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USNORTHCOM NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN (NC-NARP)

CONPLAN 3505-08

NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J5
4 April 2008

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HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite BD16
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3801
February 2008

SUBJECT: USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)

SEE DISTRIBUTION
(Annex Z)

1. Attached is the USNORTHCOM Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3505-08, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan (NC-NARP). It serves as the USNORTHCOM CONPLAN for response to an accident involving U.S. nuclear weapons in Department of Defense (DOD) custody in the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area, in accordance with guidance, policy and direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). This CONPLAN is effective upon receipt for planning and is effective for implementation when directed by the SecDef.

2. This CONPLAN fulfills the requirements of DOD Directive 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents and Incidents and DOD Manual 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures.

3. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 was coordinated with the Joint Planning and Execution Community to include U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, U.S. Air Force Space Command, and the National Guard Bureau during preparation.

4. Supporting plans must be prepared in accordance with the concepts outlined in this plan, as well as DODD 3150.8 and DOD 3150.8-M. Elements tasked in support of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 are consistent with the intent of the National Response Framework (NRF).

FOR THE COMMANDER

CHRISTOPHER D. MILLER
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USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS AND RECORD OF CHANGES

1. The long title of this plan is USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan. The short title is USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08.

2. This document is classified For Official Use Only to protect information revealing plans of U.S military forces. Information in USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 must be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of the plan, including those needing to develop supporting plans.

3. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, title 18, United States Code, sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE POSTED	POSTED BY

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USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
PLAN SUMMARY

References: a. DOD Directive 3150.8, "DOD Response to Radiological Accidents, 13 Jun 1996."

b. DOD 3150.8-M "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," 22 Feb 2005.

c. "National Response Framework (NRF)," Jan 2008.

d. DOD Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, 18 Feb 1997."

e. DOD Directive 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance, 20 Dec 1993."

f. DOD Directive 5210.41, "Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons, 1 Nov 2004."

g. DOD Instruction 5200.8, "Security of DOD Installations and Resources, 10 Dec 2005."

h. Title 50 USC § 797, "Security regulations and orders; penalty for violation."

i. Title 50 USC § 831, "Regulations for employment security (Security procedures, access to classified material)."

j. Title 42 USC § 2271, "General Provisions (Authority of the President to use Government agencies to protect Restricted Data, facilities, equipment, materials and other property)."

k. Title 18 USC § 1385, "Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus."

l. Title 42 § 5121, et seq, Robert T. Stafford Act Public Law.

m. AFSPC Plan 10-1, "ICBM Radiological Accident/Incident Response and Recovery Plan, 15 Oct 2004."

n. ACC Plan 32-1, "CONUS Radiological Accident/Incident Response and Recovery Plan, 11 Sep 02."

o. Commander, Navy Region Southeast Instruction 3440.15,

"Regional Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan, 13 Apr 2005."

p. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, 28 Feb 2003.

q. Unified Command Plan, 5 May 2006.

r. Title 10 USC § 375, "Restriction on Direct Participation by Military Personnel."

s. CJCSI 3121.01B, "Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SRUF), 13 June 2005."

t. DOD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities," 15 Jan 1993

u. DOD 5200.8-R, "Physical Security Program," May 1991

Add cite:
v. Title 10 USC §§ 371-382, "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies"

w. DOD Directive 5525.5, "DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 15 Jan 1986"

x. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-28 (S), 20 Jun 2003

y. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500-06, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations, 10 Oct 2006

z. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-05, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 11 Apr 2006

aa. Joint Publication 3-41, "Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, 2 Oct 2006

bb. Commander, Navy Region Northwest Instruction 3440.1d, Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Response Plan, 31 Jan 2001

1. Purpose. USNORTHCOM Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3505-08, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan (NC-NARP), fulfills the requirements of Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents and Incidents (Ref a) and DOD Manual 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) (Ref b). It serves as the USNORTHCOM CONPLAN for response to an accident involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DOD custody in the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area in accordance with

guidance, policy and direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the SecDef.

a. Commander USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM) has the primary responsibility to direct and coordinate the Department of Defense (DOD) response actions for a nuclear weapon accident in U.S. territory (excluding Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific, which are the responsibility of Commander USPACOM, and the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, which are the responsibility of Commander USSOUTHCOM).

b. This plan will be implemented immediately upon notification of an Operations Report (OPREP)-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW report to the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

c. USNORTHCOM conducts operations to include controlling the accident scene, regaining custody of the nuclear weapon/asset (if necessary), ensuring contamination control, removing hazards, and reducing the health and safety risk to the public and response personnel.

2. Conditions for Implementation

a. Politico-Military Situation. Ensuring the health and safety of the public is essential where DOD nuclear weapons are concerned. Due to design and safety features, the likelihood of a nuclear detonation caused by a nuclear weapon accident is extremely low. The more likely hazard would be radiological airborne particulates dispersed by the detonation of high explosive components or by the deflagration of radioactive materials involved in fire. DOD, the owning (custodial) Service, and CDRUSNORTHCOM have responsibility to insure DOD response to a nuclear weapons accident is rapid, effective and minimizes any potential radiation release.

b. Statement. This plan summary provides military decision makers with a brief recapitulation of the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of a specific contingency.

c. Legal Considerations

(1) National Defense Area (NDA). Federal statute authorizes SecDef (or his designee – typically the service or installation commander) to establish an NDA. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such non-Federal land under the effective control of the DOD to include federal lands under the control of other federal agencies. DOD 5200.8 (ref g) gives the installation

commander the authority to maintain law and order and protect installation people and property. That authority extends to an NDA under emergency situations such as accident sites involving federal equipment or personnel, to include aircraft crashes; emergency landings by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons; emergency diversions of military aircraft to civilian airports; and accidents involving nuclear weapons ground convoys. DOD may establish a NDA on non-federal lands located within the United States, its territories or possessions, for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DOD equipment and/or material. The authority includes the removal of people from, or denial of access to, an installation or site, of people who threaten the orderly administration of the installation or site. (Ref h, i, j, t, and u).

(2) Immediate Response Authority. Local military commanders and responsible officials from DOD components have Immediate Response Authority under imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency that may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage (Ref c, d, and l).

(3) Posse Comitatus Act. Prohibiting direct military involvement in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military's role in domestic affairs. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits Federal military personnel from engaging in direct law enforcement activities, such as searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. U.S. Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the PCA that allow the military, in certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the laws of the United States. The only likely exception that applies for this plan is discussed in the paragraph on NDA above. (Ref k, v, and w).

(4) Standing Rules on the Use of Force (SRUF). U.S. forces retain the inherent right and obligation to defend themselves and other U.S. forces in the area. SRUF apply when conducting operations in the United States or its Territories. Forces will be trained on SRUF before employment. Supplemental SRUF should be requested through CDRUSNORTHCOM, as necessary. Initial Response Forces (IRF) will receive an initial SRUF briefing prior to assuming post. The IRF/Response Task Force (RTF) Commander will disseminate SRUF to all subordinate units, supporting commands and civil authorities as appropriate.

(5) Stafford Act. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) provides authority for the U.S. Government to assist

state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters within the United States (Ref l).

(6) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Restrictions. Per FAA regulation, part 91, section 91.137 Temporary Flight Restrictions may be executed in the Vicinity of Disaster/Hazard Areas.

3. Operations To Be Conducted

a. Force Requirements. Assigned, attached, and/or supporting forces.

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Pentagon, Washington, DC. SecDef has delegated authority to initiate DOD nuclear weapons accident response (including the deployment of forces) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Upon notification of a nuclear weapon accident, the NMCC assembles the Joint Nuclear Accident Incident Response Team (JNAIRT) to coordinate and monitor the early operational response for the CJCS until CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of forces. If/when needed, the NMCC will deploy the IRF and RTF through the appropriate Service Operations Center. In coordination with the Service and Force Provider (USJFCOM), USNORTHCOM will assume OPCON of the IRF and RTF shortly after they arrive (separately) in the designated JOA. A Joint Staff vocal OPCON order will be followed up with a Joint Staff Execute Order (EXORD) to USNORTHCOM, codifying the OPCON relationships.

(2) DOD Representative. The SecDef may appoint a DOD Representative The DOD Representative shall assist the RTF Commander coordinate with the Principal Federal Official (PFO), and other federal, state, local, and tribal officials in the JFO. The DOD Representative will not have C2 authority over the RTF but will coordinate with the RTF Commander. The DOD Representative will not replace the DCO, who will remain the DOD single point of contact for receiving and processing requests for DOD support.

(3) United States Air Force (USAF), Washington, DC. USAF is responsible for the safe-handling, storage, maintenance and transportation of U.S. nuclear weapons, components and materials in USAF custody. When tasked by the NMCC, USAF IRF, RTF, and other response assets (as required) respond to nuclear weapon accidents. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Peterson AFB, CO and Air Combat Command (ACC) Langley AFB, VA each have an RTF that responds to DOD nuclear weapon accidents as tasked by the SecDef.

(4) United States Navy (USN), Washington, D.C. USN is responsible for safe-handling, storage, maintenance and transportation of U.S. nuclear weapons, components and materials in USN custody. When tasked by the NMCC, USN IRF, RTF, and other response assets (as required) respond to nuclear weapon accidents. The Navy RTFs, located at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida and Naval Base Kitsap, Washington provide command and control of on-scene personnel and operations. The Navy RTFs respond to a DOD nuclear weapon accident as tasked by the SecDef.

(5) United States Army (USA). The Army maintains unique capabilities to respond and operate in radiologically contaminated areas. In rare and unique cases, the Army may be the nearest military installation to respond to a DOD nuclear weapon accident (in the IRF role).

(6) United States Marine Corps (USMC). The Marine Corps maintains unique, limited capabilities to respond and operate in radiological contaminated areas. The Marine Corps response force is designated as a Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).

(7) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Scott AFB, IL. USTRANSCOM provides ground, sealift, and airlift support assets to transport personnel, teams, and equipment for the response mission.

(8) U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Provides personnel and equipment support, consistent with operational availability.

(9) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Ft. Belvoir, VA. Provides technical advice and reach-back support for U.S. nuclear weapon accident response planning, exercises, and actual nuclear weapon accidents.

(10) National Guard Bureau (NGB), Washington, DC. The NGB can coordinate with states having specialized Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities (Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) and National Guard Reaction Forces (NGRF)) that can respond and operate in radiological contaminated areas.

b. Deployment

(1) Responding U.S. military forces and commanders will maintain, or if necessary, re-establish custody of U.S. nuclear weapons.

(2) An IRF will be dispatched from the nearest military installation having a disaster response capability to render emergency assistance, and

maintain C2 of the accident site until relieved by the RTF. CDRUSNORTHCOM may assume OPCON of the IRF the IRF Commander arrives at the accident scene.

(3) The NMCC will activate and dispatch the appropriate Service provided RTF to the accident site through the normal deployment order process or by vocal authorization through normal service channels. The CJCS initiates and manages the DOD response to a nuclear weapon accident, through the NMCC, until CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of responding DOD forces (after forces arrive at the accident scene).

(4) The designated RTF Commander will relieve the IRF Commander and subsume the IRF as required.

c. Employment

(1) CDRUSNORTHCOM will direct the response and recovery actions for DOD nuclear weapon accidents in the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area. USNORTHCOM will maintain operational communications and report to the SecDef/NMCC until mission completion. The Incident Commander (i.e. The IRF or RTF Commander) will report conditions to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center and conduct operations to ensure timely, comprehensive and effective operations to safeguard the weapon(s) and prevent further health and safety risks to the public.

(2) CDRUSNORTHCOM will conduct nuclear weapon accident response operations in five phases. These phases may overlap and operations from different phases may occur simultaneously (See Basic Plan Annex C).

d. Supporting Plans

(1) AFSPC Plan 10-1, ICBM Radiological Accident/Incident Response and Recovery Plan (Ref m).

(2) ACC Plan 32-1, CONUS Radiological Accident/Incident Response and Recovery Plan (Ref n).

(3) Commander, Navy Region Southeast Instruction 3440.15, Regional Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan (Ref o).

(4) Commander, Navy Region Northwest Instruction 3440.1d, Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Response Plan (Ref bb).

4. Key Assumptions (For an accident involving a nuclear weapon in DOD custody)

a. The responsible Service will establish an NDA prior to USNORTHCOM assuming the mission.

b. Services will continue to maintain current nuclear weapons security, nuclear surety and response capabilities to include security, maintenance, training, and equipping of installation forces, IRF, RTF, and flag officer level RTF Commander.

c. Service RTFs continue to form the basis of the DOD response force.

d. Service provided RTFs and IRFs are available, trained and ready.

e. Necessary transportation and support (personnel and equipment) is available.

f. A nuclear weapon accident triggers public awareness and concern and media attention. A nuclear weapon accident also raises awareness and political sensitivity of elected officials.

g. DOE teams and assets will be available to support DOD response and recovery operations. Other federal teams and assets will also be available to support DOD if needed.

h. The responsible Service will establish a National Defense Area (NDA) prior to USNORTHCOM assuming the mission.

i. Federal, state, local, and/or tribal agencies will request DOD assistance for CM operations outside the declared National Defense Area/DOD installation.

j. DOD forces, including DOD installations in USNORTHCOM AOR are available for SecDef tasking.

5. Operational Constraints

a. Within the United States, local civil authorities have primary responsibility for implementing measures to protect life, property and the environment in those areas outside the boundaries of a nuclear weapon accident location (DOD installation, facility or NDA).

b. Immediate airlift for required resources may not be available.

c. Required resources and personnel may be in use for higher priority mission requirements.

d. The IRF may not be able to provide all equipment, supplies, and services necessary to sustain RTF operations.

6. Operations Timeline. Response operations will commence immediately following notification of a DOD nuclear weapon accident.

7. Command Relationships

a. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported Combatant Commander for a nuclear weapon accident in U.S. territory (with the exception of Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific and the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico in the Atlantic) when the weapon is in DOD custody. CDRUSPACOM is the supported Combatant Commander for a nuclear weapon accident in Hawaii and US territories in the Pacific region. Commander USSOUTHCOM is the supported Combatant Commander for a nuclear weapon accident in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico in the Atlantic. CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of DOD nuclear weapon accident response forces at the direction of the SecDef.

b. The Services, USPACOM, USEUCOM, USTRANSCOM, USJFCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USSOCOM and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations and headquarters.

c. The IRF/RTF Commander is the DOD Incident Commander at the accident site and as such commands and controls all responding DOD teams on and off site (This includes responding DOD teams and assets outside the NDA/Military installation).

d. The NMCC will activate and dispatch the appropriate Service provided RTF (Ref. a and b) to the accident site through the normal deployment order process or by vocal authorization through normal Service channels. The RTF Commander shall relieve the IRF Commander and subsume the IRF as required. The RTF Commander will report OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM at this time. This should be accomplished by the most expedient means available (Video Teleconference (VTC) if available). The RTF Commander shall brief CDRUSNORTHCOM on the status of the RTF response (current activities, responding DOD and Interagency teams, etc.). Vocal authorization from the SecDef, through the Joint Staff, for CDRUSNORTHCOM to assume OPCON of

the RTF and all other responding DOD teams/assets will be followed up by a Joint Staff EXORD codifying the OPCON relationship.

e. The RTF Commander will be flag rank IAW DOD 3150.8 (Ref a). The RTF Commander will coordinate all accident response and recovery site activities with federal, local, state and tribal officials.

8. Logistics and Engineering Appraisal. See Annex D, Logistics and Engineering and Annex L, Environmental.

9. Personnel Appraisal. Initial manpower support will be provided by the IRF and RTF. Specific functional expertise, if not available in the IRF or RTF, will be sourced through the Services, Defense Agencies, USJFCOM, and supporting federal departments or agencies.

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USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS PAGE

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USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
GLOSSARY

Access Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures.

Access to Classified Material. The ability and opportunity to get knowledge of classified information. For access to classified information the following general restrictions apply: favorable determination of eligibility for access has been made by the Head of an Agency or his or her designee. The person has signed an approved nondisclosure agreement; and the person has a need to know the information.

Access to a Nuclear Weapon or Warhead. Close physical or electrical proximity to a nuclear weapon in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage a nuclear weapon. For example, a person would not be considered to have access if an escort or guards were provided for either the person or the weapon when the person is in close proximity to the weapon.

Accident Response Group (ARG). A DOE/NNSA asset comprised of technical and scientific experts, with specialized equipment. The ARG includes a cadre of senior scientific advisors, weapons engineers and technicians, experts in nuclear safety and high-explosive safety, health physicists, radiation control technicians, industrial hygienists, physical scientists, packaging and transportation specialists, and other specialists from the DOE/NNSA weapons complex. The ARG maintains readiness to provide DOE technical assistance to peacetime accidents involving SNM anywhere in the world.

Accident Scene. The area surrounding an Accident Site from which all non-essential personnel are evacuated. The accident scene is usually defined by the property boundaries of a U.S. Military reservation, base, or station and/or a National Defense Area (NDA) established by the RTF/IRF Commander or National Security Area established by the DOE IC.

Accident Site. For DOD, an area within the National Defense Area (NDA), Weapon Storage Area, or Weapon Restricted Area containing the affected weapon(s), warhead(s), Special Nuclear Material and any potential damaged buildings, vehicles, and personnel property affected by the accident. Additionally, the accident site shall have response personnel, equipment, and

resources necessary to control entry and access to the affected area. And to plan and organize health and safety matters, weapons recovery, and other operations essential to the emergency.

Accident Site Consolidation. The third phase of the response to a nuclear weapon accident. It is marked by the arrival of a robust cadre of DOD and DOE/NNSA response assets to the accident site. It grows out of the initial response phase and begins once immediate lifesaving and firefighting activities are completed.

Accident Site Health Group (ASHG). A group of health and safety experts, staffed by representatives from the DOD and the DOE/NNSA, shall ensure the safety of all on-site personnel during recovery from a nuclear weapon accident and all associated hazards, not just radiological hazards. The ASHG was formerly known as the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center.

Aerial Measuring System (AMS). A DOE/NNSA asset consisting of fixed and rotary wing aircraft used to perform aerial radiation surveys and radioactive source searches which is able to confirm the release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere, track the radiation plume, and map the radioactive ground deposition.

Airborne Radioactivity. Any radioactive material suspended in the atmosphere.

Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). A field-qualified team of worldwide deployable health physicists, industrial hygienists, and laboratory technicians established at the Air Force Institute for Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk Analysis. Assets include a forward deployed field laboratory, supplemented by reach-back radionalytical capability at Brooks Air Force Base (AFB), TX.

Air Sampler. A device used to collect the amounts of various pollutants or other substances in the air. As related to radiation, this device is used to collect radioactive particulates suspended in the air.

Airhead. A designated location in an area of operations used as a base for supply and evacuation by air.

Alpha Radiation. Radiation emitted from atomic nuclei during nuclear reactions or radioactive decay. Alpha radiation has very limited range and cannot penetrate through materials such as human skin, paper, clothing, etc. When emitted from a radioactive source inside the body, these particles are the

most dangerous form of radiation due to their high rate of linear energy transfer rate.

Armed. The configuration of a nuclear weapon in which a single signal initiates the action required for obtaining a nuclear detonation (DOD 3150.8-M).

Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI). A tri-Service facility in Bethesda, MD, that conducts research in the field of radiobiology and related matters essential to the operational and medical support of the DOD and the Military Services. The AFRRI provides the Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT), and also provides educational courses such as, "The Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation."

Background Count. In connection with health protection, the contribution of background radiation to a measurement of radioactivity.

Background Radiation. The radioactive material in the environment, including both natural and a very small amount of manmade radioactive material. Nuclear (or ionizing) radiation arising from within the body and from the surroundings to which individuals are always exposed. It approximates 360 millirem (mrem) per year.

BENT SPEAR. The Joint Reporting flagword for a Nuclear Weapon Incident (See definition for Nuclear Weapon Incident).

Beta Radiation. Radiation emitted from atomic nuclei during nuclear reactions such as radioactive decay. Beta radiation has limited range and cannot penetrate past the first several layers of skin on humans. Due to their high linear energy transfer rate, these particles are most damaging against uncovered portions of the human body. When ingested, they are even more damaging, though not as damaging as Alpha radiation.

Bioassay. The determination of type, quantity, concentration, and/or location of radioactive material in the body using either direct measurements of the body or analysis of biological material removed (blood, saliva) or excreted (feces, urine) from the body.

Biodosimetry. A laboratory method for determining a person's dose of ionizing radiation by analyzing certain components of the blood.

BROKEN ARROW. The Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Report flagword for a Nuclear Weapons Accident (See definition for Nuclear Weapon Accident).

Centigray (cGy). The SI unit energy absorbed per unit of mass from any kind of ionizing radiation in any target. One gray (Gy) is the absorption of one joule of energy in one kilogram of mass and is the same as 100 rad.

Close Proximity. Within 2 arms' reach or 6 to 7 ft of a weapon or Special Nuclear Material (SNM).

Consequence Management (CM). Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorists incidents. CM includes the preparatory planning, training, and procurement of personnel and equipment capable of providing a national and international response in support of national and international security and public and environmental safety.

Contamination. The deposit and/or absorption of radioactive material, biological or chemical agents on, and by, structures, areas, personnel or objects where it is not desired.

Contamination Control. Procedures to avoid, reduce, remove or render harmless, temporarily or permanently, radiological, biological and chemical contamination for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the efficient conduct of military operations.

Contamination Control Line (CCL). A line that initially extends 100 meters beyond the known and/or suspected radiological contamination to provide a measure of safety. Once the Contamination Control Station (CCS) is operational, the CCL becomes the outer boundary that separates the reduced hazard area from the clean area.

Contamination Control Station (CCS). An area specifically designated for allowing ingress and egress of personnel and equipment to and/or from the Hazards Area. The outer boundary of the CCS is the CCL, and the inner boundary is the line segment labeled the hot line.

Continental United States (CONUS). U.S. territory, including the adjacent territorial waters, located in North America between Canada and Mexico.

Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information (CNWDI). Top secret restricted data or secret restricted data revealing the theory of operation or design of the components of a thermonuclear or implosion-type fission bomb, warhead, demolition munition, or test device. Specifically excluded is information

concerning arming, fusing and firing systems, limited life components; and totally contained quantities of fissionable, fusionable and high-explosive materials by type.

Cumulative Dose (Radiation). The total dose resulting from repeated exposure to radiation in the same region, or of the whole body, including multiple exposures or internal doses delivered over time.

Curie (Ci). A unit for quantity of radioactivity; it is defined as 'that quantity of radioactive material in which 37 billion atoms are transformed per second'. This quantity was originally based on the amount of radioactivity in 1 gram of Radium-226.

Custody. Responsibility for the control of, transfer and movement of, and access to, weapons and components. Custody also includes the maintenance of and accountability for weapons, components, and radioactive materials.

Decay (Radioactive). The spontaneous decrease in the radiation intensity or mass of any radioactive material with respect to time.

Decontamination. The process making any person, object, or area safe within acceptable limits by absorbing, making harmless, or removing contaminated material clinging to or around it.

Decontamination Station. A building or location suitably equipped and organized where personnel and material are cleansed of radiological and other hazardous or toxic contaminants.

Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). The DCO is a DOD Officer, appointed by USNORTHCOM, who serves as the DOD Single point of contact with civil authorities at the Joint Field Office (JFO). With few exceptions, requests for assistance originating at the JFO are coordinated with and processed through the DCO. The DCO may have a DCE consisting of a staff and military liaison officers in order to facilitate coordination and support of civil authorities. Specific responsibilities of the DCO/DCE include processing requirements for military support, forwarding mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations, and assisting the combatant commander as directed (Ref c).

Dose. The amount of energy absorbed per unit mass of material, or the time integrated dose rate. Measured in units of gray (Gy) or radiation absorbed dose (RAD).

Dosimetry. The measurement of radiation doses. It applies to both the devices used (dosimeters) and to the techniques used.

Entry Control Point (ECP). The place where entry into and exit from the CCL, Security Station, NDA/National Security Area, or classified material working space is controlled. It is located on the disaster cordon near the on-scene control point.

Explosive Ordnance. All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials, and biological and chemical agents. This ordnance includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; and artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition. It also includes all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IED); and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance which has become hazardous by damage or deterioration.

EOD Procedures. Those particular courses or modes of action taken by EOD personnel for access to, diagnosis, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of explosive ordnance or any Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) associated with an EOD incident. Those actions include

(1) Access Procedures. Those actions taken to locate exactly and gain access to unexploded ordnance.

(2) Diagnostic Procedures. Those actions taken to identify and evaluate unexploded explosive ordnance.

(3) Render Safe Procedures (RSP). The part of the EOD procedures involving the application of special EOD methods and tools to interrupt functions or separate essential components of unexploded ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation.

(4) Recovery Procedures. Those actions taken to recover unexploded explosive ordnance.

(5) Final Disposal Procedures. The final disposal of explosive ordnance which may include demolition or burning in place, removal to a disposal area or other appropriate means.

EOD Unit. Personnel with special training and equipment who render explosive ordnance safe, make intelligence reports on such ordnance and supervise the safe removal thereof.

Exposure. The level of radiation flux to which a material or living tissue is exposed. The actual dose of radiation from the exposure depends on many factors

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Federal Agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which establishes policy and coordinates all civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of executive agencies in response to emergencies which require Federal response assistance. The FEMA assists State and local agencies in their emergency planning. Its primary role in a radiological accident is one of coordinating Federal, State, local, and volunteer response actions.

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). A coalition of all Federal resources that coordinates and manages the Federal off-site radiological monitoring and assessment activities during major radiological emergencies within the United States. The FRMAC works in support of State, local, and Tribal governments through the coordinating agency.

Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). Information removed from the Restricted Data category when the DOE (or antecedent Agencies) and the DOD jointly determine that such information relates primarily to the military use of atomic weapons and that such information may be adequately safeguarded as classified defense information (Section 142d of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) as amended).

Fragmentation Zone. A computed distance which fragments created by an explosion may be projected.

Gamma-Ray Radiation. High-energy electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei during a nuclear reaction or radioactive decay. Gamma radiation requires thick layers of dense materials, such as lead, for shielding. Potentially lethal to humans, depending on the intensity of the field.

Geiger-Mueller (GM) Counter. A GM counter is a gas ionization type detector for gamma detection. They are most often used to detect beta and gamma rays. These counters are unable to distinguish gamma-ray energies and therefore may not be used to identify specific radionuclides.

Half-Life. The time required for the activity of a given radioactive element to decrease to half of its initial value due to radioactive decay. The half-life is a characteristic property of each radioactive element and is independent of its amount or physical form. The effective half-life of a given isotope in the body is the time in which the quantity in the body shall decrease to half because of both radioactive decay and biological elimination.

Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC). The HPAC is a forward deployable modeling capability. This software tool assists in emergency response to hazardous agent releases. The HPAC is able to predict the effects of HAZMAT releases into the atmosphere and their impact on civilian and military populations.

Hazardous Material (HAZMAT). Any material that is flammable, corrosive, an oxidizing agent, explosive, toxic, poisonous, radioactive, nuclear unduly magnetic, a chemical agent, biological research material, compressed gas, or any other material that, because of its quantity, properties, or packaging, may endanger life or property.

High Explosive (HE). An energetic material that detonates (instead of deflagrating or burning); the rate that the reaction zone advances into the un-reacted material exceeds the velocity of sound in the un-reacted material.

Hot Spot. The region in a contaminated area in which the level of radioactive contamination is considerably greater than in neighboring regions in the area (about 10 times background).

Incident Commander (IC). The individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and release of resources. The IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting nuclear weapon accident response operations and is responsible for the management of all accident operations at the accident site. The IRF/RTF Commander (or the responsible DOD individual at the site until the IRF/RTF Commander arrives) is the DOD IC for an accident involving a nuclear weapon in DOD custody.

Information Coordination Cell. A cell collocated with the IRF/RTF Commander and staff, comprised of senior co-equal public affairs representatives from the

DOD, the DOE/NNSA, and State and local authorities. The Information Coordination Cell plans, manages, and coordinates the on-scene public affairs response. The Information Coordination Cell provides information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) who coordinates the all incident-related public information activities.

Initial Response Force (IRF). The DOD entity directed to proceed to the scene of a radiological accident for rendering emergency assistance, including maintaining C2 of the accident site until relieved by the RTF. Subject to its capabilities, the IRF may be tasked to do the following:

(1) Rescue operations.

(2) Accident site security.

(3) Firefighting.

(4) Initiation of appropriate EOD procedures.

(5) Radiation monitoring.

(6) Establishing C2 and communications.

(7) Public affairs activities.

(8) Casualty Management.

Insensitive High Explosive (IHE). HE that requires a shock of unusual strength to cause detonation. This relative insensitivity contributes to weapon safety.

Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS). Plans for and commits DOD resources in response to requests from civil authorities. The JDOMS serves as the action agent for planning and executing the DOD support mission to civilian authorities within the United States.

Joint Field Office (JFO). A temporary federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination of Federal, state, tribal and local governments and private sector businesses and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) with primary responsibility for the response and near term recovery. The JFO is organized staffed and managed in a manner consistent with National Incident Management System (NIMS) principals and is led by the Unified Coordination Group (Ref c).

Joint Information Center (JIC). A physical location from which external affairs professionals from all the organizations involved in an incident work together to provide emergency information, media response and public affairs functions. The JIC serves as the focal point for a coordinated and timely release of incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation information to the public.

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Center (JNACC). A combined Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and DOE-centralized Agency for exchanging and maintaining information about radiological assistance capabilities and coordinating that assistance in response to an accident involving radioactive materials.

Joint Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team (JNAIRT). A Joint Staff-directed organization, consisting of representatives from the Joint Staff, and when directed, Defense Intelligence Agency, DTRA and Military Services. The JNAIRT, established after initial accident notification to the National Military Command Center (NMCC), coordinates and manages the military's responsibilities to meet time-sensitive response requirements.

Maximum Permissible Dose(sometimes referred to as Operational Exposure Guidance). That radiation dose which a military commander or other appropriate authority may prescribe as the limiting cumulative radiation dose to be received over a specific period of time by members of the command, consistent with operational military considerations.

Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT). A team from the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) of highly qualified radiation medicine physicians, health physicists, and related scientists who provide state-of-the-art advice and assistance to the U.S. Combatant Commanders, allied forces, Federal Agencies, State and local governments, and others on radiological matters including accidents of nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, radiological dispersal devices, and industrial and/or medical sources. The MRAT also provides expertise for managing and treating radiation casualties. The MRAT can deploy as part of the DTRA Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT).

Monitoring. The act of detecting the presence of radiation and the measurement thereof with radiation measuring instruments.

National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (NARAC). A DOE/NNSA asset for providing real-time computer modeling to assess events involving the release of hazardous radiological materials into the atmosphere.

National Defense Area (NDA). Federal statute authorizes SecDef (or his designee – typically the service or installation commander) to establish an NDA. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such non-Federal land under the effective control of the DOD to include federal lands under the control of other federal agencies. An NDA can be declared within the United States, its possessions or its territories, for safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DOD equipment and/or material. The senior responsible DOD individual at the accident scene shall define the boundary, mark the boundary with a physical barrier and post warning signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity shall dictate the final decision on location, shape and size of the NDA.

Need-to-Know. A decision made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized Governmental function.

Nuclear Component. Weapon components composed of fissionable or fusionable materials that contribute substantially to nuclear energy released during detonation.

Nuclear Contribution. Explosive energy released by nuclear fission or fusion reactions, as part of the total energy released by a radiological accident. Any nuclear contribution equivalent to four (4) or more pounds of TNT is considered significant and would add beta and gamma radiation hazards to other radiological and toxic hazards present at a radiological accident site.

Nuclear Detonation. A nuclear explosion resulting from fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials, such as that from a nuclear weapon.

Nuclear Radiation. Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiation, from the weapons standpoint, is alpha and beta particles, gamma rays and neutrons.

Nuclear Weapon. A complete assembly (i.e. implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration which, on completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is able to produce the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.

Nuclear Weapon Accident (flagword BROKEN ARROW). An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or radiological nuclear weapon components that results in any of the following

(1) Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing or use by U.S. Forces or U.S. supported Allied Forces of a nuclear-capable weapon system which might create the risk of an outbreak of war.

(2) Nuclear Detonation.

(3) Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component.

(4) Radioactive contamination.

(5) Seizure, theft, loss, or destruction of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning.

(6) Public hazard, actual or implied.

Nuclear Weapon Incident (flagword BENT SPEAR). An unexpected event involving a nuclear weapon, facility, or component resulting in any of the following, but not constituting a nuclear weapon(s) accident.

(1) An increase in the possibility of explosion or radioactive contamination.

(2) Errors committed in assembling, testing, loading, or transporting equipment or the malfunctioning of equipment and materiel which might lead to an unintentional operations of all or part of the weapon arming or firing sequence which, in turn, might lead to a substantial change in yield, or increased dud probability.

(3) Any act of God, unfavorable environment, or condition resulting in damage to the weapon, facility, or component.

Nuclear Weapon Theft (flagword EMPTY QUIVER). The seizure, theft, or loss of a nuclear weapon. To include:

(1) The loss (explained or unexplained) of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.

(2) The forcible, unauthorized seizure or theft of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.

Nuclear Yield. The energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon, measured in terms of the kilotons or megatons of TNT, required to produce an equivalent energy release.

Off-Site. The area beyond the boundaries of a DOD installation or DOE facility, including the area beyond the boundary of a declared NDA or National Security Area, that has been or may become affected by a nuclear weapon accident.

On-Site. The area established as the NDA by the senior DOD individual in charge of the accident.

Operations Report (OPREP) -3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW. Report used to inform higher authorities (i.e. NMCC) of a U.S. nuclear weapon accident (see definition for "Nuclear Weapon Accident").

Personal Protective Clothing. Clothing worn by response and recovery personnel that provides contamination protection. Clothing may consist of coveralls, shoe covers, cotton gloves, and hood or hair caps. Personal protective clothing protects the user from alpha, and in most cases beta radiation but, is primarily a control device to prevent the spread of contamination. A respirator may be worn with the personal protective clothing; this protects against the inhalation of contaminants.

Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). A program implemented for all DOD personnel who control, handle, have access to, or control access to nuclear weapon systems, Special Nuclear Material, and Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) materials. The program covers selection, screening and continuous evaluation of the personnel assigned to various nuclear duties. The program seeks to ensure that personnel coming under its purview are mentally and emotionally stable and reliable.

Physical Security. Elements of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel and classified information; to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, Special Nuclear Material, and NC2 materials, equipment, facilities, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

Plutonium (Pu). An artificially-produced fissile material. The Pu-239 isotope is used primarily in nuclear weapons.

Protection Factors (PFs). The level of protection that a properly functioning respirator shall provide to a population of properly trained and fitted workers.

Protection Action Guide (PAG). A radiation exposure level or range established by appropriate Federal or State Agencies beyond which protective action should be considered.

Radiation Absorbed Dose (rad). Commonly used unit of absorbed dose from ionizing radiation. 100 rad is the absorbed dose of one joule of energy in one kilogram of mass. The rad has been replaced by the SI unit of cGy.

Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). A DOE/NNSA asset that provides 24-hour direct or consulting assistance to medical and health physics practitioners dealing with radiation-related health problems or injuries from local, national, or international radiation incidents.

Radioactivity. The spontaneous emission of radiation, usually alpha or beta particles, often accompanied by gamma rays from the nuclei of an unstable isotope.

Radiological Accident. A loss of control over radiation or radioactive material that presents a hazard to life, health, property, or the environment, or that may result in any member of the general population exceeding limits for exposure to ionizing radiation.

Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). A U.S. Army, national asset DOD rapid response team specifically designed to provide timely expert guidance and services to the Combatant Commander, the IRF/RTF Commander, and/or local medical authorities and provide limited medical support to response teams in controlled areas. In peacetime or war, the RAMT is capable of responding to a wide variety of events involving limited or mass nuclear casualties, radiologically contaminated patients, or exposed populations from events such as BROKEN ARROWs, reactor accidents, radiological terrorism, or nuclear war. The RAMT may deploy within 4 hours of notification and may operate in National Security Area, NDA, and CNWDI access areas.

Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Team. A DOE/NNSA emergency asset that provides, on request, radiological assistance to DOE program elements; other Federal Agencies; State, local and Tribal governments; private groups; and individuals. RAP teams provide personnel and equipment to evaluate, assess, advise, and help lessen actual or perceived radiation hazards and risks to workers, the public, and the environment.

Radiological Control Area (RCA). The control area encompassing all known, or suspected, radiological contamination at a nuclear weapons accident.

Radiological Survey. The directed effort to determine the distribution of radiological material and dose rates in an area.

Recovery Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Procedures.

Render Safe Procedures (RSP). See Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Procedures.

Response Task Force (RTF). A DOD response force appropriately staffed trained, and equipped to coordinate all actions necessary to control and recover from a DOD nuclear weapon accident. The specific purpose of the RTF is to recover weapons and provide radiological accident assistance.

Restricted Data (RD). All data (information) concerning the following:

(1) Design, manufacture, or use of atomic weapons.

(2) The production of Special Nuclear Material (SNM); or

(3) The use of Special Nuclear Material in the production of energy, but not including data declassified or removed from the restricted data category under Section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act (Section MAW, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended).

Roentgen-Equivalent-Man (rem). A derived unit equal to the absorbed dose in humans multiplied by a quality factor, which accounts for the average effectiveness of a particular type of radiation in producing a given biological effect in humans. The rem is an older term in radiation dosimetry and is being replaced by the sievert (Sv) (1 rem = 0.01 sieverts (Sv)).

Safing. As applied to weapons and ammunition, the changing from a state of readiness for initiation to a safe condition.

Sievert (Sv). International System unit of any of the quantities expressed as dose equivalent. The dose equivalent in Svs is equal to the absorbed dose in Gys multiplied by the quality factor (1Sv = 100 rem).

Site Remediation (SR). The process of removing contaminants from a site that were the result of an accident and restoring the site to conditions agreed on by the stakeholders.

Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG). An organization formed at the accident scene whose sole purpose is to focus on SR issues. The SRWG draws on the expertise of the various elements who respond to the accident to form a coordinated SR team.

Special Nuclear Material (SNM). As defined under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, SNM, is plutonium and uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-233 or the isotope uranium-235. SNM does not include source material such as natural uranium or thorium.

Tritium (T or H-3) (acronym used in DOD 3150.8-M when referring to a formula). Tritium is a radioactive Isotope of hydrogen having one proton and two neutrons in the nucleus. Tritium is a low energy beta emitter that when in oxide form (HTO) poses a radiation hazard from inhalation and absorption through intact skin.

Two-Person Concept (TPC). A system designed to prohibit access by one individual to nuclear weapons and certain designated components by requiring the presence at all times of at least two authorized persons capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed. Also referred to as the two-person rule or policy. This term replaced the two-man rule.

Two-Person Control. The close surveillance and control of materials at all times by at least two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed and each familiar with established security requirements.

Uranium. Uranium is a heavy, silvery white, radioactive metal. In air, the metal becomes coated with a layer of oxide that will make it appear from a golden-yellow color to almost black. Uranium is primarily an alpha emitter. Decay products emit an array of other radiations. Uranium presents chemical and radiation hazards and exposure may occur during mining, ore processing, or uranium metal production. Uranium and its compounds have both toxic chemical and radiation effects, depending on dose and exposure time, as well as type of exposure, such as ingestion, inhalation or skin contact.

Warhead. That part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket or other munitions that contains either the nuclear or thermonuclear system, high-explosive (HE) system, chemical or biological agents or inert materials intended to inflict damage.

Weapon Debris (Nuclear). The residue of a nuclear weapon after it has exploded or burned; that is, the materials used for the casing and other components of the weapon, plus unexpended plutonium or uranium, together with fission products, if any.

Weapons Recovery. Includes a comprehensive assessment of the accident, neutralizing the weapon hazards and removing, packaging and shipping of the weapon hazard.

Weapon Restricted Area (WRA). That area conspicuously marked and controlled by U.S. Security Forces which contains all U.S. nuclear weapons, nuclear components and component parts of nuclear weapons. Within the WRA, special protection is given to U.S. CNWDI and the TPC is enforced.

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4 April 2008

USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
BASIC PLAN

References: a. DOD Directive 3150.8, "DOD Response to Radiological Accidents, 13 June 1996."

b. DOD 3150.8-M "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP), 22 February 2005."

c. "National Response Framework (NRF)," Jan 2008.

d. DOD Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, 18 Feb 1997."

e. DOD Directive 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance, 20 Dec 1993."

f. DOD Directive 5210.41, "Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons, 1 Nov 2004."

g. DOD Instruction 5200.8, "Security of DOD Installations and Resources, 10 Dec 2005."

h. Title 50 USC § 797, "Security regulations and orders; penalty for violation."

i. Title 50 USC § 831, "Regulations for employment security (Security procedures, access to classified material)."

j. Title 42 USC § 2271, "General Provisions (Authority of the President to use Government agencies to protect Restricted Data, facilities, equipment, materials and other property)."

k. Title 18 USC § 1385, "Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus."

l. Title 42 § 5121, et seq, Robert T. Stafford Act Public Law

m. AFSPC Plan 10-1, "ICBM Radiological Accident/Incident Response and Recovery Plan, 15 Oct 2004."

n. ACC Plan 32-1, "CONUS Radiological Accident/Incident Response and Recovery Plan, 11 Sep 02."

o. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, 28 Feb 2003.

p. Commander, Navy Region Southeast Instruction 3440.15, "Regional Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan, 13 Apr 2005."

q. Unified Command Plan, 5 May 2006.

r. Title 10 USC § 375, "Restriction on Direct Participation by Military Personnel."

s. CJCSI 3121.01B, "Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SRUF), 13 June 2005."

t. DOD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities," 15 Jan 1993

u. DOD 5200.8-R, "Physical Security Program," May 1991

Add cite:
v. Title 10 USC §§ 371-382, "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies"

w. DOD Directive 5525.5, "DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 15 Jan 1986"

x. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-28 (S), 20 Jun 2003

y. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500-06, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management (CM) Operations, 10 Oct 2006

z. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-05, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 11 Apr 2006

aa. Joint Publication 3-41, "Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, 2 Oct 2006

1. Situation

a. General. Moving and handling of U.S. nuclear weapons, components, and materials routinely occur within the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). Nuclear weapons may be involved in accidents, which may present a risk to public safety. Commander USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM) has the primary responsibility to direct and coordinate the Department of Defense (DOD) response actions for a nuclear weapon accident in U.S. territory (excluding Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific, which are the responsibility of Commander USPACOM, and the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, which are the responsibility of

Commander USSOUTHCOM). These actions include controlling the accident scene, regaining custody of the nuclear weapon/asset (if necessary), ensuring contamination control, removing hazards, and reducing the health and safety risk to the public and response personnel. DOD (through USNORTHCOM) will also support primary agency (DHS etc.) operations outside the National Defense Area (NDA) within coverage of the National Response Framework (NRF) (always in effect) within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(1) Purpose

(a) This Concept Plan (CONPLAN) is intended to fulfill the requirements of DOD Directive 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents (Ref a), and DOD Manual 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) (Ref b). It is the contingency plan for response to accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DOD custody within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area (see paragraph 1.b.(3)) In Accordance With (IAW) guidance, policy and direction of the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(b) This plan supports the guidance of Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 5 (HSPD-5) and the NRF (including the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex) (Ref c). This plan is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation such as expected availability of personnel and equipment. It is subject to modification in the context of a specific nuclear weapons accident contingency.

(2) Conditions for Implementation

(a) The U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal provides the U.S. with a long-standing strategic deterrence capability. U.S. weapons are state-of-the-art, designed and constructed with extensive safeguards to prevent release of radiation. Although risk of significant radiation release is minimal, forces must be ready to meet such a contingency. Ensuring the health and safety of the U.S. public and maintaining public trust and confidence in the safety of the U.S. stockpile is of paramount importance.

(b) For a nuclear weapon accident (when the weapon is in DOD custody), DOD is authorized to establish an NDA to protect DOD equipment and/or material, protect/safeguard the nuclear weapon, and to safeguard classified defense information (Ref. h, i, j). The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the response and recovery of nuclear weapons in their custody.

(c) DOD is responsible for the response and recovery of a nuclear weapon when the weapon is or was in DOD custody at the time of the accident. Execution details for accidents that have cross-border effects will be developed during crisis-action planning.

(d) Based on the situation, the Secretary of Homeland Security may coordinate overall Federal Government response activities. However, DOD as the coordinating agency has primary responsibility for facilitating the nuclear/radiological aspects of the response related to the accident (Ref. c). USNORTHCOM will direct and coordinate all actions within the National Defense Area or DOD installation. USNORTHCOM will support primary agency operations outside the NDA IAW the NRF.

(e) If DOD had custody of the nuclear weapon at the time of the accident, DOD will be the coordinating agency responsible for leading the Federal response (Ref. c, NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex).

(f) This plan will be implemented immediately upon notification of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW report to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado or at the direction of the SecDef through the NMCC.

(g) USNORTHCOM will support the DOE for nuclear weapons accidents in DOE custody when directed by SecDef. Response force requirements will be requested IAW the normal DSCA Request for Assistance Process.

b. Area of Concern.

(1) Area of Responsibility (AOR). IAW the Unified Command Plan (UCP) 06 (Ref q.), the USNORTHCOM general geographic AOR for the conduct of normal operations includes North America, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic Ocean from 169 degrees W, east to 45 degrees W, south to 27 degrees 30'N, west to 79 degrees 15'W, south to 26 degrees 15'N, east to 78 degrees 45'W, south to 22 degrees 45'N, west along the northern Cuban territorial waters to 23 degrees N/84 degrees W, southwest to the Yucatan peninsula at 21 degrees N/86 degrees 45'W, south from Mexico at 92 degrees W to 8 degrees N, west to 112 degrees W, northwest to 50 degrees N/142 degrees W, west to 170 degrees E, north to 53 degrees N, northeast to 65 degrees 30'N/169 degrees W, and north to 90 degrees N (Figure 1-1)



UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 1-1. USNORTHCOM's AOR (U)

(2) Area of Interest (AOI). AOI includes locations of storage, transit and maintenance of nuclear weapons within the contiguous 48 states and Alaska. The USNORTHCOM AOI also includes regional sovereign states, which may be impacted by U.S. nuclear weapon accidents.

(3) Operational Area . USNORTHCOM will designate the Operational Area(s) for air, land and maritime operations within USNORTHCOM's AOR to support nuclear weapon accident response operations. The USNORTHCOM Operational Area(s) for this CONPLAN are limited to the 48 contiguous states and the National Capital Region (NCR) and Alaska Region which are specifically designated as Operational Area(s) within USNORTHCOM's AOR IAW standing execute orders (EXORDs).

c. Deterrent Options. Not Applicable/Not Used.

d. Enemy Forces. Nuclear/Radiological Risk and Effects. Due to design and safety features, the likelihood of a nuclear detonation caused by an accident is extremely low.

(1) The more likely hazard would be radiological airborne particulates dispersed by the detonation of high explosive components or by the deflagration of radioactive materials involved in fire. Smoke from a fire or explosion may carry radioactive particles in the air causing an inhalation hazard and later disposition in the lungs. There is also the chance that radioactive particles could enter the body through the ingestion pathway. Properly fitted standard personal protective equipment may provide adequate protection for response personnel.

(2) Tritium oxide is also a hazard that may be encountered during response to an accident if it is released in an enclosed space or comes in contact with rain, snow, or a body of water. When combined with water, the body readily absorbs tritium oxide by inhalation and absorption through the skin. Self contained breathing apparatus and protective clothing may protect personnel against expected levels of tritium contamination.

e. Friendly Forces

(1) Coordinating Federal Departments and Agencies. Refer to DOD 3150.8-M (Ref. b), Annex A, Annex J, and Annex V for a more complete list of agencies and recommended actions for each agency.

(a) Department of State (DOS) , Washington DC. DOS is responsible for coordinating DOD nuclear weapon accident issues that may have effects across international borders. DOS can also accomplish the following.

1. Monitor developing emergencies and begin early coordination and planning.

2. Notify the U.S. Embassies/consulates affected, if necessary.

(b) Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Washington DC. DHS coordinates the overall Federal Government response IAW HSPD-5 (Ref. o) and the NRF (Ref. c). During a DOD nuclear weapon accident DHS can:

1. Coordinate the provision of Federal resources and assistance to designated sources. DHS can also establish a Joint Field Office (JFO) at or close to the accident site. The Unified Coordination Group within the JFO, functions as a multi-agency coordination entity working jointly to support Federal activities outside the NDA and the USNORTHCOM/RTF activities inside the NDA.

2. If needed, provide liaison activities between Federal, state, local, tribal and primary agency response structures.

3. Establish and maintain a source of integrated, coordinated information about the status of the response.

4. Be prepared to implement the catastrophic incident annex of the NRF.

5. Coordinate public affairs messages with Federal, local, and tribal governments.

6. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC. FEMA reports to DHS and can provide the following emergency response capabilities to the accident situation.

a. Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to deploy in support of the NARP mission.

b. Coordinate Consequence Management (CM) activities occurring outside the NDA/DOD installation with the RTF Commander, the Interagency, state, local, and tribal authorities.

7. United States Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG reports to DHS and can provide the following response capabilities to the accident.

a. Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to deploy in support of the NARP mission.

b. In coordination with the RTF Commander, coordinate maritime activities with state, local, and appropriate Federal agencies.

c. If the accident affects the coastal zone, DHS/USCG serves as the coordinating/cooperating agency for oil and hazardous materials response actions usually through the USCG National Strike Force (NSF). The USCG NSF mission is to provide highly trained experienced personnel and specialized equipment to the Coast Guard and other Federal agencies to facilitate preparedness and response to oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents in order to protect public health and the environment. The USCG NSF is usually dispatched by the National Response Center. The National Response Center is the US single point of contact for all pollution and hazardous material incident reporting.

8. Principal Federal Official (PFO). If the level of Federal CM activities outside the NDA/DOD installation warrants it, the Secretary of Homeland Security may appoint a Principal Federal Official (PFO) to coordinate the overall Federal Government response to the nuclear weapon accident. The PFO is the primary representative of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The PFO will most likely stand-up a JFO to provide a central coordination center for federal, state, local, and tribal authorities to coordinate their accident response activities.

(c) Department of Justice (DOJ), Washington, DC. DOJ will notify the closest local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and dispatch agents to investigate the situation and make determination of terrorist or criminal involvement. In coordination with the RTF Commander, ensure appropriate coordination with the Federal, state, local, and tribal authorities at the accident scene.

(d) Department of Energy (DOE), Washington, DC. DOE provides the DOE Headquarters Emergency Operations Center and other DOE response assets as required. DOE capabilities include:

1. Assignment of a Senior Energy Official (SEO) if the response requires the deployment of DOE assets. The DOE SEO is responsible for the coordination and employment of DOE assets at the accident site, provides direct interface and coordination between the IRF/RTF Commander and responding DOE assets, provides field management oversight of DOE assets and coordinates DOE activities with the HQ DOE Emergency Operations Center.

2. Scientific and technical assistance and support to nuclear weapon accidents including instructions and technical advice for render safe procedures, weapons recovery, packaging, containerization, and transportation.

3. Expertise in effects modeling, protective action guides, radiation monitoring, sampling, analysis, assessment, health and safety, and medical advice on radiation induced injuries.

(e) Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS can provide the following in support of a DOD nuclear weapon accident.

1. Technical advice and assistance, such as identification of contaminants, sample collection and analysis, and on-site safety and

protection activities, medical management plans, and the provision of health and medical care.

2. Appropriate public health surveillance, medical treatment protocols, decontamination capabilities, mental health services, pharmaceuticals support operations (National Pharmaceutical Stockpile), assistance for mass patient care, mass prophylaxis of exposed or potentially exposed populations, handling of mass fatalities, and the retrograde movement of patients and definitive medical care provided through the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).

(f) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

1. Routine hazmat emergency response notification, evaluations, and actions to prevent, minimize or mitigate releases or threats of release of hazardous substances in support of, or to supplement those of private, local and state responders.

2. When requested by the RTF Commander, provide Technical advice and assistance, such as monitoring; identification of contaminants; samples collection and analysis; on-site and off-site safety, protection, prevention, and decontamination activities.

(g) Department of Defense (DOD), Washington, DC. In US territory or territorial waters, DOD serves as the coordinating agency in responding to an accident involving a nuclear weapon when the weapon is or was in DOD custody during the accident. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates DOD response and recovery efforts for nuclear weapon accidents in the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area.

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Pentagon, Washington, DC. SecDef has delegated authority to initiate DOD nuclear weapons accident response (including the deployment of forces) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

a. National Military Command Center (NMCC). Upon notification of a nuclear weapon accident, the NMCC assembles the Joint Nuclear Accident Incident Response Team (JNAIRT) to coordinate and monitor the early operational response for the CJCS until CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of forces. If/when needed, the NMCC will deploy the IRF and RTF through the appropriate Service Operations Center. In coordination with the Service and Force Provider (USJFCOM), USNORTHCOM will assume OPCON of the IRF and RTF shortly after they arrive in the designated JOA. A Joint Staff

vocal order will be followed up with a Joint Staff Execute Order (EXORD) to USNORTHCOM, codifying the OPCON relationship.

b. The Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS), Pentagon, Washington, DC. At the direction of the SecDef, JDOMS plans for and commits DOD resources in response to Requests for Assistance (RFA) from civil authorities. JDOMS also commits resources to fill Requests for Forces (RFF) from the RTF through USNORTHCOM.

2. United States Air Force (USAF), Washington, DC. The Air Force is a custodian of nuclear weapons and is responsible for safe-handling, storage, maintenance and transportation of U.S. nuclear weapons, components and materials. Provides IRF, RTF, and other USAF response assets as required by SecDef for a DOD nuclear weapon accident response. The Air Force provides RTFs from Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Peterson AFB, CO and Air Combat Command (ACC) Langley AFB, VA, for command and control of on-scene personnel and operations.

3. United States Navy (USN), Washington, DC. The Navy is a custodian of nuclear weapons and is responsible for safe-handling, storage, maintenance and transportation of U.S. nuclear weapons, components and materials. The Navy provides IRF, RTF and other USN assets as required by SecDef for a DOD nuclear weapon accident response. The Navy RTFs, located at Jacksonville Naval Air Station, Florida and Naval Base Kitsap, Washington provide command and control of on-scene personnel and operations.

4. United States Army (USA). The Army is a custodian of special nuclear material and is responsible for the safeguarding, storage and handling of those materials. In addition, the Army maintains unique capabilities to respond and operate in radiologically contaminated areas. In rare and unique cases, the Army may be the nearest DOD installation to respond to a DOD nuclear weapon accident under immediate response conditions.

5. United States Marine Corps (USMC). The USMC does not maintain custody of nuclear weapons or special nuclear material. The USMC does however, maintain unique, limited capabilities to respond and operate in radiological contaminated areas. The USMC response force is designated as a Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). In rare and unique cases, the USMC may be the nearest DOD installation to respond to a DOD nuclear weapon accident under immediate response conditions.

6. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), Camp Smith, HI. For a nuclear weapon accident in HI and U.S. territories in the Pacific, USPACOM will be the supported Combatant Commander.

7. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Miami, FL. For a nuclear weapon accident in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, USSOUTHCOM will be the supported Combatant Commander.

8. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Scott AFB, IL. USTRANSCOM provides ground, sealift, and airlift support assets to transport personnel, teams, and equipment for the response mission.

9. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Provides joint capable forces and capabilities, consistent with operational availability.

10. DOD Representative in the JFO. The SecDef may appoint a DOD Representative to work in the JFO Coordination Group within the JFO. The principal function of the DOD Representative is to coordinate with the PFO and other Federal, state, local and/or tribal officials in the JFO Unified Coordination Group. The DOD Representative will not have C2 authority over the RTF but will coordinate with the RTF Commander. The DOD Representative will not replace the DCO, who will remain the DOD single point of contact for receiving and processing requests for DOD support.

11. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Alexandria, VA. IAW Ref a., DTRA serves as the DOD-lead for coordinating DOD radiological accident response planning, training, and national-level exercises, with other Federal and international agencies and activities. They also provide a deployable advisory team called the Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT) to assist Combatant Commander/RTF response forces.

(h) National Guard Bureau (NGB), Washington, DC. The NGB can coordinate with states having specialized WMD capabilities (Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) and National Guard Reaction Forces (NGRF)) that can respond and operate in radiological contaminated areas. During implementation of this plan NGB will facilitate integration of National Guard assets directly supporting USNORTHCOM as well as those mutually supporting State(s) JTFs.

(i) State, local and tribal authorities. It is imperative that extensive coordination between the RTF Commander and state, local and tribal

authorities occur to ensure weapon(s) are safeguarded and to prevent further health and safety risks to the American public.

(j) National Guards of the States and Territories. Some of the States and territories have specialized National Guard Teams that can respond and operate in radiological contaminated areas. Although USNORTHCOM will not have command and control over these forces if they are operating in state status (*i.e.* Title 32 or State Active Duty), USNORTHCOM should coordinate with the states and NGB to deconflict missions and provide unity of effort.

f. Assumptions (For an accident involving a nuclear weapon in DOD custody)

(1) The responsible Service will establish an NDA prior to USNORTHCOM assuming the mission.

(2) Services will continue to maintain current nuclear weapons security, nuclear surety and response capabilities to include security, maintenance, training, and equipping of installation forces, IRF, RTF, and flag officer level RTF Commander.

(3) Service RTFs continue to form the basis of the DOD response force.

(4) Service provided RTFs and IRFs are available, trained and ready.

(5) Necessary transportation and support (personnel and equipment) is available.

(6) A nuclear weapon accident triggers public awareness and concern and media attention. A nuclear weapon accident also raises awareness and political sensitivity of elected officials.

(7) DOE teams and assets will be available to support DOD response and recovery operations. Other federal teams and assets will also be available to support DOD if needed.

(8) The responsible Service will establish an NDA prior to USNORTHCOM assuming the mission.

(9) Federal, state, local, and/or tribal agencies will request DOD assistance for CM operations outside the declared National Defense Area/DOD installation.

(10) DOD forces, including DOD installations in USNORTHCOM AOR are available for SecDef tasking.

g. Legal Considerations

(1) National Defense Area (NDA). Federal statute authorizes SecDef (or his designee – typically the service or installation commander) to establish an NDA. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such non-Federal land under the effective control of the DOD to include federal lands under the control of other federal agencies. DODI 5200.8 (ref g) gives the installation commander the authority to maintain law and order and protect installation people and property. That authority extends to an NDA under emergency situations such as accident sites involving federal equipment or personnel, to include aircraft crashes; emergency landings by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons; emergency diversions of military aircraft to civilian airports; and accidents involving nuclear weapons ground convoys. DOD may establish a NDA on non-federal lands located within the United States, its territories or possessions, for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DOD equipment and/or material. The authority includes the removal of people from, or denial of access to, an installation or site, of people who threaten the orderly administration of the installation or site. The senior DOD representative at the scene will define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity will dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the NDA. The IRF/RTF security element plans and conducts security operations at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident to include establishing an NDA and Entry Control Points (ECP), guarding the NDA and established ECPs (Refs g, h, i, j, t, and u).

(2) Immediate Response Authority. Local military commanders and responsible officials from DOD components have Immediate Response Authority under imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency that may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from DOD components and agencies are authorized by DOD directive, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities. Military commanders will notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC) through their service chain of command, by the most expeditious means and seek guidance for continuing assistance whenever, DOD resources are committed under Immediate Response

circumstances. All such necessary action is referred to as "Immediate Response" (Ref c and d).

(3) Posse Comitatus Act. Prohibiting direct military involvement in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military's role in domestic affairs. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits Federal military personnel from engaging in direct law enforcement activities, such as searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities (Ref k). U.S. Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the PCA that allow the military, in certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the laws of the United States. The only likely exception that applies for this plan is discussed in the paragraph on NDA above. The PCA applies to the federal uniformed services within DOD (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines) but not to the U.S. Coast Guard, nor the National Guard in State Active Duty or Title 32 status. The PCA does not apply extraterritorially. By DOD policy, U.S. Federal military personnel will not engage in activities outside the U.S., which would be prohibited by the PCA within the U.S. (Ref k, r.)

(4) Standing Rules on the Use of Force (SRUF). U.S. forces retain the inherent right and obligation to defend themselves and other U.S. forces in the area. SRUF apply when conducting operations in the United States or it's Territories. Forces will be trained on SRUF before employment. Supplemental SRUF should be requested through CDRUSNORTHCOM, as necessary. Initial Response Forces (IRF) will receive an initial SRUF briefing prior to assuming post. The IRF/Response Task Force (RTF) Commander will disseminate SRUF to all subordinate units, supporting commands and civil authorities as appropriate (Ref s).

(5) Stafford Act. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288 PL 100-707), as amended, provides authority for the U.S. Government to assist state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters within the United States. It also provides Presidential authority for disaster preparedness, Presidential grants for planning, Presidential declaration of emergency, formation of immediate support teams, reimbursement to agencies (to include the DOD) and major disaster assistance programs (Ref l).

(6) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Restrictions. Per FAA regulation, part 91, section 91.137 Temporary Flight Restrictions may be executed in the Vicinity of Disaster/Hazard Areas.

2. Mission. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the DOD response and recovery for DOD nuclear weapon accidents within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations (Concept contained in Annex C of this plan)

(1) Commander's Intent. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM will respond to a nuclear weapon accident involving a nuclear weapon in DOD custody, in the USNORTHCOM Operational Area. USNORTHCOM NARP operations conclude when DOD authorities have recovered and rendered the weapon safe and the accident site is turned over to the responsible Service or civil authorities, or when directed by SecDef.

(2) General. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM shall direct and coordinate DOD response actions to a nuclear weapon accident in the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area. Responding U.S. military forces and commanders will maintain, or if necessary, re-establish custody over U.S. nuclear weapons.

(3) Deployment

(a) The military installation nearest to the nuclear weapon accident will dispatch any available emergency assets to the scene (security, emergency medical teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, firefighting) and report the accident to the NMCC. These assets will remain in place until relieved or absorbed by the IRF and/or RTF.

(b) SecDef has delegated authority to initiate DOD nuclear weapons accident response (including the deployment of forces) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Upon notification of a nuclear weapon accident, the NMCC assembles the Joint Nuclear Accident Incident Response Team (JNAIRT) to coordinate and monitor the early operational response for the CJCS until CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of forces. If/when needed, the NMCC will deploy the IRF and RTF through the normal deployment order process or by vocal authorization through normal Service channels (Service Operations Center). In coordination with the Service and Force Provider (USJFCOM), USNORTHCOM will assume OPCON of the IRF and RTF shortly after they arrive (separately) in the designated JOA. A Joint Staff vocal OPCON order will be followed up with a Joint Staff Execute Order (EXORD) to USNORTHCOM, codifying the OPCON relationships.

(c) The RTF Commander shall relieve the IRF Commander and subsume the IRF as required. CDRUSNORTHCOM shall assume OPCON of the RTF at this time. This should be accomplished by the most expedient means available (Video Teleconference (VTC) if available). The RTF Commander shall brief CDRUSNORTHCOM on the status of the RTF response (current activities, responding DOD and Interagency teams, etc.). Vocal authorization from the SecDef (through the Joint Staff) for CDRUSNORTHCOM to assume OPCON of the RTF and all other responding DOD teams/assets will be followed up by an EXORD codifying the OPCON relationship.

(d) At the time of the accident, the senior responsible DOD individual at the accident scene will assume the duties of the DOD Incident Commander (IC). In the event the IRF is not the first DOD asset on scene, the IRF Commander will assume IC responsibilities from the initial IC and the RTF Commander will assume them from the IRF Commander. As the DOD Incident Commander, the IRF/RTF Commander is responsible for commanding and controlling all responding teams (this includes both inside and outside the NDA).

(4) Employment

(a) CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for directing the response and recovery of DOD nuclear weapon(s) involved in an accident in the USNORTHCOM AOR. USNORTHCOM will maintain operational communications and report to the CJCS/SecDef through the NMCC until mission completion.

(b) USNORTHCOM operations include: Direct the DOD response to maintain custody or regain custody of the weapon(s) as necessary, perform render safe procedures, minimize and remove hazardous effects, and ensure public safety. The RTF Commander is responsible for coordinating with Federal, state, local, and tribal authorities.

(c) CDRUSNORTHCOM will conduct nuclear weapon accident response operations in five phases. These phases may overlap and operations from different phases may occur simultaneously (See Annex C).

(d) The RTF Commander will respond to the nuclear weapon accident site, report conditions, conduct timely and effective operations to safeguard and recover the weapon(s) and prevent further health and safety risks to the American public.

(e) The RTF Commander will form the Site Remediation Working Group but, will pass site remediation responsibilities to the responsible Service/SecDef directed federal agency IAW the procedures outlined in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF for extensive site remediation actions sometime after weapon recovery actions are complete.

(f) Forces assigned to CDRUSNORTHCOM for response to a DOD nuclear weapon accident will re-deploy on order.

b. Tasks/Responsibilities. The overarching key tasks for DOD to accomplish are to find, secure, and render safe the nuclear weapon; recover the weapon and transfer it to DOE control; safeguard classified information, material and components; and reassure civil authorities that no further risk is posed to the American public. Additionally, as the supported command for response within the NDA/Military installation, USNORTHCOM will coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate with responding State National Guard forces and the National Guard Bureau (NGB).

(1) Supporting Headquarters

(a) Air Combat Command (ACC) will establish, equip, train, and maintain one deployable RTF, provide a flag rank RTF Commander and provide other support as specified in ACC Plan 32-1 (Ref n).

(b) Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) will establish, equip, train, and maintain one deployable RTF, provide a flag rank RTF Commander, and provide other support as required to the deployed RTF as specified in AFSPC Plan 10-1 (Ref m).

(c) Fleet Forces Command (FFC) will establish, equip, train, and maintain two RTFs, provide a flag rank commander for each RTF, and provide other administrative support as required to each deployed RTF.

(d) National Guard Bureau (NGB), when called upon, will be prepared to coordinate support from National Guard state and regional WMD-CST, CERFP and NGRF teams, as necessary.

(2) Initial Response Force (IRF)

(a) An IRF will normally be dispatched from the nearest capable military installation having a disaster response capability to take necessary actions to control the scene and emergency actions to save lives, protect the

environment and property. The IRF also includes the DOD personnel with the nuclear weapon at the time of the accident.

(b) Assumes the IC responsibilities until relieved by the RTF Commander.

(c) Locate weapons and assess conditions.

(d) IRF Commander, or the senior DOD representative at the scene, will establish and maintain a NDA.

(e) If the IRF is the initial DOD response, the IRF Commander will report the DOD nuclear weapon accident to the NMCC by the most efficient means possible.

(f) Establish and a command/coordination center.

(g) Determine if contamination is present.

(h) Begin initial Public Affairs activities/coordination with the owning base.

(i) Prepare and conduct transition brief with the RTF Commander as required in Ref b.

(j) Coordinate with FAA to establish flight restrictions over the disaster/hazard situation if necessary.

(3) Response Task Force (RTF)

(a) The NMCC will activate and dispatch the appropriate Service provided RTF (Ref. a and b) to the accident site through the normal deployment order process or by vocal authorization through normal service channels. The RTF Commander shall relieve the IRF Commander and report OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM. This should be accomplished by the most expedient means available (Video Teleconference (VTC) if available). The RTF Commander shall brief CDRUSNORTHCOM on the status of the RTF response (current activities, etc.).

(b) The RTF Commander has the responsibility to coordinate DOD nuclear weapon accident response activities with Federal, state, local, and tribal officials, including the National Guard Bureau and the National Guard of the state or territory.

(c) Establish required recovery elements, groups, and centers i.e. the Accident Site Health Group (ASHG) etc.

(d) Develop and execute render safe procedures with assistance and advice from the DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Accident Response Group (ARG).

(e) Package weapons and components for safe movement with assistance and advice from the DOE/NNSA ARG.

(f) Move weapons to secure staging area for movement and turnover to DOE/NNSA at a jointly determined location.

(g) Disestablish NDA, if established, upon completion of recovery of weapon(s) and components.

(h) Demobilize RTF elements upon successful recovery of weapon and components, as elements are no longer required.

(i) Establish Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG) and begin process of development and approval of long-term remediation plan.

(4) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)

(a) As required, CDRUSNORTHCOM can direct a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to the nuclear weapon accident scene to serve as the USNORTHCOM single point of contact to responding Federal, state, local and tribal authorities and to perform other duties as directed. DCO responsibilities include coordinating and processing applicable requests for DOD assistance from Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, facilitating Requests for Forces (RFF) to USNORTHCOM from the RTF, orchestrating the accomplishment of approved mission assignments utilizing available resources, and facilitating required communications and reports between the RTF and the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center if required.

(b) The DCO will normally be located in the JFO established by DHS. Specific responsibilities of the DCO are subject to modification by CDRUSNORTHCOM based on the situation.

(c) CDRUSNORTHCOM may direct the DCO to assist the RTF Commander in interfacing/coordinating with the PFO and all the other agencies within the JFO.

(5) USNORTHCOM Command Assessment Element (CAE).

(a) If required, CDRUSNORTHCOM shall deploy the USNORTHCOM CAE to the nuclear weapon accident site to provide situational awareness and critical connectivity with the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center, the RTF staff, and the primary agency. The USNORTHCOM CAE may come from USNORTHCOM Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) or USNORTHCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N).

(b) The USNORTHCOM CAE, when deployed to a nuclear weapon accident site, shall assist the RTF Commander's staff as required to facilitate communications and processes between the RTF and USNORTHCOM. This assistance includes educating the RTF staff about USNORTHCOM processes, facilitating Requests for Forces (RFF) and Requests for Information (RFI) to USNORTHCOM, and facilitating required communications and reports between the RTF and the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.

(6) USNORTHCOM Joint Task Force (JTF).

(a) If the magnitude of the effects of the nuclear weapon accident outside the NDA/Military reservation are beyond the management capabilities and/or scope of the RTF, CDRUSNORTHCOM, as directed/approved by SecDef, may establish a Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) or DSCA Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) support to Federal, state, local, and/or tribal authorities. CDRUSNORTHCOM may request authority from SecDef to stand up a JTF for the purpose of providing support to the primary agency (most likely DHS) as the result of USNORTHCOM mission analysis or because of Requests for Assistance (RFA) received from federal, state, local and/or tribal authorities outside the NDA/military reservation. JTF responsibilities could be fulfilled by USNORTHCOM JTF-CS or other forces as assigned to USNORTHCOM by the SecDef.

(b) If a JTF is established, operations will be in support of civilian authorities and will most likely be executed IAW USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Ref z), or USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500, CBRNE CM Plan (Ref y). The JTF Commander will be responsible for Command and Control (C2) of allocated military forces outside the NDA/Military reservation. The RTF Commander will be responsible for C2 of allocated military forces inside the NDA/Military reservation. Both the RTF and JTF will be under the direct control (OPCON) of CDRUSNORTHOM. The

RTF Commander and JTF Commander will coordinate their efforts but, will not impinge upon the authority or operations of the other.

(7) DOD Representative in the JFO. A DOD Representative may be appointed by the SECDEF to work in the JFO Unified Coordination Group within the JFO (Ref c). The DOD Representative shall report OPCON to the SECDEF. The DOD Representative shall assist the RTF Commander in coordinating with the Principal Federal Official (PFO) as well as other Federal, state, local, and tribal officials in the JFO. The DOD Representative will not have C2 authority over the RTF or the DCO but, will coordinate with the RTF Commander and the DCO.

(8) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

(a) Deploys CONUS-based DTRA CM assets/teams as directed by SecDef or by CDRUSNORTHCOM (after CDRUSNORTHCOM has been given control of the accident by SecDef). All teams arriving to support the incident command will report to the IRF/RTF Commander.

(b) Provides hazard modeling and down-wind predictions to the RTF Commander as requested.

(c) The DTRA Operations Center is the DOD primary coordination link with the DOE/NNSA Emergency Operations Center

(9) Nearest Military Installation

(a) The NMCC, through the appropriate Service operations center, shall usually dispatch an IRF from the nearest military installation having a disaster response capability. IRF capabilities should include EOD, fire, medical, and security teams. These assets will remain in place until relieved or absorbed by the IRF (if responding installation is not IRF capable) or RTF.

(b) Establish and maintain NDA if required.

(c) Report accident to the NMCC and NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.

(d) Be prepared to provide base installation support to deploying forces, including communications (See Logistics and Engineering Annex "D").

(10) Other Supporting Organizations. Deploy as directed by SecDef through the NMCC or by CDRUSNORTHCOM (after CDRUSNORTHCOM has

been given control of the accident by SecDef). Upon arrival, report to IRF/RTF Commander.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) National Military Command Center (NMCC)

(a) The NMCC provides the means by which information and decisions of the SecDef and the CJCS may be disseminated to the RTF Commander.

(b) When DOD is the coordinating agency, the SecDef/CJCS via the NMCC, requests DOE assets for deployment through the DOE liaison to the NMCC or the DOE EOC as they are needed.

(2) Joint Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team (JNAIRT)

(a) During the initial phase of a nuclear weapon accident where radiological contamination is present or suspected, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) in the NMCC will make notifications and direct activation of the JNAIRT.

(b) The JNAIRT coordinates and monitors the early response operations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of responding DOD forces.

(c) The JNAIRT provides guidance and establishes responsibility for ensuring a joint 24-hour-a-day capability to meet the DOD time-sensitive management requirements should an accident involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DOD or DOE custody occur anywhere in the world.

(3) Services/Service Headquarters providing the RTF

(a) Maintain weapons custody and security.

(b) Develop, maintain, and provide initial emergency response forces, based on installation-specific capabilities, missions, and Service requirements, to appropriately respond to a nuclear weapon accident and assist civil authorities in determining measures to protect life, property, and the environment until the arrival of the RTF.

(c) Provide, train, organize, equip, and fund RTF and other specialized nuclear weapon accident response forces and capabilities as required to

support necessary actions in response to a nuclear weapon accident when tasked by SecDef/CDRUSNORTHCOM. Provide funding to ensure their operational capabilities and allow participation in exercises. Participate in recurring radiological emergency training and readiness exercises.

(d) Develop and maintain nuclear weapon accident response policy, plans and procedures.

(e) Develop capabilities and obtain and maintain equipment as required by the NARP (DOD 3150.8-M) (Ref b).

(f) Service supporting commands will provide logistics and communications support for their deployed forces as required.

(4) RTF Coordination with DOE.

(a) The RTF Commander will consult with and coordinate applicable weapon recovery operations with the on site senior DOE representative/DOE Senior Energy Official (SEO). However, military personnel are responsible for the actual performance, supervision, and control of hands-on weapon recovery operations.

(b) DOD military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel are tasked to perform all hands-on technical render safe procedures on damaged weapons regardless of which department is the coordinating agency. However, the department that has custody of the weapon(s) during the accident is responsible for weapon recovery operations. Service EOD personnel shall be directly supported and advised by DOE scientific and technical personnel.

(5) DOD/USNORTHCOM Coordination with DOE when the weapon is in DOE custody at the time of the accident). The following describes the DOD Request for Assistance (RFA)process to be used by DOE when requesting assistance.

(a) When DOE is the Primary Agency (has custody of the weapon at the time of the accident), DOD/USNORTHCOM assistance should be requested through the normal DOD Request for Assistance (RFA) process. RFAs should define the scope of DOD assistance/capabilities requested.

(b) DOE should submit the RFA to the SecDef Executive Secretary (this can be done through the NMCC for the initial RFAs). The SecDef Executive Secretary passes the RFA to the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) for evaluation and processing. JDOMS evaluates the RFA based on

legality, lethality, risk, cost, readiness, and whether or not other Departments or Agencies can provide the requested support. If SecDef approves the RFA, JDOMS issues an EXORD to USNORTHCOM to conduct the support mission.

(c) After a DCO is fielded to the accident site/JFO, RFAs should be submitted to the DCO for evaluation and processing. The DCO will forward RFAs that meet the minimum criteria (legality, lethality, risk, cost, readiness, and other agencies capabilities) to JDOMS via USNORTHCOM for SecDef approval or disapproval. If approved by the SecDef, JDOMS issues an EXORD to USNORTHCOM to conduct the support mission.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Logistics and engineering support for DOD nuclear weapon accident situations must be tailored to meet the specific mission requirements.

b. Initial support will come from the installation nearest to the accident site. For accidents that occur off DOD installations, a Base Support Installation may be designated to support deploying military forces. (See Annex D, Logistics and Engineering and Annex L, Environmental.)

c. CJCSM 3150-13, Joint Reporting Structure - Personnel Manual outlines accountability and reporting procedures for DOD-affiliated personnel and their family members, within a defined geographical area, after the occurrence of a natural or manmade disaster.

5. Command and Control (C2)

a. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported Combatant Commander for a nuclear weapon accident in U.S. territory (excluding Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific, which are the responsibility of Commander USPACOM, and the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, which are the responsibility of Commander USSOUTHCOM) when the weapon is in DOD custody. CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes command and control of all DOD response forces from SecDef through the CJCS. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for response and recovery of component(s) and or materials for DOD nuclear weapon(s) involved in the accident.

b. The Services, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM, USTRANSCOM, USJFCOM, USSTRATCOM, and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations and headquarters.

c. The IRF/RTF Commander is the DOD Incident Commander at the accident site and as such commands controls all responding teams on and off site (inside and outside the NDA).

d. IAW Annex J, USNORTHCOM coordinates with the National Guard Bureau and the National Guard forces in a state status (*i.e.* Title 32 or State Active Duty), to ensure deconfliction of missions and unity of effort.

f. DHS coordinates the overall Federal Government response IAW HSPD-5 and the NRF.

g. The RTF Commander will be flag rank IAW DODD 3150.8. CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of the designated RTF when the RTF Commander relieves the IRF Commander and reports ready to assume duties as IC.

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Commander, USNORTHCOM

Annexes
A -- Task Organization
B -- Intelligence
C -- Operations
D -- Logistics and Engineering
E -- Personnel – Not Used
F -- Public Affairs
G -- Civil Affairs – Not Used
H -- Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
J -- Command Relationships
K -- Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
L -- Environmental Considerations
M -- Geospatial Information and Services – Not Used
N -- Space Operations – Not Used
P -- Host-Nation Support – Not Used
Q -- Medical Services
R -- Reports
S -- Special Technical Operations – Not Used
T -- Consequence Management (CM) – Not Used (see USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500 (Ref y); CONPLAN 3500 will only be executed when the scope and

magnitude of the nuclear weapon accident is determined (through USNORTHCOM mission analysis) to be beyond the scope of the responding Service RTF)
V -- Interagency Coordination
X -- Operational Checklist
Z – Distribution

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4 April 2008

ANNEX A TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
TASK ORGANIZATION

References: a. DOD Directive 3150.8, "DOD Response to Radiological Accidents," 13 June 1996.
b. DOD 3150.8-M "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," 22 February 2005
c. "National Response Framework," Jan 2008

1. SUPPORTED U.S. COMMANDER
   a. United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM)
      (1) USNORTHCOM Subordinate Commands
         (a) Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS)
         (b) Joint Task Force North (JTF-N)
         (c) Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK)
         (d) Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR)
      (2) USNORTHCOM Components
         (a) US Army North (ARNORTH)
         (b) US Marine Forces North (MARFORNORTH)
         (c) US Navy Fleet Forces Command (FFC)
         (d) US Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH)
2. SUPPORTING COMMANDS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND AGENCIES
   a. DOD ORGANIZATIONS
      (1) National Guard Bureau (NGB)
      (2) Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
      (3) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
         (a) Joint Staff (JS)
         (b) National Military Command Center (NMCC)
         (c) Joint Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team (JNAIRT)
      (4) Department of the Army (DA)

(a) Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT)

(b) U.S. Army North (ARNORTH)

(c) 20th Support Command (CBRNE)

(d) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

(5) Department of the Navy (DON)

(a) Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM)

1. Response Task Force Northwest (RTF NW)

2. Response Task Force Southeast (RTF SE)

3. US Navy Forward Deployable Preventive Medicine Unit (FDPMU)

(6) Department of the Air Force (DAF)

(a) Air Combat Command Response Task Force (ACC RTF)

(b) Air Force Space Command Response Task Force (AFSPC RTF)

(c) USAF HAMMER ACE Communication Package (HAMMER ACE)

(d) Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT)

(7) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

(8) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

(9) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

(10) Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI)

(11) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

(a) Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Center (JNACC)

(b) Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT)

(12) National Security Agency (NSA)

(13) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

(14) U.S. Central Command (CDR USCENTCOM)

(15) U.S. Joint Forces Command (CDR USJFCOM)

(16) U.S. Pacific Command (CDR USPACOM)

(17) U.S. Southern Command (CDR USSOUTHCOM)

(18) U.S. Special Operations Command (CDR USSOCOM)

(19) U.S. Strategic Command (CDR USSTRATCOM)

(20) U.S. Transportation Command (CDR USTRANSCOM)

b. NON-DOD ORGANIZATIONS

(1) Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

(a) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

(b) U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

(2) Department of Transportation (DOT)

(a) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

(b) Maritime Administration (MARAD)

(3) Department of Energy (DOE)

(a) Accident Response Group (ARG)

(b) Mobile Accident Response Group Unit (HOT SPOT)

(c) Aerial Measuring System (AMS)

(d) DOE/NNSA Radiological Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)

(e) DOE/NNSA Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT)

(f) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Cell (FRMAC)

(g) Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Team

(4) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

(5) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(6) Department of Justice (DOJ)

(a) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b) United States Marshals Service

2. Other Federal Response Capabilities. A capabilities summary of the functional response tiers, DOD nuclear weapon accident response assets and resources can be found in Chapter 2 of DOD 3150.8-M.

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Commander, USNORTHCOM

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

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January 2008

ANNEX B TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)

INTELLIGENCE

Reference: a. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500-06, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations," 10 October 2006

1. Situation

a. General. A Full Annex B is not required. Any follow-on Intelligence support to USNORTHCOM operations if required is covered under Annex B to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500 (Ref a).

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M. A. NOLL
DISES, DAFC
Director of Intelligence

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4 April 2008

ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
OPERATIONS

References: a. DOD Directive 3150.8, "DOD Response to Radiological Accidents," 13 Jun 1996

b. DOD 3150.8-M, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures," 22 Feb 2005

c. "National Response Framework," Jan 2008

d. "National Incident Management System," 1 Mar 2004

e. CJCSI 3121.01B, "Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SRUF)," 13 June 2005

f. Title 50 USC § 797, "Security regulations and orders; penalty for violation"

g. Title 50 USC § 831, "Regulations for employment security (Security procedures, access to classified material)"

h. Title 42 USC § 2271, "General Provisions (Authority of the President to use Government agencies to protect Restricted Data, facilities, equipment, materials and other property)."

i. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500-06, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations," 10 October 2006

j. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-07, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities," 11 April 2006

k. CJCSM 3150.03B, "Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports," 28 Jul 2003

1. Situation

a. General. This annex provides guidance for operations executed by CDRUSNORTHCOM to direct and coordinate the Department of Defense (DOD) response to DOD nuclear weapon accidents in US Territory or territorial waters within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area.

b. Area of Concern

(1) Area of Responsibility. See Basic Plan.

(2) Area of Interest. See Basic Plan.

(3) Operational Area. The Operational Area encompassed by this plan includes the land, sea, and airspace of USNORTHCOM AOR as defined in the basic plan. The exact definition of the OPERATIONAL AREA will be defined during the operation (as defined in the basic plan). No operations will be conducted outside of this area without specific approval of CDRUSNORTHCOM.

c. Deterrent Options. Not applicable.

d. Enemy Capabilities. Not applicable.

e. Friendly Capabilities

(1) Supporting Commands and Agencies

(a) Department of Energy (DOE), Washington, DC. Several DOE teams may respond to the nuclear weapon accident to support USNORTHCOM/Response Task Force (RTF) operations at the accident site. If there is a DOD nuclear weapon accident, the DOE Headquarters Emergency Operations Center is notified by the National Military Command Center (NMCC). DOE also provides significant on the ground support to USNORTHCOM sponsored Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Exercises (NUWAX). When deployed, DOE teams provide a myriad of capabilities to assist CDRUSNORTHCOM, the RTF Commander and federal, state, and local agencies at the accident site;

1. Senior Energy Official (SEO). The SEO is the official who provides C2 and coordination of all DOE emergency response assets that are deployed to assist CDRUSNORTHCOM/the RTF Commander at the accident site. The SEO is the primary DOE interface with CDRUSNORTHCOM, the RTF Commander and federal, state, and local agencies at the accident site. The SEO is also the DOE spokesperson at the site.

2. DOE Accident Response Group (ARG). The ARG provides timely, worldwide support to the Department of Defense to assist and resolve consequences of accidents involving US nuclear weapons in DOD custody. The ARG is a tailorable team comprised of anywhere between 7 and 60 nuclear weapon accident responders and scientists that provide capabilities that include: Phased rapid deployment (3 phases, deployed anywhere in 1 to 12 hours after notification); radiological detection and monitoring capability and equipment; mobile laboratories, equipment for weapons access, destructive and non-destructive recovery, and packaging (materials and containers); and

expertise in nuclear weapons safing and recovery, collection, component identification, and packaging.

3. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). The FRMAC is an Interagency deployable team with a tailorable capability to collect, analyze, evaluate, assess, interpret, and distribute off-site radiological monitoring and assessment information in support of USNORTHCOM and the RTF. The FRMAC initial phase may deploy within 4 hours of notification and reach any location in the United States within 6-10 hours.

4. DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Team. The Rap team is a deployable, tailored capability that provides radiological monitoring and assessment assistance. The 7-person team provides radiological monitoring and assessment equipment including alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron detectors; air samplers; decontamination kits; and mobile laboratories for the purpose of characterizing the radiation environment and reducing the immediate radiological hazards and risk to people and the environment. A RAP team may deploy within 4-6 hours after notification.

5. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). REAC/TS is a medical consulting and/or deployable, tailored capability that provides a 24-hour response center consisting of consulting and/or deployable equipment and personnel. Capabilities provided include medical advice, specialized training, and on-site assistance in triage, diagnosis, and treatment of all types of radiation exposure events. The REAC/TS can deploy with four to 30 people within four hours of notification.

(b) Department of Justice (DOJ). DOJ will notify the closest local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and dispatch agents to investigate the situation and make determination of terrorist or criminal involvement. In coordination with the RTF Commander, the FBI will ensure appropriate coordination with the Federal, state, local, and tribal authorities at the accident scene.

(c) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA may dispatch representatives to the accident site to assist USNORTHCOM/RTF in determining the environmental impact of the accident, and provide technical advice and assistance to include monitoring; identification of contaminants; samples collection and analysis; on-site and off-site safety, protection, prevention, and decontamination activities.

(d) Department of State (DOS). DOS is responsible for coordinating nuclear weapon accident issues that may have effects across international borders. If needed, DOS can monitor developing emergencies and begin early

coordination and planning to include notification of affected U.S. Embassies and Consulates.

(e) Department of Homeland Security (e.g. Principal Federal Official (PFO), Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)/Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC) etc.

1. Principal Federal Official (PFO). If the level of Federal consequence management response activities outside the NDA/Military installation warrants it, the DHS Secretary may designate a Principal Federal Official (PFO) to coordinate Federal support to the established Incident Command System unified command structure and to coordinate overall Federal incident management. The PFO does not direct or replace the USNORTHCOM-RTF incident command structure established at the accident site, nor does the PFO have directive authority over the Federal Coordinating Officer/Federal Resource Coordinator, any other Federal, state, local and tribal officials (i.e. DOD Representative in the Unified Coordination Group). DHS will most likely stand up a Joint Field Office (JFO) to provide a central coordination center for federal, state, local, and tribal authorities to coordinate their accident response activities. The PFO will be located in the JFO (Ref c).

2. Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)/Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC)

a. FCO. The FCO manages and coordinates Federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO works closely with the PFO, and other Federal, state, local, and tribal officials. In Stafford Act situations where a PFO has not been assigned, the FCO provides overall coordination for the Federal components of the JFO and works in partnership with the state coordinating officer to determine and satisfy state and local assistance requirements.

b. FRC. In non-Stafford Act situations when a federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security to obtain support from other Federal departments and agencies, DHS designates an FRC. The FRC is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of resources to the requesting agency.

3. US Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG reports to DHS and can coordinate maritime activities with the RTF Commander, state, local, and appropriate Federal agencies. If the accident affects the coastal zone, DHS/USCG serves as the coordinating/cooperating agency for oil and hazardous materials response actions. The USCG is also part of the National Strike Force (NSF). The NSF mission is to provide highly trained experienced personnel and specialized equipment to the Coast Guard and other Federal agencies to facilitate preparedness and response to oil and hazardous

substance pollution incidents in order to protect public health and the environment. The USCG NSF is usually dispatched by the National Response Center. The National Response Center is the US single point of contact for all pollution and hazardous material incident reporting.

4. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA reports to DHS and can provide the following emergency response capabilities to assist the RTF at the accident site: Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to deploy in support of the NARP mission; coordinate Consequence Management (CM) activities occurring outside the NDA/DOD installation with the RTF Commander, the Interagency, state, local, and tribal authorities.

(f) Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS accomplishes routine hazmat emergency response notification, evaluations, and actions to prevent, minimize or mitigate releases or threats of release of hazardous substances in support of, or to supplement those of private, local and state responders. When requested by the RTF Incident Commander, provide Technical advice and assistance, such as monitoring; identification of contaminants; samples collection and analysis; on-site and off-site safety, protection, prevention, and decontamination activities.

(g) Department of Defense (DOD)

1. Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). If needed, CDRUSNORTHCOM can direct a DCO to the nuclear weapon accident scene to serve as the USNORTHCOM single point of contact at the JFO. The DCO is OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM. Requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) at the accident site are processed through the DCO. The DCO may have a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) consisting of a staff and military liaison officers to assist in required duties. DCO responsibilities include coordinating and processing applicable requests for DOD assistance from federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, facilitating Requests for Forces (RFF) to USNORTHCOM from the RTF, orchestrating the accomplishment of approved mission assignments utilizing available resources, and facilitating required communications and reports between the RTF and the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center. CDRUSNORTHCOM may direct the DCO to assist the RTF Commander in interfacing/coordinating with the PFO and all the other agencies within the JFO. Specific responsibilities of the DCO are subject to modification by CDRUSNORTHCOM based on the situation.

2. Additional USNORTHCOM Joint Task Force (JTF). If the magnitude of the effects of the accident outside the NDA/Military reservation are beyond the management capabilities and/or scope of the RTF, CDRUSNORTHCOM, as directed/approved by SecDef, may establish an additional JTF for the conduct of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosives

Consequence Management (CBRNE CM) support to federal, state, local, or tribal authorities. The JTF will operate IAW USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500, CBRNE CM Operations (Ref i). The JTF Commander will be responsible for C2 of allocated military forces outside the NDA/Military reservation. The RTF Commander will be responsible for C2 of allocated military forces inside the NDA/Military reservation. The RTF Commander and JTF Commander will coordinate their efforts but, will not impinge upon the authority or operations of the other. The JTF Commander will report OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM as does the RTF Commander. JTF-CS may be tasked by CDRUSNORTHCOM to fulfill JTF consequence management responsibilities.

4. USNORTHCOM JTF-Civil Support (CS). JTF-CS plans and integrates DOD support for CBRNE CM incidents and accidents. When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, JTF-CS shall deploy to the nuclear weapon accident site, establish C2 of designated DOD forces, and provide DSCA to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life support. JTF-CS, if deployed, would most likely be assigned operations outside of the NDA/Military installation as part of the USNORTHCOM execution of CONPLAN 3500, USNORTHCOM CBRNE CM. CDRUSNORTHCOM may deploy the JTF-CS Commander's Assessment Element (CAE) to the nuclear weapon accident site to assist the RTF Commander's staff as required. Assistance includes educating the RTF staff about USNORTHCOM processes, facilitating Requests for Forces (RFF) to USNORTHCOM, and facilitating required communications and reports between the RTF and the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.

5. USNORTHCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N). CDRUSNORTHCOM may deploy the SJFHQ-N CAE to the nuclear weapon accident site to assist the RTF Commander's staff as required. Assistance includes educating the RTF staff about USNORTHCOM processes, facilitating Requests for Forces (RFF) to USNORTHCOM, and facilitating required communications and reports between the RTF and the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.

6. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT). The CMAT is trained and equipped to help assist the RTF Commander in hazard predictions related to a DOD nuclear weapon accident. The CMAT advance party may deploy to assess the on-site situation and may be followed by additional personnel based on the situation.

7. Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT). A team from the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) of highly qualified radiation medicine physicians, health physicists, and related scientists who provide state-of-the-art advice and assistance to the U.S. Combatant Commanders, allied forces, Federal Agencies, State and local governments, and

others on radiological matters including accidents of nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, radiological dispersal devices, and industrial and/or medical sources. The MRAT also provides expertise for managing and treating radiation casualties. The MRAT can deploy as part of the DTRA CMAT.

8. USAF HAMMER ACE Package. HAMMER ACE is a quick reaction communications response capability that provides support for nuclear weapon accidents. HAMMER ACE can deploy within three hours and establish communications within 30 minutes of arrival on-site. Capabilities include: Extremely High Frequency Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable terminal; long haul communications (International Marine Satellite INMARSAT); Secure Video-Teleconference (SVTC) capability; and internet capability with reach back to DTRA.

9. US Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). The AFRAT is a field-qualified 37-person team of worldwide deployable health physicists, industrial hygienists, and laboratory technicians. Capabilities include: A forward deployed field laboratory; On-site detection, identification, and quantification of ionizing radiation hazards; and external dosimetry support for force protection of up to 1000 dosimeters per day with unlimited readings; 28 extra-duty personnel.

10. US Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). The US Army RAMT supplies radiological health hazard guidance to the IRF/RTF Commander at the nuclear weapon accident site. The RAMT may deploy within four hours of notification. Capabilities include: Guidance relative to the potential health hazards to personnel from radiological contamination, or exposure to ionizing radiation; Evaluation of survey data to provide technical guidance to the responsible officials using radiologically contaminated areas; Monitoring of medical facilities and equipment where contaminated patients have been evacuated; Advice on laboratory, and clinical procedures as well as decontamination of personnel, medical treatment facilities, and use of medical equipment; and assistance with the bioassay program.

11. US Navy Forward Deployable Preventive Medicine Unit (FDPMU). The US Navy FDPMU is a forward deployable capability that can provide: Health surveillance; force health protection; operational threat assessment and risk communication; surveillance; detection and identification of chemical, biological, radiological, or environmental agents and other stressors; the ability to recommend countermeasures for these threats; on-site detection and surveys for alpha, beta, gamma, and X-ray radiation; identification of gamma-emitting isotopes with spectrum analysis; radiation monitoring and air sampling on-site; decontamination sampling with reach back analysis; and a health physicist to perform risk management, dose estimation, personnel training, etc.

f. Assumptions. See Basic Plan.

g. Legal Considerations; See Basic Plan.

2. Mission. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the DOD response and recovery for DOD nuclear weapon accidents within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Commander's Intent. When directed by SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the response to a nuclear weapon accident involving a nuclear weapon in DOD custody, within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area.

(a) End State: USNORTHCOM NARP operations conclude when:

1. DOD authorities have recovered and rendered safe the nuclear weapon and the accident site is turned over to the responsible Service or civil authorities;

2. Or when directed by SecDef.

(b) Strategic Objectives

1. Objective. Direct and coordinate the DOD response and recovery of a DOD nuclear weapon involved in an accident in the USNORTHCOM Operational Area.

(a) Effect: Loss of Life, suffering, and significant property damage minimized.

(b) Effect: Weapon and materials recovered.

(c) Effect: Develop remediation plan, begin remediation operations, and transfer remediation responsibilities to SecDef appointed Service.

2. Objective: Integrate and coordinate the DOD response and recovery of a DOD nuclear weapon involved in an accident with the supporting Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies.

(a) Effect: Loss of life, suffering, and significant property damage minimized.

(b) Effect: Public confidence maintained.

3. Objective: Capability to defend homeland maintained.

(a) Effect: Homeland Defense vigilance maintained.

(b) Effect: Homeland Defense ability maintained.

(2) General. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 response operations will be conducted in five Phases (Ref b): Notification and Deployment (Phase I), Initial Response (Phase II), Accident Site Consolidation (Phase III), Weapon Retrieval Operations (Phase IV), and Site Remediation (SR) (Phase V).

(a) Phase I, Notification and Deployment. CDRUSNORTHCOM responsibilities during Phase I are limited in scope.

1. The notification and deployment phase of a nuclear weapon accident begins once the accident has occurred and voice reports are provided to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). In Accordance With (IAW) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3150.03B (Ref k), any nuclear weapon accident shall be reported to the NMCC by the lowest level of command having knowledge of the accident, via OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW voice report within 15 minutes of accident occurrence. A hard copy message report shall be sent to the NMCC within one hour of accident occurrence to amplify conditions at the accident site and to give an updated status of response actions.

2. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will most likely receive notification of the nuclear weapon accident from the NMCC (after NMCC receives the OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW report). The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will immediately alert CDRUSNORTHCOM. The NMCC, through the Service operations center, shall immediately activate and dispatch an Initial Response Force (IRF) cadre to take immediate life saving actions and to establish security and safety controls at the accident scene.

3. The USNORTHCOM Battle Staff will be activated and prepare to exercise command and control of the RTF.

4. The NMCC convenes a conference call with all appropriate national-level agencies, including operations centers of the Military Services; USNORTHCOM, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM); the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Operations Center (NOC); the Department of State (DOS); Department of Energy (DOE); the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and other federal agencies as needed. In addition, the NORAD-USNORTHCOM

Command Center will ensure communications are established with the NMCC, the Initial Response Force (IRF)/RTF Commander, DTRA Operations Center and other required DOD and DOE Crises Action Teams (CATs) and Operations Centers as appropriate. These communication links will be maintained for CDRUSNORTHCOM situational awareness and Command and Control (C2) purposes throughout the nuclear weapon accident.

5. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will gather information using Annex X, Operational Checklist. Information gathered includes: Source of information and whether or not the nuclear weapon accident scene has been declared a National Defense Area (NDA); How the accident was reported and whether or not an OPREP 3 has been reported to the NMCC; Type of nuclear weapon/material involved and responsible DOD Service having custody; Initial reported accident scene condition and status of nuclear weapon/material; Status of DOD response forces notified, enroute, or at the accident scene (Has the Initial Response Force (IRF) been dispatched? Has NMCC deployed the RTF?). The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will notify SJFHQ-N and JTF-CS IAW the COG Notification Template in order to initiate timely recall and deployment preparation.

(b) Phase II, Initial Response

1. The Initial Response phase to a domestic nuclear weapon accident begins when the accident occurs. Phase II actions center on first responder activities that may include, but are not limited to, lifesaving activities, firefighting activities, establishing incident command, public protection measures, providing for operational security, and controlling the spread of contamination. In most cases, these actions are shared with state, local, and tribal authorities. The first responders (other than the military personnel that were with the nuclear weapon at the time of the accident) may be civilian, military (IRF), or a combination of both. The IRF Commander arrives at the accident scene early in this phase.

2. The IRF Commander fulfills the Incident Commander role until relieved by the RTF Commander. During this phase, the DOD and DOE come together to form a unified command IAW guidelines contained in the National Incident Management System (Ref d).

3. If required, CDRUSNORTHCOM will deploy the SJFHQ-N CAE to provide situational awareness, assess the scope of the situation and provide direct connectivity back to USNORTHCOM. The SJFHQ-N CAE will also assist the RTF Commander's staff as required to facilitate communications and processes between the RTF and USNORTHCOM. This assistance includes educating the RTF staff about USNORTHCOM processes, facilitating Requests for Forces (RFF) to USNORTHCOM, and facilitating required communications

and reports between the RTF and the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.

(c) Phase III, Accident Site Consolidation. This phase evolves out of the Initial Response as imminent lifesaving and firefighting activities are completed and the accident site begins to stabilize. It is marked by the arrival of a robust cadre of DOD (Service RTF etc.), DOE, and other Interagency response teams at the accident site as well as a maturing federal coordination capability in the local area. As early as operationally possible, the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will inform the RTF command center/command post of the types, means, and intervals of reports required (VTCs, Dynamic Synchronization Event Log (DSEL) entries, Situation Reports, Commander's Estimates etc.).

1. Once the RTF Commander arrives at the accident site and receives a briefing from the IRF Commander, the RTF Commander will assume Incident Commander responsibilities and report OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of the RTF) at this time. Vocal authorization from the SecDef (through the NMCC) for this action will be given to CDRUSNORTHCOM and the responsible Service, followed up by a SecDef approved EXORD. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center shall facilitate and coordinate the vocal and written EXORD process with the NMCC to ensure CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of forces in an expeditious manner.

2. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will assist the RTF Commander in the performance of required actions at the accident site. Required RTF actions may include, but are not limited to, establishing communications, coordination, and integration of response actions with federal, state, local, and tribal authorities; contamination control; reducing the health and safety risk to the public and response personnel; site and weapon stabilization; removing hazards; solidifying security measures and maintaining the NDA; performing initial and follow-on render safe procedures; addressing public affairs issues; and initiating planning activities for Site Remediation (SR). The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will facilitate RTF Commander requests for additional capabilities (response assets) through the DOD/USNORTHCOM Request For Forces (RFF) process.

(d) Phase IV, Weapon Recovery Operations

1. Weapon retrieval involves a myriad of technical disciplines and supporting infrastructure to effectively reduce hazards to the public and the environment. Weapon retrieval begins once any existing fires have been extinguished, weapons have been cooled, exposed personnel have been removed or stabilized, and initial reconnaissance of the area has been

conducted by EOD personnel to locate weapon(s) and debris, as well as to prioritize future actions.

2. The principal resources available to the RTF Commander to meet weapon retrieval responsibilities are DOD EOD teams and specialized DOE teams.

3. Disposition of damaged weapon(s) and/or components involves returning these devices to DOE; therefore, close coordination between the RTF Commander and the DOE Senior Energy Official (SEO) is necessary throughout the weapon retrieval phase. Custody of the damaged weapon(s) and components is transferred to DOE at a time decided jointly by USNORTHCOM/RTF Commander and DOE SEO. Weapon custody is transferred to DOE once it is packaged and ready for transport. Once weapon custody transfer is complete, DOE is responsible for transporting the weapon off site to a DOE facility.

(e) Phase V, Site Remediation (SR). SR is the phase of the nuclear weapon accident response that addresses the cleanup of contamination and the restoration of the affected area to conditions agreed upon by the primary stakeholders (DOD, Interagency, state, local, and tribal authorities). DOD is responsible for managing the federal technical radiological cleanup activities after a DOD-custody nuclear weapon accident. State, local, and tribal governments are primarily responsible for planning the recovery of the affected area. Upon request, the Federal government assists state, local, and tribal governments with developing and executing their recovery plan.

1. The RTF Commander forms the Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG) during Phase III. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center monitors SR activities and provides updates to the SecDef/CJCS via the NMCC. For more information on SR activities, see Annexes D and L.

2. The RTF Commander directs SRWG activities until remediation responsibilities are transferred to the responsible Service or SecDef and Secretary of DHS approved federal agency for extensive site remediation actions (sometime after weapon recovery actions are complete and weapon custody is transferred to DOE).

3. NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will continue to monitor the accident scene and provide updates to CDRUSNORTHCOM as needed. This phase may continue for years as the site is continually monitored and actions are taken to ultimately remediate the affected area to an agreed acceptable level.

(f) Based on the magnitude of the effects of the nuclear weapon accident outside the NDA/Military Installation and the scope of requests for

DOD assistance to effected Federal, state, local, and tribal authorities, CDRUSNORTHCOM may establish one of the following Command and Control (C2) options for Consequence Management support operations outside the NDA/Military Installation (IAW CJCS Standing CBRNE CM EXORD and or USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500). These options may be directed, as needed, by CDRUSNORTHCOM during any phase of NC-NARP operations. Generally one of the following options applies.

1. Direct a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) with a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) to the nuclear weapon accident scene to serve as the USNORTHCOM single point of contact to responding Federal, state, local and tribal authorities and to perform other duties as directed. The DCO will be OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM. DCO responsibilities include those stated in the friendly forces paragraph above. Specific responsibilities of the DCO are subject to modification by CDRUSNORTHCOM based on the situation.

2. Establish a JTF when the scope and magnitude of the accident requires a significant DOD CM response force and warrants the capabilities of a 0-7 or 0-8 level HQs, which normally implies implementation of CONPLAN 3500 as directed by the SecDef through the CJCS.

3. Establish a JTF when the scope and magnitude of the accident warrants an 0-9 level HQ C2 structure over a large geographical region, with potential subordinate HQs managing the direct DOD support to the National Response Framework (NRF) primary and coordinating agencies in multiple locations. Again, this option implies implementation of CONPLAN 3500 as directed by the SecDef through the CJCS.

(3) Deployment

(a) SecDef has delegated authority to initiate DOD nuclear weapons accident response (including the deployment of forces) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Upon notification of a nuclear weapon accident, the NMCC assembles the Joint Nuclear Accident Incident Response Team (JNAIRT) to coordinate and monitor the early operational response for the CJCS until CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of forces. If/when needed, the NMCC will deploy the IRF and RTF through the normal deployment order process or by vocal authorization through normal Service channels (Service Operations Center).

(b) In coordination with the Service and Force Provider (USJFCOM), USNORTHCOM will assume OPCON of the IRF and RTF shortly after they arrive (separately) in the designated JOA. A Joint Staff vocal OPCON order will be followed up with a Joint Staff Execute Order (EXORD) to USNORTHCOM, codifying the OPCON relationships.

(4) Execution. In coordination with the Service and Force Provider (USJFCOM), USNORTHCOM will assume OPCON of the IRF and RTF shortly after they arrive (separately). A Joint Staff vocal OPCON order will be followed up with a Joint Staff Execute Order (EXORD) to USNORTHCOM, codifying the OPCON relationships. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center shall facilitate and coordinate the vocal and written EXORD process with the NMCC to ensure the timely and orderly transition of OPCON authority to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(5) Employment

(a). Standing Rules on the Use of Force (SRUF). U.S. forces always retain the inherent right and obligation to defend themselves and other U.S. forces in the area. SRUF apply when conducting operations in the United States or its Territories. SRUF will be determined before deployment but usually include SecDef restricted access to weapons except for NDA site security. Forces will be trained on SRUF before employment and issued SRUF cards prior to deployment. Supplemental SRUF should be requested as necessary. Initial Response Forces will receive an initial SRUF briefing prior to assuming post but security posting will not be delayed to create and issue SRUF to security forces. The IRF/RTF Commander will disseminate SRUF to all subordinate units, supporting commands and civil authorities as appropriate.

(b) Readiness. Criteria governing the readiness of forces to be deployed in support of this plan will be as prescribed in DOD 3150.8-M (Ref b). USNORTHCOM maintains readiness for DOD nuclear weapon accident response operations by interfacing with U. S. government response organizations, local authorities and by supporting accident response exercises.

(c) Alert. A nuclear weapon accident is normally not predictable and will generally occur without much lead time. The alert phase for most units may be only a matter of hours or days. Early identification of requirements is essential to tailor the military forces and capabilities to the need.

(d) Marshaling. When directed by the NMCC, forces will move to specified marshaling areas or Ports of Embarkation (POEs).

(e) Air Operations. Air transport of personnel and equipment may be required to support response operations. Rotary wing assets will be provided as directed to support the IRF and RTF.

(f) Redeployment. RTF disengages from and transfers site remediation responsibility to the Remediation Project Manager, or designated Service or US Government representative. As responsibilities are transferred, RTF forces are decontaminated and monitored prior to redeployment to home

station. Depending on the situation, some elements may be directed to remain and conduct radiation monitoring activities until released by CDRUSNORTHCOM or the SecDef. Upon redeployment of the RTF, USNORTHCOM relinquishes control of the accident operations to the SecDef designated Service or US Government designated agency. The intent of redeployment is to ensure personnel and equipment are decontaminated and quickly redeployed to home station(s).

b. Tasks. Tasks assigned or accomplished by each element of the supported and supporting commands and agencies. Interagency partners will assist as agreed upon in the NRF.

(1) DOD agencies/teams. When directed by USNORTHCOM, as directed by SecDef, the following DOD agencies/teams will be prepared to support USNORTHCOM by accomplishing the following tasks.

(a) Service RTF (OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM). When directed by SecDef, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM in support of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(b) DOD Representative in the JFO. When requested by CDR USNORTHCOM, provide designated support to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations when approved by SecDef.

(c) DCO/DCE (OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM). When directed by CDR USNORTHCOM, provide designated support to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(d) USNORTHCOM Joint Task Force (OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM). When directed by CDR USNORTHCOM, provide designated support to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(e) USNORTHCOM JTF-CS (OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM). Be prepared to stand up a JTF headquarters in support of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(f) DTRA. When directed by SecDef, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(g) US Air Force. When directed by SecDef, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(h) US Army. When directed by SecDef, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(i) US Navy. When directed by SecDef, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(2) DOE agencies/teams. When directed by appropriate DOE authorities, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM in support of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(3) DOJ agencies/teams. When directed by appropriate DOJ authorities, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM in support of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(4) EPA agencies/teams. When directed by appropriate EPA authorities, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM in support of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(5) DHS agencies/teams. When directed by appropriate DHS authorities, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM in support of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(6) DOS. When directed by appropriate US government authority, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM in support of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

(7) DHHS. When directed by appropriate US government authority, provide designated support to CDRUSNORTHCOM in support of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 operations.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) National Military Command Center (NMCC. During the initial phase of a nuclear weapon accident, the NMCC Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) will make notifications and direct activation of the Joint Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team (JNAIRT). The JNAIRT) coordinates and monitors the early operational response for the CJCS until CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of forces. Joint Staff vocal OPCON orders will be followed up with Joint Staff Execute Orders (EXORD) to USNORTHCOM.

(2) Services. In the USNORTHCOM AOR, the US Air Force and US Navy develop, maintain, and provide initial emergency response forces, based on installation-specific capabilities, missions and Service requirements, to deal with the effects of a nuclear weapon accident. Provide a robust command and control element and staff (RTF), specifically trained in nuclear weapon accident management, responsive to dispatch by the SecDef/CJCS via the NMCC to relieve the IRF. This RTF shall coordinate with the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center and provide reports etc. as requested.

(3) USNORTHCOM/RTF Coordination with DOE

(a) DOD military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel are tasked to perform all hands-on technical render safe procedures on damaged weapons regardless of which department is the coordinating agency. Service EOD personnel shall be directly supported and advised by DOE scientific and technical personnel. Military EOD personnel are responsible for the actual performance, supervision, and control of hands-on weapon recovery operations. DOE also provides technical advice to CDRUSNORTHCOM/RTF Commander on all aspects of the response and recovery of a DOD nuclear weapon involved in an accident. The department that has custody of the weapon(s) during the accident is responsible for the overall response and weapon recovery operations.

(b) When DOD is the coordinating agency, the SecDef/CJCS via the NMCC requests DOE/NNSA assets for deployment through the DOE liaison to the NMCC or the DOE EOC. When DOE is the coordinating agency, DOE should request DOD support/capabilities through the established DOD Request for Assistance (RFA Process) through the NMCC.

(5) Based on the situation, the Secretary of Homeland Security may coordinate overall Federal Government response activities. However, DOD as the coordinating agency having custody of the weapon, has primary responsibility for facilitating the nuclear/radiological aspects of the response related to the accident (Ref. c). DOD will be the coordinating agency responsible for leading the Federal response if DHS does not respond in their overall incident manager role (e.g. if DHS does not stand up a JFO) (Ref. c, NRF). Regardless of whether DHS is coordinating the overall Federal response, USNORTHCOM will direct and coordinate all actions within the National Defense Area or DOD installation. The scenarios below illustrate when DHS may assume responsibility for coordinating the Federal response:

(a) The Department of Justice through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) manages and directs the law enforcement and criminal investigative aspects (including possible terrorist involvement) of a DOD nuclear weapon accident response in coordination with USNORTHCOM/IRF/RTF and appropriate Federal, state, local and tribal governments.

(b) A nuclear weapon accident occurs which requires a significant consequence management response in addition to the Service RTF response.

(c) A nuclear weapon accident occurs on private or public land.

d. Operational Constraints. Component and supporting commanders will evaluate the capabilities of their forces to accomplish assigned tasks and

submit shortfalls through service channels for resolution. Unresolved shortfalls, with impact statements, will be reported to USNORTHCOM.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D, Logistics and Engineering and Annex L, Environmental.

5. Command and Control



FIGURE C-1. CDRUSNORTHCOM C2 of RTF and DOD Teams



FIGURE C-2. CDRUSNORTHCOM C2 of RTF and DOD Teams (with additional JTF for DSCA/CBRNE CM)

a. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported Combatant Command for a nuclear weapon accident in U.S. territory with the exception of Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific and Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Atlantic. CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes command and control of DOD response forces at the direction of SecDef through the CJCS. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for response and recovery of component(s) and/or materials for DOD nuclear weapon(s) involved.

b. The Services, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM, USTRANSCOM, USJFCOM, USSTRATCOM, and Defense Agencies support USNORTHCOM when directed by SecDef. The interagency (DOE, DOJ, DHS, EPA, etc.) also support USNORTHCOM when directed by appropriate authority.

c. IAW Annex J, USNORTHCOM coordinates with the National Guard Bureau and state National Guard forces to ensure deconfliction of missions and unity of effort.

d. CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of the SecDef designated RTF when the RTF Commander relieves the IRF Commander and reports ready to report OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM. CDRUSNORTHCOM should assume

OPCON of the RTF as soon as possible after the RTF Commander assumes IC responsibilities at the site.

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General, USAF
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Appendixes

1 - Nuclear Operations – Not used
2 - Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations; Riot Control Agents and Herbicides – Not used
3 - Information Operations – Not used
4 - Special Operations – Not used
5 - Personnel Recovery Operations – Not used
6 - Rules of Engagement – Not used
7 - Reconnaissance – Not used
8 - Air Base Operability – Not used
9 - Combat Camera – See Annex F, Public Affairs
10 - Noncombatant Evacuation Operations – Not used
11 - Escape and Evasion Operations – Not used
12 - Counterattack – Not used
13 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal – See Reference b.
14 - Amphibious Operations – Not used
15 - Force Protection – Not used
16 - Critical Infrastructure Protection – Not used

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ANNEX D TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
LOGISTICS AND ENGINEERING

References: a. Title 10, United States Code, Sections 12301-12304
b. Title 42, United States Code, Section 5121 et. seq. Stafford Act
c. User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning, 11 September 1994
d. CJCSI 4120.02, Assignment of Movement Priority, 15 April 2005
e. Joint Publication 4.01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, 19 March 2003
f. Joint Publication 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations for Joint Operations, 12 Feb 2007
g. CJCSI 3110.03A, Logistics Supplement to JSCP FY 2005, 14 June 2005
h. DOD 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures, 22 Feb 2005
i. DOD 4000.25-M, Defense Logistics Management System, 10 Mar 2003
j. DODD 1300.22 Mortuary Affairs Policy, 3 Feb 2000
k. DODD 3150.8, Department of Defense Response to Radiological Accidents, 13 June 1996
l. DODD 5101.10, DOD Executive Agent for Subsistence, 27 September 2004
m. DODD 5101.8, DOD Executive Agent for Bulk Petroleum, 11 August 2004
n. DODD 5101.9, DOD Executive Agent for Medical Materiel, 23 August 2004
o. JP 4.0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, 6 April 2000
p. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations, 5 June 2006
q. Additional references – see base plan

1. Situation.

a. Enemy. See base plan.

b. Friendly. See base plan.

(1) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides deployment and redeployment common-user air, land, and sea transportation for forces engaged in civil support operations and provides aero-medical evacuation and tanker support as required. Additionally, USTRANSCOM is the DOD's Distribution Process Owner, charged to integrate strategic and theater joint operations area (JOA) distribution. In addition, when requested by a federal agency and approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), USTRANSCOM provides transportation support to non-DOD organizations, such as movement of critical capabilities or commodities, or evacuation of personnel. USTRANSCOM is the principal DOD executor for transport requests from the Department of Transportation under Emergency Support Function #1.

(2) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides logistics support for the missions of the military departments and the Unified Combatant Commands engaged in civil support operations. It also provides logistics support to other DOD components and certain federal agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, and others as authorized. Through its defense reutilization and marketing services, DLA provides worldwide reuse, recycling, and disposal solutions, to include hazardous, non-radioactive material disposal.

(3) Defense Contract Management Agency provides contract administrative service support and assists USNORTHCOM in developing contingency contracting packages as required.

c. Assumptions. See base plan.

(1) When approved by the SecDef, military forces provides emergency logistics and engineering support to other federal, state, and local agencies.

(2) DOD forces deploy for thirty (30) days or more in support of DOD nuclear weapons accident response operations unless otherwise directed.

(3) The request for assistance and mission assignment process is utilized to request DOD support for response to nuclear weapons accidents that occur for material that is not under the control of DOD. Note: requests for assistance and mission assignments must be approved by the SecDef. Logistics and engineering mission assignments may include, but are not limited to: transportation of personnel; equipment and supplies; operational staging areas; fuel supply and distribution; and mortuary affairs.

d. Resource Availability.

(1) Employed forces depart home station with their requisite days of supply predicated on anticipated mission requirements and availability of commercial resources.

(2) Limited airlift is available to support continued operations.

(3) Support to war time mission takes precedence unless otherwise directed by the SecDef.

e. Planning Factors.

(1) Supply levels of consumption for DOD forces are based on service approved planning factors.

(2) Logistics planning anticipates sustained operations for a period of thirty (30) days or more.

(3) Planning factors for support must consider available commercial resources as well as DOD sources.

2. Mission. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the DOD logistics and engineering support to DOD forces engaged in response and recovery of DOD nuclear weapon accidents within the USNORTHCOM-designated OPERATIONAL AREA.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Logistics Support. Each service is responsible for providing service-unique logistics support (e.g. uniforms, special equipment maintenance support, and service-specific items) to their forces deployed for nuclear weapons accident response operations. Common-user logistics support (e.g. fuel, food, and general supplies) is provided through one of three support concepts. [In all cases, delivery of DLA-provided items are pushed as far down the supply chain as feasible to facilitate efficient application to the mission.]

(1) If a Base Support Installation (BSI) is designated in the vicinity of an incident, that installation retains responsibility for common-user support to all responding nuclear weapons accident response operations forces, in accordance with (IAW) with the following guidelines:

(a) Logistics support includes lodging, messing, general supplies (e.g. fuel, Class II), common-item maintenance (e.g. wheeled vehicles and generators), and contracting support.

(b) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI).

1. The BSI may support the Response Task Force (RTF) by providing the onward movement portion of JRSOI.

2. The designated RTF receives forces and collects information to maintain accountability of personnel and equipment in the OPERATIONAL AREA, and provides guidance for integration into the mission.

3. Additional information on JRSOI can be found in Annex C, paragraph 3.a.(3).

(c) The BSI contracts for support as required beyond their existing capabilities.

(d) Additional support forces (such as headquarters and field services units) or equipment are not required.

(2) If a BSI is designated in a location which is geographically separated from the incident response site, the nuclear weapons accident response operations forces require an organic logistics element to provide support according to the following guidelines:

(a) The logistics element is sized according to the number of responding forces it supports.

(b) The BSI acts as the source for general supplies, such as operational rations and fuel. Coordination is necessary to determine if the BSI provides delivery, or does the logistics element pick up supplies at the BSI.

(c) The nuclear weapons accident response operations forces is responsible for their own housing, feeding, and general troop care based on the appropriate proximity to the incident site.

(3) If no BSI is designated, the organic logistics element is organized to provide common-item support for all forces in the area.

(a) The RTF must request adequate logistics support forces and equipment to ensure mission success.

(b) The RTF develops the plan to ensure continuous troop sustainment for the duration of the mission.

c. Logistic and Engineering Support by Phase (See Annex C).

(1) Phase I (Notification and Deployment) and Phase II (Initial Response): Assess the situation for appropriate logistics support needs. Nominate BSIs and Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) and Aerial Ports of Embarkation (APOEs). The end of phase II is marked by the SecDef assigning CDRUSNORTHCOM Command and Control of the accident, conveyed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the National Military Command Center.

(2) Phase III (Accident Site Consolidation) and Phase IV (Weapon Recovery Operations and Disposition): Integrate the force and coordinate logistics support to sustain forces. Support the Response Task Force (RTF) commander's requirement for specialized response assets. Begin logistics planning for redeployment of forces and reconstitution of forces and equipment at home station. Begin planning for environmental remediation if required. Phase III, IV and V likely occurs concurrently.

(3) Phase V (Site Remediation): Commence and monitor remediation operations through the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center until site remediation is completed. The end of this phase is marked by the redeployment of the RTF.

d. Tasks.

(1) NORAD-USNORTHCOM Directorate of Logistics and Engineering (N-NC/J4).

(a) Provide concepts, policies, and guidance for logistics and engineering support of response forces.

(b) Maintain situational awareness of logistics support for deployed forces via the RTFs, Joint Task Force (JTF) (if designated), and/or Defense Coordinating Officer.

(c) Advise CDRUSNORTHCOM on logistics capabilities to ensure operational decisions are consistent with logistics support capabilities.

(d) Determine the requirement to activate the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Cell (NDDOC) to synchronize movement of assets into and out of the OPERATIONAL AREA.

(e) In consonance with USTRANSCOM J3, determine the requirement for and location(s) for JTF port opening capability.

(f) Recommend potential BSIs to CDRUSNORTHCOM and coordinate support of appropriate services as necessary.

(2) USNORTHCOM subordinate and supporting commands maintain accurate cost records and capture all incremental costs for reimbursement purposes.

(3) Initial Response Force (IRF) and RTF.

(a) Deploy with initial supplies to meet anticipated mission requirements as directed.

(b) Provide property, radiological and hazardous material (HAZMAT) disposal.

(c) Maintain accurate cost records and capture all incremental costs for reimbursement purposes.

(d) Coordinate BSI support requirements with designated installations.

(e) Notify N-NC/J4 of logistical issues that might hamper operations.

(4) Military Services.

(a) Ensure forces deploy with initial supplies to meet anticipated mission requirements as directed.

(b) Provide property, radiological and hazardous material (HAZMAT) disposal.

(c) Maintain accurate cost records and capture all incremental costs for reimbursement purposes.

(d) Provide supportability assessment of BSI nominations and provide BSI support as directed.

(e) Notify N-NC/J4 of logistical issues that might hamper operations.

(5) Commander, USTRANSCOM

(a) Provide common-user air, land, and sea support assets to transport DOD and other agency personnel, teams, and equipment as directed by the SecDef.

(b) Gain and maintain situational awareness of the transportation infrastructure throughout operations, and provide a common operating picture of the status of the infrastructure to USNORTHCOM, supporting commands, services, and agencies.

(c) When requested by CDRUSNORTHCOM, provide augmentation to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Cell (NDDOC) and establish JTF Port Opening capability and supporting engineer capabilities.

(d) Advise USNORTHCOM regarding APOE and APOD selection.

(6) DLA

(a) Provide support for the disposal of property and non-radioactive hazardous material (HAZMAT) for DOD.

(b) If directed by SecDef, deploy a DLA Contingency Support Team.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Logistics.

(1) Supply and Distribution. Forces deploy with a mission tailored initial level of supply. When an accident occurs off a DOD installation, the designated BSI provides sustainment support for military forces engaged in nuclear weapons accident response.

(a) Distribution and Allocation. Services are responsible for logistical support of forces OPCON to the joint force commander.

(b) Level of Supply. Forces deploy with mission essential supplies as directed.

(c) Salvage. The responsible service manages the salvage of radiological, HAZMAT and other items as required.

(d) Captured Enemy Materiel. Not applicable.

(e) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. Forces maximize use of commercial supplies and services. Acquisition procedures are IAW established federal and DOD regulations through the supporting BSI.

(f) Petroleum, Oils, and Lubrication (POL). The supporting BSI, if designated, provides POL support for deploying forces. If no BSI is designated, refer to paragraph 3a(3) above. Services provide service-unique POL support to their deployed DOD nuclear weapon accident response forces.

(g) Inter-Service Logistic Support. Inter-Service Support Agreements remain in effect.

(h) Mortuary Affairs. Service members that die while under the operational control of USNORTHCOM are handled IAW Service and subordinate command procedures. In general, civilian medical examiners or coroners maintain jurisdiction over both military and civilian fatalities. In certain circumstances, such as a mass fatality involving predominately military personnel, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) may request and receive jurisdiction. If granted, the AFME coordinates and determines final disposition of remains. Additionally, military mortuary affairs units can be deployed in order to search, recover, transport, and temporarily store remains in the event of a mass fatality incident. The capacity for this support is extremely limited within DOD and should be considered only as a last resort. See also Appendix 3.

(i) Non-Nuclear Ammunition. The military on-scene commander ensures that weapons and ammunition are adequately provided and physically secured.

(2) Maintenance and Modification. Services perform maintenance, equipment evacuation, and modification per Service and component procedures and doctrine.

(3) Medical Services. See Annex Q.

(4) Mobility and Transportation.

(a) General.

1. Supporting and subordinate commands use the Joint Operations and Planning Execution System (JOPES) for the movement of all forces.

2. Force deployment is time-phased to meet operational mission requirements per validated priorities in JOPES. CDRUSNORTHCOM, as the supported Combatant Commander, validates movement requirements via time-phased force deployment data and Special Assignment Airlift Mission.

3. CDRUSTRANSCOM provides required lift IAW CJCSI 4120.02, Assignment of Movement Priority.

(b) Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis.

1. In conjunction with the deployed RTF and USTRANSCOM, USNORTHCOM determines movement priority and designate APODs and or APOEs.

2. Seaport and aerial port terminals are assessed with regard to throughput capabilities.

(c) Intra-Theater Lift. If commercial aircraft and or airfields are functionally or operationally incapacitated, USTRANSCOM, in coordination with USNORTHCOM, provides intra-theater lift to move forces and sustainment resources into the OPERATIONAL AREA by setting up channel or shuttle service, IAW JTTP 4.0, Doctrine for Logistics.

(d) The NDDOC serves under the control of the N-NC/J4 and is composed of military and civilian personnel from NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, the services, and other organizations as directed. The NDDOC has directive authority and is designed to increase the speed and agility of support provided by national partners by implementing the RTF commander's intent through direct coordination.

(5) Civil Engineering Support Plan. USNORTHCOM provides oversight of the RTF's Civil Engineering support activities. Civil engineering activities consist of support related to recovery of the damaged weapon, support to forces in the field, and environmental remediation activities in conjunction with local, state, tribal and federal agencies. Construction activities are limited to

temporary construction necessary to recover the damaged weapon and provide for the IRF and RTF in the field.

(6) Environmental Support. USNORTHCOM provides coordination and support for all environmental planning and activities conducted by the RTF and owning service or base while the RTF is in command. USNORTHCOM maintains an informational perspective while remediation planning and execution are conducted (See Annex L Environmental).

(7) Sustainability Assessment. The RTF commander develops a sustainability assessment to ensure DOD's ability to maintain logistic support to all deployed nuclear weapons response forces through the duration of the operation.

(8) Security Assistance. See base plan, paragraph g. Legal Considerations.

(9) Logistics Automation for Deployment, Force Tracking, and Sustainment General Guidance. Components ensure in-transit visibility of deploying personnel, equipment, and cargo. Components capture, process and transmit shipment information in electronic format whenever feasible to maximize utilization of the Global Transportation Network and Joint Total Asset Visibility program.

b. Administration. Reporting requirements are tailored to the situation and vary depending on both the nature and scope of the DOD response.

5. Command and Control. See base plan and Annex J.

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Appendixes:
1 -- Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply – Not Used
2 -- Joint Substance, Food Service Support & Water Management – Not Used
3 -- Mortuary Affairs
4 -- Sustainability Analysis – Not Used
5 -- Mobility and Transportation – Not Used
6 -- Engineering Support Plan – Not Used
7 -- Non-nuclear Ammunition – Not Used

8 -- Logistics Automation – Not Used

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
MORTUARY AFFAIRS

References:
a. Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support in Joint Operations, 5 June 2006
b. Joint Publication 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint operations, 5 June 2006
c. Army Regulation 40-57, BUMEDINST 5360.26, AFR 160-99, Armed Forces Medical Examiner System, 2 January 1991
d. Department of the Army Pamphlet 638-2, Procedure for the Care and Disposition of Remains and Personal Effects, 22 December 2000
e. Department of the Army Pamphlet 638-XX (Draft), A Guide for Developing and Executing Installation Multiple-Casualty Event Plans
f. DOD Directive 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy, 3 February 2000
g. DOD Directive 5154.24, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, 03 October 2001
h. DOD Instruction 1300.18, Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures, 18 December 2000

1. General. Each of the military services is responsible for the care of remains of deceased members. This includes decontamination, if required. However, during Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations, the legal jurisdiction over deceased personnel rests with an appropriate local civilian authority, normally a medical examiner or coroner. If a National Defense Area is declared, then The Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) has jurisdiction for that particular area. Additionally, installation commanders and their parent service follows the appropriate service procedures for the handling of remains and casualty assistance.

2. Purpose, Scope, and Limitations. Depending on the severity, a nuclear weapons accident may generate a variety of mortuary affairs requirements. These requirements include, but are not limited to: coordination with the local medical examiner for mission requirement; protective measures for mortuary affairs personnel; coordination with explosive ordnance disposal personnel and structural engineering personnel for access to or through the site; coordination with the medical examiner and investigative authorities in regards to preserving evidence on the remains and personnel effects; liaison with public affairs personnel for interface with the press; and coordination with logistics representatives for refrigeration,

transportation, contracting, and decontamination of remains. The underlying principle is that the local medical examiner and primary agency determines the extent and type of support.

3. Mortuary Affairs Intelligence. The condition of remains and extent of contamination can best be assessed by the initial responders and the local medical examiner. Other subject matter experts such as the Center for Disease Control, Federal Emergency Management Agency and Chemical Center can provide intelligence. See USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500 Annex B for applicable engineering intelligence such as climatologic, terrain, hydrographic, and natural and industrial resources in the operational area.

4. Concept of Mortuary Affairs Support to Civil Authorities. The scope of mortuary affairs support focuses on integrating into the existing local, state, and federal mortuary affairs plans by providing search and recovery, tentative identification, and local transport of remains to designated locations for disposition. The primary agency has the assistance of Disaster Mortuary Response Teams (DMORT). DMORT has the ability to scale their response for the size of the incident and has considerable capability to store, identify, conduct forensic investigation, and prepare a large number of remains for burial. Mortuary affairs units are prepared to support decontamination of remains if augmented by decontamination assets.

5. Concept of Mortuary Affairs for Military Forces. The current DOD death and concurrent return program remains in effect as long as local conditions allow. Forces under operational control (OPCON) of USNORTHCOM have to coordinate with local authorities for release of military remains in civilian jurisdiction to the AFME or to the person authorized to direct disposition. An interment program is only implemented at the direction of CDRUSNORTHCOM.

6. Contaminated remains. Contaminated remains are not removed from the incident area until decontaminated. Most radiological contaminated remains can be decontaminated using exterior decontamination procedures in accordance with Joint Publication 4-06, Chapter 8. However, if remains are severely contaminated and continue to pose a health hazard to responders after an exterior contamination, then remains should be temporarily interred until they are determined to be safe.

6. Tasks. Joint Mortuary Affairs Officer (JMAO). Response Task Force OPCON to USNORTHCOM appoints a JMAO to coordinate DSCA and military mortuary affairs support.

7. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Temporary Interment. The authority to temporarily inter remains resides with the appropriate civilian authority at the incident site. The authority to temporarily inter military personnel resides with CDRUSNORTHCOM, in coordination with the local authorities or nearest military base commander.

b. Reporting. Report casualties of forces OPCON to USNORTHCOM in accordance with N-NC/J1 procedures.

c. Casualty Assistance. Casualty notification and family assistance is the responsibility of the appropriate service and installation commander.

d. Mortuary Affairs Standards. The military mortuary affairs missions are conducted with civilian guidance and monitored by civilian authority or law enforcement in charge. General procedures set forth in Joint Publication 4-06 should be followed and modified to comply with the civilian plan.

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ANNEX F TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

References: a. Joint Publication 3-61, "Public Affairs," 9 May 2005
b. "National Response Framework," Jan 2008
c. "National Incident Management System (NIMS)," 1 Mar 2004
d. DOD 3150.8-M, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," 22 Feb 2005
e. DOD 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance," 20 Dec 1993

1. Situation

a. General. This annex assigns responsibilities and provides guidance for military PA actions for responding to a nuclear weapon accident. (See Annex C for operational details.)

b. Enemy. Not Applicable/Not Used.

c. Friendly (See basic plan)

d. Policy. The DOD policy for US nuclear weapons accidents is to provide effective PA activities near the scene of the accident to expedite the flow of information to the public and the internal audience.

(1) Although it is routine DOD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or nuclear components at any specific location, exceptions exist when a DOD nuclear weapon accident occurs. The Initial Response Force (IRF)/Response Task Force (RTF) Commander will confirm the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. Notification of public authorities is required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon or its components.

(2) Statements confirming the presence of nuclear weapons should contain information about the possibility of injury from HE weapon components and/or potential radiation exposure. If injury or radiation exposure is unlikely, that should also be stated.

e. Assumptions

(1) The IRF/RTF Commander's PA element is prepared to handle the accident for the first 24 hours without augmentation.

(2) The respective Response Task Force will provide adequate PA augmentation to handle the accident.

(3) The National Response Framework (NRF) and ESF 15 may be utilized, placing DHS in charge of all public communication.

(4) Local, state and federal agencies will co-locate in a Joint Information Center (JIC).

2. Mission. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the DOD response and recovery for DOD nuclear weapon accidents within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area. USNORTHCOM Public Affairs will support the DOD response to nuclear weapon accidents involving DOD nuclear weapons by providing responsible and accurate information to the public while at the same time protecting the inadvertent release of classified information.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) The IRF/RTF Commander's PAO has the initial responsibility for conduct of the public affairs mission. PAOs should be dispatched to the accident location and a JIC should be established (The installation PA office may initially serve as the JIC until one can be established elsewhere).

(2) The Response Task Force will include adequate PAO augmentation to conduct extended public affairs operations.

(3) USNORTHCOM and DTRA will deploy PAOs as necessary to provide additional expertise.

(4) Mission success relies on maximum release of information about the accident and maximum media access to the accident.

b. Tasks

(1) Release Authority: The IRF/RTF Commander will make the initial release of information for a nuclear weapons accident. Subsequent release of

information will be through the JIC. Copies of all releases will be provided to USNORTHCOM PA.

(2) Reporting Requirements: The RTF will provide daily Situation Reports (Sitrep) to USNORTHCOM PA in accordance with the established battle rhythm. Sitrep will include a summary of PA actions along with clipping of articles published in the preceding 24 hours. If possible, provide transcripts or summaries of broadcast media reports. NIPR E-mail will be the preferred method of communication.

(3) Equipment: Deploying PAOs should be prepared to be self-sufficient. That is, they should deploy with appropriate portable computer equipment, cell phones, and digital photographic equipment (if available). Internet access should be available in all commercial billeting (hotels) and through the JIC. Deploying PAOs should be prepared to obtain commercial rental vehicles.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Command Relationships (See basic plan)

(2) Coordination of Release of Information. USNORTHCOMPA will keep OASD (PA) informed regarding release of information. USNORTHCOM PA will provide any additional guidelines (if necessary) to the RTF.

(3) Information Operations Coordination. Coordination between IO and PA will only be conducted at the USNORTHCOM level. Issues requiring IO & PA coordination at subordinate levels will be forwarded to USNORTHCOM for action.

4. Security Review. Although "information sharing" is key PAOs must exercise "security at the source," OPSEC will be considered throughout all phases of the operation. USNORTHCOM will conduct Security Policy review when necessary.

5. Arrangements for the Media: Since this accident occurs in the USNORTHCOM AOR, no special arrangements (messing, billeting, medical, transportation, communications, etc.), will be made available through government facilities or at government expense. If required, media will be credentialed by the JIC. Except on federal military installations or within National Defense Areas, DOD has no jurisdiction over where the media may go or what they may do. The JIC should establish a media center for the media to gather, file reports, and obtain information including regular media briefings.

6. Security of Operations and Personnel

a. Operations. Media will be granted maximum access to view and photograph response actions. Unless special arrangements are made to sanitize the area, the media will not be allowed access to areas where classified information or operations are present.

b. Personnel. It is the responsibility of the individual RTF Commander to plan for and ensure the security of personnel during nuclear weapon response operations.

7. Operations Security. PA will comply with OPSEC.

8. Audiovisual and Visual Information. The installation PAO is encouraged to use organic assets to document the operation. Combat camera assets should be considered and requested if necessary. Significant imagery should be forwarded to the Joint Combat Camera Center and USNORTHCOM PA. Imagery will be annotated as "cleared for public release" or "requires review."

9. Internal Information. As news releases and statements are issued to the media, they should also be disseminated to the internal audience. Commanders and technical experts may speak to response force and installation audiences in a "Town Meeting" format if circumstances warrant. An intranet website should be established, if possible, with a news and information page managed by the JIC.

10. Community Relations. Community Relations activities will be conducted in coordination with local, state and federal agencies involved in the operation.

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ANNEX H TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS

References: a. DOD 3150.8-M, 22 Feb 2005, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)."
b. DOD Directive 3150.8, "DOD Response to Radiological Accidents, 13 June 1996."

1. Situation

a. General. During operations, the impact of weather, to include adverse and/or unfavorable meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) conditions, must be factored into the conduct of operations. Accurate, timely, and reliable METOC information can provide the knowledge necessary to anticipate and exploit the best window of opportunity to plan, execute, respond to, support, and sustain a variety of responses.

b. Concept of Meteorological and Oceanographic Support. To provide guidance for meteorological and oceanographic support for nuclear weapon accident response by USNORTHCOM.

c. Weather Information Sources. The weather data sources for inputs to Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) modeling are the weather servers maintained by DTRA in Virginia and New Mexico. Data are available on the NIPRNET as well as the US-only SIPRNET.

d. Assumptions

(1) There has been a release of radiation or a potential/probability for release of radiation from the accident site.

(2) Weather reports and data will be made available from various DOD and other US Government sources. These sources will provide, in a timely manner, the weather data to create HPAC plots or other modeling and prediction tools.

e. Resource Availability.

(1) The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) DTRA's Hazard Prediction Assessment Capability (HPAC), provides fast access to real-time

weather data through the Meteorological Data Servers (MDS). This information is available via the DTRA Operations Center.

(2) Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration. (NNSA) DOE/NNSA's National Response Capability for real-time computer modeling is the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) program, which assesses events involving the release of hazardous radiological materials into the atmosphere. More information may be found at: http://narac.llnl.gov.

(3) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NOAA maintains state of the art weather monitoring, modeling, and forecasting capabilities. These resources can be called upon in the event of a nuclear weapon accident.

2. Mission. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the DOD response and recovery for DOD nuclear weapon accidents within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area. USNORTHCOM METOC Office will provide or arrange meteorological and oceanographic information and support, as necessary, for DOD nuclear weapon accident response in the USNORTHCOM-designated OPERATIONAL AREA.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) General. Local weather history, wind patterns, should be queried to determine the best location for response assets. Responders should use official national, state, and local government sources for this information.

(2) Timeliness. METOC operations are only effective when information is received in time to consider its impact within the decision-making cycle.

(3) Accuracy. Accurate and timely METOC information must be supplied in order to plan and direct operations. Inaccurate or late METOC data can undermine the successful execution of the accident response.

(4) Unity of Effort. METOC information should not be derived from a single source. A complete and integrated summary of METOC information from a variety of sites should be provided. Military forces, to include various headquarters and civil support teams, should coordinate with their servicing METOC office to ensure they obtain the most accurate and timely weather information.

b. Tasks and Responsibilities

(1) Commander, Initial Response Force. The IRF Commander will, with assistance from the Commander's METOC Officer or other METOC personnel arranged through the USNORTHCOM METOC Office:

(a) Research and analyze weather conditions to determine how they shall affect the response.

(b) Place air samplers upwind and downwind of the accident site.

(c) Receive and use modeling predictions, if previously requested from USNORTHCOM or DTRA.

(d) Provide incoming RTF Commander a transition briefing with relevant weather related information, to include:

1. Effect on recovery operations.

2. Discussion of downwind contamination and impact.

3. Forecast weather.

(2) Commander, Response Task Force. The RTF Commander will continue those responsibilities outlined for the IRF Commander. In addition, the RTF Commander will:

(a) Ensure additional equipment and supplies, such as cold weather or rain gear, are available for personnel to operate in the existing conditions. A list of relevant equipment is located in DOD 3150.8-M.

(b) Provide CDRUSNORTHCOM with continually updated hazard models.

(c) Maintain USNORTHCOM awareness of hazard modeling.

(3) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DTRA will provide:

(a) Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT). Provides weather data, hazard modeling capabilities and advise on courses of action.

(b) DTRA Operations Center. The DTRA Operations Center will provide reachback capabilities and hazard modeling expertise to the RTF Incident Commander. The hazard modeling will be identical to that available to

the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center. DTRA Operations Center will coordinate with DOE for Atmospheric Release Assessment Center (ARAC) modeling and DHS for Interagency Modeling Atmospheric and Assessment Center (IMAAC) modeling as necessary.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The National Military Command Center. The NMCC will serve as a clearinghouse for weather related information and equipment requests.

(2) The Services will ensure that IRF and RTF forces are trained and equipped in weather monitoring techniques relevant to the response.

(3) NC/J34 and N/J33N (CBRNE) provides the NORAD-USNORTHCOM's Command Center rapid HPAC hazard modeling support. NC/J34 and N/J33N (CBRNE) coordinate, through reachback, with DTRA for additional interagency modeling and survey results.

4. Administration and Logistics. Initial logistical support, to include initial radiation monitoring, will be provided by the IRF and nearest military installation. Sustaining logistics requirements beyond the capabilities of the IRF will be supported by designated base support installation (BSI). The entire resources of DOD and the Federal government are considered available to support requirements.

5. Command and Control. When DOD is the coordinating agency, the RTF Commander will coordinate weather related actions with the senior official from the DOE, as well as other Federal, state, local, and tribal officials as needed.

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ANNEX J TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

References: a. DOD Directive 3150.8, 13 Jun 1996, "Department of Defense Response to Radiological Accidents."
b. DOD 3150.8-M, 22 Feb 2005, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)."
c. "National Response Framework", Jan 2008
d. "National Incident Management System (NIMS)," 1 Mar 2004

General

a. Purpose. This annex details relationships between CDRUSNORTHCOM and the following:

(1) Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(2) Joint Staff (JS).

(3) Other Combatant Commanders.

(4) USNORTHCOM component commands.

(5) Response Task Force (RTF) Commanders.

(6) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

(7) Department of State (DOS).

(8) Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

(9) Department of Justice (DOJ).

(10) Department of Energy (DOE).

(11) National Military Command Center (NMCC)

(12) National Guard Bureau and the National Guards of the States and Territories

b. Scope

(1) Commander USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM) has the primary responsibility to direct and coordinate the Department of Defense (DOD) response actions for a nuclear weapon accident inside US Territory or territorial waters in the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area. Command relationships for CDRUSNORTHCOM directed operations are specified in this annex. Actions for these operations include controlling the accident scene, regaining custody of the nuclear weapon/asset (if necessary), ensuring contamination control, removing hazards, and reducing the health and safety risk to the public and response personnel.

(2) Response forces are not dedicated to CDRUSNORTHCOM for use prior to a nuclear weapon accident. In the event of a nuclear weapon accident in the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area, SecDef will direct assignment of forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM, conveyed by CJCS via the NMCC. CDRUSNORTHCOM will have operational control (OPCON) of provided forces during the DOD nuclear weapon accident response.

2. Command Lines

a. Services.

(1) Each of the Services has responsibility for equipping, administering, and supporting forces assigned and allocated to CDRUSNORTHCOM except as otherwise directed by the SecDef. Service component commanders communicate directly with their Service Chief on Service related matters. The operating details of service logistic support systems will be retained and exercised by the Service Commander per departmental instructions. CJCS is delegated authority from the SecDef to initiate nuclear weapons accident response, including the deployment of the Initial Response Force (IRF) and the RTF. CJCS exercises this authority through the NMCC. In the event of a nuclear weapon accident, when directed by the NMCC, Commanders of designated Service component commands will be prepared to deploy a Response Task Force (RTF).

(2) Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. In the event of a nuclear weapon accident, Commander, Air Combat Command (ACC) or Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) (as designated) will deploy an RTF upon receipt of direction from NMCC through the Air Force Operations Center. CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of the designated RTF when the RTF Commander relieves the IRF Commander and reports ready to assume duties as Incident Commander (IC). The RTF will be operationally controlled by CDRUSNORTHCOM until released sometime after weapons recovery.

(a) Commander, ACC provides RTF-CONUS, Langley AFB, VA. This RTF will principally respond to nuclear weapon accidents involving weapons in US Air Force custody, to include US Air Force Storage locations, except for weapons controlled by AFSPC units.

(b) Commander, AFSPC provides RTF-ICBM, Peterson AFB, CO. This RTF will principally respond to nuclear weapon accidents involving ICBM weapons in US Air Force custody at Air Force Space Command units.

(c) At US Air Force Units where ACC and AFSPC both have nuclear assets, it is expected that the ACC RTF will respond to accidents involving ACC-controlled nuclear weapons and AFSPC will respond to accidents involving AFSPC-controlled nuclear weapons.

(3) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In the event of a nuclear weapon accident, Commander, U S Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) will deploy an RTF upon receipt of direction from NMCC through Navy Operations Center. CDRUSNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of the designated RTF when the RTF Commander relieves the IRF Commander and reports ready to assume duties as IC. The RTF will be operationally controlled by CDRUSNORTHCOM until released sometime after weapons recovery.

(a) Commander, CFFC provides Navy RTF – EAST, Jacksonville, FL. This RTF will principally respond to nuclear weapon accidents involving weapons in custody of US Navy units east of the Mississippi River.

(b) Commander, CFFC provides Navy RTF – WEST, Bangor, WA. This RTF will principally respond to nuclear weapon accidents involving weapons in custody of US Navy units west of the Mississippi River.

b. Other Subordinate Commands. At the direction of the SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will assume OPCON of provided forces during the nuclear weapon accident response. Administrative control of the forces will remain with their headquarters and respective services. USNORTHCOM Requests for Forces (RFF) during a nuclear weapon accident are made through the Joint Staff. Upon arrival at the accident site, these forces will report to CDRUSNORTHCOM, and the RTF Commander. See Appendix 1.

3. Support and Coordination Relationships

a. Supporting Military Forces. The following U.S. commands provide support to CDRUSNORTHCOM in the event of a nuclear weapon accident.

(1) Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM). CDRUSJFCOM provides forces at the direction of the SecDef through the NMCC.

(2) Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM). CDRUSTRANSCOM provides strategic movement of forces at the direction of the SecDef through the NMCC.

b. Department of Defense (DOD) Supporting Agencies. For specific responsibilities see Basic Plan and DOD 3150.8-M (Ref. b).

(1) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

(2) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

(3) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

(4) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

(5) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

c. Non-DOD Supporting/Cooperating Organizations. The RTF Commander will forward requests for non-DOD support to CDRUSNORTHCOM. CDRUSNORTHCOM will request support as required through the OSD/NMCC. For specific responsibilities and capabilities see the basic plan, DOD 3150.8-M, the NRF, and Annex V.

(1) Department of Energy (DOE)

(2) Department of State (DOS)

(3) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG))

(4) Department of Justice (DOJ) (Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI))

(5) Department of Transportation (DOT)

(6) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

d. National Guard Bureau and the National Guards of the States and Territories.

(1) NGB acts as the channel of communications between the Secretaries and Chiefs of the Army and the Air Force and the states on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, both Army and Air.

(2) On behalf of the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, the NGB provides situational awareness to USNORTHCOM, by coordinating with the National Guards of the states, territories, and the District of Columbia to ensure that Services and Combatant Commands have visibility on the plans and activities of the National Guard performing missions in a non-Title 10 status.

(3) USNORTHCOM will foster coordination with the NGB and leverage the NGB's capability to facilitate situational awareness, planning, and execution of military support within the States/Territories.

(4) The NGB will advise USNORTHCOM regarding National Guard capabilities and activities that may impact USNORTHCOM mission areas; and assist USNORTHCOM with planning and coordination of multi-state, regional, or national scale military operations involving employment of National Guard capabilities.

(5) Although USNORTHCOM will not have command and control over National Guard forces if they are operating in a state status (*i.e.* Title 32 or State Active Duty), USNORTHCOM should coordinate with the states and NGB to ensure deconfliction of missions and unity of effort.

4. Planning Relationships. USPACOM, USJFCOM, USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USSTRATCOM exchange and coordinate necessary information directly with USNORTHCOM and supporting commands during planning and deployment phases.

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Appendix
1 -- Command Relationships Diagram – See Annex C, Figures C-1 and C-2

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ANNEX K TO NC CONPLAN 3505-08
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS (C4)

References:

a. Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy, 22 May 98

b. Unified Command Plan 06, 5 May 06

c. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006

d. Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, 17 March 2006

e. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006

f. Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 5 June 2003

g. Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 23 March 2004

h. Joint Publication 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, 8 August 2006

i. Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System, 20 March 2006"

j. CJCSI 3110.10C, Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 10 Oct 02

k. CJCSM 3115.01a, Joint Data Networking (JDN) Operations, 1 September 04

l. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 9230.1-PL, Federal Response Plan, with Terrorism Incident Annex, April 1999

m. USNORTHCOM Communications Extension Standards Guidance and Telecommunications Rules of Engagement, 27 July 2006

1. Situation.

a. Enemy. See Base Plan.

b. Friendly. Department of Defense (DOD) resources must be capable of establishing critical voice and data communications directly through their chain of command with USNORTHCOM, the Principal Federal Agencies, other Supporting Agencies, civil authorities, and other supporting forces to effectively manage the situation. As supported commander for HD, CDR USNORTHCOM will have operational lead for NetOps. This mission will be executed through a designated service lead and supported by the Commander, US Strategic

Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). Mission partners include agencies and organizations within and beyond the DOD.

(1) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Approves requirements for and identifies sources of tactical and gateway communications-electronics assets requested by USNORTHCOM.

(2) Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). Provides satellite communications (SATCOM) support as required. As the DOD Executive Agent for computer network operations (CNO), supports CDRNORTHCOM in executing NetOps within the AOR.

(3) Supporting Combatant Commands/Military Services/Agencies. Support CDRNORTHCOM when directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(4) The National Communications System (NCS). If a natural disaster, terrorist incident, or accident involving hazardous materials occurs, the NCC will have the most current status of the commercial telecommunications infrastructure and capabilities in the incident area. The NCC can be contacted at (703) 607-4950, DSN 327-4950, unclassified email ncs@ncs.gov.

(5) Defense Information System Agency (DISA).

(a) Provides use of existing GIG and DISN assets to meet operational requirements of USNORTHCOM.

(b) Provides primary and alternate routing of DISN services for command and control (C2) elements supporting USNORTHCOM. This support includes use of alternate entry stations and facilities on short notice to restore connectivity in the event of failures of primary stations or facilities.

(c) Provides provisioning and restoral coordination for DISA leased commercial communications service.

(6) U.S. Coast Guard will provide communications support as directed.

(7) The National Guard Bureau (NGB) provides C4 support as directed.

(8) Canada Command. Canada COM will be the normal point of liaison for coordinating communications support from Canada.

c. Assumptions

(1) Sufficient funds will be available for extending C4 services.

(2) Sufficient SATCOM resources and assets will be made available.

(3) Required communications facilities and circuits will be available.

(4) Intra-theater transportation support for deploying highest priority communications resources will be available and limited.

(5) A large percentage of the JOA infrastructure could be destroyed or degraded, to include commercial power systems and grids. A robust tactical communications architecture may be required to counter these outages.

(6) National Security Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) may be invoked for the AOR.

(7) DOD systems and networks will have the ability to react to a catastrophic event, and provide critical voice and data capabilities to support essential civil authorities operations.

2. Mission. USNORTHCOM will plan, install, operate, and maintain C4 systems in support of the USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505 mission.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Network Connectivity Requirements. Support for the baseline C4 systems and other essential communication capabilities requires planning for connectivity to DISN services to provide secure and non-secure voice, secure and non-secure data, e-mail, file transfer, and VTC services.

(2) Essential communications with the intergovernmental organizations will continue to evolve as requirements are defined and as the situation dictates. The designated C2 HQ will ensure coordination with intergovernmental participants for implementation of critical links in support of communications and information flow.

(3) The Information Synchronization Group (ISG) synchronizes the mission and function of the cyberspace domain and provides decision makers and mission partners with relevant, accurate, and timely information in order to achieve decisive levels of shared and accessible knowledge.

b. Tasks.

(1) USNORTHCOM/J6

(a) Oversee and monitor networks in support of USNORTHCOM. Set policies and provide guidance to ensure C4 equipment interoperability, compatibility and integration between USNORTHCOM, Service Components and other supporting commands and agencies. Coordinate with other agencies and mission partners as required for communications support.

(b) Establish a Theater NetOps Contol Center (TNCC) to oversee and monitor JTF Joint NetOps Control Centers (JNCC).

(c) Establish a Joint Frequency Management Office North (JFMO NORTH) with the overall responsibility for spectrum management control for Joint Operations within the JOA/AOR

(d) Coordinate use of joint keying materials.

(e) Release a COMSEC Call Out message to all supporting units.

(f) Request, coordinate, and validate the interfaces (protocols, standards, etc.) between commercial and fixed communications systems.

(g) Develop, promulgate, and update a JCEOI IAW Appendix 5, Tab B.

(h) Identify, review, validate, assess and obtain SATCOM services.

(i) Develop and validate C4 CIP issues within the JOA.

(j) Identify, validate, and prioritize STEP support for USNORTHCOM.

(j) Coordinate with USJFCOM for C4 support to supporting units.

(l) Coordinate with NCS to provide National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) requested by CDRNORTHCOM.

(m) Manage and maintain the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) supporting the USNORTHCOM Common Operational Picture (COP).

(2) USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office (DISA-North)

(a) Provide a liaison to the HQ USNORTHCOM organizations, JTFs, and Battle Staff Cells when mutually coordinated or agreed upon.

(b) Provide interface with HQ DISA to leverage DISA support.

(c) In conjunction with NCS coordinate NSEP actions.

(d) Assist USNORTHCOM planners in identifying DISA provided communications capabilities during Course of Action (COA) development.

(3) National Security Agency (NSA)

(a) Provides COMSEC materials system (CMS) support as required.

(b) Provides cryptographic support as required.

(4) Army Forces North (ARNORTH); Air Force North (AFNORTH); Marine Corps Forces North (MARFORNORTH); U. S. Fleet Forces Command (FFC), Joint Task Force -Civil Support (JTF-CS); JTF-North (JTF-N); Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region (JFHQ-NCR), JTF–Alaska (JTF-AK)

(a) Provide C4 personnel and equipment support for JTF HQ.

(b) When designated, nominate and provide a JTF/J6.

(c) Be prepared to establish JTF C4 nodes.

(d) Be prepared to establish a JNCC in support of this plan. JNCC will be responsible for overall network management of the deployed C4 systems for the JTF and its subordinates. JNCC will also be responsible to provide a "Help Desk" as the single POC for all network computer and phone problems.

(e) Provide a C4 planning team for the deployed JTF JNCC.

(f) Identify C4 requirements to USNORTHCOM J6 to include JCSE or SATCOM access support. Include C4 locations within the JOA that should be assessed for additional CIP support or protection.

(g) Plan communications interoperability procedures for operations with USNORTHCOM Service Components, support elements, and civil agencies.

(h) Be prepared to provide C4 support for follow-on units.

(i) Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM J6 TNCC who will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

(j) Maintain C4 equipment to support the DCO/DCE.

(k) Submit reports in accordance with Tab G to Appendix 6.

(l) Provide unit and track data to the USNORTHCOM COP.

(5) AFNORTH will facilitate the implementation of Full Motion Video (FMV) to assist in critical intelligence and reconnaissance missions.

(6) Commander, USJFCOM. Upon CJCS approval, support, as available. Advise USNORTHCOM J6 of any limitations or shortfalls.

c. Special Measures

(1) Any Commander imposing MINIMIZE within the USNORTHCOM AOR will coordinate with USNORTHCOM/J6.

(2) Requests for deployed routing indicators (RI) and plain language addressees (PLA) or Defense Messaging System (DMS) support will be forwarded via chain of command, to USNORTHCOM/J6.

(3) IA and Information Systems Security for a specific contingency management operation will be addressed by USNORTHCOM/J6 or the JTF Information Manager (IM), in the appropriate Orders (EXORD, DEPORDs, etc.).

(4) Information Conditions (INFOCON) within the USNORTHCOM AOR will be declared by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(5) Commanders of supporting forces will identify personnel and equipment shortfalls limiting support of this plan to USNORTHCOM/J6.

(6) Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM/J6 TNCC.

(7) Data within the DOD enterprise network must be protected in accordance with its classification and mission criticality. (See Appendix 1).

(8) Service and country TEMPEST standards will be followed.

(9) USNORTHCOM TNCC provides 24/7 coordination, oversight, defense and situational awareness of USNORTHCOM NetOps resources.

(10) Existing communications infrastructure will be used to the maximum extent possible. (See Appendix 6).

(11) The JFMO NORTH will support USNORTHCOM and assigned units to coordinate approval for use of required military radio frequencies and those required for interoperability with civil authorities. (See Appendix 5).

(12) C4 plans include support among coalition forces. Coalition C4 links should be used in accordance with Host Nation agreements.

(13) Joint communications procedures will be employed unless otherwise directed. Joint procedures will supercede individual service doctrine.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Logistics. Refer to Annex D.

(1) USNORTHCOM components and agencies will fund their costs incurred as a result of this operation to include all pre-deployment costs and ongoing costs of transportation support to and from the USNORTHCOM JOA. Component commands will track costs and report costs to their comptrollers.

(2) Maintenance and logistic support of communications resources tasked to support joint requirements will be the responsibility of supporting services unless other arrangements are made through prior coordination.

b. Administration

(1) The USNORTHCOM classified portal can be accessed directly via the SIPRNET at https://operations.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/. The unclassified portal can be accessed at http://operations.noradnorthcom.mil.

(2) Reporting requirements will be as directed by the USNORTHCOM EXORD or DEPORD.

5. Command and Control

a. Command Relationships. Refer to Annex J for command relationships.

b. C4 Systems. Refer to the appendices for C4 requirements.

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Commander, USNORTHCOM

Appendices
1 - Information Assurance
2 - Satellite Communications Planning
3 - Defense Courier Service
4 - Foreign Data Exchange
5 - Frequency Spectrum Planning
6 - Command, Control, Communications and Computer Planning

OFFICIAL



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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA)

References:

a. DOD Directive 5200.28, *Security Requirements for Automated Information Systems (AISs)*, 21 March 1988

b. DOD Directive 8500.01, *Information Assurance*, 24 October 2002

c. DOD Instruction 8500.02, *Information Assurance Implementation*, 6 February 2003

d. DOD Directive O-8530.1, *Computer Network Defense*, 8 January 2001

e. DOD Instruction O-8530.2, *Support to Computer Network Defense*, 9 March 2001

f. *Interim DOD Certification and Accreditation Process Guidance*, 6 Jul 06

g. NSA Information Assurance Technical Framework Forum, *Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF)*, Release 3.1, September 2002

h. NSTISSI No. 4013, *National Information Assurance Training Standard for System Administrators (SA)*, March 2004

i. CJCSI 3210.01B, *Information Operations Policy*, 5 January 2007

j. CJCSI 6510.01D, *Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense*, 15 June 2004

k. CJCSM 6510.01, *Defense-in-Depth: Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense*, 14 Aug 2006

l. Joint Pub 3-13, *Information Operations*, 13 February 2006

m. Deputy SecDef Memorandum, *DOD Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA)*, 30 December 99

1. Situation.

a. General. Advanced information systems technology today represents the cutting edge in many of our weapons, sensors, and C4 systems. This advanced technology is also a threat to military systems due to the availability of inexpensive attack alternatives to our adversaries. Adversaries have an array of attack options available including Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and other Offensive Information Operations (OIO) options. For these reasons, a coordinated and structured strategy must be employed to defend against adversarial attacks on DOD computers and computer networks of the Global Information Grid (GIG).

b. Enemy. We can expect the enemy to possess or acquire the capability to launch CNA against USNORTHCOM networks from almost anywhere in the world. These attacks may be conducted over a variety of transmission mechanisms disguised as harmless traffic but are intended to disrupt, delay or prevent information exchange and disrupt military operations. These attacks could prove extremely harmful during operations supporting a nuclear weapons accident recovery. If there appears to be unusual events happening on the network, contact the USNORTHCOM TNCC.

c. Friendly. All organizations are involved in protecting communications networks. USSTRATCOM via Joint Task Force-Global Net Ops (JTF-GNO) is responsible for processing and disseminating IA Vulnerability Alerts (IAVAs)/IA Vulnerability Bulletins (IAVBs) which include implementing instructions.

2. Mission. Protect information by ensuring systems availability, integrity and confidentiality, and detecting, reporting, and recovering from incidents.

3. Execution. USNORTHCOM shall incorporate both technical and non-technical means to employ multiple protections within information systems and their supporting networks to establish and maintain a strong IA posture.

a. Concept of Operations. The USNORTHCOM Computer Network Defense (CND) strategy employs people, technology and operations to provide a defense-in-depth structure of DOD networks.

(1) Networks must be protected against unauthorized access and denial of service attacks to the maximum extent possible.

(2) DOD systems and networks must have the ability to react to a catastrophic event and restore critical capabilities to support operations

b. Tasks. All USNORTHCOM functional components and assigned forces will develop and implement a CND program. USNORTHCOM subordinate elements and staff must accomplish the tasks listed below.

(1) Ensure all computer networks are reinforced with access control and strong identification and authentication measures within the system or network management components.

(2) Enforce the need-to-know principle for access to computer networks and specific types of information (e.g., intelligence, proprietary).

(3) Ensure network enclaves are protected by intrusion detection systems and firewalls.

(4) Ensure networks are protected by DOD licensed anti-virus software.

(5) Ensure classified or sensitive information transmitted between networks over a non-secure medium is encrypted or travels through an approved, protected distribution system.

(6) Provide for an IA monitoring and analysis capability that includes review of audit, firewall and intrusion detection logs.

(7) Ensure Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) are developed and tested for all mission critical and support systems.

(8) Ensure electronic transaction data integrity and authentication are enhanced using appropriate combinations of digital signature, keyed hash and encryption mechanisms, whenever possible.

(9) Ensure systems are deployed and implemented as outlined in the accreditation package approved by the Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA).

(10) Ensure all personnel who use, operate, administer, or maintain DOD computers and computer networks receive CND and IA awareness training. Ensure all system administrators are certified in accordance with DOD skill qualifications and training level requirements.

(11) Ensure all systems comply with DOD, USNORTHCOM, and service COMSEC instructions and regulations.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Local units tasked to provide COMSEC service will support requests from operational elements for keying material required to support operations.

b. Ensure anti-virus software, enterprise security management software, etc. required to protect USNORTHCOM information systems is implemented.

c. Operational Units will identify their COMSEC requirements early to the "base or facility COMSEC service" to ensure the COMSEC material is on hand.

5. Command and Control. Report all possible compromises of COMSEC keys to the unit COMSEC Custodian.

Tabs

A – Information Security (INFOSEC)
B – Theater COMSEC Management
C – Cryptographic Instructions

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
INFORMATION SECURITY (INFOSEC)

References:

a. DOD Directive 8523, *Communications Security (COMSEC),* Draft (C)

b. DOD Directive 4640.6, *Communication Security Telephone Monitoring & Receiving*, 26 June 81

c. DOD Instruction 8500.02, "Information Assurance (IA) Implementation", 6 February 2003

d. DOD Directive 8570.1, Information Assurance Training, Certification And Workforce Management, 7 Jul 2004

e. CJCSI 3210.01B, Joint Information Operations Policy, 5 Jan 07f. DOD Directive 8500.01, "Information Assurance (IA)", 24 October 2002

f. Interim DOD Certification and Accreditation Process Guidance, 6 July 2006

g. NAG 16, *Field Generation & Over-the-Air Distribution of COMSEC Key in Support of Tactical Operations and Exercises*, January 1999

h. NTISSD 600, *Communication Security Monitoring*, 10 April 1990 (FOUO)

1. Purpose. This tab establishes USNORTHCOM's Information Security procedures to ensure the defense of DOD information and information systems that Combatant Commanders, Services, and agencies rely on to conduct operations. It includes processes and procedures necessary to achieve a secure information environment in which unauthorized elements are denied access. It includes the responsibilities, concepts and procedures of Information Security (INFOSEC), including COMSEC and Computer Security (COMPUSEC).

2. General. INFOSEC is critical to the successful execution of US military operations. The provisions of this tab apply to all who use USNORTHCOM computers and networks in the performance of their duties. The objective of this tab is to provide for transmission security, cryptographic security, and the physical security necessary to support INFOSEC and ultimately CND.

a. Training.

(1) The Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA), Information Assurance Manager (IAM), Information Assurance Officer (IAO), System Administrators, Information Assurance Professionals, JTF-C2 Protect Officer, and others

assigned Automated Information system (AIS) and computer network security responsibilities must be properly trained in security principles per reference d to ensure the program is properly administered.

(2) Personnel with access to USNORTHCOM computer networks will be familiar with the USNORTHCOM Information Assurance Awareness Program.

b. Certification & Accreditation.

(1) Information and processes must be protected to ensure a level of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability exist and ensure NORAD-USNORTHCOM operations are not disrupted.

(2) All information systems to, include stand-alone personal computers, connected systems, and networks must be accredited IAW the DOD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Program (DIACAP).

3. Execution.

a. Concept of COMSEC Support. Detailed in Tab B of this Appendix.

b. Concept of COMPUSEC. Fundamental COMPUSEC safeguards shall be enforced to limit access to authorized persons, assure data integrity and provide for continuity of operations.

4. Administration and Logistics. Units are required to protect their information and information systems IAW written policy and procedures.

5. Physical Security. Units are required to protect their information and information systems IAW written policy and procedures commensurate to the highest classification of information processed.

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K SUPPORTING NORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
THEATER COMSEC MANAGEMENT

References:

a. DOD Directive 8523, *Communications Security (COMSEC),* Draft (C)

b. DOD Directive 4640.6, Communication Security Telephone Monitoring & Receiving, 26 June 81

c. NTISSD 600, Communication Security Monitoring, 10 April 90 (FOUO)

d. CNSSI 7000, TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities, May 04 (Conf)

1. Purpose. Establishes the INFOSEC/COMSEC procedures to attain a secure communications-electronics (C-E) environment in which hostile elements are denied interception, intrusion, imitative deception, extraction, and analysis of essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). Additional procedures will be approved by the NC/J6 COMSEC office prior to implementation.

2. General. These provisions apply to all who use secure USNORTHCOM C4 systems in the performance of their duties.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of COMSEC Support Operations. Achieve maximum protection against hostile interception and analysis of communications by:

(1) Minimum use of non-secure systems.

(2) Complying with established red and black installation standards.

(3) Separating classified and unclassified systems to minimize acoustical and electromagnetic coupling that could result in inadvertent transmission of classified information beyond established physical control zones.

(4) Bulk encrypting transmissions to reduce interception vulnerability.

(5) Establishing procedures to reduce electro-magnetic emissions (reduce transmitter power, directional antennas, eliminate unnecessary transmissions, etc.)

(6) Practice and train in electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).

(7) Establishing a Joint Theater COMSEC Management Office with a primary mission to provide centralized control of the distribution of COMSEC key materials in the AOR supporting NORAD-USNORTHCOM operations.

(8) Links to coalition elements must be secured by U.S.-based COMSEC. Releasing COMSEC to a coalition partner requires prior NSA approval and use of special-purpose cryptographic devices. Until release approval is received or where no releasable devices are available, U.S. TSEC-nomenclature COMSEC may be used at a coalition location if it is under continuous, positive control of U.S. personnel. Foreign nationals cannot view COMSEC rekeying activities. During periods of non-U.S. presence, the U.S. COMSEC equipment will be zeroized, removed, and securely stored in locations under U.S. control.

(9) USNORTHCOM COMSEC Management Office is the DOD POC for COMSEC management. USNORTHCOM J6 provides overall policy guidance.

b. Tasks.

(1) Commanders will ensure appropriate joint, Service component, and unit-unique cryptographic codes and authenticators are issued from unit accounts to support operations.

(2) Responsible personnel will continuously account for and provide physical security of all classified C4 equipment, materials, and directives.

(3) Responsible personnel will maintain continuous accountability of all COMSEC material according to prescribed service directives.

(4) Commanders ensure custodians are trained on the Electronic Key Management System (EKMS). This will be the primary means for distributing keying materials in the AOR.

(5) Only approved storage facilities will be used for COMSEC material.

(6) COMSEC materials will be destroyed IAW Service procedures.

(7) Commanders will ensure unit personnel are briefed on the following:

(a) Proper COMSEC procedures.

(b) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

(c) Proper use of call signs, crypto codes, and authentication systems.

(d) Techniques and countermeasures to use when confronted with communications deception and jamming.

(8) The Joint COMSEC Management Office Intertheater COMSEC Package (ICP) will be used to support joint secure communications connectivity, other specific circuits and interoperability. USNORTHCOM will issue COCOM level COMSEC Call Out messages providing additional specific guidance as needed in coordination with supported and supporting Combatant Commanders. USNORTHCOM AOR-specific COMSEC will be distributed in-theater from the JTCMO to the units, when directed.

(9) Component headquarters will ensure units requisition listed materials, based on required connectivity, from Service cryptologic depots in advance of deployment. Deploying units will take all assigned/on-hand joint, Service, and unit-unique material. The basic deployment load for ICP and non-ICP material is current one (1) month plus three (3) reserve editions/months. Refer problems encountered in obtaining keying material for joint requirements to USNORTHCOM/J6 for resolution.

(10) To order required cryptographic material, one-time holders of ICP material will submit requests, through Service channels, to the Joint COMSEC Management Office (JCMO) ICP manager, and info USNORTHCOM/J6.

(11) Requests for cryptographic period freezes or extensions associated with AOR contingency operations will be considered on a case-by-case basis for nets secured by ICP or USNORTHCOM short titles prescribed for joint and/or combined interoperability. Requested or proposed freeze of ICP will be IAW applicable JCMO ICP Policy, while freeze of USNORTHCOM controlled short titles will be at the direction of the USNORTHCOM/J6.

(12) COMSEC incidents (cryptographic losses/violations, physical/personnel insecurities, etc.), to include those concerning ICP material, will be reported by immediate message, to USNORTHCOM //TNCC/TCMO// and the controlling authority of the keymat involved (for ICP material: JCMO MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL//) with info copies to Service authorities and cryptologic agencies.

(13) Release a COMSEC Call Out message to all Services, Service Components and potential units.

(14) USNORTHCOM makes decisions for emergency supercession of USNORTHCOM controlled keying material.

c. Training. All organizations are required to have trained COMSEC personnel IAW written policy and procedures.

d. Coordinating Instructions. Holders of COMSEC material will follow service directives to maintain continuous accountability.

4. Administration and Logistics. Administer COMSEC programs IAW written policy and procedures.

a. Cryptographic Security. Only those codes, ciphers, or authentication systems provided by approved production agencies will be used for USNORTHCOM operations.

b. COMSEC Assistance to Foreign Governments and Military Organizations.

(1) Foreign COMSEC release is governed by CJCSI 6510.06. and NSTISSP No. 8

(2) (U/FOUO) Providing COMSEC assistance and information relating to cryptographic materials to foreign states is extremely sensitive, and will be authorized on a case by case basis by USNORTHCOM. Information concerning specific releases to specific foreign states is classified SECRET until approved. Once approved, this information is releasable to the state concerned.

(3) (U/FOUO) A request for COMSEC release to a foreign state must be based on a U.S. interoperability requirement. The justification for release is normally best articulated by the USNORTHCOM Service component having the interoperability requirement. The fact that a foreign state requires or desires U.S. COMSEC is not a basis for a release approval.

(4) Requests for COMSEC release should be forwarded, with justification and all information required by CJCSI 6510.01, to USNORTHCOM J6.

(5) Requests for keying material for foreign forces will be initiated by the supported U.S. Command.

c. Physical Security. Units are required to administer their COMSEC programs IAW written policy and procedures.

(1) Formal cryptographic access will be granted based upon national/Service regulations or instructions.

(2) Personnel assigned to guard vehicles, ships, or aircraft which contain cryptographic equipment do not require clearance or formal cryptographic access. Personnel assigned to operate equipment and who do not have access to keying material do not require formal cryptographic access.

(3) COMSEC equipment may be used in the immediate presence of non-U.S. personnel. Non-U.S. personnel should not be allowed to examine keying material, support documents, or the equipment interior. Non-U.S. personnel will not be used as couriers for keying material.

(4) Over-the-Air Transmission/Re-keying will only be done in emergency situations and precautions will be taken to reduce the chances of compromise of keying materials.

(5) Follow TEMPEST guidelines as outlined in CNSSI No. 7000 Annex A.

5. Command and Control.

a. Positive Actions.

(1) When using non-secured telephone or radio communications:

(a) Maintain strict communications discipline.

(b) Restrict number and length of telephone call/radio transmissions.

(c) Maximize use of approved operations codes and authentication systems. Called station initiates challenge when authentication is mandatory.

(d) Using available automanual systems, encode or encrypt all sensitive or classified information for transmission.

(e) Review crypto instructions of automanual cipher systems.

(f) Advise personnel of open circuit or uncradled phones to prevent acoustical coupling of background conversations over non-secure paths.

(2) Use secured communications links:

(a) To pass EEFIs and sensitive or classified information.

(b) To pass actual or suspected COMSEC violations.

(c) To provide the required physical and personnel security for cryptographic equipment and materials.

(3) Transmission of sensitive but unclassified information will be encoded or encrypted when it:

(a) Reveals tactical training or the readiness or efficiency of units.

(b) Contains information regarding identity, location, movement, or changes in strength of units.

(c) Reveals changes in unit organization or mission.

(d) Reveals the introduction of equipment which changes capabilities.

(e) Discloses shortages or deficiencies impairing unit readiness.

(f) Reveals actions which indicate operational intent or activity.

(g) Reveals the classification of a classified operation or program.

b. Prohibited Actions.

(1) Do not discuss classified information or EEFI over nonsecured communications means or attempt to "talk around the subject."

(2) Do not use "homemade" call signs, code, cipher, or authentication systems or make modifications to approved cryptographic systems.

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TAB C OF APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
CRYPTOGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS

Reference:

a. NSTISSI-4003, *Reporting and Evaluating COMSEC Incidents*, Current Edition, 2 Dec 91 (FOUO)

1. Purpose. To prescribe COMSEC software, authentication systems and tables, and operation codes for use in interfacing USNORTHCOM with higher HQs, component/supporting HQs, and allied or host-nation forces, as required.

2. General.

a. ICP will be used to secure links between CFC and component HQ during deployment/employment phase, or until directed to transition to USNORTHCOM controlled, AOR-specific COMSEC material by the NC/J6.

b. Components will use the ICP, until otherwise directed by NC/J6, to secure lateral connectivity with other components or for cross-attachment of forces from other Services.

c. Components will provide for intra-Service/component-downward COMSEC netting requirements for establishing COMSEC netting with subordinate forces to ensure availability of sufficient secure interconnectivity.

3. Execution.

a. Component HQ will ensure that units requisition only required listed joint materials from service cryptologic depots before deployment IAW JCMO ICP validation procedures. Basic deployment load is current month plus three months editions reserve. Material will accompany deploying units. Follow-on resupply is the responsibility of components.

b. CFC will promulgate RADAY keying material change (HJ) times and effective edition status for operational use of CFC-managed networks.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING

References:

a. CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite Communications, 30 April 07
b. Strategic Command Instruction (SI) 714-4 (final draft), 2 Aug 2007 and SI 714 Series
c. *The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations*, 25 August 2006 (S)
d. CJCSI 3320.02A, *Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution Program (JSIR),* 20 January 2006
e. US Joint Forces Command, Global Broadcast Service Information Guide , 28 February 2003
f. *DISA CIRCULAR 800-A110-1* APRIL1995 (S),
g. *CJCSI 6251.01*, 21APR2003 (S),
h. (FOUO) *USNORTHCOM Communications extension, Standards Guidance and Telecommunications Rules of Engagement* (FOUO), Section 6.1.6, 27 July 2006

1. Situation.

a. General. Satellite planning and execution under this plan will be accomplished in accordance with reference (a). Satellite requirements identified during deliberate planning processes must be prioritized according to mission criticality in consideration of on-going assigned and operational missions using narrowband, wideband, protected, Government-augmented, and commercial resources in support of NORAD and USNORTHCOM.

b. Threat. Units deploying in the NORAD-USNORTHCOM AOR must recognize that C4 systems are vulnerable to frequency interference, deception, and possible physical and virtual attack.

2. Satellite Resources.

a. MILSATCOM and Commercial SATCOM resources are managed differently within the various spectrums (UHF, SHF, EHF, government augmented, and commercial). Satellite resources are subject to change based

on real-world events. Current operational situations may require immediate reassignment of SATCOM resources as priorities dictate.

b. NORAD-USNORTHCOM manages those UHF/SHF/EHF satellite resources apportioned by Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS/J6Z) to NORAD-USNORTHCOM. Users acquire a Satellite Database (SDB) number or an SDB waiver from the Joint Staff J6. UHF service requests are prioritized based upon the SDB and the actual mission. A Satellite Access Request (SAR) and or a Gateway Access Request (GAR) is then prepared and forwarded to the J635 NORAD USNORTHCOM SATCOM-OMB for assessment and validation. The J635 validates and forwards the request to the Global SATCOM Support Center (GSSC). The GSSC assigns satellite resources for mission execution and issues a Satellite Access Authorization (SAA). Upon mission completion, users forward After Action Reports (AARs) to the J635 and the GSSC. Joint Staff approved SAR/GAR/GMRS templates are posted on the GSSC homepage.

3. Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Resources. Guidance and direction for UHF SATCOM use during USNORTHCOM exercises and operations

a. UHF Voice Nets.

(1) Homeland Defense Net (HD Net). Used to maintain positive control of forces being deployed to secure critical infrastructure identified by Commander, USNORTHCOM. JFLCC is the Net Control and can delegate net control to a subordinate. QRFs and RRFs are the expected users of this net as directed by JFLCC. Units deploying for this mission will resource their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.

(2) Defense Support to Civil Authorities Net (DSCA Net). Used to maintain positive control of forces being employed to assist civil authorities in consequence management as directed by Commander, USNORTHCOM. The JTF-HQ is Net Control. Along with the JTF, any DCOs supporting the operation will use this net to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units deploying to this mission will resource their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.

b. UHF Data Networks. The following UHF Data Nets will be established with identified participants.

(1) Homeland Defense Data Net (HD Data Net). Used to pass data supporting positive control of forces employed to secure critical infrastructure identified by Commander, USNORTHCOM. JFLCC is the Net Control. QRFs and RRFs responding to taskings are the expected users of this net as directed

by JFLCC. Units deploying to this mission will resource their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.

(2) Defense Support of Civil Authorities Data Net (DSCA Data Net). Used to pass data supporting positive control of forces being employed to assist civil authorities in consequence management as directed by Commander, USNORTHCOM. The JTF HQ is Net Control. Along with the JTF any DCOs being employed in this operation will use this net to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units deploying to this mission will resource their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.

4. Super High Frequency (SHF) Satellite Resources. Guidance and direction for SHF SATCOM use during USNORTHCOM exercises and operations.

a. SHF HD wideband SATCOM capabilities. Supports HD and DSCA by providing commercial Internet, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, Defense Switched Network (DSN), Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), VTC, and JWICS service to deployed forces. Deployed JTFs and DCOs use this link to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units will resource their own SHF terminal equipment.

5. Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Satellite Resources. Guidance for EHF Protected SATCOM use during USNORTHCOM exercises and operations.

a. Low Data Rate Capabilities. The purpose of these protected SATCOM capabilities is to establish voice and or data communications for the HD Net. The HD Net maintains positive control of the deployed forces' secure and critical communications infrastructure. JFLCC will be the Network Controller.

b. Medium Data Rate Capabilities. These resources provide protected communications for HD and DSCA. Protected SATCOM provides connectivity to the Internet, DSN, commercial telephone service, and high-speed data capabilities from deployed forces to component and command HQs. JTF-CM and DCOs use this link to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units will resource their own EHF terminal equipment.

6. Commercial Satellite Resources. Guidance and direction for Commercial SATCOM (COMMSAT) use during USNORTHCOM exercises and operations.

a. COMMSAT requirements may be satisfied by using commercially-leased resources. U.S. forces can access DISN services through use of deployable COMMSAT terminals, typically operating in the C-, Ka-, or Ku-bands. COMMSAT services can be obtained through DISA's COMMSAT Team (CST) Office. Users can lease access to a COMMSAT transponder and use a commercial ground entry point (teleport) to a DISN point of presence (POP).

b. Authorization for frequencies to be used on COMMSAT platforms must be obtained through the Joint Frequency Management Office-North (JFMO-North).

7. Government-augmented Global Broadcast System (GBS). Guidance and direction for COMMSAT use during USNORTHCOM exercises and operations.

a. Provides a high throughput satellite broadcast capability for transmitting video and data products to fixed, in-transit, and forward deployed forces.

b. Information managers at the JTF and Component levels develop information product lists supporting their missions using a "Smart Push/ Users Pull" philosophy to avert saturating deployed forces with information.



Figure 1, Commercial Satellite Topology



Figure 2, DSCS Satellite Topology

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE

References:

a. DOD 5200.33-R, *Defense Courier Service Regulation*, August 1998
b. DCS 5200.2-M, *Customer Service Manual*, August 2003
c. www.dcs.ftmeade.army.mil

1. Purpose. The purpose of this appendix is to provide guidance for requesting Defense Courier Service (DCS) support.

2. General.

a. DCS provides service to the DOD and other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, as well as organizations that have close ties with the USG. Activities requiring courier service must make their needs known to a DCS Station or Headquarters DCS, 830 Chisolm Ave, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-5370, DSN: 923-4974 or COMM: (301) 677-4974.

b. During wartime or contingency situations, a supported Combatant Commander must identify priorities for material destined to his or her command based on mission requirements, and ensure DCS is accorded appropriate airlift priority to meet requirements. The cost of special movements is the responsibility of the customer.

c. A customer may request special movement of material that must be delivered by a specific date, which cannot be moved within established DCS schedules. See DOD 5200.33-R, para C1.1.4.4 for information required to process special movement requests.

d. Mobile or afloat units with current verified authentication documentation on file with DCS may obtain courier service from any DCS station, worldwide.

e. To request DCS support, contact the Station Chief, Superintendent, or Operations NCO at the servicing (local) DCS Station. They will coordinate with the appropriate DCS Station to arrange requested service.

f. DCS stations and areas of responsibility can be found in the references.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
FOREIGN DATA EXCHANGES

References:

a. DOD Directive 5230.11, *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*, 16 June 1992
b. NDP-1, *National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*, 2 October 2000
c. DOD Directive C-5230.23, *Intelligence Disclosure Policy*, 18 November 1983
d. CJCSI 5221.01B, *Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Combatant Commands to Disclose Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*, 1 December 2003
e. CJCSI 5714.01C, Policy for the Release of Joint Information, 28 Aug 06

1. Purpose. The purpose of this appendix is to provide guidance for disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and international organizations.

2. General. It is U.S. national and DOD policy under National Disclosure Policy-1 (NDP-1) that classified military information is a national security asset that shall be protected and shall be shared with foreign governments only when there is a clearly defined benefit to the United States. Disclosures of such information shall be made only when authorized by officials designated under DOD Directive 5230.11, and then only when all requirements of the directive are met.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K SUPPORTING USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT, JCEOI, EMI REPORTING

References:

a. USMCEB PUB 7, Version 7, Standard Frequency Action Format (SFAF), 30 June 2005

b. ACP-190B, Guide to Spectrum Management in Military Operations, May 2003

c. CJCSM 3320.01B, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace, 25 March 2006

d. CJCSM 3320.02A, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 20 January 2006

e. CJCSI 3320.03A, Joint Communications Electronics Operations Instructions, 29 June 2006

1. Purpose. This appendix provides frequency management, JCEOI development, and electromagnetic interference (EMI) guidance upon implementation of the plan.

2. Concept.

a. Pre-deployment. This period is dynamic and characterized by an uncertainty about exact positioning of equipment or which equipment will be deployed. Using units, based on identified requirements, must request frequency support. These requirements must be determined early enough to allow for established lead-time as specified by the lead agency or supported Combatant Commander. Nominally, a minimum of 90 days notice is required for frequency coordination between agencies.

b. Deployment. This period involves actions taken while forces are enroute to the AOR. It is critical for commanders to have frequencies free of harmful interference during this phase.

c. Employment. This period involves actions taken while forces are installing equipment and initializing circuits. The assigned frequency manager must be totally involved in this process to assure electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) of deployed frequency-dependent equipment. If components are assigned excess frequencies, they should turn back unused frequency assets to the JTF frequency manager so other units can utilize those frequencies.

Likewise, if additional frequencies are required to support the required event or campaign, the deployed JTF frequency manager should be notified of the unplanned requirement in order to begin coordination with higher levels.

d. Redeployment. This period involves actions, which are taken after the mission is completed and forces are departing the AOR. During this phase the deployed frequency manager should be advised as systems are deactivated or released, especially satellite systems, so those frequency resources can be re-assigned to support other organizations.

3. Spectrum Management.

a. General. Joint Frequency Management Office NORAD–USNORTHCOM (JFMO NORTH) is responsible for frequency management and coordination of the military electromagnetic systems dedicated to intergovernmental civil frequency support and Homeland Defense support in the USNORTHCOM JOA. JFMO NORTH will coordinate with Federal and State agencies including the National Guard Bureau, Service Frequency Management Offices (FMOs) and local civil authorities to ensure comprehensive communications requirements are satisfied.

b. Concept of Support. Frequency managers assigned to all components operating in support of all NORAD-USNORTHCOM mission will consolidate their frequency requests and submit them in Standard Frequency Action Format (SFAF) per reference (a) and forward all frequency requests to JFMO NORTH. A Joint Frequency Management Element (JSME) will be deployed to the JTF HQ staffed IAW the C2 structured identified in the EXORD and CJCSI 3320.03.

4. JCEOI Concept. The JCEOI is a single, comprehensive document developed by the USNORTHCOM/J6 and coordinated through NC/J3.

a. The JCEOI will be developed using Joint Automated CEOI System (JACS) and will be distributed electronically. Paper copies will be distributed as required by exception.

b. Subordinate and Component commands are responsible for establishing standards and procedures for planning, generating, disseminating, operating, and managing communications networks supported by JACS.

c. Subordinate and Component commands will provide JCEOI input to JFMO NORTH. Input is required 90-days prior to the commencement of operations to allow adequate time for JCEOI development and distribution. In the event of Consequent Management Contingency Operations or other

national emergencies the 90-day requirement will be waived to accommodate the mission.

(1) USNORTHCOM will develop, maintain, and provide the components with the joint layer for the JCEOI. This layer provides the central core of the JCEOI containing only joint circuits and coordination nets. Create suffix and expander list for organizations which would require communications over joint circuits. The component layers of the JCEOI will be prepared by the respective components, which contain frequencies, nets, SINCGARS information, call signs and words, and sign or counter signs for all event participants.

(2) AFNORTH and FFC will extract the appropriate call sign, call words, and frequency data from the JTF JCEOI to build an Air Tasking Order or Navy Operation Task Communication (OPTASKCOM).

5. Spectrum Interference Resolution Reporting.

a. Reports of EMI will be reported to JSME, JCCC(s), JFMO NORTH and NORAD-USNORTHCOM IAW the procedures outlined in Reference (d).

b. Follow-up reports will be submitted as additional information becomes available. The JCCC(s) will report on EMI within the JOA IAW Reference (d). Include NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC on all messages.

6. Points of Contact. JFMO NORTH POC can be reached at (719) 554-4008/4656, DSN 692-4008/4656, Fax (719) 554-8198. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC can be reached at (719) 554-8222, DSN 692-8222. JFMO NORTH organizational mailbox is nc.jfmonorth.omb@northcom.mil (Unclassified) or nc.jfmonorth.omb@northcom.smil.mil (Classified)

Tabs

A - EMI Reporting
B - JTF JCEOI Concept
C - Frequency Management Deconfliction

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI) REPORTING

References:

a. CJCSM 3320.02A, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 20 January 2006

b. CJCSI 3320.02C, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 27 January 2006

1. General. Guidance for reporting radio frequency interference incidents.

2. Procedures. All reports of suspected hostile interference will be reported and submitted via secure means. The user experiencing the interference is responsible for submitting the interference report. All interference reports will be coordinated and submitted IAW the C2 structure dictated by the EXORD and Reference a. Attempt to resolve interference problems at the lowest levels possible before submitting JSIR reports to higher headquarters.

3. Specialized EMI reporting nodes.

a. Global Satellite Support Center (GSSC), Regional Satellite Support Center (RSSC).

(1) Provides the central operational focus for global satellite communications (SATCOM) constellation payload management.

(2) Assists spectrum managers to track, coordinate, and assist in radio frequency interference (RFI) identification and resolution for SATCOM systems.

(3) Provides assistance to Combatant Commands and other users when there is a disruption to SATCOM services.

b. Global Positioning System (GPS) Support Center (GSC). The GSC coordinates responses to RFI in the use of GPS in military operations. They provide tactical support for planning and assessing military missions involving the use of GPS and serve as USNORTHCOM interface to the civil community. They routinely assesses the GPS service being provided to the civil community to determine compliance with US national policy guidelines.

4. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Reporting.

a. The Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) is the OPR for the JSIR program. The JSC also provides analytical and on-site assistance in resolving EMI problems. Interference incidents should be resolved at the lowest level of the DOD component, using the chain of command. If the interference cannot be resolved, units should contact the NORAD-USNORTHCOM components will contact TNCC and JFMO NORTH via their chain of command. JFMO-NORTHC can then refer the incident to JSC assist with resolution.

b. JSIR Reporting Format. Submit the following as minimum:

(1) Organization affected by EMI. POC information: Name and telephone number. Make sure the POC is familiar with the problem.

(2) Place name, latitude, and longitude where EMI occurred.

(3) Times, dates, periods EMI occurred. Indicate whether the duration of the interference is continuous or intermittent, the approximate repetition rate of interference, and whether the amplitude of the interference is varying or constant and at regular intervals during the day or if it is sporadic.

(4) Systems and equipment affected by the EMI. Affected system function, nomenclature, manufacturer, model number, system description.

(5) Frequency band or authorized frequency of equipment affected.

(6) Station or equipment causing interference and location or call sign.

(7) Allocated frequency band or authorized frequency of the station or equipment causing the interference, if known.

(8) Probable cause of interference (for example, co-channel assignment, harmonics, inter-modulation, spurious products, jamming, etc.).

(9) Extent of impairment to operational capability of affected equipment. Characteristics of interference (reduced range, false targets, data errors, etc.).

(10) Corrective measures to resolve or work around the interference.

(11) Effect of corrective measures.

(12) Additional remarks. Provide a clear, unstructured narrative summary on the interference and local actions taken to resolve the problem.

c. Addressees for EMI reports. Contact JFMO-North as necessary.

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4 April 2008

TAB B TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
JTF JCEOI CONCEPT

References:

a. CJCSM 3320.01B, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace, 25 March 2006

b. CJCSI 3220.01B, Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations, 15 May 2006

c. CJCSI 3320.03A, Joint Communications Electronics Operations Instructions, 29 June 2006

d. CJCSI 3320.02C, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 27 January 2006

1. General. Provide information concerning the Joint Communications Electronics Operation Instructions (JCEOI) concept and its use during execution of the base plan. USNORTHCOM is directed to develop and use a JCEOI to support contingency operations and exercises.

a. The JCEOI is a critical document that provides the JTF Commander as well as the Service Components and major subordinate units with specific instructions for the operation of C-E equipment, systems and facilities. The JCEOI is the only authorized document from which subordinate elements may extract call signs, call words, suffixes, expanders, sign/counter-sign and frequency data. The JCEOI is divided into two parts; part one is a directory of radio net or units and their associated frequencies, call signs, call words, and listed by time period; part two contains supplemental procedures for electronic, visual, and verbal interactions such as sign/countersign, smoke/pyrotechnics, and suffix/expanders.

b. The JCEOI offers some degree of communications security protection by changing call signs, call words, and frequencies on a daily basis. Daily changes increase the difficulty for an adversary to obtain EEFI by monitoring unencrypted radio nets.

c. Use of call signs/words and frequencies will be in accordance with Service approved documents, interoperability agreements, service coordinated messages, and the JCEOI.

2. Procedures.

a. The Joint Automated CEOI System (JACS) will be used during operations to create, modify, and generate the JCEOI. The JCEOI is a single, comprehensive document that contains frequencies, nets, Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) information, and call signs/words for all participants. To provide adequate lead-time for submission of frequency requirements for coordination and to design, publish, and distribute the JCEOI, the following relationships and milestones are established:

(1) Submit all JCEOI data through component headquarters for consolidation and forward to the Joint Task Force (JTF) Joint Spectrum Management Element (JSME) for inclusion in NORAD-USNORTHCOM JCEOI.

(2) Inputs are required from ARNORTH, AFNORTH, MARFORNORTH, CFFC, and all Component Headquarters supporting USNORTHCOM contingencies and exercises.

b. The desired input method for JFC JCEOI inputs are electronic JACS format; files must be formatted and sent as exported (.exp extension) documents. At a minimum an electronic copy must contain the Master Net List, Net Groups, Equipment, Separation Plans are required.

(1) To create the JCEOI, a list of all radio nets is required.

(a) Identify classification of the nets (i.e., U, C, S)

(b) Identify radio nets, having a specific title; e.g., Command (CMD), or Antijam (AJ). Radio net titles may contain sixteen (16) characters including spaces; e.g., (10TH MTN DIV CMD). Also identify the frequency band that radio net will operate in; e.g., HF, VHF/FM, VHF/AM, UHF, SHF, or EHF.

(c) Identify radio nets requiring a fixed frequency.

(d) Identify nets that require frequency separation.

(e) Identify nets that can be included in a share plan.

(f) Satellite net names will appear in the JCEOI but may not have frequencies due to time constraints and availability of channels.

(g) HF DCS entry frequencies.

(h) Frequencies to be included in the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) must be identified prior to final generation of JCEOI.

(i) Nets requiring restriction codes and the restriction code definitions.

(j) List of all nets requiring a call sign to build the call sign vocabulary. Daily changing alphanumeric, trigraph (letter-number-letter) call signs will be used; e.g., Z2F, R8J.

(k) Identify all net groups to ensure listing in your component layer of the JCEOI.

(l) Listing of unit's net names. These names can contain a maximum of sixteen (16) characters including spaces; e.g., 4TH MAR DIV CMD. Net names cannot be used more than once within your component; net names must be unique.

(m) List of all nets requiring a call word in order to build the call word dictionary for fixed and daily changing call words. The JTF JSME will deconflict the call word dictionary against any fixed call words that are requested.

(n) List of the suffixes that each component will use. The suffix is a two-digit number attached to a call sign or call word used to identify personnel or staff sections within a unit. The suffix vocabulary may contain a maximum of 99 assignments. There will be one master changing suffix vocabulary for the JCEOI.

(o) List of expander titles that your unit will use. The expander is a single letter assignment used to further identify personnel within a unit. Expander vocabulary can contain a maximum of twenty (20) expander titles. There will be one master changing expander vocabulary for the JCEOI.

(p) Instructions for the use of changing suffixes/expanders are provided in the Quick Reference pages of the JCEOI.

(q) The JCEOI when completed will be transmitted electronically to all component commanders.

c. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM JCEOI will be in half-page 52-line format, generated in three (2) editions, one active edition and one reserve edition. The reserve edition will not be distributed below component headquarters level and used in case of a compromise.

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
FREQUENCY DECONFLICTION

References:

a. CJCSI 3320.02C, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 27 January 2006
b. AF Instructions 10-707, Spectrum Interference Resolution Program, 20 June 2005
c. CJCSM 3320.01B, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace, 25 March 2006
d. CJCSI 3210.03B, Joint Electronic Warfare Policy, 25 August 2006
e. DOD Directive 3222.4 Change 2, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM), 20 January 1994
f. Joint Pub 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, 7 April 2000

1. Purpose. Describes the process for ensuring friendly force use of the electromagnetic spectrum without adverse impact from friendly electronic countermeasures (ECM).

2. General. ECM operations have the potential to interfere with C4 systems. Frequency deconfliction is a management procedure for limiting the effects of this interference. This tab provides familiarization with electronic warfare frequency deconfliction in joint military operations.

3. Definitions.

a. Frequency Deconfliction. Frequency deconfliction is the first process of EW deconfliction planning for the most effective employment of electronic countermeasures (ECM) assets against hostile targets while protecting friendly emitters from unintentional jamming.

b. TABOO. Friendly frequencies are of such importance they must never be deliberately jammed or interfered with by friendly forces. TABOO frequencies are generally long standing but can be limited by geography and/or time. TABOO frequencies may include nets used to pass USNORTHCOM Emergency Action Messages and Atmospheric Tactical Warning information, international distress, stop (cease) buzzer, safety, and controller frequencies.

c. Protected. Protected frequencies are those used by friendly tactical forces for a particular operational requirement, identified and protected to prevent them from being inadvertently jammed by friendly forces while active EW operations are directed against hostile forces. These frequencies are of such critical importance that jamming should be restricted unless absolutely necessary or until coordination with the using unit is made. They are generally time and/or geographically oriented, may change with the tactical situation, and must be updated periodically. Air/Ground/Air frequencies for aircraft control are an example of protected frequencies.

d. Guarded. Enemy functions or frequencies that are currently being exploited for combat information and intelligence. A GUARDED frequency is time-oriented in that the list changes as the enemy assumes different combat postures. These frequencies may be jammed after the commander has weighed the potential operational gain against the loss of technical information.

e. Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL). The JRFL is a time and geographically oriented listing of TABOO, Protected and Guarded functions, nets, and frequencies. It is limited to the minimum number of frequencies necessary for friendly forces to accomplish USNORTHCOM's missions.

f. Deconfliction Process. The USNORTHCOM/J3 defines the concept of operations with input from the NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J2 describing intelligence support requirements and enemy electronic systems targets. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J6 is responsible for the administrative and technical management of the spectrum requirements and assigns frequencies, analyzes and evaluates potential conflicts, resolves internal conflicts, recommends alternatives, and participates in spectrum-use conflict resolution. The assignment of frequencies is based on the USNORTHCOM/J3 concept of operations. In the absence of a Unified Joint Frequency Management Office, USNORTHCOM has delegated responsibility for frequency management to JFMO NORTH. The responsible frequency management office will create a frequency background environment that encompasses all frequencies, DOD and Civil, which are used in the area of operations. The background environment will be used to deconflict all frequencies that will be used for operations/exercises and contingencies. NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J6 will coordinate the NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J2/J3 JRFL input to ensure accuracy and completeness. Once approved by NORAD-USNORTHCOM /J2, the USNORTHCOM/J3 will publish and disseminate through the C-E Annex and EW Appendix.

g. If no disruption occurs to friendly communications during the course of ECM operations, then no frequency conflict exists. However, if unplanned disruptions occur, the following two actions will be taken:

(1) For critical functions (generally those frequencies on the TABOO list), an immediate STOP BUZZER notification will be promulgated if the offending friendly system can be positively identified. The STOP BUZZER notification will be issued only on the control net of the offending jammer and no acknowledgment of interference will be made on the critical function net.

(2) Submit JSIR in accordance with Reference (a).

4. Tasks and Responsibilities.

a. NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J6.

(1) Coordinate frequency requests with appropriate agencies and lateral and higher commands as appropriate before compiling the JRFL and forwarding it to USNORTHCOM/J3 for publication.

(2) Nominate changes to the JRFL based on changing or reassigning operational frequencies used by friendly forces.

(3) Assist in minimizing the adverse impact of friendly ECM on critical networks by providing alternative communications frequencies/modes of communications where possible.

(4) Maintain the frequency database of allotments, assignments and coordination actions.

(5) Send STOP BUZZER notifications, when appropriate.

b. USNORTHCOM Component Commanders.

(1) Establish a unit POC responsible for frequency deconfliction.

(2) Provide the N-NC/J6 candidate nodes and nets with frequencies.

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4 April 2008

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER (C4) PLANNING

References:

b. CJCSM 6231 series, *Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems*, March 99
c. JCS Pub 3-56, *Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations*, 3 May 1995 (C)
d. CJCSI 6110.01A, *CJCS-Controlled Communications Assets*, 1 July 2002
e. JANAP 128J, *Automatic Digital Network Operating Procedures*, July 1993
f. ACP 121, *Communications Instructions General*, April 1983
g. ACP 126, *Communications Instructions Teletypewriter Procedures*, May 1989
h. DOI-102, *DSSCS Operating Instructions, Routing Indicators*, 1 May 2003 (S)
i. DOI-103, *DSSCS Operating Instructions, System/Data Procedures*, Dec 1999 (C)
j. ACP 117, *Allied Communication Routing Indicator Book*, Canada-U.S., April 1991
k. ACP 100, *U.S. Call Sign and Address Group System Instructions and Assignments*, March 1984 (C)
l. CJCSI 6511.01, *Information Security Guidelines for the Deployment of Deployable Switched Systems*, 1 February 2001
m. USNORTHCOM Communications Extension Standards Guidance and Telecommunications Rules of Engagement, 27 July 2006

1. Purpose. Identifies C4 systems required to support USNORTHCOM missions, assigned forces and supporting commands, and assigns specific responsibilities to provide, install, operate, and maintain (PIOM) these systems.

2. Execution. Upon execution, C4 will be established between USNORTHCOM and designated DCOs, DCEs, JTF HQs, designated Base Support Installations (BSIs) and other Federal and State agencies as required.

a. Reference m identifies the minimum requirements and specifications to extend the USNORTHCOM Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) to deployed or mobile forces supporting HD or DSCA missions. It identifies

specific threshold and objective requirements for DCOs, DCEs, Emergency Planning Liaison Officers (EPLOs), Domestic Attack Assessor Authority, Command Assessment Elements (CAEs), and components and subordinates.

b. Alternate Communications. At the direction of USNORTHCOM, communications will be established using NSEP/TSP to procure existing commercial telecommunications services, tactical and theater fixed base communications, as well as BSI assets. Should BSI assets fail, implement normal systems restoration plans. If systems are still inoperable, DISN action plans will be initiated to restore communications. If DISN restoration actions are not effective, then available tactical communications systems may be tasked to provide critical BSI communications. (See Tab D of this Appendix).

c. Circuit Allocation. USNORTHCOM and Service owned communications equipment associated with circuits listed in the Mission Essential Service List (MESL) will be employed IAW this plan. The designated JTF/J6 will exercise technical control of the tactical communications systems in the JOA. Additional circuits necessary to support contingency operations may necessitate preemption of lower priority circuits and deployment of additional tactical communications equipment to the JOA.

3. System Description. JTFs will be equipped with traditional military C4 systems as well as commercial capabilities. Elements subordinate to a JTF may not be equipped with military C4 capabilities, since their primary mission may be to interface with local, State, and Federal emergency response services.

4. Planning Considerations. Specific guidance for planning and implementation of Promina network transmission resource controllers, voice, data, and message switch networks and terrestrial transmission systems are provided in reference m of this appendix.

a. Multiplexer Network. The joint transport network or backbone will be supported using the Promina transmission resource controller.

b. Voice Networks. The backbone of the USNORTHCOM deployed voice network will consist of deployed RED Switches, Commercial Private Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX) switches, (REDCOM IGX, and TTC-56 Single Shelter). Gateway links shall be established between US and designated coalition switches as required. DSN service and PSTN will be extended to most deployed locations. PSTN is typically preferred to enable direct collaboration between military and civil responders. Refinement of the routing scheme will be accomplished as equipment becomes available until the entire network is complete. Changes will be coordinated with the TNCC, and subscribers will be notified of numbering scheme changes. Circuit status reporting to the TNCC will be IAW the USNORTHCOM JCESI.

c. Data Networks. Joint data networks in the USNORTHCOM AOR include Commercial Internet, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, RELCAN, and JWICS. Commercial Internet may be extended to deployed locations to support civil responders.

d. Messaging Network. The USNORTHCOM standard for messaging is the Defense Message System (DMS). Exceptions are related to specific security classifications and/or compartmentalization.

e. Terrestrial Transmission Systems. The following information and guidance for the activation, operation, and configuration of the terrestrial transmission systems applies to all forces and subordinate elements operating or subscribing to the intra-theater communications systems or networks.

(1) Joint Radio Net Operations. Joint C2 radio nets will be used to support combat operations and DSCA; radio net operation will be IAW applicable ACPs and JANAPs. Net Control Stations will maintain positive control over the network's operation. Only authorized and assigned frequencies will be used. The USNORTHCOM JCEOI provides information on joint radio nets and will be supplemented as necessary by separate orders.

(2) Terrestrial Multi-channel Communications. Terrestrial transmission systems provide significant increases in bandwidth availability and ease the burden on scarce satellite resources.

(a) Components and supporting agencies will use terrestrial transmission media to the maximum extent possible. Every effort will be made to transition fixed nodes (e.g., air bases, port and logistics facilities) from satellite transmission systems to terrestrial systems at the earliest opportunity. Priority use of available satellite space segment is to mobile forces.

(b) Transmission systems will be shared whenever possible to provide an alternate routing capability for restoral of high priority circuits.

(c) To ensure interoperability, component C-E units providing support to agencies external to their command will ensure changes in transmission media are coordinated with the agency concerned prior to implementation.

Tabs
A - Collaboration Tools
B - Interagency Communications
C - NetOps
D - Recovery
E - TNCC
F – COP

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
COLLABORATION TOOLS

References:

a. Message, NORAD-USNORTHCOM Chief of Staff, NORAD-USNORTHCOM Trusted Information Exchange, 160028Z July 2005
b. *USNORTHCOM Information Management Plan*, 30 Dec 03

1. Purpose. Overview of the collaborative tools and outlines key features.

2. Collaborative Information Environment (CIE). The NORAD-USNORTHCOM CIE provides trusted information exchange and situational awareness between and among organizations and mission partners. The CIE provides the capability for horizontal and vertical information flow between traditionally unconnected or divergent organizations.

3. Communications Tools. Ref a directs use of specific collaborative tools by NORAD and USNORTHCOM HQs, regions, component forces, and supporting commands. The aim is to provide the Commander with the most current, accurate, and timely information available to achieve decision superiority.

a. The Dynamic Synchronization Event Log (DSEL) is the command's permanent event log on SIPRNet and NIPRNet. Entries in DSEL will include operational events and events that directly support exercises. For non-DOD organizations, a Restricted Public Internet version of the DSEL is available.

b. NORAD and USNORTHCOM use webchat on JWICS, SIPRNET, RELCAN, and NIPRNet. Chat includes both operational and intelligence data that may not be verifiable, but is a means of providing synchronous, real-time, basic communications. Chat provides assistance and redundancy with the more traditional C2 systems. For collaboration with non-DOD organizations, webchat is also available on the Internet.

c. NORAD and USNORTHCOM also use the Defense Collaboration Tool Suite (DCTS) on SIPRNET and RELCAN. DCTS is a packaged set of collaborative tools supported by DOD. It has desktop voice, video, and data collaboration capability. DCTS provides a capability to join a conference and to collaborate from desktops.

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

1. Purpose. Coordination methods USNORTHCOM and Federal Agencies supporting USNORTHCOM missions.

2. General. The following guidance will apply to DOD forces required to collaborate with local, state, and federal agencies.

a. All unclassified information will be posted on the unclassified NIPRNET portal to allow maximum information sharing among participants.

b. The current method for viewing an unclassified Common Operational Picture (COP) will be identified at the USNORTHCOM portal.

c. Unclassified message traffic will be posted on the NIPRNET portal.

d. When possible, VTCs will be unclassified for maximum participation.

e. PSTN and commercial Internet services will be pre-positioned at DOD satellite teleports for extension to deployed forces.

f. Acquisition or employment of C4 devices for civil interoperability will follow guidelines established in reference m of this appendix.

g. Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs) have been prepared for FEMA to quickly identify communications capabilities to support their mission and to expedite the SECDEF review and approval/disapproval process.

h. Mission success often depends a great deal on the cooperation and coordination of efforts amongst federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector organizations. As these agencies do not generally have a large number of people with security clearances, nor the computer systems to process such information, operating in the classified realm should be minimized to the greatest extent possible. If it is necessary to operate in the classified realm, paragraphs should be marked appropriately so that unclassified information can still be released to appropriate authorities supporting mission operations.

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
NETWORK OPERATIONS (NETOPS)

References:

a. *GIG NetOps Guidance and Policy Memorandum No. 10-8460 – Network Operations,* 24 August 2000
b. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020*, May 1996
c. CJCSI 3110.01A, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP),* 12 September 2003
d. CJCSM 3150.07A, *Joint Reporting Structure (JRS),* 1 October 1998
e. CJCSM 6231.01A, *Manual for Employing Joint Communications Systems: Joint Tactical Systems Management,* 23 May 1997
f. CJCSM 6231.07, *Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications: Joint Network Management and Control,* 1 August 2001
g. Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),* 24 February 1995
h. DODD O-8530.1, *Computer Network Defense (CND),* 8 January 2001
i. DODI O-8530.2, *Support to Computer Network Defense (CND),* 9 March 2001
j. CJCSI 3170.01E, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System,* 11 May 2005
k. DODD 4630.5, *Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology and National Security Systems,* 5 May 2004
l. DODI 4630.8 *Procedures for Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology and National Security Systems,* 2 May 2002
m. *CJCS Standing Execute Order for Computer Network Attack and Computer Network Defense,* 20 January 2004

1. Purpose. NetOps is the operational construct that the Commander, NORAD-USNORTHCOM will use to enable a full spectrum of assured, interoperable, Net-Centric capabilities to direct, prioritize and respond to mission requirements. NetOps will provide the commander NORAD-USNORTHCOM SA of all AOR theater GIG assets and C2 of those required for mission accomplishment.

2. General. NetOps will employ the following methods to achieve these goals:

a. Establish NetOps Joint Mission Essential Tasks List (JMETL). Define, develop and deploy functions and capabilities through the integration of

NetOps JMETL ~ Enterprise Service Management / Network Management (ESM/NM), Information Assurance/Computer Network Defense (IA/CND) and Content Staging/Information Dissemination Management (CS/IDM). Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of NetOps (ESM/NM, IA/CND and CS/IDM) by enhancing understanding of the effects each has on one another and managing them holistically.

b. Establish shared situational awareness. Define, develop and deploy a user definable, automated, near real-time SA capability that supports all DOD domains and NetOps decision makers. This includes developing a collaborative decision making process, the standard reporting TTP, criteria, thresholds and information required to integrate, correlate and analyze the GIG.

c. Establish an operational construct. Define an operational construct that establishes the authorities and responsibilities for centralized control and decentralized execution of NetOps throughout the Combatant Commands, Services and Agencies (CC/S/A). Develop well-defined collaborative TTP that establishes an operational understanding between warfighting, intelligence and business domains. This collaborative process of operating the TIG will enable Net-centric Operations and Warfare by DOD and NORAD-USNORTHCOM. Key to the successful operation and security of the TIG are the collaborative tactics, techniques and procedures that will enable centralized control and decentralized execution of NetOps.

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TAB D TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION

Reference: http://gets.ncs.gov

1. Purpose. Provide CONPLAN instruction to USNORTHCOM, its subordinate commands, and the Service Components on available emergency capabilities.

2. General.

a. There are two primary emergency capabilities employed by USNORTHCOM, its subordinate commands, and the Service components; Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), and Wireless Priority Service (WPS). An alternative system that may be considered is the Military Affiliated Radio System.

b. Each USNORTHCOM subordinate command and Service component is responsible for establishing its own policy for managing GETS and WPS.

c. The Military Affiliated Radio System (MARS) is addressed below.

3. Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS).

a. GETS provides National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) users with a dependable and flexible switched voice and voice-band data communications service for use during periods of emergency or crisis. GETS uses existing features and services of the public switched telephone network (PSTN) with selected NS/EP augmentations and enhancements. The GETS architecture allows the service to capitalize on the changing and improving technological capabilities in the PSN and remain responsive to NS/EP users.

b. GETS is an emergency telecommunications service to be used only when a user is unable to complete emergency calls through normal or alternative telecommunications means. It is to be used on a call-by-call basis for voice calls and/or low rate data communications calls; it is not intended for extended use on a modem line or for high volume/high speed data communications calls.

c. GETS is available nationwide and from overseas locations through the GETS universal access number, 1-710-NCS-GETS (627-4387).

d. GETS can be accessed from a telephone service connected directly to a local phone service provider end office, cellular service, personal communications service (PCS), or connected to the PSN through a private branch exchange (PBX) or central office exchange (Centrex). In addition to these normal PSN access methods, Federal Telecommunications System (FTS), Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS), and Defense Information System Network (DISN) provide access alternatives for government GETS users.

e. POC and User Organization Responsibilities.

(1) Responsibility for GETS policy and procedure administration resides within each of the subordinate commands and Service components. These policies and procedures are generally incorporated into the operational or contingency telecommunications plans of the user organization. Each organization is responsible for designating a POC and alternate. A POC's responsibilities include identifying GETS users, requesting GETS cards for each user, reviewing GETS Usage Reports (Call Detail Records), and identifying future GETS requirements. POCs are also required to validate the accuracy of their GETS card holdings on an annual basis.

(2) Access to the PSN and to the local telephone company end office is the responsibility of the GETS user organization and must be addressed for each location where GETS users are expected to perform NS/EP functions.

(3) GETS cards must be protected to prevent unauthorized access to GETS and fraudulent use of the service.

(4) The GETS POC is responsible for submitting a completed GETS/WPS request form for each user to the OMNCS (See "Requesting GETS" below). In addition, user organizations may request active GETS cards to be retained as "stockpile." Stockpiling ensures the user organization has an active GETS card supply available for emergency use, but requires careful control and handling. Each user organization may request no more than 10% of their total GETS cards as stockpile. In an emergency, the cards may be distributed by express mail, telephone, e-mail, or fax. When issuing a stockpile card to an individual, it is necessary to inform the OMNCS, preferably by submitting an on-line GETS/WPS User Request, including only the first eight digits of the stockpile PIN used as indicated on the GETS card. In the case of a short-term GETS card assignment, it is necessary to cancel the card after the need has passed. If necessary, it is possible to request replacement stockpile cards.

4. Wireless Priority Service (WPS). Allows authorized NS/EP personnel to gain access to the next available wireless radio channel on their cell phone to initiate calls during an emergency. When congestion is experienced on a WPS-

enabled phone, dial *272 + the destination number. This will invoke the WPS feature and signal the network that the call being placed is a priority call. Use the GETS card by dialing *272 710-NCS-GETS for even greater priority to a destination number. GETS provides priority service over the landline segments of your cellular call. GETS and WPS work together to greatly enhance the chances of completing an NS/EP call.

5. Military Affiliated Radio System (MARS).

a. MARS is a Department of Defense sponsored program, established as a separately managed and operated program by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The program consists of licensed amateur radio operators who are interested in military communications on a local, national, and international basis as an adjunct to normal communications. There are various types of networks and each accomplishes a specific goal. For example, administrative networks take care of the day-to-day management of the program; traffic networks exist solely to pass third-party traffic; and of course, emergency networks provide for communications needs during periods of emergency.

b. USNORTHCOM subordinate commands and Service components will develop plans to use MARS as appropriate in a contingency.

c. The MARS program is designed to support the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Communications System (NCS), and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).

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TAB E TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
MCCC

References:

a. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Operation Order 2-CY, Survivable Mobile Command Center Operations, 2 May 2003 (S/REL CAN)

b. EAP-CJCS, Volume VII, EAM Dissemination and NEREP Procedures. 16 May 2005 (S)

c. National Military Command System (NMCS)-Department of Defense (DOD) Emergency Communication Plan, 1 May 2005

d. USNORTHCOM OPORD 2-04; Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC) Operations, 03 June 2004 (S/RELCAN)

e. Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC) Standard Operating Procedures/153rd Command and Control Squadron (CACS), 1 June 2004

1. Purpose. Provide direction and coordinating instructions for PIOM of the MCCC platform in support of USNORTHCOM forces for CONPLAN 3505. Establishes C-E and Automated Data Processing (ADP) concepts and systems architectures for MCCC support personnel and 153rd CACS.

2. Situation. USNORTHCOM conducts operational, contingency, and exercises under CONPLAN 3505 in order to support CJCS operational readiness requirements and USNORTHCOM training objectives. MCCC operational requirements will be delineated in Annex C of CONPLAN 3505. All communications planning and execution will be in accordance with references (a) through (e) except as noted.

3. Mission. Reference Annex C to Base plan.

a. Operational Concept.

(1) The MCCC can be tasked to support USNORTHCOM missions.

(2) The MCCC primary and alternate communications and reporting paths, in priority of use are:

(a) DRSN: Intra/Inter secure voice communications, to include voice conferencing.

(b) Data networking: SIPRNET, JWICS-TS/SCI, NIPRNET, DMS.

(c) Secure and non-secure VTC; to include internal and external capabilities.

(d) STU III/STE.

(e) PSTN.

b. Tasks and Responsibilities.

(1) 153rd CACS.

(a) Exercise management of the MCCC communications networks in support of USNORTHCOM exercise objectives. Provide equipment and personnel to meet C4 requirements in support of USNORTHCOM battlestaff and external agency members. Ensure MCCC communications equipment interoperability, compatibility and integration between USNORTHCOM, Service components and other supporting commands and agencies.

(b) Install, operate, and maintain (IOM) the MCCC platform and associated communications assets IAW this plan.

(c) Install and operate C4 services over commercial leased T-1 and Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) communications paths.

(d) IOM Single Channel Radio (SCR) and MILSTAR circuits, as required.

(e) IOM designated DRSN conferencing circuits, as required.

(f) As required, IOM sixteen (16) additional IST-2 DRSN phones in the remote operating environment (ROE).

(g) As required, IOM an additional eight (8) STU-III capable phone terminations in the ROE.

(h) Coordinate use of joint keying materials with controlling authorities.

(i) Coordinate, and validate the communications systems and interfaces (protocols, standards, etc.) between commercial, fixed communications systems, and USNORTHCOM Patch and Test Facility (PTF).

(j) Conduct Communication Exercises (COMMEX), as required, to ensure functionality of communications systems.

(k) Establish SIPRNET and NIPRNET email accounts for designated Battlestaff and associated members and provide local administrative support. Ensure requisite levels of security are provided for all classes of data networking.

(l) As required, request NS/EP TSP from USNORTHCOM.

5. Command and Signal.

a. The NC/J6 exercises operational and supervisory control over all C4 assets; organic, assigned, or attached, or in support of USNORTHCOM. The NC/J6, via the TNCC, will direct all activation, restoration, and deactivation of C4 systems, circuits, and links.

b. The Commander, 153rd CACS exercises tactical and administrative control over MCCC C4 systems and activities. This will include, but is not limited to, personnel, equipment, and administrative/exercise areas.

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TAB F TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J6 THEATER NETOPS CONTROL CENTER (TNCC)
NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS REPORTING

1. Purpose. Provide information on TNCC reporting requirements.

2. TNCC Mission. TNCC provides 24/7 Situational Awareness (SA), coordination, defense and oversight of NORAD-USNORTHCOM C4 resources. The TNCC monitors status of C4 troubleshooting, networks, bandwidth, SATCOM apportionment, spectrum management, and Information Assurance (IA) activities within the command and for assigned forces.

3. Operations.

a. Normal Operations. During non-crisis and non-exercise periods the TNCC conducts normal operations. The functions of each position are:

(1) Systems and Network Management (S&NM) Watch. Includes monitoring the different transmission systems that carry voice, data, and video throughout the theater. S&NM functions include the following:

(a) Maintain SA on the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TIG resources.

(b) React to unscheduled outages.

(c) Coordinate scheduled outages.

(d) Submit Daily Network Operations (NETOPS) Assessment Report.

(e) Coordinates with Air Force Space Command Network Operations and Security Center (AFSPC NOSC) and DISA Global NetOps Center (DISA GNC) at daily meeting.

(2) Information Assurance/Computer Network Defense (IA/CND) Watch. The IA/CND Watch mission includes the following functions:

(a) Assess impact of C4 issues and the events affecting operations.

(b) Recognize IA threats and coordinate CND measures.

(c) Provide C4 SA to operations, planning, and support groups.

(d) Monitor DRSN conferences.

(e) Represent NORAD-USNORTHCOM in Computer Network Event Conference (CNEC) and Computer Network Assessment Conferences (CNAC).

(f) Complete all appropriate checklists during an IA/CND event.

(g) Perform S&NM tasks as needed.

(3) Noncommissioned Officer In Charge (NCOIC) of the Watch. The NCOIC monitors all aspects of the TNCC operations and provides guidance to the S&NM, IA/CND, and DMS personnel to ensure that the TNCC is successful in its mission. The NCOIC will also complete the following:

(a) Assure quality products from the crew.

(b) Attend key meetings such as the CSAM, and OPS/INTEL.

(c) Prepare and present TNCC daily briefing.

(d) Brief J6 Director and staff who call in for SA updates.

(3) Cyber Space Domain Watch Officer. The CWO monitors all aspects of the TNCC operations and provides Theater NetOps situational awareness reporting to the N2C2. The CWO will also complete the following:

(a) Assure N2C2 receives timely and accurate NetOps reporting.

(b) Act as J6 representative to the N2C2.

(c) Prepare and present TNCC daily briefing.

(d) Brief J6 Director and staff who call in for SA updates.

b. Adaptive Operations (Crisis Ops). During a crisis or exercise the NORAD-USNORTHCOM HQ transitions to an adaptive structure. When this occurs the TNCC will adapt its operations to support the adaptive structure.

4. Reporting Requirements. Reporting is divided into Systems & Network Management (S&NM) and Information Assurance/Computer Network Defense (IA/CND). All components will report to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC. All reporting formats can be found on the NORAD-USNORTHCOM NIPRNET and SIPRNET portals.

a. Components and assigned JTFs will provide a daily NETOPS SITREP each workday to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC NLT 2300Z. Reporting times may be adjusted as mission and real world events require. Components will submit a Communications Spot (COMSPOT) report within 1 hour of an event. Components are welcome to email additional charts, spreadsheets, or text files that amplify NETOPS status.

(1) Information required to S&NM.

(a) Unscheduled outages, start/end times, and mission impact to the following systems as applicable: Data, NIPRNET, SIPRNET/ADNET, JWICS. SATCOM; SHF, EHF, UHF, GBS, IRIDIUM, commercial, INMARSAT, Voice: DSN, DRSN, PSTN/Cellular, Line of Sight Ground Entry Station (LOS/GES – a system used by CADS). VTC, DMS/AUTODIN, and deployable communications suites.

(b) Loss of service or issues with the following: GCCS, TBMCS, Missile or Air Warning, email, web server, chat, JDISS, GBS, and DCTS.

(c) Failure or issues with any DRSN conferences.

(d) Pending scheduled outages, start/end times, and mission impact to the systems listed above.

(e) Any issues with the above systems or other systems that affect mission capability or readiness.

(f) Absence of Component Commander and J6/A6.

(g) Pending actions or issues you are awaiting action from the NORAD-USNORTHCOM J6 staff. These may include requests for information or staffing an action.

(2) Information required to IA/CND.

(a) Current INFOCON, attainment DTG, and any pending change.

(b) Status of Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) compliance and receipt acknowledgement for any new IAVA.

(c) Status of compliance with any current Computer Tasking Orders (CTO).

(d) Incidents/intrusions/infections of component C4 systems.

(e) Any IA/CND issues that affect readiness.

b. POC for NETOPS issues for each of the NETOPS areas are:

TNCC – DSN 692-8222 (24/7)
CWO – DSN 692-2365 (24/7)

c. Components may send reports to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC at: nc.tncc.omb@northcom.smil.mil (SIPRNET), nc.tncc.omb@northcom.mil (NIPRNET), and norad.nc.tccc@noradhq.relcan.mil (RELCAN SIPRNET).

d. TNCC reports are sent via email from the TNCC. If your component is not receiving TNCC reports, contact the TNCC to be added to the distribution lists. Reports and reporting formats are posted to USNORTHCOM SIPRNET and NIPRNET portals.

5. Relationships: TNCC communicates with multiple federal agencies outside of NORAD-USNORTHCOM Combatant Command during a crisis. The TNCC uses collaborative tools to maintain communications. These tools include the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Portals, DCTS, and the DSEL.

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TAB G TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE (COP)

Reference: USNORTHCOM COP CONEX, 12 December 2005

1. Purpose. Provides an overview of the CONEX for the NORAD-USNORTHCOM COP.

2. General. Common Operational Picture (COP) Management.

a. A solid understanding of friendly, threat, and environmental information are key to maintaining situational awareness (SA) supporting HD and CS. This architecture includes static and dynamic track displays as well as briefings for senior officers. Awareness promotes knowledge. To make sound decisions, judgment applied against knowledge generates a level of understanding required for leaders at all levels of command. Properly integrated, the COP reduces elements of uncertainty and increases the level of knowledge.

b. The end state for the USNORTHCOM COP is as follows: Each battle space domain (Land, Maritime, Air, SOF, NGB, Cyber, and Interagency) has a single integrator for that respective component of the COP. USNORTHCOM provides overall integration of each battle space domain to produce a "fused" COP. Inputs to the COP supporting DSCA are inherent to the missions of JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFACC and JTFs. All USNORTHCOM JTFs report integrated COP information pertaining to their JOA per established guidelines. USNORTHCOM/J32 will provide COP inputs for all special operations forces in support of USNORTHCOM to the COP manager.USNORTHCOM leverages the NGBs unique position as a conduit and channel of communications to the National Guard in the 54 States/Territories; NGB supports USNORTHCOM COP development and sustainment by reporting information pertinent to employment of National Guard capabilities employed by the Governor(s) in State Active Duty (SAD) and/or Title 32 status.

c. The USNORTHCOM COP is capable of fusing Geographic Information Systems (GIS) based information from local, State, non-DOD Federal Agencies, and other civil sources, with traditional military information that lies within the GCCS. Fusion, analysis, and dissemination of GCCS and GIS information promote HD and CS mission success.

d. Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness. Organizations, both DOD and non-DOD will employ Blue Force Tracking (BFT) devices while operating in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

e. USNORTHCOM is the COP Fusion Center (CFC) for the USNORTHCOM AOR as directed by Joint Staff and the NMCC. USNORTHCOM will create and maintain an OPTASK COP Message which identifies to subordinate and supporting commands what information is required in the COP.



Figure K-2-L-1. COP Diagram (U)

3. Detailed information and products about COP operations can be found on the USNORTHCOM portal:
https://operations.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/sites/NNCJ6/NNCJ62/NNCJ623/COPOPS/default.aspx

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ANNEX L TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

References: a. Title 42, United States Code, Section 4321 et seq., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended
b. Title 40, The Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 1500 through 1508, 1978, The Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act
c. Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework, Jan 2008
d. Joint Pub 3-34, 12 Feb 2007, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations
e. Joint Staff Instruction 3820.01C, 1 May 2000, Environmental Engineering Effects of Department of Defense Actions
f. DOD Instruction 4715.1E, 19 Mar 2005, Environment Safety, and Occupational Health
g. DOD Instruction 4715.2, 3 May 1996, DOD Regional Environmental Coordination
h. DOD Instruction 4715.9, 3 May 1996, Environmental Planning and Analysis

1. Situation.

a. Purpose. To provide guidance for environmental planning and practices by DOD personnel for the environmental issues that must be addressed in response to a nuclear weapon accident in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility. Environmental planning is conducted in accordance with references a-h. The environmental considerations outlined in this plan do not overshadow or interrupt life-saving efforts.

(1) Local, tribal, and state governments plan remediation of the affected area in conjunction with the owning installation, military service, or federal agency.

(2) Remediation planning and actions do not take place until the conditions of the accident have stabilized and immediate actions have been taken to protect public health, safety, and property. The federal government assists state, local, and tribal governments to develop and execute recovery plans. Long-term remediation responsibilities are assigned to the responsible service and approved federal agency in accordance with the procedures outlined

in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF for extensive site remediation actions sometime after weapon recovery actions are complete.

b. Assumptions.

(1) There is a designation of a military lead service based on weapon ownership or geographic location.

(2) The accident site is contaminated with hazardous materials.

(3) The federal government responds under the provisions of the National Response Framework.

(4) Monitoring and assessment of the accident site is not terminated until there is agreement among agencies involved to terminate activities.

(5) Actions undertaken by USNORTHCOM and its Components and or Response Forces are considered emergency actions needed to ensure national security and protection of life or property. USNORTHCOM responses involve crisis circumstances that make it necessary to take immediate actions without preparing the normal environmental planning documents required under references a-h.

2. Mission. CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the DOD response and recovery for DOD nuclear weapon accidents, within the USNORTHCOM designated Operational Area. Military forces responding to a DOD nuclear weapon accident in the USNORTHCOM designated OPERATIONAL AREA employ environmentally responsible practices in order to minimize adverse impacts to human health and the environment. The responsible service or SecDef approved federal agency, executes long term remediation efforts following the completion of emergency response activities.

3. Execution.

a. In all phases of operations, the responsive service develops strategies to reduce or eliminate negative impacts on mission accomplishment caused by environmental degradation.

b For a DOD nuclear weapon accident without DHS coordination of the Federal response, the owner or service is responsible for coordinating environmental remediation and cleanup in concert with local, tribal, state, federal government, and private property owners.

c For a DOD nuclear weapon accident with DHS coordination of the Federal response, DHS directs the overall Federal government response with assistance from DOD as the coordinating agency.

d While retaining overall technical lead as the coordinating agency, DOD may require support for a long-term cleanup from a cooperating agency with cleanup and recovery experience and capabilities (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). As approved by SecDef, long term remediation activities are transferred to the appropriate federal agency.

4. Tasks.

a. CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(1) Continually monitor crisis operations for any potential environmental impact.

(2) Coordinate with the National Military Command Center, subordinate commands, interagency partners, supporting commands, and higher headquarters to provide continuous support to deployed forces and report all environmental impact status.

(3) Conduct liaison with the appropriate DOD Regional Environmental Coordinator to maintain situation awareness.

b. Services.

(1) As directed by SecDef, the responsible service provides extensive and extended support to the affected area with long-term remediation programs.

(2) Long term remediation activities are transferred to an appropriate federal agency as directed by SecDef. DOD provides support to the federal agency responsible for long term remediation activities as directed by SecDef.

(3) Coordinate with USNORTHCOM and the Response Task Force (RTF) Commander to ensure required environmental planning, documentation and response and remediation actions and to determine operational alternatives that minimize damage to the natural environment or cultural and historic resources.

(4) Supporting headquarters, Air Combat Command, Air Force Space Command, or Fleet Forces Command provide an RTF to manage accident response and remediation efforts. Include environmental considerations in planning and executing nuclear weapon accident response.

(a) The RTF Commander establishes the Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG) and begins development and approval of the long-term site remediation plan.

(b) Following successful recovery of weapon and components, long-term remediation responsibilities are transferred to the DOD appointed Remedial Project Manager or SecDef approved federal agency.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) CDRUSNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM J42 coordinates with the RTF Commander's Environmental staff to determine required regulatory environmental planning, documentation and response and remediation actions.

(2) Other Federal Agencies. Federal agency's responses are coordinated through the SRWG.

(a) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). The FRMAC is an Interagency team that conducts radiological monitoring and assessments of nuclear weapon accidents as directed and funded by the DOE, with later transfer to the appropriate lead agent for intermediate and long-term actions. The Director of the FRMAC assigns a representative to the SRWG.

(b) DHS - Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS forms the Joint Field Office to coordinate federal, state and local agencies' assistance to the Initial Response Force Commander or the RTF Commander for off site accident response functions other than radiological monitoring and assessment. Operations continue into the remediation phase.

(c) EPA. The EPA participates in the SRWG and site remediation activities.

(3) SRWG.

(a) Outlined by DOD 3150.8-M, the SRWG is formed at the accident scene with a primary focus on site remediation issues.

(b) The SRWG, is convened after weapons are removed and classified components and documents are recovered, but before the federal response is deactivated.

(c) The SRWG stays active after deactivation of DOD forces for continued support to state and local governments as requested.

(4) Legal. USNORTHCOM addresses legal concerns over environmental damage through command legal counsel.

5. Administration and Logistics.

a. Logistics. The RTF Commander, through the responsible service, is responsible for resourcing environmental compliance. Consult the service major command and USNORTHCOM J42 for resolution of environmental issues.

b. Reports. Environmental reports are included as part of the Engineers section of unit situation reports (SITREPs). SITREPs include time and date of occurrence, identification and quantity of material released or encountered, responsible party, cause, areas damaged or threatened, formation of SRWG, proposed containment method used and or planned mitigation measures, assistance required, and additional comments.

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ANNEX Q TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
MEDICAL SERVICES

References: a. CJCSI 3110.01C, "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 02 (JSCP FY02), Logistics Supplement, Health Service Support Guidelines," 16 Oct 1998

b. DOD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities," 15 Jan 1993

c. DOD 3150.8-M "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures" (NARP), Feb 2005

d. Joint Publication 4-02, "Health Service Support," 31 October 2006 (U)

e. Joint Staff Memorandum, MCM 251-98 "Deployment Health Surveillance and Readiness," 4 Dec 1998

f. "National Response Framework," Jan 2008

1. Situation

a. General. Despite safeguards built into U.S. nuclear weapons, radioactive contamination may result from a nuclear weapon accident. The DOD, the owning (custodial) Service and USNORTHCOM have the responsibility to ensure response to a nuclear weapons accident is rapid, effective and designed to minimize any potential radiation release. Although risk of significant radiation release is minimal this plan must address, and forces must be ready, to meet requirements for accidental radiation release. Even when radioactive contamination is not dispersed, the medical requirements, while greatly simplified, may still be significant. There is a potential for a large number of casualties through high explosive detonation or the presence of noxious fumes. The presence of radioactive contamination will not by itself delay emergency medical response, but must be considered as a planning factor.

(1) Purpose. This annex provides guidance on medical response requirements resulting from a nuclear weapon accident in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(2) Applicability. See TASK ORGANIZATION in the Basic Plan.

b. Enemy Forces. See Basic Plan.

c. Friendly Forces. See Basic Plan.

d. Assumptions. All assumptions will be in accordance with the base plan and reference a.

e. Limitations

(1) A nuclear weapon accident could produce major consequences that may severely degrade health care delivery and overwhelm the medical infrastructure in and around the accident site.

(2) In mass casualty situations, the capacity of hospitals, pharmaceuticals for advanced treatment, and detection equipment will be overwhelmed.

(3) Sophisticated treatment available only at special medical facilities will be required, particularly for radiological contamination.

(4) A delayed initial response time (remote location) or non-availability of medical personnel, may add to the difficulty of proper medical response (NARP, medical). In addition, personnel first on the scene will likely be civilian responders.

(5) If radioactive contaminants are dispersed, medical personnel must be prepared to treat people with both internal and external contamination.

(6) Medical equipment may require deliberate decontamination or reconstitution if supporting a nuclear weapon accident response.

(7) Special precautions are necessary in handling contaminated patients, and disposing of contaminated corpses.

2. Mission. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the DOD response and recovery for DOD nuclear weapon accidents, within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area. USNORTHCOM provides medical services to assist in DOD nuclear weapon accident related medical treatment.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Medical problems resulting from a nuclear weapon accident vary in complexity depending primarily on the level of and type of radioactive contamination (ie particulate or electromagnetic), as well as additional factors such as location accessibility, and availability of medical personnel. These operations are directed towards the medical response

functions and are applicable to both the DOD and DOE/NNSA response force personnel.

(1) Transition/Pre-accident Preparation

(a) Prior to an accident, the response force's medical officer and supporting personnel will be identified. The Initial Response Force (IRF) will be staffed and equipped to provide emergency medical treatment. The Response Task Force (RTF) will be equipped and staffed to support a long-term response when DOD is the coordinating agency.

(b) Unless specifically tasked otherwise, the medical footprint to support RTF operations is tailored to support the deployed U.S. force. If USNORTHCOM is tasked to provide any level of medical support beyond that required for the deployed U.S. force, the medical force structure must be adjusted upward accordingly.

(2) Concept by Phase. This plan will be executed in five phases.

(a) Phase I – Notification and deployment

1. Conduct mission analysis for immediate response. Determine asset requirements.

2. Determine and maintain a status of available CONUS based medical assets.

3. Conduct necessary medical preparation of U.S. forces.

(b) Phase II – Initial Response

1. Promptly treat accident casualties and injuries or illnesses and arrange for disposition of fatalities in accordance with Annex D to this Plan.

2. Provide advice and minimize the impact of the hazard on the local environment, limit migration of contaminants, prevent the spread of infectious disease, and protect food and water resources.

(c) Phase III – Accident Site Consolidation

1. Provide advice and assistance to local medical authorities.

2. Provide advice and assistance to minimize the impact of the hazard on the local environment, to limit migration of contaminants, to prevent the spread of infectious disease and to protect food and water resources.

3. The Initial Response Force will ensure that the incoming Response Task Force is appropriately briefed and up to date on the medical situation and conditions of the accident site.

(d) Phase IV - Weapon Retrieval Operations

1. Provide advice and assistance to local medical authorities.

2. Provide advice and assistance to minimize the impact of the hazard on the local environment, to limit migration of contaminants, to prevent the spread of infectious disease and to protect food and water resources.

(e) Phase V - Site Remediation. Provide advice and assistance to minimize the impact of the hazard on the local environment, to limit migration of contaminants, and to protect food and water resources.

(3) Responsibility and Command Relationships. See Annex J.

(4) Emergency Rescue and Treatment

(a) Rescuing and treating casualties is a high priority. The amount of response force involvement in initial rescue and treatment depends on response time.

(b) Do not delay lifesaving procedures because of radiological contamination. No medical personnel or equipment will leave the contaminated area without monitoring for contamination; however, transporting the seriously injured victim will not be delayed for monitoring or decontamination (DOD 3150.8-M). If decontamination cannot be completely accomplished, reduce the risk of spreading contamination by wrapping patients (to the extent possible) in uncontaminated material such as blankets.

(c) If possible, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and/or radiation monitors should mark a path, or accompany medical personnel into accident site to help avoid radioactive and explosive hazards (weapon render safe operations may prevent this) (DOD 3150.8-M).

(d) Medical response personnel will wear protective clothing (appropriate for the risk) when entering the accident area, as well as respiratory protective devices both for radiological hazards as well as smoke and dust.

(e) If available, a single medical facility will be designated to deal with contaminated casualties in need of immediate medical treatment (DOD 3150.8-M, C11.5.2.10.1)

(f) Additional, specific requirements, particularly suggested casualty handling procedures, can be found in the DOD 3150.8-M Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP), chapter 11, Medical Response.

(5) Hospitalization

(a) Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. government civilians are eligible for treatment in US medical treatment facilities (MTF). Civilian personnel may receive emergency care to save life, limb, or eyesight and any other level of care deemed necessary by competent medical authority.

(b) State and local medical facilities may be used. In all cases, proper precautions will be taken to protect against contamination.

(6) Patient Movement

(a) Decontaminate patients before entering them onto any aeromedical evacuation aircraft.

(b) Exercise caution while using aeromedical evacuation assets in a nuclear or radiological environment. Should it become necessary to commit air evacuation resources into a contaminated area, these resources will remain dedicated to operations within the contaminated area until appropriate decontamination can be accomplished.

(7) Force Health Protection. Unit commanders are responsible for ensuring all pre- and post-deployment screening requirements are met in full for all forces responding to the accident, in accordance with guidance.

(8) Veterinary Services

(a) Veterinary services include:

1. Food inspection.

2. Health care for military animals and other animals as appropriate.

(b) Veterinary support personnel will evaluate animal control, domestic animal care and investigate unexplained or unusual animal morbidity and mortality.

(9) Displaced Civilians. In the event of a nuclear weapon accident, all medical units must be prepared to care for displaced civilians and civilian casualties.

b. Tasks

(1) IRF

(a) The IRF will have a medical element. The medical element will have a medical officer trained in radiological health matters.

(b) The IRF will assist local responders with emergency medical treatments. A full list of tasks can be found in DOD 3150.8-M, chapter 11.

(2) RTF

(a) The RTF medical officer will assess the medical requirements and ensure that adequate medical resources are available.

(b) The RTF will initiate processing of fatalities, including contaminated remains.

(c) The RTF will integrate their medical response with the on-site IRF. A full list of the emergency medical response tasks can be found in DOD 3150.8-M, chapter 11.

(3) IRF/RTF Tasks. The following tasks are part of the medical capability associated with both the IRF and the follow-on RTF.

(a) USNORTHCOM Command Surgeon, will provide direction and guidance for health service support activities not described in the plan.

(b) Promptly treat accident casualties and injuries or illnesses, and arrange for disposition of fatalities in accordance with Annex D to this Plan.

(c) Assess and report the size of the accident, including numbers and categories of injuries, suspected contamination and priority for transport.

(d) Advise medical facilities receiving casualties, in coordination with radiological personnel, of possible contamination and measures to prevent its spread.

(e) Establish health and safety programs to support response operations over an extended period of time.

(f) Ensure bioassay samples from personnel in the area are collected so that bioassay and external exposure data become part of the health records.

(g) Establish a heat and/or cold exposure program and other environmental prevention measure programs.

(h) Assist with decontaminating casualties.

(i) Manage remediation of internal contamination as required.

(j) Help acquire and maintain radiation health history of all personnel involved in accident response, as well as exposed civilians in the surrounding community.

(k) Record and track all information relevant to personnel, evacuees, and casualties for hand-off to the Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT) or Medical Radiobiological Advisory Team (MRAT) for follow-up.

(l) Ensure IRF/RTF Commander and USNORTHCOM leadership are informed of situation.

(m) Ensure ionizing radiation dosimeter results including bioassay specimens and external exposure data are archived in the appropriate Military Service Dosimetry Center and in medical records when applicable.

(4) Service Components

(a) Ensure all pre-deployment and post-deployment activities identified in DOD 3150.8-M are executed.

(b) Be prepared to provide/re-supply emergency blood products and Class VIII materials as required/directed until a supply chain distribution program is established.

(c) Provide trained medical personnel and equipment with appropriate CBRNE capabilities for short periods to conduct assessments, provide technical expertise/advice, consultation, and assist in transitional planning as required.

(5) Director of the Accident Site Health Group (ASHG) Tasks and Responsibilities.

(a) Advise USNORTHCOM Command Surgeon on the health care requirements needed for displaced persons and civilians and on the capability of local medical (non U.S. military) resources to provide that support.

(b) Design medical force requirements to support RTF forces. Coordinate the initial medical footprint with the USNORTHCOM Command Surgeon for inclusion in the tasking order. If tasked for medical missions beyond direct support to the deployed U.S. force, design the medical footprint required and coordinate with the USNORTHCOM Surgeon.

c. Coordinating Instructions. See Basic Plan.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Medical Materiel

(1) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the executive agent for supply and re-supply.

(2) Once an incident has occurred, CDRUSNORTHCOM will designate a lead agent for Class VIII supply/resupply activities.

(3) U.S. medical forces must deploy with supply levels consistent with Service doctrine. Deployed medical units will consider re-supply requests as soon as units are operational.

b. Reports. See annex R – Reports.

5. Command and Control. CDRUSNORTHCOM exercises directive authority for HSS logistics. All requests for medical support issued by the RTF will be made through USNORTHCOM to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) or the DTRA Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Cell (JNACC).

a. Command. CDRUSNORTHCOM accepts OPCON for medical forces assigned to the USNORTHCOM AOR with the exception of USTRANSCOM aeromedical evacuation forces. CDRUSTRANSCOM retains OPCON of aeromedical evacuation forces. The Director of the ASHG works directly for the RTF Commander. For the medical chain of command, the RTF Surgeon works directly for the USNORTHCOM Command Surgeon. Service Component surgeons remain available to provide guidance and assistance as requested.

b. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems. The Director of the ASHG in coordination with the Service Component Surgeon will consider taking some form of automated processing capability in addition to the automation provided by the RTF. Early communication is critical to ensuring medical support to the RTF is right sized and otherwise appropriate for the mission.

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Commander, USNORTHCOM

Appendixes

1 -- Joint Patient Movement System - TBP
2 -- Joint Blood Program - TBP
3 – Hospitalization - TBP
4 -- Returns to Duty - TBP
5 -- Medical Logistics (Class 8A) System - TBP
6 -- Force Health Protection - TBP
7 -- Medical Command, Control, Communications, and Computers - TBP
8 -- Host-Nation Health Support - TBP

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ANNEX R TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
REPORTS

References: a. CJCSM 3150.03B, 28 July 2003, "Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports, 28 July 2003."
b. DOD 3150.8-M "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP), 22 February 2005."

1. Purpose. This annex sets forth the reporting procedures that must occur during a nuclear weapon accident response. It describes the reporting requirements and the process to identify, and track activities to coordinate effectively with units.

2. Mission. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the Department of Defense (DOD) response and recovery for DOD nuclear weapon accidents within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area . The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will provide CDRUSNORTHCOM with current operational, logistical, and personnel information on deployed response elements.

3. Concept of Operations

a. Reporting Channels.

(1) The focal point for initial DOD reporting is the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The OPREP-3 Pinnacle BROKEN ARROW initial report will be submitted to the NMCC. Units making the report may copy their parent Directorates/Staff Offices on correspondence, as required.

(2) NMCC will forward the OPREP-3 via conference call to all appropriate national level officials and Agencies, including operations centers of the Military Services, the appropriate Combatant Commands, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), Department of State (DOS), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ/FBI), and other Federal Agencies, as appropriate.

b. Types of Reports. The following reports are required in a nuclear weapon accident response.

(1) OPREP-3 PINNACLE

(a) The OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW report is used to initially report a nuclear weapon accident to the NMCC.

(b) The lowest level of command having knowledge of the accident and access to communications provides the OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW voice report to the NMCC (Ref a). Procedures for submitting the SITREP are in the Basic Plan, Annex X.

(c) A hard copy message report shall also be communicated to the NMCC.

(2) Daily Situation Reports (SITREPs). The SITREP is the primary report submitted by the Response Task Force (RTF) Commander to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center and the NMCC. This daily report includes basic information about the situation, current and future activities, and logistical and personnel status and requirements. Procedures for submitting the SITREP are in the Basic Plan, Annex X.

(3) Media Reports. Media reports information; see the Basic Plan, Annex F, Public Affairs.

c. Classification

(1) The OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW will be classified at a minimum of Secret when it includes specific weapon information. The format is unclassified.

(2) SITREPs will be kept at the unclassified level whenever possible. Classification determination will be made by the reporting unit. All classified reports will be marked accordingly with overall classification and appropriate portion markings.

d. Responsibilities

(1) Reporting Command

(a) The nearest military installation's command center having knowledge of the accident will submit the OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN

ARROW voice report to the NMCC within 15 minutes of accident occurrence in accordance with CJCSM 3150.03B, reference a.

(b) A hard copy message of the accident shall be communicated to the NMCC within one hour of accident occurrence to amplify conditions at the accident scene and to give an updated status of response actions.

(2) NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center

(a) Compile and maintain SITREPs and other reporting information on deployed units.

(b) Responsible for keeping CDRUSNORTHCOM updated on the status of the response.

(3) RTF Commander

(a) The RTF Commander is responsible for providing updates to Commander USNORTHCOM and the NMCC. These reports may be written, conference calls, or video teleconferences (VTCs).

(b) The RTF Commander will maintain 'open line' reporting to the Commander USNORTHCOM and the NMCC.

(4) Downrange units will be responsible for submitting timely, accurate information to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.

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ANNEX V TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-08 (NC-NARP)
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

References: a. DOD Directive 3150.8, "DOD Response to Radiological Accidents," 13 Jun 1996
b. DOD 3150.8-M "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," 22 Feb 2005
c. "National Response Framework," Jan 2008

1. Situation and Mission

a. General. The Interagency process allows integrated planning and clarifies lines of responsibility between United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Coast Guard (USCG), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Agriculture (USDA), and many other governmental and non-governmental agencies. NC-NARP execution requires the support of many agencies. Failure to integrate planning early will cause seams in synchronization of agency efforts, may cause shortfalls in resources needed to support mission accomplishment, and may jeopardize the overall success of the DOD nuclear weapon accident response.

b. Purpose. This annex provides interagency coordination procedures for USNORTHCOM. This annex, in conjunction with Annex A to this CONPLAN, identifies Agency Partners who are required or requested to support nuclear weapon accident response missions.

c. Scope of Interagency Coordination. The extent and level at which interagency assistance will be needed will vary depending on the nature and scope of the nuclear weapon accident. The realm of possibilities range from a minor nuclear weapon accident to a nuclear weapon accident with a release of radioactive material. The National Response Framework (NRF) assumes that accidents are typically managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level. From the USNORTHCOM perspective the underlying principal in terms of interagency coordination is to respond to the accident at the lowest level possible while ensuring that communication and coordination remains open to all appropriate agency partners.

d. Mission. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the DOD response and recovery for DOD nuclear weapon accidents within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area. NORAD-USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Directorate (NC/IC) will integrate and synchronize USNORTHCOM interagency activities to ensure mutual understanding, unity of effort and full spectrum support in all phases of CDRUSNORTHCOM directed nuclear weapon accident response.

e. Objective. Ensure integration between the Initial Response Force (IRF) Commander/Response Task Force (RTF) Commander and interagency organizations at the accident site, to include DOD, DHS, DOE, Department of Justice (DOJ) / Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and all other partner agency stakeholders.

2. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Commander's Intent for Interagency Coordination. The purpose of N-NC/IC operations is to coordinate the full range of partner agency activities to ensure an integrated response to assist CDRUSNORTHCOM in responding to a nuclear weapon accident in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(2) Major Areas of Partner Agency Response by Phase

(a) Phase 1 Notification and Deployment. See Annex C (Operations) for military operations associated with this phase. Key to the success of the notification and deployment phase will be notification of all appropriate agency partners and alerting partner agency specialized response assets. During this phase of the operation, USNORTHCOM, in conjunction with the agency partners, will:

1. Stand up the Interagency Coordination Group (ICG) as a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (24/7) operating cell.

2. Facilitate requests for partner agencies to alert specialized response assets (for example, DOE's Accident Response Group (ARG) and EPA's Emergency Response Team (ERT)).

3. Increase intelligence and information sharing to develop a single, integrated operations picture with situational awareness.

4. Request appropriate partner agency augmentation to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and the ICG.

(b) Phase II Initial Response, Phase III Site Consolidation, and Phase IV Weapons Retrieval Operations. See Annex C (Operations) for military operations associated with this phase. Key to the success of these phases will be successful interagency coordination with civil authorities at all levels. During this phase of the operation, USNORTHCOM, in conjunction with the agency partners, will:

1. Provide enhanced situational awareness to CDRUSNORTHCOM and Staff as well as agency partners.

2. Facilitate requests for partner agency response assets, as necessary.

3. Integrate appropriate partner agencies into the JIACG and the ICG.

4. Increase intelligence and information sharing to develop a single, integrated operations picture with situational awareness.

(c) Phase V Site Remediation. See Annex C (Operations) for military operations associated with this phase. Interagency coordination main effort is to ensure desired end state from state and local officials is achieved. During this phase, long-term remediation responsibilities will be assigned to the responsible Service/SecDef approved federal agency in accordance with the procedures outlined in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF for extensive site remediation actions. During this phase of the operation, USNORTHCOM, in conjunction with the agency partners, will:

1. Continue appropriate actions from Phases I-IV

2. Provide the Commander with situational awareness of transition requirements from DOD and agency partners for mutual support.

3. Facilitate the execution of DOD support to the primary or coordinating agencies through interagency coordination as required.

4. Provide interagency coordination for DOD requirements/actions in transition operations where DOD is the coordinating agency.

b. Responsibilities

(1) NORAD-USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Directorate (N-NC/IC).

(a) Conduct liaison with Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies to support nuclear weapon accident response and execution of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505.

(b) N-NC/IC may coordinate through the National Guard Bureau, law enforcement representatives or CDRUSNORTHCOM appointed coordinating officer to liaison with non-federal entities.

(c) N-NC/IC can establish liaison with state, tribal, and local agencies and organizations as required to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

(d) Include Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) in all interagency coordination efforts as the primary SecDef delegate for DOD-Interagency coordination.

(2) Other USNORTHCOM Directorates (Recommended responsibilities). N-NC/J2/J4/J5/J6/J7/JA/SG and NC/J3 provide a representative to the JIACG.

c. Recommended Interagency Actions. This CONPLAN cannot task the interagency partners. As signatories of the National Response Framework (NRF), USNORTHCOM partner agencies are cooperating agencies when responding to a nuclear weapon accident in the USNORTHCOM AOR (when DOD has custody of the weapon). When notified by the coordinating agency (DOD in this case), cooperating agencies are responsible for participating in planning and conducting operations in support of the coordinating agency. The following are recommendations for interagency partner actions when supporting USNORTHCOM led response to a nuclear weapon accident. See Basic Plan, Appendix 1 to this Annex, the NRF, and DOD 3150.8-M (Ref. b) for more specific recommended agency actions and assets.

(1) Department of Energy (DOE)

(a) Designate technical personnel, supporting equipment and resources to support the NARP mission.

(b) Acquire, maintain, and make available any special equipment and capabilities required to provide the necessary scientific and technical assistance

(2) Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

(a) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Designate technical personnel, supporting equipment and resources to support the NARP mission.

(b) United States Coast Guard (USCG). Designate technical personnel, supporting equipment and resources to support the NARP mission.

(3) Department of Justice (DOJ) - Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Designate and assign appropriate FBI personnel and resources to support the NARP mission.

(4) Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Designate technical personnel, supporting equipment and resources to support the NARP mission.

(5) Environmental Protection agency (EPA). Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to deploy in support of the NARP mission.

(6) Department of State (DOS). Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to deploy in support of the NARP mission.

3. Coordinating Instructions

a. Agencies desiring personal representatives to NORAD-USNORTHCOM JIACG should contact the JIACG support group at (719) 554-4615. The JIACG is typically held at Building 2 on Peterson AFB. Agencies can also attend the JIACG remotely via Secure Video Teleconferencing (SVTC).

b. The Interagency Coordination Group (ICG) is the staff element that stands up in times of crises or when directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM. Manning requires 4 individuals as a minimum for 24/7-coverage, 6-8 is recommended for sustained (2+ weeks) operations.

c. Agency representatives should possess a SECRET clearance; TS-SCI is required for full access. Representatives with less than a SECRET clearance will have reduced access to operational and planning information.

d. Agency representatives should possess a broad and current knowledge of agency organization, operations and procedures and possess appropriate access to agency data.

e. Specialized agency communications requirements should be deployed with the representative(s).

f. Agency representatives will not be expected to deploy from the N-NC headquarters location.

g. Units and Services within DOD have memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with other federal agencies and non-governmental agencies. Those MOAs will be executed as appropriate.

4. Sustainment. USNORTHCOM provides workspace for representatives and Information Technology (IT) support for internally supported networks and systems. Agencies will retain administrative support responsibilities for their representatives.

5. Command and Communications

a. Command. Agency representatives remain under the control of the agency to include tasking authority. USNORTHCOM will request representatives to provide needed agency information.

b. Communications. Specialized agency communications requirements should be provided by the agency for their representatives' use.

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December 2007

ANNEX X TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3505-07 (NC-NARP)
OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST

References: a. DOD Directive 3150.8, "DOD Response to Radiological Accidents, 13 Jun 1996."
b. DOD 3150.8-M, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures, 22 Feb 2005."
c. National Response Plan (NRP), and NRP Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, December 2004.
d. National Incident Management System, 1 Mar 2004.

1. General

a. Purpose. Appendix 1 to this annex is the Operational Checklist, used by the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center for operations executed by CDRUSNORTHCOM to direct and coordinate the Department of Defense (DOD) response to nuclear weapon accidents in U.S. Territory or territorial waters within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area.

b. Mission. On order, CDRUSNORTHCOM directs and coordinates the DOD response and recovery for U.S. nuclear weapon accidents within the USNORTHCOM-designated Operational Area.

c. You may contact the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center land desk at 719-554-2359.

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Appendix
1 - Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Operational Checklist

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Major General, USA
Director of Operations

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NO. 307	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED (SECRET when filled in)	OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST	PAGE 1 of 6

SUBJECT: Appendix 1 to Annex X to NC-NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE

DATE: April 08

REFERENCE: LOCAL PROCEDURES

VALIDATION:

ACTION	POS	COMP	CHECKLIST ITEM

NOTE: THIS CHECKLIST APPLIES TO ALL NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS REGARDLESS OF TYPE OF MATERIAL OR CUSTODY (DOD/DOE). IT APPLIES TO ALL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REGARDLESS OF GRADE, USE OR TRANSPORTATION METHOD.

AS REQD ___ *1. COPY THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:_____(NAME)

ORGANIZATION:_____

DSN/COMM TELEPHONE NUMBER:_____

INCIDENT TYPE:_____
(SPILL / LOSS / THEFT / DETONATION / ETC)

TIME OF OCCURRENCE_____

LOCATION:_____

IS LOCATION A MILITARY INSTALLATION? (YES / NO)

TYPE OF MATERIAL OR WEAPON SYSTEM:_____

IS THE MATERIAL SECURED?_____

HAS THERE BEEN A RADIATION LEAK? (YES / NO)

IF THE LOCATION WAS AT AN OFF BASE LOCATION, HAS THE AREA BEEN DELARED A NATIONAL DEFENSE AREA? (YES / NO)

WHO OWNS THE MATERIAL AT TIME OF THE INCIDENT(DOE / DOD)?

WAS THE MATERIAL BEING TRANSPORTED? (YES / NO) IF SO, HOW?_____ (MILITARY OR DOE)

OPR: NC/J33

DISTRIBUTION: ALL N-NC Cmd Center CREW POSITIONS (7), RELOCATION BINDERS (2), MASTER CHECKLIST BINDER (1)

SUBJECT: Appendix 1 to Annex X to NC-NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE

DATE: April 08

REFERENCE: LOCAL PROCEDURES

VALIDATION:

ACTION	POS	COMP	CHECKLIST ITEM

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:_____

_____

LN ___ 2. OPEN CHECKLIST 401 AND PREPARE FOR A DEC/DTC LAND EVENT CONFERENCE.

CC ___ 3. IF NOTIFICATION WAS NOT RECEIVED VIA THE N-NC COMMAND CENTER:

CC ___ A. NOTIFY THE DEO AND ENSURE THE N-NC COMMAND CENTER WILL NOTIFY THE CDR / DCDR.

CC ___ B. REQUEST A COPY OF ALL INCIDENT OPREP-3 REPORTS.

CC ___ C. VERIFY THE N-NC COMMAND CENTER WILL TRANSMIT OPREP-3 REPORTS AS NECESSARY. (FOR NUDETS STRATCOM WILL REPORT)

CC ___ 4. NOTIFY: _____ NC J33 _____ NC J3

ALL ___ 5. IMPLEMENT THE COG NOTIFICATION TEMPLATE.

CC ___ 6. IF THE MATERIAL IS UNDER THE CUSTODY OF DOE AND THEY HAVE NOT ALREADY BEEN NOTIFIED, NOTIFY THEM AT COMM; 505-845-6952.

CC/SEC ___ 7. IF THE INCIDENT APPEARS TO BE A TERRORIST RELATED:

SEC ___ A. EVALUATE IF THE EVENT MEETS BLUE DART CRITERIA, AND IF SO, OBTAIN APPROVAL TO IMMEDIATELY TRANSMIT A BLUE DART MESSAGE.

SEC ___ B. CONSIDER CHANGING THE FPCON FOR THE REGION AFFECTED OR WORLDWIDE.

CC ___ C. CALL THE DEO WITH A DOMESTIC EVENT/DOMESTIC THREAT CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION AND RECOMMEND THREAT ASSESSMENT. IF A VOL VI CONFERENCE IS INITIATED OPEN CHEKLIST 401

SUBJECT: Appendix 1 to Annex X to NC-NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE

DATE: April 08

REFERENCE: LOCAL PROCEDURES

VALIDATION:

ACTION	POS	COMP	CHECKLIST ITEM
CC		___	8. IF THE INCIDENT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO IMPACT OR THREATEN NORTH AMERICA OR U.S. FORCES, RECOMMEND THROUGH THE DEO THAT A SIGNIFICANT EVENT CONFERENCE BE CONVENED. IF A VOL VI CONFERENCE IS INITIATED OPEN CHEKLIST 401
LN		___	9. HAS AN IRF BEEN DISPATCHED TO THE INCIDENT LOCATION? **(YES / NO)**. IF YES, WHERE WERE THEY DISPATCHED FROM: (OBTAIN THIS INFO FROM THE NMCC / JNAIRT AT DSN 228-3000) ___ALERTED ___DEPLOYING ___ON-SITE IRF HOME STATION:_____
SEC		___	10. HAS NMCC DEPLOYED THE RTF **(YES / NO)**. IF YES, WHICH RTF:_____ WHO IS THE RTF CC:_____ HAS THE RTF/CC BEEN PROVIDED REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS TO USNORTHCOM (YES / NO) ***STANDARD REPORTING TIMES ARE 1500Z AND 0100Z.*** USE THE CONTACT NUMBERS BELOW FOR NOTIFYING THE CORRECT RTF: **FOR USAF RELATED INCIDENTS:** AIR FORCE OPS CTR "AFOC" DSN:227-6103 OR COMM:703-695-6103 AIR FORCE HAS 2 RTFS – CONUS RTF (ACC @ LANGLEY, VA) ICBM RTF (AFSPC @ PETERSON, CO) **FOR NAVAL RELATED INCIDENTS:** NAVAL OPS CTR "NOC" COMM:703-614-1114 NAVY HAS 2 RTFS - RTF EAST (JACKSONVILLE, FL) AND RTF WEST (BANGOR, WA)

OPR: NC/J33

DISTRIBUTION: ALL N-NC Cmd Center CREW POSITIONS (7), RELOCATION BINDERS (2), MASTER CHECKLIST BINDER (1)

SUBJECT: Appendix 1 to Annex X to NC-NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE

DATE: April 08

REFERENCE: LOCAL PROCEDURES

VALIDATION:

ACTION	POS	COMP	CHECKLIST ITEM
			RTF HOME STATION:_____
CC			11. DIRECT WX TO PROVIDE A WEATHER REPORT FOR THE INCIDENT AREA. ENSURE FOCUS IS ON WIND SPEED, WIND DIRECTION AND PRECIPITATION FOR THE NEXT 72 HRS(CONTACT DTRA AT DRSN:427-7817, COMM:703-767-2003) WIND SPEED_____ DIRECTION:_____ FORECAST:_____
SEC			12. CONTACT DTRA AT DRSN:427-7817, COMM:703-767-2003, WITH AS MUCH DATA AS POSSIBLE TO BEGIN HAZARD MODELING. ALSO NOTIFY J34 TO ASSIST WITH DTRA LIAISON. ____A. LOCATION ____B. CONTAMINATION SOURCE (CESIUM, PLUTONIUM, ETC) -WEAPON LINE NUMBER -WEAPON TYPE -MATERIAL (CESIUM, PLUTONIUM, ETC ____C. DISSEMINATION METHOD (EXPLOSIVE, LEAK, ETC) ____D. MITIGATION IN PLACE (SHIELDING, ETC)
CC			13. DIRECT THE COP TO DISPLAY THE PROJECTED HAZARD DATA, . LISTING WHO PROVIDED IT, E.G. DTRA HPAC, LLNL NARAC, OR THE APPROVED IMAAC PRODUCT. INCLUDE IN THE COP PICTURE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ____A. MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS ____B. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ____C. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ____D. HOSPITALS ____E. PROJECTED POPULATION NUMBERS (BOTH AT THE SCENE AND DOWNRANGE) ____F. AIRFIELDS WITH THEIR RUNWAY CAPABILITIES
CS			14. IF JNAIRT HAS PASSED RESPONSIBILITY TO USNORTHCOM AND THE

SUBJECT: Appendix 1 to Annex X to NC-NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE

DATE: April 08

REFERENCE: LOCAL PROCEDURES

VALIDATION:

ACTION	POS	COMP	CHECKLIST ITEM

RESPONDING TEAM REQUIRES TRANSPORTATION, NOTIFY TRANSCOM TO HAVE AIRLIFT ASSETS AVAILABLE.

CC ____ 15. UPON J3 NOTIFICATION, DETERMINE IF BATTLE STAFF IS TO BE FORMED. IF SO,OPEN CHECKLIST 201 AND DETERMINE WHICH EGGS ARE TO BE RECALLED:

_____ CEB _____ COG _____ OPG _____ JPG
_____ JSG _____ CPOC _____ ISG _____ ICG

BATTLE STAFF IN-PLACE TIME:_____

FIRST BRIEF DUE TIME:_____

AS REQD ____ 16. OPEN CHECKLIST 501 AND BEGIN PREPARATION OF THE CEB BRIEF.

AS REQD ____ 17. MONITOR THE SITUATION FOR DEVELOPING EVENTS UNTIL RESOLUTION. IF THE SITUATION DICTATES, RE-ACCOMPLISH THIS CHECKLIST AND ALL NOTIFICATIONS.

ALL ____ 18. LOG ALL ACTIONS, CLEAN CHECKLIST.

AMPLIFYING DATA: NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENTS WILL BE REPORTED AS ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPREP-3 REPORTS. OPREP-3PNF HAS THE MOST STRINGENT REPORTTING TIMING REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS 5 MINUTES FOR THE VOICE REPORT AND 15 MINUTES FOR THE HARDCOPY. PINNACLE NUCFLASH IS USED TO REPORT ONLY THE MOST SERIOUS NUCLEAR ACCIDENT:

OPREP-3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH (OPREP-3PNF). USED BY ANY UNIT TO REPORT A SITUATION THAT COULD LEAD TO THE OUTBREAK OF A NUCLEAR WAR.

OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW (OPREP-3PBA). USED BY ANY UNIT TO REPORT A US NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT THAT DOES NOT CREATE THE RISK OF A NUCLEAR WAR.

ACTION	POS	COMP	CHECKLIST ITEM
			OPREP-3 PINNACLE EMPTY QUIVER (OPREP-3PEQ). USED BY ANY UNIT TO REPORT THE SEIZURE, THEFT, OR LOSS OF A US NUCLEAR WEAPON.
			OPREP-3 PINNACLE EMERGENCY DISABLEMENT (OPREP-3PED). USED BY ANY UNIT TO REPORT THE COMMAND DISABLEMENT OR NONVIOLENT DISABLEMENT OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
			OPREP-3 PINNACLE EMERGENCY EVACUATION (OPREP-3PEV). USED BY ANY UNIT TO REPORT THE EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
			OPREP-3 BENT SPEAR (OPREP-3BS). USED TO REPORT INCIDENTS INVOLVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT ARE OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST, BUT ARE NOT CATEGORIZED AS PINNACLE NUCFLASH OR PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW.
			OPREP-3 FADED GIANT (OPREP-3FG). USED BY ANY UNIT TO REPORT NUCLEAR REACTOR OR RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS.
			(DULL SWORD (DS). USED BY ANY UNIT TO REPORT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SERVICE GUIDELINES, A NUCLEAR WEAPON EVENT NOT CATEGORIZED AS AN ACCIDENT

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