CHAPTER XVI

The Far East Again

Q: Let's go to your position in the Far East. Would you like to tell us how you got there, what mode of travel you used?

A: Well, very simply, after the pressures that we had been under and the harassment and all, my wife and I saw no reason for rushing over by air. We said let's make it more like a vacation for a change and go on a transport. I've forgotten what the time was, but it was the better part of two weeks at sea and we had a fairly enjoyable trip. It was in September, the weather was pleasant as a whole, and it gave us more time to talk than we had probably had in the preceding two months together. She was terribly upset at this time because it had come as a shock to her and she felt I hadn't kept her sufficiently informed as to what was happening, I guess. But these are the kinds of things that you don't talk about, sometimes even with your wife, when you are dealing in this field. I arrived over there and I was met by many good friends on the staff. I had some people who were in intelligence in Tokyo also, so I was warmly greeted and well taken care of. I enjoyed my service there immensely; as I say, I had worked with General Lemnitzer before. He had been the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in Washington when I was G-2. We also had an excellent understanding in my job as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in Tokyo which, of course, was the kind of job he had had at the Department of the Army level. I had plenty to do and I thoroughly enjoyed doing it. I found that my contemporaries -- the flag officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force -- were enjoyable. I had known most of them before -- not all, but most of them. It was a pleasant life for the year I had in Tokyo.

Q: I noticed some of the people here, and I might mention them to bring back some memories. We had already talked about Paul Caraway. He was the J-3.

A: Yes, he was the J-3.

Q: General Barnes was the Chief of Staff.

A: Barnes was later. Originally it was Rogers, Elmer Rogers, and then Barnes.

Q: Then the J-1 was Harlan Parks, Air Force; and John Fowler, J-2; Hubbard, Rear Admiral Hubbard, J-4; and Daniel Strickler, J-5.

A: Dan Strickler was the former Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania. When Eisenhower had the NATO build-up in the very early fifties, Dan took the 28th Division to Germany, then remained in service for a while and came over and was on the staff there. Delightful people.

Q: I notice the senior member on the Military Armistice Commission was Major General Robert G. Gard, who served with you on the War Crimes Tribunal in the Philippines and at Eighth Army, General I. D. White.

A: Yes, he had been the commander of the Constabulary when I had the 1st Brigade under him in Germany.

Q: And Bob Montague had the Corps.

A: Right, and I succeeded him a year later.

Q: Well, before we get back to Korea, do you want to talk about your year's duty, some of the aspects of your position in the Far East Command? I have very little information, by the way. In fact, I have no information in reference to your job in the Far East Command. I've picked it up when you went to I Corps. Would you like to talk a bit about the year on the Staff? What was Tokyo like? Did you get involved in intelligence again?

A: Yes. Once you are in it you can't keep out of it very much. It is stimulating too. Having had the 1st Cavalry Division on Hokkaido, I was fairly acquainted with -- I say fairly well; at least I had been exposed to -- the Japanese for a year on Hokkaido. As I told you in the beginning, the Japanese Self Defense Force, up to the strength of two divisions and a corps headquarters, was organized on Hokkaido, feeling, I guess, that there would be less resistance to it there than there would have been down on Honshu. Consequently, the military men I had known before, or at least those who were given military rank, had come from the Japanese National Police. Many of them were on important jobs in Tokyo. For instance, this is where I extended my friendship with General Keizo Hayashi, who was Chief of the Japanese Joint Staff for many years -- I've forgotten how many, maybe ten. I'm

not sure it is not on this desk, but I'm just thinking of an ashtray that he gave me, for instance, which symbolized the first joint problem executed at the theater level by the Japanese forces and ours in 1956. By direction of General Lemnitzer, I was the American in charge and General Hayashi was running it for the Japanese. It was very successful and very satisfying that this could happen so few years after the war, really almost ten. It was quite amazing because of the terrific enmity that had existed between our forces and their people.

Q: Maybe we should talk about that for a minute, General. Everyone in the last several months has said that we have to consider Japan as the power in the Pacific. We know that it has the third largest GNP and that by the year 2000 it is going to surpass us, whatever that means. I question whether we should nurture Japan to really become the power in the Pacific. What is your feeling?

A: Well, I just have one question about that. If you don't, then who do you support? Japan has the same vulnerabilities in many respects that the British Empire had; in other words, it is an island that is far from self-sustaining. Again it is based on self-interest, which is trade. Who do they trade with? They can trade with the Philippines and Southeast Asia. On certain terms, eventually they can trade with China, or they can trade with Russia and the United States, of course, which is what they are doing. But they are doing it to the point where we are trying to put roadblocks against Japanese products coming in, whether steel or leather or shoes or electronics. The Japanese are in quite a spot. Japan is also, for all intents and purposes today, dependent on Middle East oil. It is quite obvious if the Russians got control of Middle East oil what could happen to the Japanese because of the Russian power to turn off the spigot or turn it on and control the Japanese economy. It would create very serious problems for Japan. On the other hand, Japan's only hope of making an inroad, whether it is from trade or other reasons or purposes, on the mainland is to stay on our side with certainly the Russians being their opponent. And perhaps the Chinese, although their trade with the Chinese is more likely than with the Russians. There is a new aspect to this thing, though, that did not exist before, and that is the Republic of Korea. Because whoever is going to have

access to the Manchurian mainland has got to have access practically through Korea, unless you would envision going straight into Vladivostok or something of the sort. Vladivostok is not Manchurian. Manchuria is, or was, Chinese territory. There are some real hurdles here -- some real roadblocks -- and I don't know which way to go. But I do know one thing; that is, it doesn't look to me that there can be any great military-industrial power in the Western Pacific unless it is Japan, over a long period of time.

This was true when I was there, when General Lemnitzer was in command, and it is still true. They are not carrying their share of the burden as far as defense is concerned. Even with their tremendous growth in GNP I would guess that even today they're probably not putting more than one percent into their own defense. In our day it was less than one percent, and it was a matter of constant pressure during that time to get the Japanese to up the amount of GNP that they were putting into their defense. I haven't had reason to check, but it is still very small. Of course, every time that we try to do anything about this, old Article Nine of the Constitution -- which was insisted upon by General MacArthur -- raises its ugly head and the dissident groups -- the minority in Japan, and the majority as well -- yell about it. The fact is that Japan has had a very hard time rearming even for its own defense.

Q: I see two more problems in the Pacific. One is the obvious reduction of U. S. forces in South Korea; we have already announced one division, and we probably are going to see more. Also, I think that we are aware now that in the Straits of Malacca there really are great beds of oil. The potential for oil, which certainly seems to be a significant strategic factor for the future, could play itself against the Middle East.

A: That is what they were trying to do before, of course.

Q: Yes. My point is that I think it would be extremely dangerous in the long run if the United States lost its presence in that part of the world.

A: Well, I do too. I thoroughly agree with you.

Q: I hope that as the years go by we don't place too much importance in Europe.

A: Yes. Of course, Japan's other hope right now is to expand the trade she has with the United States -- meaning Alaska -- in the way of timber and fisheries. There is no question what they do when they get into an area and what their fishing does, and third is oil from Alaska which has its strategic aspects.

Q: Well, Sir, I think that we had better get back to our role in the Far East Command.

A: Well, I was working with the Japanese quite a bit because of past contacts and because of the nature of my job. In Caraway I had a very able planner. We also had much to do in connection with Okinawa. Okinawa was a big problem in those days, because of the High Commissioner and the Rights that are coming up now. We recognized a residual sovereignty for Japan there, which may or may not have been a mistake, but whatever it is it has been done. This was constantly plaguing us to improve the situation as far as the Ryukyuans (Okinawans) were concerned on Okinawa and also to keep in balance the demands being made on the Japanese, by the Japanese, for the return of their sovereignty and control of the islands. One of the pleasant things I did was when I was selected to go down to double-ten day on Taiwan for the Chinese. This is the 10th day of the 10th month of each year. This goes back to free China in 1911 and Sun Yat-sen. During the years that I was in the Far East, 1955, 1956, 1957, I was selected to be the U. S. representative on Taiwan. I had always had excellent relations with the Chinese and this was a satisfying little thing, not too important.

I went over to Korea, of course, and I received an even higher decoration from President Rhee this time. I had known him during the war, and it was a friendship that extended not only now but all through his life. He was a great man. He may have been getting senile and old as age went on, but you couldn't take away the fact that he literally was the father of that country in modern times.

Q: Let me jump you back to Formosa for a moment. We are going to be pushed out of Okinawa; I think right now we can see Kadina Air Base dwindling away as the years

go by. What do you consider the political-military aspects of increasing our presence in Formosa?

A: Well, it certainly is an anchor there in the Far East. When you think of that term Far East, it is interesting to note that it isn't Far East at all; it's the Western Pacific we should really speak of, or Eastern Asia, or Southeastern Asia. But, of course, it goes back to the time when the world revolved around London, and so it became the Near East, the Middle East, and the Far East. But the terms keep being used and we all know what we are talking about all right. Formosa is certainly a most important anchor there and it may continue to be, considering the difficulties we have had in the Philippines, to whom we've given everything and get goddamn little in return. It may be that we should still stick by that anchor. Of course, there are a group of people here who think that we should go for Red China and throw Chiang Kai-shek overboard. Well, he has his limitations and so does everybody else. The strategic value of Formosa increases as we lose our hold in Japan or Okinawa. I think it becomes critical for our future together with the Marianas and Guam as stepping-stones.

Chiang has finally gotten to the point where I think that the native Taiwanese are able to reach at least the rank of captain, and this may have gone up again since I last checked on it. In the early days this was impossible, as you know; they kept them down where they couldn't reach officer rank, but I think that is ironing out to a degree. Then there is bound to be intermarriage and other factors because actually they are the same people basically. I think Formosa becomes of greater importance than ever before with the dissidence that exists in the Philippines and the growing loss of power that we have in Okinawa and Japan.

The Military Aid Program was a very important program with respect to the Koreans. This was a matter which, while the recommendation came out of Korea, had to be settled in our Headquarters in the Far East and United Nations Command. Of course, it was during that year also -- in other words, during the spring of 1956 -- that the question came up about elimination of the Far East Command. I was one of the principal negotiators together with Admiral Stump's Chief of Staff in Hawaii, Admiral George Anderson. He became Chief of

Naval Operations and later Ambassador to Portugal. They didn't reappoint him, however, and were unhappy because he stood up against some of McNamara's foolishness. These conversations were intricate and, of course, they brought in service rivalries.

The Navy was bound to dominate the whole thing, and it did get to a point where a Supreme Commander was important. I suppose you say, well, we (the Army) had one in Europe so the Navy had to have the one in the Pacific and the Air Force was given the Supreme Command in Alaska. These are not too unrealistic and it is alright; it works out. I think these things have done a lot in the field to bring the services together. I have always found that the closer you get to where the problems are -- where the fighting is -- the people work better together than they do on the high staffs where everyone is seeking power.

As I said, the relationships with the Japanese Self Defense Forces were certainly interesting and important. This exercise that I talked about was called Clover-1. This was a maneuver that was held during the month of September 1956. Immediately after that I was sent by General Lemnitzer to be the American representative on a SEATO operation in Southeast Asia that was being conducted by the British Commander, General Festing, in Singapore. This was quite a delightful experience. The problem involved Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines as the battle area. This was 1956, and, of course, look at what it has since become. It was while I was there in October -- early October -- that I was notified that I was being promoted and would go to Korea immediately to take over the I Corps (Group).

This did come as a surprise. It is one of those things that you hope for, but it did come as a surprise; I had no previous knowledge that it would actually come through.

Q: General, let's talk about SEATO, collective security, multiple relationships which existed at the time in the SEATO consensus, and so forth. These come under great criticism today. Do you feel back then that we were gaining by what we were doing? Let's just look at SEATO. Do you see SEATO then as being an alliance favorable to us, and how do you look at SEATO today?

A: Yes I do, because the British were then a power. They still held Singapore and they were recognized as a power. They had a division of Gurkhas still there in Malay. They had reasonably substantial forces in Hong Kong, at least a reinforced regiment. They were looked on with respect, and I think the fact that SEATO nations -- the United States and Britain, in particular, and Australia -- stood together here and did a whole lot in convincing Thailand, among others, that we would be there to back them up; this was terribly important. I think all of those things had their effect on Burma to the west, and Ne Win, as you know, became a good friend of ours for a period. He had had his ups and downs. I was with General Ne Win; as a matter of fact, I picked him up when he was in the hospital at Rochester. He was in Mayo's and I brought him home from Mayo's. I brought him into Washington and played some golf with him. I had been in Burma when I was G-2, which was just a couple of years before. I know quite a number of people in all of those military forces. I think these things had a very positive value. Even though the British haven't come in and given us any direct help in Southeast Asia, the Australians have and New Zealand has because they could see where their bread is buttered.

I like to bring this up because I think it is a great failure on the part of the government and other people who think that we, in effect, have lost Southeast Asia. We haven't lost Southeast Asia. As a matter of fact, as Foch once said years ago, "The General who fights for the last fifteen minutes wins." I'm not sure but what if we kept fighting, and had done it in a more aggressive and positive way once we decided force was to be used, that this Vietnam mess might be over now. But even if it isn't over, you cannot deny the terrific gains for Australia and New Zealand feeling much more safe. And 110 million people in Indonesia are now back on our side and Malay is on our side. Remember Thailand drops right into Malay there and they could see the whole Peninsula and Singapore going. Now we are welcome back there, with the same man in charge, Lee Yuan Kew; he is still head man, whatever his title is in Singapore. Now we are welcome! These are very positive gains, and I'm amazed that the government itself and the media don't bring them up. One hundred and ten million people is a lot of gain, a hell of a lot of gain, believe me.

Q: General, let me be specific about Vietnam. You were G-2 during the Geneva Conference, you were in the Far East as . . .

A: I was in Vietnam during that time, too.

Q: We were getting interested, obviously. I think the big question remains: why did we make the decision to fight in Vietnam? Maybe this is way off the subject, but I think it is a critical one and it is going to be discussed for years. Was it necessary to fight in Vietnam? Was it necessary to draw the line there, or could we have, as some people like to say today, let them try and if they couldn't have done it alone then just forgotten it? What is your feeling there?

A: I don't know, but I would say this: that at the time that President Johnson decided to go in there, in 1965, there probably never was a period when I was paying less attention to military problems in any depth. I will admit that I was surprised; I was surprised when I saw we were really going to move in there in a big way. But I didn't know the background, as I say; I hadn't been living in that atmosphere. But I did think then when they started that they would realize that Hanoi and Haiphong were the key to Southeast Asia and not Saigon as far as that area is concerned. Thailand and Burma, that is still another problem to the west. I was quite amazed. I never thought that they would go in there without having made up their minds about the strategy -- since shooting was going to start -- but that they were going in and cut Viet Cong lifelines in key places, Hanoi and Haiphong. Whatever they did to Hanoi, Haiphong seems to be left alone for fear that we might sink a Russian ship.

Q: High-level personnel have mentioned that people who were involved at the time recognized the fact that we would have limited objectives, but they didn't recognize at the time that we would be limited in our application of power.

A: That is exactly what I'm saying. In other words, I've never gone for Gavin's idea of having enclaves there and doing nothing else about it and just waiting for them to attack you and throw you out. I never thought we would get ourselves in the position in which they put MacArthur when they wouldn't let him move north of the Yalu; same damn thing. Now here, of course, we

were worried about a third country coming in. North of the Yalu we would still have been against the Chinese; here they were worried about the Russians. If they didn't think that we had the power of deterrence -- worldwide deterrence, real power -- then we should rebuild it today if we haven't got it. If they didn't think we had the power of deterrence then they probably shouldn't have moved as far as they did. And if they did think that we had the power of deterrence, then we should have told the Russians that Haiphong becomes a target in combat and to keep Russian ships clear, period. And they would have kept them clear.

Q: I'm just wondering if a reverse Cuba occurred at that time. This is speculation. I wonder if we weren't told at that time in the event that we took action either in Hanoi or Haiphong that we would then have to be prepared to suffer damage in our own country.

A: Probably not. If we had the deterrence that we should have had in 1965 it wouldn't be true. Now what deterrence we have today is open to question, particularly when you hear Laird and the others. They almost quiver because Jackson had said that they [the Russians] have these new missiles and they say, "Oh no, they are just building a few new silos." Well there is a difference in that estimate; which is true, I don't know. I know what Jackson said, and I feel sure in my own mind from what everybody had said, that we do not have the degree of deterrence today that we had in 1965. Whether we have enough to deter is questionable. What I think the administration was afraid of was, if we did this then, there would be additional problems in Western Europe and we certainly weren't prepared to take on two or three, let's say, conventional-type wars. Or maybe more in Egypt or the Middle East, although the Israelis seem to have given bloody noses enough to the Egyptians so they must have learned something by now.

Q: General, you discussed the fact that you had gone down to this conference in SEATO, and that was when I interrupted.

A: There isn't much more. There were very interesting briefings and discussions as to what contributions we could make, and there were a lot of discussions about problems of air support and the type of planes that could be used there. Of course, in any defense of

what we call Southeast Asia, Thailand became very important because of the nature of the country, its location, and it's willingness to stand firm. They have been a very solid friend at times when they must have doubted our integrity. Thailand came in for an awful lot of discussion, when you think of it, and we since have done something about it in the way of improving routes of communication right up to Vientiane to try and shut the Commies off up north on the Mekong, in other words, Laos to the north. But there was really more play given to Thailand and to the Vietnamese area than there was to the area where we had most of our struggle along the coast and down in the delta.

Q: On the 18th of October, 1956, you were notified that you were getting your third star and that you would take over I Corps in Korea. I'm sure this was an extremely satisfying moment. I would like to get your feelings . . .

A: Well, I felt that there was some degree of vindication -- not completely but to some extent, so that was very satisfying. I liked the idea of going back to Korea and taking a command. It did separate me from my wife again, and she came home and stayed with our children, visited friends, and got an apartment -- all those things that wives have to do. But I was very pleased at getting that corps command. One of the most interesting aspects was that I found myself in command of the corps with two American divisions and the corps troops and the 6th ROK Corps of six divisions. I had a force of about 150,000 men. This gave me a lot of satisfaction and a lot of room for maneuvers, training, and supervision, things that I enjoyed. It was particularly meaningful to me that I had commanded both of my American divisions, the 1st Cavalry and the 7th Infantry; that was really quite unusual.

Q: Well, General, let's talk about your command. I think I should show you these pictures. I think you represent the Patton of Korea.

A: Yes. Well, as I say, it was very satisfying to me. I had a splendid rapport with the Koreans from Rhee down and still consider most of their generals and senior officers as my friends. While I didn't know it then, Brigadier General Park Chung Hee, Chief of Staff of the VI Corps, was to become the President of the country in another three years. It was a satisfying

experience; the Koreans had high morale, they had excellent housekeeping, they set quite a pace. As a matter of fact, the Americans had a hard time keeping up with the Koreans as far as their housekeeping was concerned. The training was active and good; we had many maneuvers and, of course, the Koreans were quite realistic about theirs. I remember when President Diem came up with President Rhee to see the Koreans in maneuvers; he was amazed, particularly in their use of artillery in close support. Just "walking a wave" up a hill in front of them and not in back of them like the Chinese do.

Q: Let me ask you about that particular visit. You had a series of correspondence with Sam Williams, who was over in Vietnam at that time. And you arranged to have Vietnamese officers come and work with your people. I sort of had the idea that Diem's visit was tied in with one of these.

A: It was. They'd have a group of possibly 15 or 18 officers at a time come up. I've forgotten what they spent, but it was like a week or ten days, maybe two weeks. It wasn't enough, but at least they got quite an eye-opener. They would come with a Corps Commander, his staff, and his subordinate divisions. Most of those names then on the rosters are the men that have been leading the forces in South Vietnam.

Many of these people have gone on to higher commands and civilian jobs. General Kim Song On became the Chief of Joint Staff over there, among others. They were fine young officers and the Koreans were young; their generals were in their 30s. I finally got smart myself. I'd go out in a chopper to visit two or three Korean divisions. I'd pull up, particularly if they were in forward positions, and drop in with the chopper, and, of course, the Division Commander would be there to meet me. We would go maybe 400 yards in a jeep and then start climbing. They loved to climb those hills. You could do all that in about an hour or so and then you could go with a jeep to another one. You would get over there and that guy would start you climbing too. I finally got smart and interspersed my stops so that I wasn't climbing one hill after another. It was one thing to keep up with a 30-year-old, which I could do pretty well, but it was another thing to do it four or five times in rapid

succession. I slowed that pace down. But there are a couple points that stand out in my mind here that are interesting.

The Koreans, on motor maintenance, felt that they lost a little face if they really did any work themselves. I ran a school like we had at Holabird; the Ordnance actually ran the school for me, of course. I went out as Corps Commander and gathered all the generals that could be gotten together. There were quite a number between these six divisions and my two and the attached troops. I ran them through a two-day course, not very long, but a two-day course on motors. I made them all put on coveralls. They were quite amazed that a general would get his hands dirty and let a sergeant or a lieutenant tell him how to take a carburetor apart and adjust it. It was a hell of a good lesson for them. They talked about it later, you know; the generals do this and do that. Another time I remember that they were firing a demonstration and I had a group of people -- I'd say they were Americans -- going down the line and a youngster was firing a machine gun, a .30-caliber machine gun. He was getting jams and monkeying around with it, and neither his instructors nor his officers would do anything. I had on a pressed field uniform because I was part of the inspection party. I dropped down beside this soldier and adjusted the head space on his machine gun. Well, these people couldn't believe it -- they couldn't believe that a general officer would get down and do that. But those are the kind of examples that you had to give them.

Then I arranged a pistol match for all general officers, and, God, how these guys got out and practiced! They were shooting up more pistol ammunition; they didn't want to do anything except practice, thinking that practice makes perfect. Well, practice makes better, but it doesn't make a poor shot perfect. I didn't have time to do that. I used to be a pretty good shot . . . but anyhow we went out there and again we all fired and a Korean won it. I don't know whether they expected me, just because I was Commanding General, to win it or not. I had won plenty of matches, but I didn't win that one. Well, they thought this was great, you know, that they could get out and beat the old man pistol shooting. All these things were good and needed. They had that Oriental opinion of what face is and they didn't want to dirty their hands. They think that they can

command and control from a distance with a certain degree of aloofness, and we know better than that. Those were very satisfying things to get across to them. I'm sure other American generals have done this, too, because it is our way of doing things. We improved the battle positions, which hadn't been tinkered with for a long time up on the Kansas line. I accented the use of communications; I insisted that I be able to keep in touch with my commanders and they keep in touch with me, and I was rather merciless if they couldn't keep in touch. I built automatic relay stations up on the tops of high peaks so, whether they had line of sight or not, they could get through. They finally learned that they could get through.

I improved the use of artillery to a considerable extent, and I particularly accented battlefield illumination. That was a weakness in American forces always, and I think it is a weakness today. I say that for this reason: there is a tendency to depend upon the artillery illuminating round -- whether it is from an 82 mortar, a 105, a 155, or what have you -- as providing battlefield illumination. It does in a way, but it is often unsatisfactory because, while it may show you something for the half a minute or the minute that it lasts, when it is over you are worse off then you were before. Since the Chinese fight at night they hate battlefield illumination, not only because it shows them up but because again they lose their night eyes and can't continue effectively. I always accented to a great extent the same damn thing that I had done in combat, and that is take any kind of plane the Army has and put illuminating flares up there that have 2.5 to 3 minutes burning time. I've forgotten how many million candle power they had, but maybe 800 or 1,200 thousand and really get sustained light over the battlefield. That is what I'm talking about when I say battlefield illumination. I mean sustained at least until the period of danger has elapsed.

I have seen it where I have been able to keep light over the battlefield with just small planes at my own disposal as long as I had the flares for two or three hours at a time. That was another thing that I accented -- night action; I was always on that. I was also emphasizing the condition of messes, construction and, of course, field exercises; I enjoyed those and the men did too. I remember one field exercise we had -- I think the January before I left. I don't believe

the temperature ever got over 20 degrees, in other words, always below freezing. The tendency had been, and I did it myself in my earlier maneuvers, to have a withdrawal action, you know, from the prepared positions, leaving a minimum screen and moving the rest of them back. Well, these were good, but I finally said to myself, why in hell do we always have a withdrawal action? I'm going to withdraw first, and then we are going to attack and go back to our forward positions for psychological reasons. I remember the last day we had an attack at one of the principal strongholds just north of the Han Tan River. We had a big reviewing stand there and, of course, President Rhee and General Decker, who was then in command, came up on this final day of the attack. We had advanced north for four or five days and were practically back in our original battle positions when we put on this demonstration of a battalion attacking a high point. Old President Rhee was always testing me out as a Corps Commander and asked whether I would attack or not. Well, of course, he doesn't understand the American mentality if he thinks a Corps Commander is going to launch an attack without proper orders and preparation because of all the things that could happen between the time the order was given and H-hour. Perhaps nothing happened. Well, anyhow, he was sitting there; he had a hibachi and he was warming his hands. It was colder than hell, and we were watching this battalion attack up this slope with the artillery fire in front. Finally they got to the objective and there was the red flare. They had gotten their objective, and had done it well. Suddenly on the slope behind them from out of the ground where it had been rolled up, about four or six men, who had stayed behind dug this big sign out of a trench and put it into prepared holes. That sign that was so big, all in Korean, that it could be read from our reviewing stand which was probably at least 600 yards from it. Of course, I didn't know what it said in Korean so I said to President Rhee, "Mr. President, what does that sign say?" He says, "General, sign say, 'Let us go North'." And he gets up and he grabs Decker and myself by the hands and said, "Let us go now!" He was ready.

Q: You know, that is rather interesting because we hear now about General Thieu in Vietnam talking about going North. How did you politely, politically, and tactfully play that down?

A: Well, you just have to give the old man an offhand answer that you hope the situation some day will permit this; you just pass it off. He knows you can't do it, of course, but he is always pushing.

Q: I wonder if Thieu knows if he can or can't do it. Thieu has got now probably the strongest army going over there.

A: Well, this is alright, except he knows who controls his logistics. This is where we had him. This is where they were always limited as to the amount of ammunition they could directly have under their control and things of this sort, you know, fuel and ammo. They learned enough to know they couldn't move without their logistic tail being well supported.

We did a great deal for the civilian people in the area. As a matter of fact, I even established clinics where I sent nurses at certain periods of time to try and help, particularly where children were concerned. We built schools for them. We had a pretty good aid program and did a whole lot to help these people. Everything was valuable to them. I remember that we had a contract, for instance, that gave us the equivalent of $600 a month, for collecting our waste. I don't mean just garbage. I mean things like beer cans which they flattened out and made into walls; not shingles, but walls. Cardboard cartons which our canned foods came in; they flattened those out and it may not sound like much but it is a hell of a lot better than a mud floor in your house. They could make use of everything. Trucks would disappear, and the next thing you know a bus would appear and the whole sides of that bus would be from oil drums flattened out; now this is quite a job. These fellows are ingenious; they could do all sorts of things and, of course, some of them did things that weren't too honest. I mean they had Oriental trickery; or to put it another way, they did things that I guess people feel they can do when they have nothing, and the other fellow has everything.

Did I tell you the story about the naming of Camp Red Cloud? Well, I think this is worth telling. My compound there, the corps headquarters, had always been called Jackson Six, which was our telephone exchange. That seemed to me a rather inadequate name. I told somebody -- my G-1, I guess, or PR officer, whoever it was -- to start digging and find

some people in this corps who got a Congressional Medal of Honor during combat and let's name our compound here, our headquarters, for the most worthy. They came up with several names, and they had a couple of lieutenants. One of them was this Lieutenant Shea that I mentioned, who had just reported to my division and was killed on Pork Chop Hill. Shea was sort of a favorite of mine, because he held the two-mile record at West Point, about 30 seconds faster than I had held it 30 years before. I had a great feeling for Shea and when I went back home had a review and presented the decoration to his mother. Shea was one of the names, and there were two or three other lieutenants. I finally looked this list over and spotted the name of Corporal Mitchell Red Cloud. I thought that was interesting; what did he do? I got out the citation, and Mitchell Red Cloud had done about everything a soldier could do; he charged a bunker and knocked off about 20 of the enemy and finally -- even after he was badly wounded, tossed a grenade in a bunker before he died. So what about Mitchell Red Cloud? Well, Mitchell Red Cloud's mother was the daughter of a chief of the Winnebago Indian Tribe. I said, "Now let's get hold of all the records we can, and we'll put in and get this camp named Camp Red Cloud." I was thinking of the relationship between a native American and a native Asian. We did this, and I had a brass plaque made. I put the brass plaque on a tremendous rock on the more or less flat sloping side in front of I Corps (Group) headquarters, where it is today. We put it in front, right at our flagpole. On Armed Forces Day, 1957, I decided that we had the authority to redesignate and announce it at the Armed Forces Day meeting.

It was a lovely May day; I had all the Diplomatic Corps, President Rhee and his wife, Ambassador Dowling and his wife, General Decker, I believe, or White -- all the Americans. We had about 150 people that were there for the ceremony and then for lunch at my club, which I had built or greatly extended across the street. They were sitting there. General Lemnitzer came over; he was always great because my wife had remained in Tokyo, so he brought her over. She was sitting in the front row of seats next to Mrs. Rhee. The President was standing there on one side of this curtain. I was going to say something about Camp Red Cloud, draw the curtain, and expose this plaque, and then the President was to make some remarks. This all happened; we pulled the cord and it worked, fortun-

ately, and the brass plaque was there, so I read what the brass plaque said. Then I said, "How wonderful it is that an American, a native American, an Indian whose ancestors lost their country to us, came over here to fight for the freedom of the native men of Asia." I went on and built this one up a little bit, and emphasized that he gave his life for the freedom of Asian people. I then turned it over to President Rhee. Well, he said excitedly what a great thing this was. Mrs. Rhee was getting itchier by the moment, because she knew that he frequently went off on tangents, and my wife was keeping her calm, saying, "Never mind, everything is going to be alright."

The President launched into this one. He said, "Yes, American Indians are exactly like Asian people. I think American Indians came from Asia." But then he said, "Why is it that all the time you have American movies over here, you show soldiers and cowboys killing American Indians? Asian people don't like to see white men killing American Indians." Then he said, "Never again will a motion picture be shown in Korea that has the American soldiers or cowboys killing American Indians." And they never have, but this doesn't mean that our compounds cannot. There was quite a "to-do," Mrs. Rhee was so upset. I said, "This is nothing. What he said is true, but this happened more than a hundred years ago." Of course, to them this could be happening today. The dates aren't shown frequently, and they think this is still going on out in the West. It is bad psychology.

Before I left there to come back to the United States at the end of that year, the end of 1957, I wrote back to G-2 and I said, "Listen, you have got to go out and get me two of the finest pictures, portraits, grand portraits of American Indian chiefs that you can get for me to present to President Rhee." Mrs. Trudeau and I were invited there for dinner at Chung Mu Dae, now the Blue House, with President and Mrs. Rhee. He presented me with another Korean decoration and then I said, "Your Excellency (or Mr. President), I have a presentation I would like to make to you." He said, "Certainly." So we went into the next room. The portraits were on the wall. I had this all planned with his people bringing him in and then we were going to flip the covers back. I said, "Mr. President, you remember the day we named the I Corps Headquarters Camp Red Cloud for Mitchell Red Cloud, the American Indian who came to fight for your freedom in Asia?"

He said, "Oh, yes, I remember". "Well," I said, "I want to show you, I want to present to you a pair of portraits of other famous American Indians who are high in our esteem in our country also." I've forgotten which ones they were, but I presented them to him; he thought it was tremendous. Goddamn it, they looked more like him than he did himself, if he had had a headdress on. It was terrific!

Well, that is about it. We accented athletics, we accented recreation. My troops of the United Nations Command shrank to almost nothing. I had a Thai company there, and it was a good little company, and they used to put on some very interesting entertainment. They had an orchestra with different kinds of wind instruments, bamboos; it was terrific. I also had a Turkish brigade, and about the time I left there this was going to be cut back. They rotated them on a yearly basis and it was unfortunate that they filled them with green men rather than with professionals. They came over and got good training, but then when they got back, they disbanded instead of utilizing this as an advanced training ground for their regular officers and men. They didn't do as good a job as the Koreans. They didn't have the standards of either personal appearance or of taking care of their equipment but I'm sure if there had been a battle, these guys would have been right in there doing it well. I had the British at first, the Sussex and Essex Battalion, but they were pulled out shortly and went to Gibraltar. I think down at headquarters, down at Far East United Nation Headquarters, they had a few representatives, sort of a consolidated color guard of three or four people from each of several countries, including the Ethopians, but they didn't contribute anything to my strength. We used to have a lot of get-togethers, a lot of good athletics and recreation.

Of course, we had the usual visits from prominent people from all sources. I was there two Christmases, 1956 and 1957. The Cardinal came over; Cardinal Spellman came over on both occasions. Bob Hope was there on one; I think the other one he had been in Europe. Bob, as usual, always had a wonderful show, but he did give me a problem on this particular one. His last show had been in Okinawa and his people hadn't really estimated the severity of the weather conditions in Korea. When they went into their electronic hook-up just before the show, everything was being rushed, and things didn't work. He got

hours behind in his program, and the Cardinal was gracious enough to change his schedule of Masses and visits quite a bit to help Hope out. But I think Bob got a little mad at me. All of our Christmas dinners were delayed throughout the whole corps because of his tardiness, and finally it got so bad that if I was going to make the rounds to the dinners I had to get up and leave one of his presentations up at the 7th Division. I think he was quite annoyed that I had to do that. However, we played golf last summer and he didn't bring it up, so maybe he has forgotten that.

Q: You didn't mention this -- and I thought you would -- that you didn't like the name I (Eye) Corps; that you changed it.

A: Well, it isn't "I" Corps. It is a roman numeral because Corps are numbered with roman numerals. If the Roman four (IV) was there, you wouldn't think of calling it anything else besides four, and you can't improve on being first. I like to be first in anything I do, and I wanted this Corps to feel it was first. This is why I insisted on calling it First Corps, not "Eye" Corps. That's right. I told them I wanted them to be first.

Q: Your 6th ROK Corps Commander, Paik Sun-Yup, Pepper Paik, you called him . . . The feeling I got in talking to Jim was that the President would visit in your area mainly because you were there; in other words, he liked to come just to be with you; that sort of association was there.

A: That's right. Yes, I was very fond of him. The old man was a real friend.

Q: One of the things that you did talk about a lot to him was your whole philosophy on the Cavalry spirit and the Patton spirit and soldierly skill. I'm not going to ask you to talk about that because, in the six times that we've been together, it comes out all the time. I think it is there; it doesn't need to be discussed specifically. He told me of your areas of interest in the Middle East, Pakistan, and India. He also mentioned Sergeant Sullins, who was your orderly for years. You mentioned that he is still living.

A: Oh yes, he is still on active duty; he is in Panama. I'd hoped that he was going to retire and come with me and take care of some of my needs. I never got him

out of the service yet. I haven't really pushed him. Sullins is married to a Japanese girl, a very nice Japanese girl. She is a lovely little girl. They have three children, three boys, and Sullins frankly doesn't want to get mixed up in this racial mess that exists here in this country; furthermore, as I say, he is married to this Japanese girl. They've bought themselves a piece of property in Hawaii and he intends to retire in Hawaii. I probably will never have him with me. But he was with me for many years -- I've forgotten, 12 or more years. I went and raised him from a young private to at least a sergeant first class.

Q: Well, I did mention this because Jim did spend an hour or so with me.

A: I'm sorry I haven't seen that chap more, but time catches up with you so much. I think he is down at Belvoir.

Q: Yes, he's down at Belvoir. I thought that when I first started to do research on you that it would be necessary to get around and talk to all these people. It really wasn't, because I find that your files are complete enough where I know what you are writing to people, and this gives one insights. Plus the fact that you've had our conversations so well-organized; this made my job very easy.

General, what happened near the end of your tour? I find it intriguing that you've had such a diversified career and all of a sudden you are heading for Research and Development. I know you were interested early in your career in vast developments. Normally, however, I think it is a man who devoted his entire life to Research and Development efforts that gets into it. At least recently it has been that way. General Betts is an example; I don't think he has done anything but that. I know that there was the Gavin situation that occurred. I'd like you to address your last days here, where you start getting the idea that you might be coming back and anything else you want to talk about as far as your wind-up in Korea.

A: Well, of course, I had been reading about Gavin's problems and that they were upset because he said that nuclear attack could result in 70 million dead and all that. Of course, somebody over in the Pentagon said last week 100 million dead and it didn't shake

anybody. But it did in Gavin's days, and I suspect there were other problems involved there and I don't know about them. In any event, I received a communication, probably about Christmas time because I knew that nobody was going to hold my command for more than 16 months and taking over in October 1956, my 16 months was going to run out the end of January or in February 1958. So when Christmas came, I knew that I had orders coming up shortly.

Interestingly, thinking of the Cardinal again, he was a great little man and, of course, I'm Catholic, so I'm probably a little biased in his favor, but I want to tell you this one and then remind me to get back in the trend of things. He was there for Christmas Eve again, so we fixed up our gymnasium, which had practically no heat. We were just kidding ourselves but we had a couple of blowers there, and it was like a wartime gym, very temporary type. In any event, it was the only place that we had that was going to be big enough to hold the men that wanted to go to Midnight Mass and hear the Cardinal. I had my chaplain and his assistant fix the place up and I hadn't seen it that night before we went there. I'd had the Cardinal over before (1956) and we'd been talking at dinner. He got a little rest for two or three hours before Midnight Mass. When we went to the chapel there was a lot of snow on the ground, it was very cold and it was a matter of 300 yards, so I got him in a car and got him down there. I went in and, of course, he went into a room and put on his vestments. Well, when I got into the gymnasium and sat down on one of the front pews I saw what had happened to the altar and I personally got a great kick out of it, so I'll tell you what it was. The Cardinal came out to start Mass, he gets around in front as priests do when they are facing the altar then, you know, instead of the congregation. The altar was right under the basketball basket and as the Cardinal joined his hands and started to say the Mass he looked up, as Cardinals or priests frequently do, to heaven for guidance and what he saw was the statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary sitting in the basket. Well I was sitting not too far behind him. He started to giggle. He just giggled for a minute; I'm sure he did if you were looking him in the face, because he spoke of it afterward. It certainly took him by surprise, and he got a tremendous kick out of it. He said, "Well, at least She was looking down on me."

Q: General, we are going to bounce back to Korea for a minute. I found the special edition of the Bullseye, which is the farewell to General Trudeau.

I will say this; your farewell speech is the sort of battle cry that you carried forward with you. As you were talking with these people, you said, "There can be no thought of relaxation, no half-hearted efforts on the part of any individual, since the lives of his nation and his comrades as well as himself are at stake once the battle begins. As Marshal Foch once said, 'the side that fights the last 15 minutes wins the battle.'" This is your remark at your I Corps farewell ceremony on the 3d of February, 1958.

A: There is no date on this; this was prepared before that review, I think. I'll bet this is the week before. I'll tell you why. My departure was the first time we were able to show the Honest John and the 280mm gun battalions with their atomic weapons. I had been organizing that for months before. Have you got that somewhere?

Q: Is that the 280s? There is your Honest John sitting there.

A: You bet your life it is. Yes Sir, that is the day after. You see, that was a special edition the week before. That's right; that's the atomic cannon and Honest John. That is the first time they were ever shown in Korea; they had just gotten in. We had been preparing for that for several months. I knew they were coming, of course, and I was pushing to get them there before I left. As a matter of fact, I would like to tell you the story on the 280 cannon. We knew this was coming and, of course, we had a great problem getting our road system so we knew where it could go. There were many bridges, and some weren't capable of taking what totalled to a 70-ton load, I guess. So I took the biggest tank retriever I could get and put an engineer on it and a couple of other people, loaded it with sand up to the limit, and then we gave them a chart. I guess my engineer officer in charge of roads was the one doing it. I gave him a chart and told him to go from point A to point B or from point B to point X and back to Q and over to N and all that, you know, checking this road map for bridges. Well, this went on for three or four days with just the sergeant driving it with a jeep leading him, you see. Finally it broke down on some bridge and the officer came up

to him. Nothing had been said before; he had just been told where to go. The officer came up to him and the soldier said to him, "Lieutenant, can I ask you a question?" And the lieutenant said, "Sure soldier, go ahead." And he said, "Does any Goddamn bastard know where I'm supposed to deliver this load of sand?"

Well, anyhow, back to the end of the year. I got a message that I would be ordered back shortly after the first of the year to be the Chief of Research and Development. The Chief of Staff was my old friend, and greatly admired friend, General Lemnitzer. I guess I probably wrote a note to him and I said it would be a great honor but I was afraid, after what happened to me when I was G-2, that the red flag was up and that there were instructions that I was not to be brought back to the Washington area. Whereupon I got a letter from him saying not to worry about what anybody told me, that I was coming back to be Chief of R&D of the Army. It was very satisfying to know that I had that kind of gung-ho support from your Chief of Staff. And that is what did happen. I got orders and I left the corps at the very end of January. They wanted me back early for an overlap.