CHAPTER XV

Pentagon III

A: On the 24th of November 1953, I was sworn in as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Intelligence. They gave me a few days' leave; I made a couple of short trips, and understudied my predecessor. General Dick Partridge was a fine officer but he'd been put on the spot by Senator McCarthy for lack of either interest in or knowledge about communism, which became an important subject in those days. Apparently that resulted in his being given a change of station and my being brought in to replace him.

Q: Can I ask you why you were being brought in? Had you become known for your very articulate comments concerning the threat?

A: Well, I don't know about the articulate comments, but I certainly was known as a person who had very great concern about the advance of world communism and the Russians using it as a vehicle for world domination. As a matter of fact, these feelings had come to the surface, I guess, a number of times -- even during World War II, when some of us in the Pentagon saw this threat arising, while they were supposedly our great allies. This may have had something to do with it. I never was really told and I don't really know.

Q: At the time that you were called to Washington, Bob Stevens was Secretary of the Army, General Ridgway was Chief of Staff, and General Bolte was the Vice Chief of Staff. General Weible was the Deputy Chief of Operations and Administration.

A: Weible might well have had something to say about it. Weible was very close to General Ridgway, and of course, as I said, I'm sure Ridgway was an important factor in my selection as Deputy Commandant of the War College. He'd given me the opportunity with the 1st Cavalry Division, so undoubtedly all of those people had something to do with it. Secretary Stevens had visited my division during combat; Henry Cabot Lodge, Secretary Dulles, and naturally a great number of people had been up to that division.

Q: I've had a letter that I didn't discuss with you from Secretary Stevens. Actually, he visited you twice. I

think it is an important relationship that begins to develop here between you and him.

A: Well, I had the highest regard for him and it could possibly be that he was the man; I'll never know.

Q: Well, I'm asking these questions for one reason, and that is that it appears to me that if a man makes his reputation -- if he has established it -- his name probably appears on the lips of men when they're looking for somebody. It's obvious you weren't looking for this job, but it is also interesting that Stevens had visited you not too long before. You were well known to Ridgway, and Weible was on the staff; obviously these were men who respected you and thought you could do the job.

What happened when you got to the Pentagon? How were you greeted, what was your briefing, and what were the ground rules laid down? What was the problem?

A: Well, the main problem as it existed at the time, or at least the one that came into the most discussions, of course, was Senator McCarthy. I had met him before; I didn't know him very well, but I met with him on a few occasions. (Interviewer hands an organization chart to the general.) Well, since I'm looking at the organization chart here, Bob Schow was a man who had long experience in G-2 and as an attache. Frederick had a good background on foreign operations. Paxton was an Engineer, I had known him before. All in all, it was a small but competent office. I think General Bolling had it before General Partridge.

Q: Was Colonel Lemley there?

A: I'm not sure that he would have been there then. I brought him in there later. The problem concerning us at the moment was probably how to approach McCarthy. At that time he was making these serious attacks on the Army about Fort Monmouth, about General Zwicker and some of his operations. I remember being called to the first meeting. He came over to the Pentagon and we had a meeting. It was a luncheon-sandwich-type meeting, with the Secretary of the Army (Secretary Stevens), General Ridgway, myself, Senator McCarthy, and Roy Cohen, his attorney. This was the time that he was making charges against the Army. I feel that others outside of the Army very skillfully built up

the Army-McCarthy struggle in order to get people's minds off other things he was doing, such as trying to ferret out numerous Communists who then certainly did exist in government together with people having that leaning and inclination. I felt at that time that, rightly or wrongly, there was fire here; there was no question about it. He was making some serious charges against the Army. Secretary Stevens, who is rather a gentle man and a gentleman, too, was modest but really incensed at the attack on one of his officers. I think he had a right to be. So out of this grew that great struggle that became the McCarthy Hearings of the next April. The Army, to my mind, was used as a vehicle to move the scene away from what McCarthy was trying to do, to surface to a greater extent the Communist threat to this country. And they succeeded. McCarthy, to a considerable extent, and Cohen along with him, and Shine, one of his boys, are to some extent to blame, too, because neither their strategy nor their tactics were conducive to alerting the public interest. On the other hand, the powerfully integrated forces opposing McCarthy -- opposing the surfacing of the real Communist threat to this country -- were not to be discounted either. They prevailed. It's a very strong statement, I know.

Q: I was going to ask you if the Army was being used. Was General Trudeau used?

A: No, no, I wasn't. The circumstances had occurred before I was there. I was even excused from the McCarthy Hearings the next April, when I found myself in the Middle East on a month's trip. I was not even present at any of the McCarthy Hearings. The Army was the stalking horse.

Q: I'm interested in your comment that the Army was used. Was the attack on Zwicker?

A: The attack was on Zwicker, and Stevens made it an attack on him -- as it was on the Army as a whole -- and he stood up valiantly. As a matter of fact, I wish the civilian heads of the Defense Department and of the Army would stand up as valiantly today for their officers. Civilian control is fine, but I think civilian responsibilities lie there, too. And I think responsibility normally means defending your subordinates the best you can -- your family, you know. Well, we'd better leave that alone, because we're in the midst of it again.

Q: I want to get with the beginning before we really get with the main issue. Do you want to talk about the Davies Board, Doolittle and Clark?

A: That came somewhat later, I think. Davies, I suppose that's Paul Davies of FMC. I'd almost forgotten about that one. The other boards came later. The Doolittle and Clark Board were investigations of the CIA and I think they were a little bit later in my career, because here I'm just barely beginning to get into things, you see. The Davies Board I don't quite place as such, but I remember that there was a board in the early days. It seemed to me that Karl Compton may have been the head of it, but again I'm not sure. Scientists were always concerned about secrecy -- nothing could be a secret, nothing could be classified -- and they were giving us a rough time, particularly in G-2, when it was quite obvious that some things did need to be classified. You can argue this point all day, of course; it's been argued for years, so there is nothing that I can gain here by discussing it. But this was one of the problems that we had at the moment.

Q: Let me ask you a question in reference to your job. G-2 has changed, and ACSI doesn't have the same responsibilities that it had when you were there. You had a tremendous responsibility for the entire attache system worldwide. Maybe we should just start our discussion of G-2 with a little survey of the responsibilities that the office had at the time that you moved into it.

A: Well, first -- and then we can leave it aside for the moment -- was the question of internal security, particularly as applied to industrial security. That was quite a problem, because our industrial capacity had been again expanded during the Korean War. Industrial security became a big problem, so this was quite a strong side of the house. Furthermore, we had records on subversives and on others in some detail. I hope to God they don't destroy them all because, after all, there's information on a lot of people in this country that should be kept on file and not destroyed just because Senator Ervin wants them destroyed. They're not there unless they're true, and they're not there unless they record something that is adverse to the overall security of the country. I hate to see this sort of destruction. I'm not saying that we may not have overstepped our bounds and got

overly enthusiastic in the last few years. I'm not qualified; I haven't been tied into that at all. I think in ferreting out the troublemakers in this country -- the people who are subversive, the people who resort to violence, and to other actions that are criminal and affect the nation's security, the security of executives in our country, or the security of the capital if that's involved -- while that is not the Army's primary responsibility, everybody in intelligence should lend their shoulders to the wheel. Now, as to personnel standards, I have a little note on that. I observed -- not particularly the people on the staff, but as I moved around to more than 50 different countries and observed our attaches of all services -- I was impressed that there was too much mediocrity in the overall intelligence set-up for it to be a really successful operation. The old concept of an attache was that he was off on a nice cushy job with a lot of expense funds and generally he dealt with his military counterparts and the socially elite. This was all fine, and occasionally he had something to report that was meaningful. To me there was a changing concept of what an attache needed to be and to do. The result was that, I guess, I moved a few people. I also had an arrangement -- and I was quite insistent about it -- that I be given a better choice of officers for the higher jobs. I made my ideas stick. I had a second objective in that intelligence had never been highly respected by the high command of the Army for the most part. That was one reason that the people who engaged in intelligence never got to the top. The reason for that was that the people who engaged in intelligence were really just not the top officers of their grade who were going on to be the generals. So I decided that, if intelligence was ever going to have its appropriate place in the Army, we had to start bringing in, at as early an age and rank as possible, extremely capable officers who could rise to the top, who, through mid-career and cross-career training, had an opportunity to become general officers. I've lived long enough now to see that materialize. It was one of the better things that I did for G-2. It was based on the caliber of personnel that I insisted be provided to my office, and I hope that still persists. Language training I was very keen on. I'm not the linguist that Max Taylor is, but I did a lot to build up the language training in the Army. I had done it during the war in establishing language training at the University of Minnesota and other places where I had

ASTP and was the Director of Training for the Service Forces. The importance of languages to me was first grade, and that's why we built up the system that we did; that has since been expanded in Monterey and other places.

Technical intelligence had never been adequately recognized. I hope it is today. The officers who were serving as attaches, by and large, were officers of the combat branches, I might say almost to the exclusion of technically trained officers. It seemed to me that there were certain places where it was more important to know what could be produced in a certain type of plant if you went by it in a street, than to be able to talk just to your opposite number in the uniform of the country you're in about the order of battle -- which is practically an open and shut case in damn near all countries that you serve in, unless it's behind the Iron Curtain. Even if you're behind the Iron Curtain, I still maintain that it is, I'd say, equally important -- if not more so -- to recognize whatever you can see or are permitted to see in Russia than it is to determine the order of battle. I greatly expanded the number of technically trained officers in doing this, and it paid dividends to me later. When I became the Chief of Research and Development (R&D) a few years later, I looked to these same people who knew what the enemy had and had some technical background to come into R&D. There's nothing more logical than the cross-training, or particularly the cross-experiences and details between intelligence officers and R&D. They can't be one and the same or you compromise their value, depending on the job. So technical intelligence was greatly expanded. I found the foreign attaches to be a very interesting group of people and, as much as I could when we were together, I tried to treat them as fellow military officers doing their job with respect to the overt collection of military intelligence. I knew in some cases, of course, that this was not true. As a matter of fact, even the friendly ones ought to be looking for other information; we were not naive about that. I tried to prevent any feeling that attaches, even those representing countries inimical to our best interest, were not treated respectfully. There were certain conferences to which some were not welcome. Naturally I formed closer friendships with some of those who were allied to us than those who I knew were apparently our natural enemies. I guess that's the only way I can say it.

Q: The Soviet Union had a representation over here during the time that you were G-2. I know you had conversations with these people, though not very meaningful conversations, from what I've picked up from some of the records I read. The junior officers looked very superficial.

A: No, conversations were quite limited with those behind the Iron Curtain, less limited with some others. If we felt that they were going to serve with third parties -- third country intelligence -- and anything that we told them would go straight to the Soviet bloc, why naturally we were a little more reticent about what we discussed. This is understandably so, I'm sure. We set up a number of trips for them except for certain restrictions that had to be placed on the Soviets from time to time, because we believed in a quid pro quo situation. I mean, if our attaches had the opportunities for certain visits and trips and freedoms, that was fine; we extended the same courtesy. We finally tried to constrict them in those countries where our people were constricted; I think that's the only way you can play the game with these birds.

I found the visits to foreign countries, naturally, among the most interesting. My first was to Europe in 1954 -- January, I think. I went to most of our NATO countries in Western Europe and also to Scandinavia. One of the interesting things I recall about Sweden, for instance, was when I arrived there. I reported, of course, to my opposite number in the Swedish Army Staff. I was quickly taken to the Chief of Staff and then to the Chief of the Defense Staff, and then the next thing I knew I was in the Minister of Defense's Office, all in about 20 minutes. Well, I couldn't imagine what had caused this tremendous interest in my presence. I found out shortly, because the Defense Minister said -- and he spoke fine English as far as I could see; but for purposes of the record, I guess, he said -- "Do you mind if I address you through an interpreter?", and I said, "Of course not, Your Excellency." The gist of his conversation was this. He had just read our latest issue of Time magazine, which said that we really have the answer to all military problems now in the nuclear bomb, so you can forget about all ground forces. I said the latest issue, but it had probably been out two or three weeks; it hadn't been out long; it was relatively current. He was already under pressure for two

things: to reduce the length of service and also to reduce the number of men being drafted for compulsory service. This got a little bit hard to explain, and it's another reason why I've always thought that in any of our magazines, or in almost anything that we do that involves international relations, we ought to have someone who's the devil's advocate, who looks at it from the other side. Because we do say and write and distribute statements that sound absolutely stupid to the man on the other side because he's in a different position. For instance, with the Swedes right up against the Russian border, what were they supposed to do? Whose nuclear bomb? What would they do without forces on the ground? You could well see the man's concern, and this was a little hard to explain.

Q: Did you satisfy him?

A: I think so. I tried to put it in this context: that somebody was talking about the viewpoint from where the United States sat, and not from somebody who is up against the threat of an attack any minute across a land border. But it was not easy to do. I don't recall there was a reduction in the Swedish land forces at that time. They have a pretty good system. As a matter of fact, part of their farm equipment is subsidized so that their tractors can haul ammunition and supplies. Most of the ground force is civilianized and called to active duty when needed. They haven't fought a war in a long time, and I don't know how good they would be.

The other visits I made were extensive. These visits were set up to include Africa and the Middle East, the Pacific and Southeast Asia, and Latin America. They were organized to include people from all of the intelligence agencies. I succeeded with one exception: to be perfectly blunt, the CIA wouldn't have a representative go along unless they ran the show. I saw no reason for turning it over to them. I did have good collaboration. There was always an Air Force and a Navy representative of intelligence, also a State Department, FBI, Atomic Energy, and, on some of the trips, JCS representatives. We knew our area; we had a definite schedule, we had recording equipment and, sometimes, a secretary. We would travel with about eight or ten people. We'd take off for a month at a time; we would study our black books before we arrived in a country. We knew what we were looking

for. We had different people looking for the answers to different questions, or the same question(s) seeking confirmation from two or more different sources. They were very pleasant -- they were very tiring -- trips, but they were very successful. They were tiring particularly in Latin America, which was a long trip with little time in flight between countries. On the longer flights, where we had a few hours between each country, we'd get aboard and we'd all relax a bit. Then we'd get together, collaborate and record the notes we wanted to get down on the last stop, get out the black book on the next stop, and shift clothing if we needed to (this varied according to climates, of course). By the time we got to the next country we again knew what we were looking for. So, while we weren't in these countries long, it was a valuable orientation. I think it also resulted in some excellent contacts and some very good collection activity. I remember our trip to the Pacific and going to Indochina in July and August 1958. Dien Bien Phu had fallen by that time, but only in April of that year. In other words, it wasn't until we really let them off the hook in North Korea that their forces and supplies could be concentrated southward so that they were able to eventually cause the collapse of the French (which occurred nine months after the Korean Armistice).

An interesting aspect of this particular visit to Saigon to me was this: I got a call one night when I was in General Mike O'Daniel's (General O'Daniel was the MAAG Chief) quarters and I picked up the telephone. This voice said, "Just a minute, General Eli (the French Commissioner General and French Commander) wants to speak to you." He said, "Can you come over and have a cocktail with me?" and I said, "I think I can." He didn't invite General O'Daniel, but anyhow I reported that to General O'Daniel and I went over. What he was concerned about was that we were going to back Diem to head the effort in South Vietnam and he was making quite an issue about it. He said, "You're picking on the wrong man, you're picking on the wrong segment. I know you're over here to support this," which was giving me credit for more authority that I really had. He said, "I'm taking off for France at 8 PM tonight, but I want to get this message back to you Americans before I leave. I think it would be a serious mistake." Well, of course, they resented the fact that they were getting quite unwelcome and that we were getting more welcome over

there. I'm sure there are probably other points from his level that I didn't appreciate. But it was very interesting because, of course, shortly after that we did recognize Diem as the head of the government. We would have done better if we would have stuck behind him in 1963, instead of causing his demise. It's never been quite that satisfactory since. Despite the troubles with the little guy, you can't tell me that the power of the United States couldn't have really gotten him to where he would have accepted some of the Hao Hao and Cao Dai and some of the other sects into his government to some degree. I guess we have paid a price for it since.

Q: You made a comment that I want to question you about, that he gave you more credit than you were actually over there for. You've traveled in high circles, and you've been a responsible individual in many positions. Do you feel that the perception that others have of you -- that you have more authority than you really do have -- plays a very important role in dealings between countries? They really think you're capable of doing more than you actually can?

A: Yes, I think so. Let me go back . . . . I'll tell you a very amusing one. We were talking about Sweden a few minutes ago. One of the nights I was in Sweden our attache had a dinner out at his house for me. I had gotten to be very good friends during those two or three days with my opposite number, the Army Chief of Staff, General Ackerman. But in any event, the time came to go home and all day I had been plied with the question, "Who is going to be our next ambassador?" This was in addition to the Time magazine item I was telling you about. "Who is going to be our next ambassador?" "Well," I said, "I really don't know." They thought this was amazing that the Chief of Intelligence wouldn't know that. We were riding home and we had our schnapps and our aperitifs. We were doing all right and were on a first-name basis. Finally he's driving the car and he nudges me and says, "Now, Arthur, tell me who is going to be the next ambassador." I said, "I told you all day, I really don't know. I've been asked this question all evening and I really don't know. If I knew and couldn't tell you, I would tell that I know but can't tell you, but I don't know. Now why is this question coming up continuously?" We had just transferred our ambassador, Wally Butterworth, from Ambassador to Sweden to be, I think, Minister in London under Jock

Whitney. In other words, London wanted a career man there in the number two spot. Butterworth went there to take this job. He finally tells me, "Well, Norway has had a woman ambassador, Denmark has had a woman ambassador. We don't want a woman ambassador in Sweden." So there it was. But I was supposed to know that answer. He was sure that I was holding out on him a great secret. There had been a gap of maybe two months. Actually I think John Lodge was sent over. I think that was the sequence, if I remember rightly. That's been so many years, it's hard to remember . . . but these trips were quite fascinating.

On one to Africa, for instance, I started out in Rabat. I found all along that northern coast that the French governors of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were all French officers who had been with the TOA, the French Army on the Rhine, when I had the 1st Constabulary Brigade in Weisbaden. I had the most wonderful reception from these people because I had known all of them quite well. General Guillaume was Governor General of Morocco. General Cailles, Governor General of Algeria, who became the Inspector General of the French Army later, had been the Group Commander for the French forces in Germany. General Schuneukel was Governor General of Tunisia. This was a very interesting visit across the sweep of North Africa. You could see then that the French position was definitely deteriorating, which had been obvious ever since the war. I stopped in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli, then in Egypt.

This was the first time I'd been in Egypt and this was 1954. Our position looked as though it was deteriorating at the time. Nasser hadn't been in very long, less than a year. He wanted certain things from the United States, principally military logistic support. A senior member of our Defense Department had been over there recently. They had searched out the terms, but then the United States government refused them for reasons I'm not sure of. I'm afraid it is again that question of trying to insure a balance between Israel and Egypt and still keep both sides happy, which becomes a rather difficult thing to do. But in any event, things started in the other direction, and then shortly the Russians came to build the Aswan Dam. When I went back to Egypt a year later the Russians were just about to move in with naval power and military supplies. From there I went down to Ethiopia.

This was an interesting visit, because you remember I told you the Kagnew Battalion, the Emperor's troops, were under my command in Korea. I was royally welcomed by the Kagnew Battalion officers, who had great parties for me, and also by the Emperor personally. I remember an interesting little story about Haile Selassie. I went in to see him one morning and, of course, I was in uniform. But my FBI friend had to borrow a morning coat and striped trousers. (The State Department man did too, the civilians did, and then, I think, two other people -- our attache there, and one other -- came with me. The rest of my little mission didn't come in.) Anyhow, we marched down this long room where the lions used to be straining at you from the chains at the wall; you've seen pictures of it. We went in and you have to bow. There were six of us, so we bowed carefully inside the door, stopped and bowed half way down, and then we bowed again when we got in front of the Emperor. Well, the second bow was too much for my FBI friend, who weighed about 240 pounds. The borrowed striped trousers were a little too small for him; they completely split. He had on a morning coat with tails, so he covered that part of it, but he was uncomfortable for the rest of the half-hour or so he was in there. Well, anyhow, I had boned up on my French, which I had used to some degree in Germany but not fluently. I knew that with royalty you're supposed to use their language if you can, and they appreciate it if you do. I decided I'd do my best with Haile Selassie. So I did. I was getting along fairly well, and the rest of the group were excused, including the Ambassador. I was sitting relatively on a foot stool compared to Haile Selassie, which is the way royalty like to make you feel -- so you look up at them, you know; something like Mussolini and his high balcony. I was sitting there talking to the Emperor and I knew that he was coming to the United States shortly because I had been designated as his Presidential Aide by President Eisenhower. In G-2, you know, I had the function of nominating a general officer to be his aide, so I nominated one of my friends, George Smythe, who was the Deputy Commander of the Second Army, thinking he could be spared from that job. The Chief of Staff came back and said, "Well, his troops were under you. Why shouldn't you do it?" I said, "Okay." I didn't mind; it was really a very pleasant assignment. Well, anyhow, we got to talking and Haile Selassie said, "You know I'm coming to the United States?" Let's say, next month. I said,

"Yes, I know it, your Imperial Majesty, and I've already been designated as your aide by President Eisenhower." "Well," he said, "Is that so," and I said, "Yes." I don't think he knew it before, because when I left he was not satisfied with the quality of the gift he had planned to give me, and told his aide-de-camp or whatnot to take it back and get me a much better one, which was a magnificient one. In any event, to go on with it, he said, "Now tell me about my visit to the United States. Where am I going?" He probably knew all of this. I said, "Well, of course, we're to meet in New York when you come in." (He was coming in by ship.) I said, "We'll meet in New York, and we're going down to Washington to spend several days, with possibly a trip to Williamsburg and then Gettysburg; then we'll come back to New York and visit the UN." Then I said, "Then you're going to Canada and to the West Coast and to Oklahoma." (We were providing them agricultural support from the University). He said, "Oh, yes, that's fine. Are you going to Canada with me?" I said, "No, your Majesty, when you leave our country to go to Canada, I'll say good-bye at that time." "Well," he said, "Tell me about Canada." Well, I said, "Canada is a great country. It's larger than the United States in size but much smaller in population. It's a country with great natural wealth; they have oil, they have gold, they have timber, and they have wheat." He said, "And uranium, General?" Mind you, I'm still speaking in French -- trying to. I said, "Oh, yes, they have uranium in Canada, your Majesty." He said, "Tell me, General, does the United States use all of the uranium that's mined in Canada to make atomic bombs?" So I looked at him, and I said, "Your Imperial Majesty, that question is too delicate for my poor French. May I respond to you in English?" He said, "Yes, General, go ahead," so I tried to answer him in English as best I could and get us off the hook. He's quite a man; a very impressive man. There's a tremendous dignity in that man. I liked him very much. I had some wonderful days with him, about a week.

Q: I have a lot of pictures of your visit with him there, and then his visit here. I know I have pictures of your visit to the Military Academy.

A: The Military Academy, and then we went up to see John D. Rockefeller, I think, from the Military Academy that day. Then on Sunday we had a great trip which set the pace for something that I've forgotten to tell

you. We stayed in New York in the Towers of the Waldorf, and I'd go up each morning, having had my breakfast, and he'd be having his when I got there. He'd say, "Come in and sit down, General." I'd go in and have a cup of coffee with him. I'd always address him in French when I went in in the morning, and then I'd address him in French when I said good night. This particular morning was a Sunday morning, and I knew we were going to have a busy day. Being a Catholic, I went over to St. Patrick's, which is just a couple of blocks away. Then I went up with him to the Greek Orthodox Church, which is up around 125th Street, where he presented them with a Greek cross. We then went up to Eleanor Roosevelt's home in Hyde Park, where they had an Episcopalian service, and we drove down about 4:00 in the afternoon to the Abyssinian Baptist Church, where Adam Clayton Powell preached. I felt I'd had quite my day religious-wise, you know. I thought of it once later in connection with some stories, and it occurred to me then what happened in Korea.

In Korea I had Turkish troops -- in other words, Moslems. I had Catholic troops, I had Protestants. I mean, they mixed in as far as we were concerned with French and Belgian battalions and whatnot. And, of course, I had some Jewish boys in my division. The time came for Yom Kippur, and I was being visited by Harry Henshel, the head of the Bulova Watch Company, and two very prominent rabbis who were overlooking how things were handled for men of the Jewish faith. So we had this ceremony and meal during Yom Kippur, and I was there; it was after the war. I had all of the Jewish men in the division there. We were talking about religion and mutual understanding and respect for other people's ideas and beliefs. I gave them this talk, which was used later by one of the rabbis. I think his name was Lowenstein, but I'm not sure; very prominent in the Los Angeles area. I told them this: I said, "You know, I had quite a week here. On Friday our Arab friends have their ceremonies; on Saturday, of course, it's the Sabbath for the Jewish men of the division; On Sunday -- I'm Catholic -- I go to Catholic mass, and I try to attend one of the Protestant services in my division. And on Monday," -- and this is where the Thai Battalion came in -- I said, "we've got the Buddhists here on Monday. Now that's Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and Monday. If we could just get the Russians to pick up the other

three days, perhaps we could all live in peace together." It hit the point.

My visit to Ethiopia was very interesting, and I flew from there to Saudi Arabia. While I didn't meet with Ibn Saud, because I was over on the shore where the oil is, I did meet with Sheik Bin Jilui and some of the others from the Trucial States (United Arab Emirates) and along the Gulf. This was very interesting. I went to a party at the American Consul-General's house, I remember, at Dhahran, and here were these sheiks sitting inside. You could hardly get through, because all of their bodyguards had the door blocked and they were sitting on the stairways with their rifles between their knees in the home of our Consul-General. That's the way they do things. Now, it was a fascinating trip, very fascinating.

I think the other story that I'd like to tell in connection with that visit is when I went to Karachi and then to India, to Delhi. Then I flew west to Rawalpindi and went up to Peshawar and through the Khyber Pass over Afghanistan.

When I came back from Afghanistan it happened to be the night of the dedication and dinner at the Medical School at the University of Peshawar, which is just on the Pakistani side of the mountains there. I was invited to it because I had met General Ayub Khan, who was the Commander in Chief of their Army, but he hadn't yet risen to political power. I was invited to this dinner as one of the guests because the Governor General of Pakistan was there. He was the first Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, so I was very well treated; as a matter of fact, he used me as a sort of a foil to keep the provincial governors off his neck most of the evening. That's what really happened. So, after dinner -- and it was a long summer evening; not summer really, it was late April or early May -- we sat out with these beautiful Persian rugs, or the equivalent of them, on overstuffed furniture. I sat beside the old man, who had a bit of palsy; his mind was clear, but physically he was not in too good shape. He said to me, "Have you been to Karachi?", and I said, "Yes I have, your Excellency." He said, "Are you going back to Karachi?", and I said, "Yes, I am," and so I told him what I was seeking. I said, "Well, one of the things I'm looking for on this trip is not just the military aspects entirely, but I'd

like to learn something more about the philosophy of the men of the East." That apparently sank in. He said, "Well, when will you be in Karachi?" I told him whenever it was to be and he said, "You'll have dinner with me Monday night." I said, "Well, I'm sorry, your Excellency; your Minister of Defense is giving me a dinner on Monday night." The old man turned and looked at me and he said, "No, you'll have dinner with me Monday night," and I said, "Yes, Sir." So that was that. So I said to our attache who was with me -- his name was Wyman; he was a brother of the Congressman Wyman -- "Now get me off the hook on this. The old man says come, and so I'm coming." Well, anyhow, he started radioing and when we got to Karachi, whatever day that was, he said, "It's all fixed. The Governor General wants you for breakfast at the Presidency the next morning. We can go ahead with the dinner with the Defense Minister Monday night." So I did. The next morning I went out to the Residency and, knowing the sensitivity of the State Department (they had a political appointee as Ambassador), I thought I'd better take him along and tell him about it so I wouldn't be accused of lese majeste, which I was accused of later, anyway. So I took him and we went there and had breakfast. There was the Governor and his protocol man, whoever he was, and the Ambassador and myself. Toward the end of the breakfast somebody came in and whispered in the Governor General's ear. He said to me, "One of my men wants to meet you, General. If you'll follow my assistant here, he'll take you and then bring you right back." He said to the Ambassador, "You might as well stay here with me." He took me out, and what do I do? I sit down at a meeting with the Pakistan cabinet, who had the big question on their mind as to whether they could trust the military aid agreement with the United States, or whether it really interferes with the sovereignty of their country. The cabinet was headed at that moment by Zafrullah Khan, who is now a member of the World Court and was then the Finance Minister of Pakistan. There were about eight men there and they plied me with questions; they were all beautifully English-educated, so there was no problem. They plied me with questions as to what this meant, and how much it would interfere with their sovereignty. I think I finally assured them, because when I went back in, and before we left, somebody came in and whispered to the old man again. He said to me in a very meaningful way, and with a very meaningful handshake, how much he appre-

ciated my coming to breakfast. And now we get to the most important or interesting part of the story.

He said, "You told me in Peshawar that you wanted to learn something about the philosophy of the men of the East." I said, "That's right, your Excellency." He said, "Are you going to Turkey?" I said, "Yes." "When?" I guess it was in about ten days or two weeks, because I was stopping in all of the other countries in between. He said, "Would you take a message for me to one of my friends in Turkey? He's one of my dearest friends. He's an old man like I am and he's laid up with a broken hip." I said, "Certainly I will, your Excellency." When I left by plane that next day, he gave me not only the letter, but a lovely mahogany case with his inscribed photograph in a silver frame. Next I went to Iran, and when I got to Teheran I was advised that our AID agreement with Iraq was approved and that I could deliver my message in Baghdad. I carried that message to the then-Governor of Iraq. From there I went on to Jordan, Beirut, Cyprus, and then to Turkey. I was on a schedule in Turkey, because the State Department had been kind enough to invite me to attend a meeting of the Ambassadors of the Middle East, which was a fascinating session. Again, this non-career Ambassador from Pakistan was there. I called up the party that I was supposed to see and they said, "Yes, come and see us" at a certain time, some afternoon when the meeting's over. The individual in question was Rauf Orbay, who was the first Foreign Minister under Kemal Ataturk. Now we go back to 1923 -- way back a long time ago -- when he had been an admiral in the Turkish Navy. He was a very brilliant man. He'd risen to power, and recently he had fallen and broken his hip. When the Ambassador and I visited him that afternoon, I had a basket of fruit for him and the letter from Ghulam Mohammad. We rang the bell to his very modest apartment, went up a typical little French-type elevator, got off on his floor, and were met by a young man who was the old man's nephew and was taking care of him. We went into his apartment, which was very simple, and Monsieur Orbay was propped up in a brass bed just recovering from a broken hip. Across his bed he had what we would call a breakfast tray and some mail. I introduced myself and the Ambassador, presented him the basket of fruit and the letter, and he said, "Oh, do you mind if I read the letter from my old friend Ghulam?" We said, "Of course not, your Excellency." So the Ambassador and I

sat down, and he opened the letter and read it. Then he turned to me and he said, "General, you know this is one of the great days of my life." I said, "Well, how can that be, your Excellency?" "Well," he said, "I've received two letters today from my two dearest friends." "Well," I said, "That's wonderful; that is just wonderful, your Excellency." And he said, "You'd never guess who," and I said, "No, I couldn't." He said, "Well, you just brought me one from Ghulam," and I said, "Yes, that's right, and it gives me great satisfaction to do that." He said, "The other one is from Pacelli." (He's the Pope in Rome.) I said, "Your Excellency, that's amazing. How could that be?" He said, "Many years ago when we were representing our respective countries and I was a representative of India at the time, we were all stationed in Munich and Pacelli was there. I was there from Turkey and Ghulam was there from India and Pacelli was the Nuncio, and we've all been close friends all of our lives. Now I hear from both of them on the same day. I'm nothing, Ghulam is a Moslem and . . . ." It's a meaningful story in these days of ecumenicism.

One of the interesting special trips I made was to South Africa. I'd gotten acquainted with the South African Ambassador in Washington after I'd made several of these trips or while I was making them; he had been their Finance Minister. He was a very, very fine man indeed. And he said to me one night, "Don't you like my country?" I said, "Yes, I like South Africa very much. I think it's a very important country." (I still do, and for many reasons.) He said, "Well, why don't you go? Why haven't you been there? I understand you've been to most of the countries in the world." I said, "Well, really I try to go to all of the countries where we have diplomatic representation, but it's such a long way from Cairo to Capetown that I haven't tried to make that jump." (Of course, now you've got thirty more countries in Africa, but you didn't then.) So he said, "Would you go if my government invited you?". I said, "Yes, I'm sure I would and I think I could; I think the Army would send me." So lo and behold, an official government request comes through for my visit to South Africa, whereupon the State Department had to take off their glasses, or put them on, and look around and say what the hell's going on here, a military man to go down there. In any event, I was permitted to go, but I was only permitted to take an aide with me; State said they didn't want a military party down there.

But I went and it was a very valuable meeting. I think I was able to square them away on a lot of misconceptions that they had in very high places as to where their security lay. They thought their security was in building a DEW line, an early warning system at the northern border of South Africa, and I said, "Your security lies in the Middle East," which is where it does lie. So finally they saw the light. Of course, the South Africans have been difficult about dealing with other people; that's been one of the problems. But after that they took a brigade and had an exercise moving it from South Africa to Kenya -- to Nairobi -- and that's quite a little trip.

I think the other story that ought to get into the record has to do with my visit to Latin America, and here we visited all 20 of the Latin American countries in about six weeks. I started in early February -- or the last day of January -- which ran us through their carnival time; you know, February -- around Ash Wednesday. It was a pretty wild trip with the late hours they keep and the American habit of getting up early and working all day. We were absolutely exhausted when we finished. There were lots of valuable contacts made. In some places certain people tried to prevent me from seeing the top man but I succeeded in every case.

The highlight I'd like to tell is about the man that's now out of power, and I'm sure won't be back in; it's about Juan Peron and the Argentines. I flew into the Argentine and spent three or four very fine days with his ministers and generals. I didn't really expect to see Peron. While I'd had a considerable number of gifts of different types to give to people, depending on their level, I didn't have anything suitable for Peron, because I didn't expect to see him. My aide from the Argentine Army told me, "I think that the President is going to want to see you tonight." I said, "All right, I'll make myself available." Well, he didn't, but the aide came around and said, "No, he wants you to come out to Olivas, his summer place, tomorrow morning (Saturday morning) at 9:30." "Well," I said, "that's fine. I can do that." I didn't have any plans for the next morning. So I went out there with this aide the next morning and met Peron. He was in sports clothes; we sat down and had a good chat. I didn't chat about the military problems. Hell, I knew what his tables of organization were and his so-called order of battle and other conventional information. I

started talking to him about the economic development of his country and his relationship with the United States. We had a very interesting conversation, with the result that when I wanted to leave about 10:30 -- I'd been there an hour -- he said, "Oh, you can't go now. I want to talk more to you." We talked for another hour or so, and then I got up to leave, but he said, "I want you to see what I've got here." And this is all an area of playgrounds. We went out. There we met this girlfriend of his and the three of us walked around and watched all sorts of games and activities. It was a great outlet for youngsters, teen-agers mostly, and young people. When we got all through about noon we were down where he's got a marina and a little lake that the kids swim in. He said, "What are you doing this afternoon?" I said, "I'm going out on the La Plata with your Minister of War and some of your staff. He said, "Oh, you must go on my yacht." I replied, "Well, I'm sure the yacht they have is quite satisfactory." "No, General, you must go on my yacht," so we did the Alphonse-Gaston act a little bit. When I got down there, I found out I was on his yacht. We had a fine afternoon and we came back toward evening and went to see the championship soccer game between the Argentines and Uruguay; they were over from Montevideo. This turned out to be quite a long, drawn-out affair. After a light supper, the game started at 10:00 in their wonderful stadium with the moat around it, a moat about ten feet wide and ten feet deep so nobody could jump onto the field, they thought. In any event, the Argentines were leading 1 - 0 in the first period when the Urguayans also got a goal. But just before they got the goal, the whistle blew (Somebody was off-side or something.). The goal didn't count, whereupon the Urguayans all fell upon the British referee and beat him up. He was finally carried off the field and a general melee occurred. About 800 or 1,000 young people found that they could leap the barrier, and that field was a mess. The game was finally over about 1:30. I had to be very appreciative; I'd been in the box with Evita and Peron and his staff.

I finally arrived back in the United States after visiting several countries. We were traveling up the coast and went to Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, and Venezuela. We checked in to Panama again and visited all the countries in Central America. We made them all.

When I got back to the United States, I reported to General Ridgway, who had a great feeling for Latin America, and told him about all these visits. It was agreed that it would be appropriate for me to send something to Peron. I had a very lightweight revolver made up by Army Ordnance, with a walnut box for the revolver itself and a walnut box for the 50 cartridges, to send down to Peron. I sent it to the Army attache and said, "Please present this to President Peron whenever you have an opportunity." It had a brass plate on it -- not from me, but from the United States Army -- "with kindest regards" or something of the sort. The attache, who was Colonel Arthur Tyson, received it and told the Ambassador about it. Ambassador Nuefer, who was there at the time, said, "All right, the next time I have an appointment with the President, I'll take you along, and when the appointment is over, I'll see that you have an opportunity to present it." This is what happened.

This particurlar morning the appointment was over and Ambassador Nuefer called in Tyson, and Tyson presented the pistol with the greetings from the United States Army to Peron, who opened it and snapshot around the room. I think it was a titanium pistol I had made up especially for him -- very lightweight but powerful. He was snapshooting around the room because he liked guns, pretty girls, and motorcycles. Everything ended fine. They left the Presidential office and the palace in their car. Ten minutes later, a bomb went off. It was June 22, 1955, the day of the revolution. I immediately learned this through the wire services. I got Tyson on the phone as soon as I could and we discussed the situation. He said, "It has just started; we don't know what is going to happen, but they have overthrown Peron and the President is seeking asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy for security." Then, bang, the phone went dead.

The next thing we got was mail by slow boat, ten days later. We got nothing by way of official mail or anything of the sort. In that mail, I got two letters. One was signed by Juan D. Peron. He couldn't have signed it that morning; it must have been signed the next day or so. But it was to Mi Gran Amigo, to me, thanking me for the wonderful pistol. Here was this guy under this kind of pressure, taking time to acknowledge a gift. He must have signed it in the next couple of days and put it on that boat. Then

I opened Tyson's letter. He generally said, "I'm sorry that we have been so delayed, but we haven't been permitted to use the radio or to get mail out by air mail because the American Embassy has been under suspicion." He said, "The opposition found out about this pistol that we gave the President this morning." He said, "We are under suspicion because they don't know whether we gave it to him to shoot himself or to protect himself." Well, this was having its repercussions; we got a little inkling of this through State also. About August, we got a new Argentine Ambassador in Washington. They also had a new attache. They were under the new government, of course, because Peron was out. I invited the attache over to a luncheon and asked him if he wouldn't bring the new ambassador, which he did. I got General Ridgway, the Chief of Staff, to come. At the luncheon, there were 10 to 20 people. I told the pistol story, whereupon everybody had a damn good laugh and we dispelled what appeared to be a diplomatic incident.

Q: Sir, I know you made several visits. Obviously, you made visits every year, in your job as G-2. How about some of your visits in the States?

A: Well, I went to a great number of them. I was concerned about industrial security. I spent quite some time on that. I was interested in improving combat intelligence instruction and was responsible for concentrating it at Holabird. The former school on combat intelligence had been at Fort Riley. We moved it and consolidated it with certain other instruction at Holabird. We also ran a strategic intelligence school in which we trained, or I guess a better word would be oriented, our attaches. This was done in coordination with language training to a considerable extent. We sent many of them who needed the longer courses to Monterey, where they were taught in groups of from three to eight, usually with a native from the country concerned teaching the language. Many of them, who only needed a refresher, either took it here at Berlitz or in connection with Navy Intelligence, which is over at Anacostia.

Along with all this we ran a strategic intelligence school, orienting them on what to look for so that if they saw something different, they knew what they were looking at in connection with various types of plants, stills, reactors, and other structures. That's where the higher degree of technical proficiency showed

itself, in that field. I expanded the Reserve program considerably in those days. I'm afraid it has been broken up now, but we had Reserve intelligence units at a number of the universities. In some universities, they would concentrate on certain areas. Maybe one was strong on Chinese, or Urdu, or some other language. I tried to use them in reviewing and updating parts of the National Intelligence Survey. The National Intelligence Survey consists of many parts that deal with every aspect of the government: economics, social structure, and everything about a particular country. It comes in several volumes and it's consolidated by the CIA. We found these selected Reserve officers were very knowledgeable about the country in question and made real contributions to these surveys because they were interested. It kept them updated and it kept the National Intelligence Survey updated.

One of the things I tried to do was to impress on our government the importance of education in some of these underdeveloped areas. You may have found a paper that I submitted to the Operations Coordinating Board, which was then a high-level executive agency to pull things together. The paper suggested the establishment of universities in different parts of the world where we would assemble an outstanding faculty from the areas concerned, like a University of the Americas in Bolivia. I recommended two specifically for Africa, one in Ethiopia and one in Liberia. I think they could have had their impacts and at a reasonable price comparable to the cost of a day's war in Korea. Not too much had been done on that; something has been done, though, through AID and other programs.

Another effort that I tried to start was the Civic Action Program. Here I was impressed. The first place that this was applied that I know of was in Bolivia. There we were making quite some progress. In other words, my theory was that they need troops in each of these countries largely to maintain order. Our program was rather pitiful, around the early 1950s, in connection with military aid agreements. For instance, the Brazilians were supposed to train anti-aircraft battalions to rush to the defense of the Panama Canal. This is really stretching it. You would leave Sao Paulo and Rio open. What happened in Brazil was they would get this equipment, which was very expensive, and leave it in the warehouse. In

Brazil, while they kept their officer and noncommissioned cadre on a fairly permanent basis, they pulled in their draftees on a yearly basis and usually ran out of money about September. Then the draftees were sent home and the equipment lay idle for two or three months until a new group came in. Consequently, you just can't imagine an efficient organization being developed. What I wanted to do was to train them -- and I would call it as close as anything else -- as combat engineers; in other words, as fairly good infantry. They could do the job of security in the country, which is what they are primarily for. And when they weren't doing this, they would get out and open up the roads and trails, build bridges, open up waterways, and do the things our Army Engineers did in the early development of our country. We made some progress on that. I think it could be one of the really great contributions in Latin America. I don't know what its present status is today. It was talked up quite a bit a few years ago, but, as of now, I have no knowledge of whether it is really being pushed today or not. Everybody who is a soldier comes from the people; you can't get away from that. It's particularly true where a large part of your Army is a drafted Army or a civilian Army. They are all the son or brother or husband of somebody. How great it would be for the unity of a country if they felt that their army was really a part of them in doing things to help them instead of just a factor for suppression of free thought. These were all factors that could be very important in this civic action type program.

You asked me earlier about the boards that were headed up to study the military intelligence field as far as the United States is concerned. One was headed up by General Doolittle; the other one, later, by General Mark Clark. Both of them, as far as I know, were looking for answers to about the same problem: how can we improve American intelligence affecting the security of the United States? To put it in its broadest terms, this is not only military; it gets into the political, economic, and industrial fields as well. One of the areas that has caused us much concern is East-West trade, the loss of trade secrets and a lot of other matters. I don't know that either the Doolittle or Clark Board reports ever resulted in very much constructive action. They may have; I never read the reports themselves because they were never made available to me. I appeared before both of them,

as did numerous other men in the intelligence field. I never saw much that evolved after these reports were submitted to indicate that they were very productive. Interestingly, even after I retired I was called upon by a certain very senior person in the Congress to head up still another board. I stalled on this one because, I said to him, "If you can show me anything that came out of either the Doolittle or Clark Board that was meaningful, I'll take a look at it." I was never shown anything. I would rather leave him unnamed here; he is really one of the top people. There may have been gaps in intelligence. If there were, this was unfortunate. There probably were some overlaps in intelligence. This is nothing I apologize for at all, even if the Army were one of those involved in an overlap situation. Because, after all, there is one fact: when you get information, it is just that. It isn't intelligence until it is evaluated. If you can get it from two or more sources, then it may become convincing if they all agree. If they don't agree, it means you had better take another look before coming to a conclusion. You have to consider many things when you are talking about the collection of information. Is it unnecessary duplication? It is unprofitable duplication? You can't just say there is duplication and throw it out the window, because very frequently you need it. I am afraid that the tendency now, in trying to unify intelligence and derive it from one source, will lead us down the wrong path. Furthermore, I don't think one service -- speaking of the men in uniform -- representing the country in the military will get real answers, without regard to whether the man is Army, Navy, or Air Force. His real field of expertise always is in regard to his particular arm. There may be information coming from other arms which either will not be given to him, or, because of the complexity of the situation, he won't really understand the full implications even though his contemporary tries to explain it to him. We have got to be very careful about this oversimplification. As a matter of fact, I think we have done the country a disservice in connection with the Defense Intelligence Agency by taking away collection capabilities from the individual services. I don't think that this is right. I don't think that this is good. There are several areas here that certainly need further clarification, and some of it may come to light in view of the attacks on the Army in connection with industrial intelligence, which is its real justification for operations within the

United States. We never tried to take anything in the way of domestic intelligence away from the FBI. We've been very careful about it. Our field has been industrial intelligence. But when we get to the point where there are indications of violence, or implications that military force may be needed, then I think that the Army very definitely better know who is the enemy and where the trouble may come from to be prepared to meet it.

Q: Well, General, I think we have pretty well wrapped up this portion of your career, in intelligence. Were there any prospects on the horizon? You had been moving around rather rapidly these last few years. Did it look like you were heading somewhere else, to another part of your career?

A: Well, I did leave rather suddenly, which is another point. But at the time this occurred, the Army was about to have a reorganization. General Gavin, who had been Deputy Chief of Operations, was very keen on establishing the Office of Chief of Research and Development. He was succeeding in doing so and expecting to take that position himself. I had been informed that I probably would be side-slipped from Chief of Intelligence to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, which would have been a fascinating job and one into which my past experience would have perfectly fit. I could say unforeseen circumstances, but they weren't unforeseen circumstances -- because I had been getting a sensing for the past two years that perhaps other things might happen. And they did. That ended my service as Chief of Intelligence abruptly in about August 1955.

Q: General, what I would like to do is talk about sensitive material, the Army's activity in covert operations, and those things that you think would be interesting from a historical point of view and perhaps again some lessons learned. I would like to end up talking about the reason why you left the post of G-2. Let's go back now and talk about the various activities that we were involved in, how it related to our attaches, what our system is, and so forth.

A: Well, by and large, as I said, the attache system is a system for the overt collection of military intelligence. Obviously, it is important to get all information possible -- military information -- about the country in which you are serving, but it also

becomes of growing importance to learn more about their industrial and technological capabilities as well as the psycho-political, political, and other factors that go into making up the overall strength of a country. Frequently, when dealing in a friendly country, you can succeed in getting valuable information about a less-friendly country by thirdhand means, where the attache in the less-friendly country is unable to get information himself. Consequently, the extensive search for information of all kinds on all countries through any means and through any of your contacts becomes important, and you can't simplify it to a point by saying that A talks only to B, and A doesn't talk to B about C; A does talk to B about C if he can get anything on him, and about D and E and all the way through. So third-country information becomes a very important asset. By and large, attaches should not be compromised by having them deal in the field of covert information. Not only are they likely to be dismissed from the country in which they are serving, but I think in some cases it impairs their overall value and may be inhibiting to them themselves.

Covert operations are a game in themselves; there is no easy way to explain this. Men have to be tested in every possible way -- vetted, we call it; vetted to determine their integrity and their resistance to the principal temptations in life: women, liquor, and money. No matter how reputable the homosexuals can appear to make their activities, they are still not a safe bet in the intelligence field. Nor are people who are easy victims of women or tempted by large amounts of money. Consequently, this is a field where matters have to be held pretty close and men have to be tested at various levels before additional trust or responsibility can be placed in them. One of the weaknesses I've seen in trying to build a covert intelligence capability too rapidly is that the system gets so badly penetrated that it is hardly worth keeping in existence. When the number of your own agents who are taken -- in other words, captured or controlled by your opponents -- becomes significant at all, you can be sure that the degree of secrecy that you have retained is approaching zero. At the end of World War II we had great capabilities in covert intelligence, particularly in Eastern Europe, because of the fact that they are people much like ourselves and that many of our Americans of their ethnicity had no difficulty at all in identifying by appearance,

culture, and language with the peoples of these countries concerned, including Russia itself but to a lessening degree. With the Asiatics the normal problems of difference in race and appearance and language difficulties creep in severely, as we've noticed in the countries of Eastern Asia. Probably the country in which we've done the best is Japan, where we've had many Japanese-Americans who have been extremely loyal but who have been knowledgeable in the language and customs involved. As we get into the other countries of Eastern Asia I think we are having increasing difficulty in this field. This will ease as more Orientals become Americanized.

Unfortunately, the residual capability of Army covert intelligence with cover in Eastern Europe after the war was resented by the Central Intelligence Agency to an alarming degree. I sensed this on many, many occasions; in fact, it always was a factor in any actions that we took and was a real contributing factor to difficulties that developed in my own relationship, particularly with the covert segment of the CIA. Completely unfounded remarks and reports were submitted in this regard to at least the Clark Board, which I had to defend against and fortunately had the necessary exchange of correspondence to do so. In some cases I made very substantial contributions to CIA activities, particularly if the area was one where the Army was far better equipped to do the job. One particular effort in this regard in Europe was highly productive over a period of years until it was uncovered, which happens in nearly all cases as time goes on.

One of the diffficulties that developed between myself and the CIA at the U. S. Intelligence Board level was in the insistence by the Director of that agency that a draft on important subjects which had been under study and preparation for four to eight months would be handled by the Army over the weekend preceding a final meeting. After attempting to comply on many occasions at the expense of great demands on key personnel for weekend time, I finally informed the Board that the Army would not respond to any such long-term studies without at least one week of study being available before the meeting. In such cases, and even at best, we were able to get only a footnote to any objections in small print in the report, which seldom counteracted the impact of the desired language as placed into the report by the Agency itself. The

subtlety of such actions should be readily apparent when it is considered that these intelligence reports normally form the base for national security policy or actions resulting therefrom.

It was my feeling then and it is my feeling now that a Chief or Director of Intelligence should be a member of the National Security Council, someone who is separate and distinct from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite the fact that the Dulles brothers no longer exist to act in complete coordination, the attempted unification and reduction in numbers of the existing intelligence agencies increases the danger of a single agency or person making a major decision. I might inject here the thought that the dominating personality of a Kissinger, who controls the thought processes of his entire staff on one side and has the complete confidence of the President on the other, only accents the danger of one-man control. I think the effort to eliminate all collection operations from the individual uniformed services and to place the entire matter in the hands of the DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, is likewise a mistake. Again I repeat, the duplication in itself need not be necessarily wasteful but can be most essential to securing evaluated intelligence rather than just accepting source information.

I feel that complete dependence of the Agency on certain centers for studies can in itself be detrimental. Those, of course, who have complete confidence in the integrity, patriotism, and wisdom of the Fund for the Republic or similar institutions are privileged to disagree. Too often, however, the tendency of the State Department to compromise the situation, which is part of the art of diplomacy, with the feeling that "Things will be better tomorrow" has led us to the dangerous position in which we find ourselves today.

I found a basic subject for discussion with one of the real thought makers in the State Department in my time to be simply, "On whose side is time?" My own belief was that time was not on our side unless we used it more profitably and found ways in which to take the initiative on certain problems of vital importance rather than responding halfheartedly and too late from the defensive. I found I could always generate a lot of heat on this question despite a relative calmness

on my part. I was advised a month before I left the Pentagon from G-2 that such thoughts and philosophy on my part were damaging me to the point where others thought my presence was no longer desirable in Washington. I was advised about this by a dependable friend in a senior hierachy and so advised the then Chief of Staff, General Ridgway. He showed no concern and urged me to have none myself. However, within 30 days of his retirement and the assumption of the job of Chief of Staff by General Taylor, I found myself on the way back to the Far East. You are getting into a deep one here.

A report was prepared in some depth by myself and two associates which analyzed the lines of communications between having decision-making or high decision-recommending powers in the White House right on back to agencies who were feeding them material. We plotted these names and their relationships, where they really had an "in." We then analyzed the statements made in a large number of national security papers and very frequently would get down to a clause, sentence, or paragraph which changed the meaning or moderated it very materially. We pinpointed these changes. We pinpointed not only these recommendations on papers submitted but also correlated them with resulting national security policy papers and showed the influence and penetration that was made in this regard which, in most cases, was weakening our overall policy. But somebody let it get in the wrong hands of a man so high that they -- and I can't explain that too much -- started screaming. It resulted in an Assistant Secretary of State's departure from here, was a factor in my departure, and also resulted in the movement out of the State Department of another man. We had the goods. One person handed it to the wrong man who is still in government -- in a sensitive position, I believe.

Q: General, who took the initiative in making such a study? I don't want to ask what the motivation was, but who took the initiative?

A: One other man and myself, because I was convinced we were being sold down the river by equivocation and quibbling in national security policy. There were other aspects also.

Q: I'm sure that there is much more of this that we can talk about. You have discussed several points that

seemed to create problems; there is another problem that arose because of your interest in attempting to establish an attache from West Germany. I would like to ask you if I'm correct in that assumption; was there a problem, and if so, what were the circumstances surrounding it?

A: Yes, that is correct and the problem arose from the fact that when the Germans got their sovereignty in 1954 and soon established an Ambassador in the United States, they did not establish any of the services -- in other words, the military, Naval or Air attaches. I was quite well acquainted with the first German Ambassador, Dr. Krechler; he was not a career man; I think he was a chemist or a scientist as a matter of fact -- a very fine person. I asked Krechler on two or three occasions when he was going to have a military attache, in our case an Army attache, and he said, "I don't know. We'll probably have one soon." After the second or third time I asked him, he said, "Why are you so interested in an Army attache?" I said, "I would like to talk to him regarding the problems that are bound to arise in connection with your development of an attache system and also with the questions as to security because, with your sovereignty, you are now becoming part of NATO and are going to share in a lot of highly classified information and war plans; I would like to work with your new man." "Well," he said, "I don't know when he is coming but I'll let you know." So he called me one day in the office and he said, "I'm having a very important guest this afternoon and you might like to discuss this question of an attache with him." I said, "Fine." He did not identify the guest. I did not suspect it was their number one man, der Alte Adenauer, the Chancellor. Some stories assert that I "talked to Chancellor Adenauer at dinner." That is completely false. I never intended to talk to him and was caught completely by surprise when he appeared.

When I got to the German Embassy for a conference, we went out under a tree, Krechler and myself, and started a general discussion for a few minutes when who appeared but Chancellor Adenauer. Well, this was quite a surprise to me. But wanting to be specific about some of the questions I had in mind (and I don't recall them now although they're a matter of record), I had with me perhaps eight or possibly ten 3-by-5 cards on which I marked down questions and problems that I was seeking answers to; my staff had

contributed to those questions. There seemed nothing sensible to do but go ahead and discuss them with Chancellor Adenauer. I suppose it was a case of lese majeste, which is certainly the way the State Department interpreted it, but this was the circumstance. So I posed the questions and the Chancellor answered some of them; he discussed them more than he answered them and said that they were important questions and he would like to consider them at length and would I leave him the questions. I couldn't refuse. I said, "Yes," and I then handed him the cards. This was in the middle of June 1955, and General Taylor took over as Chief of Staff on the first of July 1955, when General Ridgway retired for age.

The next I heard about it was when I was on a trip to the West where I visited the language school at Monterey and a number of other installations in late July. I got a call in Los Angeles from General Taylor asking me when I was returning. I only had about two days left of the trip, and I told him whatever the date was; this would have been about the end of July. So he said he would like to see me no later than, say, next Tuesday or something of the sort on an important matter, so to report when I got back. I said, "Fine."

I did that, and he seemed quite disturbed when I finally did report to him. He said, "Now we should go up to see the Secretary." So we both went up to see Secretary Brucker. I might say that Brucker had been most friendly to me even when he had been General Counsel of the Defense Department. I've forgotten several matters that brought us together, probably during the McCarthy Hearings, but in any event he'd shown a real friendship. Even before he became Secretary of the Army he told me he would like to go up to Fort Holabird where I was then establishing the intelligence and counterintelligence center and, of course, where this Central Records Facility is located that has been under so much fire recently. As a result, I realized that Mr. Brucker was more upset than General Taylor was. I knew that basically I had a friend in Mr. Brucker and an understanding person. He immediately, however, asked me a question about my contacts and said that Mr. Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, had sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense saying that he had lost all confidence in me because of this contact I had made with Adenauer. It

became quite apparent that either the German Embassy was penetrated or that Adenauer had turned the cards over to the CIA. I mean, one of the two things had to have happened because he physically had the cards on which I had the questions I asked Adenauer. They were the same; they weren't copies; they were the same cards because I was able to identify them. As a matter of fact, I have the cards now; they're in a safe place. So the upshot was that Secretary Brucker demanded a report from me within the next 48 hours. General Taylor was the only auditor of this; he had nothing to say. So I told Mr. Brucker that I appreciated his anxiety in getting a prompt answer but I was not prepared to give him an answer in 48 hours because I had to assemble more data and background together, whereupon he said, "The Secretary of Defense is very insistent that you respond within 48 hours." "Well," I said, "my respects to the Secretary of Defense and to you, Mr. Secretary, but you cannot have my response in 48 hours. From what you are telling me here, my career is at stake, and I intend to take a reasonable amount of time to prepare my defense and respond to this charge." Which was in writing, incidentally. Well, that shocked him a little bit, that I didn't immediately give in to his demands. But he said, "How much time are you talking about?" And I said, "I want a full week." He said, "That's too long." And I said, "I want a full week." And I got a full week. So I went back and with two or three people in whom I had confidence and who knew what the problems were: I brought them into my close confidence and prepared my defense, prepared my reply.

As I recall it, I had no more turned it in than I explained that I recognized that Mr. Dulles said he had lost confidence in me, and I guess I was brash enough to say that I had also lost confidence in him and his associates. I laid it on the line; I didn't take the blame lying down, and I didn't intend to. In any event, I had no sooner turned this in when I was told that I was summarily relieved as G-2. Much to his surprise, General Ridgely Gaither, who had been a Division Commander with me in Korea, was immediately brought back from Fort Bragg. I don't believe he had been there a week because he had just been in talking to me about where he was going and what he was doing. I'm sure nobody was as surprised as Gaither to get the G-2 job. I don't remember whether they asked me where I wanted to go or not -- they may have -- but they wanted me out of the country fast. They did

quite a logical thing; they sent a cable at least to General Lemnitzer who was in command of the Far East. Lemnitzer was pretty well acquainted with me and what I had been doing; he had been Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. So he immediately cabled back, "Yes, send him over; I've got a job for him." So to make a long story short, I did go to Japan. I accepted that; I was very happy with that, as a matter of fact. I was reassured at the time because my response was pretty stiff and the Secretary said, after I gave it to him and he read it over, that he hoped it was the only copy. I assured him that it wasn't; that I had one in a perfectly safe place, and if they wanted to make a public issue of it I was fully prepared to respond. And he understood. I still have that copy and there are only a couple of people who know where it is and could get to it. He then told me after reading my reclama that he hoped I was not going to make a public issue of it. I said I didn't really intend to, but it depended on what the charge was against my career. At that time, as I told you, I had already been contacted about the possibility, not certainty, that I would move into another position on the General Staff shortly. The door looked wide open until this happened to me. I wasn't about to take it lying down but I knew that this had been sufficient so that I'd have the red tab on my record in the State Department, in the White House, and a couple other places as far as further promotion was concerned. But then I was told by Secretary Brucker what a great record he thought I had and how he regretted this circumstance. He said, "Don't make any public issue out of it. Take this assignment over there and do a good job for a year, which I know you will, and I'll see that your promotion is not lost." That was to three stars. So I left it that way. I worked in the Pentagon and I had leave. I worked in a little back room trying to pull things together and help my successor from 9 August until I sailed in September. I decided instead of flying after this pressure and all that my wife and I would do better if we just got on a transport and left. So we did, and we had a couple of restful weeks at sea because there was a lot of shake-up, naturally, in the family. She was disturbed; these are pressures that are hard to take anyway.

Q: I was going to wait until October of next year, I guess 18 October 1956 . . . I did pick up a story from Fred Weyant, Brucker's executive, to sort of confirm what you just said. When you got promoted, the letter to you reminded you of the conversation that you had with the Secretary and that the Secretary did say that he certainly wasn't going to let your file get lost. What you have just said is exactly what Weyant said.

A: That put the limit on my future, but at least I did get that much out of it. And I appreciate what the Secretary did because actually both the Secretary and Admiral Radford, Chief of Joint Staff, I understand, went directly to the White House to get an exception to the tab that had been put on my record after the Adenauer contact.

Q: Yes, that is another thing. When General Weyant, then Colonel Weyant, wrote to you, he said that the Secretary took your promotion to the Secretary of Defense and then walked it to the White House to make sure that nothing would slow it up.

A: That's right. It showed a lot of understanding on the Secretary's part, and he knew that the pressures were very great on Allen Dulles -- it was the people under him more than Dulles himself. We had been good friends but he resented, to a degree, the fact that I wouldn't accept all that his deputies and subordinates were putting in writing. In other words, maybe I was a little more firm about some of these things than he thought I should be, but he always respected me and I knew that. I know the individuals down below. One of them went off his rocker and soon died; the man who was most responsible was the individual in charge of covert intelligence operations for the CIA. I know the other two men; one of them has gone on to higher places and the other one hasn't. Both have bitten the dust. Another, an ex-German, has since left and gone back to Germany. I'm not sure which side of the curtain he is on, as a matter of fact, but I guess he is still in West Germany. When I left they were going to send him to Tokyo, and I got a message back that I didn't think Tokyo was big enough for the two of us because he had really been at the bottom of the German problem.

Mr. Brucker couldn't stand that kind of pressure. I don't mean from weakness on his part but just the fact that Allen Dulles plus the State Department Dulles,

John Foster -- the two of them -- sent strong letters to Secretary Wilson who thought intelligence was a dirty business anyway. Oh, yes, he had absolutely . . . old Engine Charlie had no use for intelligence. He was not what I would call a very astute man and I'm not sure but what was good for General Motors then was not good for the United States. Anyhow, he was the Secretary of Defense and he had that power and, of course, he had that power over Brucker. So Mr. Brucker himself couldn't have changed the picture at the moment, I don't think. There really could have been some big noises made over this because the CIA was not in too good repute anyway, and they were losing an awful lot of agents in their German setup who were being exposed -- perhaps because they built too fast; at least they were penetrated. We were worried about an outfit that already was penetrated having charge of German security in Bonn, in the area where our war plans and everything else would be exposed. Of course, since then those plans were leaked to the Russians, to the East; the things that I surmised would happen have happened. They all have happened. There have been many serious defections. I have no apologies for what I tried to do for American security.

I took a pretty positive step with respect to intelligence because I didn't believe in the concept that some of my contemporaries in other parts of government had. They said if we do nothing then things will get better with Russia; some of them still do. I adhere to a firm idea that we should develop a positive strategy that would put the Russians on the defensive, not only in a military way but also as a result of economic and diplomatic actions. This was greatly resented. There were certain areas in the world, I said then and I'll still say, where the Army at that time had a greater covert intelligence capability, with better cover, than any of our other intelligence agencies in existence. When you say that you shouldn't get into anything that has to do with strategy and policy, however, you can't avoid it because strategy and policy can only be based on evaluated intelligence. If you're in this field and you see the intelligence being poorly distorted or poorly evaluated, or incorrect conclusions drawn, then I think it is up to each individual who has responsibility to initiate and foster the necessary actions to try to offset and counteract this adverse and dangerous approach. This is exactly what I did.

I have no apologies to make at all. What has happenened in the way of penetration of the West German government and the loss of highly classified war plans and intelligence is, to me, still an indication that I was absolutely right in what I tried to prevent in 1955. Read the books about Gehlen's organization. I'm not apologizing to anybody. Nor do I regret that I expended as much effort as I did, even though it put a real crimp in my Army career.

Q: General, there were some letters written to you as you left the Pentagon by your close friends indicating that they considered this a step up and that there was a possibility of a third star. As you left the Pentagon for the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in the Far East Command, did you see this as a step up?

A: No. It could only be a two-star job; I was not expecting anything there. As a matter of fact, the Secretary said, "Get over there and do a good job, which I know you can do, and in a year from now I'll see that you are taken care of." That is what he said.

Q: General, I know that at a time like this it becomes a very personal thing and, as you said, your career was on the line. I had an opportunity to go through the letters that you were writing at that time to some of your close friends: Bill Donovan, Eddie Rickenbacker, Mark Clark, and General Truscott.

A: They were letters of appreciation. They all tried to save me on the job, but they couldn't.