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
Report No. DODIG-2013-066

April 12, 2013

# Inspector General

United States

Department of Defense



Transportation Planning is Sufficient for Retrograde Operations;  
However, There is an Opportunity to Improve the Efficiency of  
Management Systems

~~Classified By: Michael J. Roark~~  
~~Derived from: Multiple Sources~~  
~~Declassify on: December 12, 2037~~

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

JOPES	Joint Operations Planning and Execution System
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
TC-AIMS II	Transportation Coordinator's-Automated Information for Movement System II
TEU	Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit
TTN	Transportation Tracking Number
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command



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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

April 12, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR AUDITOR GENERAL, U.S. ARMY

SUBJECT: Transportation Planning Is Sufficient for Retrograde Operations; However,  
There Is an Opportunity To Improve the Efficiency of Management Systems  
(Report No. DODIG-2013-066)

(U) We are providing this report for your information and use. Although U.S. Transportation Command is providing sufficient support to U.S. Central Command for retrograde operations in Afghanistan at this time, an efficiency in management systems used for retrograde operations could be realized. We considered management comments on the draft of this report when preparing the final report.

(U) Comments on the draft report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore, we do not require any additional comments.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-<sup>DoD</sup>[REDACTED] (DSN 664-<sup>DoD OIG</sup>[REDACTED])

Amy J. Frontz  
Principal Assistant Inspector General  
for Auditing

cc:

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
Commander, U.S. Central Command  
Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan  
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command  
Director, Joint Staff

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# Results in Brief: Transportation Planning Is Sufficient for Retrograde Operations; However, There Is an Opportunity To Improve the Efficiency of Management Systems

## What We Did

(U) We determined whether U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) officials were developing plans to provide sufficient Government and contract capabilities to support U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) requirements for the retrograde of cargo from Afghanistan.

## What We Found

(U) USTRANSCOM has plans in place to provide sufficient Government and contract capabilities to support USCENTCOM requirements for the drawdown of equipment from Afghanistan. USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM officials are coordinating to support requirements by issuing guidance, determining route capacities, and executing contracts. However, the management systems used to support retrograde operations lack a common data field. Joint Sustainment Command-Afghanistan personnel have to manually enter data from the Transportation Coordinator's-Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II) into the Joint Operations Planning and Executing System.

(U) This occurred because Army G-4 missed two deadlines to fund and implement the 2009 Joint Requirements Oversight Council Transportation Tracking Number (TTN) change recommendation in TC-AIMS II. As a result, the lack of a common data field creates an inefficiency in these management systems used for retrograde operations, making it more difficult to provide planned to actual cargo

(U) movements and end-to-end in-transit visibility. Without using the TTN capability to provide visibility of equipment movement from origin to destination, USTRANSCOM may have more difficulty thoroughly planning retrograde movements as drawdown efforts increase.


## What We Recommend

(U) ~~USCENTCOM (b) (5)~~

## Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Comments from the Army Chief of Staff were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

(U) Figure 1. Airmen Load a C-5M With Cargo at Bahgram Airfield, Afghanistan



(U) Source: Air Mobility Command Web Site

## Recommendations Table

<b>Management</b>	<b>Recommendation Requires Comment</b>	<b>Additional Comments Required</b>
Army Chief of Staff		No

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## Introduction

### Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) officials were developing plans to provide sufficient Government and contract capabilities to support U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) requirements for the retrograde of cargo from Afghanistan. See Appendix A for the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the objective.

(U) This report focuses on USTRANSCOM's planning efforts for the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan. Future projects on the drawdown will focus on the tactical level execution and are likely to include topic areas such as Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services, Redistribution Property Assistance Team yards, and the Northern Distribution Network.

### Background

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[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

### Drawdown Phases

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

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- ~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ <sup>TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)</sup> [REDACTED]

***Roles and Responsibilities***

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ <sup>TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)</sup> [REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ <sup>TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)</sup> [REDACTED]

***Retrograde Equipment***

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ <sup>CENTCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)</sup> [REDACTED]

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<sup>1</sup>~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ <sup>TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)</sup> [REDACTED]

### **Equipment Drawdown Process**

(U) Several management systems are used to retrograde equipment from Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM officials indicated they use the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to review and validate retrograde requirements. Another system used is the Transportation Coordinator's-Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II), which provides transportation management for movement of units and day-to-day cargo within the Defense Transportation System. TC-AIMS II enhances coordination, control, and management of force deployments and improves in-transit visibility and total asset visibility.

(U) A Joint Sustainment Command-Afghanistan official stated that the 401<sup>st</sup> Army Field Support Brigade manually enters the equipment data into TC-AIMS II. This data is then e-mailed to Joint Sustainment Command-Afghanistan officials. A Joint Sustainment Command-Afghanistan official further stated that their contractors manually enter the data into JOPES, and USFOR-A, USCENTCOM, and USTRANSCOM must all validate equipment retrograde requirements in JOPES before movement. This process takes approximately 24 to 72 hours.

(~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) USCENTCOM (b)(1), 1-4(a), USTRANSCOM (b)(1), 1-4(g)

### **Review of Internal Controls**

(U) The USTRANSCOM internal controls we reviewed were effective; we identified no internal control weaknesses.

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<sup>2</sup>(U) Multiple systems are used to retrograde equipment from Afghanistan; however, this report solely focuses on Transportation Coordinator's-Automated Information for Movement System II and Joint Operations Planning and Execution System.

## **Finding. Support Provided for Transportation Planning; However, There is an Opportunity to Improve the Efficiency of Retrograde Planning Operations**

(U) USTRANSCOM has plans in place to provide sufficient Government and contract capabilities to support USCENTCOM requirements for the drawdown of equipment from Afghanistan. USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM officials are coordinating to support requirements by issuing guidance, determining route capacities, and executing contracts.

(U) However, the management systems used to support retrograde operations lack a common data field; thus, Joint Sustainment Command-Afghanistan personnel have to manually enter data from TC-AIMS II into JOPEs. This occurred because Army G-4<sup>3</sup> missed two deadlines to fund and implement the 2009 Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Transportation Tracking Number (TTN) change recommendation in TC-AIMS II. As a result, the lack of a common data field creates an inefficiency in these management systems, making it more difficult to provide planned to actual movement comparisons and end-to-end in-transit visibility. Without using the TTN capability to provide visibility of equipment from origin to destination, it may be more difficult for USTRANSCOM to thoroughly plan retrograde movements as the drawdown efforts increase.

### **Planning To Support Retrograde Requirements**

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USTRANSCOM (b) (1), (1)(g)



#### **Command Coordination**

(U) USTRANSCOM officials coordinate drawdown efforts internally and externally with USCENTCOM. To coordinate internally, personnel from all USTRANSCOM staff sections, as well as personnel from USTRANSCOM's Component Commands, work together daily in the Fusion Center at USTRANSCOM headquarters. To coordinate externally, USTRANSCOM officials attend numerous meetings with USCENTCOM

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<sup>3</sup>(U) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council recommendation was directed towards the Army. Within the Army, Army G-4 is responsible for implementation of TTN into TC-AIMS II.

(U) personnel and have a liaison officer stationed at USCENTCOM headquarters. USTRANSCOM officials participate in daily, weekly, and bi-weekly briefs with USCENTCOM, to include the Joint Transportation Board and Northern Distribution Network teleconferences. In addition, USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM participate in quarterly Force Flow Conferences. The October 2012 Force Flow Conference was held at USTRANSCOM headquarters with personnel from USCENTCOM and USFOR-A in attendance. Topics discussed during the conference included costing, guidance, and the feasibility of completing retrograde operations by December 2014.

### ***Retrograde Guidance***

(U) As part of their planning efforts, USTRANSCOM issued Operations Order 12-038, "Distribution Guidance to Afghanistan," on November 2, 2012. Operations Order 12-038 details the concept of operations for retrograding equipment from Afghanistan and responsibilities for various USTRANSCOM staff sections and Component Commands. Furthermore, Operations Order 12-038 details which countries each route transports through, including ports and transportation modes, as well as route restrictions, monthly materiel reduction guidance, and monthly capacity guidance. The monthly materiel reduction guidance breaks down each route by minimum and maximum amounts of rolling stock and TEUs allowed per month.

### ***Ongoing Management of Route Capacities***

(U) Although USFOR-A established monthly retrograde goals of 1,200 pieces of rolling stock and 1,000 TEUs net per month, USTRANSCOM determined the route capacities. Operations Order 12-038 establishes minimum and maximum capacities for seven routes<sup>4</sup> used to retrograde equipment from Afghanistan. Specifically, by using seven routes, USTRANSCOM can move a minimum total of 450 pieces of rolling stock and a maximum total of 3,075 pieces of rolling stock per month. Additionally, USTRANSCOM can move a minimum total of 610 TEUs and a maximum total of 3,800 TEUs per month. Therefore, USTRANSCOM could handle additional capacity beyond USFOR-A's monthly goals. To maintain strategic flexibility and to ensure no single points of failure, the minimum monthly goals are required to support retrograde cargo movement.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1-4(g)



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<sup>4</sup>(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1-4(g)



(U) Figure 2. USTRANSCOM Rolling Stock Capacity Break Point



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM

(U) Figure 3. USTRANSCOM TEU Capacity Break Point



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM

(U) A USTRANSCOM official stated that the capacity for each route is calculated using several factors such as the number of pieces allowed in a country per month, the number of pieces that border personnel can check per day, observation of routes, weight limits, and oversized/outsized cargo limits. USTRANSCOM will also maintain redundant lines of communication along the Northern Distribution Network to provide maximum operational and diplomatic flexibility. USTRANSCOM will maximize use of all distribution options and not saturate or rely on any single node, line of communication, or mode of transportation.


### **Contracts Awarded**

(U) To provide sufficient contract capabilities, USTRANSCOM awarded the Universal Services Contract-7, which moves more than 78 percent of DoD cargo worldwide and is the primary contract vehicle for transporting cargo into and out of Afghanistan. In addition, USTRANSCOM also awarded a separate multi-modal contract, valued at \$1.64 billion, that provides door-to-door movement of DoD and other Government cargo using multiple modes of transportation to include airlift, sealift, and line haul to and from multiple locations globally, while reducing transit times. USTRANSCOM anticipates they will be able to move approximately 12,000 to 15,000 pieces of equipment per year with the multi-modal contract.

### **Limitations and Risk Areas**

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CENTCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)



~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~

CENTCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)



(U) Figure 4. Equipment Reduction Assumptions



**Legend**

- |         |  |
|---------|--|
| A2E     | Afghanistan to Europe                      |
| CJOA-A  | Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan |
| FEPP    | Foreign Excess Personal Property           |
| FERP    | Foreign Excess Real Property               |
| FMS     | Foreign Military Sales                     |
| LOCs    | Lines of Communications                    |
| M/M     | Multi/Modal                                |
| MOG     | Maximum on Ground                          |
| NRS     | Non-Rolling Stock                          |
| PAKGLOC | Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication     |
| RS      | Rolling Stock                              |
| TSR     | Trans-Siberian Route                       |
| USTC    | U.S. Transportation Command                |

(U) Source: USTRANSCOM



## Lack of a Common Data Field in Systems Used for Retrograde Operations

(U) Although USTRANSCOM plans to meet USCENTCOM's retrograde requirements, a lack of a common data field causes an inefficiency in the management systems used to support retrograde operations. Joint Sustainment Command-Afghanistan personnel must manually enter data from TC-AIMS II into JOPES because the two systems cannot automatically transfer data. The lack of a common data field makes it more difficult to provide planned to actually movement comparisons and end-to-end in-transit visibility. Without using the TTN capability to provide visibility of equipment from origin to destination, it may be more difficult for USTRANSCOM to thoroughly plan retrograde movements as drawdown efforts increase.

*(U) Without using the TTN capability to provide visibility of equipment from origin to destination, it may be more difficult for USTRANSCOM to thoroughly plan retrograde movements as drawdown efforts increase.*

## Funding and Implementation Needed for Transportation Tracking Number

(U) Army G-4 has attempted to fund and implement the needed systems change; however, Army G-4 has been unable to complete the TC-AIMS II systems change in the last 4 years. In 2009, the JROC endorsed the implementation of the TTN data field in various joint and Services' systems, including the Army's TC-AIMS II system. The TTN is a 17-digit data element that will link classified force deployment planning data with unclassified transportation schedules and movement information while preserving operational security.

### **Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum Recommendation**

(U) In February 2009, the JROC issued JROC Memorandum 034-09, "Transportation Tracking Number DOTMLPF [Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities] Change Recommendation," which endorsed the TTN change recommendation approaches and actions to improve the needs of the warfighter for joint deployment and global distribution process improvements. The memorandum detailed the requirements to develop and incorporate TTN requirements into joint and Services' deployment and distribution systems. USTRANSCOM is the overall lead organization for these actions and the Services and the Joint Staff are responsible for implementing the actions outlined. The Army had an original suspense date of February 2011 to fund and incorporate the newly added TTN capabilities into their TC-AIMS II systems. However, Army G-4 did not meet the

*(U) Army G-4 did not meet the suspense date and in April 2011, the JROC approved an extension for the Army to complete TTN implementation by February 2013.*

(U) suspense date and in April 2011, the JROC approved an extension for the Army<sup>5</sup> to complete TTN implementation by February 2013.

### ***Efforts To Implement Transportation Tracking Number Recommendation***

(U) Although Army G-4 attempted to implement the TTN recommendation, Army G-4 missed two deadlines to fund and implement TTN into TC-AIMS II. Army G-4 officials stated that problems with other systems prevented any work on TC-AIMS II from February 2009 through February 2011. Specifically, the Army requested an extension to JROC Memorandum 034-09 citing that various system complications caused by funding and other resource allocation delays were the primary challenge in meeting the February 2011 suspense. From March 2011 to September 2012, Army G-4 attempted to obtain funding to implement the TTN change but was unable to obligate the funds to a contract before the end of the fiscal year.

(U) An Army G-4 official stated that Army G-4 will miss the JROC extended suspense date of February 2013 and estimated that the implementation of TTN into TC-AIMS II will be complete by the end of December 2013. The Army Chief of Staff should perform a review to determine the priority for implementing TTN in TC-AIMS II to ensure that the change is operational and can be used during the remainder of the drawdown and beyond.

### **Conclusion**

(U) Without a common data field linking TC-AIMS II with JOPES, end-to-end in-transit visibility can be difficult to provide. In addition, without using the TTN capability to provide visibility of equipment from origin to destination, USTRANSCOM may not be able to adequately plan upcoming retrograde movements. As the drawdown efforts increase, the potential lack of movement visibility may greater impact USTRANSCOM's ability to plan transportation for equipment retrograde. With approximately 21 months remaining until the end of the drawdown, implementation by the end of 2013 would leave only 11 months to use this capability for management systems used to retrograde equipment.

### **Management Comments on the Report and Our Response**

#### ***Department of the Army Comments***

(U) The Acting Director, Force Projection and Distribution, Army G-4, responding for the Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged that Army G-4 missed two deadlines to fund and implement TTN into TC-AIMS II and believes this happened because of

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<sup>5</sup> (U) Other Service Components were also granted an extension at that time.

(U) unique circumstances. The Acting Director stated that the report inaccurately implies that the lack of TTN is the sole reason that data is manually entered into JOPES and notes that TC-AIMS II receives and sends data to JOPES through either the Joint Force Requirements Generator II or the Computerized Movement Planning and Status System, as required by Joint Publication 3-35, "Deployment and Redeployment Operations," January 31, 2013. However, neither of those two systems are currently used in the process. The Acting Director further stated that the implementation of TTN, although critical to retrograde visibility, will not resolve the manual data entry problem.

### ***Our Response***

(U) Although we acknowledge that the lack of a TTN may not be the sole reason that the 401<sup>st</sup> Army Field Sustainment Brigade is manually entering data into JOPES, having the TTN capability, as well as using the Joint Force Requirements Generator II or the Computerized Movement Planning and Status System, could help reduce manual data entry and expedite the process. Our intent was not to imply that TC-AIMS II and JOPES are the only two systems used in the retrograde process. We make note of the existence of additional systems in footnote 2 on page 3 of the report. The report focused on those two systems because they were the two emphasized during our audit fieldwork regarding the lack of a TTN.

### **Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response**

(U) <sup>CENTCOM (b) (5)</sup>



### ***Department of the Army Comments***

(U) The Acting Director, Force Projection and Distribution, Army G-4, responding for the Army Chief of Staff, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. In response, Army G-4 has expedited the implementation of TTN into TC-AIMS II. Specifically, a contract was awarded to develop a TTN solution on March 8, 2013, and the development process began on March 13, 2013. The program office responsible for TC-AIMS II anticipates completion by January 24, 2014. Army G-4 will monitor TTN implementation and provide a formal progress report on July 16, 2013.

### ***Our Response***

(U) The Acting Director's comments were responsive. Although he did not agree or disagree, the planned actions meet the intent of the recommendation, thus, no further comments are required.

## Appendix A. Scope and Methodology


(U) We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 through February 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) To determine whether USTRANSCOM officials were developing plans to provide sufficient Government and contract capabilities to support USCENTCOM requirements, we coordinated with or interviewed officials from:

- (U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics;
- (U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
- (U) USCENTCOM;
- (U) USFOR-A;
- (U) USTRANSCOM;
- (U) Joint Staff; and
- (U) The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army G-4, Logistics.

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TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1-4(g)



(U) To gain an understanding of how USTRANSCOM officials are developing plans to provide sufficient Government and contract capabilities to support USCENTCOM requirements, we conducted site visits to USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM in September and October 2012. During our site visits, we met with command officials to discuss their roles and responsibilities to understand the procedures and requirements for planning and executing the Afghanistan drawdown. In addition, we observed how JOPES was used for equipment retrograde. We also interviewed officials from USFOR-A to gain an understanding of how drawdown requirements were generated and understand what the preliminary monthly drawdown goals would be for equipment to be retrograded from Afghanistan.

## Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

## Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) have issued five reports discussing developing plans for the transportation of equipment retrograde. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>.

## GAO

(U) Report No. GAO-13-185R, "Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations: DOD Decision Makers Need Additional Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess Equipment," December 19, 2012

(U) Report No. GAO-12-883R, "Defense Logistics: DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve Some Segments of the Materiel Distribution System," August 3, 2012

(U) Report No. GAO-08-930, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq," September 10, 2008

## DoD IG

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TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1-4(g)

(U) DoD IG Report No. D-2010-025, "Transportation Planning for the Withdrawal of DoD Personnel and Assets From Iraq," December 11, 2009

## Appendix B. List of Classified Documents

- Source 1: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)~~  
Declassify On: 20370215  
Date of Source: 15 Feb 2012
- Source 2: ~~DoD OIG (b) (7) (E)~~  
Declassify On: 20370921  
Date of Source: 21 Sep 2011
- Source 3: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)~~  
Declassify On: 20371211  
Date of Source: 12 Dec 2011
- Source 4: ~~DoD OIG (b) (7) (E)~~  
Declassify On: 20371212  
Date of Source: 19 Nov 2012
- Source 5: ~~DoD OIG (b) (7) (E)~~  
Declassify On: 20371212  
Date of Source: 19 Nov 2012
- Source 6: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)~~  
Declassify On: 20370310  
Date of Source: 10 Mar 2012
- Source 7: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)~~  
Declassify on: 20371102  
Date of Source: 02 Nov 2012
- Source 8: ~~DoD OIG (b) (7) (E)~~  
Declassify on: 20370925  
Date of Source: 1 Oct 2012
- Source 9: ~~DoD OIG (b) (7) (E)~~  
Declassify on: 20370905  
Date of Source: 5 Sep 2012
- Source 10: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)~~  
Declassify on: 20370228  
Date of Source: 28 Feb 2012
- Source 11: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)~~  
Declassify on: 20370524  
Date of Source: 24 May 2012

Source 12: ~~TRANSCOM (b) (1), 1.4(g)~~

Declassify on: 20360331  
Date of Source: 19 Aug 2011

## Department of the Army Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4  
500 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0500

DALO-FPD

DoD OIG (b)  
(c)

28 Mar 2013

MEMORANDUM THRU THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4, 500 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC 20310

FOR U.S. ARMY AUDIT AGENCY, 3101 PARK AVENUE, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22302

SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Report, "Transportation Planning is Sufficient for Retrograde Operations; However, There is an Opportunity to Improve the Efficiency of Management Systems (Project No.D2012-D000JA-0195.000)"

1. The Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), G-4 concurs with the DoDIG finding that implementing the Transportation Tracking Number (TTN) may enhance retrograde efficiency. HQDA, G-4 acknowledges that two deadlines were missed to fund and implement the TTN functionality in Transportation Coordinator's-Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II).
2. In response to those findings, the HQDA, G-4 has expedited the implementation of the TTN in TC-AIMS II. On 8 March 2013, the Engineer Research and Development Command (ERDC), the contracting activity responsible for TC-AIMS II, awarded a contract to develop TTN. On 13 March 2013, Product Director-Automated Movement and Identification Solutions (PD-AMIS), the program office responsible for TC-AIMS II, began the development process and anticipates completion by 24 January 2014.
3. The HQDA, G-4 seeks to clarify a technical aspect of this report. The paragraphs titled "Equipment drawdown process" (page 3) and "Lack of common data field for systems used for retrograde process" (page 9) imply that the lack of TTN is the sole reason that the 401<sup>st</sup> Army Field Sustainment Brigade is manually forwarding and entering data into the Joint Operations Planning and Executing System (JOPES). This is not accurate. For clarification, TC-AIMS II (unclassified) receives and sends data to JOPES (classified) through either the Joint Force Requirements Generator II (JFRG II) or Computerized Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS). In accordance with Joint Publication 3-35 (Appendix A), Deployment and Redeployment Operations (31 Jan 13), the use of JFRGII or COMPASS is required to pass data between TC-AIMS II (unclassified) and JOPES (classified). Neither JFRGII nor COMPASS is currently utilized in the process. The implementation of TTN, while critical to retrograde visibility, will not resolve the manual data entry issue.



DALO-FPD

SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Report, "Transportation Planning is Sufficient for Retrograde Operation; However, There is an Opportunity to Improve the Efficiency of Management Systems (Project No.D2012-D000JA-0195.000)"

4. The HQDA, G-4 believes that the earlier missed TTN implementation dates were due to unique circumstances. The HQDA, G-4 will monitor TTN implementation and provide the DoDIG a formal progress report on 16 Jul 13.

5. The HQDA, G-4 point of contact is DoD OIG (b) (6)

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Acting Director, Force Projection  
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