



# CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF NOTICE

J-7

DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C, JEL

CJCS Notice 3500.01

30 October 2014

## 2015–2018 CHAIRMAN’S JOINT TRAINING GUIDANCE

References: See Enclosure B.

1. Purpose. This notice provides the annual CJCS Joint Training Guidance to all DoD Components for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint individual and collective training for fiscal years (FYs) 2015 to 2018. As an element of the Joint Strategic Planning System, this guidance and the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) program goals and objectives (reference a) are intended to support development of FY 2016 Joint Training Plans (JTPs). This notice may also guide adjustments to FY 2015 JTP scheduled training events and objectives to address emerging operational concerns, high-interest training requirements (HITRs), and the Chairman’s high-interest training issues (HITIs).

2. Superseded/Cancellation. CJCS Notice (CJCSN) 3500.01, 10 October 2013, “2014–2017 Chairman's Joint Training Guidance,” is hereby canceled.

3. Applicability. This CJCSN applies to Combatant Commands (CCMDs), Services, the National Guard Bureau, combat support agencies (CSAs), Joint Staff directorates, and other joint organizations.

4. Background. The Joint Force is entering a period that requires flexibility and adaptivity as we rebalance our strategic posture and force structure. Supporting both Service and joint readiness will be a priority as we address Global Force Management and balance CCMD requirements with our ability to respond to crises. While the reality of ongoing budget uncertainty drives the reshaping, resizing, and posture of the U.S. military, our adversaries are studying how we operate and are employing hybrid/asymmetric capabilities and creating contested environments that require us to develop new capabilities. The rebalanced force will be a rapidly deployable force that takes advantage of key multipliers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); cyberspace capabilities; electronic warfare; stand-off

precision strike; space systems; special operations forces; and ballistic missile defense. Joint training will integrate and synchronize capabilities between multiple CCMDs and across all domains while emphasizing flexible joint command and control (C2) options that integrate a whole-of-government approach to preparing for and executing joint operations across the full spectrum of conflict.

a. Profession of Arms. Fundamental to a fully capable Joint Force is a sustained commitment to the values and ethos of the Profession of Arms. Everyone serving in our Total Force has an important role in fostering a climate that reinforces professionalism, respect, core values, and trust. We will stay committed to maintaining our honor and integrity through courage and selfless service in performing our duties. As described in my white paper titled “America’s Military—A Profession of Arms” (reference b) and as emphasized in the Chairman’s Desired Leader Attributes, trust is the foundation of our profession. Nowhere is this more important than in our collective duty to eliminate sexual assault. Sexual assault breaks the trust that we must have in each other and in the chain of command. We will make every effort to prevent and eliminate sexual assault and, when required, to respond appropriately.

b. Joint Training Programs. Joint training programs will reestablish foundational competence to conduct campaigns and major operations. CE2T2 will be a key enabler of joint readiness from tactical to strategic levels. In FY 2015 and beyond, our Joint Staff J-7 exercise support model will provide scalable options to allow CCMDs and Services more flexibility to conduct exercises in support of command and Departmental priorities. Our focus will be on the consideration of more effective and efficient training modes and the use of Web-accessible joint training enablers (e.g., Joint Training Environment) to achieve multiple cross-CCMD joint training objectives.

c. Mission Partners. The joint community will sustain training with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. Our shift of strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region does not reduce our commitments to key allies and partners in other regions. We will rely on allies and Coalition partners while conducting a wide range of actions designed to strengthen regional partnerships and partners. We will strive to develop partners capable of contributing at the operational as well as the tactical level in Coalition operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Connected Forces Initiative is key to sustaining allied interoperability in the post-International Security Assistance Force environment and to sustaining NATO Response Force readiness. Engagement activities such as bilateral and

multilateral exercises to improve multinational interoperability will continue to play a key role in shaping the global security environment. Integration of all U.S. Government partners in joint training events ensures that we retain the versatility and competence to effectively combine with all elements of U.S. national power to accomplish any mission.

d. Joint Force 2020 (JF 2020). Realization of JF 2020 requires the continued efforts of all joint training stakeholders. The operational concept of globally integrated operations suggests a number of force development implications detailed in the “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020” (reference c). Of special emphasis for joint trainers are the following: the creation of training conditions and environments that enable the practice of mission command during training events; effectively operating in denied, manipulated, and/or contested cyberspace; effectively operating in a congested/contested electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); conventional and special operations forces integration; cross-CCMD coordination and synchronization; operational contract support integration; rapid transition from steady-state operations to crisis response; and the use of Mission Partner Environments (reference d) to facilitate partner integration. When appropriate, CCMD and Service exercises should be leveraged to evaluate mature concepts that support the continued development of joint capabilities.

e. IRON CRUCIBLE. The first IRON CRUCIBLE CJCS joint war game examined global agility and explored flexible joint C2. Key issues that need further definition and refinement through inclusion in cross-CCMD exercises include the role of “global synchronizers”; Departmental-level risk assessment and decision-making; access and basing agreements; mutual support between CCMDs; dynamic retasking of joint enablers; and global battle rhythm processes and formats. Joint wargaming creates an environment to pursue innovation and serves as a bridge from concepts to training, exercises, and doctrine.

## 5. Action or Procedure

a. The Director, Joint Force Development (Joint Staff J-7):

(1) Develops strategy and procedures that synchronize the Joint Force Development functions to incrementally advance JF 2020.

(2) Develops and implements a Joint Task Force-capable headquarters training program for Service headquarters designated by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) In coordination with U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Cyber Command, Service cyber Components, and Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) staff, supports flexible, relevant, and persistent cyberspace training including exercises that challenge continuity of operations. Additionally, supports the realistic replication of the cyberspace domain, its interaction with the space domain and the EMS, and the increased interoperability and advancement of dedicated cyber ranges. This includes, through ranged environments, facilitating the execution of CYBER GUARD and CYBER FLAG as tactical/operational level exercises linked with CCMD training events to enhance cyber training and readiness. Provides staffs the opportunities to practice and develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to operate and complete missions regardless of cyberspace conditions while providing secure range environments to allow cyberspace operations professionals the opportunity to hone skills and TTPs against realistic cyber threats.

(4) In collaboration with CCMDs and Services, supports integration of IRON CRUCIBLE key issues into the Chairman's Exercise Program and the Joint Exercise Program.

b. Commander, USSTRATCOM:

(1) Coordinates with Services, as appropriate, to integrate Computer Network Defense Service Providers (CNDSPs) and other related organizations, when feasible, in the planning, execution, and assessment of CCMD and Service network training events and exercises. Additionally, synchronizes and supports Service and CCMD and opposing forces (OPFOR)/Red Team requirements.

(2) Integrates and synchronizes joint ballistic missile defense (BMD) training in accordance with reference e.

(3) Coordinates with Services and other CCMDs, as appropriate, to integrate EMS operations (including spectrum management, electronic warfare, and intelligence support to EMS operations) when feasible in the planning, execution, and assessment of training events and exercises.

c. Combatant Commanders; Chief, National Guard Bureau; and CSA Directors:

(1) Incorporate realistic cyberspace operations environments to support robust cyberspace threats and realistic offensive cyberspace, defensive cyberspace, and Department of Defense Information Network operations. Develop a cyberspace operations training program, which includes robust OPFOR/Red Team operations in training events and exercises in order to develop capabilities and TTPs to sustain combat and other essential operations in a denied or manipulated cyberspace environment. Include periods stressing

mission command in a denied and contested C2 system environment in exercises. Update standard operating procedures and TTPs following these exercises to incorporate lessons learned from operating in denied, manipulated, and/or contested cyberspace environments.

(2) Integrate degraded space environments into exercises and training. Training objectives should include conditions whereby the training audience operates in and through the denied/degraded space environment, including loss of satellite communications and positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities.

(3) Integrate degraded EMS operations into exercises and training. Training objectives should include conditions whereby the training audience operates in and through a congested/contested EMS.

(4) Better synchronize joint training and security cooperation activities by linking exercise objectives to theater campaign plan intermediate military objectives during campaign plan and JTP development.

(5) Ensure training includes preparing appropriate Service headquarters units to assume Joint Force headquarters roles.

(6) Pursue opportunities during training and exercises to sustain integration with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners and address and coordinate cross-CCMD operational issues and requirements.

d. The Military Services:

(1) Focus Joint National Training Capability service training program accreditation/certification nominations on tasks that align with the HITIs in Enclosure A.

(2) Consider training opportunities to prepare appropriate headquarters to assume a Joint Force headquarters role.

(3) Incorporate realistic cyberspace conditions, including robust OPFOR/Red Teams, into exercises in order to develop capabilities and TTPs to sustain combat and other essential operations in a denied or manipulated cyberspace environment. Update standard operating procedures and TTPs following these exercises to incorporate lessons learned from operating in denied or manipulated environments. Leverage CNDSPs to ensure that cyber training is maximized during exercises and that OPFOR/Red Teams are granted the maximum amount of freedom possible to fully stress C2 during exercises.


(4) Integrate degraded EMS operations into exercises and training. Leverage joint forces to fully evaluate joint capability and C2 in realistic EMS environments during exercises.

6. High-Interest Training Issues (HITIs). HITIs are unprioritized focus areas that commanders should consider for emphasis in their JTPs. The HITIs at Enclosure A reflect capabilities required of the Joint Force and do not reflect a higher-to-lower precedence of priorities. Each command should incorporate relevant mission-specific aspects of these HITIs into its joint and/or Service training program.

7. High-Interest Training Requirements (HITRs). HITRs are capability requirements identified by Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to support specific theater objectives. CCMD HITRs are developed annually and should inform Service development of joint capable forces. CCMD HITRs are recommended for force provider action in the CJCS JTP Tab H published in the Joint Training Information Management System (reference f).

8. Releasability. UNRESTRICTED. This notice is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited on NIPRNET. DoD Components (including the Combatant Commands), other Federal Agencies, and the public may obtain copies of this notice through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Electronic Library at <[http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives)>. Joint Staff activities may also obtain access via the SIPR directives Electronic Library Web sites.

9. Effective Date. This NOTICE is effective upon receipt. It expires 31 August 2015.



MARTIN E. DEMPSEY  
General, U.S. Army

Enclosures

- A—High-Interest Training Issues
- B—References

## ENCLOSURE A

### HIGH-INTEREST TRAINING ISSUES

The high-interest training issues (HITIs) in this enclosure represent focus areas that are consistent with the priorities established in Defense Strategic Guidance (reference g), the Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force (reference h), the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (reference c), and the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (reference i) and will be an integral part of joint training programs.

1. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. Services, CSAs, and CCMDs should advocate a robust Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program and provide individual education and training to prevent and appropriately respond to incidents of sexual assault (reference j).
2. Ethics, Values, and Leadership. Incorporate moral, legal, and ethical decision-making into training. Training will emphasize a leader's role as the principal steward of precious resources, both organic and contracted, and challenge the leader to continually assess whether an action, even if legally permissible, is also prudent.
3. Joint Operational Access. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) (reference k) proposes 30 capabilities needed for joint forces and their interagency mission partners to achieve operational access. Each of these capabilities directly aligns with force development implications described in the CCJO and are imperatives not only for the current force but also in the development of JF 2020. The JOA Implementation Plan (reference l) identifies the top 10 required capabilities and the force development activities supporting them that the Joint Force will accomplish. Many of these actions require adjustments to joint training activities and should be reviewed for CCMD and Service training program applicability. Joint training at all levels should incorporate and mitigate appropriate anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats and capabilities described in the JOAC. Cross-CCMD exercises and joint, tactical-level training that focus on cross-domain synergy to counter A2/AD threats in depth should be designed and executed. Training will emphasize quickly combining capabilities from across the Joint Force and with mission partners as an intrinsic element of executing globally integrated operations in an operating environment characterized by accelerating rates of change. Our joint training and exercise programs will support mastery of these capabilities with focus in the areas cited below.
  - a. Space. Access to and use of satellites in support of military operations are essential capabilities that will be protected. It is likely that adversaries will interfere with our use of this domain. Commands, Components, and Services

should integrate degraded space environments into exercises and training. Joint training objectives should require the training audience to operate in and through the denied/degraded space environment, including loss of satellite communications, ISR, and positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities.

b. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense. Increase participation of existing integrated air and missile defense capabilities and incorporate associated training objectives into homeland, regional, and theater training events when appropriate. The ballistic and cruise missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively (reference m). Emphasize joint and Coalition planning processes that enable CDRs to execute air and missile defense within their areas of responsibility (AORs), across adjacent and multiple AORs, and globally in support of defense of the homeland from air and or missile attack. Ensure that full-spectrum missile warning is integrated into existing exercises and widen the breadth of participation for a more vigorous sensor to decision maker exercise program.

c. Conventional Warfighting. Restore proficiency to conduct full-spectrum, operational-level warfare to enable the future Joint Force to conduct operations as outlined in the JOAC. Training should stress the synergistic and holistic employment of Joint Force, interagency, and multinational partner capabilities to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects. Exercising all aspects of joint operational access will provide opportunities for the Joint Force to practice these skills at the tactical through operational levels of command.

d. Operational and Tactical Maneuver. After a decade of focus on the relatively confined geographic limits of stability operations and counter-insurgency, the Joint Force will restore its ability to maneuver over distance. Foundational competency in operational and tactical maneuver that routinely employs complementary cross-domain capabilities will establish the freedom of action to achieve domain superiority. Innovative and collaborative approaches are required in order to achieve this objective affordably.

e. Entry Operations. Increase the number of training events that exercise entry operations. Focus on exercising joint C2, CCMD liaison teams, force aggregation, interagency coordination, multinational partner integration, and tactical units and assets participation. Include a detailed examination of all support forces, staging bases, joint seabases, and lift assets required to execute operational plans (reference n).

f. Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) Operations. Access to and the ability to operate effectively in a congested/contested EMS are essential to operations and continuous support to the whole of government. Joint training at all levels will regularly incorporate and evaluate EMS operations training objectives to develop and refine the ability to operate in a congested/contested



electromagnetic environment. At a minimum, this training should include TTPs to operate in a densely congested and highly contested electromagnetic environment with directed energy weapons and communications, data link, and radar jamming (reference o).

4. Cyberspace Operations. The ability to operate effectively in and through cyberspace is essential to operations and continuous support to the whole of government. Particular attention will be paid to understanding and acting on information pertaining to cyber vulnerabilities. New and current capabilities should be used/tested during exercises or operations (references p, q, and r).

a. Cyberspace training will simulate today's information environment to allow operators to assess their ability to operate in cyberspace. Realistic cyberspace threats and capabilities will be replicated in the training and exercise environments. Commands, Components, and Services should integrate cyber OPFOR/Red Teams into exercises and training with the greatest amount of freedom possible. Use of joint cyberspace range capabilities for exercise support should be maximized.

b. Joint training at all levels will regularly incorporate and evaluate cyberspace operations training objectives, i.e., to develop and refine the ability to operate in a denied or manipulated environment; to execute continuity of operations plans; and to develop targeting and C2 processes. AOR-specific training should be designed to execute, protect and recover C2 in contested cyberspace. Training should regularly include elements of the operational cyberspace C2 construct (CCMD Joint Cyber Centers, Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber) to improve the Department of Defense's ability to fully synchronize and integrate cyberspace lines of operation across geographic boundaries and mission areas (reference s).

c. Cyber Mission Forces (National Mission Teams, Combat Mission Teams, and Cyber Protection Teams) will be constituted, employed, and routinely integrated into the planning and execution of joint training events. Inclusion of Cyber Mission Forces into joint exercises will hone team proficiency and support the refinement of operational constructs, training standards, and doctrine (reference r).

5. Irregular Warfare (IW). As the Joint Force reemphasizes full-spectrum capabilities, it will retain the ability to be equally effective in both traditional warfare and IW. CCMDs and Components will conduct training to sustain and improve IW capabilities, TTPs, and integrated planning processes, with increased focus on the ability to support mission partner efforts to counter irregular and hybrid threats. The proliferation of advanced technologies, including weapons of mass destruction and cyber, will increasingly imbue irregular adversaries with global reach, disruptive capacity, and lethality. The

ability to effectively train, advise, and assist partner nations is contingent upon retention of organic IW competency. Components will be prepared to influence and support relevant populations to counter the IW threat, either independently or in support of others.

a. Our adversaries are often highly adaptable nonstate actors who are organized in transnational or regional human networks with financial, criminal, smuggling, and other functional linkages and structures. Joint training should incorporate opportunities for leaders and staffs to analyze and understand threat networks as part of the operational environment to inform and exercise operational design to affect them. Training will also provide opportunities to develop and implement options to disrupt, neutralize, or defeat those threat networks through lethal and nonlethal means in order to achieve desired operational outcomes.

b. The Joint Force will sustain and maintain the relevancy of joint training for foreign internal defense and security force assistance activities through the integration of staff and unit collective training programs and joint exercises. Additionally, it will maximize the use of the Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program (section 2010) and General Purpose Forces Training with Foreign Security Forces (section 1203) authorities to expand Coalition interoperability.

c. CCMD, Component, and Service training should support language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. It should also maximize individual and collective training initiatives that reinforce understanding escalation-of-force procedures and minimizing civilian casualties. Additionally, CCMDs, Components, and Services should integrate consideration of potential civilian casualties into fire support planning and the deliberate and dynamic targeting processes (reference t). Training should incorporate procedures for preparing for and responding to incidents of civilian casualties and other unintended consequences.

6. Information Operations. Information-related capabilities (IRCs) should be integrated into training and exercises. The Joint Force will be trained to operate effectively in the information environment (IE) and trained about the consequences of inadequate attention to the IE. Training in information operations (IO) and the synergistic integration of IRCs in military operations and training is the primary means of achieving operational effectiveness in the IE. IO training will focus on understanding the IE, activities that affect the IE, and shaping those activities to bring about the desired end state.

a. Planning and Execution. Focus training on embedding IO and IRCs across all phases to enhance effectiveness and mitigate vulnerabilities of operations. Train to integrate effects of IO into the planning, assessment, and targeting processes.

b. Intelligence Integration. Emphasize training in IO intelligence integration in support of commander's objectives, IO planning, target analysis, and assessing operational effectiveness.

c. Partner Integration. Improve training on interagency, nongovernmental organization, and multinational coordination to enrich information sharing, leverage capabilities and authorities, and enhance IO and IRC planning and execution in the global operational environment.

d. Leadership Awareness. Tailor training for leadership to increase awareness of IO and the IRCs, their potential to contribute to the achievement of objectives and the desired end state, and the consequences of ineffectively operating in the IE. Leadership IO training and exercises will emphasize information as an instrument of national power.

7. Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Exercise effective, operational decision-making through the exploitation of real-time information/intelligence during planning and execution processes. Emphasize the effective integration and synchronized employment of sensors and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities into the joint force commander's decision cycle. Ensure operational-level joint and Service training, Component staff training, and exercise objectives stress the early identification of collection requirements and staff collaboration required for the effective management and optimal employment of limited sensors, assets, and associated PED systems (references u and v).

a. Joint training at home station and combat training centers should include integration of national and theater-level collection and PED capabilities into tactical-level operations to ensure units are able to immediately employ supporting capabilities upon entry into a theater of operations. Incorporate ISR into joint individual training objectives that enhance staff collaboration to effectively manage the employment of sensors, assets, and associated PED systems. Scenarios will train unit leadership to properly incorporate new sensors and PED systems and products into unit TTPs.

b. Maximize joint training on sensors and PED capabilities using real or synthetic systems. Synthetic systems may be replicated through appropriate model and simulation systems.

c. Incorporate counterintelligence into exercises and sensitive training in order to ensure realistic scenario development regarding hostile intelligence threats, enhance operational security to protect our operational capabilities and plans, and protect our critical technologies.

8. Homeland Defense/Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Continue to develop and implement programs to train units, leaders, and staffs in homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, including required chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management skills. Exercise and evaluate domestic consequence management operations in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments to include planning, integration and support to civilian authorities in complex fatality operations. Emphasize the coordination of Active and Reserve Component forces, including National Guard in State Active Duty, title 32, and title 10 statuses. Continue to collaborate with federal, state, and local partners with specialized planning, exercises, and TTPs to respond to natural and man-made disasters.

9. Integration of Special Operations Forces with Conventional Forces. Joint training will emphasize special operations forces (SOF)/conventional force (CF) integration for joint operations across the range of military operations (references w, x, and y). SOF/CF integration will focus on training, advising, and assisting foreign conventional security forces; supporting foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions; and conducting counter-insurgency and counterterrorism operations. Pre-deployment training will focus on command relationships and emphasize the opportunity to exercise and rehearse prior to employment in theater.

10. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Joint countering WMD training should fully address four elements that comprise the Department of Defense's approach to countering WMD: prepare, prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crises. Emphasize training that addresses proliferation security initiatives and reinvigorate capabilities that have declined by integrating WMD events into overarching collective training.

11. Nuclear Deterrence/Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications. Accomplish training to ensure the nuclear command, control, and communications procedures required to accomplish effective nuclear deterrence are maintained at the highest standards. CCMD and national command centers that have Emergency Action Procedures responsibilities (references z and aa) should participate in training events that include multiple command centers. Command centers are encouraged to participate in USSTRATCOM integrated mission area training events to meet this requirement. Consideration should be given to participation by CCMDs with these responsibilities in USSTRATCOM Exercise GLOBAL THUNDER.

12. Joint Logistics Enterprise. Joint logistics will be routinely practiced to create and sustain proficiency and enable global agility. Exercises will include strategic and operational distribution and deployment that includes deployment planning for organic and contracted forces at the operational and strategic levels of command. Employment of rapid port opening capabilities, including seaport and airfield damage repair, should be exercised to improve our ability to establish, sustain, and recover expeditionary distribution networks. Ensure operational contract support (references ab and ac) and joint medical support planning and execution are fully incorporated into joint training and exercises.

13. Personnel Recovery (PR). The ability to successfully conduct the five PR tasks of report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate is essential to operations and requires effective preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation. Joint training across the spectrum of operations should routinely incorporate and evaluate PR-related training objectives in appropriate training events to exercise the PR network of Joint Force, interagency, and multinational partners and supporting technologies. Interagency, Coalition, and host nation partners are potential PR force multipliers will be considered in every PR operational planning effort. Institutionalizing PR exercise requirements supports the development of CCMD or Joint Task Force-specific execution plans for a well-synchronized and prepared PR network.

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ENCLOSURE B

REFERENCES

- a. "Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation Program Goals and Objectives," 6 February 2014
- b. CJCS white paper, undated, "America's Military—A Profession of Arms"
- c. "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020," 10 September 2012
- d. Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Memorandum 026-13, 5 February 2013, "Future Mission Network 90-Day Study Report"
- e. "Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Training," 26 August 2012
- f. Joint Training Information Management System link at <<http://jtims.js.smil.mil/jtims>> (SIPRNET—accessed 2 June 2014)
- g. DoD report, January 2012, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense"
- h. CJCS report, 6 February 2012, "Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force"
- i. DoD report, 4 March 2014, "Quadrennial Defense Review 2014"
- j. DoD Instruction 6495.02, 28 March 2013, "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures"
- k. "Joint Operational Access Concept," version 1.0, 17 January 2012
- l. CJCSN 3015, 29 August 2014, "Joint Operational Access (JOA) Implementation Plan (JIP)"
- m. DoD report, February 2010, "Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report"
- n. CJCS report, 14 February 2014, "Joint Concept for Entry Operations"
- o. CJCS report, November 2013, "National Military Strategic Plan for Electronic Warfare"
- p. DoD report, July 2011, "Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace"

- q. CJCS Strategic Seminar II Final Report, March 2012
- r. Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, 5 February 2013, "Cyberspace Operations"
- s. CJCS executive order, 212105ZJUN2013, "Execute Order to Implement Cyberspace Operations Command and Control (C2) Framework"
- t. Joint Staff J-7 Joint and Coalition Warfare Operational Analysis Division report, 4 April 2012, "CIVCAS Update Study"
- u. JP 2-01, 5 January 2012, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations"
- v. JP 2-0, 22 June 2007, "Joint Intelligence"
- w. JP 3-0, 11 August 2011, "Joint Operations"
- x. JP 3-05, 18 April 2011, "Special Operations"
- y. JP 3-05.1, 26 April 2007, "Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations"
- z. CJCSI 3280.01 Series, "National Military Command System (NMCS)"
- aa. CJCSI 6810.04 Series, "Nuclear Command, Control and Communications Personnel Performance Objectives and Assessment Criteria"
- ab. JP 4-10, 16 July 2014, "Operational Contract Support"
- ac. JROC report, 7 October 2013, "Operational Contract Support Joint Concept"