CHAPTER X

Pentagon II

Manpower Control

A: In late March 1946, I returned to the United States as Director of Military Training, and there was a lot to be done in returning our troops and reshaping the Army. But when I got back I found that I was coming back as the Deputy Director of Military Training again, the job having been filled by a returned division commander from Europe. In fact, in the few months I was there there were two such directors who arrived. Neither was interested in the job. They were being placed there for convenience. One of them was in the hospital practically all the time looking forward to retirement, but he would not agree to being placed on the hospital list or to surrender his title as director. I served under both of these men really as Deputy Director of Military Training, which was less than the assignment I had had when I departed.

However, the War Department at that time was getting into quite a bad situation with respect to counting noses. In other words, we didn't really know how many people we had. I'm speaking now of the Army and the attached Air Corps. It was decided that someone should set a system to get better, more accurate, and more timely information on the strength of the Army. In other words, what they would have liked was a daily morning report that was 100 percent accurate. This was impossible, but we were doing so badly at the time that they recognized something had to be done. I guess because I was an Engineer officer they thought my arithmetic might be better than some; I was loaned for two months to G-1 to set up a better system and made the chief of what they called the Manpower Control Group. This is not a manpower study board; this was a manpower control group. My job really was to determine the requirements for officers and enlisted personnel in the Army within the authorized strength, and establish the number to be drafted, enlisted, commissioned, or discharged. It was really a very interesting job. Actually, I started in the early summer of 1946 and it was two years before I left. We found that summer that, while the Army was supposed to get down to a strength around 1,640,000 men by September or October, at the time we first got a recount we were running about 10 percent over strength; we were running about 1,800,000. This

created great embarrassment, with the result that congressional pressures became great. The General Staff was forced to take hasty actions, not realizing the adverse impact of action A before they adopted action B, and so the result was that a lot of confusion continued.

For instance, one of the first things Congress decided to do was to release all fathers -- right now. Let's say there was some minimum service required; let's say 18 months service. Well, the result was we were landing new troops in Japan, sending those men to the replacement depot and returning about 75 percent of them on the same transport to the United States for discharge. So they really got a free trip across the Pacific and back, but the waste of money, time, and effort was terrific. We got in touch with IBM (International Business Machines) and a system was soon worked up in which we developed a worldwide system for reporting with data computers and electronic data machines. This was called GPA-45. It was put into effect by early 1947 and became the system which quickly gave the Army a much better read-out than they had ever had before. It was far from perfection, but for the first time we were able to know more about the specialties (MOSs) of men who were being returned sufficiently in advance so that we could train new men with the right MOSs; otherwise you could get a surplus of welders in a unit who had to be retrained as cooks. We were not only counting noses, we were counting grades and skills and predicting requirements three, six, and nine months ahead; it was a great positive step in the right direction. I'm sure they've greatly improved it from there on out.

Q: But we haven't perfected it yet.

A: No. There's a human equation that affects all of these problems that will prevent us from ever reaching perfection. When I was in ASF during the war I was in a cross-fire about something that has become an accomplished fact; that is, that the individual training should be under the Director of Personnel, who is supposed to know what the Army needs. It always appeared to me that that was the appropriate place for it. In the Army Service Forces during the war the director of military training worked very closely with the director of personnel. In that directorate there were two groups, civilian personnel and military personnel. There were many difficulties in this regard, and I am very happy today to see that

they have finally put individual training where it belongs: under the Director of Personnel, or G-1. One of our biggest problems was in balancing out our estimates with what was occurring in the overseas theaters. As I mentioned before, I was in Europe as V-E Day arrived and had been charged with assisting in making certain plans and establishing certain policies for the withdrawal of troops from Europe either to the United States for demobilization or to the Pacific. I was sent back there in the summer of 1947. I had been loaned, as I told you, to the director of personnel for two months in 1946, a time when the Army was concerned about the great overstrength in the Army and congressional pressures resulting. Secondly, it was not inappropriate because, at that time, the Army Service Forces were starting to be phased out; consequently, the number of general officers was being greatly reduced. I was fortunate enough to be one of 25 officers with less than 25 years' service who held their grade after World War II. Most of us were brigadiers. I think a few were major generals. So General Paul sent me to Europe at that time to study the situation there and assist in whatever way I could in easing and improving personnel policies and procedures. It, of course, provided an excellent opportunity -- I was gone about six or eight weeks -- to look at everything that was then in the European theater in all countries. I hope we did some good while we were there, and certain new policies did evolve as a result of my visit.

We also found at that time -- while we had some interesting studies going using German generals or senior personnel to study problems regarding strategy, tactics, and logistics -- nothing was being done with respect to studying how the Germans handled their military personnel situation. I was able, through the help of people there, to establish a program in which we also employed a fair number of senior German military personnel who made studies laid out by our office back in the United States. They had to do, as you might expect, with the physical and mental requirements, induction and drafting procedures, promotion policies, leave policies, rotation policies, and everything else that has to do with the handling of military personnel. This was a very interesting aspect of it, and fortunately I was in positions where I could observe the results over the next several years -- first back in Washington, where I returned and was there until the summer of 1948, and then back

to Germany, where I had the First Constabulary Brigade, from 1948 to 1950.

The day I returned from Europe I was advised that I would immediately take off for Japan, for General MacArthur's theater, to study their problems. This was to be a most interesting visit. At that time General MacArthur had not returned -- repeat, not returned (I think that is still correct) -- any of his senior general Regular Army officers to the United States. Many of them had been with him since even 1940 or 1942 and, while their wives were able to join them by this time, the War Department was very insistent that he start rotating some of his senior personnel. General Eisenhower was the Chief of Staff and I wasn't aware as to what pressures might have been exerted at that time. But MacArthur was not a man on whom it was easy to exert pressure, even from Washington. One of the deficiencies that had been permitted to occur, in his theater -- and I'm speaking of September, 1947 -- was that while his strength had been established at 225,000 men, because of the serious impact of this rapid rotation and of change of policies I mentioned to discharge men early, the actual strength in his theater at that time was not much above 125,000. Which meant that he was literally 100,000 men understrength. I was sent over there to investigate the personnel situation and also to see if General MacArthur could be encouraged to start rotating some of his general officers. Well, again, I was made most welcome. He remembered the Amphibian Command in Australia and the fact that I was from the class of 1924 at the Military Academy -- his class, as he called it. I had what I felt from General MacArthur was a warm welcome.

Needless to say, I didn't get very far in getting an agreement out of him to rotate his general officers soon. As you might expect, he did most of the talking; he stressed the serious condition in which he found himself, because of this terrific understrength. This was strictly an occupation Army, and while the Japanese were really overly obedient and causing no trouble -- they were such a well-disciplined people -- nevertheless, between the language problems and the extent of the area that he had to occupy, his troops were suffering badly from being over-extended, together with this very rapid turnover that was occurring. Some correction was made to this situation. Nevertheless, when the Korean War occurred almost three years later in 1950, the adverse

impact of his being so badly understrength in so many diversified jobs -- in civil affairs really -- with no opportunity for real military training by and large (except perhaps for the 1st Cavalry Division), was perhaps one of the most serious problems that he had to face when Korea was invaded in June of 1950. We paid heavily for it.

One of the items that I was concerned with in Korea . . . and at that time I was with, but not a member of, the party with Under Secretary of the Army, General Bill Draper; he was over there on a number of missions. I'm sure he was talking to General MacArthur on a number of matters, the problems of the pacification of Japan and others. But one of the problems was the question of power, electrical energy for South Korea. It so happened that the Huachon reservoir was really under control of the Russians. They had the power and I quess they exercised it a couple of times, shutting off the power when they wanted to for any good reason or otherwise. In any event, power was scarce and continuity was important, so I was able to make a suggestion that they do what we had to do in the Philippines toward the end of the war; that was to use a couple of power barges that were available -- the Jacona and the Impedence, both of which were diesel-electric generating plants of 30,000 Kw each. Those two were brought in shortly thereafter; one was located at Inchon and one at Pusan. For a long time they eased the power problem greatly. It wasn't until other plants were built, such as coal-burning plants in the vicinity of Seoul and other locations, that they really began to get the power that was needed to develop that country. I went on from there to Okinawa, where I ran into the midst of the housing feud between the Army and the Air Force. While I wasn't able to resolve it, at least I tried to bring back some of the facts.

I then went to Manila which, of course, had been my old wartime command. There I noticed that they were still suffering from the problems of World War II, because all the equipment and supplies were being rolled up to Manila from the islands, all the way from Australia up. They were all being brought into Manila, despite the fact that in 1946 we were shipping out as much as we could to China and Japan and other areas. Remember, nothing could come back to the United States that would interfere with new commercial production: no bulldozers, no trucks, nothing that could reduce production rates or employment in the

United States came back to this country -- by order. It was a matter of policy; otherwise we would have accented the unemployment, which was already occurring, first, due to cutbacks in military production of such items, and secondly, the discharge of millions of men from the Armed Services. In any event, it was a pretty bad situation and when I went back I reported to General Lutes, who was then in charge of what remained of the Army Service Forces. American troops had been withdrawn and most of the work being done in the depots in sorting out this equipment and identifying it was done by Filipinos who couldn't read the English in the first place, and secondly many of the crates were so weatherbeaten that you couldn't make out what they contained. In any event, I returned to the United States in the latter part of 1947 and was then informed that I would be going to Europe the following spring. What did I want to do?

Q: General, before we get to that, there were a few rather significant actions that had occurred during the period 1946-47. I would like to ask you about some of them. One was the Haislip Board on unification of the services and separation of the Air Force. I know that we have mentioned it, but I would like to ask you about the unification that took place at that time, the 1947 act. I'm sure you were involved in the planning. Did it turn out the way it was actually planned; the way you had been thinking about it in the Pentagon?

A: I guess the answer is yes. Although my limited view of that, which is largely from the personnel but to some degree from the training standpoint, didn't permit me to view it from the higher levels such as were being approached by General Haislip, who probably was the Vice Chief of Staff at the time, or from Wedemeyer who was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, or Director of Operations, on this board together with Norstad and others from the Air Corps. We didn't envision, for instance, that there would be a complete duplication of all the logistical and administrative services required; but perhaps we should have. I don't know.

Q: Let me ask you this. Do you feel that as the years have gone by that we really did the correct thing as far as denying our commanders the ability to control their own tactical air?

A: No, I never have agreed with that, and I suffered from it in Korea in later days. I think that the commander in combat must have all the things he needs under his own direct control. They can give you a lot of reasons why it should be otherwise, some of which are valid, but, by and large, there is no substitution for being able to order someone who is a part of your own command to do something and have him do it.

Q: Sir, in October 1946 there was a great amount of discussion about policy regarding permanent general and flag-rank officers. I know that you sent a memo to General Paul in reference to the relative rank of senior officers. Specifically, the problem was how the Army equated to the Navy with their one-star, two-star system. Would you like to just discuss that?

A: Yes. That was at the time we were about to organize the Department of Defense. The Navy was sitting pretty in this case. Once they were selected for rear admiral they immediately put on two stars, whereas a man selected for brigadier general only put on one. Furthermore, they just rode freely from a rear admiral of the lower half (as they called it) to a rear admiral of the upper half; no change in insignia or date of rank. They didn't have to be selected over again as we did to be a major general. In the Army you started over and all brigadiers were again in competition. This was not true in the Navy. So we felt that they had a very definite edge on us, and where we felt it most was in seniority when you sat on a joint board. Any admiral in the upper half, by and large, had to be senior to any major general by virtue of the fact that his rank came from the day he was made a rear admiral of the lower half. This was in respect to the Navy. With respect to the Army, the situation was that the Air Force was promoting its people so young in grade that they also, by the time that they served on boards on the Joint Staff, would always be senior to their opposite numbers in the Army. As a matter of fact, I've heard certain of them in very high places say, "This is the way we planned it." Well, I guess it was, but the Army was soon going to be bringing up the rear end of everything if they got by with it. I fought diligently to get them to retain the grade of commodore, which was a one-star grade and from which a man had to be selected to be a rear admiral. The commodore would have substituted for the rear admiral, lower half, and would have been the equivalent of our brigadier general. But the Navy fought and they said, "You can't do that. Other

navies of the world would always outrank us," and all that. Of course, we were thinking of the Navy always outranking us in the Army when we got into joint operations, and this became rather distasteful. In any event, they got away with it then but there have been intermittent modifications on our selection and promotion processes that have equalized most qualities.

Q: I understand that at one time you had an opportunity to brief Field Marshal Montgomery. Does that bring back anything of significance?

A: No. I don't recall that I did. Montgomery came over because the British were trying to reduce their indebtedness to the United States. They tried to get us to give them $100 million credit for that project of making breakwaters and jetties with old ships and whatnot when we landed on the French beaches, which we didn't go along with at all. But that was the substance of it. They came over with a high powered program, really a PR program, to talk us out of $100 million, and they didn't get away with it; they called it "Reverse Lend Lease."

Q: General, another action ongoing at the time was in reference to cadets at the Military Academy. There was a strong effort made to enlist all cadets in the Army and only send them later to the Academy. What was this all about?

A: Well, this was all a part of the charges about the caste system which were so loud and vociferous during those days after the war. It was another attempt to break down respect for the Army, much like we are going through today, castigating the Regular Army for every error or failure that had been made by some 90-day wonder who was doing his best but still didn't have much background to go on. These are some of the errors that lieutenants still make, and I suppose they will always make them in a large citizen Army; but what they were trying to do was to blame the Regular Army. I sent memoranda to General Paul and suggested that perhaps with his closeness to General Eisenhower, he could get General Eisenhower to say something good in defense of the officers of the Regular Army. I didn't succeed very much in that respect. If you were reading the papers about Churchill's visit here years ago, you may recall that he gave a talk in Fulton, Missouri. What he said was that it was a marvel to him that the United States, with its very small

Regular Armed Forces, could have developed the leadership in its Officer Corps that resulted in such a tremendous victory. It had to come from Churchill; damn few Americans have ever said anything that favorable before or since about the Army.

Q: As long as we're on that note (I know we've been following a chronological order here), I would like to discuss your concept of professionalism, and ask you specifically what you mean by the military as a profession. What makes a professional? That's the first question.

A: Well, when you speak of a professional today, and we'll limit it to the Army, you're still looking at men who acquire a wide variety of talents in different balance. The successful combat commander (or any commander) is quite different, in many respects, from many successful staff officers. This is why a successful staff officer doesn't necessarily make a good commander. If we look at the psychological approach to men, we see that there are three things: the id, the ego, and the superego. I would call it the physical, the mental, and the spiritual, to put it in other words. The combination of those qualities or characteristics will vary in people doing different jobs, and also in rank to some degree. For instance, obviously at the junior level, for the noncommissioned officer the physical requirements are of the utmost importance. The mental requirements are important, too, but on the field of battle itself it may be that the superego, or the spiritual qualities, are not as important -- at least at the moment. On the other hand, you get to our senior leaders and the physical requirements drop off, while the mental and spiritual demands increase. As you go toward the higher grades or rank or seniority, more and more do I feel that the moral ascendancy of the individual is of great importance. I also feel, naturally, that this goes for mental attainments to a high degree, but I'm not talking about the Ph.D., as against a man of sound mentality in the upper third as far as his mental characteristics are concerned. Men respect and look for physical ability and energy on the part of the commanders that serve. They look for higher mental and spiritual levels more and more as they go up in rank and years, and the spiritual aspect has great impact. Those are some of the points I see.

In a country like this, with a relatively small professional Army -- again we speak only of the Army

-- when we have to undergo such terrific expansion during the time of war, the effort of raising the level of the whole to that of the professional Army is a worthy one and one that we strive for, but one which can never be quite achieved. I say never; however, if a war lasted for years, God forbid, then perhaps you could. The trouble in war is that you always lose the best in battle. They are the ones who are always with it; they're the men who keep moving. They're not the men who sit in the foxhole and count their points until they go home. You have to get along with the rest. I know from my personal experience with nine battalion commanders at any one time commanding infantry battalions integral to my division. I would say that as a rule I would have three I could really depend on for anything; I could assign them any task. I had three I could take a chance on; I was more sure of them in some situations than in others. Very frequently, I hate to say it, but we normally had three that I wished I didn't have. Very frequently I had to find some job off on the side, some special mission for them, and let a major, or sometimes a captain, take their battalion to get a man whom I could depend on when the chips were down. I don't know, human nature being what it is, whether we can do better or not. Of course, in a time of major emergency -- with problems greatly enlarged and expanded, less controlled, less direction, less adherence to policies -- then I suppose the situation gets all the worse.

This is one of the problems with discipline, or the lack of it. I think the quality of our leadership today, or lack of it, is best indicated by the lack of discipline. Whether this is a problem that is now getting too big for the military to handle, in view of the fact that there in no real discipline in any element of our society, is a serious question; whether the Army can field a competent and motivated civilian Army composed of youngsters who enjoyed -- if that's the word -- all this permissiveness during their teenage years is a serious question. We can only do it if we can crack down hard from a disciplinary standpoint. But with courts and courts-martial being as liberal as they are, and the leniency in the criminal courts, civil courts, and every other place, I don't know how we can restore discipline, the respect for authority or patriotism in our beloved land.

Q: Do you see a further breakdown, or an increase of permissiveness, if, in fact, the volunteer Army concept is approved?

A: I'm not one of the ones who puts much faith in a volunteer Army as far as a good Army is concerned -- or even having a dependable Army when the chips are down. In time of depression we will get more men and better men; the more severe the depression, the better the men we will get. But, by and large, they'll be mostly from the lower half of the population as far as overall education and quality are concerned. Then when the chips are down, you will find even this level drying up, so what do we do then? Go back to the draft, and get people who meet the mental and physical standards that we really need; no exemptions. They're not going to be forthcoming as volunteers. You can't buy this sort of thing. Some sort of a national service is the only decent answer to this. I mentioned universal military training earlier; this is probably not feasible today by itself. I do feel that national service with small or reasonable pay and a shorter period for those who choose or are assigned to military service in contrast to those employed otherwise, would be justified. I think I suggested 12-16 months for military service, 24 months for non-military service, but every male to perform some service.

Q: I noted that in 1947 you spent a lot of time considering a volunteer Army; in fact there was a lot of pressure at that time. You were concerned -- when I say you, I mean you and what you represented -- about the fact that the GI bill was going to expire. This would certainly not be favorable to the volunteer Army. You were concerned about education benefits. You were concerned about quarters, the type of uniforms, the fact that people were engaged in menial tasks (which is the exact thing that we are doing today), that the grade distribution needed to be more equitable to the Army than what we are seeing in some of the other services. The re-enlistment bonus was necessary; the re-enlistment furlough. We are considering the possibility that maybe we should allow people to purchase their discharges, which we had previous in the earlier times; do away with that short-term enlistments, because they were detrimental; increase per diem, restoration of clothing and money allowances, and a two-year overseas tour and an assured two years in the States when they came back. These are items I got out of your papers, and they are

exactly the same things we're talking about today, not anything new.

A: No, they are the same. You can go back to the Office of Chief of Military History and you can find all these things have been studied and restudied before. There's nothing new about it. Since you mention that, I would tell you that one of my most interesting experiences in front of the Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, was in this connection with this. He had one of the very top generals of the Air Force, still the Air Corps then, and also one of the top four-star generals of the Army in there. The Army general agreed to let the Air Force take all the people with AGCT (IQ) ratings of above 100 while the Army took the others.

I rose up as a lowly brigadier, which I probably shouldn't have done, and said, "What do we do in the Army when we need special skills and officers if we only get men up to a 100 IQ? That is just about a high school graduate level and it insured that the Air Force would get all the people who were going to be sweeping out their hangars with better than high school and up to a college-level education. That was blocked, but it is an indication of some of the very specious thinking that sometimes goes on at high levels.

Q: At that time, 1947, we also had a very major change in military justice. Did you see a decline to the negative rather than to the positive?

A: Oh yes, it was quite apparent. It just followed on the comments I made before regarding the military tribunals; the attempt to destroy military discipline, to destroy the respect for authority, to destroy willingness to accept responsibility, to exercise authority. It was all a part of it. It's gone from bad then to worse now.

Q: General, I think that wraps up the years that you spent with the Director of Personnel as Chief of Manpower Control.



Arthur Trudeau as a West Point cadet.

Port of Manila. Under Trudeau’s Base X command, Manila handled 20,000 tons of cargo daily in preparation for the invasion of Japan.

Trudeau found music good for the soul and relaxing. The troops loved it. Here with banjo, he and his staff relax at their Manila headquarters in August 1945.



General Trudeau with other members of the War Crimes Tribunal in Manila, February 1946.

Handing out Abraham Lincoln cards to the children of Hokkaido, Japan, 1952.



ゲテイスバーグの演說

私達の祖先は九十七年前にこの大陸に自由を求め、すべての人々は同じように造られているということを主張して新しい國を築き上げました。

只今私達は自分の國や他の同じような國々が長い間耐えることが出來るかどうかということを試すための南北戰爭をしております。私達はこの戰爭で國のために死んだ人達のために墓を作りました。私達がこれをするのは當り前の事であります。でも實ぐ云えば私達は自分の力だけでこの國を捧めることは出來ません。

勇敢な人達は戰死された人も、今生きておられる人達がこの國で私達よりも遙に一生懸命に働きになつてこの國を捧められました。私達の話すことは世界の人達に直ぐ忘れられてしまうでしょうが、この勇敢な人達の働きは決して忘れられないでしょう。この勇敢な人達の立派な働きを無駄にしないように私達は一生懸命に勤めなければなりません。この勇敢な人達が命を捨てゝ戰つて造り上げた國を私達は神様の御力に依つて新しい自由な國に作り上げることを決心しなければなりません。そして人民の人民に依る人民のための政府を守らねばなりません。

アブラハム・リンカーン

アブラハム・リンカーン

十九世紀の偉大なアメリカ大統領アブラハム・リンカーン程日本の人達にそして子供達にまでよく知られている米國人は少ないでしょう。リンカーンはかぎりけのない人で、自分の國に一生懸命に盡し、人の惜さや誤にでも偉くなる機會のあることや、そして又人々が各々の意見を話したり又空我を信ずる自由を認めるあの民主々義の理想に身を捧げましたので自由のすべての國民から慕われているのです。

アメリカの南北戰爭の後戰地であり、又リンカーンが國民に對して有名な演說をしたあのゲテイスバーグという町の大學の學長ハンソン博士は米國の政治家が明治十四年にゲテイスバーグの古戰場を訪れた時の話をしてくれました。

その日米の政治家は『貴下はどこを一番見たいのですか』と聞かれた。『私はアブラハム・リンカーンがあの偉大な演說をされた時に立つておられた處だけが見たいのです』と答えましたので、そこに案内しますと、その日本の政治家は唯敬の念に打たれて唯默つて頭を下げました。やがてハンソン博士に向い感謝の面持で『世界の諸国民がリンカーンの言葉を解ろうとさえしてくれたらば』と言い、それから彼はアブラハム・リンカーンの立つていたという地面に接吻するため身を屈めたということであります。

リンカーンの像はアメリカで一番安いあのペニーと呼ばれる一セント銅貨に刻まれておりますが『けれどもリンカーンはどんな貧乏な人でも持つことの出來る一番安い銅貨に刻まれ、そしてすべての人がその銅貨を見てはリンカーンが一生涯掲げたあの理想を忘れないことを誓つておられたことでしょう。』

陸軍軍醫團長　陸軍少將　アーサーGルーード

Lincoln card with penny and text of the Gettysburg Address and Lincoln anecdote.

Trudeau meets with Emperor Haile Selassie on a trip with heads of U.S. Intelligence agencies to Africa and the Middle East, April 1954.

President Rhee visits Operation Snowflake, the largest training exercise in Korea since the end of the war (1957).



President Syngman Rhee and General Trudeau unveiling memorial to Corporal Mitchell Red Cloud, Jr., as I Corps Headquarters was renamed Camp Red Cloud on Armed Forces Day, May 1957.

General Trudeau, Commanding General, I Corps, Camp Red Cloud, Ui-jong-bu, Korea, 1957.