CHAPTER XII

The Army War College

Q: Well, Sir, I think you were saying that you arrived at Fort Leavenworth to help start the Army War College. We'd be interested to hear what happened there.

A: I am very proud of having participated in the reactivation of the Army War College in 1950. There was a great contest going on at that time between two schools of thought. The one thought that the War College should in effect be a second-year Leavenworth, or just an extended Command and Staff College. This was represented by General Manton Eddy, a fine person who was then the Commandant at Leavenworth. There was another school of thought that believed that there should be a break between an officer's education and what he had absorbed at Leavenworth and then, after a few more year's experience, re-selection of a smaller number to go on to higher schooling that would reach into higher departmental and joint service levels. This was quite a clash, apparently, some of which I was not in on.

General Joe Swing had been selected for the task of Commandant of the Army War College. I didn't know Swing at the time and consequently I thought perhaps he was the more reserved type of person. Because I wasn't known for being that way, I thought perhaps the War Department, in their wisdom, were picking two people who complemented each other in their talents, or limitations, if you want to put it that way. I soon found out that I was quite wrong about this. If there was anybody who needed to do a little holding back in the place, it was Trudeau holding back and not Swing holding me back. This made for a very interesting relationship, not without some problems, because we were both men of some temper and a fair degree of decisiveness, but we always managed our way through. We were good friends and we ended up good friends. By and large we advanced down the same path. The school plan for a year at the Leavenworth level and later a year at the War College level was approved.

The Department of the Army decided to locate it initially with the Staff College at Leavenworth so we would have the benefit of the fine facilities there -- the library and all the rest -- for the first year, and seek a place for a permanent home. Some of this information arrived even when I was still in Germany

and it immediately occurred to me to get it located at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. I'll tell you why before we go further. During the war, when I was Director of Training, I mentioned that the Medical Field Service School was there and we had to expand it by buying land for training and ranges and farms for what's now the golf course and more areas for training areas. As a medical training center we saw that it had really outgrown the needs of the modern Army, as we knew that the Army was going to be a million men or so after the war. The Director of Training of the Medical Department and myself seized the opportunity to start lining up the 9th Infantry Quadrangle at Fort Sam Houston when the Ground Forces decided they would not put a division there after the war, which amazed the hell out of most of us. I think the Ground Forces or the Infantry are still sorry that they didn't put a division there, but they didn't. We grabbed it, and as I also said before, that meant filling up Carlisle with whatever we could shift. This consequently meant the small schools which were easy to move; it was hard on them, but we did. Military Government, Information-Education, Adjutant General, Chief of Information; you name them, we had six or eight of them. That solved it then.

This site always stuck in the back of my mind as being the ideal place for a small college. When this opportunity came it looked like "the" ideal place: far enough from Washington where you wouldn't be bothered by the Pentagon every day; yet near enough that you could get there quickly if you wanted to; and ease of transportation -- air, rail, road -- from the big cities where we would have to get our lecturers from. It just had everything as far as I was concerned. It had a beautiful countryside, good American people, a great area. I immediately started stumping for Carlisle and it wasn't any too soon, because Senator Lister Hill of Alabama had the pressure on and didn't see any reason why we couldn't go to Camp Rucker, Alabama. He said, "The Air Force is at Montgomery, and that would put you both down here. You'll be near each other." Well, there was nothing there we needed that the Air Force had, and while they could fly their speakers down from Washington, we didn't have the kind of planes to fly our speakers around, so we finally licked that one. I went to Somervell for help; he was president of Koppers in Pittsburgh and subsequently to Mr. Richard Mellon. They sent me over to Harrisburg

and I talked to Governor Red Duff. We did a lot of good spade work and we got ourselves into Carlisle.

The first problem, of course, was at Leavenworth in getting set up for the first year. We had almost carte blanche in picking the people we wanted for the staff: 25 officers. The list of colonels that we brought in there were just about the pick of the young colonels in those days and, almost without exception, they all became generals with one- to four-star rank. The first class was limited to 100 students because of limited facilities. They were 100 excellent men. I think most of those people became generals, too. A few of them later wore four stars, I know. But we ironed out our problems fairly well. There was a feeling, and it was unfortunate, at Leavenworth by both the faculty and the students of the Staff College that they were being downgraded, that another school came and set down on top of them. It didn't go well. It had its problems on the post, but it only had to last for one year and we all lived with it as best we could. I found myself commuting to Pennsylvania getting the place ready for the 1951-52 school year. The next June (1951) we got out of Leavenworth and settled into Carlisle.

Q: I might add, before you talk about Carlisle, that it is interesting that you had Westmoreland on the staff and Bruce Palmer and Abrams as students.

A: General Swing brought Westmoreland in as secretary. Swing thought a great deal of Westmoreland. General Swing only stayed the first year and was replaced by Almond who came back from Korea and brought McCaffrey, his right hand man; so that's the sequence there. Then I left after nine months at Carlisle; I went to Japan in March 1952 and then on to Korea.

Q: Before we talk about Carlisle, were there any other significant problems while you were at Leavenworth? I think the point you made about resentment, perhaps, at Leavenworth is the most significant.

A: I think that is the most significant, and the fact that by and large, we lived through it pretty well. We had great class esprit, and I did something there that I still believe was right, and I was sorry to see it done away with some years ago. With General Swing's approval, we instituted at Leavenworth a term -- even in our telephone directory -- that all of us, whether we were staff, faculty, or student (well, largely

faculty and students), were "members" of the Army War College. I thought it closed the gap, or prevented one from showing. Of course, with 100 students and 25 instructors, we had the very closest rapport with this class anyway. It was a wonderful class.

Q: General, I have some specific questions. First, when you established yourself in Carlisle, looking at the proposed organizational structure without going into details, you didn't bring much administrative support from Leavenworth.

A: We were trying to keep it streamlined. In other words, we felt that there was sufficient talent and experience in that class itself that we could give them certain work to do that they could do equally well, and perhaps better for their own development, than by having some of it done by some member of the faculty or staff.

Q: I'd like to talk to you about the library. I know that when you came here you had no library, only a fine building.

A: That was a tremendous task putting one together. I've forgotten who really gets the credit, but we had to go back to the National War College, the Library of Congress, and all our service schools when we went to Leavenworth.

They did a remarkably fine job while at Leavenworth. Then, of course, we had to move it and continue to expand it at the War College. That summer our service schools loaned us several catalogers for the 60- to 90-day period, and we used the Harrisburg library and the one at Dickinson College. General John D. F. Barker, Deputy Commandant at the Air War College, also helped us.

Q: I wonder if you would address yourself to the graduate program. What was your effort? What was your interest? How did you think you were going to handle that?

A: I felt that these men were in a professional status where they should have additional recognition on the outside as well as in the Army -- something more than their rank, which tells a civilian nothing about academic achievements. I still think it approaches the course at Georgetown now, in which you get a master's degree in international relations. I thought that if

we could prove that point and got certain credit for on-post instruction, it would go toward earning the credits necessary to get that degree. Furthermore, a lot of these officers were coming from the Pentagon. We had 5,000 officers in the Pentagon who were taking instruction at night toward college degrees, either undergraduate or graduate. I saw no reason why they couldn't start taking a course when they knew this was going to be a part of their curriculum. On the other hand, a lot of them not only came from the Pentagon, but a lot of them leave the War College and return to the Pentagon. If they didn't have their credits earned when they left Carlisle, they could pick them up here at George Washington and complete their degree. That was exactly my thought then, and I've never changed. The next opportunity that I had, before it came to light, was almost ten years later, around 1959 or 1960. Upon query, I found this was being considered again, and I put my shoulder to the wheel and for a couple of years it was done, in the early 1960s. I think maybe there was a little over-enthusiasm in that one. I think that was pushed to a point where if an officer didn't get into this program he felt he was being left behind. Also there is a difference in people's interest, and there's a difference in their capacity to absorb. Some people had all they could do with the War College work. Other people could do the War College work and still read a novel a week, or take three hours in international relations; but it should have been made strictly voluntary. They should keep it strictly voluntary. It shouldn't be anything a man feels is against his record if he doesn't take it. This should be entirely voluntary, but to stand up to these people in civilian life who not only know their own particular discipline but, if they have a Ph.D. behind their name, think they can solve everybody's problem, then officers with advanced degrees and accomplishments should be recognized. When I left for Korea in March 1952 there hadn't been time to bring this to fruition.

Q: There were problems that you had with Wherry housing, with the legal aspects of it; requirements for 12-month occupancy and so forth. This is where you wrote to a retired general, Otto Nelson, for help on 6 July 1950. You did get it approved in January 1951. There was a Mr. Walter K. Durham involved. Is there any

story about the housing? Was there something you wanted that you didn't get?

A: Yes, it was quite obvious that we were going to need housing. There was practically none there and everything that we could scrape up was not going to be enough. I went there in 1950, and I even went as far away as Gettysburg and talked to Dr. Hanson, President of Gettysburg College, about housing and what could be done in the area, what his experiences were in a growing college. I asked my brother-in-law who the best architect was in Philadelphia. He said, "Walter Durham." So I called Walter Durham and I said I'd like to meet with him. He said "All right. Come up and meet me at the Racket Club in Philadelphia." So we met on a Sunday morning and we went out to see an area where a very wealthy client had had part of his farm on the outskirts of Philadelphia subdivided, put in utilities, roads, and built a lot of homes of the type that are now at Carlisle -- split-level houses. I felt that these were fine; and they were just being sold at the time. I knew the price was about at the limit as far as the law governing Wherry housing was concerned. I had to look for something in that price class -- $9,000 -- but we thought that we might get away with $10,000 or $11,000. Those houses were then selling for, let's say, $9,500. This included the land, utilities, roads, and homes developed from scratch. I felt that if these were $9,500 there shouldn't be any problem in getting them on our Army post where we already had heating capacity, the land, all utilities, and the roads. I could see no reason why we should have any problem in being able to build these for less than $9,000. Well, I didn't know my politics; by the time the housing people got through haggling over this and kicking it around from one door to another, who was going to get the contract and all, they came up with ridiculous figures. What we had to do was to reduce that house about two feet in length and two feet in width, and this is quite a bit of footage when you apply it to the whole house. It made a lot of difference. Then they did certain other things where they cut corners. They didn't finish the upstairs room which was to have at least a lavatory and another bedroom. They did all sorts of monkeyshines. As I say, I got away before this was done. It wasn't finished until 1952, I guess, but if anyone could bring a red herring across where another dollar could be siphoned off, this was pulled on us. Fortunately, we came out fairly well, but not as well

as we should have. Well, they were penny wise and dollar foolish, all the damn Wherry housing and the politics of it all.

Q: I noticed some correspondence with retired General Menninger on the Committee on Present Danger.

A: Bill was a great friend of mine. He was the top psychiatrist in the Army during the war. He was a brigadier general. A great psychiatrist, and a great fellow also with his feet on the ground. I had him give a presentation at the Army War College the first year.

General Swing didn't come to Carlisle, but General Almond arrived about the end of July 1951. I had charge of the transfer and rebuilding job that summer until Almond arrived. General Almond was very much interested in Tac Air, and also in tactical atomic weapons. He brought Colonel McCaffrey, who had been his Chief of Staff when he commanded the X Corps. McCaffrey was engaged for months trying to assemble battle data and complete a study as to when tactical nuclear weapons could have been used. I think McCaffrey came to the conclusion that they'd never had sufficient information that would have justified their use against a timely and appropriate target. By and large, they didn't have sufficient information of the enemy's exact positions or movements to select a worthwhile battlefield target.

Q: Well, I sort of got the impression from some of your correspondence that General Almond was very determined on this; he just didn't want to let go, and he kept attempting to get his views incorporated somehow. I think he wanted this taught at the school, or at least studied at the school. One of the things that came out -- and I think it's rather important -- was the mission of the school and the relative standing of the Army War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. There is quite a bit of correspondence that requests that we get this straightened out -- that the Army War College is a pinnacle for the Army officer; that the mission of the college should not be one which is only teaching Field Army and Army General Staff operations but involves the social, economic, and political factors as they affect the Army missions. Could you talk about that?

A: Well, I'd only say that that was our position. We felt it was the highest Army school and that by the

time an officer had graduated, this should be his final preparation for a general officer's command. We did not envision the college as being subordinate to the National War College. This was another reason why we justified teaching as much as we did about the diplomatic, political, and economic aspects of problems dealing with our own and other nations as well as potential military plans and problems. It was not only a problem in the leadership of the Army. We didn't envision it that way and we had a lot of contests about what the curriculum should offer. Those who had favored it being just a second-year Leavenworth thought it should be restricted to where we talked about leading an army instead of leading a corps. We didn't see it that way. We didn't feel that officers, when they reached that senior point of service, could spend more than a year at a war college, very frankly. This is why we didn't envision somebody going on from the Army War College to the National War College.

That's what he (Almond) wanted, but, of course, it got worse before it got better. Because in the McNamara years nobody could get anywhere unless they'd had "joint experience," including the National War College, or joint staffs here or joint staffs there; you weren't suppossed to know anything or be able to deal with people decently up at those levels unless you had dealt with them before you got to a senior level. It became a block to promotion or at least it was supposed to have been; I don't know whether it was or not. By and large, I felt many times that McNamara was trying to find out how well officers could be manipulated, so that they could promote those who could be further manipulated rather than to find out who could stand on his own feet and be counted.

Q: General, as a wind-up to our discussion of the War College, I wonder if I could refer you back to some remarks that you had made at the conclusion of the 1950-51 course. I was taken by the perceptiveness of the remarks made and, oh, how true they'd been. I'm just wondering if you'd like to discuss them briefly; summarize what you said then and perhaps relate it to today.

A: Well, it might interest you to know that while I gave these at the conclusion of the 1950-51 school year, this subject had been bothering me for the whole year I was at Leavenworth. Having been in Germany for

those years from 1948 to 1950, of course, gave me a particular awareness of what the Russians were trying to accomplish and their strategy for doing so. I have to admit that during the war, I was one of the group of "young Turks" in the Pentagon who thought and said we were playing with fire in helping the Russians at the time (to the degree that we did). When we saw that we were stopping at the line of the Elbe and let the rest of Germany go and all of Eastern Europe, we couldn't help but disagree strongly with the decisions that had been made. We didn't have anything to do with it, and we couldn't do anything about it. As we got into the new school year here I remember that I asked or said the substance of about everything that is in this paper to the great Father Edmond Walsh, who lectured to us. He was the founder of the School of Foreign Relations in Georgetown and one of the great geo-politicians of our time; a man who had gone in, as a young man at the end of World War I, to the Ukraine and Russia, and had seen what was happening. A man of great astuteness as far as understanding what moves things in the world. I tried to get Father Walsh, during the question period, to commit himself or discuss a little about this. I could see that he didn't want to do it but he had dinner with us the night before in my house -- the Commandant's house -- and I'd discussed some of these problems with the Soviet. I'm not sure why he was reticent about discussing these problems before the class, but he did recognize them; nothing that's happened in the last 20 years has changed my feelings about this at all, except in this way. The situation is worse than I thought it was in 1951. There had been no resurgence of Japan yet. You see, Japan didn't even regain its sovereignty until April 1952. So this is when Japan was nothing as far as its industrial build-up was concerned. Today, with 90 percent of Japan's oil coming from the Middle East, you have to add Japan. Their people are more dependent on it than Western Europe. Whoever can supply oil to Japan as well as Western Europe also has that great power -- maybe the greater power -- of being able to shut off the faucet and bring them to their knees. So, if anything, this situation is more critical today than what I thought it was 20 years ago.

To summarize, in 1967 I had an opportunity to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and the subject got on Russia and communism; it was largely on communism. It turned to what the Russian

objectives were and still are, the Middle East with its oil and Africa with its minerals. Before I was through, the Chairman of the Subcommittee had asked me to submit my views so you'll find them in the records of that subcommittee as of 24 May 1967, which was 12 days before the blitzkrieg that the Israelis launched when they defeated Egypt and took over control of the Suez and the Sinai. I don't really know what more we can say about it. The pattern of what Russia is trying to accomplish -- whether you say that world communism is using Russian imperialism as a vehicle for world domination, or if you want to, you can say that Russian imperialism is using world communism as a vehicle for world domination. I don't care which way you put it, but I think the objectives are clear. There's nothing that changes; she modifies her strategy, or tactics, for convenience, but there is nothing that is changing this pattern at all. The efforts now to move into the Indian Ocean, to support the war in Indochina -- which could have been over long ago, or could be over in months, if the Russians would withdraw their support -- these things are still bothersome. The opening of the Suez; our own stupidity in making things difficult for South Africa and Rhodesia when it's the only way we've got to get around the tip of South Africa with all that oil from the Middle East for Western Europe, or ourselves; and to keep the gates to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf open. There it all is; it's right in front of us if anybody can read a map.

Q: General, as a concluding comment, I was struck by the little scroll that the class of 1952 gave you. I don't know if this brings back any memories to you.

A: I've got a scroll signed by everybody in the class. Bill Train and Ralph Haines were the characters behind it. That's about the time . . . . I'll tell you, that was my farewell shortly after they had inducted me into the Cavalry, after my branch transfer to Armor was announced.

Q: I wonder if you'd talk about the branch transfer. I have the order here. It was special order number 200 dated 4 October 1951, paragraph six. It said that "Colonel Arthur G. Trudeau, CE (Brigadier General, AUS), Army War College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is relieved from assignment to the Corps of Engineers and is assigned Armor, effective 4 October 1951, with

Regular Army date of rank 10 June 1948." Now, I have to ask you about this, because I don't think I've ever heard of any general officer changing branches before. I may be uninformed.

A: Well, I don't think that the branch situation is as important as it was in those days. It's true; no officers except those from the primary combat branches have ever gotten to be Chief of Staff, or Vice Chief of Staff yet, but much of that sort of folderol is by the board. When an officer, who's been a general officer for seven years, still has to transfer from one branch to another to insure that he has continuing opportunity to advance, something is wrong.

The circumstances were as follows: I told you in my early service that I was prevented, or at least delayed, from getting to Leavenworth by my branch -- then the Engineers -- because my service wasn't considered balanced. In other words, I hadn't been on river and harbor work. The Chief was then very anxious that his young officers get some experience in the junior grades on river and harbor work. So, despite the fact that it doesn't make much sense that you have to have river and harbor work to help you at Leavenworth as far as the development of your career is concerned, that was policy and I can't contest it. In any event, that was the situation. But what happened next was that I had this choice offered by General Huebner of going over as Chief Engineer of the European theater, or going over and commanding the 1st Constabulary Brigade. He said very frankly, "This you have to decide, whether you think you want to push on to be the Chief of Engineers, or whether you think you want to go the other way; the way of the Army as a whole." I said, "I'll go the other way, the way of the Army as a whole." I didn't want to get assigned to rivers and harbors again. I'd had some of it; in fact, I'd had enough of it. At that time, I talked with General Paul, who was the Director of Personnel, and I was Assistant Director of Personnel, as Chief of Manpower Control. I said, "What about this? I'm still carried as a lieutenant colonel of Engineers, even though I'm a brigadier general," and he said, "Oh, that doesn't make any difference, that doesn't make any difference." So then I was promoted; I got to be a full colonel, Regular Army, in 1948. That's why they dated me back to 1948 in rank as a brigadier general; that was the same date of my rank as colonel in the Regular Army. Of course, I had held my rank as

a brigadier general since August 1944, but they were "playing musical chairs" with general rank and seniority.

I had to return from Europe in the fall of 1948, so I went in to see General Brooks. He was then the Director of Personnel, and he said, "Oh, that doesn't make any difference," so I went back again. When I returned to the U.S. in 1950 and looked into the situation, I found that the Chief of Engineers was definitely not going to recommend me for a promotion until I came back to the Engineers and had some river and harbor work, by God. So here I was back to take over as number two at the War College, but I couldn't get a recommendation out of my own Chief for promotion. I was then six years as a brigadier, so I then went in very frankly and talked to the new G-1, General McCauliffe, and he took me to General Collins himself -- the Chief of Staff, Joe Collins. They checked me out, and they said, "Listen, you'd better transfer," and I said, "What to?" "Well," he said, "It doesn't make any difference; go Infantry or Armor." Well, I'd just commanded the 1st Constabulary Brigade for two years and I loved the Armor side of it. I said, "Alright," so I put in and I transferred to Armor. That's the story. So then I got back in the good grace of somebody where I could at least be considered for promotion. In 1952, I was sent to the Far East, got the First Cavalry Division, and was promoted to major general. That's the story on it. I think that this branch stuff has largely disappeared; it's ridiculous. The Chief of Engineers now welcomes assignment of his senior officers to broader opportunities.

Now I'll tell you an interesting one, though. The DA during these recent years had to send many officers to combat units who never had combat command, or who never had command in combat or even commanded combat troops in peace. They sent them out to purify them. They sent out quite a few, gave them a division or smaller unit for six months, and that qualified them. I had one case, no less than my great good friend, "Tick" Bonesteel, when I was commanding the I Corps in Korea. Bonesteel was Assistant Division Commander, but an Engineer colonel. The Army knew Bonesteel had plenty of stuff, and they were giving him a break; and he finally came to me one day and he said, "What the hell do I do about this?" "Well", I said, "I don't know how they're operating in the

Pentagon now, but if you want to have the door opened to you all the way you'd better get out of the Engineers and transfer into some different branch." So he did; he transferred into Infantry. Now, I don't know how many others there are like this, but I'm sure of that case because I remember the conversation and I saw the order later.

Q: Well, General, we've been talking about the Army War College. You were the Deputy Commandant at its inception. We all look upon you as being a pioneer, and I'm just hoping that you might have some final thoughts on it before we move on to the next stage in your career.

A: I don't have any words of wisdom. I think whoever made the decision that the Army must have the Army War College again is entitled to the real credit. It certainly was needed -- it is needed -- and from my viewpoint, it's been a very highly successful operation. I've known the officers that came through there when I was a student, and I certainly have observed a tremendous number of graduates since. I think the selection by and large to the College has been fine, and I think the benefits to the Army from its graduates have been tremendous. I don't see how we could have gotten along without it, really. I know that we get some fire from people like Fulbright, because they would prefer, apparently, that we didn't know anything about the world power struggles, diplomatic problems, or other peoples or nations, except in the military sphere. Fortunately, we didn't buy that from the beginning, and while the emphasis has varied from one Commandant to the other as to how much effort should be devoted to this aspect -- whether political, economic, psychological, psycho-political or socio-political -- nevertheless, by and large, the curriculum has gone along the same broad general pattern. That was the orginal concept of General Swing and myself and the others who organized the college. This in itself is a matter of great personal satisfaction to us, to have the ideas that we had started with 20 years ago continually validated in principle, if not exactly.