30 Jul 51, p. 188. DOD Press Release 165-51, 24 Jul 51. (U) Msg, DA 96649 to CINCUNC (ADV), 18 Jul 51.
50. J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime* (1969), p. 331.

51. Information on methods of operation at the Base Camp at Munsan is derived from: Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, pp. 168–169, and (TS) Hq FECOM, *History of the Korean Conflict, Korean Armistice Negotiations (July 1951–May 1952)*, pts 1 and 2 (prepared by James F. Schnabel, hereafter cited as Schnabel, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (Jul 51–May 52)*; copy in JCS Hist Div files).

52. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 331. The State Department officials with whom the Joint Chiefs of Staff met changed frequently during the period but consisted usually of two of the following: Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor; U. Alexis Johnson, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; H. Freeman Matthews, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Paul Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff; Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

53. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 459.

54. (U) Msg, CSUSA, DA 97099 to CINCUNC (ADV), 24 Jul 51. (U) Msg, JCS 98713 to CINCFE, 11 Aug 51.

55. For examples see (U) Msg, CINCFE, CX 67904 to DA for JCS, 29 Jul 51, DA IN 19954; (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 462 to CINCUNC (info DA), 18 Nov 51, DA IN 581.

56. (TS) Ltr, AsstSecDef to SecState, 6 Aug 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 56; (TS) Ltr, DepUSecState to SecDef, 17 Aug 51, same file, sec 59.

57. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 67826 to DA for JCS, 27 Jul 51, DA IN 19359. (U) Map, Encl to Record of Events, 11th Sess, Conference at Kaesong, 27 Jul 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) BP pt 3. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 67877 to DA for JCS, 28 Jul 51, DA IN 19823; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 67939 to DA for JCS, 29 Jul 51, DA IN 27; (U) Msg, CINCFE, C 67997 to JCS, 30 Jul 51, DA IN 371; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68020 to DA for JCS, 31 Jul 51, DA IN 596.

58. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68672 to DA for JCS, 10 Aug 51, DA IN 4466.

59. *Ibid.*

60. (U) Msg, JCS 98637 to CINCFE, 10 Aug 51.

61. (U) Msg, JCS 98713 to CINCFE, 11 Aug 51. Drafts of this message in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 57 attest to discussions with State and approval by the President.

62. (U) Msg, JCS 98713 to CINCFE, 11 Aug 51. Secretary of State Acheson speculated later that because of circumstances at the time of Malik's talks with Kennan, Malik's specific reference to the 38th parallel, and the vagueness of original UNC proposals on the initial agenda, the Communist side was genuinely surprised by UNC refusal to settle for the 38th parallel. As he wrote: "so it seems to me highly probable that the Russians and the Chinese, for whom they were acting, received a considerable shock when at the start of a negotiation to restore, as they thought, the *status quo ante* they found us demanding a new line for our sphere of influence, not only more militarily significant but involving considerable loss of prestige for them. They would never imagine that what appeared to be trickery was wholly inadvertent on our part. It was exactly the sort of maneuver in which they would have delighted." Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 536.

63. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69026 to DA for JCS, 16 Aug 51, DA IN 6269. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 69108 to DA for JCS, 17 Aug 51, DA IN 6700.

64. Details of these and subsequent Communist charges and of the alleged violations of the negotiations may be found in Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 40–51.

65. *Ibid.*

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 40–41. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68310 to DA for JCS, 4 Aug 51, DA IN 2213.

67. (TS) DA TT 5018, 4 Aug 51, CJCS Message book, CINCFE Incoming Jul–Oct 51.

68. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68437 to DA for JCS, 6 Aug 51, DA IN 2821.

69. (U) Msg, JCS 98216 to CINCFE, 6 Aug 51.

70. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 41–42.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43; Schnabel, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (Jul 51–May 52)*, pt. 1, Ch. 4, p. 4; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 69575 to DA, 25 Aug 51, DA IN 9688.

72. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 45. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 50115 to DA for JCS, 2 Sep 51, DA IN 12632; (U) Msg, JCS 80658 to CINCFE, 5 Sep 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 62; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 50633 to DA for JCS, 11 Sep 51, DA IN 15415; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 50634 to DA for JCS, 11 Sep 51, DA IN 15310.

73. (U) Msg, JCS 81246 to CINCFE, 12 Sep 51.

74. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 39138 to DA for JCS, 24 Sep 51, DA IN 51472. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 51493 to DA for JCS, 24 Sep 51, DA IN 19710. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 45.

75. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 105 to DA for JCS, 16 Jul 51, DA IN 15062; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68437 to DA for JCS, 6 Aug 51, DA IN 2821.

76. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 51575 to DA for JCS, 25 Sep 51, DA IN 116. (TS) Telecon, DA TT 5193, 26 Sep 51, CJCS message book, CINCFE Incoming Jul–Oct 51.

77. (TS) Memo, Bohlen to SecState, “Report on Trip to Japan and Korea with General Bradley,” 4 Oct 51, Encl to SM–2564–51 to JCS Members, 24 Oct 51; (TS) Memo, GEN Bradley to JCS, “Trip of General Bradley to Japan and Korea,” 9 Oct 51; CJCS File, 091 Korea (1951).

78. (TS) Memos by Bohlen and Bradley cited in preceding note. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69346 to DA for JCS, 21 Aug 51, DA IN 7897; (U) Msg, JCS 82085 to CINCFE, 21 Sep 51; (TS) Telecon DA TT 5193, 252300Z Sep 51.

79. (U) Msg, TEW–185, CINCFE to ACofS G–2, DA (EYES ONLY for Bradley), 4 Oct 51, and (U) Msg, unnumbered, Bradley to Ridgway, EYES ONLY, 5 Oct 51, both in CINCFE message books in CJCS files.

80. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 340 to CINCUNC, 7 Oct 51, DA IN 4594.

81. (TS) Cmd Rpt, FECOM/UNC, Oct 51, pp. 6–9. GEN Bradley later expressed the view that the long argument over the Kaesong site had been a mistake and that the issue was not important enough to justify risking a rupture of the talks. “Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting,” unsigned, 12 Nov 51, (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 1122–1124.

82. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 66323 to DA for JCS, 4 Jul 51, DA IN 10908.

83. (U) Msg, JCS 96032 to CINCFE, 11 Jul 51.

84. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67474 to JCS, 21 Jul 51, DA IN 17293. (U) Memo for Record, E.H.J. Carnes, DepSecy, JCS, 21 Jul 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 54. (U) Msg, JCS 96938 to CINCFE, 21 Jul 51.

85. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67520 to DA for JCS, 23 Jul 51, DA IN 17620; (U) CINCFE CX 67652 to DA for JCS, DA IN 18440; (U) Msg, JCS 97223 to CINCFE, 25 Jul 51.

86. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68064 to DA for JCS, 30 Jul 51, DA IN 531.

87. For a detailed treatment of these operations during the summer and autumn of 1951 in Korea, including such spectacularly fierce battles as Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge, see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 80–103.

88. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68437 to DA for JCS, 6 Aug 51, DA IN 2821; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68428 to DA for JCS, 6 Aug 51, DA IN 2699.

89. (U) Msg, G–3 DA 98288 to CINCFE, 7 Aug 51.

90. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 68567 to DA for G–3, 8 Aug 51, DA IN 3534.

91. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68131 to DA for JCS, 1 Aug 51, DA IN 994. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Removal of Restriction Against Attacks on Najin (Rashin),” 3 Aug 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 56. (U) Msgs, JCS 97989 to CINCFE, 3 Aug 51, and 98632, 10 Aug 51.

92. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 108. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69638 to DA for JCS, 26 Aug 51, DA IN 9923.

93. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69168 to DA for JCS, 18 Aug 51, DA IN 7143; (U) Msg, JCS 99522 to CINCFE, 22 Aug 51; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 86–87; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 50391 to DA for JCS, 8 Sep 51, DA IN 14313.

94. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 69830 to DA for JCS, 29 Aug 51, DA IN 10923.

95. (U) Msg, JCS 81533 to CINCFE, 14 Sep 51.

96. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 51095 to DA for JCS, 19 Sep 51, DA IN 17897.

97. *Ibid.*

98. (U) Msg, JCS 82084 to CINCFE, 21 Sep 51.

99. (TS-RD) JCS 2173/4, 30 Jun 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 50.

100. (TS-RD) JCS 2173/6, 11 Aug 51, same file, sec 57.

101. (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Military Effectiveness and Desirability of Employing Atomic Weapons Tactically in Korea,” 14 Aug 51 (der from JCS 2173/6), same file, sec 58. (TS-RD) Memo, Actg SecDef to JCS, same subj, 23 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 2173/7, 24 Aug 51, same file, sec 60. The President’s approval is not documented in available sources but is inferred from the fact that the strikes took place. Messages authorizing the strikes and reporting the results, exchanged among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCFE, and CINCSAC, are in CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 9. In February 1953 General Bradley told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff “have discussed many times the use of the atomic bomb, tactically,” but that it was “rather hard” to find a target that was “sufficiently remunerative” to justify depletion of the stockpile of atomic weapons. *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Historical Series), vol. V, 83d Cong, 1st Sess, 1953 (made public Feb 1977), p. 114. Most of these discussions must have taken place orally; JCS documents reflect only the discussion summarized above and the earlier instance inspired by the Chinese intervention (pt. 1 Ch. 8).

102. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 55841 to DA for JCS, 25 Oct 51, DA IN 11412, and (U) C 55852, DA IN 11488. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 113–114.

103. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 55922 to DA for JCS, 26 Oct 51, DA IN 11881.
104. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 430 to DA for JCS, 8 Nov 51, DA IN 17036.
105. (U) Msg, JCS 85254 to CINCFE, 26 Oct 51; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 56073 to DA for JCS, 28 Oct 51, DA IN 12729.
106. (U) Msg, JCS 85537 to CINCFE, 30 Oct 51. Draft in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 68 bears approval of President.
107. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 56380 to DA for JCS, 1 Nov 51, DA IN 14156.
108. *NY Times*, 11 Nov 51, IV, 3:3.
109. (U) Msg, JCS 86291 to CINCFE, 6 Nov 51.
110. *Ibid.*
111. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 56810 to DA for JCS, 7 Nov 51, DA IN 16588; (U) Msg, CINCFE HNC 430 to DA for JCS, 8 Nov 51, DA IN 17036.
112. (U) Msg, JCS 86654 to CINCFE, 9 Nov 51.
113. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 56058 to DA for JCS, 10 Nov 51, DA IN 17876; (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 437 to CINCFE Tokyo, 10 Nov 51, DA IN 17961; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57142 to DA for JCS, 12 Nov 51, DA IN 18255.
114. “Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting,” unsigned, 12 Nov 51, (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 1122–1124. (U) Msg, JCS 86804 to CINCFE, 13 Nov 51.
115. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57216 to DA for JCS, 13 Nov 51, DA IN 18543. (Words abbreviated for message transmission have been spelled out.)
116. (U) Msg, JCS 86797 to NAV AIDE to President, 12 Nov 51; (U) Msg, NAV AIDE to President to JCS, 130254 Nov 51, DA IN 18398; (U) Msg, JCS 86804 to CINCFE, 14 Nov 51.
117. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 57332 to CINCUNC (ADV) 15 Nov 51, DA IN 19257; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57466 to DA for JCS, 17 Nov 51, DA IN 190. The members of the UNC delegation felt very strongly about being forced to yield. Partly this was because of the abuse heaped on them by Communist negotiators during meetings on the item, and partly because they had believed that the UNC position was firm to the end. Admiral Burke apparently felt, along with General Hodes, that his usefulness to the delegation had ended with this action. He wrote that the order to concede after having taken such positive positions to the contrary would mark them as “push-overs” in the eyes of the Communists. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, fn 23, p. 119, quoting letter from Admiral Burke to Mrs. Burke, 16 Nov 51.
118. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 57466 to DA for JCS, 17 Nov 51, DA IN 190; (U) CX 57724, 21 Nov 51, DA IN 1498; (U) C 57723, 21 Nov 51, DA IN 1502; (U) C 57837, 23 Nov 51, DA IN 2023; (U) C 58114, 27 Nov 51, DA IN 3401. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 119.
119. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57837 to DA for JCS, 23 Nov 51, DA IN 2023; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58114 to DA for JCS, 27 Nov 51, DA IN 3401.
120. (U) Msg, JCS 88266 to USARMA, Rome, 28 Nov 51; (U) Msg, DA 88198 to CINCFE 28 Nov 51. *Public Papers, Truman, 1951*, p. 637.
121. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58327 to DA for JCS, 30 Nov 51, DA IN 4515; (U) Msg, DA (JCS) 88293 to President aboard *Williamsburg*, 29 Nov 51.
122. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 178–182. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 57143 to CG ARMYEIGHT (ADV), 12 Nov 51, DA IN 18285.
123. Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, pp. 173–174.
124. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 331.
125. *NY Times*, 11 Nov 51, IV, p. 1.
126. (TS) Cmd Rpt, FECOM/UNC, Nov 51, pp. 24–26, CCS 319.1 (10–6–50) BP pt. 6.

Chapter 2. The Developing Diplomatic Deadlock

1. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “United States Courses of Action in Korea,” 13 Jul 51, (der from JCS 1776/240), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 53.
2. (TS) Memo, SecDef to Pres, 18 Jul 51, same file, sec 54.
3. (TS) Dept of State, WFM T–10, “Washington Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Tripartite and British Talks, UN Action in Korea in Case of an Armistice,” 18 Aug 51, Encl B to JCS 1776/247, 29 Aug 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 61. (TS) Dept of State, WFM T–10–1, “Washington Foreign Ministers’ Meeting . . . , UN Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice,” 18 Aug 51, Encl B to JCS 1776/246, 27 Aug 51, same file, sec 60.

4. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings (Tripartite Talks) Draft Position Paper . . . 'United Nations Action in Korea in Case of an Armistice,'" 31 Aug 51 (der from JCS 1776/247), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 61. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 4 Sep 51, Encl A to JCS 1776/249, same file, sec 63.

5. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings . . . Draft Position Paper . . . 'UN Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice,'" 29 Aug 51 (der from JCS 1776/246, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 61. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted, however, that since Rashin had already been bombed, it was no longer an issue and hence reference thereto should be removed from their 13 July list of actions. (Rashin had been bombed on 25 August 1951; see Ch. 1.)

6. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 4 Sep 51, Encl A to JCS 1776/249, 7 Sep 51, same file, sec 63.

7. (TS) Dept of State, WFM T-10/1a, "Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings . . . UN Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice," 8 Sep 51, Encl to JCS 1776/250, 12 Sep 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 63. The fact that the revised paper was used in the tripartite talks was stated in the JCS comments, cited in footnote 8.

8. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings . . . Draft Position Paper (WFM T-10/1a) . . .," 12 Sep 51 (der from JCS 1776/251); (TS) Ltr, ActgSecDef (Lovett) to SecState, 13 Sep 51; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 63.

9. (TS) Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Major General Elmer J. Rogers, Jr., USAF, Department of Defense Representative to the Secretary of State for the September 1951 Washington Foreign Ministers' Meetings, n.d., Encl to JCS 2116/67, 24 Sep 51, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 7. For a fuller account of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting, see vol. IV, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*, Ch. 9. In the communique issued after the meeting, the subject of Korea was mentioned only in passing, as evidence of the seriousness of the world situation (Dept of State *Bulletin*, 24 Sep 51, p. 486).

10. (TS) Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, "United States Courses of Action in Korea," 4 Sep 51, Encl B to JCS 1776/249, 7 Sep 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 63. This was one of General Marshall's last actions as Secretary of Defense. He retired on 12 September and was succeeded by Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett.

11. (U) NSC Action No. 562, 26 Sep 51.

12. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 51897 to JCS, 30 Sep 51, DA IN 2011. On the Communist air buildup during September and October 1951, see Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953* (1961), pp. 370–380. He credits the Communists with 525 Mig-15s as of 1 September and claims some of them were flown by Soviet or Soviet-satellite pilots.

13. See pp. 39–40 and note 16.

14. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, "United States Courses of Action in Korea," 2 Oct 51, Encl to JCS 1776/255, 3 Oct 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 65.

15. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 51424 to DA for JCS, 23 Sep 51, DA IN 19478. (U) JCS 1776/260, 26 Oct 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 67.

16. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Courses of Action in Korea," 3 Nov 51, (der from JCS 1776/260), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 68.

17. *Ibid.*

18. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Courses of Action in Korea," 3 Nov 51, (der from JCS 1776/260), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 68.

19. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, "United States Courses of Action in Korea," 9 Nov 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 69. (U) N/H of JCS 1776/260, 14 Nov 51, same file, sec 67.

20. (U) NSC Senior Staff study on "United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," 5 Dec 51, Annex to NSC 118/2, 20 Dec 51, same file, sec 73.

21. For details of the state of US rearmament efforts and of the attempt to strengthen the North Atlantic alliance, see selected chapters of *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. IV, 1950–1952.

22. (U) NSC Senior Staff study cited in note 20. The possibility of such a joint statement had in fact already been discussed with the British, during the negotiations described in the next section.

23. (U) Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (1960), pp. 17–20.

24. Secretary Acheson's explanation to Mr. Eden has been found in a draft copy of a message prepared by U. Alexis Johnson, dated 4 Dec 51, in CJCS 091 Korea, 1952. Buck slips attached and signed by BG Throckmorton, Secretary of The General Staff, DA, inform General Collins that these are "copies of communications with the British . . . introduced by General Bradley at State/JCS meeting on Wed 5 Dec." Whether Secretary Acheson's message was actually sent is not indicated in available records, but it illustrates his views. Although the State Department advocated a naval blockade if an armistice were reached and subsequently violated, it did not favor a blockade in the event that negotiations failed to produce an armistice, as was shown later in connection with NSC 118/2.

25. (U) JCS 1776/268, 18 Dec 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 74. The earlier staff study did not accompany the NSC draft but was distributed later, somewhat revised, as an annex dated 14 Dec 51. In this version, the arguments developed by the Senior Staff in support of their conclusions had been considerably elaborated, and two intelligence studies were cited in support of the conclusions. These two studies were NIE 55, “Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea through Mid-1952,” and SE-20, “The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and Korea,” both circulated separately by CIA on 7 Dec and 17 Dec respectively. In forwarding to SecDef their comments on the NSC draft, dated 18 Dec 51 (see below), the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that they had not seen the annex and requested that it be altered as necessary to reflect their comments and recommendations.

26. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea,” 18 Dec 51, (der from JCS 1776/268), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 74.

27. (U) NSC 118/2, 20 Dec 51.

28. For the corresponding passage in NSC 48/5, see pt. 1 Ch. 9, pp. 216–218. The principal difference in NSC 118/2 was the stipulation that a settlement in Korea must not jeopardize the US position on other issues. The reference to a boundary for the ROK that would be “in general, not south of the 38th parallel” reflected the need for flexibility in negotiations; NSC 48/5 had said that the boundary must be “in no case” south of the parallel.

29. (U) Msg, JCS 95354 to CINCLUNC, 30 Jun 51. See Ch. 9 for extensive quotations from this message.

30. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52227 to JCS, 4 Oct 51, DA IN 3575; (U) Msg, JCS 84817 to CINCFE, 23 Oct 51.

31. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57217 to JCS, 13 Nov 51, DA IN 18565.

32. (U) Msg, JCS 87239 to CINCFE, 16 Nov 51.

33. (U) Msg, G3, DA (Bolte) 87452 to CINCFE, 19 Nov 51.

34. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 57838 to DA for JCS, 23 Nov 51, DA IN 2085.

35. (U) Msg, JCS 88226 to CINCFE, 28 Nov 51.

36. At this session MG Howard M. Turner, USAF, replaced MG Craigie as a member of the UN delegation. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 123.

37. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58115 to DA for JCS, 27 Nov 51, DA IN 3407.

38. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58115 to DA for JCS, 27 Nov 51 DA IN 3407.

39. See the following (U) Msgs from CINCFE to DA for JCS: C 58194, 28 Nov 51, DA IN 3779; C 58288, 29 Nov 51, DA IN 4424; C 58370, 30 Nov 51, DA IN 4608; C 58449, 1 Dec 51, DA IN 5225; C 58512, 2 Dec 51, DA IN 5358; C 58513, 2 Dec 51, DA IN 5380.

40. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58579 to DA for JCS, 3 Dec 51, DA IN 5653; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58639 to DA for JCS, 4 Dec 51, DA IN 5898; (U) Msg, CINCFE 58635 to DA for JCS, 4 Dec 51 DA IN 5880; (U) Msg, CINCLUNC C 58665 to DA for JCS, 4 Dec 51, DA IN 6078; (U) Msg, CINCLUNC CX 58666 to CINCLUNC (ADV), 4 Dec 51, DA IN 6079.

41. (U) Msg, JCS 88877 to CINCFE, 5 Dec 51. This message had been extensively discussed with State Department representatives and was in fact drafted by a State-Defense working group. Memo of Conversation by DepAsstSecState for FE Affairs (Johnson), 5 Dec 51, (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 1243–1244.

42. (U) Msg, JCS 89114 to NAV AIDE *Williamsburg*, 7 Dec 51.

43. (U) Msg, JCS 89114 to NAV AIDE *Williamsburg*, 7 Dec 51. (TS) Msg, NAV AIDE *Williamsburg* to JCS, 080555Z Dec 51, DA IN 7586.

44. (U) Msg, JCS 89118 to NAV AIDE *Williamsburg*, 8 Dec 51.

45. (U) Msg, JCS 89173 to CINCFE, 10 Dec 51.

46. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59220 to DA for JCS, 12 Dec 51, DA IN 9115; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59378 to DA for JCS, 14 Dec 51, DA IN 9888; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59464 to DA for JCS, 15 Dec 51, DA IN 10370; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59530 to DA for JCS, 16 Dec 51, DA IN 10585.

47. (U) Msg, CINCLUNC (ADV) Korea HNC 588 to DA for JCS, 18 Dec 51, DA IN 11132.

48. (U) Msg, CINCLUNC (ADV) Korea HNC 588 to DA for JCS, 18 Dec 51, DA IN 11132.

49. (U) Msg, JCS 90083 to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51.

50. (U) Msg, JCS 90083 to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51.

51. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59840 to DA for JCS, 21 Dec 51, DA IN 12666; (U) Msg, CINCLUNC 59942 to DA for JCS, 22 Dec 51, DA IN 13009; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59976 to DA for JCS, 23 Dec 51, DA IN 13149; (U) Msg, CINCLUNC (ADV) Korea HNC 11–67 to CINCLUNC Tokyo, 29 Dec 51, DA IN 58355; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60584 to DA for JCS, 1 Jan 52, DA IN 15471; (U) CINCFE C 60633 to DA for JCS, 2 Jan 52, DA IN 15559.

52. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60584 to DA for JCS, 1 Jan 52, DA IN 15471.

53. (TS) Memos of Conversation, Rome, 28 and 29 Nov 51, Apps A and B to Memo, Frank C. Nash to GEN Bradley, 19 Dec 51 (Encl to (TS) SM–3044–51 to JCS Members, 20 Dec 51), CCS 383.21 Korea

(3–19–45) sec 75. Memo of Conversation by DepDir, Executive Secretariat, DepState (Barnes), 28 Nov 51, (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 1189–1193. Eden, *Full Circle*, pp. 19–20.

54. Eden, *Full Circle*, pp. 19–20. (U) Msg, JCS 90083 to CINCFE 19 Dec 51. (Words abbreviated for message transmission have been spelled out.)

55. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 60961 to DA, 7 Jan 52, DA IN 17600.

56. (U) Msg, JCS 91600 to CINCFE, 10 Jan 52. (Draft in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 78 indicates approval of President.)

57. (U) Msg, JCS 91602 to CINCFE, 10 Jan 52. A “flimsy” draft of this message, in same file as item cited in preceding note, indicates that JCS approved State’s draft on 5 Jan 52 and SecDef and the President approved it the following day. An earlier version had been sent to the JCS for discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff: (TS) SM–3043–51 to JCS members, 19 Dec 51, same file, sec 75.

58. (U) Msg, JCS 91606 to CINCFE, 10 Jan 52.

59. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61348 to DA for JCS, 12 Jan 52, DA IN 19740.

60. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61348 to DA for JCS, 12 Jan 52, DA IN 19740.

61. (U) Msg, JCS 92059 to CINCFE, 15 Jan 52.

62. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 61088 to DA for JCS, 9 Jan 52, DA IN 18248.

63. Msgs, CINCFE to DA for JCS, (U) CINCFE C 61167, 10 Jan 52, DA IN 18676; (U) C 62046, 23 Jan 52, DA IN 3621; (U) C 62112, 24 Jan 52, DA IN 4040.

64. Msgs, CINCFE to DA for JCS, (U) C 62195, 25 Jan 52, DA IN 4524; (U) C 62314, 27 Jan 52, DA IN 5276; (U) CX 62312, 27 Jan 52, DA IN 5280.

65. (U) Msg, JCS 84883 to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50; (U) Msg CINCFE Z 49953 to JCS, 4 Jul 50, MC IN 51469.

66. William L. White, *The Captives of Korea* (1957), pp. 6–7, 26–27.

67. (U) Msg, JCS 95354 to CINCUNC, 30 Jun 51.

At the outbreak of the Korean War the International Red Cross in Geneva had sent messages to the belligerents offering its services in Korea. The United States had assured the IRC that “without regard to legal applicability to conflict of Geneva Wounded and Sick and Prisoners of War Conventions of 1969 and Geneva Conventions of 1949, US Government will of course be guided by humanitarian principles of Conventions, particularly Article 3 of Geneva Conventions of 1949.” (U) Msg, State 16 to SCAP, Tokyo, 4 Jul 50, CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 1.

68. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 067 to DA for JCS, 12 Jul 51, DA IN 13778.

69. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 135–136.

70. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 136–137. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners,” 6 Jul 51, Encl to JCS 2095/2, 9 Jul 51, CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 1. (TS) Msg, DA (McClure) WET–6 to CINCFE, 6 Jul 51, CJCS Message Book, CINCFE Outgoing Jul–Nov 51.

71. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 66603 to DA, 8 Jul 51, DA IN 12372.

72. (U) Memo, Secy JSSC to Secy, JCS, “Draft Message to CINCFE,” 18 Jul 51, CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 1. (U) Msg, JCS 96615 to CINCFE, 18 Jul 51.

73. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67459 to DA for JCS, 21 Jul 51, DA IN 17240.

74. (U) JCS 2095/3, 31 Jul 51; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners,” 8 Aug 51 (der from Encl A to JCS 2095/3); CCS 000.5 (5–12–59) sec 1. General Ridgway was informed on 15 August that the policy was under consideration. (U) Msg, G–3 DA 99024 to CINCFE, 15 Aug 51. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were wrong in assuming that the UNC had promised safety and asylum to Chinese and NK military personnel. General Ridgway corrected this misapprehension when he pointed out that the UNC had not promised asylum to enemy soldiers who surrendered voluntarily. This had been deliberately avoided because to do so would involve a “radical departure” from the provisions of the Geneva Convention. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 56642 to DA for JCS, 5 Nov 51, DA IN 15530.

75. (U) Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 14 Aug 51; (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 27 Aug 51, App to JCS 2095/4, 5 Sep 51; CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 1. In his memoirs, Secretary Acheson states that the question of voluntary repatriation precipitated a “deep issue” between the State and Defense Departments. “The military were, understandably enough, primarily concerned with getting back their own men (a much smaller number) at the end of the fighting . . . But to insure the return of our enemy-held prisoners, the Pentagon favored the return of North Korean and Chinese prisoners and civilian internees regardless of their wishes.” It is true that in his book on the negotiations Admiral Joy, Chief UNC delegate, speaks disparagingly of “voluntary repatriation,” claiming that it “cost us over a year of war” and that the UN Command suffered 50,000 casualties in the war while the UN delegation was forced to argue to protect a lesser number of ex-Communists who did not wish to return to Communism. However, Mr. Acheson’s charge is hardly justified by the facts. As already noted, the idea of “voluntary repatriation” was developed in the Pentagon by General McClure, while Mr. Acheson in

his memorandum of 27 Aug 51 argued against it. Acheson, *Present At The Creation*, p. 653; Joy, *How Communist Negotiate*, p. 152.

76. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 25 Sep 51, Encl to JCS 2095/5, 26 Sep 51, CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 1.

77. (U) JCS 2095/6, 29 Sep 51; (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners,” n.d. (JCS 2095/7, 15 Oct 51); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same sub, 15 Oct 51 (der from Encl A to JCS 2095/7); same file.

78. (U) Msg, JCS 84081 to CINCFE, 13 Oct 51; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 55993 to DA for JCS, 28 Oct 51, DA IN 12414.

79. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 140–141. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 55993 to DA for JCS, 27 Oct 51, DA IN 12414.

80. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 27 Aug 51, App to JCS 2095/4, 5 Sep 51, CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 1. (U) Msg, JCS 84081 to CINCFE, 13 Oct 51.

81. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 55993 to DA for JCS, 27 Oct 51, DA IN 12414.

82. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 53095 to DA for JCS, 16 Oct 51, DA IN 7796.

83. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 55993 to DA for JCS, 27 Oct 51, DA IN 12414.

84. Memo by Actg SecState, 29 Oct 51, recording meeting with Pres, same date, (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 1073–1074. Documents examined for this study do not record any earlier pronouncements by the President on the POW issue. It is to be presumed that knowledge of the President’s views, as expressed at this meeting, reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since they were in close touch with the Department of State.

85. (U) JCS 2095/8, 9 Nov 51, and Dec On, 15 Nov 51; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners,” 15 Nov 51 (der from JCS 2095/8); CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 2.

86. (TS) Memo, Actg SecDef to JCS and Jt Secs, 23 Nov 51, w/encl, (TS) Ltr, Actg SecDef to SecState, 23 Nov 51 (Encl and App to JCS 2095/9, 27 Nov 51), same file.

87. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners,” 3 Dec 51 (der from JCS 2095/10), CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 3.

88. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58115 to DA for JCS, 27 Nov 51, DA IN 3407.

89. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 58195 to DA for JCS, 28 Nov 51, DA IN 3785.

90. *Ibid.*

91. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58702 to DA, 5 Dec 51, DA IN 6285.

92. At a JCS-State meeting of 5 Dec 51, already referred to (above, note 41), at which the JCS draft was discussed, Mr. Matthews, of the State Department, reminded the others of the President’s views. General Bradley added (evidently on the basis of his own conversation with Mr. Truman) that the President felt there had been some “fuzzy thinking on this problem” and wanted any directive to be cleared with him in advance.

93. (TS) Memo, MAJ J. D. Mitchell, USA (OFMA, OSD) to COL T. W. Dunn, USA (Staff Asst to DJS), 4 Dec 51; (U) DM-197–51 to SecDef, 7 Dec 51, w/encl (draft of revised directive for CINCFE); CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 3.

94. (U) Msg, JCS 8909 to NAV AIDE *Williamsburg*, 7 Dec 51; (U) Msg, NAV AIDE to DA for JCS, 081731Z Dec 51, DA IN 7807. The instruction to uphold the one-for-one principle “vigorously” was not in the draft that was submitted to the President. The draft had to be transmitted electrically because the President was in Key West, Florida, at the time (*NY Times*, 9 Dec 51, p. 1).

95. (U) Msg, JCS 89172 to CINCFE, 10 Dec 51.

96. (U) Msg, JCS 89172 to CINCFE, 10 Dec 51.

97. *Ibid.* During State-Defense discussions of the directive in draft form, the Department of State had been unable to furnish guidance on the disposition of accused criminals because of unresolved differences within the Department. (TS) Memo, MAJ Mitchell to COL Dunn, 4 Dec 51, cited Footnote 93.

98. (U) Msg, JCS 89189 to CINCFE, 10 Dec 51.

99. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 59188 to DA for JCS, 12 Dec 51, DA IN 8885.

100. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 59188 to DA for JCS, 12 Dec 51, DA IN 8885.

101. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58985 to CINCUNC (ADV), 9 Dec 51, DA IN 8055; (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 530 to CINCUNC, 9 Dec 51, DA IN 8060; (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 534 to CINCUNC, 11 Dec 51, DA IN 8513.

102. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59156 to DA for JCS, 11 Dec 51, DA IN 8632; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 59154 to CINCUNC (ADV), 11 Dec 51, DA IN 8647.

103. (U) Msg, JCS 89746 to CINCFE, 15 Dec 51. Ambassador Muccio had reported on 5 December that he had two incomplete and overlapping lists of ROK civilian prisoners, with a total of 7,143 names, but that ROK officials spoke of 20,000 citizens who had been taken north. He thought that it was important to broach the subject of ROK civilians along with those of non-ROK origin; failure to

do so would give the ROK public cause to “jeer” at the armistice, which was already unpopular. (TS) Msg, Pusan 532 to State, 5 Dec 51, DA IN 6973.

104. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 588 to DA for JCS, 18 Dec 51, DA IN 11132.

105. *Ibid.*

106. (U) Msg, JCS 90083 to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51.

107. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59648 to DA for JCS, 18 Dec 51, DA IN 11110. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 141.

108. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 587 to CINCUNC Tokyo, 18 Dec 51, DA IN 11364; (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 593 to CINCUNC Tokyo, 19 Dec 51, DA IN 11365; (U) Msg, CINCUNC Tokyo C 59779 to CINCUNC (ADV), 21 Dec 51, DA IN 12216. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 141.

109. (U) Msg, JCS 90157 to CINCFE, 20 Dec 51.

110. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 59943 to DA for JCS, 22 Dec 51, DA IN 13080. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 143.

111. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 60059 to DA for JCS, 24 Dec 51, DA IN 13352; C 60060, 24 Dec 51, DA IN 13361; C 60182, 26 Dec 51, DA IN 13533; C 60193, 26 Dec 51, DA IN 13897. The UN position on the reclassified ex-ROKs was weakened to a degree owing to the fact that although CINCUNC had forwarded a complete list of those reclassified to Washington, asking that it be forwarded to the ICRC in Geneva in order that the enemy could be notified, the list was actually not forwarded to Geneva by the Department of State until 26 December 1951. Thus the enemy had not been officially notified of the deletion of these men from the POW lists when these discussions were taking place. (U) Msg, DA 90533 to CINCFE, 27 Dec 51.

112. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 60734 to DA for JCS, 29 Dec 51, DA IN 14662.

113. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60472 to DA for JCS, 30 Dec 51, DA IN 15074.

114. (U) CINCFE C 60583 to DA for JCS, DA IN 15455. (TS) Schnabel, *Korean Armistice Negotiations* (Jul 51–May 52), pt. 2, Ch. 2, pp. 29–30.

115. The complete text of ADM Libby’s statement, including the specific proposals derived from General Ridgway’s 29 December message, is contained in (U) Msg, CINCFE Z 18450 to DA for JCS, 2 Jan 52, DA IN 59109.

116. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60704 to DA for JCS, 3 Jan 52, DA IN 16102.

117. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60763 to DA for JCS, 4 Jan 52, DA IN 16406.

118. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60824 to DA for JCS, 5 Jan 52, DA IN 16736.

119. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 60827 to DA for JCS, 5 Jan 52, DA IN 16737.

120. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 60827 to DA for JCS, 5 Jan 52, DA IN 16737.

121. (U) Msg, JCS 91607 to CINCFE, 10 Jan 52.

122. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61421 to DA for JCS, 14 Jan 52, DA IN 19927.

123. (U) Msg, JCS 91964 to CINCFE, 15 Jan 52.

124. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 61505 to DA for JCS, 15 Jan 52, DA IN 440; (C) Msg, Taiwan 867 to State, 13 Jan 52, DA IN 223.

125. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61348 to DA for JCS, 12 Jan 52, DA IN 19740. This request was in connection with the proposal to defer discussion of the airfield issue (Item 3) and proceed with other items on the agenda, as described earlier in the chapter. General Ridgway doubted that the Communists would agree, but on the chance that they might, he felt it important for the UNC to be in position to move at once toward agreement on other items.

126. (U) Msg, JCS 92059 to CINCFE, 15 Jan 52.

127. (U) Msg, JCS 92059 to CINCFE, 15 Jan 52.

128. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61829 to DA for JCS, 19 Jan 52, DA IN 2276; (U) Msg, JCS 92484 to CINCFE, 21 Jan 52.

129. Msgs, CINCFE to DA for JCS, (U) C 61049, 8 Jan 52, DA IN 18045; (U) C 61253, 11 Jan 52, DA IN 19364; (U) CX 61421, 14 Jan 52, DA IN 19927; (U) C 61534, 15 Jan 52, DA IN 637; (U) C 61625, 16 Jan 52, DA IN 1155.

Chapter 3. Narrowing the Issues

1. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62009 to DA for JCS, 22 Jan 52, DA IN 3263; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62064 to DA (Personal for GEN Collins), 23 Jan 52, DA IN 3851.

2. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62217 to DA for JCS, 25 Jan 52, DA IN 4540; (U) Msg, JCS 93043 to CINCFE (Personal for GEN Ridgway), 26 Jan 52. GEN Ridgway in this message was protesting a request that he send a representative to Washington for a proposed high-level State-Defense conference to explore possible new actions that might lead to an armistice; (U) Msg, DA 92631 to CINCFE (Personal for

Ridgway from Collins), 22 Jan 52. In his message of 23 January (C 62064), cited in the preceding note, GEN Ridgway had expressed doubt that any representative from CINCFE could usefully contribute to such a conference but added that he was prepared to send the head of JSPOG, BG E. K. Wright, USA, if desired. The JCS reply of 26 January told GEN Ridgway that the proposed meeting would be held the following week but that he need not send a representative. Available sources do not indicate whether the meeting took place; in any case, it did not result in any new initiatives from Washington.

3. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 58695 to CINCUNC (ADV), 5 Dec 51, DA IN 7008.
4. (U) Msg, JCS 90083 to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51. (Words abbreviated for message transmission have been spelled out.)
5. (U) Msg, JCS 90388 to CINCFE, 24 Dec 51.
6. (U) Msgs, CINCFE to DA for JCS, C 59942, 22 Dec 51, DA IN 13009, C 59976, 23 Dec 51, DA IN 13149.
7. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 60640 to DA for JCS, 2 Jan 52, DA IN 15576.
8. (U) Msg, JCS 91122 to CINCFE, 4 Jan 52.
9. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 62465 to DA for JCS, 3 Feb 52, DA IN 6207; (U) Msg, JCS 900075 to CINCFE, 1 Feb 52. On the day before the plenary sessions on Item 5 got underway, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained to General Ridgway why the UN commission formula would be preferable to a political conference. First, it would avoid the inherent dangers of a conference being broadened to include subjects other than Korea; second, it would give greater flexibility to UN efforts to achieve a settlement, since a commission could continue in existence indefinitely without obvious failure. A one-time conference, on the other hand, might break down early and result in increased worldwide tensions. (U) Msg, JCS 900323 to CINCFE, 5 Feb 52.
10. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 62821 to DA for JCS, 3 Feb 52, DA IN 100962.
11. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62999 to DA for JCS, 6 Feb 52, DA IN 102028.
12. (U) Msg, CINCUNC ADV HNC 875 to DA for JCS, 6 Feb 52, DA IN 102056; (U) JCS 900453 to CINCUNC (ADV), 6 Feb 52.
13. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63307 to DA for JCS, 10 Feb 52, DA IN 103681; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 63309 to DA for JCS, 10 Feb 52, DA IN 103678. On 5 January the General Assembly of the United Nations had voted 51 to 5 to hold a special session to consider the Korean question as soon as an armistice agreement was signed. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 18 Feb 1952, p. 260.
14. (U) Msg, JCS 900783 to CINCFE, 11 Feb 52, with draft in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 84 indicating approval of President.
15. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63731 to DA for JCS, 16 Feb 52, DA IN 106172.
16. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63732 to DA for JCS, 16 Feb 52, DA IN 106162; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63797 to DA for JCS, 17 Feb 52, DA IN 106459.
17. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63907 to DA for JCS, 19 Feb 52, DA IN 107188 (and corrected version, DA IN 107268). For the final version of this paragraph, see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 531. The only changes made in the draft submitted by the Communists were to speak of a political conference “of a higher level” of both sides and to change “negotiations” to “negotiation.” Admiral Joy cites this incident as an example of the hyper-suspicious nature of Communist delegates at Panmunjom. The Communists were so disconcerted at the ease with which the UNC accepted their proposal that General Nam Il asked for several successive recesses while they presumably pondered, trying to see wherein they had blundered. When the delegations met again, “Nam Il delivered a long statement full of escape clauses affecting his own proposal,” Admiral Joy recalls. “At the end of this . . . Nam Il proposed that staff officers be directed to discuss Item 5 further.” Admiral Joy agreed but instructed his staff officer not to agree to any substantive change in the Communist proposal. No further meetings were ever held on Item 5. “The Communists did not actually waltz on their own proposal . . .,” Joy admits, “but I think it is obvious they thought long and hard about doing so.” Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, pp. 135–136.
18. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 62195 to DA for JCS, 25 Jan 52, DA IN 4524, C 62283, 26 Jan 52, DA IN 5118.
19. (U) Msg, CINCFE Z 23608 to DA for JCS, 29 Jan 52, DA IN 69798.
20. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62478 to DA for JCS, 29 Jan 52; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62825 to DA for JCS, 3 Feb 52; DA INs 6034 and 100968 respectively.
21. UNC planners had forecast the actual rotation requirement for UN forces during an armistice to be about 60,000 men per month. Recognizing that a total of 60,000 would be unpalatable to the Communists, General Ridgway on 13 January had suggested to Admiral Joy the possibility of reducing the demand to 35,000 men per month, with the stipulation that personnel departing Korea and returning thereto would not be considered within the rotation limit. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61360 to CINCUNC (ADV), 13 Jan 52, DA IN 19796.

22. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62825 to DA for JCS, 3 Feb 52, DA IN 100968; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62892 to DA for JCS, 4 Feb 52, DA IN 101295; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63197 to DA for JCS, 9 Feb 52, DA IN 103303; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63306 to DA for JCS, 10 Feb 52, DA IN 103683.

23. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63438 to DA for JCS, 12 Feb 52, DA IN 104463.

24. (U) Msg, JCS 901022 to CINCFE, 13 Feb 52.

25. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62825 to DA for JCS, 3 Feb 52, DA IN 100968; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62892 to DA for JCS, 4 Feb 52, DA IN 101295; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 62889 to DA for JCS, 4 Feb 52, DA IN 101084.

26. (U) Msg, JCS 900289 to CINCFE, 5 Feb 52.

27. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59130 to DA for JCS, 11 Dec 51, DA IN 8536. (U) Msgs, JCS 89473 and 90381 to CINCFE, 12 Dec and 24 Dec 51 (with drafts in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) secs 73 and 75, respectively).

28. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62705 to DA for JCS, 1 Feb 52, DA IN 100351; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63571 to DA for JCS, 16 Feb 52, DA IN 106191.

29. *Ibid*; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63796 to DA for JCS, 17 Feb 52, DA IN 106463; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63843 to DA for JCS, 18 Feb 52, DA IN 106627.

30. (U) Msg, DA 901353 to CINCFE, 16 Feb 52. The UNC made only a token effort to fall back on the argument that the USSR was too near Korea, abandoning it after being roundly ridiculed by the enemy delegation. Transcript of Staff Officers Mtg, cited in (TS) Schnabel, *Korean Armistice Negotiations* (Jul 51–May 52), pt. 2, Ch. 2, p. 69.

31. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63843 to DA for JCS, 18 Feb 52, DA IN 106627.

32. (U) Msg, JCS 901451 to CINCFE, 18 Feb 52; (U) Msg, JCS 902160 to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 64458 to DA for JCS, 28 Feb 52, DA IN 110448; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65357 to DA for JCS, 16 Mar 52, DA IN 116739.

33. (U) Msg, JCS 902160 to CINCFE, 27 Feb 51 (and draft in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 86).

34. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 64458 to DA for JCS, 28 Feb 52, DA IN 110448; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65357 to DA for JCS, 16 Mar 52, DA IN 116739.

35. Available sources do not explain the reason for this UNC offer, which would appear to have undercut the position that General Ridgway had earnestly argued to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 February.

36. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63986 to DA for JCS, 20 Feb 52, DA IN 107574; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 64084 to DA for JCS, 22 Feb 52, DA IN 108375; (U) Msg, CINCFE 64178 to DA for JCS, 23 Feb 52, DA IN 108746. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 161. As with the concession on the rotation figure, General Ridgway apparently did not consult Washington before authorizing Admiral Joy to go below a figure that he himself had urged as “final.”

37. (TS) Schnabel, *Korean Armistice Negotiations* (Jul 51–May 52), pt. 2, Ch. 2, pp. 76–77.

38. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 65357 to DA for JCS, 16 Mar 52, DA IN 116739; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65574 to DA for JCS, 20 Mar 52, DA IN 118195; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65913 to DA for JCS, 26 Mar 52, DA IN 120474.

39. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 66034 to DA for JCS, 28 Mar 52, DA IN 121296; (U) Msg, CINCFE HNC 1163 to DA for JCS, 19 Apr 52, DA IN 129588. (TS) Schnabel, *Korean Armistice Negotiations* (Jul 51–May 52), pt. 4, Ch. 2, pp. 82–83.

40. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62047 to DA for JCS, 23 Jan 52, DA IN 3597.

41. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 62125 to DA for JCS, 24 Jan 52, DA IN 4063, C 62216, 25 Jan 52, DA IN 4587.

42. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62416 to DA for JCS, 28 Jan 52, DA IN 5470.

43. See Ch. 2, p. 72.

44. *Ibid*; (U) Msg, CINCFE Z 23608 to DA for JCS, 29 Jan 52, DA IN 69798; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62481 to DA for JCS, 29 Jan 52, DA IN 6213; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62820 to DA for JCS, 3 Feb 52, DA IN 100991; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63002 to DA for JCS, 6 Feb 52, DA IN 102001.

45. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 63013 to DA for JCS, 6 Feb 52, DA IN 102022.

46. (U) Msg, JCS 900383 to CINCUNC (ADV), 6 Feb 52. Draft in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) shows that this message was cleared with State but was not considered to require Presidential approval.

47. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63086 to DA for JCS, 7 Feb 52, DA IN 102709; (U) Msg, CINCFE HNC 915 to DA for JCS, 13 Feb 52, DA IN 104716.

48. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 63597 to DA for JCS, 14 Feb 52, DA IN 105238; (U) C 63669, 15 Feb 52, DA IN 105707; (U) C 64037, 21 Feb 52, DA IN 107867.

49. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 64088 to DA for JCS, 22 Feb 52, DA IN 108361, (U) C 64508, 29 Feb 52, DA IN 110812.

50. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 64373 to DA for JCS, 27 Feb 52, DA IN 109807.

51. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 150.
52. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 64383 to DA for JCS, 27 Feb 52, DA IN 109858.
53. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 460. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 653. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 150.
54. (U) Msg, JCS 902159 to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52. File copy in CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 7 shows that the message was prepared in the State Department and approved by JCS, SecState, and SecDef, and by the President on 27 Feb 52.
55. Unless otherwise noted, this portion of the chapter is based upon appropriate CINCFE radios and upon the following secondary sources: Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (1954), pp. 50–63; William L. White, *The Captives of Korea: An Unofficial White Paper of the Treatment of War Prisoners*, pp. 1–164; Hal Vetter, *Mutiny on Koje Island* (1965), pp. 59–95; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 223–240; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 205–209.
56. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52613 to DA for JCS, 3 Jan 51, DA IN 6350.
57. (U) Msg, JCS 80705 to CINCFE, 10 Jan 51.
58. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 205–206.
59. The control and administration of all prison camps was the responsibility of CG, Eighth Army, who had delegated this responsibility to CG, 2d Logistical Command.
60. (U) Msgs, CINCFE CX 63948, to DA for JCS, 20 Feb 52, DA IN 107479, CX 64055, 21 Feb 52, DA IN 107911.
61. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 64158, to DA for JCS, 23 Feb 52, DA IN 108624; HNC 990, 28 Feb 52, DA IN 110447; C 64508, 29 Feb 52, DA IN 110812; C 64646, 3 Mar 52, DA IN 111738.
62. The UNC had abundant evidence that the riots and other troubles in the prison camps at Koje-do and elsewhere were being directed by the Communist high command. Instructions were sent into the camps by means of highly trained agents who allowed themselves to be captured and who upon entry into the camps, effectively took charge. A sophisticated system of communication and control was found to exist in all the POW camps, with orders emanating from the principal North Korean delegates at Panmunjom, Nam Il and Lee Sang Cho. The disruption and embarrassment caused the UNC by these enemy actions paid dividend to the enemy, and undoubtedly delayed the solution of the POW problem. An intelligence study prepared by the Military Intelligence Section, GHQ UNC/FECOM, in January 1953 reveals the full extent of the enemy apparatus for directing actions of Communist prisoners, actions that included numerous murders of anti-Communists being held in compounds. This study was based on seized enemy documents, prisoner interviews, statements by captured enemy agents, and intelligence reports. It is summarized in Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 50–51.
63. (TS) Schnabel, *Korean Armistice Negotiations* (Jul 51–May 52), pt. 2, Ch. 2, pp. 71–74. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 163–164.
64. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 1033 to DA for JCS, 11 Mar 52, DA IN 114495.
65. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 1033 to DA for JCS, 11 Mar 52, DA IN 114495.
66. (TS) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Courses of Action in the Korean Armistice Negotiations,” n.d. [ca. 11 Mar 52], seen in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 88; cannot now be located.
67. (U) Msg, JCS 903687 to CINCFE, 15 Mar 52, flimsy copy in file showing various approvals, seen in same file, sec 89, not now in file.
68. (U) Msg, JCS 903687 to CINCFE, 15 Mar 52, flimsy copy in file showing various approvals, seen in same file, sec 89, not now in file.
69. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65430 to DA for JCS, 17 Mar 52, DA IN 116955.
70. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65430 to DA for JCS, 17 Mar 52, DA IN 116955.
71. (U) Msg, JCS 904101 to CINCFE, 20 Mar 52.
72. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 65650 to DA for JCS, 20 Mar 52, DA IN 118696.
73. This paragraph and the next two are based on daily reports of negotiations forwarded by CINCFE to the JCS, especially the following (U) Msgs: CINCFE C 64569, 1 Mar 52, DA IN 111238; C 64592, 2 Mar 52, DA IN 111434; C 64593, 2 Mar 52, DA IN 111453; C 64646, 3 Mar 52, DA IN 111738; C 64762, 5 Mar 52, DA IN 112454; C 64944, 8 Mar 52, DA IN 113844; C 64969, 9 Mar 52, DA IN 114048.
74. The UNC statement to the enemy delegation charged that during September and October 1950 the enemy had moved the bulk of the ROK POWs into Manchuria. After a period of political indoctrination these prisoners were assigned to the 6th, 7th and 8th Corps of the North Korean Army. Some enemy divisions contained as high as 30 percent former ROK soldiers who were compelled to fight against the UNC during 1951. From December 1950 to August 1951, ROK POWs were assigned to the 2d, 3d, and 5th Corps of the North Korean Army. In late months the number of former ROK personnel in NKA combat units had declined, most of them being assigned to service units because of political unreliability. (U) Msg, CINCFE 64762 to DA for JCS, 5 Mar 52, DA IN 112454.

75. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 65213 to DA for JCS, 14 Mar 52, DA IN 115842; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65314 to DA for JCS, 15 Mar 52, DA IN 116479; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65356 to DA for JCS, 16 Mar 52, DA IN 116742.
76. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 64969, to DA for JCS, 9 Mar 52, DA IN 114048; C 65037, 10 Mar 52, DA IN 114354; C 65066, 11 Mar 52, DA IN 114572; C 65111, 12 Mar 52, DA IN 115006; C 65174, 13 Mar 52, DA IN 115467.
77. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 65244, to DA for JCS, 14 Mar 52, DA IN 115871; C 65314, 15 Mar 52, DA IN 116479; C 65356, 16 Mar 52, DA IN 116742.
78. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 65424 to DA for JCS, 17 Mar 52, DA IN 116952.
79. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 65424 to DA for JCS, 17 Mar 52, DA IN 116952.
80. (U) Msg, JCS 904095 to NAVAIDE *Williamsburg*, 20 Mar 52; (U) Msg, NAVAIDE 192355Z Mar 52 to JCS, DA IN 118130; (U) Msg, JCS 904101 to CINCFE, 20 Mar 51.
81. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 65650 to DA for JCS, 20 Mar 52, DA IN 118696.
82. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 65650 to DA for JCS, 20 Mar 52, DA IN 118696.
83. (U) Msg, NAVAIDE to Pres to JCS, 222155Z Mar 52, DA IN 118977.
84. (U) Msg, JCS 904385 to CINCFE, 22 Mar 52. Annotated copy showing approval procedure in CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 7.
85. (U) Msg, JCS 904334 to NAVAIDE, *Williamsburg*, 21 Mar 52; (U) Msg, NAVAIDE, *Williamsburg* 220337Z Mar 52 to JCS, DA IN 119063; (U) Msg, JCS 904385 to CINCFE, 22 Mar 52.
86. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65725 to DA for JCS, 22 Mar 52, DA IN 119237.
87. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65878 to DA for JCS, 25 Mar 52, DA IN 120163.
88. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 66006 to DA for JCS, 27 Mar 52, DA IN 120910.
89. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 66197 to DA for JCS, 31 Mar 52, DA IN 122309.
90. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 66228 to DA for JCS, 1 Apr 52, DA IN 122697. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 169.
91. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 66285 to DA for JCS, 2 Apr 52, DA IN 123129; C 66397, 4 Apr 52, DA IN 124075. William H. Vatcher, Jr., *Panmunjom* (1958), p. 142. *NY Times*, 5 Apr 52, p. 1 (reporting “some indications” that a break in the deadlock at Panmunjom “might be forthcoming shortly”).
92. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 1118 to DA for JCS, 3 Apr 52, DA IN 123736.
93. (U) Msgs, JCS 905426 to CINCUNC (ADV), 3 Apr 52; CINCUNC CX 66469 to DA for JCS, 5 Apr 52, DA IN 124553; CINCFE C 66649 to DA for JCS, 10 Apr 52, DA IN 126222.
94. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 66832 to G–3 DA, 12 Apr 52, DA IN 127291; CINCUNC C 66838 to DA for G–3, 12 Apr 52, DA IN 127294; CINCUNC C 66864 to DA, 13 Apr 52, DA IN 127515. The screening process is described in Vatcher, *Panmunjom*, pp. 142–144.
95. (U) Msg, JCS 906314 to CINCFE, 15 Apr 52.
96. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 66953 to DA for JCS, 15 Apr 52, DA IN 128107; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 67005 to DA, 16 Apr 52, DA IN 128352; (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 1118 to DA for JCS, 3 Apr 52, DA IN 123736.
97. (U) Msg, JCS 906539 to CINCFE, 16 Apr 52.
98. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 67067 to DA for JCS, 17 Apr 52, DA IN 128861; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 67190 to DA for JCS, 19 Apr 52, DA IN 129609; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67242 to DA for JCS, 20 Apr 52, DA IN 129939; (U) Msg, CINCUNC HNC 1182 to DA for JCS, 24 Apr 52, DA IN 131315; (U) CINCUNC CX 67500 to DA for JCS, 25 Apr 52, DA IN 131695. CINCUNC’s concern over the 70,000 figure was manifested when he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 April that “every conceivable effort is being made to return the maximum number of North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war to the Communists without resort to forced repatriation.”
99. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 67235 to DA for JCS, 20 Apr 52, DA IN 129944; (U) Msg, JCS 906923 to CINCFE, 22 Apr 52.
100. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 67500 to DA for JCS, 25 Apr 52, DA IN 131695; CINCUNC Z 38735 to DA for JCS, 25 Apr 52, DA IN 631189; CINCFE C 67580 to DA for JCS, 26 Apr 52, DA IN 132207; JCS 907347 to CINCFE, 26 Apr 52.
101. (U) Msg, CINCUNC Tokyo CX 67613 to CINCUNC (ADV), 26 Apr 52, DA IN 132487; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 67619 to DA for JCS, 27 Apr 52, DA IN 132507.
102. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 67640 to DA for JCS, 27 Apr 52, DA IN 132562.
103. *Ibid.*
104. (U) Msg, JCS 907378 to CINCFE, 27 Apr 52. The content of this message leaves little doubt that it had been cleared with State Department and the President, but the fact cannot be documented with available evidence. The DTG was 271701Z, or 280201Z. Far East time; it evidently reached CINCFE early on the morning of 28 April, in time to allow the scheduling of a plenary session by 1100 that day.
105. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67677 to DA for JCS, 28 Apr 52, DA IN 132707.

106. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67677 to DA for JCS, 28 Apr 52, DA IN 132707. The text of Joy's statement is given in (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 67603 to DA for JCS, 26 Apr 52, DA IN 132239.
107. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 174.
108. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67677 to DA for JCS, 28 Apr 52, DA IN 132707.
109. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67900 to DA for JCS, 2 May 52, DA IN 134364.
110. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC Tokyo CX 67901 to CINCUNC (ADV), 2 May 52, DA IN 134405; JCS 907962 to CINCFE, 3 May 52; CINCUNC CX 67977 to DA for JCS, 4 May 52, DA IN 135143.
111. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 68022 to DA for JCS, 5 May 52, DA IN 135343; CINCFE C 68065 to DA for JCS, 6 May 52, DA IN 135681; CINCUNC C 68108 to DA for JCS, 7 May 52, DA IN 136122; CINCUNC CX 68135 to DA for JCS, 8 May 52, DA IN 136582. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953* (1966), pp. 321–322. For JCS clearance of GEN Ridgway's statement, see (U) Msgs, CINCFE CX 67235 to DA for JCS, 20 Apr 52, DA IN 129944, and JCS 906923 to CINCFE, 22 Apr 52.
112. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 67750 to DA for JCS, 29 Apr 52, DA IN 133133.
113. (U) Msg, JCS 908093 to CINCFE, 6 May 52.
114. The commands held by General Ridgway at this time were: Commander in Chief, Far East Command; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commanding General, Army Forces, Far East; and Governor, Ryukyu Islands. With the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty effective 28 April 1952, the post of Supreme Commander Allied Powers had been abolished. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, p. 211; Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 30, 34.
115. The remainder of this chapter is based principally upon messages, as indicated, and upon the following published accounts: Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 243–254; Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 35–49; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 210–216; Vetter, *Mutiny on Koje Island*. White, *The Captives of Korea*, presents the best available description of the overall situation in the POW camps of both sides.
116. (U) Msg, CG ARMY EIGHT (ADV) to JCS, GX 5777 TAC KCG, 8 May 52, DA IN 136673.
117. Ibid.
118. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68280 to DA for JCS, 10 May 52, DA IN 137482; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 68366 to DA for JCS, 12 May 52, DA IN 138016. Of Van Fleet's actions, General Ridgway has this to say in his history of the Korean War: "The Prisoners of War were ultimately my concern, although the authority to deal with them had been delegated to the Army Commander. His was the primary responsibility and I soon had need to remind him of it." With respect to his direct orders to General Van Fleet, prepared after consultation with Admiral Joy, General Ridgway recalls, "Van Fleet, however, postponed carrying out my order, in part because of the delay in arrival of the tank battalion, and in part for other reasons not clear to me." Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 210, 213.
119. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 68366 to DA for JCS, 12 May 52, DA IN 138016.
120. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 68366 to DA for JCS, 12 May 52, DA IN 138016. *NY Times*, 13 May 52, p. 1. General Ridgway had seen and approved this statement before leaving the Far East (Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 45–46).
121. (TS) DATT 5819, 13 May 52, copy in CJCS Message Book, CINCFE Incoming May–Jul 52.
122. (U) JCS 908789 to CINCFE, 14 May 52. *NY Times*, 15 May 52, p. 1.
123. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 68379 to DA for JCS, 13 May 52, DA IN 138236; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68757 to DA for JCS, 20 May 52, DA IN 140954.
124. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 39.
125. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 68205 to DA for JCS, 9 May 52, DA IN 136975; CINCFE C 68291 to DA for JCS, 11 May 52, DA IN 137717. General Collins thought that the POW disturbances were largely responsible for the fact that the negotiations dragged on for another year: Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 342.
126. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68757 to DA for JCS, 20 May 52, DA IN 140954. (U) Ltr, SecArmy Pace to Senator Richard B. Russell, 23 May 52, CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 9. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 47–48. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 346–347.

Chapter 4. The UN Command in the Middle

1. (U) Msg, Pusan 806 to State, 15 Feb 52, DA IN 105987, referring to Pusan 1103 to State, 30 Jun 51.
2. (U) Msg, CINCFE C68048 to DA for JCS, 31 Jul 51, DA IN 522. (U) Memo, K. T. Young, OFMA, OSD to COL Bayer, "Presidential Reply to President Rhee's Letter," 2 Aug 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 56. (U) Msg, SCAP CX 68128 to Pusan, 1 Aug 51, DA IN 993. (U) Msg, SCAP CX 68256 to Pusan, 3 Aug 51, DA IN 2014. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, "Measures to Assist General Ridgway and

Ambassador Muccio in Problem of ROK Government Attitude Toward Armistice,” n.d. (ca. 3 Mar 52), w/encl, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 87.

3. (S) Msg, Pusan 270 to State, 21 Sep 51, DA IN 50706.
4. (S) Msg, Pusan 276 to State, 21 Sep 51, DA IN 19522.
5. (S) Msg, Pusan 410 to State, 6 Nov 51, DA IN 16175; (U) Msg, Pusan 530 to State, 5 Dec 51, DA IN 6516.
6. (S) Msg, Pusan 637 to State, 4 Jan 52, DA IN 16451.
7. (S) Msg, Pusan 685 to State, 15 Jan 52, DA IN 537.
8. (C) Msg, Pusan 639 to State, 16 Jan 52, DA IN 1089, summarizes the contents of the letter.
9. (U) Msg, Pusan 752 to State, 31 Jan 52, DA IN 100240.
10. (U) Msg, Pusan 806 to State, 15 Feb 52, DA IN 105987.
11. (U) Msg, CINCUNC ADV HNC 937 to CINCUNC, 17 Feb 52, DA IN 109113.
12. (U) Msg, CINCUNC ADV HNC 937 to CINCUNC, 17 Feb 52, DA IN 109113.
13. (C) Msg, Pusan 807 to State, 15 Feb 52, DA IN 105925.
14. (S) Msg, State 615 to Pusan, 18 Feb 52, DA IN 107029.
15. (S) Msg, Pusan 817 to State, 19 Feb 52, DA IN 107457.
16. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 64241 to DA for JCS, 25 Feb 52, DA IN 109112.
17. (U) Msg, JCS 902158 to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52. Drafts seen in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 86, indicating high-level approval, cannot now be found.
18. (TS) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Measures to Assist General Ridgway and Ambassador Muccio in Problem of ROK Government Attitude Towards Armistice,” n.d. [ca. 3 Mar 52], w/encl, State Dept memo and draft ltr, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 87. In his memo, the CSA recommended that the JCS (transmitting their views orally in view of the urgency of the matter) express no objection to the proposed letter or to the choice of FADM Nimitz. However, another copy of the State Dept memo, in same file, has attached a handwritten memo from OSD recording the JCS decision that “some nonmilitary man” be chosen as the messenger and that they should express no opinion on the draft letter, since it was “purely a political matter.”
19. (TS) Msg, DA 902912 to CINCFE, 6 Mar 52, quotes in full the Truman letter to Rhee.
20. (C) Msg, Pusan 833 to State, 23 Feb 52, DA IN 108911.
21. (S) Msg, Pusan 893 to State, 14 Mar 52, DA IN 116543; (S) Msg, Pusan 939 to State, 28 Mar 52, DA IN 121530.
22. (U) Msg, Pusan 984 to State, 10 Apr 52, DA IN 126602.
23. (U) Msg, Pusan 1005 to State, 17 Apr 52, DA IN 628226. In reflecting on Rhee’s opposition to the armistice, General Clark later conceded that “History may well prove that Rhee was more right than we were when he opposed the armistice and declared that for the good of the free world as well as for Korea the Communists had to be defeated militarily in Korea.” Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 168.
24. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 69182 to DA, 27 May 52, DA IN 143770; (S) Msg, Pusan 1217 to State, 31 May 52, DA IN 145500; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 69352 to DA, 31 May 52, DA IN 145240. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 345–346. (TS) Msg, CINCUNC C 69439 to DA, 1 Jun 52, DA IN 145602. Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1952* (1953), pp. 188–189.
25. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 69182 to DA 27 May 52, DA IN 143770.
26. (U) Msgs, CG ARMY EIGHT (ADV) LC 893 to CINCFE, 28 May 52, DA IN 144468, LC 894, DA IN 144470.
27. (TS) Msg, CG ARMY EIGHT G 6130 TAC KCG to CINCUNC, 29 May 52, DA IN 145011; (U) Msg, CG ARMY EIGHT GX 6129 TAC KCG to Pusan, 29 May 52, DA IN 145008.
28. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 69392 to CG ARMY EIGHT et al., 31 May 52, DA IN 145239; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69323 to DA for JCS, 30 May 52, DA IN 145019; (U) Msg, CG ARMY EIGHT (ADV) G 6135 TAC KCG to CINCFE, 29 May 52, DA IN 145021; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 69322 to DA, 30 May 52, DA IN 145040.
29. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 69329 to DA, 30 May 52, DA IN 145022.
30. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 69352 to DA, 31 May 52, DA IN 145240; (U) Msg, DA 910149 to CINCFE, 30 May 52 (TG 301817Z, or 310317 Far East time.)
31. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 69393 to DA for CSUSA, 31 May 52, DA IN 145238.
32. Ibid. About the same time that UNCURK was demanding that Rhee lift martial law and CINCUNC was outlining possible contingency actions, Ambassador Muccio, speaking at Brown University, expressed his confidence “that with cooperation between UNKRA [United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency] and the Republic of Korea, that country can become a model to other Asian peoples, a place to convince Communists and ‘doubting Thomases’ that democracy is a vital force that can and does do more for man than any other system of government.” Dept of State *Bulletin*, 16 Jun 52, p. 942.

33. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 69444 to DA for CSUSA, 1 Jun 52, DA IN 145634; (S) Msg, CINCUNC C 69540 to DA, 3 Jun 52, DA IN 146186.
34. (U) Msg, CINCUNC GX 6204 TAC KCG to CSUSA, 2 Jun 52, DA IN 145819.
35. (S) Msg, CINCUNC C 69651 to DA, 4 Jun 52, DA IN 146554, gives a summary of and excerpts from the Truman-Rhee letter, as part of a report on the ROK crisis based on information furnished by the US Embassy in Pusan.
36. The letter was delivered by the Acting US Ambassador at 1100 on 3 June, during a cabinet meeting in which Rhee was already demanding that the cabinet either approve the dissolution of the assembly or devise other means of accomplishing his objectives. (S) Msg, CINCUNC C 69651 to DA, 4 Jun 52, DA IN 146554.
37. (S) Msg, CINCUNC C 69733 to DA, 6 Jun 52, DA IN 147395.
38. (S) Msg, Pusan 1263 to State, 4 Jun 52, DA IN 146559.
39. (U) Msg, CG ARMY EIGHT GX 74155 KCG to CINCUNC, 5 Jun 52, DA IN 147266; (TS) Msg, Pusan 1248 to State, 3 Jun 52, DA IN 146211.
40. (TS) Msg, OSD DEF 910410 to CINCUNC, 4 Jun 52.
41. (S) Msgs, CINCUNC C 69818 to DA, 7 Jun 52, DA IN 147826; C 69915, 10 Jun 52, DA IN 148612; C 50186, 14 Jun 52, DA IN 150359.
42. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 50221 to DA for JCS, 15 Jun 52, DA IN 150592. The message from Muccio containing the suggestion on which GEN Clark was commenting has not been found.
43. (TS) Msg, Pusan 1395 to State, 18 Jun 52.
44. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 50416 to Pusan, 18 Jun 52, DA IN 151606; (U) Msg, DA 911565 to CINCUNC, 18 Jun 52.
45. (TS) JCS 1776/298, 24 Jun 52, and Dec On, 25 Jun 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 104. (U) Msgs, JCS 912098 to CINCFE (with instructions to pass to AMB Muccio) and 912289, 25 Jun 52.
46. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 50748 to CG ARMY EIGHT, 24 Jun 52, DA IN 153876; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 50901 to DA for JCS, 27 Jun 52, DA IN 155038.
47. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 51399 to DA for JCS, 5 Jul 52, DA IN 157957.
48. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 51399 to DA for JCS, 5 Jul 52, DA IN 157957. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 346. *NY Times*, 6 Aug 52, p. 2, 7 Aug 52, p. 3. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 152 and passim.
49. James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (1972), p. 394. For a summary of earlier proposals to expand the ROK, see *ibid.*, pp. 168, 230, 313–314.
50. (U) Msg, CINCFE 61433 to DA (Personal for Collins), 1 May 51, DA IN 7500. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 394–395.
51. (U) NSC 48/5, 17 May 51. (See pt. 1 Ch. 9 for a full account of NSC 48/5.)
52. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 395.
53. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 67484 to DA, 22 Jul 51, DA IN 17555.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 207–210.
56. See Ch. 1, p. 13.
57. (U) Memo, G–3, DA to CINCFE, “Planning Data Concerning Armed Forces in Korea,” 18 Aug 51, App to JCS 1776/281, 12 Feb 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 84.
58. (U) 1st Endorsement to memo cited in Fn 57, 16 Oct 51 (part of App to JCS 1776/281).
59. (U) 1st Endorsement to memo cited in Fn 57, 16 Oct 51 (part of App to JCS 1776/281).
60. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, “Post-Hostilities Military Forces of the Republic of Korea,” 10 Nov 51, encl to JCS 1776/263, 13 Nov 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 69.
61. See Ch. 2 for details of NSC 118/2.
62. (U) Encl to JCS 1776/281, 12 Feb 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 84.
63. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60202 to DA for JCS, 27 Dec 51, DA IN 13902; (U) Msg, DA 93080 to CINCFE, 27 Jan 52.
64. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Post-Hostilities Military Forces of the Republic of Korea,” 23 Jan 52, (der from encl to JCS 1776/276), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 81.
65. (U) JCS 1776/281, 12 Feb 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 84; (U) SM–521–52 to CINCFE and CINCPAC, 20 Feb 52, same file, sec 85.
66. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65987 to DA for JCS, 27 Mar 52, DA IN 121000.
67. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65987 to DA for JCS, 27 Mar 52, DA IN 121000.
68. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 211–212. (TS) Msg, DA 905814 to CINCFE, 9 Apr 52, and (TS) Msg, CINCFE CX 66647 to DA, 8 Apr 52, copies in GHQ FECOM/UNC Command Rpt. April 1952. The Van Fleet interview was published in *US News and World Report*, 28 Mar 52, pp. 24–26. In it, General Van Fleet stated: “Certainly the South Korean soldier has proved himself to be one of

the best in the world. . . . I feel that leadership in the [South] Korean Army is developing fast. . . . Koreans under American supervision have developed into a first-class fighting army.”

69. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 212.

70. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 171. Several times within the first two weeks after he assumed command, General Clark “remarked that the bigger the ROK Army was, the better he would like it.” Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 340.

71. (U) Msg, CINUNC C 69356 to DA, 31 May 52, DA IN 145225.

72. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 50459 to DA, 19 Jun 52, DA IN 152025.

73. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 50698 to DA for JCS, 23 Jun 52, DA IN 153560.

74. (U) JCS 1776/296, 23 Jun 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 104; (U) Dec On JCS 1776/281, 30 Jun 52, same file, sec 84. On the postwar existence of the ROK Marine Corps, the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed the advice of CINCPAC, who thought that a Marine division would be justified in view of “the peninsular nature of Korea and the numbers and military importance of its offshore islands” (Annex to App B to JCS 1776/296).

75. See Ch. 5.

76. *NY Times*, 3 Feb 52, p. 1.

77. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 230–231.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 231–232. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1952, p. 12195. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs*, 1952, pp. 34–36. *NY Times*, 28 Feb 52, p. 2.

79. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 17 Mar 52, pp. 427–428.

80. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1952, p. 12195. (U) Memo, CSAF to JCS, “Chinese Communist Threat,” n. d. [ca. 8 Mar 52], CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 87.

81. (U) Msg, CINUNC CX 64676 to DA for JCS, 4 Mar 52, DA IN 112317. Illustrating the specificity of communist charges, a Chinese broadcast monitored in New Delhi and passed on to Washington charged that at 9 P.M. on 6 March an American plane had dropped packages of various types of infected insects on Tsing-tao, China.

82. (U) Msg, JCS 903060 to CINCFE, 7 Mar 52. One of the authors of this volume (Schnabel) was stationed in Tokyo at this period and can recall distinctly the Communist posters throughout the city, the front-page pictures of “diseased” flies and insects in many Japanese newspapers, and, especially, the credibility actually given germ-warfare charges by some of his Japanese acquaintances.

83. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 24 Mar 52, pp. 452–453.

84. (C) Memo, State Dept (U. Alexis Johnson) to COL Jack Mathews, G–3, DA, “WHO Offer of Assistance in North Korea,” 15 Mar 52, Encl to (C) Memo, CSA to JCS, 17 Mar 52, seen in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 89, cannot now be located. (U) Msg, JCS 903780 to CINCFE, 17 Mar 52. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65515 to DA for JCS, 19 Mar 52, DA IN 117762. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1952, p. 12195.

85. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 31 Mar 52, pp. 506, 515, 516. In connection with Soviet charges, it is interesting to note that during a potato crop failure in Czechoslovakia earlier, the Communists had accused the United States of dropping potato bugs on their fields from airplanes.

86. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1952, p. 12195.

87. (U) Memo, CSAF to JCS, “Chinese Communist Threat,” 11 Mar 52 (JCS 1776/282, 12 Mar 52), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 88. (U) Msg, JCS 903686 to CINCFE, 15 Mar 52 (with flimsy in same file, sec 89, showing approval of State, SecDef, and Pres). (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65348 to DA for JCS, 16 Mar 52, DA IN 116709; (U) Msg, JCS 904097 to CINCFE, 20 Mar 52; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65648 to DA for JCS, 21 Mar 52, DA IN 118699.

88. *Facts on File*, 1952, p. 93.

89. *NY Times*, 5 May 52, p. 1, 8 May 52, p. 1. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 19 May 52, p. 777, 9 Jun 52, pp. 925–926. *Public Papers, Truman*, 1952–1953, p. 378. White, *The Captives of Korea*, pp. 148, 151, 167–172, analyzes the pilots’ confessions and the methods by which they were induced.

90. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 7 Jul 52, pp. 32–39.

91. (U) Msg, JCS 910473 to CINCFE, 5 Jun 52. Drafted by representatives of Depts of State, Defense, and Army, according to a draft in CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 10 (undated, erroneously filed with documents dated 10–11 Jun 52).

92. (U) Msg, CINUNC C 69888 to DA for JCS, 9 Jun 52, DA IN 148276; (U) Msg, DA 911198 to CINCFE, 13 Jun 52. (S) JCS 1776/301, 8 Jul 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 106. The committee was known as the Interdepartmental Committee for Korean Information Guidance. It operated under the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, an interdepartmental body established by the NSC to advise the Secretary of State, which had representatives from State, Defense, CIA, and the JCS, with observers from the Services.

93. (U) Msg, JCS 911727 to CINCFE, 20 Jun 52; (U) CINCFE C 50709 to DA for JCS, 24 Jun 52, DA IN 153759; (U) Msg, JCS 912290 to CINCFE, 27 Jun 52.

94. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 68108 to DA for JCS, 7 May 52, DA IN 136122, (U) C 68152, 8 May 52, DA IN 136605.
95. (U) Msg, JCS 908433 to CINCFE, 9 May 52.
96. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 68269 to DA, 10 May 52, DA IN 137454.
97. (U) Msg, JCS 908528 to CINCFE, 10 May 52.
98. Msg, CINCFE C 68350 to DA for JCS, 12 May 52, DA IN 137957; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 68355 to DA for JCS, 12 May 52, DA IN 137958.
99. (U) Msg, JCS 908998 to CINCFE, 16 May 52.
100. (U) Msg, CINCFE 171053Z May 52 to DA for JCS (retransmitting CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 1249), DA IN 140117; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 68655 to DA for JCS, 18 May 52, DA IN 140437; (U) Msg, JCS 909130 to CINCUNC, 18 May 52.
101. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 68527 to DA for JCS, 16 May 52, DA IN 139508. For the Colson agreement, see Ch. 3.
102. *Ibid.*
103. (TS) Msg, CINCFE CX 68462 to DA for JCS, 17 May 52, DA IN 140147; (U) Msg, JCS 909231 to CINCFE, 19 May 52.
104. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 68567 to DA for JCS, 16 May 52, DA IN 139602.
105. (U) Msg, JCS 909104 to CINCFE, 17 May 52.
106. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 68858 to DA for JCS, 22 May 52, DA IN 141817.
107. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 1255 to CINCUNC, 19 May 52, DA IN 140889.
108. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 265. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 68695 to DA for JCS, 19 May 52, DA IN 140579; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 68876 to DA for JCS, 22 May 52, DA IN 141855.
109. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 68970 to DA for JCS, 23 May 52, DA IN 142339; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68942 to DA for JCS, 23 May 52, DA IN 142264. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt III, vol. I, pp. 18–19 (copy in JCS Hist Div files).
110. Msg, CINCUNC CX 68975 to DA, 23 May 52, DA IN 142347; (U) Msg, JCS 909747 to CINCFE, 26 May 52.
111. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 69063 to CINCUNC ADV, 25 May 52, DA IN 143137.
112. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69171 to DA for JCS, 27 May 52, DA IN 143718. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–Jul 1953)*, pt III vol. I, pp. 20–21.
113. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69291 to DA for JCS, 29 May 52, DA IN 144557.
114. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69426 to DA for JCS, 1 Jun 52, DA IN 145569 (retransmitting CINCUNC ADV 1277).
115. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 69351 to DA for JCS, 31 May 52, DA IN 145230.
116. *Ibid.*
117. (U) Msg, JCS 910484 to CINCFE, 5 Jun 52.
118. *Ibid.*
119. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 50050 to DA for JCS, 12 Jun 52, DA IN 149501.
120. *Ibid.*
121. (U) Msg, JCS 911248 to CINCFE, 13 Jun 52.
122. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt III, vol. I, pp. 33–45. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69890 to DA for JCS, 9 Jun 52, DA IN 148385; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 69891 to DA for JCS, 9 Jun 52, DA IN 158391. (U) Msg, JCS 910892 to CINCFE, 10 June 52.
123. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt III, vol. I, pp. 39–40, 45–46. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 51031 to CINCUNC (ADV), 28 Jun 52, DA IN 155551.
124. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt III, vol. I, pp. 40–45. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 50600 to DA for JCS, 21 Jun 52, DA IN 152928. Presumably the information about the Soviet Actions was sent to the UNC by the State Department, but it was not transmitted through JCS channels.
125. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 64029 to DA for JCS, 21 Feb 52, DA IN 107877.
126. (U) Msg, CINCUNC 69687 to DA for JCS, 5 Jun 52, DA IN 146933.
127. *Ibid.*; (U) Msg, JCS 910811 to CINCFE, 10 Jun 52.
128. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 50051 to DA for JCS, 12 Jun 52, DA IN 149495; (U) Msg, JCS 911250 to CINCFE, 13 Jun 52.
129. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 50208 to DA for JCS, 12 Jun DA IN 150334; (U) Msg, JCS 911339 to CINCUNC, 16 Jun 52.
130. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, Pt III, vol. I, pp. 48–49. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 50315 to CGARMYEIGHT (ADV), 17 Jun 52, DA IN 151300. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 50668 to DA for JCS, 23 Jun 52, DA IN 153438, C 50717, 24 Jun 52, DA IN 153775.
131. (TS) Command Report, HQ FECOM/UNC, June 1952, pp. 66–67. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 255–261.

132. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 50636 to DA for JCS, 22 Jun 52, DA IN 153229.

133. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 51053 to DA for JCS, 29 Jun 52, DA IN 155821. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, Pt III, vol. I, p. 33. Civilian internees are included in the table because they had not yet been released.

Chapter 5. The Search for Feasible Options

1. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 175–185.

2. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60326 to DA for JCS, 28 Dec 51, DA IN 14572.

3. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60744 to DA for JCS, 4 Jan 52, DA IN 16359. On the air interdiction effort in 1951 and 1952, see Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 400–493.

4. (U) Msg, CINCFE 302 to JCS, 1 Mar 52 (special channel msg; copy in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 86).

5. (TS) Memo, ACofS, G–2 to ACofS, G–3, “SE–25, Communist Short Term Intentions in Korea,” 25 Apr 52, DA files, G–3 091 Korea 1952 (TS) sec 3, case 59.

6. (TS) Memo, ACofS, G–2 to ACofS, G–3, “SE–25, Communist Short Term Intentions in Korea, 25 Apr 52, DA files, G–3 091 Korea 1952 (TS) sec 3, case 59.

7. (TS) JSPC 853/113, 8 Jul 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 106.

8. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 50832 to CG ARMY EIGHT, 25 Jun 52, DA IN 154621; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 51033 to DA for G–3, 28 Jun 52, DA IN 155577.

9. (U) Msg, HQ USAF to CG FEAF, AFODC TS 4934, 3 Apr 52, DA IN 123975.

10. (U) Msg, CG FEAF to HQ USAF, VCO 118 CG, 29 Apr 52, DA IN 134844.

11. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 67909 to DA for JCS, 3 May 52, DA IN 134720; (U) Msg, JCS 908100 to CINCFE, 6 May 52.

12. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 70–72. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 320. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 50328 to COMNAVFE and CG FEAF, 17 Jun 52, DA IN 151209.

13. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Removal of Restriction on Attacks Against Yalu River Hydro-electric Installations,” 19 Jun 52 (der From Encl A to JCS 1776/297), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 104.

14. (U) JCS 1776/297, 19 Jun 52, same file. (U) Msg, JCS 911683 to CINCFE, 19 Jun 52.

15. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 322.

16. (S) Msg, London SECTO 27 to State, 28 Jun 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (8–19–45) sec 105; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 656–657. For Secretary Lovett’s statement, see *NY Times*, 25 Jun 52, p. 1. In an unusual address to members of the British Parliament and other political leaders in London on 26 June, Secretary Acheson defended the bombing operation but admitted that the British Government should have been informed in advance (Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 657).

17. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1952*, pp. 191–192.

18. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 69892 to DA for JCS, 10 Jun 52, DA IN 148568; (U) Msg, JCS 910915 to CINCFE, 11 Jun 52 (with draft flimsy in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)-sec 102); (U) Msg, CINCFE C 50060 to DA for JCS, 12 Jun 52, DA IN 149468; (S) Msg, DA 914522 to CINCFE, 25 Jul 52; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52589 to DA, 26 Jul 52, DA IN 165422; (U) Msg, JCS 914541 to CINCFE, 26 Jul 52. *NY Times*, 2 Jul 52, p. 1, 29 Jul 52, p. 3. After visiting Korea, Lord Alexander agreed that British representation on the UNC armistice delegation was not necessary: (U) Msg, CINCFE C 50318 to DA for JCS, 17 Jun 52, DA IN 151297.

19. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 324–325. The oil refinery attack was carried out with special permission from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stressed that the general policy forbidding attacks within 12 miles of Soviet territory remained in effect. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 54180 to DA for JCS, 25 Aug 52, DA IN 176434; (U) Msg, JCS 916925 to CINCFE, 26 Aug 52.

20. See Ch. 4, pp. 126–127.

21. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 340–342. (U) Msg, DA 915709 to CINCFE, 11 Aug 52. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Augmentation of Wartime Republic of Korea Army,” 15 Aug 52 (Encl to JCS 1776/306, 20 Aug 52), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 110.

22. Msgs, CINCFE to DA, (U) CX 54489, 1 Sep 52, DA IN 179035, (U) C 55066, 12 Sep 52, DA IN 183011. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 341. On the origin of the KATUSA program, see Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 385–389. The total number of KATUSAs had averaged approximately 13,000 per month since the program began, according to the JCS memo of 26 Sep 52 to the SecDef (below, note 24).

23. (TS) Memo for Record, SecDef Lovett, “Meeting with the President on Korean Situation,” 15 Sep 52, DA File, CSUSA 091 Korea (TS) 1951–52, Case 40.

24. (U) JCS 1776/317, 26 Sep 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 113.

25. *Ibid.*; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Augmentation of the Wartime Republic of Korea Army and Marine Corps,” 26 Sep 52 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/317), same file.

26. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 56149 to DA for JCS, 1 Oct 52, DA IN 190069. By (U) Msg, JCS 919468 to CINCFE, 26 Sep 52, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had told GEN Clark that they had recommended that SecDef approve his requested increases.

27. (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, “Augmentation of the Wartime Republic of Korea Army and Marine Corps,” 8 Oct 52, Encl to JCS 1776/322, same date; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 10 Oct 52, (der from Encl to JCS 1776/323), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 114.

28. For the formulation of the budgets for 1953 and 1954, reflecting the administration’s decision to stretch out the ambitious force goals adopted in 1950, see *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*, Chs. 3 and 4.

29. (U) Msg, DA 920585 to CINCFE, 9 Oct 52. When the reply from CINCFE was delayed for almost three weeks, the Department of the Army sent a reminder that an “early reply” would be “especially helpful” for the Department, which was “exploring all possibilities to alleviate critical personnel problem”; (U) Msg, DA 922128 to CINCFE, 25 Oct 52.

30. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57893 to DA, 28 Oct 52, DA IN 200767.

31. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 25 Oct 52 (Encl to JCS 1776/328, 27 Oct 52); (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Augmentation of the Wartime Republic of Korea Army and Marine Corps,” 30 Oct 52 (Encl A to JCS 1776/332, 31 Oct 52); CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 116. (U) Msg, JCS 922607 to CINCFE, 30 Oct 52. The Secretary had delayed his recommendation pending determination of the impact of the ROK expansion on the proposal to equip two Chinese Nationalist divisions for service in Korea, as described in the next section of the chapter. (TS) Memo, DCS, Plans and Research, DA (LTG Lemnitzer) to GEN Collins, “Status of JCS Recommendation to Augment ROK Army,” 24 Oct 52, DA File, CSUSA 091 Korea (TS) 1951–52, Case 44. The ROK expansion plan was not submitted to Congress, but tacit Congressional approval could be inferred, inasmuch as Congress had been informed that the US Army was furnishing military equipment to the ROK Army and had approved fund requests for the US Army that included replacement of equipment furnished the ROK. (TS) Briefing for the Secretary of Defense Designate by the Chief of Staff, 17 Dec 52, DA Files, G–3 337 (TS) 1952, Sec 4, Case 64.

32. (TS) *History of the Formosan Situation*, pp. 116–117. (TS) JCS 1776/304, 2 Aug 52 (p. 1626, para 2), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 108. (U) Msg, DA 903888 to CHMAAG (Formosa), 18 Mar 52.

33. (TS) *History of the Formosan Situation*, pp. 117–118. (U) Msg, JCS 908833 to CINCPAC did not reply until November, by which time the use of Nationalist forces was no longer under serious consideration.

34. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69181 to DA for JCS, 27 May 52, DA IN 143769.

35. (U) Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 282022Z, May 52; (U) Msg, Chief MAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, 3 Jun 52 (repeated for info to DA as DA IN 156422, 1 Jul 52) (Encls E and F to JCS 1776/304, 2 Aug 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 108).

36. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 51139 to DA for JCS, 1 Jul 52, DA IN 156422 (Encl H to JCS 1776/304, cited in preceding note).

37. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 51139 to DA for JCS, 1 Jul 52, DA IN 156422 (Encl H to JCS 1776/304, cited in note 35).

38. (TS) JCS 1776/304, 28 Jul 52; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea,” 5 Aug 52, (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/304); CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 108.

39. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea and Supply Priorities in Connection Therewith,” with Encl, (TS) Memo for Record, SecDef Lovett, same subj and date, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 109. (TS) Encl and App B to JCS 1776/308, 25 Aug 52, same file, sec 110.

40. (TS) *History of the Formosan Situation*, pp. 124–125.

41. (U) Memo, CSA to SecDef, “Comparative Cost of Preparing, Deploying and Maintaining in Korea for One Year, Two National Government of the Republic of China (NGRC) Divisions Versus Two Newly Activated ROKA [Republic of Korea Army] Divisions,” 25 Aug 52, Encl to JCS 1776/309, 27 Aug 52, same file, sec 110.

42. (U) Memo, CMC to JCS, “Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea,” 19 Aug 52, Encl to JCS 1776/307, 21 Aug 52, same file. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “Employment of Chinese Nationalist Marines in Korea,” 26 Sep 52, Encl to JCS 1776/319, 29 Sep 52, same file, sec 113.

43. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces," 21 Nov 52 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/337), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 117.
44. The subject was discussed during General Eisenhower's trip to Korea following his election, but no action was taken. See Ch. 6, p. 193.
45. See Ch. 4.
46. (TS) Msg, JCS 911932 to CINCFE, 23 Jun 52. (TS) Memo for Record, sgd McDuff, 19 Jun 52, CJCS 091 Korea, 1952.
47. (TS) Msg, JCS 910520 to CINCFE, 5 Jun 52.
48. (TS) Msg, JCS 911932 to CINCFE, 23 Jun 52.
49. (TS) Msg, JCS 913418 to CINCFE, 12 Jul 52.
50. (TS) Msg, DA 913558 to CINCFE, 15 Jul 52.
51. (U) Msg, DA 912792 to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52. In an apparently unrelated move, Ambassador Kennan on 23 July 1952 delivered a note asking the Soviet Government to use its good offices in an effort to obtain compliance by North Korea and Communist China with the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention governing the treatment of prisoners: Dept of State *Bulletin*, 4 Aug 52, pp. 171–172.
52. (TS) Text of Msg, State 268 to Moscow, 25 Jul 52, copy in CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 11; also in CJCS Message Book, CINCFE Outgoing Mar 52-Jul 53. Sent for information to Tokyo (Ambassador Robert Murphy, Political Advisor to CINCFE. By (U) Msg, DA 914536 to CINCFE, 26 Jul 52, General Clark was asked to give his comments on the proposal.
53. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 527988 to DA for CSUSA 30 Jul 52, DA IN 166851.
54. For General Clark's proposal of 7 July (which was still under consideration in Washington), see next section.
55. (U) Memo by CSA, "Armistice Negotiations in Korea," n.d. [ca. 30 Jul 52], CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 108.
56. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 51050, to DA for JCS, 28 Jun 52, DA IN 155625, CX 51216, 2 Jul 52, DA IN 156928. Two changes in the UNC delegation took place about this time: RADM John C. Daniel, USN, replaced RADM Libby, and BG Joseph T. Morris, USAF, replaced MG Turner (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 272).
57. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 51283 to DA for JCS, 3 Jul 52, DA IN 157194. Release of civilian internees had begun by this time, as described in Ch. 4.
58. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 51133 to DA for JCS, 1 Jul 52, DA IN 156370.
59. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C51282 to DA for JCS, 3 Jul 52, DA IN 157177.
60. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 273.
61. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 51286 to DA for JCS, 3 Jul 52, DA IN 157181 (relaying message HNC 1361 from GEN Harrison).
62. (U) Msg, JCS 912791 to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52.
63. Ibid.
64. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C51356, to DA for JCS, 4 Jul 52, DA IN 157633; C 51401, 5 Jul 52, DA IN 157938; C 51435, 6 Jul 52, DA IN 158109.
65. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C51435, to DA for JCS, 6 Jul 52, DA IN 158109, C 51465, 7 Jul 52, DA IN 158297.
66. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 51489 to DA for JCS, 7 Jul 52, DA IN 158387.
67. Ibid.
68. (U) Msg, JCS 912998 to CINCFE, 8 Jul 52.
69. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 51780 to DA for JCS, 11 Jul 52, DA IN 159939.
70. (U) Msg, JCS 913383 to CINCFE, 11 Jul 52.
71. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 51870 to DA for JCS, 13 Jul 52, DA IN 160608; C52124, 18 Jul 52, DA IN 162436. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52147 to DA for JCS, 18 Jul 52, DA IN 162454.
72. (U) Msg, JCS 913758 to CINCFE, 17 Jul 52.
73. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 52284 to DA for JCS, 21 Jul 52, DA IN 163253. For an account of General Clark's experience with Soviet representatives in Austrian DP Camps, see his book, *Calculated Risk* (1950), pp. 475–477.
74. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 52284 to DA for JCS, 21 Jul 52, DA IN 163253.
75. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C52553 to DA for JCS, 25 Jul 52, DA IN 164959.
76. (U) Msg, JCS 914523 to CINCUNC, 25 Jul 52.
77. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C52600 to DA for JCS, 26 Jul 52, DA IN 165491.
78. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C53069, to DA for JCS, 3 Aug 52, DA IN 168565; C 53465, 11 Aug 52, DA IN 171350; C 53917, 19 Aug 52, DA IN 174193; (U) Msg, CINCFE C54299 to DA for JCS, 27 Aug 52, DA IN 177276.
79. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 52641, to DA for JCS, 27 Jul 52, DA IN 165857, C 53135, 5 Aug 52, DA IN 169102. (TS) Hq AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 3, vol. 1, pp. 102–104.

The completed draft of 29 August, containing 63 articles, was forwarded to Washington with (U) Ltr, Hq FECOM to TAG, DA, 4 Sep 52 (CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 111). The UN Command released it with a special report of 18 October 1952, noting that the paragraphs relating to repatriation (Article 51, providing that all prisoners “shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible,” as quoted above, and Article 54, setting a two-month time limit for the process) had been accepted by the UNC only “on the understanding that they would be interpreted in such a way as not to require the forcible repatriation of prisoners of war.” *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952*, pp. 166–174.

80. (U) Msg, JCS 915579 to CINCFE, 8 Aug 52.

81. According to one account, newspapermen at Munsan in July 1951, watching the initial departure of the UNC delegation for Kaesong, speculated on how long it would take to reach a cease-fire, and “the ‘pessimists’ guessed six weeks.” Poats, *Decision in Korea*, p. 204.

82. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 276.

83. See note 79 above.

84. Mr. Hallinan’s proposal apparently was not considered newsworthy in the United States and was not widely reported in the US press. It was endorsed by spokesmen of the US Communist Party (which supported Mr. Hallinan’s candidacy) and was printed by Soviet publications, *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*. See (TS) “Brief of Pertinent Messages between JCS and General Clark on Next Step in Korean Armistice Negotiations,” Encl to (TS) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Armistice Negotiations in Korea,” 15 Sep 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 112, and (S) Msg, JCS 917260 to CINCFE, 29 Aug 52. Whether State Department representatives learned of it from the Soviet journals or through some other means is not indicated in available sources. Mr. Hallinan made his proposal public in a speech on 6 September: *NY Times*, 7 Sep 52, sec 1, p. 46.

85. (TS) “Brief of Pertinent Messages . . .” and (S) Msg, JCS 917260 to CINCFE, cited in preceding footnote.

86. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 54495 to DA for JCS, 1 Sep 52, DA IN 179036.

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.*

89. (TS) “Brief of Pertinent Messages Between JCS and General Clark on Next Step in Korean Armistice Negotiations,” Encl to (TS) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Armistice Negotiations in Korea,” 15 Sep 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 112. (TS) Msg, JCS 917569 to CINCFE, 4 Sep 52.

90. The text of the Mexican letter to the UN SYG, containing the Aleman plan, is in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 3 Nov 52, p. 696. The plan was transmitted to the US Government the next day but was not made public until the following week. (TS) “Brief of Pertinent Messages Between JCS and General Clark . . .,” cited in last note; *NY Times*, 10 Sep 52, p. 3.

91. (U) Msg, JCS 917910 to CINCFE, 8 Sep 52.

92. *Ibid.*

93. (TS) “Brief of Pertinent Messages Between JCS and General Clark . . .,” cited in note 89 above.

94. (TS) Msg, JCS 917927 to CINCFE, 9 Sep 52.

95. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 55003 to DA for JCS, 11 Sep 52, DA IN 182579.

96. *Ibid.*

97. This inference seems to follow from Secretary Lovett’s remarks about “the discussion between State and Defense” in the memorandum cited in note 98.

98. (TS) Memo for Record, SecDef Lovett, “Meeting with the President on Korean Situation,” 15 Sep 52, DA File, CSUSA 091 Korea (TS) 1951–52, case 40. This paragraph and the three following are based on this source.

99. As he did on 24 September, when he finally settled the issue (see below). As Secretary Acheson points out, it was President Truman’s regular practice to have spokesmen for all viewpoints present when reaching a decision on a disputed question (*Present at the Creation*, p. 733).

100. (TS) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Armistice Negotiations in Korea,” 17 Sep 52, w/encls, draft memo, JCS to SecDef, and draft msgs prepared by JCS and by State, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 112.

101. This account of the Lovett-Acheson conference of 17 Sep 52 is taken from (TS) Memo of Conf, ADM Fechteler, “State-Defense Conference on Korean Armistice Negotiation—17 September 1952,” n.d. [17 Sep 52], CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 112. An attached office memo by ADM Fechteler, also dated 17 Sep 52, indicates that he prepared the memo with the help of RADM Libby but that it had not been confirmed by Secretary Lovett.

102. In speaking of the “Mexican proposition,” Secretary Acheson was actually thinking of only a portion of the plan offered by President Aleman, namely, immediate settlement of the war on the basis of an exchange of 83,000 prisoners for 12,000, leaving the fate of the remaining prisoners to be determined later. The rest of the plan—that UN members accept nonrepatriated prisoners as tempo-

rary immigrants—never entered the discussion, since obviously it would come into play only after the enemy had agreed to the earlier part.

103. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 54177 to DA for JCS, 25 Aug 52, DA IN 176419.

104. *Ibid.*

105. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Release of 11,000 Anti-Communist South Korean POWs,” n.d. [ca. 10 Sep 52], CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 11. (U) Msg, DA 917089 to CINCFE, 27 Aug 52; (S) Msg, JCS 917260 to CINCFE, 29 Aug 52.

106. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, cited in preceding note.

107. (U) Msg, JCS 918515 to CINCFE, 15 Sep 52. Approval of the President was obtained at the meeting of 15 Sep 52 described above (see note 98).

108. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 55410 to DA for JCS, 19 Sep 52, DA IN 185490. *NY Times*, 21 Sep 52, p. 2. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 3, vol. 1, pp. 117–118. Earlier meetings in September were held on the 4th and 12th of the month (*ibid.*, p. 145).

109. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 55641 to DA for JCS, 23 Sep 52, DA IN 186885.

110. The conference of 24 Sep 52 is described in (TS) Memo for Record, “White House Meeting on Status of Korean Truce Negotiations, 24 September 1952,” no signature or date, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 112 (filed under date 7 Sep 52, along with Fechteler memo of that date cited in note 101 above). Another copy is in CJCS Message Book, CINCFE Outgoing (Mar 52–Jul 53), filed between messages dated 25 and 26 Sep 52. Neither copy gives any clue as to the originator of the memo. The account of the conference given here is taken entirely from this source.

111. (U) Msg, JCS 919368 to CINCFE, 25 Sep 52.

112. *Ibid.*

113. (TS) Msg, Pres to CINCFE (Personal for GEN Clark), 262005Z Sep 52, DA IN 188571. General Clark acknowledged this message the next day, assuring the President that matters would be handled as he had ordered: (U) Msg, CINCFE C 55891 to Pres (Personal from GEN Clark), 27 Sep 52, DA IN 188775.

114. The meeting of 28 September is described in (U) Msg, CINCUNC Z 23092 to DA for JCS, 28 Sep 52, DA IN 687567.

115. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 56247 to DA for JCS, 2 Oct 52, DA IN 190583, CX 56259, DA IN 190591. (U) Msgs, JCS 920188 to CINCFE, 3 Oct 52, and JCS 920223 and 920224 to CINCFE, 4 Oct 52. Drafts of these JCS messages in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 114 attest to the extent of JCS-State discussion.

116. (U) Msg, CINCFE Z 24663 to DA for JCS, 8 Oct 52, DA IN 690940. The text of GEN Harrison’s statement is in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 20 Oct 52, pp. 601–602.

117. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 20 Oct 52, pp. 600–601.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 600.

119. (U) Msg, CINCUNC Z 25921 to DA for JCS, 16 Oct 52, DA IN 693690.

120. (U) Msg, CINCFE Z 25907 to DA for JCS, 16 Oct 52, DA IN 693710; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 57177 to DA for JCS, 17 Oct 52, DA IN 196636; (U) Msg, JCS 921487 to CINCFE, 18 Oct 52; (U) Msg, CINCUNC Z 26370 to DA for JCS, 20 Oct 52, DA IN 694732. Texts of both of the Communist notes and the UNC replies are printed in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 10 Nov 52, pp. 751–754.

Chapter 6. Problems and Progress

1. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1952*, pp. 311–322. Secretary Acheson’s speech of January 1950 has been discussed in Ch. I. For Mr. Acheson’s comments on General Eisenhower’s charges, see *Present at the Creation*, pp. 690–691.

2. The quotations in the two preceding paragraphs are from Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1952*, pp. 319–321. President Truman later sharply criticized the General’s statements on Korea, particularly his promised trip, which could accomplish “little if anything” (*Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 501–502).

3. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1952*, p. 321.

4. *NY Times*, 20 Nov 52, p. 1.

5. (S) Position Paper on Korean Question, 9 Oct 52, and Annex A, Draft Resolution, Encl to (S) Memo, OSD to JCS, “US Position on Korea in the General Assembly of the United Nations,” 18 Oct 52, (Encl and App to JCS 1776/325, 21 Oct 52); (S) Msg, USUN to State, DELGA 28, 21 Oct 52, DA IN 198071 (containing revised version of draft resolution), Encl B to JCS 1776/326, 22 Oct 52; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 22 Oct 52 (der from JCS 1776/327); CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 115.

6. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 3 Nov 52, pp. 679–692. The text of the resolution is given on p. 680.

7. *Ibid.*, 10 Nov 52, pp. 761–762, 17 Nov 52, pp. 802–803. (S) Msg, USUN DELGA 134 to State, 6 Nov 52, DA IN 204722 (copy in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 116).
8. (TS) Memo, OSD to JCS, “U.S. Position on Korea in the General Assembly of the United Nations,” 27 Oct 52, Encl to JCS 1776/329, 29 Oct 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 116; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 17 Nov 52 (der from JCS 1776/334), same file, sec 117.
9. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 18 Nov 52, Encl to JCS 1776/338, 19 Nov 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 117.
10. (U) Msg, USUN DELGA 206 to State, 17 Nov 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 117, gives the text of the Indian resolution as submitted on 17 November. Secretary Acheson first learned of the general nature of the Indian plan from a British representative on 28 October (Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 700).
11. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 700–702.
12. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 701. (TS) Memo of Conversation, 17 Nov 52, describing meeting of Secs Acheson, Lovett, and GEN Bradley with UK and Canadian representatives in New York, CJCS File, 091 Korea (1952). This memo is unsigned but was prepared by LTC J. B. Matthews, International Branch, G3; see (S) Memo, LTC Matthews to GEN Bradley, “Discussion with Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot on the Indian Resolution with respect to POWs,” 21 Nov 52, same file.
13. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 700–702. (TS) Msg, USUN DELGA 196 to State, 15 Nov 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 117.
14. (U) Msg, USUN DELGA 206 to State, 17 Nov 52, same file.
15. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 703–705. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 8 Dec 52, pp. 910–917. *NY Times*, 2 Dec 52, p. 1, 4 Dec 52, p. 1. For GEN Bradley’s participation in the effort to have the resolution amended, see the memo from LTC Matthews to GEN Bradley, 21 Nov 52, cited in note 12, and (U) Memo, RADM H. P. Smith (Dir, Ofc of Mil Assistance, DOD) to GEN Bradley, 24 Nov 52, same file.
16. *NY Times*, 7 Dec 52, p. 1. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 705.
17. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 3, vol. 1, pp. 160–162. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 403–404.
18. (U) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 3, vol. 1, p. 162. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 405–406. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 705.
19. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 60653 to DA for JCS, 30 Dec 52, DA IN 222189.
20. (TS) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 3, vol. 1, pp. 164–166. (U) Msg, JCS 928298 to CINCFE, 9 Jan 53.
21. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 52443 to DA, 24 Jul 52, DA IN 164488; CINCUNC CX 53852 to DA, 18 Aug 52, DA IN 173806.
22. (S) Msg, Pusan 238 to State, 22 Aug 52, DA IN 176155.
23. (TS) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Trial of POWs for Post-Capture Offenses,” 28 Aug 52 (JCS 2095/13, same date); (U) Memo for Record, SJCS, “Trials of POWs in UNC Custody for Post-Capture Offenses,” 2 Sep 52; CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 11. (U) Msg, DA 917477 to CINCUNC, 2 Sep 52. The letter from GEN Clark to GEN Bradley has not been found but is referred to in the CSA Memo cited here.
24. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 60821 to DA for JCS, 5 Jan 53, DA IN 223686; (U) Msg, JCS 928298 to CINCFE, 9 Jan 53. The JCS recommendation for an interdepartmental committee was contained in (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Trial of Prisoners of War for Post-Capture Offenses,” 9 Jan 53 (der from JCS 2095/15), CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 13. Apparently the recommendation was never put into effect, although Secretary Lovett sent it to the Secretary of State with his approval: (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 19 Jan 53, same file.
25. (U) Msg, CINCFE ZX 35682 to DA, 28 Jan 53, DA IN 727513.
26. (U) CINCUNC CX 61135 to DA for JCS, 4 Feb 53, DA IN 233925. The murder of the US soldier had been reported in (U) CINCUNC CX 61076 to DA for JCS, 20 Jan 53, DA IN 232248.
27. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Trial of Prisoners of War for Post-Capture Offenses,” 11 Feb 53 (der from JCS 2095/16); (U) Ltr, ASD(ISA) (Frank C. Nash) to AsstSecState for FE Aff (John M. Allison), 16 Feb 53; (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, same subj, 20 Feb 53; CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 14. (U) Msg, JCS 931969 to CINCFE, 20 Feb 53.
28. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 61323 to DA, 24 Feb 53, DA IN 240527; JCS 932476 to CINCFE, 27 Feb 53. The JCS message was presumably cleared with SecDef and State before being sent, but the fact is not documented in available records.
29. (U) Msg, JCS 919368 to CINCFE, 25 Sep 52.
30. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 296–311; Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 323.
31. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 311–318.
32. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 328–329; Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 487–497.

33. (U) SM–548–52 to JSSC, 25 Feb 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 86. (U) JCS 1776/287, 3 Apr 52, same file, sec 92. (U) JCS 1776/291, 22 Apr 52, same file, sec 95. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Courses of Action in Korea,” 30 Apr 52 (der from JCS 1776/291); (U) SM–1086–52 to JSPC, JIC, and JLPC, 30 Apr 52; same file, sec 96.
34. (U) SM–1270–52 to JSPC, 22 May 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 100 (Encl B to JCS 1776/316, 24 Sep 52, same file, sec 113).
35. (TS) JCS 1776/310, 29 Aug 52, same file, sec 110.
36. (U) SM–2093–52 to JSPC, 5 Sep 52, same file, sec 111. (U) JCS 1776/316, 24 Sep 52, and Dec On, 6 Oct 52, same file, sec 113. (TS) JCS 1776/321, 2 Oct 52, and Dec On, 7 Oct 52; (TS) SM–2340–52 to JSPC, JLPC, and JIC, 7 Oct 52, same file, sec 114.
37. (U) Msg, JCS 919187 to CINCFE, 23 Sep 52.
38. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 56022 to DA for JCS, 29 Sep 52, DA IN 189331.
39. *Ibid.*
40. (TS) Ltr, GEN Clark to GEN Collins, no subj., 9 Oct 52, DA files, G3 091 Korea 1952 (TS) Section I–C, Bk 3, Case 8.
41. (U) CINCUNC OPLAN 8–52, 15 Oct 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) BP pt 4.
42. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 81.
43. (U) Ltr, CINCUNC to CSA, 16 Oct 52, Encl to JCS 1776/330, 30 Oct 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 116.
44. (U) Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, “Reduction of U.S. Manpower in Korea,” 16 Oct 52, Encl to Memo, OSD to JCS, same subj, 29 Oct 52 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/331, 31 Oct 52), same file.
45. (TS) Ltr, GEN Collins to GEN Clark, 7 Nov 52, DA files, G3 091 Korea (TS) Sec I–C, Bk 3, Case 8.
46. This account of General Eisenhower’s visit to Korea is drawn from the following sources: Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (1963), pp. 130–134; Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 232–239; (U) Msg, CINCPACFLT to DA for CJCS, 102101Z Dec 52, DA IN 216232 (Personal from GEN Bradley to BG W. S. Matthews, of his office); handwritten memo by GEN Bradley, 15 Dec 52 (no classification indicated), CJCS File. 091 Korea (1952). See also the following messages, which describe plans for the trip: (U) D924708 to CINCFE, 25 Nov 52; (U) CINCFE C 59375 to CSUSA, 27 Nov 52, DA IN 211629; (U) CINCFE C 59410 to CSUSA, 28 Nov 52, DA IN 211855.
47. General Chase apparently misrepresented Chiang’s views on the use of Nationalist troops in Korea. On returning to Taiwan, General Chase found that the Generalissimo now had little enthusiasm for this action; he feared Communist air raids in reprisal and asked that modernization of his air force be given priority. (TS) *History of the Formosan Situation*, pp. 129–130. Probably for this reason, General Eisenhower, after he became President, abandoned the idea of using Nationalists in Korea. He did, however, cancel President Truman’s order to the Seventh Fleet, issued in June 1950, prohibiting any Chinese Nationalist offensive action against mainland China. (TS) Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, pp. 489–491.
48. *NY Times*, 6 Dec 52, p. 1. (U) Msg, CINCPACFLT to DA for CJCS, 102101Z Dec 52, DA IN 216232.
49. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 233. The President-elect was, however, aware of OPLAN 8–52; he and Mr. Wilson had been briefed on it before departure. (U) JCS 1776/374, 9 Jun 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 130.
50. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 61157 to DA for JCS, 7 Feb 53, DA IN 235064.
51. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 61172 to DA for JCS, 9 Feb 53, DA IN 235464.
52. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61160 to DA for JCS, 7 Feb 53, DA IN 235072. For the agreement of October 1951 regarding Kaesong, see Ch. 1.
53. (U) NSC Action No. 708, 11 Feb 53. (U) Memo, O.N.B. [GN Bradley] to GEN Cabell, 11 Feb 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 123.
54. (U) Msg, JCS 931311 to CINCFE, 13 Feb 53.
55. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 61283 to DA for JCS, 19 Feb 53, DA IN 239106.
56. (U) Msg, JCS 931744 to CINCFE, 18 Feb 53.
57. See Ch. 5.
58. (TS) Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, “Further Expansion of Republic of Korea Army Forces,” 17 Nov 52, App to JCS 1776/340, 9 Dec 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 118.
59. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Further Expansion of the ROK Army Forces,” 5 Dec 52, (Encl to JCS 1776/340), 9 Dec 52, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 118.
60. (TS) Briefing for the Secretary of Defense Designate by the Chief of Staff, 17 Dec 52, Army files, GS 337 (TS) Sec 4, Case 64, 1952.
61. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 60941 to DA for JCS, 14 Jan 53, DA IN 226714.

62. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Augmentation of the Wartime Republic of Korea Army," 19 Jan 53 (der from JCS 1776/343), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 120. (U) Msg, JCS 929141 to CINCFE, 19 Jan 53. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, same subj, 30 Jan 53, same file, sec 121.

63. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Further Expansion of the ROK Forces," 11 Feb 53 (der from JCS 1776/355), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 123. This memo also responded to one from Secretary Wilson in which he had asked for more complete information on the logistic implications of expanding the ROK: (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Augmentation of the Wartime Republic of Korea Army, and Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces," 3 Feb 53, Encl to JCS 1776/351, 4 Feb 53, same file, sec 122.

64. See (TS) Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, pp. 5–13, for the budgetary outlook of the Eisenhower administration and its early attack on the FY 1954 budget inherited from President Truman.

65. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Further Expansion of Republic of Korea Forces," 18 Mar 53, (Encl to JCS 1776/363, 19 Mar 53), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 125.

66. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Further Expansion of Republic of Korea Forces," 25 Mar 53 (der from JCS 1776/364), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 125.

67. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 61791 to DA for CSUSA, 7 Apr 53, DA IN 254982.

68. Ibid.

69. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 61837 to DA for JCS, 9 Apr 53, DA IN 255747.

70. Ibid.

71. (U) NSC Action No. 765, 22 Apr 53. The JCS recommendation was apparently made orally; there is no evidence of a memorandum on the subject.

72. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Further Expansion of the Republic of Korea Forces," 13 May 53, seen in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 128, cannot now be located.

73. (U) NSC Action No. 787, 13 May 53. (U) Msg, DA 938886 to CINCFE, 14 May 53.

74. These factors pointing to a need for policy reexamination were cited in (TS) NSC Staff Study, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," pp. 3–4, pars 6–7, Encl to (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC Planning Board, same subj, 31 Mar 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) BP pt 6. NCS 118/2 is fully described in Ch. 2.

75. *NY Times*, 6 Mar 53, p. 1.

76. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 189.

77. (TS) JCS 1776/354, 12 Feb 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) BP pt 5. (TS) JCS 1776/357, 19 Feb 53, and Dec On 20 Feb 53, same file, sec 123. (U) JCS 1776/365, 23 Mar 53, same file, sec 125. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Future Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea," 27 Mar 53, with Apps A and B (der from JCS 1776/367), same file, BP pt 6.

78. (TS) App A to Memo, JCS to SecDef, 27 Mar 53, cited in note 77.

79. Ibid.

80. (TS) App to Memo, JCS to SecDef, 27 Mar 53, cited in note 77.

81. App C to JCS 1776/365, 23 Mar 53, cited in note 77.

82. The number of aircraft available to the UNC was not given in the JCS study. In July 1953 FEAF had 19 groups (or wings) and 69 squadrons, with 1,536 aircraft (Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, p. 644). This was doubtless close to the figure for March 1953.

83. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Future Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea," 27 Mar 53, cited in note 77; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, same subj, 30 Mar 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 126. The NSC Planning Board was the new name given the Senior Staff in a reorganization of the NSC machinery ordered by President Eisenhower in March 1953.

84. NSC 147, 2 Apr 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) BP pt 7.

85. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Possible Actions to Impress Communists in Korea of U.N. Offensive Intentions in Event Armistice Negotiations Break Down," 4 May 53 (der from JCS 1776/370), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 128.

86. (U) NSC Action No. 782, 6 May 1953.

87. A report intended to provide the basis for the JCS position was submitted by the JSPC on the same day the Council met: (U) JCS 1776/372, 13 May 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 128.

88. (U) NSC Action No. 787, 13 May 53. The briefing by GEN Hull and MG Bradley was presumably based on the JCS memo of 27 Mar 53 to the SecDef. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not present at the meeting.

89. (U) JCS 1776/372, 13 May 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 128.

90. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea (Analysis)," 19 May 53 (der from JCS 1776/372), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 129.

91. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea (Analysis)," 19 May 53 (der from JCS 1776/372), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 129.

92. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea (Analysis)," 19 May 53 (der from JCS 1776/372), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 129.
93. (U) JCS 1776/374, 9 Jun 1953.
94. (U) JCS 1776/374, 9 Jun 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 130. (U) Msg, JCS 941479 to CINCFE et al., 16 Jun 53.
95. (U) Msg, JCS 931742 to CINCFE, 18 Feb. 52, summarizes the text of the resolution and gives the results of the voting.
96. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 60418 to DA for G3, 21 Dec 52, DA IN 220029.
97. (U) Msg, JCS 931724 to CINCFE, 18 Feb 53 (with draft in CCS 000.5 (5–12–49) sec 14); (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61281 to DA, 19 Feb 53, DA IN 239084. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 411. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 6 Apr 53, p. 494.
98. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 412.
99. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61670 to DA for JCS, 28 Mar 53, DA IN 251884. The text of the enemy letter is printed in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 6 Apr 53, pp. 494–495.
100. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 61673 to DA for JCS, 29 Mar 53, DA IN 252152; (U) Msg, JCS 935136 to CINCUNC, 30 Mar 53; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 61707 to DA for JCS, 2 Apr 53, DA IN 253384. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 13 Apr 53, p. 528.
101. *NY Times*, 31 Mar 53, p. 1. Text of statement in *ibid.*, p. 4, and Dept of State *Bulletin*, 13 Apr 53, pp. 526–527.
102. *NY Times*, 1 Jun 53. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) CX 61710 to DA for JCS, 2 Apr 53, DA IN 253423 (giving text of statement by Kim Il Sung).
103. (U) Msg, JCS 935344 to CINCUNC, 1 Apr 53.
104. *Ibid*; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (1960), p. 147.
105. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 61723 to DA for JCS, 3 Apr 53, DA IN 253841; CINCUNC Tokyo CX 61752 to CINCUNC (ADV), 4 Apr 53, DA IN 254440. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 414.
106. (U) Msg, JCS 935741 to CINCFE, 4 Apr 53.
107. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 61759 to DEPTAR for JCS, 5 Apr 53, DA IN 254628; CINCUNC CX 61752 to CINCUNC (ADV), 4 Apr 53, DA IN 254440. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 414–415. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC Z 36241 to DA for JCS, DA IN 751909; C 61889, 12 Apr 53, DA IN 256807. While the UNC liaison officer told the Communists that he found the number of UNC prisoners to be returned "incredibly small," General Clark informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the number appeared reasonable to him. He declared himself "happy that no more of our side are seriously sick and wounded." (U) Msgs, CINCUNC Z 36208 to DA for JCS, 8 Apr 53, DA IN 750638; CINCFE C 61813 to DA for JCS, 8 Apr 53, DA IN 255325.
108. The enemy made every effort to create propaganda out of the exchange and some minor difficulties were encountered. For details of Operation LITTLE SWITCH see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 414–419, and Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 240–256.
109. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 61854 to DA, 10 Apr 53, DA IN 256085.
110. (U) Msgs, JCS 936633 to CINCFE, 15 Apr 53; CINCUNC Tokyo CX 61945 to CINCUNC (ADV), 16 Apr 53, DA IN 258014; CINCUNC Z 36299 to DA for JCS, 16 Apr 53 (17 Apr, Far East time), DA IN 753825.
111. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 61826 to DA for JCS, 9 Apr 53, DA IN 255672; JCS 936633 to CINCFE, 15 Apr 53.
112. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC Z 36304 to DA for JCS, 17 Apr 53, DA IN 754088; Z 36315, 19 Apr 53, DA IN 754617; C 62063, 24 Apr 53, DA IN 260840.
113. (U) Msg, JCS 937205 to CINCFE (CSUSA to CINCUNC) 23 Apr 53.
114. (U) Msg, JCS 937205 to CINCFE (CSUSA to CINCUNC) 23 Apr 53.
115. Rhee's opposition to the armistice is described in detail later in the chapter. Three new faces appeared in the UNC delegation at the 26 April meeting: MG Choi Duk Shin (ROK Army), BG Edgar E. Glenn, USAF, and BG Ralph M. Osborne, USA, replaced BG Lee, BG Morris, and BG McConnell (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 422).
116. (U) Msg, CINCUNC Z 36387 to DA for JCS, 26 Apr 53, DA IN 756986.
117. (U) CINCUNC C 62103 to DA for JCS, 26 Apr 53, DA IN 261631.
118. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 62150 to DA for JCS, 29 Apr 53, DA IN 262411; JCS 938003 to CINCFE, 1 May 53.
119. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC ZX 36441 to DA for JCS, DA IN 159160, CX 62214, DA IN 263713, CX 62221, DA IN 263750, all dated 2 May 53.
120. (U) Msg, DA 938041 to CINCFE, 2 May 53.
121. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC ZX 36456 to DA for JCS and AMB Pusan, 4 May 53, DA IN 759486; JCS 938085 to CINCFE, 4 May 53.
122. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62251 to DA for JCS, 5 May 53, DA IN 264366.

123. (U) Msg, CINCUNC ZX 36484 to DA for JCS, 7 May 53, DA IN 760688.
124. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62301 to DA for JCS, 8 May 53, DA IN 265477.
125. (U) Msg, DA 938429 to CINCFE, 8 May 53, (CSUSA to CINCUNC; sent at direction of JCS).
126. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC ZX 36511 to DA for JCS, 9 May 53, DA IN 761563; ZX 36524, 10 May 53, DA IN 761777.
127. (U) Msg, DA 938571 to CINCFE, 10 May 53; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62296 to DA for JCS, 7 May 53, DA IN 265173.
128. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 62354 to DA for JCS, 11 May 53, DA IN 266330; JCS 938626 to CINCFE, 11 May 53.
129. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 427–428. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC (ADV) HNC 1678 to DA for JCS, 12 May 53, DA IN 266709; JCS 938704 to CINCFE, 12 May 53.
130. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 62385 to DA for JCS, 13 May 53, DA IN 267018; ZX 36559, 13 May 53, DA IN 762671. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 427.
131. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62456 to DA for JCS, 16 May 53, DA IN 268196.
132. Ibid.
133. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 62419 to DA for JCS, 14 May 53, DA IN 267421.
134. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 461. Futrell, *US in Force in Korea*, pp. 624–628.
135. (U) Msg, JCS 939673 to CINCFE, 23 May 53.
136. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 61324 to DA for JCS, 24 Feb 53, DA IN 240638.
137. (U) Msg, JCS 934994 to CINCFE, 27 Mar 53 (with draft in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 126. (No draft in file.))
138. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 61736 to DA for JCS, 4 Apr 53, DA IN 254383.
139. Ibid.; (U) Msgs, CG 8th Army G 3731 KCG to CINCFE, 5 Apr 53, DA IN 254706; CG 8th Army G 3756 KGIC to CG AFE ADV), 6 Apr 53, DA IN 254969; CINCFE C 61736 to DA for JCS, 4 Apr 53, DA IN 254383.
140. (U) Msg, JCS 936213 to CINCUNC, 10 Apr 53.
141. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 61949 to DA for JCS, 16 Apr 53, DA IN 258050.
142. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 61976 to DA for JCS, 18 Apr 53, DA IN 258833. The question of an agreement on control of ROK forces had been discussed in February 1952; see Ch. 4.
143. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 261; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 442–443.
144. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 62098 to DA for JCS, 26 Apr 53, DA IN 261611.
145. (U) Msg, DA 937468 to CINCFE, 27 Apr 53; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 62143 to DA for Collins, 28 Apr 53, DA IN 262143.
146. Mr. Briggs replaced Ambassador Muccio in November 1952 (*NY Times*, 7 Nov 52, p. 2).
147. Both letters are quoted in full in (U) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, Pt 4, pp. 97–100.
148. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 444. (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) to DA for JCS, HNC 1678, 12 May 53, DA IN 266709.
149. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 62406 to DA for JCS, 13 May 53, DA IN 267117.
150. (U) Msg, JCS 939673 to CINCFE, 23 May 53.
151. See Ch. 2 for the “greater sanctions” statement.
152. The above account of the Clark-Briggs-Rhee meeting of 25 May is taken from (U) Msg, CG 8th Army to DA for JCS, 250539Z May 53, DA IN 270912; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62630 to DA for JCS, 26 May 53, DA IN 271119; (U) Msg, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 261008Z May 53, DA IN 271212; Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 268–271. The concluding quotation is from Msg DA IN 271212.
153. (U) CG 8th Army to DA for JCS, 250610Z May 53, DA IN 270918.
154. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62727 to DA for JCS, 29 May 53, DA IN 272308.
155. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62726 to CINCUNC (ADV), 29 May 53, DA IN 272310.
156. An outline of Plan EVERREADY (U), dtd 4 May 53, is in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 130, files under date 5 Jun 53. A shorter brief is given as Encl A to (U) JCS 1776/373, 5 Jun 53, same file.
157. (U) JCS 1776/373, 5 Jun 53, p. 2330, para 2.
158. (U) SM–916–53 to JSPC, 5 May 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45), sec 128.
159. (U) Memo for Record, MG C.D. Eddleman, USA (ACS, G3), “Conference on the Current Difficulties with the ROK Government due to their Dissatisfaction with Armistice Terms,” 1 Jun 53, Encl to (U) Memo, LTG L.L. Lemnitzer, USA (DCS, P&R) to DepSec JCS, 5 Jun 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) section 130. (U) Msg, DA 940238 to CINCFE (CSUSA Exclusive for GEN Clark), 30 May 53 (DTG 300357Z, or 292357 Washington time).
160. (U) SM–1099–53 to JSPC, 1 Jun 53. CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 129.
161. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 62747 to DA for JCS, 30 May 53, DA IN 272725. Copy in CJCS Message Book, CINCFE Incoming Apr–May 53, was timestamped in JCS Msg Ctr at 301006, Washington time.
162. (U) Memo for Record, MG Eddleman, 1 Jun 53, cited in note 161 above.

163. (U) Msgs, DA 940241 and 940242 to CINCFE, 30 May 53.

164. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 62750 to DA for JCS, 31 May 53, DA IN 272838. Formal action on Plan EVERREADY was completed on the basis of a JSPC study, which concluded that the actions set forth were “feasible and appropriate” (except for the establishment of a military government) and that CINCUNC had already been granted the necessary authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted this conclusion on 16 June and so informed General Clark the following day. (U) JCS 1776/373, 5 Jun 53, and Dec On, 17 Jun 53; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 130; (U) Msg, JCS 941567 to CINCFE, 17 Jun 53.

165. (U) HQ AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 3, vol 2, pp. 380–384. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 62621 to DA for JCS, DA IN 270932, DA IN 270940, both 25 May 53.

166. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 62582 to DA for JCS, 23 May 53, DA IN 270595; (U) JCS 939867 to CINCFE, 26 May 53; (U) Msg CINCUNC C 62700 to DA for JCS, 28 May 53, DA IN 271866; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62796 to JCS, 3 Jun 53, DA IN 273690.

167. (U) Msg, CINCUNC ZX 36732 to DA for JCS et al., 31 May 53, DA IN 76847; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62808 to DA for JCS, 4 Jun 53, DA IN 274024; (TS) DA 940728 to CINCFE, 5 Jun 53, (State-Defense Message); (U) Msg, CINCUNC (ADV) CX 62581 to CINCUNC HNC 1720, Tokyo and DA for JCS, 6 Jun 53, DA IN 274749. Presumably President Eisenhower was consulted regarding the acceptability of the enemy draft of 4 June, but available documents do not so indicate.

168. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62869 to DA for JCS, 6 Jun 53, DA IN 274848; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62875 to CINCUNC (ADV), 7 Jun 53, DA IN 275018; (S) Msg, DA 940816 to CINCFE, 7 Jun 53; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62893 to DA for JCS, 8 Jun 53, DA IN 275125.

169. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62908 to DA for JCS, 8 Jun 53, DA IN 275149. *NY Times*, 8 Jun 53, p. 1. The text of the agreement in given in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 22 Jun 53, pp. 866–868.

170. (TS) Msg, JCS 940978 to CINCFE, 9 Jun 53. For the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, see Ch. 3.

Chapter 7. Finale: Suspense to the End

1. Ch. 6, pp. 193–194.

2. (U) Hq AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 4, pp. 172–174, prints the text of Rhee’s message, as given in a message on 2 Jun 53 from AMB Briggs to CINCUNC, sent via 8th Army.

3. Ch. 6, p. 225.

4. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62781 to DA for JCS, 2 Jun 53, DA IN 273323; (TS) Msg, DA 940543 to CINCFE, 4 Jun 53, (CSUSA to CINCUNC, with instructions to pass to AMB Briggs).

5. (U) Msg, GEN Clark and AMB Briggs to SecState, 050850Z Jun 53, DA IN 274380.

6. *NY Times*, 6 Jun 53, p. 1. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62854 to DA for JCS, 6 Jun 53, DA IN 274780, gives advance text of the statement; it was furnished to GEN Harrison by the ROK delegate, GEN Choi, with the “hope” that it would be introduced into the negotiations.

7. (U) Msg, DA 940811 to CINCFE, 6 Jun 53 (CSUSA to CINCUNC). Text also in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 15 Jun 53, pp. 835–836.

8. (U) Msg, 8th Army GX 5715 KCG to DA for JCS, 7 Jun 53, DA IN 275056; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62890 to DA for JCS, 7 Jun 53, DA IN 275070.

9. (U) Hq, AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 4, pp. 197–208; (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 62899 to DA for JCS, 8 Jun 53, DA IN 275135, C 62933, 9 Jun 53, DA IN 275482.

10. See Ch. 6, p. 200.

11. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 62955 to DA for JCS, 10 Jun 53, DA IN 27571. This message quotes the State Dept message referred to in the preceding paragraph.

12. (TS) Msg, JCS 941344 to CINCFE, 12 Jun 53. For subsequent developments on this matter, see pp. 256–257.

13. (U) Hq AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 4, pp. 214–222.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 222–224, giving the text of Rhee’s message as contained in a message from Seoul to State on 17 June 1953. The text is also in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 6 Jul 53, pp. 13–14, where the date is given as 19 June.

15. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 62927 to DA for JCS, 9 Jun 53, DA IN 275432; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 62963 to DA for JCS and AMB Pusan, 10 Jun 53, DA IN 275829; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63069 to DA for JCS, 15 Jun 53, DA IN 277552; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63119 to DA for JCS, 17 Jun 53, DA IN 278316.

16. (U) Msg, CG, 8th Army to DA for JCS, 250610Z May 53, DA IN 270918. The rescreening of prisoners in June–July 1952 (Ch. 5, pp. 156–157, 159) had shown 34,373 North Koreans opposing repa-

triation. At the time of the breakout on 17–18 June 1953, this number had increased to 35,472 men, divided among 8 camps; (U) Msg, CGAFFE EX 18733 to DA for JCS, 20 Jun 53, DA IN 279903.

17. (U) Hq AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 4, pp. 226–233. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 62899 to DA for JCS, 8 Jun 53, DA IN 275135; C 62933, 9 Jun 53, DA IN 275482; C 63114, 17 Jun 53, DA IN 278302.

18. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 62910 to DA for JCS, 8 June 53, DA IN 275159. Plan EVERREADY is described in the preceding chapter.

19. (U) Msg, CG 8th Army to DA for JCS, 250610Z May 53, DA IN 270918.

20. *NY Times*, 18 Jun 53, p. 1. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 29 Jun 53, p. 905. (U) Msg, CINCFE ZX 36907 to DA for CINFOR, 18 Jun 53, DA IN 775359; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 63128 to DA for JCS, 17 Jun 53, DA IN 278617; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63138 to DA for JCS, 18 Jun 53, DA IN 278743; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63145 to DA for JCS, 18 Jun 53, DA IN 278759.

21. *NY Times*, 19 Jun 53, p. 1. (U) Msg, CINCFE, CX 63170 to DA for JCS, 19 Jun 53, DA IN 279091; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 63171 to DA for JCS, 19 Jun 53, DA IN 279102; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63176 to DA for JCS, 19 Jun 53, DA IN 279124; (U) Msg, CGAFFE EX 18733 to DA for JCS, 20 Jun 53, DA IN 279903; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63239 to DA for JCS, 21 Jun 53, DA IN 279977. *Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 542.

22. Text of Rhee's announcement given in (U) Msg, Seoul 10 to State, 18 Jun 53, DA IN 775375.

23. (U) Msg, CINCFE ZX 36907 to DA for JCS, 18 Jun 53, DA IN 775359; (U) Hq AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 4, pp. 239–240; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63156 to CG 8th Army Korea et al., 18 Jun 53, DA IN 278812. Clark's letter to Rhee is also reprinted in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 29 Jun 53, p. 907; it is dated 20 Jun 53, which may be the date of a confirmatory written copy (the original version was delivered through Eighth Army channels).

24. Text of both letters in (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63182 to DA for JCS, 19 Jun 53, DA IN 279172. Pyun's letter is in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 29 Jun 53, p. 906. For the UNC proposal of 13 May 53, see Ch. 6, pp. 215–216.

25. (U) NSC Action No. 816, 18 Jun 53.

26. (U) Hq, AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 4, pp. 241–243.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 243; Dept of State *Bulletin*, 29 Jun 53, p. 905.

28. (U) Hq AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 4, pp. 266–268; *NY Times*, 19 Jun 53, p. 1.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 244–245.

30. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 63170 to DA for JCS, 19 Jun 53, DA IN 279091; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63176 to DA for JCS, 19 Jun 53, DA IN 279124; (U) Msg, JCS 941793 to CINCFE, 19 Jun 53.

31. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63227 to DA for JCS, 20 Jun 53, DA IN 279698.

32. General Taylor became Commanding General, Eighth Army, on 11 Feb 53, replacing General Van Fleet, who retired (*Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 390–391).

33. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 63215 to DA for JCS, 21 Jun 53, DA IN 280068.

34. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63246 to DA for JCS, 21 Jun 53, DA IN 279990.

35. (U) Hq AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt 4, p. 273.

36. (U) Msg, DA 942008 to CINCFE, 22 Jun 53. The text of Secretary Dulles' letter to Dr. Rhee is printed in (S) Dept of State Research Project No. 339, "The Rhee-Robertson Conversations and Their Aftermath," Jul 53, pp. 6–8 (copy in JCS Hist Div files, hereafter cited as "Rhee-Robertson Conversations").

37. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63157 to DA for JCS, 18 Jun 53, DA IN 278820.

38. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63162 to DA for JCS, 18 Jun 53, DA IN 278850.

39. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 63168 to DA for JCS, 19 Jun 53, DA IN 279086, CINCUNC CX 63189 to DA for JCS, 19 Jun 53, DA IN 279185.

40. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63214 to DA for JCS, 20 Jun 53, DA IN 279652; Dept of State *Bulletin*, 29 Jun 53, pp. 906–907.

41. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63228 to DA for JCS, 20 Jun 53, DA IN 279718.

42. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63250 to DA (Exclusive for Acting CJCS), 21 Jun 53, DA IN 279998. The Acting CJCS at that time was Admiral Fechteler, the CNO; General Bradley was ill and on convalescent leave (*NY Times*, 21 June 53, p. 54).

43. (TS) Msg, DA 942048 to CINCUNC, 22 Jun 53; (U) Msg, JCS 942083 to CINCFE, 23 Jun 53 (both Joint State-Defense msgs).

44. (U) Msg, CG, 8th Army to DA for JCS, 22 Jun 53, DA IN 280121.

45. (TS) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63325 to DA for State, Defense, and JCS, 25 Jun 53, DA IN 281220.

46. (U) Msg, CSUSA DA 942296 to CINCFE (Exclusive to Clark from Hull), 25 Jun 53. During the discussion, President Eisenhower suggested the possibility of launching a local attack by ROK divisions, with US participation limited to artillery and air support; he thought that the outcome of such

an attack might well convince Rhee that he could not “go it alone.” Apparently no one present offered any comment on this idea, and nothing came of it.

47. (TS) Msg, JCS 942368 to CINCFE, 25 Jun 53.
48. (TS) Msg, JCS 942368 to CINCFE, 25 Jun 53. For the “greater sanction” statement, drafted in January 1952 in accord with a decision embodied in NCS 118/2, see Ch. 2, pp. 55–58.
49. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63347 to DA for JCS, 26 Jun 53, DA IN 281621.
50. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63341 to DA for JCS, 26 Jun 53, DA IN 281612. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 10–11.
51. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 12–15.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–18. (TS) Msg, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 281528Z Jun 53, DA IN 282344.
53. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 18–21. (TS) Msg, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 281528Z Jun 53, DA IN 282344.
54. (TS) Msg, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 281528Z Jun 53, DA IN 282344.
55. (U) Msg, CINCUNC HNC 1796 to DA for JCS, 29 Jun 53, DA IN 282416; Dept of State *Bulletin*, 13 Jul 53, pp. 46–47.
56. (TS) Msg, CG, 8th Army to DA for JCS, 290645 Jun 53, DA IN 282418.
57. (TS) Msg, DEF 942613 to CINCUNC, 30 Jun 53.
58. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63449 to DA for JCS et al., 2 Jul 53, DA IN 283539.
59. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63500 to SecDef, 5 Jul 53, DA IN 284490.
60. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 25–27.
61. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 30–32.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–35.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–38. (U) Hq AFFE, *Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 1952–July 1953)*, pt. 4, pp. 324–325.
64. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 41–42. (TS) Msg, Seoul to State, [unnumbered], 061600Z Jul 53, DA IN 284682.
65. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 42–43.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 44
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.
68. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” p. 49. (TS) Msg, Seoul [unnumbered] to State, 091125Z Jul 53, DA IN 285596.
69. (S) Msg, State 25 to Seoul, 8 Jul 53, DA IN 285439; (TS) Msg, Seoul [unnumbered] to State, 091125Z Jul 53, DA IN 285596.
70. (S) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63556 to DA for JCS and State, 9 Jul 53, DA IN 285500.
71. The texts of Rhee’s letter of 9 Jul 53 and of his draft of a security treaty are given respectively in (C) Msg, Seoul, [unnumbered], to State, 091315Z Jul 53, DA IN 285626, and (S) Seoul, [unnumbered], to State, 091320Z Jul 53, DA IN 285629. (TS) Msg, Seoul, [unnumbered], to State, 091125Z Jul 53, DA IN 285596, tells when Ambassador Robertson received the documents.
72. (S) Msg, Seoul, [unnumbered], to State, 091600Z Jul 53, DA IN 285728.
73. (S) Msg, State 31 to Seoul, 9 Jul 53, DA IN 286076.
74. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 59–60.
75. *NY Times*, 12 Jul 53, pp. 1, 3. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 20 Jul 53, pp. 72–73 (text of joint Rhee-Robertson statement). (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” p. 60 (text of Rhee letter to Eisenhower, dtd 11 Jul 53).
76. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63530 to DA for JCS, 7 Jul 53, DA IN 284883; (U) Msg, CINCUNC Z37098 to DA for JCS, 8 Jul 53, DA IN 782356; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63566 to DA for JCS, 9 Jul 53, DA IN 295573. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 20 Jul 53, pp. 73–74.
77. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 22 Jun 53, p. 866.
78. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63548 to DA for JCS, 8 Jul 53, DA IN 285236.
79. (U) Msg, JCS 943398 to CINCFE, 8 Jul 53, (joint State-Defense message).
80. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63567 to DA for JCS, 9 Jul 53, DA IN 285601. (TS) Msg, JCS 943567 to CINCFE, 10 Jul 53 (sent after the session of 10 July; see p. 249).
81. (U) NSC 154, 15 Jul 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 131.
82. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea (NSC 154),” 17 Jun 53 (derived from JCS 1776/378), same file.
83. (U) NSC Action No. 833, 2 Jul 53. (U) NSC 154/1, 7 Jul 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 132.
84. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63574 to DA for JCS, 10 Jul 53, DA IN 285955.
85. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63583 to DA, 10 Jul 53, DA IN 285965; (TS) Msg, JCS 943567 to CINCFE, 10 Jul 53.
86. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63608 to DA for JCS, 11 Jul 53, DA IN 286396.
87. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63460 to DA for JCS, 12 Jul 53, DA IN 286657.

88. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 63652 to DA for JCS and AMB Pusan, 13 Jul 53, DA IN 286821, CX 63671, 14 Jul 53, DA IN 287112. For the statement of Rhee to which the enemy delegation referred, see “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 61–62.

89. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63690 to DA for JCS, 14 Jul 53, DA IN 287143; (U) Msg, JCS 943836 to CINCFE, 14 Jul 53; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63702 to DA for JCS, 15 Jul 53, DA IN 387489.

90. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63715 to DA for JCS, 15 Jul 53, DA IN 287531; (S) Msg, JCS 943913 to CINCFE, 15 Jul 53, (joint State-Defense message).

91. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63731 to DA for JCS, 16 Jul 53, DA IN 387842.

92. The recess was extended an additional day at the request of the Communists. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63775 to DA for JCS, 18 Jul 53, DA IN 208606.

93. (U) Msg, CINCUNC ZX 37213 to DA for JCS and AMB Pusan, 19 Jul 53, DA IN 786720.

94. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63819 to DA for JCS and AMB Pusan, 19 Jul 53, DA IN 288983.

95. Ch. 6, pp. 194–196.

96. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 366–397, 459–465.

97. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62784 to DA for JCS, 2 Jun 53, DA IN 273332.

98. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 465–468.

99. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 62983 to DA for JCS, 11 Jun 53, DA IN 276324; (U) Msg, JCS 941184 to CINCFE, 11 Jun 53; Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 636–637. For the earlier attack on North Korean dams in May 53, see Ch. 6, p. 217.

100. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 470–475. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63693 to DA for JCS, 14 Jul 53, DA IN 287177.

101. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63436 to DA for JCS, 2 Jul 53, DA IN 283452; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63500 to SecDef, 5 Jul 53, DA IN 284490; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63704 to DA for JCS, 15 Jul 53, DA IN 287491. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 472, 475.

102. See Ch. 4, pp. 119–120. The garrison in Japan included two divisions, the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry, which, until Feb 52, had been in Korea where they were replaced by the 40th and 45th Infantry (National Guard) Divisions; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 202–204.

103. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63704 to DA for JCS, 15 Jul 53, DA IN 287491; (TS) Msg, JCS 944075 to CINCFE, 17 Jul 53.

104. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 475–477.

105. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63716 to DA for JCS, 15 Jul 53, DA IN 287555; (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63753 to DA for JCS, 17 Jul 53, DA IN 288220; (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63766 to DA for JCS, 17 Jul 53, DA IN 288275.

106. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63854 to DA for JCS, 21 Jul 53, DA IN 289372.

107. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63871 to DA for JCS, 21 Jul 53, DA IN 289577.

108. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 486. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 63907 to DA for JCS, 23 Jul 53, DA IN 290096; CX 63929, 23 Jul 53, DA IN 290206. (U) Msg, JCS 944523 to CINCFE, 24 Jul 53 (joint State-Defense message).

109. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC CX 63828 to DA for JCS, 20 Jul 53, DA IN 289053; C 63906, 23 Jul 53, DA IN 290089. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 64000 to DA for CSUSA, 26 Jul 53, DA IN 291235, CX 64028, 27 Jul 53, DA IN 291380.

110. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 76–85.

111. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 63870 to DA for JCS, 21 Jul 53, DA IN 289593.

112. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 94–95.

113. (S) “Rhee-Robertson Conversations,” pp. 95–97.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

115. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 63852 to CSUSA, 21 Jul 53, DA IN 289367.

116. (U) Memo for Record, DJS (LTG F.F. Everest, USAF), 22 Jul 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 133. (U) Msg, JCS 944347 to CINCFE, 22 Jul 53.

117. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 63907 to DA for JCS, 23 Jul 53, DA IN 290096. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 484–485.

118. Msg, CINCFE CS 63963 to DA for JCS, 24 Jul 53, DA IN 290677; (U) Msgs, JCS 944601 to CINCFE, 24 Jul 53; CINCUNC CX 63969 to DA for JCS, 25 Jul 53, DA IN 290930; (U) Msg, DA 944648 to CINCFE (CSUSA to CINCUNC), 25 Jul 53, (joint State-Defense message).

119. (U) Msgs, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, C 64007, 26 Jul 53, DA IN 291255, CX 64028, 27 Jul 53, DA IN 291380.

120. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 64008 to CG AFFE et al., 26 Jul 53, DA IN 291278.

121. (U) Msg, CG 8th Army (from CINCUNC) to DA for JCS, 27 Jul 53, DA IN 291370.

122. *NY Times*, 27 Jul 53, p. 1, 28 Jul 53, p. 1. (U) Hq UNC, Transcript of Proceedings, 159th Session, 133d Mtg, Military Armistice Conference, 27 Jul 53, (copy in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 134). Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 489–491. The complete text of the armistice agree-

ments (reproduced from Dept of State Publication 5179, *Treaties and Other International Acts* series, No. 2782), is given as Appendix 1.

123. (U) CINCUNC (ADV) to TAG, DA, unnumbered, 27 Jul 53, DA IN 789531. *NY Times*, 27 Jul 53, p. 4. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 3 Aug 53, pp. 131–132.

124. (U) Msg, JCS 944675 to CINCFE (Exclusive for Clark), 27 Jul 53. (DTG 271650Z Jul 53, or 271250 EDT).

125. (U) Msg, Seoul 101 to State, 28 Jul 53, DA IN 790574. *NY Times*, 27 Jul 53, p. 3.

126. (U) Msg, JCS 940124 to CINCFE, 29 May 53, outlines the procedures that had been agreed upon for signing and releasing the “greater sanctions” statement.

127. (S) Msg, JCS 944462 to CINCFE, 23 Jul 53.

128. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 24 Aug 53, pp. 246–251. The Joint Policy Declaration was also published separately by the United States in the *Treaties and Other International Agreements* series (No. 2781, 27 Jul 53). The signatories were the governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States. The concluding sentence, regarding peace in “any other part of Asia,” was added as a result of US-UK-French discussions during the first half of 1953; it was aimed primarily at possible Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia (Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1953* (1955), pp. 35–36, 129, 190, 234.)

129. See Ch. 2, pp. 51, 53.

130. (U) Msg, CINCUNC ZX 37320 to DA for JCS, 30 Jul 53, DA IN 790998. The chairman of the UNC component of the MAC was MG B. M. Bryan, USA; the other four UNC members were flag or general officers from the USN, USAF, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.

131. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 493–494. (TS) JCS Historical Division, “Expanded Chronology of Events Leading to the Unilateral Suspension by the United Nations Command of Certain Provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement,” 24 Jul 59 (Copy in JCS Hist Div).

132. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 494–495. Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. 6, 1955–1956, pp. 377–390. (TS) JCS Historical Division, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. 7, 1957–1960, pp. 642–645.

133. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 495–514. (Other writers give slightly different figures: Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1953*, pp. 235–236; White, *The Captives of Korea*, p. 262). See Appendix 3.

134. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1953*, pp. 388–389, 448–449. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 495–496, 515. White, *The Captives of Korea*, pp. 266–317. (Where these writers give differing figures, those from Hermes were chosen).

135. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1953*, pp. 449–450, and *The United States in World Affairs, 1954* (1956), pp. 204–205. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 496. White, *The Captives of Korea*, pp. 319–329. During the 30-day interval after the explanations ended, a few more prisoners changed their mind and chose repatriation. As a result, among the 22,604 nonrepatriates that the UNC turned over to the NNRC on 23 September 1953, the final count showed that 628 (440 Chinese, 188 Korean) returned to Communist control; another 86 chose neutral India; 51 escaped or died in custody; and 21,839 (14,235 Chinese and 7,604 Koreans) were returned to the custody of the UNC. The UNC had little better success in its “explanations” to its 359 men in enemy hands. Only 10 of these (2 US, 8 Koreans) returned to their homelands, while 2 more Koreans went to India; the remaining prisoners (325 Korean, 21 US, and 1 British) remained with the Communists.

136. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1953*, pp. 238–247; 289–394.

137. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1954*, pp. 115–128, 211, 215, 232–236.

138. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, pp. 433–440, 457–473.

139. See Appendix 2.

140. The preceding three paragraphs are based in part on the summary of the results on the Korean War given in Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 498–502. The military budget policies of the Eisenhower administration between 1953 and 1960 are described in Volumes 5, 6, and 7 of this series of JCS histories.

141. Appendix VII lists JCS members and other prominent officials who held office during the Korean War. The Commandant, US Marine Corps, was granted “coequal status” with the Joint Chiefs of Staff through legislative enactment in June 1952 when matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps, as determined by him, were under consideration.

Bibliographic Note

This history is based primarily on the official documents contained in the master records files of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other sources include the records maintained in the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by agencies of the Joint Staff. Research also extended to certain records of the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The volumes published by the Department of State in the *Foreign Relations* series have proved invaluable, especially in illuminating the relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Department of State and the National Security Council.

During the period of this volume the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were organized under a case file system that had been in continuous use since 1942. This system is identified by the prefix CCS (for Combined Chiefs of Staff) attached to each file folder title. Within each footnote, the file location is the last element given. When several documents are cited, all those contained in a single footnote "sentence," enclosed by a period, are to be found in the records file given at the end of the sentence. "Same file," rather than "Ibid.," is used for repeated, successive references to the same file.

Some documents are cited without a file reference. These include types that are widely distributed and that may be located without reference to the JCS files, such as Records of NSC Actions. Most messages can be readily found either in the regular JCS files or in a series of message books containing messages exchanged with CINCFE, maintained by General Bradley when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now making up part of the CJCS Files. Monthly Command Reports of FECOM/UNC are in the Army Files in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service.

Since the first draft of this volume was completed, a recheck of some of the JCS files used in its preparation has shown that some documents have been removed from the folders and can no longer be located. Instances of such missing documents that have come to the attention of the authors are pointed out in the footnotes.

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