

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continental
Air Defense Command

KAD, D1-2A
July 1956 - June 1957
vol 4
X

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

JULY 1956 - JUNE 1957

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
VOLUME THREE

DOCUMENTS 177 THROUGH 213

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

RM-67-2230

[REDACTED]

4-1726-4

UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG	
ACTION	ROUTINE	BOOK	MULTI
INFO	ROUTINE		SINGLE
FROM:		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO
CINCONAD		AF	AFOAC-S/C
TO:			Cite 54793
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA			12 Apr 57
INFO COMADC ENT AFB COLO (COURIR)			CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
COMNAVFORCINAD ENT AFB COLO (COURIER)			SECRET
COM64CADD PEPPERFELL AFB NEWFOUNDLAND			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
<p>From COOOP <u>I-056</u></p> <p>This message in three parts. Part I. Following message has been received from cs USAF: Quote AFOAC-S/O Cite 54793. This is an Executive Agency message. NOFORN. Reference Message AFOAC-S/O 54129 concerning Faeroes Island. Following message from USNMR SHAPE is quoted. Quote No Current plans for inclusion US CIRCUITS in ACE Forward SCATTER Communication System Capacity of link Faeroes to Shetlands 6 channels planned. If expansion capacity this link desired, information should be furnished SHAPE NMR United States soonest since contractual negotiations begin 10 April Unquote. In view of above, request you expedite submission of Operational Plan with communications requirements as requested by Message AFODC 50229 21 Dec 1956.</p>			
SYMBOL		DATE	
COOOP		18	2330Z
COL JEFFUS/daf		Apr	57
2130		SIGNATURE	
FILE NO. 1		J. W. LEDOUX	
PAGE NO. 2		LCDR, USN	
CLASSIFICATION		RM-67-230	

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0716

177

4-17-57

UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		[REDACTED]	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COM & NEGOTIATION CENTER					
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (CHK)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	
		BOOK MULTI SINGLE		ORIG. OR REFERS TO	
ACTION				CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE	
INFO					
FROM:		CINCOMAD		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO:		<p>Advise. Unquote. Part II. Following answer to above message has been dispatched to CS USAF: Quote For chief of Staff USAF AS Executive Agent for COMAD. WOFORN. Reference AFOAC-S/O Cite 54793. As indicated in COMAD message COHCS X034, CINCLANT is agency to provide operational plan and communications requirements for United States interest in extension of DEW Line from Greenland to Scotland via Iceland and Faeroes. Unquote. Part III. COMAD comments on operational plan submitted by your letter dated 27 Feb 1957, Subject: Quote Operation of the Atlantic Seward Extensions of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line Unquote will be forwarded to you by 1 May 1957</p>			
SYMBOL		DATE		TIME	
WRITER		MONTH		YEAR	
TYPIST NAME AND TITLE		SIGNATURE			
PAGE NO.		NAME AND TITLE			
NO. OF PAGES					

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M/R On 21 Dec 1956, C/S USAF requested CONAD to prepare an operational plan for the DEW line from Iceland to Scotland via Vaeroes. A proposal was submitted to CINCLANT concerning this matter, and CINCLANT accepted responsibility for the development of such a plan. The plan developed by CINCLANT was prepared on 27 Feb 57 and forwarded to CONAD for comments. On receipt of this plan, CONAD dispatched a message to COFS USAF as Executive Agent 1 which indicated that CONAD had made known to CINCLANT the information concerning the air traffic across the Line which would be useful to CONAD and that further development of the ops plan would be accomplished by CINCLANT. The USAF message LAROAC S/O 54793 was apparently sent to CONAD without knowledge of COHCS X034. The present message to C/S USAF indicates that CINCLANT is appropriate agency to supply the information requested. Also attached is copy 1 of the two messages concerned to CINCLANT.

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0718



178

3 MAY 1957

COMNAV	SEC
SECDEF	SEC
SECRETARIAT	SEC
Asst. Sec.	SAG
Asst. Sec.	SAY
Asst. Sec.	SPL
INFO SERVICES	INFO
DCS CBE	CCO
Systems	SSO
Plan & Eval	EPF
Ext. Affairs	EA*
DCS I	INT
Ext. Affairs	ISO
Plan & Eval	ISE
Ext. Affairs	IS*
DCS P&G	OPC
Plan & Eval	OPR
Ext. Affairs	OOP
Plan & Eval	OPA
Ext. Affairs	OC*
DCS S&C	SOA

0000P

SUBJECT: Operation of The Atlantic Seaward Extensions of The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Atlantis
U. S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

1. Reference CINCLANT classified letter 77-2/16-12 0027/53, dated 27 February 1957, subject as above.

2. Referenced letter forwarded CINCLANT's Outline Operational Plan for 1960 operations of Atlantic Command extensions of the DEW Line, stating that subject to COMNAV's agreement thereto, CINCLANT will carry out detailed planning, arrangements, and implementation of the concept.

3. CINCOMNAV agrees to the Outline Plan attached to the letter referenced above, with the following provisos:

a. Operational experience may indicate the necessity for re-evaluation of procedures for timely passage of data from the Cape Parry-Asore line (particularly the Northern portion thereof) into the COMNAV system.

b. Maximum possible standardization of identification procedures employed throughout the DEW Line and ocean extensions thereof is a prerequisite to efficient utilization of this line. Continued joint evaluation of data collection, correlation, evaluation, and discrimination methods employed by CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCPAC and CINCOMNAV is therefore indicated.

1 Dist
Via CINCLANT
77-2/16-12 0027/53
dtd 27 Feb 57, a/1 Encl

E. E. PARTRIDGE
General USAF
Commander-in-Chief

This letter was rewritten because of a minor revision in the last paragraph; the original coordination strip has been affixed.

7-14
12/22



UNCLASSIFIED



178

3 MAY 1957

COMNAV	SEC
SECDEF	SEC
SECRETARIAT	SEC
Asst. Sec.	SAC
Asst. Sec.	JAV
Asst. Sec.	SPL
INFO SERVICES	INFO
DCS CSE	ESC
Asst. Sec.	ESG
Asst. Sec.	ESP
Asst. Sec.	ESR
DCS I	INT
Asst. Sec.	INT
Asst. Sec.	IPS
Asst. Sec.	IS
DCS P&O	OPC
Asst. Sec.	OPR
Asst. Sec.	DOP
Asst. Sec.	OPA
Asst. Sec.	OC
Asst. Sec.	OD
COMNAV	
COMNAVFORCOMAD	
CG AFMAA COMAD	
RCAP LIAISON	

0000P

SUBJECT: Operation of The Atlantic Seaward Extensions of The Distent Early Warning (DEW) Line

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic U. S. Naval Base Norfolk 11, Virginia

1. Reference CINCLANT classified letter FFL-2/16-12 0027/53, dated 27 February 1957, subject as above.

2. Referenced letter forwarded CINCPAC's Outline Operational Plan for 1960 operations of Atlantic Command extensions of the DEW Line, stating that subject to COMNAV agreement thereto, CINCLANT will carry out detailed planning, arrangements, and implementation of the concept.

3. CINCOMAD agrees to the Outline Plan attached to the letter referenced above, with the following provisos:

a. Operational experience may indicate the necessity for re-evaluation of procedures for timely passage of data from the Cape Farewell-Inshore Line (particularly the Northern portion thereof) into the COMNAV system.

b. Maximum possible standardization of identification procedures employed throughout the DEW Line and ocean extensions thereof is a prerequisite to efficient utilization of this line. Continuing joint evaluation of data collection, correlation, evaluation, and discrimination methods employed by CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCPAC and CINCOMAD is therefore indicated.

Dist
Via CINCLANT
FFL-2/16-12 0027/53
dtd 27 Feb 57, w/1 Inal

E. E. PARTRIDGE
General USAF
Commander-in-Chief

This letter was rewritten because of a minor revision in the last paragraph; the original coordination strip has been affixed.

11-7-14
12/52



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None on reverse side

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M/R: On Feb 27, 1957, CINCLANT sent Hqs CONAD his proposed Outline Operational Plan for the extension of the DEW Line both to U.K. via Greenland, Iceland and Faeroes, and from Greenland to Azores. This plan was sent for comment. A thorough study indicates that CONAD should agree with the proposed plan, subject to the need to a re-evaluation of the procedure for passing data from the Argentia-Azores line into the CONAD system, and to reconsider the procedure used for identification of friendly aircraft crossing the line. Our requirements for "evaluated" information have already been provided CINCLANT and accepted by him. This letter provides CONAD comments on the Outline Operational Plan submitted by CINCLANT, as discussed above.

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THE ATLANTIC COMMAND
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Norfolk 11, Virginia

307

18 SEP 1956

REGISTERED MAIL

From: Commander in Chief Atlantic
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Atlantic Barrier Communications with Air Defense Commanders

Ref: (a) CINCONAD ltr C00PR-4 of 26 Apr 56 (Encl to CINCLANTFLT ltr
ser 0045/53 of 2 Jun 56)(NOTAL)
(b) CNO ltr ser 00282P60 of 3 Jul 56 (NOTAL)
(c) NBDP 1-55 (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Description of Terminal Equipment

1. In reference (a), the Commander in Chief Continental Air Defense Command stated his requirements of the Atlantic Extension of the Distant Early Warning Line. Included were requirements for passing Barrier contact and amplifying reports, evaluated as unknown or hostile, to the Commander Joint Eastern Air Defense Force at Stewart Air Force Base and to the Commander 64th Air Division at Pepperrill Air Force Base, within specified time limits, with provisions for alternate routing of landline communications, and with a system reliability of at least 95%. Reference (a) stated no requirement for reception of unevaluated reports, therefore, the existing plan for relay circuits for this purpose can be abandoned. Reference (b) requested that the Commander in Chief Atlantic initiate action leading toward the submission of recommended communication circuitry, responsive to reference (a). Reference (c) contains the currently effective communication plans for the Atlantic Barrier.

2. In order to meet the requirements of reference (a), it is recommended that a landline telling net be established by which the Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet may transmit telling messages, which have been evaluated as unknown or hostile, simultaneously to the Commanders named in paragraph 1 above. This net should be provided alternate routing via different routes, available on short notice in conformity with the requirements stated by Commander in Chief Continental Air Defense Command. It is considered that half duplex teletype circuitry is the most suitable for this purpose.

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~~SECRET~~

3. In order to meet the time limits for message handling required by the Commander in Chief Continental Air Defense Command, it will be necessary to provide terminal equipment at the Norfolk terminal which will reduce manual processing of messages to a minimum. For this purpose, it is proposed to transmit incoming telling messages internally at Norfolk from the message center to the operational control center by teletype, cutting a teletype tape in the process. This tape will then be used for semi-automatic screening and selective retransmission of telling messages, after evaluation, on the teletype net described in paragraph 2 above. The terminal equipment needed for this purpose is described in enclosure (1). It is intended that this means be employed pending the installation of a complete system for semi-automatic data processing at the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

4. The half duplex telling net described above will have limited capacity for messages directed to Norfolk, but should be able to handle receipts for evaluated reports, and occasional requests for verification or amplification. In addition, however, the communication system devised should include provision for telephone communications between the Norfolk terminal and the other two stations for coordination purposes. Private line telephone is already available with the Joint Eastern Air Defense Force. It is recommended that provision be made for telephone communications with the 64th Air Division by installing a suitable switching device on the appropriate existing telephone lines at the Command Control Center of the Barrier Commander whereby conversation can be held directly between the Operational Control Center of the Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet and the Air Defense Control Center of the 64th Air Division, by switching at Argentia.

5. Commander Eastern Sea Frontier is now included in a circuit shown in reference (c) for the transmission of evaluated Barrier reports. This requirement is now withdrawn since any such reports on which he should act will be passed by other means. Further, insofar as the responsibility of Commander Eastern Sea Frontier as the Alternate Interim Successor to Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet to assume the latter's tasks in connection with receipt, evaluation and dissemination of Barrier contact reports is concerned, it is considered that the most feasible solution is for them to be performed by the Barrier Commander at Argentia. The Barrier Commander is receiving the unevaluated contact reports already; he will in the future have ocean air flight data on friendly aircraft available from the Gander and Azores Flight Information Regions for use in evaluating, and he will have a ready means for introducing evaluated reports into the CONAD early warning network by use of the existing direct telephone circuit which the Barrier Commander has to the 64th Air Division at Pepperrill Air Force Base.

B-686-2

101
SECRET

179

6. The provision of funds for the circuitry listed in paragraph 2 above appears to be a proper obligation of the U. S. Air Force and is submitted for determination at Departmental level. It is recommended that the equipment and funds listed in paragraph 3 of enclosure (1) be provided by the Chief of Naval Operations.

C. L. MELSON
Deputy Chief of Staff

C. to:
COMNAVCONAD (w/encl)
COMNAVFORCONAD (w/encl)
COMNAVFORSEAFRON
COMJEADEF (w/encl)
COMNAVFORSEAFCONAD (w/encl)
COMFIVE
COMAERLANT
COMFAIRWINGSLANT (w/encl)
COMAERWINGSLANT
COMNAVSUPLOGSANTA

Authorized

W. J. LEWISTING
Flag Secretary

SECRET

3-38-53X

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PRIORITY

CINCONAD

CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

 ADRRQ-C 01775 . REF your MSG DPLBP

3659. BSW Line CURR programmed to EXIT from Midway is to Unak IS, along the Aleutian Chain to Naknek, around the Western perimeter of present Alaskan AC&W SYS to Cape Lisburne, across the 69th parallel to Cape Dyer, over to Holstenburg, Greenland, across the ice cap to Ikateq, Greenland, north to Kap Ravn, Greenland, then to Iceland, the Faroes IS, and the U.K. Plans are now under study to EXIT Atlantic coverage through the NATO countries to Africa and the Pacific coverage SUP far south to PVRT "end-running" by manned BMR. Stated RQR are for the Line to have 100 percent probability of detection on a one-quarter SQ meter TGT at 200 nautical miles from surface to 100,000 FT ALT over water and coverage to EXIT from 200 to 100,000 FT over land masses. We EST these RQR will be a reality in 1962.

ADRRQ-C

J.B. KOELLE, CAPTAIN, USAF

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B-604
4. 1962

0725

CINCONAD

180

BASED on radar, ship and aircraft DEW programs now under way, it is EST that the seaward extension to the DEW lines will have the capability in 1962 of detection of single B-47 type TGT in excess of 60,000 FT ALT at ranges in excess of 200 miles, with a reliability of 90 percent or greater. Anti-ECM program not USF firm to PROV useable EST. If changes to this program occur within the next two or three weeks, we may be able to FURN EST if still desired. Early WNG SIS proposed INDC that 15-20 MIN of WNG time will be obtained. The predicted impact area under the above WNG Times will be an ellipse 200 by 600 miles.

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AG007
A-338-10

MHA X02

PP RJEDEH
DE RJEDEMH 336
P 092039Z
FM CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO CINCOMAD ENT AFB COLO

BT

~~SECRET~~ DPLBP 3659. THIS HQ IS CONDUCTING A YEARLY EXERCISE TO DEVELOP A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR 1962. THIS REVIEW EXAMINES THE AVAILABILITY OF WARNING TO EACH SAC BASE BASED ON THE PROGRAMMED EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS FOR THE TIME PERIOD. REQUEST THIS HQ BE FURNISHED THE PROGRAMMED EARLY WARNING NETS INCLUDING ANY OVERSEAS BACK-UP, DEW LINE AND ALL OF ITS EXTENSIONS, MID-CANADA LINE, ETC., FOR THE TIME PERIOD OF 1962. IN ADDITION IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE CAPABILITIES OF DETECTION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF AIRCRAFT, I.E., B-52 B-47, AND BALLISTIC MISSILES, AT HIGH AND LOW ALTITUDES FOR THE VARIOUS TYPES OF PROGRAMMED RADAR BE FURNISHED. IF SOME OF THIS INFORMATION IS NOT FIRM, REQUEST YOUR ESTIMATE.

PAGE TWO RJEDEMH 336
THIS INFORMATION IS NEEDED ASAP AS THE EXERCISE IS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS
REQUEST IT BE ADDRESSED TO CINCSAC, ATTN: WAR PLAN BRANCH.
THIS MSG CLASSIFIED SECRET IAW PARA-4B, ACR 205-1
09/2103Z AUG RJEDEMH

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0721

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...filled i COPY OF INCOMING CL/ FIED MESSAGE
...message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of CONAD Adjutant)
SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

READING FILE

181
PRIORITY

UN027
NR0024
PP RJEDEH RJEDEF RJKDAG
DE RJEPIHQ 142
P 021826Z
FM HEDUSAF WASH DC
TO RJEDEH/CINCOMAD ENT AFB COLO
INFO ZEN/CHO WASH DC
ZEN/CHIEF OF SOAFF USAR WASH DC
RJKDAG/CINCAL ELMENDO
S AFB LAASKA
RJEDEP/COMANC WPAFB OHIO
RJEDEH/COMAIRDEFCOM ENT AFB COLO
RJKDAG/COMAAC ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA

ACTION: COOPR
INFO: COOPD

X76107

FROM AFODC 35621.
...ATIVE AGENCY MESSAGE. REF CONAD HSGS COOPR X-
WASJLAP APR 57 AND COOPR X-018, NR APR 57. MARCH 1959 CONSIDERED AS
DATE THE ALEUTIAN SEGMENT DEW WILL BE COMPLETELY INSTALLED, TESTED AND
FULLY OPERATIONAL. LIMITED OPERATIONAL.
CAPABILITY ANTICIPATED BEGINNING JANUARY 1959. MEETING
SEPTEMBER 1958 OPERATIONAL DATE WOULD REQUIRE EXPENDITURE
EXCESSIVE AMOUNTS OF ALREADY BIRICAL P-200 FUNDS FOR PURPOSES OF
EXPEDITED COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS PROCUREMENT AND AIR
TRANSPORTATION TO SITES. SUCH EXPENDITURE WOULD

light

CONAD HIST FILE
306

PAGE TWO RJEPIHQ 142
JEOPARDIZE IMPLEMENTATION OTHER PRIORITY AIR DEFENSE ELECTRONIC
PROJECTS. FURTHER, EVEN WITH PREMIUM COST EXPEDITING EFFORT WOULD
BE DOUBTFUL THAT SEPTEMBER 1958 DATE COULD BE MET. MARCH 1959 DATE
CONSIDERED AS BEST POSSIBLE OBJECTIVE UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER REQUESTING CINCPAC TO ADJUST ROUTE PACIFIC SEAWARD
EXTENSION TO MEET YOUR REQUIREMENTS DURING PERIOD JULY 1958 TO DATE
ALEUTIAN SEGMENT BECOMES OPERATIONAL. JCS BEING ADVISED.

BT
08/1958Z MAY RJEPIHQ

EA--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY 2 ESENTIALS--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INCOGNIT. REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR
TO DECLASSIFICATION.
//ADVANCE COPY OF THIS MSG HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO 3007

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READING FILE

COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

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file) COPY OF INCOMING C LASSIFIED MESSAGE

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182

READING FILE

302-13
RVEDUP
RVEDUP 280
P 122330Z
FM HQ AMC UPAFO OHIO
TO COPS USAF WASH DC
INFO CINCOMAB ENT AFB COLO
COMDR ADC ENT AFB COLO
COMDR AAC ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
USAFIR-A C/O ALS DIST ENG ANCHORAGE ALS
ELECTRONICS DEF SYS DEV 22 CHURCH ST IN
COMDR ROME AF DEPOT GRIFFISS AFB NY

Action: coop
Info: coop
Signature: [illegible]
X7-~~5397~~5397

/CITE MGRHA-1105-E. FOR: AFMPP, AFOP, TULSA
E-ALEUTION SEGMENT-DEWLINE. HQ-USA. MESSAGE
22091 DATED 29 MARCH 59 RESCHEDULED OPERATIONAL DATE OF
SEGMENT TO MARCH 59. HQ USAF MESSAGE AFOP-OC-F/3 26094 DATED
23 MARCH 59 ESTABLISHED THE REVISED OPERATIONAL DATE AS 1 MARCH
59. AT PRESENTATION BY DPMO GIVEN AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS, 12
59, ON FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALEUTION SEGMENT
DEFERRED FROM THE OPERATIONAL DATE OF 30 SEPTEMBER 59
THE DPMO INTERPRETATION OF THIS FIXED THE REVISED OPERATIONAL
DATE OF 31 MARCH 59. ALL CONTRACTUAL ACTIONS INCLUDING

file

PAGE TWO RVEDUP 280
STATEMENT ARE BASED ON THIS 31 MARCH 59 DATE. ACCORDINGLY
OPERATIONAL DATE FOR THE ALEUTION SEGMENT-DEWLINE IS
31 MARCH 59 INSTEAD OF 1 MARCH 59 AS NOTED IN THE AFOP
12/2330Z APR RVEDUP
AC--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY 3
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE TIME
TO DECLASSIFICATION--NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCES IF DATE TIME
IS QUOTED.

CONAD HIST FILE
306

READING FILE

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COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

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183

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

2. EVERY MESSAGE MUST BE CLASSIFIED
 TO CATEGORY P, EN, OR SECRET
 REMOVE ALL DATE AND TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (CLASS)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION ROUTINE	BOOK MULTI SINGLE	AF	AFOOP-OC-F/3 54094	SECRET
INFO ROUTINE	X			
FROM: CINCONAD			COMAD HIST	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: **COFS USAF WASH DC** 306

INFO: **COMDR AMC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO**
CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA
COMDR ADC (COURIER)

Boyle

FROM **COOPR X-014**. Chief of Staff, USAF, as Executive Agent for COMAD. Reference your message AFOOP-OC-F/3 54094. Slippage of operational date for Aleutian segment of DEW Line to 1 March 1958 does not meet requirement of this headquarters. CINCPAC expects operational date of Pacific Flank to be 1 July 1958. Consequently, a serious gap in DEW Line along Aleutian chain will exist for eight months. Request operational date of Aleutian segment of 1 September 1958 be the objective if at all possible.

RECEIVED AND TRANSMITTED
 DATE TIME GROUP
 R-137-10
 10-2305 R

DATE	TIME
10	1430
MONTH	YEAR
Apr	1957

SYMBOL	SIGNATURE
COOPR	<i>L. W. Hough</i>
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
LUTHER W. HOUGH, Lt Col, USAF	EDWICK
PHONE 2437	OSN
PAGE 1	Count
NR. OF PAGES 1	
SECURITY	

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filled

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READING FILE

CONAD FILE
184
~~301~~

CON015
A-685-23
RR RJEDEK RBEPK
DE RBHPB 78A
R 222046Z
FM CINCPACFLT
TO CINCONAD
INFO CNO
CINCPAC
BT

*Action: COOPR
Info: COOPR
Suspense: 27 May 57
X7-6773*

~~SECRET~~ // YOUR 092015Z CITE COOPR-R MY 021. CINCPACFLT
OPINION FOLLOWS: FORCES ASSIGNED ARE BARELY SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE
REQUIRED PROBABILITY OF DETECTION ON MIDWAY-UNAK LINE. ANY EFFORT
TO TAKE UP THE SLACK FROM LATE COMPLETION OF ALEUTIAN LAND RADAR
LENGTHENS THESE AWARD EXTENSION. A LONGER LINE REQUIRES MORE
FORCES OR ARE DUCTON IN REQUIRED DETECTION PROBABILITY.
BASING ACFT IN THE ALASKAN AREA WOULD BE NECESSARY BECAUSE
THE WV-2 ACFT CANNOT FLY A LONGER ROUND-TRIP THAN MIDWAY-UNAK.
BASING AKFT IN THE ALSKAN AREA APPEARS INFEASIBLE BECAUSE OF LACK
OF TIME OR FUNDS FOR BASE BUILD UP. CNO COMMENT IS BEING SOUGHT
AND FURTHER STUDY WILL BE MADE IF FORCES OR FUNDS ARE MADE AVAILABLE.

BT
22/2046Z MAY RBHPB
A--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR
TO DECLASSIFICATION.

*We are preparing a JCS msg.
for your approval on this subject.*

[Signature]

READING FILE

COPY: 3 OF 4 COPIES

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When filled

COPY OF INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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CONAD FILE

185

307

C O CONO15 HQA028AGC031
RR RJEDEM
DE RJKDAG 7C
R 221845Z
FM CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
TO CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO
BT

*Action: Coop
Info: Casp
X7-6752*

FROM OPN 5191. YOUR COOPR-RX 021 X A SYSTEM SUCH AS
OUTLINED IN THE COMBARPAC OP PLAN 1-57, DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1956, AND
OPERATING FROM OAHU WITH A TERMINUS AT WAKNEK WOULD BE ADVISABLE AS
AN INTERIM MEASURE FOR PROVIDING EARLY WARNING IN THE ALEUTIAN SEGMENT
OF THE DEW LINE X
BT
22/1847Z MAY RJKDAG

NNNNN A--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR
TO DECLASSIFICATION.

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READING FILE

COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		[REDACTED]	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMENTS					
READING FILE					
186					
PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE	
ACTION ROUTINE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	AF	X
INFO ROUTINE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
FROM:	CINCONAD				
TO:	CINCPAC PEARL HARBOR T H				
INFO:	COFS USAF WASH D C COMDR ADC ENT AFB COLO SPRINGS COLO (COURIER) COMNAVFORCONAD ENT AFB COLO SPRINGS COLO (COURIER) CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA CNO WASH D C				
	CONAD HIST FILE 307				
<p>FROM [REDACTED] COOPR-R X021. INFO COFS USAF AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR CONAD. HQ USAF AS EXECUTIVE AGENT HAS ADVISED THIS HEADQUARTERS THAT MARCH 1959 CONSIDERED AS DATE THE ALEUTIAN SEGMENT DEW LINE WILL BE COMPLETELY INSTALLED, TESTED, AND FULLY OPERATIONAL. LIMITED CAPABILITY ANTICIPATED COMMENCING JANUARY 1959. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS ON POSSIBILITY OF ADJUSTING PACIFIC SEAWARD EXTENSION ROUTE OR SURFACE PICKET STATIONS TO COVER ALEUTIAN SEGMENT UNTIL MARCH 1959.</p>					
A PROCEDURE NOT RECOMMENDED TO TO CATEGORIES OF... REMOVE ALL... MEMO FOR RECORD: N/R					
DDI - N/R					
UNCLASSIFIED					
SYMBOL			SIGNATURE		
COOPR-R			[Signature]		
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
LT COL L W HOUGH, USAF			J. W. LEDOUX		
PHONE	PAGE NR.	NR. OF PAGES			
2435	1	1			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			READING FILE		
[REDACTED]			LCDR, USN Asst Adjutant		

DD FORM 173 MAY 55

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

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187

Commo #10

CON03-020HQA023

RR RJEDEM
DE RJEPMQ 92
R 281321Z
FM HEDUSAF WASHDC
TO CINCPACFLT AFB COLO

*Action: Commo
Enyo: Commo
X7-6940*

[Redacted] FROM AFOOP-OC-F/3 56576. REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE
[Redacted] 9 MAY 57. THIS HEADQUARTERS CONSIDERS TWO
POSSIBILITIES ACCEPTABLE. ONE: LOCATION OF PICKETS BETWEEN
MIDWAY-UNNAK AREA AND RADAR COVER OF KING SALMON. OPERATION OF
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT ALONG ROUTE OF PICKETS TO EXTENT
OF RADIUS AND RETURN TO MIDWAY. AS ALEUTIAN LAND-BASED FACILITIES
DEVELOP OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY PICKETS SHOULD BE RETRURED TO MIDWAY-
UNNAK ROUTE. TWO: LOCATION OF PICKETS BETWEEN HAWAII AND KODIAK.
RANDOM OPERATION OF AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT FROM HAWAII
ON ROUND ROBIN FLIGHTS ALONG PICKET ROUTE. OCCASIONAL AIRBORNE EARLY
WARNING TURN AROUND IN ALASKA POSSIBLE BUT SHOULD NOT GENERATE CON-
STRUCTION REQUIREMENTS AT ALASKAN BASES.
BT
28/1548Z MAY RJEPMQ

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TO DECLASSIFICATION--

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CONAD SECYT FORM 16
16420 9 MAR 57

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[Redacted] filled in)

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FORM 8-55 (Rev. 1-47)

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LETTERS ONLY

188

(One box must be checked)

REGULAR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
 AIR MAIL REGISTERED MAIL

IN REPLY REFER TO:

FPI-1
AS
Ser 00509

DATE

20 June 1957

NAVAL SPEEDLETTER

Permits dispatch in informal language.

May be sent (1) with enclosures, (2) in a window envelope (size 8 7/8" X 3 7/8"), if contents are not classified as confidential or higher, (3) to both naval and nonnaval activities.

Is packaged 500 sheets of white or of one color: yellow, pink, or green.

TO: Distribution List

(Fold)

COMBAMPAC will initiate on 1 July 1957 a modest barrier between Midway and Adak (becoming Midway to Unalak at a later date) for training purposes. Originally only one and one-half flights per day and no surface pickets will be provided. A progressive build-up to full operation on 1 July 1958 is planned. The main purpose of this early effort is training. It will be modified or interrupted as circumstances dictate. Contact reports will be evaluated from information that can be made available and forwarded to the same commands that will receive them from the ultimate full barrier. Initially, existing communications facilities will be used. As additional communication support items approved for the ultimate barrier are ready for operation they will be phased into the program. Identification requirements for barrier transit will be developed at a later date.

M. E. CURTS
Deputy

Authenticated:

W. O. Hill
W. O. HILL
Flag Secretary

Page 1 of 2 Pages

COPY TO

COMAD X7 7922

ADDRESS: Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

SENDER'S MAILING ADDRESS

Address reply as shown at left; or reply hereon and return in window envelope (size 8 7/8" X 3 7/8"), if not classified as confidential or higher.

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GEN-1008 (Rev. 1-49)

Navy—Pearl Harbor, T. H. (4-55)

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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGULAR MAIL	<input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL DELIVERY	[REDACTED]	PF1-1
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR MAIL	<input type="checkbox"/> REGISTERED MAIL		25
			Ser 00509
			DATE
			20 June 1957
TO: Distribution List			NAVAL SPEEDLETTER
			Permits dispatch or informal language
			May be sent (1) with enclosures, (2) in a window envelope (size 8 3/8" X 3 3/8"), if contents are not classified as confidential or higher, (3) to both naval and nonnaval activities.
			Is packaged 500 sheets of white or of one color: yellow, pink, or green.

7-4169

Distribution List:

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- COMALSEAFRON
- COMAIRHAWAII
- COMNAV L&ND
- COMWESTSEAFRON
- COMNAVSTA MIDWAY
- COMNAVSTA KODIAK
- COMNAVSTA ADAK

Page 2 of 2 Pages

COPY TO

CONAD 27

7922

<p>Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California</p>	<p>SENDER'S MAILING ADDRESS Address reply as shown or reply hereon and return in window envelope (size 8 3/8" X 3 3/8"), if not classified as confidential or higher.</p>
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JOINT MESSAGEFORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		[REDACTED]	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COPIES					
PRECEDENCE			TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL
ACTION	ROUTINE		BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
INFO			X		
FROM:	CINCOMAD		AF	X	
TO:				ORIG. OR REFERS TO	
COMCPCGR RICHARDS-GEBAUR AFB GRANDVIEW MO					
COMCFMGR HAMILTON AFB CALIFORNIA					
INFO: COMADC ENT AFB COLORADO (COURIER)				CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE	
CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA					
[REDACTED] om COOP-T <u>X092</u> .				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
<p>The following message from CINCPACFLT is quoted for your information. Quote COMBAPAC will initiate on 1 July 1957 a modest barrier between Midway and Adak (becoming Midway to Unnak at a later date) for training purposes. Originally only one and one-half flights per day and no surface pickets will be provided. A progressive build-up to full operation on 1 July 1958 is planned. The main purpose of this early effort is training. It will be modified or interrupted as circumstances dictate. Contact reports will be evaluated from information that can be made available and forwarded to the same commands that will receive them from the ultimate full barrier. Initially, existing communications facilities will be used.</p>					
SYMBOL		DATE			
COOP-T		25		2130Z	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		MONTH		YEAR	
Maj Foss/bll		June		1957	
PHONE	PAGE NR.	NR. OF PAGES	READING FILE		
2088	1	2	[REDACTED]		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE			
[REDACTED]		J. W. LEDOUX			
		LCDR, USN			
		Asst Adjutant			

DD FORM 173 MAY 55

REPLACES DD FORM 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY
CITECONAD		[REDACTED]
189		
<p>As additional communication support items approved for the ultimate barrier are ready for operation they will be phased into the program. Identification requirements for barrier transit will be developed at a later date. Unquote.</p> <p>M/R Not required.</p>		
<p>A PINNACLES FOR THE... TO... REMOVE... TIME...</p>		
OL	COOP-T	PAGE NR 2
		NO. OF PAGES
		INITIALS

DD FORM 173-1
MAY 55

PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-58236

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COPY

190

14 January 1957

SUBJECT: (SECRET) Continuation of the Pacific Extension of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line South from Midway

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
As Executive Agent for CONAD
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to SM-511-56, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 June 1956, concerning possible extensions of the Pacific Distant Early Warning line south from Midway.

2. CONAD personnel have studied the possible extensions south of Midway with primary emphasis on probable contributions to the air defense of the United States. In addition, staff level discussions on these proposals between CINCPAC and CINCOMAD have been held. As a result of this study and later command conference, the following brief conclusions have been reached.

a. With due consideration of the Soviet threat, the expected time of implementation and the present and projected air defense posture in the North American combat zone, it is believed that the southward extension of the DEW line from Midway is of lower priority than existing requirements for:

- (1) Improving our continental air defense capability to include early implementation of the vital radar expansion program in Canada.
- (2) Improvement and extension of the offshore contiguous warning zone and forces.
- (3) Increasing the effectiveness of the presently planned DEW line and its seaward extensions.

3. It is therefore recommended that in light of the lower priority of the DEW extension proposals, no diversion of funds for the extension of the Pacific Distant Early Warning Line south of Midway be considered. Instead, it is recommended that emphasis be given to those higher priority areas outlined in paragraph 2, which represent a greater return for the air defense of North America.

Copy furnished:
CINCPAC

/s/t E. E. PARTRIDGE
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief

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CON 002

VJ007

PP RJEDEN RJWPSB

DE RFEMV 04/02

P 021840Z

FM CANAIRDEF COC

TO ZEN/CANAIRHED

ZEN/CANAIRVAN

RJEDEN/CONAD ENT AFB

RJEDEN/USAF ADC ENT AFB COLORADO

RJWPSB/WADF HAMILTON AFB CALIF

ZEN/RCAF STONEY MOUNTAIN

ZEN/RCAF DAWSON CREEK

ZEN/RCAF CRANBERRY PORTAGE

ZEN/CANAIRDEF COC

READING FILE

PRIORITY

Action: COOP
Info: COOP-COIC
X7-7064

027 02 JUN

03 JUNE 57 THE STONEY MTN SECTION OF THE MID CANADA LINE WILL COMMENCE LIMITED OPERATIONS ON A 24 HOUR BASIS PD DATA HANDLING WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH USAF/RCAF OPERATIONS PLAN DATED 01 JUNE 58 PD SINCE CERTAIN FACILITIES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BY 03 JUNE 57 IDENTIFICATION PERFORMED BY STONEY MTN WILL NOT BE OF THE HIGH CALIBRE INVISIONED IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED OPS PLAN PD NORMAL PROBLEMS WITH NEW EQUIPMENT MAY CAUSE SOME DETERIORATION IN QUALITY OF DETECTION SUCH AS FALSE ALARMS BEING REPORTED AS LIVE TRACKS PD IN VIEW OF ABOVE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO EXERCISE CAUTION IN THE INITIATION OF TACTICAL ACTION BASED ON MCL TRAFFIC UNTIL ADVISED THAT OPERATIONS ON MCL HAVE STABILIZED AND ALL FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE PD FOR STONEY MTN

PAGE TWO RFEMV 04/02

ONLY YOUR AD101 27 MAY REFERS PD UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED YOU ARE TO MONITOR FLIGHT PLAN INFORMATION PASSED BY EDICNTON ATCC TO SASKATOON MTH AND EXTRACT THOSE FLIGHT PLANS FOR FLIGHTS PENETRATING YOUR SECTION

BT

02/18/82

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308

29 June 57

CON030
BV002
PP RJEDEN RJEDNG RJWPSB
DE RFEWVB 13/29
P R 291745Z
FM CANAIRDEF
TO ZEN/STN BIRD
INFO RJEDEN/CONAD
RJEDEN/USAF ADC ENT AFB COLO
RJEDNG/31 AIR DIV SMELLING AFB MINN
RJWPSB/WADF HAMILTON AFB CALIF
ZEN/CANAIRHED
BT

PRIORITY

ACTION: COELC
INFO: COOOP
X7-8160

[REDACTED] D35 29 JUN
[REDACTED] TO OUR AC556 DATED 20 JUN 57 PD BIRD ADVISES REQUIREMENT
TO SHUTDOWN OF EASTERN SECTION OF L SECTOR MCL TO TEST OVER ALL
SIGNAL NOISE LEVELS PD AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CONDUCT TESTS 2 JUL
FROM 1300Z TO 2300Z PD FOR BIRD THIS ANSWERS YOUR AOB 28 JUN
BT
29/18 J3Z

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184201 5 MAR 57

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CONO16DV003

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308

PP RJEDEN RJWPSB RJEDNG
DE RFEMVB 4/20
P 201400Z
FM CANAIRDEF ST HUDERT CANADA
TO RJEDEN/USAF ADC ENT AFD COLORADO SPRINGS
RJEDEN/CONAD
RJWPSB/WADF HAMILTON AFB CAL
RJEDNG/31 AIR DIV SNVELLING AFD MINN
VZEN/CANAIRDEF
ZEN/4:-1 BIRD
VINFO ZEN,;:4-,23446 PORTAGE
ZENGXCANAIRVAN
ZEN/SECTOR EDGAR
ZEN/CANAIRDEF/COC
BT

PRIORITY

ACTION: COOP
INFO: COOP
17-7826

AC556 WP JUNE
EFFECTIVE 0001 21 JUN 57 THE BIRD SECTION OF THE MID CANADA LINE
WILL COMMENCE LIMITED OPERATIONS ON A 24 HOUR BASIS PD DATA HANDLING
WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH USAF SLANT RCAF OPERATIONS PLAN DATED 1 JUN
56 PD SINCE CERTAIN FACILITIES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BY 21 JUNE CMM
IDENTIFICATION PERFORMED BY BIRD WILL NOT BE OF THE HIGH CALIBRE
ENVISIONED IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED OPS PLAN PD NORMAL PROBLEMS WITH NEW
EQUIPMENT MAY CAUSE SOME DETERIORATION IN QUALITY OF DETECTION SUKH AS
FALSE ALARMS BEING REPORTED AS LIVE TRACKS PD IN VIEW OF ABOVE YOU ARE
REQUESTED TO EXERCISE CAUTION IN THE INITIATION OF TACTICAL ACTION BASED

PAGE TWO

PAGE TWO RFEMVB 4/10
ON MCL TRAFFIC UNTIL ADVISED THAT OPERATIONS ON MCL HAVE BECOME STABILIZED
AND ALL FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE PD YOU WILL BE ADVISED OF DATES FOR
LIMITED OPERATIONS FOR REMAINING SECTIONS OF MAL AS THEY BECOME
AVAILABLE
BT
20/1509Z

NNNN
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ROUTINE

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-AF

OPN 5483 SECRET

CINCPAC COMAD

CINCPAC ELMENDORF AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA

INFO: COMR AAC ELMENDORF AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA

HQ ADC (COURIER)

CGARAACOM (COURIER)

COMNAVFORCONAD (COURIER)

[REDACTED] OM COOP 60458.

This message in two parts. Part I. Alert Requirements for interceptors during normal preparedness states as outlined in our CONADR 55-8, dated 31 May 1956, for a one-squadron base is: Two aircraft on Quote Readiness Unquote (five minute), four aircraft on Quote Backup Unquote (one hour), and the remaining operationally-ready aircraft on Quote Reserve Unquote (three hours). Alert status for a two-squadron base is the same except that Quote Back-up Unquote (one hour aircraft) is increased to eight. This headquarters is now in the process of revising CONAD 55-8 to provide joint force commanders with the proper guidance to specify states of alert for interceptor forces within their area. It is planned that joint air defense force commanders will be authorized to establish a staggered alert system of the above magnitude in order to accomplish more training while still providing an adequate ready force. It is requested that you provide this headquarters with the conditions of alert that you consider necessary for all types of Air defense weapons in your areas during normal preparedness states. This data will be considered for inclusion into


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194


the revised regulation. Part II. For CINCAL. This answers your
message GPN 5483, dated 28 November 1956.

2 2

03 2015Z

Dec 56

/s/t/

Maj Frymire
2722
3 Dec 56

COOOP

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WITH FOLLOWING DATE TIME GROUP

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SAY
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INFO SERVICES
INFO
DCS CAB
ELC
Plans & Policy
EPP
Elec Ops
EOP
RAMS
ERA
DCS I
INT
Call & Draw
ICB
Pack & Estimate
IRE
Ops Inter
IOI

DCS PEG
Ops & Plan
OPV
Operations
OOP
Plans Analysis
OPA
Control Ops Coord
COC
Ops Analysis
OOA

COMAD
COMAFFORCONAD
CO AREA COMAD

~~SECRET~~
COMCONAD

K A AF

COMCONAD
INFO: COMAFFORCONAD APP (COMBIA)

COMAFFORCONAD-T KG12

Reference your JAGC-1 811. Your proposed aircraft commitments at Griffis AFB and Burlington is considered; however, you may desire to reconsider, in view of our message 111000, which authorized you to establish a staggered aircraft schedule. For your consideration the proximity of 47th and other F-105 bases in your area, the average monthly scrambles accomplished by the 37th FIB, and the cost of maintaining the detachment at Burlington may overshadow the actual requirement for jet aircraft at Burlington during the period in question.

COMBACK COPY

COMBACK COPY

Not required, not furnished
Furnished: 21 JAN 1957
(Date) (Initials)

DISPATCHED
21 JAN 1957
A.D.C.
57

Refer to File No.
X7-666
SC Type and Serial

COMAFFORCONAD
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
MAJ WD FRENCH
2722 - 281a 1 1

W J. BIRMELE
Lt Col USAF
Adj Gen

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195

M/R Our message 0000F-T X 00 authorizes the force commanders to establish a staggered alert system and to handle such problems of alert commitments at various bases, such as the problem brought forth in their attached message. As the force commander now has this authority, we are passing this problem back to him with our recommendations concerning the solution. Maintaining detachments away from home bases is an extensive business. In this case F-94's would be sent to Burlington which is a F-8 base. The radar station near Burlington does not have an identification responsibility nor active scramble responsibility. Therefore, it is our opinion that alert requirements at Burlington from 8 February to 9 March, can be waived without jeopardizing the defence system.

196

PRIORITY
PRIORITY
CIRCULAR

J. ASD & OIG

COMCHOR STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
INFO: COMPAR AND ENT (4/4/68)

COMPAR AND ENT - 1009

Reference your JASALD OIG. As an interim measure we are authorized to establish immediately a state alert commitment at selected interceptor bases similar to that proposed in your quote Normal Preparedness unquote study submitted in support of the revised SSG Plan. Your principal guidance for establishing the alert commitments will be our proposed revision of SSGS resolution 55-8, forwarded to your headquarters for comment on 9 January 1957. Request you provide this headquarters, by separate message, with an outline of your alert commitments upon initial implementation.

COMEBACK COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
2722 - 281h

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M/R This policy of authorizing force commanders to establish alert requirements within their area is in accordance with our proposed revision of COMAD Regulation 55-3 which will not be in the field for another three weeks to a month. 16 of the 39 squadrons in Eastern are undergoing "follow-on" modification to F-66Ls. The policy in the program is to maintain at least 18 aircraft at all times in a squadron undergoing "follow-on". An example would be the 94th Squadron at Selfridge, which on 1 January, possessed 20 aircraft. During January, they were to feed into the factory in California 5 aircraft and during the month, they were to receive 6 aircraft for a total of 21 by 31 January. Aircraft have not been coming out of the modification factory up to schedule. They have been piling up at the factory awaiting test flight, delayed in deliveries by weather. These deficiencies have, in some cases, resulted in squadrons possessing as low as 14 aircraft for a period during the month. In addition, 4 of the 39 squadrons are on, or will be, converting to F-102s and a number of other squadrons are undergoing Iran and other modifications, namely F-89s and F-94s. This proposal to authorize Eastern to establish their own alert commitments in order to prevent the loss of combat capability will require CINCOMAD approval. Upon publication of our revised COMAD Regulation 55-3, these problems can be handled on-the-spot by the Eastern Commander.

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7 Jan 57
WDOIN 73 1012

SECRET

CINC CONAD

COMDR JWADF HAMILTON AFB CAL

INFO: COMDR ADC ENT AIR FORCE BASE (COURIER)

FROM COOOP-T X005

Reference your WDOIN 73 1012. Subject: Alert commitments for McChord AFB. Alert requirements for McChord relieved from 7 January 1957 until 317th FIS develops alert capability with F-102s, approximately 15 March 1957.

M/R 321 FIS with F-89 D/N/J at Paine field and the 460th FIS at Portland with F-89Ds can adequately cover the identifications alert for the Western half of Washington State. The 317th FIS at McChord presently is converting to F-102 and now has 1 TF-102 and 5 F-102s with all F-86Ds transferred. Within 30 days they will have the full complement of 23 F-102s. The 318 FIS at McChord now has 11 F-86D, 7 as of 2 January and 6 as of 1 February. As of 15 February, they will automatically be relieved of alert requirements in accordance with the F-102 Conversion Plan. The above inventory of F-86Ds for the 318th is in accordance with the Conversion Plan; however, if they are required to pull alert, pilot proficiency will be lost with a resultant loss in combat potential. Therefore the alert requirements are waived so that the remaining F-86Ds may be used for maintaining pilot proficiency and combat capability. The redeployment of other aircraft to McChord to pull alert is not feasible due to the heavy commitments placed on ADC by project Follow-on (C&E modification to F-86D)

Maj. W. D. Frymire /s/t/

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198
16 Oct 1956

DDOF-D

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Revised ADC Plan

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff
Plans and Operations
Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

- a. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff dated 2 July 1956, subject: Revised ADC Plan, from CINC CONAD.
- b. Revised ADC Plan, dated 16 July 1956.
- c. CINCONAD letter, to Chief of Staff USAF as Executive Agency for CONAD, subject: Revised Continental Air Defense Planning, dated 5 September 1956.

2. Air Defense Command action is being taken to implement the revised ADC Plan, reference paragraph 1b above. One such specific action pertains to the "states of alert" presently being maintained by the ADC Fighter units.

3. It is the desire of this headquarters to reduce the fighter alert commitment by at least 50 percent through the use of a pre-planned staggered alert system in order to provide:

- a. Better defense per "defense" dollar.
- b. Provide greater opportunity for maximum participation of defense forces in realistic evaluated training against friendly aircraft with characteristics similar to those of the potential enemy.
- c. Provide commanders with greater latitude in the employment of their personnel and facilities.
- d. More stable working hours for a greater number of skilled personnel.
- e. It is not the intent to cause a general relaxation on the part of pilots in complying with the procedures for ADIZ flights but to allow greater operational freedom in policing the ADIZ's. In this connection it is also our intent to allow greater operational freedom in determining the significant or insignificant nature of unknowns and whether interception action is required.

5. In order to accomplish the objectives outlined above, necessary revision must be made to

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[REDACTED]
Hq Air Defense Command, Subj: (Unclassified) Revised ADC Plan

a. CONAD Regulation 55-8, State of Alert for Air Defense Units, dated 31 May 1956.

b. CONAD Regulation 55-6, Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures for Interceptors in Air Defense, dated 8 October 1955.

c. Also, ADC Regulation 55-12, Standard Identification of Air Movements (Decision pending whether rewrite of ADC-55-12 will be an ADC or CONAD Regulation).

6. It is recommended that an early meeting of appropriate representatives from the CONAD or ADC staff meet as soon as possible in order that corrective action can be taken to enable ADC to implement this portion of the Revised ADC Plan.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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SECRET

CONAD HIST FILE

5 September 1956

199

COHCR

SUBJECT: Revised Continental Air Defense Planning

TO: Chief of Staff, USAF
As Executive Agency for CONAD
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D.C.

1. In a letter, subject: Continental Air Defense Planning, dated 14 November 1955, I asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take cognizance of the necessity for certain realignments in the positioning of Air Defense units to provide a more equitable defense for the Strategic Air Command's bases and for the vital atomic energy installations and storage sites in the central United States. In the intervening period, planning in accordance with the above letter has continued but certain unforeseen events and slippages force me to ask you at this time to note a temporary departure from the desired concept for the distribution of our air defense forces.

2. The United States Air Force has thus far been unable to provide the Air Defense Command with the resources necessary to carry out the current agreed program. The deficiencies, coupled with the necessity for major economies, make it expedient that I, as CINCONAD, agree to the Air Defense Command's proposal for a gradual realignment of the Air Defense Command's units of the United States Air Force according to three priorities.


3. On the attached map are shown areas in green, blue, and red. The Air Defense Command units in the areas marked in green and in general embracing the northeastern United States, the Hanford-Seattle area, and the San Francisco-San Diego area will be accorded a top priority so that they will continue to operate at maximum effectiveness. The areas marked in blue cover the remainder of the western, northern, and eastern boundaries of the United States except for Florida and in addition, provide a backup zone on the southern edge of the vital northeastern heartland. In the zones marked in blue, the active Air Defense units will have a lower priority and a diminished air defense capability. Within the zone marked in red, the active air defenses will be of lowest priority and their effectiveness will be meagre.

M/Gen M.S. Roth/bid(ADHCS)

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 199
Hq CONAD, COHCR, Subj: Revised Cont Air Def Planning

4. The details of the defenses to be carried out in the three zones are shown in some detail in Inclosure 1. In broad terms, the radar surveillance system throughout the United States will continue to operate on a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week basis. This means that the early warning which should be secured from the over-all system will remain unchanged. However, only in the top priority areas will there be a capability for continuous and full scale fighter interceptor action for air defense purposes. Furthermore, in category 2 and 3 areas, the manning of our fighter and radar units, and the provisions of fighter aircraft will be on a reduced scale.

5. Inherent in this plan is the elimination of the Albuquerque Air Defense Identification Zone. Other Air Defense Identification Zones will continue in effect.

6. The Air Defense Command is implementing this plan on a very gradual basis so that its full effects will not be apparent for some months. Likewise, the savings to be achieved will not begin to be felt for at least six months, since lead time connected with the realignments is essentially of that order.

7. My acceptance of the Air Defense Command plan is on a calculated basis and in the belief that the plan will produce the most air defense for the resources currently being provided. Adherence to this plan is temporary measure only. As added resources become available to the Air Defense Command, the air defenses along the perimeter of the United States (blue areas) will be augmented as soon as practicable so that the entire western northern and eastern edges of the country will enjoy maximum protection. Thereafter the realignments pointed out in my letter of 14 November 1955 will be undertaken.

E. E. PARTRIDGE
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief

1 Incl
Revised ADC Plan
&/maps (Withdrawn)

- 2



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10 OCT 1956

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ADOOP-3

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) ADC Revised Plan

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Bent Air Force Base
Attn: Director, ODCMA
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Attached for your information is the Memorandum for Record of the meeting held on 2 October 56, subject: ADC Revised Plan.

2. Appropriate staff agencies will be requested by separate DFs to study the feasibility of incorporating the recommended principles in the ADC Revised Plan.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Memo for Record

F. H. [Signature]

B-702-1

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

200

SUBJECT: ADC Revised Plan

1. On 2 October 1956, the Directorate of Operational Plans, members of the ADC staff, and representatives of the three air defense forces met to discuss the ADC Revised Plan and its implementation.
2. A brief presentation was given on the background leading up to the development of the plan, and the requirement for providing maximum combat effectiveness within present manpower and other resources limitations. It was pointed out that implementation of this plan was a temporary measure only and that the objectives of providing equitable air defense for SAC, industry, and population would be accomplished as and if additional resources become available.
3. All aspects of the plan were then reviewed and after considerable discussion, the following six principles were recommended which the ADP's felt must be followed in implementing the revised plans:
 - a. Emphasis be placed on quality rather than quantity.
 - b. Full recognition be given to the fact that Strategic Air Command is being provided no air defense other than the early warning except that which may be provided by ANG units or TALOS deployment at a later date.
 - c. Reduction of US aircraft should be accomplished across the board.
 - d. That a fighter alert for policing the ADIZ's is a

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continuing requirement but on a lesser scale than is presently required. For planning purposes, 50% of present effort will be allocated to the alert and identification function.

e. Twenty-two flying hours per month per pilot is the minimum necessary to maintain proficiency.

f. A continuing review of existing concepts of operations should be made which are expensive in use of existing resources (i.e., Establishment of Master OOI type of operations in areas of low traffic density with consolidation of identification functions and resultant reduction of personnel and communications requirements).

4. Action by appropriate staff agencies is being taken to study the feasibility of incorporation of the above principles in the revised plan.

5. Attached is a list of conferees.

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ADCOF-8, Hq Air Defense Command, 15 Oct 56, Subj: (Unclassified) Revised
ADC Plan

COOP

1st Inf

176 NOV 1956

Headquarters, Continental Air Defense Command, Ent AFB, Colorado Springs,
Colo.

TO: Commander, Air Defense Command, Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colo.

1. Reference paragraph 5 of the basic letter. COMADR 55-8 is being revised and will be compatible with the intent of the Revised ADC Plan. COMADR 55-6 has been revised and coordinated with your headquarters and will be published within the next week. ADC Regulation 55-12 should be revised, as necessary by your headquarters, coordinated with this headquarters, and published as an ADC regulation.

2. Adequate informal coordination has been effected with your staff; therefore an early meeting, as recommended, is not necessary. COMADR 55-8 will be formally coordinated with your headquarters prior to publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

HARVEY E. ALDRIN
Major General, USAF
DCI/Plans & Operations

COMEBACK COOP

May. Frywire
2722
9 Nov 56

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As a result of the [REDACTED] and your concurrence in one of the recommendations to modify or relax the interceptor alert requirements by establishing a staggered alert system, we have proposed a revision to COMAD regulation 55-8. In regard to interceptors the present regulation establishes a firm alert commitment for all F-4B regardless of location. The philosophy in the proposed revision is to establish certain minimums and provide guidance so that Force Commanders can specify alert requirements within their own area. This approach will not degrade our defense capability but will afford force commanders an opportunity to rotate their squadrons in those heavier defended areas, thus permitting more training which is required to raise the squadron combat capability. This approach, at this time, is particularly appropriate because of the conversion and modification programs which is in many cases putting squadrons in a position where they don't have enough aircraft to meet present alert requirements, train crews and maintain proficiency thus lowering combat capability. The staggered alert system under supervision of Force Commanders can handle these problems on-the-spot as they arise which will help to maintain the desired combat capability.

Our proposed revision, in regard to interceptors, requires staggered alert requirements for perimeter units policing coastal or interior ADIZs with relaxed requirements for the second line and interior fighter squadrons.

An example of this was presented in a special study by Eastern in which they proposed the staggered alert for the coastal areas only. Eastern's proposal tends to be more of a perimeter defense that we advocate.

Our proposed revision was ready by 1 December; however, we have

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another proposed regulation defining definitions of states of alert for all air defense weapons which ties in closely with 55-8. We sent this to ARAACOM for coordination and we have still not received their comments. In order to get along with 55-t, we sent it and the alert status regulation to the components and forces for comment on 9 January 1957.

Our immediate concern is to obtain your concurrence in this approach for establishing alert requirements is so that we can handle a problem confronting us in Eastern. They have approached us requesting relief from present alert commitments because of the reduced number of interceptors some units have because of the "Follow-on" modification. As a result training and proficiency is suffering. We propose the commander at Eastern be immediately authorized to establish the staggered alert system within his area. As our proposed 55-8 will not be in the field for another 3 weeks to a month. Your approval is required in order to implement this policy in Eastern immediately.

39 Sqn in Eastern

4 to F-102

16 Sqn F-86 L "Follow-on" conversion

7-F-94C's

7-F-89D H J

[REDACTED]

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6 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with General Twining Regarding Revised
Air Defense Command Plan

1. In Washington on 1 August I discussed with General Twining the proposal of ADC and advised him that we propose to submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a proposal reflecting the reduced capability of the Air Force to support Air Defense operations.

2. Neither General Twining nor General White to whom I had explained the plan earlier raised the slightest opposition. They feel that the plan is sound and that it will be accepted without question at the JCS level.

Action to CONAD Operations to prepare a brief statement of the plan for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unless there is some better method of getting the JCS to agree, I believe this plan should go forward to be noted.

Incl.
General Partridge's
notes

E. K. PARTRIDGE
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief

Info: VC
C/S

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COOP-1

SUBJECT: (Encl) Proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8.

TO: Commander
 Joint Eastern Air Defense Force
 Stewart Air Force Base
 Newburgh, New York

9 JAN 1957

1. Attached hereto is a draft of proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8 (Inclosure No. 1) which is designed to replace existing CONAD Regulation 55-8, 31 May 1956. This regulation will establish a modified minimum level of alert requirements for all air defense weapons during a condition of normal preparedness which is related to the existing estimate of tactical warning and to the improving state of early warning information. In general this regulation, while maintaining a high state of alert for radar surveillance and identification, especially in Coastal ADIX areas, would reduce the minimum state of alert requirements to provide some air defense capability within 1 hour ("Back-Up" state) while the bulk of the air defense capability would be held in a "Stand-By" (3 hour) state, based upon other factors within each CONAD Region and CONAD Division, such as reliability of contiguous radar cover, density of air traffic in areas of development of "significant unknowns", proximity of vital targets to limit of continuous tracking capability, etc. CONAD Region commanders would be expected to establish specific schedules of alert requirements for all air defense weapons available, in accordance with local considerations during the condition of normal preparedness.

2. Your comments are requested especially concerning the feasibility of scheduling the alert requirements as indicated. Attached (Inclosure No. 2) is a proposed regulation outlining definitions for state of alert for all air defense weapons. This proposal is not final, however is attached for guidance in connection with CONAD Regulation 55-8. Terminology for ground to air weapons may change however time availability of weapons as outlined in proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8 will not be affected.

3. It is requested your comments be submitted not later than 23 January 1957.

FOR THE COMMANDER - JEF

W. J. Fryaire

2814

8 Jan 57

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2 Incls

1. Two copies proposed Reg 55-8
2. Two copies proposed Reg (Definitions)

Secretary of Defense

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CONAD HIST FILE

420

COPY

1 Feb 57

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COOP-T

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Alert Requirements for Air Defense Units During Normal Preparedness

TO: Air Officer Commanding
Air Defense Command
RCAF Station, St. Hubert,
Quebec, Canada

1. Attached for your information is a final draft copy of a revision to our current CONAD Regulation 55-8, Subject: (Unclassified) State of Alert for Air Defense Units, dated 31 May 1956.

2. As noted in paragraph 1 of the revision, the purpose contains an entirely different approach from that outlined in our current Regulation. The new approach is to provide certain guidance, specify certain alert minimums and authorize Region Commanders to prescribe alert requirements on this basis for all weapons in their areas of responsibility. This delegation of responsibility is of particular importance in those areas of high density weapons employment. In these cases alert requirements are somewhat modified, thus allowing the command to realize a higher state of combat effectiveness by providing an increased number of aircraft available for aircrew training. You will note also a modified requirement for anti-aircraft fire units which makes their alert requirements compatible with other air defense weapons.

3. It appears that the revision has no particular ramifications concerning the RCAF; however, your comments are invited. The revision is to be published approximately 15 February 1957, and should you desire to adopt a similar policy in regard to alert requirements for your air defense weapons, you may wish to implement such a policy at the same time. The Eastern CONAD Region has now been authorized to establish alert requirements for interceptors within their area, using as their guidance the policy outlined in the attached revision. Your attention is invited to Eastern's classified message JEROCOP-W 015, dated 21 January 1957, on which your headquarters was an information addressee. This message outlined the interceptor alert requirements now in effect in Eastern.

4. Your comments on the attached revision are invited at your earliest convenience.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Incl
(Draft) CONADR 55-8

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DISPOSITION FORM		SECURITY	CLASSIFICATION (If any)
			SECRET
FILE NO.	SUBJECT: <u>Warfare Proposed COMAD Regulation 55-2</u>		
TO: 0000P-T	FROM: [Redacted]	DATE: 16 Jan 57	COMMENT NO. 02
<p>1. Do not concur that COMAD can justify any reduction in our present alert requirements. In view of the distinct possibility of a re-warning or, at best, a minimum-warning attack, our combat capability depends on what we have on alert.</p> <p>2. Ref per 4, proposed regulation: Disagree with statement that this reduction in alert to allow for more training will increase our combat capability. Our combat capability is that ability which we have to become airborne in a matter of a few minutes to strike down a threat from any source. Events in the past have conclusively proven to us that the threat of an enemy entering our defenses with no distinct warning whatsoever is constantly there. Rather than reduce alert commitments, we should think of increasing them.</p> <p>Should we revert various measures of our present training status during specified periods, those squasions standing down will, in all probability, have no part at all in the initial battle phase. Unless we have a concept and scope of weapons employment, our most critical risk to our survival is dependent upon the time and quantity of weapons with which we can meet the threat. COMAD cannot afford to reduce its alert requirements until a warning situation exists today until such time as we can get strategic or tactical warning of at least 4-6 hours.</p> <p>Normal deployment of aircraft in weapons training centers, transitioning to new aircraft, etc., inadvertently provide for a staggered alert status and can visualize no necessity in giving the commands the prerogative of setting their own staggered schedules. In numerous places there exist no areas of overlapping responsibility, and staggered schedules are impossible (Frasque Isle, Great Falls, etc).</p> <p>3. The attached proposal is apparently based on assurance of strategic warning through intelligence channels; therefore I recommend COMAD DCS/I coordinate on this.</p> <p>4. Summary: This plan should be reconsidered when DEW and Barrier installations are completed and we can feel assured of 4-6 hours' warning. At the present time consideration should be directed toward increasing, rather than decreasing, the number of aircraft on alert.</p>			
3 Incls n/a	[Redacted]		<p>[Signature]</p> <p>MERRY V. SWOLF Colonel, USAF 1 Apr</p>

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(Unclassified) Proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8.

Major General Ainess
(COOPD)

COOPD

2 Jan 57

Colonel Jeffus/2722/sc

1. Attached hereto is a proposed revision of CONAD Regulation 55-8, together with a proposed letter of transmittal of this proposed regulation to component and CONAD Regional Commanders for comment concerning the technical aspects of the subject matter.
2. The considerations involved in the tactical decision concern the following:
 - a. Estimate of Enemy Capability. The Director of Operational Intelligence (CONAD) indicates the enemy capability to launch a fierce attack with less and less warning and/or a "sneak" attack with minimum strategic warning is improving. In addition, a good course of action for the enemy to consider in order to use this improving capability successfully would be to launch either type of attack at a time when the air defense forces were in a "relaxed" state.
 - b. Estimate of Enemy Intentions. This factor is not specifically related to a capability for warning of launch of attack and must be considered to be a conclusion involving risks which are evaluated.
 - c. Physical State of Air Defense Forces. If the state of defense forces is such that deterioration of capability is resulting from the current state of alert being maintained or from other reasons and an improvement could be made in the utilization of our air defense forces by a modification of the State of Alert, then a change should be made.
3. On the basis that at least some of the above considerations have been involved in arriving at the conclusion which would support a modified state of alert of air defense weapons under a condition of Normal Preparedness, it is requested that the attached draft of CONAD Regulation 55-8 be reviewed for general acceptability.

1 Incl.
Draft ltr w/incl.

JOHN H. JEFFUS
Colonel USAF
Director of Operations

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ADDOAA-3 ONLY 300.3 (9 Jan 57) 1st Ind (S)
 SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8 (U)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base,
 Colorado Springs, Colorado 21 JAN 1957

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command,
 Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. This headquarters concurs in the basic principle of relaxing alert requirements at the present time; however, it is believed that the authority to specify normal alert requirements should be retained at the CONAD level for the following reasons:

a. Normal alert requirements should be based on the accurate and careful evaluation of strategic intelligence data and the international situation. This evaluation can best be accomplished at the CONAD level.

b. It is contemplated that the manpower situation will become increasingly austere in the foreseeable future. Personnel strengths to support specified alert requirements can best be ascertained and established at the CONAD level.

c. Experience has shown that commanders of subordinate elements are prone to maintain their units at advanced states of alert for prolonged periods. This is due in part to the lack of knowledge of the overall intelligence situation, which is usually known only at the CONAD level.

d. Normal alert requirements for air defense weapons is considered a major policy matter and should not be placed in the same general category with routine operational activities. These requirements generally must be established in the light of the overall international situation which can best be ascertained at the CONAD or higher level.

2. Past experience with complex electronic fire control systems indicates that a small percentage of anti-aircraft fire units should be maintained on a more advanced status than outlined in Inclosure 1. Suggested normal alert requirements for anti-aircraft fire units are attached as Inclosure 3.

3. The Commanding General, ARAACOM recommends that:

a. The authority to designate normal alert requirements be retained at the CONAD level.

REGARDING DATA CANNOT
 BE PREDETERMINED

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ADAAA-3 O&T 300.3 (9 Jan 57) 1st Iss (Cont) (S)
SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Proposed COMAD Regulation 55-8 (U)

b. Normal alert requirements for Antiaircraft
weapons be provided for as indicated in inclosure 3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

- 3 Incl
Dupe Copies Incl 1 and 2 w/d
Added 1 Incl
3. Suggested Normal Alert
Requirements for AA Fire
Units (in dupe)

[Handwritten Signature]
JOHNSON
Brig Gen. GS
Chief of Staff

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REGRADING DATA CANNOT
BE PREDETERMINED

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COOP-7, Hq CONAD, 9 Jan 57, Subject: (B) Proposed CONAD Regulation
55-8

ADCOO-F

1st Ind

24 JAN 1957

Hq Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command,
Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. This headquarters concurs with the proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8.
2. The immediate effect of the modified alert requirements would substantially reduce the number of operational ready aircraft available for immediate use. However, the proposed alert requirements would allow this command to reach a higher state of effectiveness by providing an increased number of aircraft available for air crew training.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls.
r/e

H. J. Joso
H. J. JOSO
Capt, USAF
Asst Command Adj

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COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
ENT AIR FORCE BASE
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

210
1-10-57
Ser: 00557

24 JAN 1957

SECRET

From: Commander Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense Command
To: Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (Attn: C000P-1)
Subj: Comments on proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8

1. The subject proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8 has been reviewed. The following comments are submitted herewith:

a. The title of the proposed regulation indicates that it refers to alert requirements during "normal preparedness." Inasmuch as Naval augmentation forces are not under the operational control of CINCONAD during periods of "normal preparedness" this regulation would have little impact on the maintenance of combat readiness of those units.

b. It would appear, however, that the latitude allowed in establishing alert requirements outlined in the proposed regulation would be to the advantage of both tactical commanders and subordinate CONAD commanders. It should aid them in maintaining a balance between alert commitments and the training requirements necessary to maintain combat units at a high state of training.

Erwin Chase
ERWIN CHASE
Chief of Staff

701058

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HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1 March 1957

CONAD REGULATION }
55-8

OPERATIONS

(Unclassified) Alert Requirements for Air Defense Units During Normal Preparedness

1. Purpose. This directive establishes the guidance for CONAD regional commanders to prescribe alert requirements to be maintained by units under the operational control of CINCOMAD. It further provides information to CENICAL and COMNEAC of the alert requirements established within the U. S.

2. Scope. This directive applies to all echelons of command under CONAD and is for the guidance of other commands and agencies having air defense responsibilities to CINCOMAD. CENICAL and COMNEAC will prescribe alert requirements for all air defense weapons in Alaska and in the northeast area outside of Canadian territory, respectively.

3. Responsibility. The commanders of all organizations participating in air defense operations are responsible for insuring that:

a. The alert requirements outlined in paragraph 4 below and further specified by CONAD regional commanders are complied with, and that CINCOMAD, through the CONAD COC, is informed of all alert status in accordance with prescribed procedures.

b. During conditions other than normal, preparedness actions required will be as specified in COMADR 55-3.

4. Alert Requirements During Normal Preparedness. Alert requirements during normal preparedness will be such as to increase combat capability through training while at the same time maintaining an adequate ready force for air defense operation. CONAD regional commanders will prescribe alert requirements for all air defense units in their region that are under the operational control of CINCOMAD. Further guidance for determining alert requirements for air defense units is provided as follows:

a. Fighter Interceptor Squadrons.

(1) Only those fighter interceptor squadrons operating from bases which will permit identification interceptions of aircraft violating coastal or interior ADIZs and which are under scramble control of direction centers having identification responsibilities for perimeter or interior ADIZs will be required to maintain aircraft on a "5-Minute Alert" status. CONAD regional commanders are authorized to establish a staggered schedule of alert of various fighter interceptor squadrons in these areas to provide interceptor coverage of the area with a minimum of duplication of coverage by adjacent squadrons. The schedule of periods for commitment to "5-Minute Alert" and "1-Hour Alert" status should be varied to prevent stereotype periods of alert at each squadron or base. Alert requirements for aircraft on "5-Minute Alert" and four on "1-Hour Alert" per base should not be less than two aircraft on "5-Minute Alert" and four on "1-Hour Alert" at any one base during the period the alert commitments are being provided by that base. The remaining aircraft, not committed to the alert requirements for "5-Minute Alert" at bases located within these areas which can be operationally ready within three hours will be retained on a "3-Hour Alert" status or higher stage of alert.

(ADC-1129-7)

*This supersedes COMADR 55-8, 3

CONAD X7 1013

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CONAD REGULATION }
55-8

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1 March 1957

OPERATIONS

(Unclassified) Alert Requirements for Air Defense Units During Normal Preparedness

1. Purpose. This directive establishes the guidance for CONAD regional commanders to prescribe alert requirements to be maintained by units under the operational control of CINCONAD. It further provides information to CINCAL and COMNEAC of the alert requirements established within the U. S.

2. Scope. This directive applies to all echelons of command under CONAD and is for the guidance of other commands and agencies having air defense responsibilities to CINCONAD. CINCAL and COMNEAC will prescribe alert requirements for all air defense weapons in Alaska and in the northeast area outside of Canadian territory, respectively.

3. Responsibility. The commanders of all organizations participating in air defense operations are responsible for insuring that:

a. The alert requirements outlined in paragraph 4 below and further specified by CONAD regional commanders are complied with, and that CINCONAD, through the CONAD COC, is informed of all alert status in accordance with prescribed procedures.

b. During conditions other than normal, preparedness actions required will be as specified in CONADR 55-3.

4. Alert Requirements During Normal Preparedness. Alert requirements during normal preparedness will be such as to increase combat capability through training while at the same time maintaining an adequate ready force for air defense operation. CONAD regional commanders will prescribe alert requirements for all air defense units in their region that are under the operational control of CINCONAD. Further guidance for determining alert requirements for air defense units is provided as follows:

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This supersedes CONADR 55-8, 31 Mar 1956.

(ADC-1429-7)

CONAD X7 1019

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COMADR 55-8

(2) Normal alert requirements for those fighter interceptor squadrons located outside the areas listed in (1) above, and those fighter interceptor squadrons located in areas listed in (1) above which are not scheduled to provide "5-Minute Alert" and "1-Hour Alert" aircraft during scheduled periods, will be as specified by COMAD regional commanders. Commanders may, in the interest of training, and as required to back up air defense identification activity, specify squadrons to provide "5-Minute Alert" and "1-Hour Alert" aircraft in accordance with this staggered alert system. The remaining aircraft which can be operationally ready within 3 hours will be retained on a "3-Hour Alert" status.

(3) CINCOMAD will specify by separate directive the locations and alert requirements for interceptors equipped with the MB-1 air-to-air rocket.

(4) COMAD regional commanders will prescribe alert requirements for all augmentation A-1 and day fighter interceptors including ANG units when made available to CINCOMAD for operational control.

(5) COMAD regional commanders may temporarily redeploy fighter interceptor squadrons and/or detachments thereof, exclusive of ANG units, when, in the opinion of the commander concerned, redeployment is necessary to maintain or increase defense capabilities in certain areas. COMAD regional commanders may approve deployment of fighter interceptors, or detachments thereof, within their region for training purposes and will insure that defense capability is not adversely affected as a result of these deployments.

(6) COMAD regional commanders are authorized to permit maximum of twenty percent of the in-commission fighter interceptor aircraft from a squadron to be absent from home station on navigational flights which permit returning to home base within three hours. This will be authorized provided that alert commitments up to and including the "1-Hour Alert" status are met.

(7) Commanders concerned will insure that all fighter interceptor aircraft capable of aiming and firing armament, except MB-1 air-to-air rockets, will operate with a full combat load of armament on all missions except: Transition, engineering test flights, and air shows. The operation of combat ready MB-1 equipped aircraft will be specified by separate directive.

(8) Upon notification that an air defense warning exists, or upon declaration of an air defense emergency and/or air defense readiness, the following policy is established for control of fighter interceptor squadrons deployed to a weapons employment center:

(a) If an attack occurs without warning, operational control of aircraft will go to the COMAD division commander in whose area the interceptors are located. Further redeployment will be directed by CINCOMAD.

(b) If sufficient warning of attack is received to allow redeployment, instructions for fighter interceptor squadrons will be issued by CINCOMAD.

b. Antiaircraft Fire Units: Minimum alert requirements will be as follows:

(1) Missile Units:

(a) Twenty-five percent of missile fire units on fifteen-minute alert (15 minute) at the following defenses: Loring, Boston-Providence, Hartford-Bridgport, New York, Philadelphia, Washington-Baltimore, Norfolk, Fairchild, Hanford, Seattle, San Francisco, Travis and Los Angeles.

(ADC-1429-7)

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CCNADE 55-8

(b) Twenty-five percent of missile fire units on thirty-minute alert (30-minute) at the following defenses: Niagara-Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Ellsworth.

(c) Seventy-five percent (75%) of missile fire units in all defenses on a three-hour alert status (3 hour).

(2) Gun Fire Units:

(a) Twenty-five percent (25%) of gun fire units in all defenses on a thirty-minute alert status (30 minute).

(b) Seventy-five percent (75%) of gun fire units in all defenses on a three-hour alert status (3 hour).

(3) Skysweeper Fire Units:

(a) One-third (1/3) of skysweeper fire units in all defenses on a thirty-minute (30 minute) alert status.

(b) Two-thirds (2/3) of skysweeper fire units in all defenses on a three-hour (3 hour) alert status.

(4) Alert requirement for Army National Guard Special Security Force on site fire units is four (4) hours after receipt of proper notification. Subsequent to being called to Federal service, alert requirements will be as specified by CINCONAD.

(5) Availability of and states of alert for naval antiaircraft weapons in port will be as specified by appropriate Naval commanders.

c. Picket Ships, while on station, will operate in accordance with instructions issued by COMAD regional commanders.

d. Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons:

(1) Aircraft control and warning squadrons will maintain continuous radar surveillance and control capability as specified by COMAD regional commanders.

(2) Those squadrons which are on limited operational status that provide or augment perimeter radar coverage will be operated at least during a four-hour period beginning two hours before sunrise and a four-hour period beginning two hours before sunset, for early warning raid recognition purposes.

e. ABM/Con aircraft will conduct radar surveillance on stations designated by COMAD regional commanders and will report to appropriate COMAD divisions in accordance with established procedures.

f. The Ground Observer Corps will conduct twenty-four hour Skywatch operation in designated filter center areas in accordance with applicable directives.

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COMADR 55-8

5. General. Alert requirements, specified by CONAD commanders, are subject to change by CINCONAD as the tactical situation dictates.
(COOPO)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

J. W. Lemoix
J. W. LEMOIX
Lt Commander, USN
Assistant Adjutant

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(ADC-1429-7)

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CONADR 55-8ACONADR REGULATION)
55-8A)HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado
3 June 1957

OPERATIONS

Alert Requirements for Air Defense Units During Normal Preparedness.

CONADR 55-8, 1 March 1957, is changed as follows:

1. Purpose. This directive establishes the guidance for CONAD regional commanders to prescribe alert requirements to be maintained by units under the operational control of CINCONAD. It further provides information to CINCAL and Comdr 64th CONAD Division of the alert requirements established within the U.S.

2. Scope. This directive applies to all echelons of command under CONAD and is for the guidance of other commands and agencies having air defense responsibilities to CINCONAD. CINCAL and Comdr 64th CONAD Division will prescribe alert requirements for all air defense weapons in Alaska and in the Northeast area outside of Canadian territory, respectively.

* * *

4. Alert Requirements During Normal Preparedness.

* * *

a. Fighter Interceptor Squadrons.

(1) Fighter interceptor squadrons operating from bases which will permit interception of aircraft violating ADIZs, and which are under scramble control of direction centers having identification responsibilities, will be scheduled by CONAD regional commanders to maintain aircraft in an alert status. Alert schedules should be varied to prevent stereotype periods of alert at each base and designed to insure ADIZ coverage with a minimum of duplication. Alert requirements shall be not less than two fighter interceptor aircraft on "5-minute alert" and four on "1-hour alert" at any base upon which an alert requirement is levied. Except as noted in paragraph 4a(6) below, all other aircraft which can be operationally ready within three hours will be retained on a "3-hour alert" or higher status of readiness.

(2) The CONAD regional commanders may, in the interest of training and air defense back-up, prescribe a "5-minute and 1-hour alert" status for aircraft in other areas. Except as noted in paragraph 4a(6) below all other aircraft which can be operationally ready within three hours will be retained on a "3-hour alert" status.

CONADR 57 10183

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CONADR 55-8A

* * *

(6) CONAD regional commanders are authorized to permit a maximum of twenty percent of the in-commission fighter interceptor aircraft from a squadron to be absent from home base on navigational flights. This will normally be authorized provided that alert commitments up to and including the "1-hour alert" status are met at the home base.

* * *

(COOOP)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

W J Birmele
W. J. BIRMELE
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO
ACTION	ROUTINE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	
INFO			X		AF
FROM: SINCOBIA					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO:					
COMR ADC ENT AFB COLO (COURIER)					
COMUSFOR STEWART AFB NEWBURGH N Y					
COMUSFOR RICHARDS-GERRARD AFB MO					
COMUSFOR HAMILTON AFB CALIF					
[REDACTED] from COOP-F <u>X071</u> .					
Reference COMAD Regulation 55-8 dated 1 March 1957.					
This message in 5 parts. Part I. In paragraphs 1. and 2. change COMRAC to COMR 64th COMAD DIVISION. Part II. Paragraph 4a(1) is changed to read: quote Fighter interceptor squadrons operating from bases which will permit interception of aircraft violating ANNs, and which are under seamless control of direction centers having identification responsibilities, will be scheduled by COMAD Regional Commanders to maintain a schedule of aircraft in an alert status from time to time. ^{Alert} The schedule should be varied to prevent stereotype periods of alert at each base and designed to insure ANN coverage with a minimum of duplication. Alert					
SYMBOL				DATE	TIME
COOP-F				23	2100
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)				MONTH	YEAR
<i>Major [Signature]</i>				May	1957
PHONE	PAGE	NR. OF	SIGNATURE		
2000		2	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
SECURITY CLASS	UNCLASSIFIED				

COMR ADC ENT AFB COLO (COURIER)

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
FROM	[REDACTED]	
TO	413	
<p>requirements shall be not less than two fighter interceptor aircraft on quote 5-Minute Alert unquote and four on quote 1-Hour Alert unquote at any base upon which an alert requirement is levied. Except as noted in paragraph 4a(6) below, all other aircraft which can be operationally ready within three hours will be retained on a quote 3-Hour Alert unquote or higher status of readiness unquote. Part III. Paragraph 4a(2) is changed to read: quote The COMAD Regional Commanders may, in the interest of training and air defense back-up, prescribe a quote 5-Minute and 1-Hour Alert unquote status for aircraft in other areas. Except as noted in paragraph 4a(6) below all other aircraft which can be operationally ready within three hours will be retained on a quote 3-Hour Alert unquote status, unquote. Part IV. Paragraph 4a(6) is changed to read as follows: Quote COMAD regional commanders are authorized to permit a maximum of twenty percent of the in-commission fighter interceptor aircraft from a squadron to be absent from home base on navigational flights. This will normally be authorized provided that alert commitments up to and including the quote 1-Hour Alert unquote status are met at the home base. Unquote. Part V. This message may be considered as an official change pending receipt of published revision to the regulation.</p>		
SYMBOL	NO. OF PAGES	INITIALS
8808F-2	2	[REDACTED]

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DISPOSITION FORM		214
FILE NO.	SUBJECT: Proposed Change to COMNAV 55-8	
TO: C000F-T	FROM: [illegible]	DATE: [illegible] COMMENT NO 1
<p>1. Experience during previous crises by which COMNAV, on 5 May 56 Flap, the pre-204754 JCR, passed responsibility for COMNAV to specify the degree of alert inventory, and components. COMNAV has ready access to the intelligence needed and to the resources that are necessary to insure valid decisions. The "regional control" of the region commander" is not justified.</p> <p>2. Sight should not be lost of the fact that the aircraft on alert have a primary mission of alerting. They are to be ready to combat any threat against a no-warning attack. It is not possible to have a primary mission of alert aircraft if they are to be used for other purposes. That over a 3-hour warning of attack is required, the knowledge of it is not lost.</p> <p>3. Recently changed, the aircraft on alert (the JCR) which may give a 3-hour warning of attack. Under the proposal of COMNAV 55-8, with the proposed change, it is proposed that intercept areas without current alert commitments will not have a single interceptor available for air battles, even with a 3 to 4-hour warning period.</p> <p>4. This directive does not conflict with the proposed change to COMNAV 55-8, nor with the regulation itself (see the original comment dated 12 Apr 57).</p>		
<p>1 Incls 1 By C/P 204754 on 57 Subj: Proposed Change 55-8 2 C 000F-T</p>		

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DISPOSITION FORM



FILE NO. _____ SUBJECT Proposed Change to COMNAV 55-8

TO CGPO FROM _____ DATE 15 May 57 COMMENT NO. 4

Col. Jeffus/9130/daf

1. Attached hereto is a proposed change to COMNAV Regulation 55-8. This change authorizes absence in excess of one-fifth of the "in commission" fighter interceptor aircraft at home base during (a) hour alert status to be absent from their home station on navigational training flights in excess of three (3) hours. The present regulation permits navigation training flights for absence of three (3) hours. As it is presently worded, the authorization is meaningless, since the three (3) hour restriction applies equally to all flying activity, whether navigational training flights or otherwise. In order for the navigational training flights to be of further value, the COMNAV regulation should be changed to authorize this type of flight in excess of three (3) hours at the discretion of COMNAV Sector Command concerned.

2. As indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2, the proposed change does not conflict with the proposed change. In general, the objection is related to the lack of guarantee of warning of air attack. It should be noted in this connection that the situation has not been indicated to be different from that existing at the time the decision to approve the original COMNAV Regulation 55-8 was made. Therefore, on the basis that conditions permitted a restriction to the alert status in the first place, the same factors are involved in a similar proposed change outlined in Inclosure #2.

3. While it is true that the total number of fighter interceptor aircraft which would be available at the end of a period would be less than at any fighter interceptor base may be expected, the following factors tend to reduce the significance of this operational variation:

- a. The three (3) hour warning period is not a magic period. In fact, the establishment of the length of this restriction period is arbitrary, and constitutes a convenient accounting device. The three (3) hour status should not, therefore, be related to an intelligence warning capability.
- b. Navigational training flying is recognized as a worthwhile procedure for development of combat crew skills and proficiency. An active and realistic application of this procedure requires more than three (3) hours duration in many cases.
- c. The fact that fighter intercept aircraft are absent from home base during a period which might require active defense operations would not absolutely preclude the use of their aircraft in the area in which they were located at the time of the emergency, if required.
- d. The provisions of COMNAV Regulation 55-8 apply only during a condition of "Normal Preparedness." In cases of air defense conditions other than "Normal Preparedness," the alert commitments which will prevail will be related to the requirements of the situation.

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Proposed Message Change to COMADR 55-8

Comment No. 1 (Continued)

4. It is therefore recommended that the proposed change (Inclosure #2) to COMAD Regulation 55-8 be approved.

3 Incls

1. & 2. w/s

Added 1 Incl:

3. COMADR 55-8, 1 Mar 57

John H. Jeffers
JOHN H. JEFFERS
Colonel USAF
Director of Operations

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FM CIECAL ELANDORF AFB ALASKA
TO CINCONAD HWT AFB COLO

19 Dec 56

S E C R E T FROM OPN 5512 REF UR MSG COOOP SIX ZERO FOUR FIVE EIGHT
DID ZERO FOUR TWO THREE ZERO ZERO ZULU X THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS X PART ONE
X THE CONDITION OF ALERT CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR INTERCEPTOR IN THE AAC
AREA DURING NORMAL PREPAREDNESS STATUS FOR A THREE SQUADRON BASE ARE CLM
FOUR ACFT ON READINESS PAREN FIVE MINUTE PAREN CMM FOUR ACFT ON QUOTE
ATBA X UNQUOTE PAREN THIRTY MINUTE PAREN CMM FOUR ACFT ON QUOTE BACK UP
UNQUOTE PAREN ONE HOUR PAREN CMM AND THE REMAINING OPERATIONAL READY
ACFT ON QUOTE RESERVE UNQUOTE PAREN THREE HOURS PAREN X DURING PERIODS
WHEN EIGHT INTERCEPTORS FROM A THREE SQUADRON BASE ARE DEPLOYED TO
PERFORM ALERT REQUIREMENTS ARE A DEPLOYMENT BASE CMM ALERT TATU CONSIDERED
NECESSARY FOR THE THREE SQUADRON BA XI CLM TWO ACFT ON QUOTE READINESS
UNQUOTE PAREN FIVE MINUTE PAREN CMM TWO ACFT ON QUOTE AT BASE UNQUOTE
PAREN THIRTY MINUTE PAREN CMM EIGHT ACFT ON QUOTE BACK UP UNQUOTE BACK
UP UNQUOTE PAREN ONE HOUR PAREN CMM AND THE REMAINING OPERATIONALLY
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QUOTE READINESS UNQUOTE PAREN FIVE MINUTE PAREN CMM TWO ACFT ON QUOTE
AT BASE UNQUOTE PAREN THIRTY MINUTE PAREN CMM AND THE REMAINING OPERATION-
ALLY READY ACFT ON QUOTE RESERVE UNQUOTE PAREN THREE HOUR PAREN X THE
CONDITION OF ALERT CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR AAA WEAPON IN THE AAC AREA
WILL BE SUBMITTED EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE X 19/0102Dec

CONAD HIST FILE

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COMADR 55-6

CONAD REGULATION)
55-6)

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado
13 May 1957

OPERATIONS

Rules of Engagement

1. Purpose and Scope. This Regulation provides instructions for interception, identification, and engagement of hostile aerial targets within the boundaries of the continental United States, Alaska, the coastal Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ's), and Canada where the Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD) exercises operational control of air defense forces.

2. Concept. These Rules of Engagement are based upon agreements between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. They are predicated upon the concept of centralized operational control of all air defense weapons by the CINCONAD with maximum decentralization of tactical authority, as the development of the air battle dictates.

3. Responsibilities.

a. It is the responsibility of commanders at all echelons of this command (CONAD) to insure that all persons concerned with the contents of this regulation be fully aware of its provisions and understand the extent of their authority.

b. Commanders have the responsibility to insure that training and proficiency of personnel are such that, within the capabilities of available equipment, hostile aircraft are prevented from reaching their targets and, at the same time, friendly aircraft are not inadvertently engaged.

c. Nothing in these instructions shall be construed as preventing any responsible commander from taking such action as may be necessary to defend his command when subjected to a hostile attack.

d. Interceptor aircrews will gain maximum proficiency in recognition of multi-engine and jet aircraft, civil and military, of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Western European nations, the U.S.S.R., Soviet Satellite nations, and Nationalist and Communist China. Recognition also includes national markings of these countries on all aircraft.

4. (b) (1)

a. (b) (1)

(b) (1)

*This supersedes CONADP 55-6, 8 Oct 55; 55-6A, 29 Feb 56 and CONADP 55-2, 5 Apr 55

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CONADR 55-6

(b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) (2) [redacted] (b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) (3) [redacted] (b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) (4) [redacted] (b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) (5) [redacted] (b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) [redacted]
b. (b) (1) [redacted]
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(b) (1) [redacted]
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(b) (1) (3) [redacted] (b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) (4) [redacted] (b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) (5) [redacted] (b) (1) [redacted]
(b) (1) [redacted]

(b) (1) [redacted] The use of the
(b) (1) [redacted] unknown category for aircraft is permitted only until SCATER plans
have been implemented.)

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CONADR 55-6

5. (b) (1)

a. (b) (1)

(b) (1)

b. (b) (1)

(1) (b) (1)

(b) (1)

(2) (b) (1)

(b) (1)

6. Identification and Engagement of Aircraft over Canada.

a. Air defense aircraft under the control of this command may overfly the Canadian border when such action is required for identification purposes provided it is not possible for Canadian military aircraft to accomplish the identification. Overflight of the Canadian border will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of current directives governing tactical overflight of the United States-Canadian border (ADCR 55-35). Any engagement by fighter interceptors over Canadian territory will be conducted in accordance with rules of engagement promulgated by RCAF/ADC "Air Staff Instructions," (ASI 2/5).

b. Cross-border agreements are being finalized between this command and RCAF/ADC for the employment of surface-to-air weapons over Canadian territory. Until these agreements are issued, the following procedures will exist:

(1) Operational control of the following surface-to-air weapons defenses will, in all cases, be exercised by or through the CONAD division commander:

- (a) Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan - 37th CONAD Division
- (b) Port Huron, Michigan - 30th CONAD Division
- (c) Detroit, Michigan - 30th CONAD Division
- (d) Niagara Falls-Buffalo, N.Y. - 30th CONAD Division
- (e) Loring AFB, Maine - 32d CONAD Division

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COMADR 59-6

(2) Prior to ordering or authorizing the engagement of any aircraft within air space over Canadian territory, the COMAD division commander will obtain the concurrence of the division/sector commander authorized to exercise operational control within the air space in which the engagement will occur, as listed below:

(a) 30th COMAD Division - Hq #3 ADCC/USAF

(b) 32d COMAD Division - Hq #1 or Hq #2 ADCC/USAF
depending on area concerned.

(c) The area of responsibility of the 37th COMAD division commander includes an area in Canada. Air defense actions taken in this Canadian air space will be on the authority of the AOC ADC (Canada) and will be conducted in accordance with procedures and instructions laid down by the AOC.
(COOP)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

WJB

W. J. BIRMELE
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

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CAA, Washington, D.C. (3 cys)

3 Incls:

1. Annex A (Interception and Recognition Procedures)
2. Annex B (Visual Air-to-Air Signals)
3. Annex C (Engagement Procedures for Surface-to-Air Weapons)

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ANNEX A

217

Interception and Recognition Procedures

1. General. All fighter interceptors engaged in air defense activities in defense of the continental United States, Alaska, and the coastal ADIZ's where CINCONAD exercises operational control of air defense forces will be governed by the following procedures:

a. All aircraft which are classified as being "significant-unknown" by the ACEW system, under established CONAD identification criteria, will be intercepted for more positive identification to determine their absolute identity except as in the instances noted below.

b. Practice intercepts will not be conducted against known civilian aircraft.

c. Interceptors will fly no closer to the intercepted aircraft than is necessary for positive visual recognition.

d. VFR interception patterns will be as outlined in current directives governing day-visual interceptions. (ADCR 55-21)

e. At night, or during conditions of restricted visibility, interceptions conducted for identification purposes by aircraft equipped with all-weather fire control systems will be in accordance with paragraph 103.b. of ADCM 55-5, 15 October 1956, "Standard Tactics for Air Defense Operation." Intercepts conducted for identification purposes by aircraft not equipped with all-weather fire control systems will be in accordance with paragraph f. below.

f. Fighter-interceptor pilots will keep the direction center directors advised of conditions of marginal visibility, and:

(1) When visibility at interception altitude is less than two miles, but more than one mile, the interception will be completed only when the fighter interceptor is under direct control, or has AI contact with the intercept target.

(2) When the visibility is less than one mile, interception will be completed only when the fighter interceptor has AI contact with the intercept target.

(3) Under exceptional circumstances, in which identification is deemed mandatory, the CONAD division commander may waive the limitations imposed in (1) and (2) above.

g. When more than one fighter interceptor is employed on an interception, only one pilot will effect recognition. The remaining aircraft will maintain surveillance from a position where attack could be made against the intercepted target. One such surveillance aircraft will, where possible, record the recognition particulars as transmitted by the pilot effecting recognition.

ANNEX A
Page 1

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h. The fighter-interceptor pilot effecting recognition, or the other member of the element, will immediately report the number, type, nationality, ownership, etc., and any unusual behavior of the intercepted target to the direction center director as outlined in ACOM 55-5, paragraph 103.b.(2)(c). Aircraft serial numbers will be obtained and reported only when considered necessary by the director to effect identification, and the fighter-interceptor pilot is so notified.

i. If the intercepted aircraft is positively identified as friendly, the fighter interceptors will withdraw immediately unless previous arrangements have been made for simulated attacks against the intercepted aircraft.

j. If the intercepted aircraft cannot be positively identified as friendly, the interceptor will maintain surveillance and await further instructions from the direction center director. (b) (1)

(b) (1)

k. Every effort will be made by fighter-interceptor pilots to prevent startling intercepted aircraft crews or passengers. The effect desired is one which assures personnel in the intercepted aircraft that the fighter interceptor is making routine investigation in the interest of conducting properly the mission of this command.

l. The direction center director, when unable to identify an aircraft through information passed by the interceptor, will immediately notify the appropriate CONAD division control center giving all pertinent information.

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ANNEX B

VISUAL AIR-TO-AIR SIGNALS

(To be published at a later date)

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ANNEX C

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Engagement Procedures for Surface-to-Air Weapons

1. General. All surface-to-air weapons units engaged in air defense activities in defense of the continental United States, Alaska, and the coastal ADIZ's where CINCONAD exercises operational control of air defense forces will be governed by the procedures prescribed herein.

2. Weapons-Control Status. Normally, the following weapons-control status will be observed by surface-to-air weapons for the situation indicated. CONAD division commanders concerned will make changes in status of these weapons, as necessary, to accomplish effective air defense employment of all weapons concerned:

- a. Normal Preparedness -- Weapons Tight
- b. Increased Readiness -- Weapons Tight
- c. Air Defense Readiness -- Weapons Tight
- d. Air Defense Emergency -- Weapons Tight
- e. Warning White -- Weapons Tight
- f. Warning Yellow (prior to SCATER) -- Weapons Tight
- g. Warning Yellow (subsequent to SCATER) -- Weapons Free
- h. Warning Red -- Weapons Free

3. Engagement Procedures for Surface-to-Air Weapons Units.

- a. Weapons Free. Fire at any aircraft not identified as friendly.
- b. Weapons Tight. Fire only at aircraft identified or declared hostile or committing hostile acts.
- c. Discreet Fire. Fire at specified targets as assigned by designated CONAD commanders.

d. Hold Fire - Do Not Open Fire - Cease Fire. "Hold Fire" may be imposed on a temporary basis for the purpose of permitting safe operation of friendly aircraft through or within predetermined corridors, altitudes, or sectors only in those exceptional instances wherein other weapons control procedures would prove unsuitable for this purpose. Issuance of "Hold Fire" orders will be made by a CONAD division commander or his authorized representative. CONAD division commanders may delegate this authority to senior directors at air defense direction centers with the proviso that "Hold Fire" orders issued to surface-to-air weapons units by the senior director will be

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relayed immediately to the CONAD division commander for his confirmation. Failure of the CONAD division commander to confirm the "Hold Fire" order will release the surface-to-air weapons units from the "Hold Fire."

4. All weapons-control status orders issued by CONAD division commanders will be issued direct to the antiaircraft defense commander at the antiaircraft operations center (AOC) if communications permit; otherwise, such orders will be issued through the appropriate direction centers. CONAD division commanders will keep the direction center senior director advised of the weapons-control status of surface-to-air weapons units. In the event of all communications failing between an air defense control center, a specified air defense direction center and the associated antiaircraft operations center, the antiaircraft defense commander concerned will designate the surface-to-air weapons control status for the surface-to-air weapons under his command.

5. If, during the actual conduct of the tactical air battle, CONAD division commanders determine that simultaneous engagement of incoming hostile targets becomes necessary in order to insure their destruction, such engagement will be undertaken with all available air defense weapons at their disposal.

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RESEARCH	
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COMBAT	
COMMUNICATIONS	
ENGINEERING	
MAINTENANCE	
TRANSPORTATION	
GENERAL	

CINCOMAB

COFS USAF WASH DC

ROUTINE

EX

14 MAR 1955

[REDACTED] 60088. Personal to Twining from Partridge.

Continental Air Defense Command message CCOFR 10141, 1 June, and message AFDCB 59626, 19 September 1955. In Collins-Vandenberg agreement dated 1 August 1950. The purpose of this agreement was to define certain aspects of control of antiaircraft units of the United States Army by various command echelons of the United States Air Force charged with air defense responsibilities. Since these operational aspects pertaining to antiaircraft units are now clearly delineated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Air Defense Plan Continental United States 1-25 and Secretary's Memorandum 688-54 there appears no valid reason why referenced agreement should not be officially rescinded. In my opinion the Collins-Vandenberg agreement is incompatible with Secretary's Memorandum 688-54 and Air Defense Plan Continental United States 1-25 and hence superseded by these documents. In your referenced message I noted that the Army agreed that Joint Chiefs of Staff approval of Air

A 2

SEND IN ORIGINAL TEXT
 WITH ABBREVIATIONS

note

Prepared by: **1st Lt Col T E Tolarew**

Telephone: [REDACTED]

Refers to Field No. [REDACTED]

This correspondence is [REDACTED]

Per [REDACTED] APR [REDACTED]

16 MAR 1955

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(CONFIDENTIAL) COMINT 60088

Defense Plan Continental United States 1-55 would constitute super-
cession of this agreement. The uncertainty now existing concerning
status of referenced agreement causes confusion and creates obstacles
in the development of orderly continental air defense planning. I intend
shortly to announce that the Childer-Lewis agreement is no longer
effective. I would like the Joint Chiefs of Staff to note that I intend
to make the same announcement with respect to the Collins-Vandenberg
agreement.

MESSAGE TRANSMITTED
WITH FOLLOWING DATE TIME GROUP
B-4-15 142345Z

SEND IN ORIGINAL
WITHOUT ABBREVIATIONS
A - PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT WHERE
TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION - PHYSICALLY
REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE
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16 MAR 55



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4 JAN 57

ROUTINE

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CONFIDENTIAL FROM COOPR 003

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF, AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR COMAB. REFERENCE
 THE COLLINS-VANDENBERG AGREEMENT DATED 1 AUGUST 1950. THE PURPOSE
 OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS TO DEFINE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF CONTROL OF ANTI-
 AIRCRAFT UNITS OF THE U.S. ARMY BY VARIOUS COMAB SCHEDULES OF THE
 U.S. AIR FORCE CHARGED WITH AIR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES. SINCE ALL
 OPERATIONAL ASPECTS PERTAINING TO ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS INCLUDED IN
 THIS AGREEMENT ARE NOW CLEARLY DELINEATED IN HQ 716-56 DATED 4 SEP
 56, THE JCS APPROVED AIR DEFENSE PLAN COMAB 1-55 AND CURRENT COMAB
 REGULATIONS ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMAB TERMS OF REFERENCE
 THERE APPEARS NO VALID REASON WHY REFERENCE TO AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT
 BE OFFICIALLY RESTRICTED. THE UNCERTAINTY NOW EXISTING CONCERNING
 THE STATUS OF THE COLLINS-VANDENBERG AGREEMENT LEADS TO CONFUSION IN
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORDINARY JOINT AIR DEFENSE PLANNING FOR COMAB.
 FOR EXAMPLE, THIS HQ HAS RECEIVED PLANS WRITTEN AT THE SUBORDINATE

23201

JAN 1957

COOPR

F B TRIMMER AND RECORD
2675 1 2

HARVEY T ALNESS
Maj Gen, USAF

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CINCPAC

MEMORANDUM OF THE ARMY COMPONENT COMMAND WHICH CITE THE PROVISIONS
OF THE COLLINS-VANDEBERG AGREEMENT TO DEFINE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF
AIR LAUNCHED WEAPONS AND THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR SURFACE TO AIR
WEAPONS. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS REQUESTED THAT NECESSARY ACTION BE
INITIATED TO HAVE THE ABOVE REFERENCED AGREEMENT OFFICIALLY
RENEWED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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0794

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220

28 MAR 1957

SECRETARY	SEC
Asst. Sec. for	SAG
Asst. Sec. for	SAV
Asst. Sec. for	SPL
INFO SERVICES	NFO
DCS: G&P	ELC
DCS: S&P	ESS
DCS: X&Y	EPB
DCS: W&A	EEY
DCS: P&O	OPD
DCS: L&R	OPF
DCS: I&M	OPG
DCS: A&S	OPA
DCS: T&C	CCO
DCS: A&V	DDA
COMADC	
COMNAVFORCONAD	
COMARAA CONAD	
RCAP LIAISON	

COOPR

SUBJECT: Vandenberg-Collins and Chidlaw-Lewis Agreements

TO: Commander, Air Defense Command
Commanding General, US Army Air Defense Command

1. Executive Agency Message AFODP 53187, 7 March 1957 (Incl 1), officially rescinds the Vandenberg-Collins Agreement of 1 August 1956.

2. The Chidlaw-Lewis Agreement of 15 July 1952 has been reviewed by this headquarters in light of the Terms of Reference for CINCONAD, JCS SM 716-66, 4 September 1956. All aspects of the Chidlaw-Lewis Agreement have been adequately covered by the Terms of Reference for CINCONAD and other existing directives. Therefore, it is requested that your headquarters take necessary action to rescind the agreement and so advise this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Incl
Cy Exec Agency
Msg 53187, 7 MAR 57

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

M. S. Carter
Rewritten by
Gen Carter
2234 - 27 Mar 57
Values to Field No.

jk Tyons Initial

Memo for the Record: The Terms of Reference for CINCONAD have outdated the Chidlaw-Lewis Agreement of 15 July 1952. This letter requests action by ADC and USARADCOM to officially rescind agreement.

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DISPATCHED
27 MAR 1957
C of S Conad
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JOINT MESSAGEFORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
221			
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER			
PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL
	ROUTINE	BOOK MULTI SINGLE	
ACTION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	AF
INFO			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FROM:	CINCONAD		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO:	COMCFOR STEWART AFB NY CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA COMFCOR RICHARDS-CEBAVE AFB MD COMFCOR HAMILTON AFB CALIF COMR 64TH COMAD DIV PEPPERRELL AFB NY		
INFO:	COMADC ENT AFB COLORADO SPRINGS COLO (COURIER) CGUSARADCOM ENT AFB COLORADO SPRINGS COLO (COURIER) COMNAVFORCENAD ENT AFB COLORADO SPRINGS COLO (COURIER)		
	UNCLAS FROM COOPR 016		
	This message in two parts. Part I. Reference Collins-Vandenberg Agreement dated 1 August 1950. Referenced agreement has been officially rescinded by Executive Agency Message AFOPD 53187, 7 March 1957. Part II. Reference the Chidlaw-Lewis Agreement dated 15 July 1952. The provisions of this agreement have been superseded by current COMAD Terms of Reference and will no longer be used as a basis for air defense planning and operations.		
			Lt Col Telarow 2675 11Jun57 dng
			DATE 11 TIME 2230 MONTH YEAR June 57
			MEMO FOR RECORD: (Over) 53 58 i.
SYMBOL	COOPR		
TYPED NAME	LT COMFCOR RICHARDS-CEBAVE		
PHONE	3075		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED		
	UNCLASSIFIED		

DD FORM 173 MAY 55

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

0795

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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UNCLASSIFIED

223

FORM WHICH APPLIES TO ALL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (FORM)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	ROUTINE	REG	MULTI	SINGLE			
INFO	ROUTINE		X		AF	COMOP-W 157	UNCLASSIFIED
FROM:	CINCONAD						

TO: COMCFOR STUART AFB NEWBURGH NY
 INFO: COMCFOR RICHARDS-DESAIR AFB GRANVILLE OH
 COMCFOR HAMILTON AFB CALIF
 CIGAL ELMENDORF AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA
 CG WAPADONK ENT AFB COLORADO (COMBATT)
 COMADG ENT AFB COLORADO (COMBATT)
 COMNAVFORCONAD ENT AFB COLORADO (COMBATT)

UNCLASSIFIED From COMOP-T 157.

Reference message COMOP-W 157. The following is forwarded in answer to your request for further clarification of the term quote Discreet Fire unquote and the conditions under which its employment is envisioned. Quote Discreet Fire unquote is a weapons control condition as specified in COMADR 55-6, Annex C, to be used when the tactical situation permits specific target assignment to air defense weapons and when CONAD Commanders are assured that accurate and discriminatory air surveillance information suitable for such a weapons control condition is available to all concerned. Quote Specific targets unquote

DATE: June 19 1957
 TIME: 1130Z
 MONTH: June YEAR: 1957

SYMBOL		COMOP-T		SIGNATURE	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (If signature is required)		Major Schiebel/bll		I. W. LEROUX LCDR, USN Asst Adjutant	
PHONE	2082	PAGE NO.	1	NO. OF PAGES	2
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		UNCLASSIFIED		UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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FROM: ~~GENOGRAB~~

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is intended to mean individual tracks, multiple tracks, or raids. This term is also used in RCAF Air Defense Command directives for engagement of targets over Canadian territory.

x

M/R Not required.

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HQ CANAD CO270

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PAGES 2

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INITIALS

DD FORM 173-1
MAY 55

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-152124

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
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INFO						
FROM:				AF	EPLP 15thAF	UNCL
CINCOMAB						

TO:

COMCFCOR STEWART AFB NEWBURGH NY

COMCFCOR HAMILTON AFB CALIF

COMCFCOR RICHARDS-GERBER AFB GRANDVIEW MO

INFO: USARADCOM ENT AFB COLORADO (COURIER)

COMNAVFORCOMAB (COURIER)

COMBR ADC ENT AFB COLO (COURIER)

UNCLASSIFIED From COOCP-T 081

This headquarters is in receipt of correspondence from Headquarters SAC concerning control of surface-to-air weapons around SAC bases. Paragraph 3d, Annex C, of COMAB Regulation 55-6 dated 13 May 1957 prescribes the conditions under which "Hold Fire" may be imposed on a temporary basis to permit safe operation of friendly aircraft through or within predesignated routes, corridors, altitudes, or sectors. It is the opinion of this headquarters that these routes, corridors, altitudes or sectors should be determined and established by the local COMAB Division commander after

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
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MONTH	YEAR
June	1957

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R. E. GARVEY JR.
Major, USA
Asst Adjutant

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

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COOSP-F - CIMCOMAR

proper coordination with commanders of organizations operating tactical aircraft and all other interested agencies located within the local defense area. Local agreements made in this matter in accordance with the procedures specified in COMNAV Regulation 55-6 and incorporated into the classified portions of Division SEATER Plans are acceptable to CIBCOMAR and require no further approval by this headquarters. Request this matter be brought to the attention of all COMAD Division commanders to insure that satisfactory procedures are established in all areas defended by surface-to-air weapons, and in particular that procedures are established at all applicable SAG bases.

R/R This message initiated as a result of correspondence from SAC dated 23 April 1957 dealing with this subject. 9th COMAD Division proposed a regulation to handle this matter. Regulation delegated control responsibility of weapon SAG Base Commander. We cannot concur in this approach. Most Divisions have already established these procedures in their SEATER plans.

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 HQ COMAD CO240

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1 APR 56

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956 - 052224

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IPLP, Hq 15AF, 12 Feb 57; Subj: Draft Regulation: Control of Ground-to-Air Weapons, Fairchild Air Force Base

COOQP-T 2d Ind

JUN 25 1957

Hq Continental Air Defense Command, 15th Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, 15th Air Force Base, Nebraska

1. The attached 9th COMAD Division draft regulation is not in accordance with current COMAD directives as a means to establish procedures to permit the safe operation of friendly aircraft through an area defended by surface-to-air weapons. In addition, the statement that "The Commander, Fairchild Air Force Base may temporarily control ground-to-air weapons fire when necessary to protect friendly aircraft" is not in consonance with COMAD's concept of operational control. This concept prescribes that the COMAD Division commander or his authorized representative is responsible for the weapons control status to be exercised by surface-to-air weapons.

2. This headquarters has recently published COMAD Regulation 55-6, Subject: "Rules of Engagement", dated 15 May 1957, copies of which are attached for your information. Paragraph 3d, Annex 6, of this regulation prescribes conditions and procedures under which "Hold Fire" may be imposed on a temporary basis to permit the safe operation of friendly aircraft through or within predetermined routes, corridors, altitudes or sectors. These routes, corridors, altitudes or sectors are determined and established by the local COMAD Division commander after proper coordination with commanders of organizations operating tactical aircraft and all other interested agencies located within the local defense area.

3. Local agreements made in this manner, in accordance with the policies and procedures announced in the directive cited above should then be incorporated into the classified portion of the local SCATER Plans. These agreed-upon procedures are acceptable to COMAD and require no further approval by this headquarters.

4. In separate correspondence this headquarters has directed that the COMAD Region commanders insure that the COMAD Division commanders have established these procedures to the satisfaction of all concerned in all areas defended by surface-to-air weapons.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

It is noted that these procedures can be established at COMAD Division level as noted in the correspondence. There is no need to take up this matter at higher headquarters as suggested by SAC.

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 Encl
- 1. m/s
- 2. Added 2 cpy COMAD 55-6

HARVEY T. ALBES
Major General, USAF
DCS/Plans & Operations

UNCLASSIFIED

224

DPLP, Hq 15AF, 12 Feb 57, subj: Draft Regulation: Control of Ground-to-Air Weapons, Fairchild Air Force Base

DPL

1st Incl

Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

TO: Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado

1. The attached 9th Continental Air Defense Division draft regulation outlines the procedures by which the Commander, Fairchild Air Force Base, may request halting of ground-to-air weapons fire when necessary to protect friendly aircraft.
2. Present USAF programs indicate that there are a total of 10 SAC bases that are equipped with or programmed for defense by CINCOMAD ground-to-air units.
3. This command concurs that controls should be established to preclude ground-to-air fire from interfering with the operation of friendly aircraft. It is believed that this matter should be coordinated between the JCS commanders, CINCOMAD and CINCSAC, prior to publication of detailed implementing regulations by the defense unit and the SAC base involved. This command would welcome a visit by COMAD personnel to discuss this matter.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl
n/c

L. E. LYLE
Col. USAF
Deputy D/Plans

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224

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
March Air Force Base
California

DPLP

FEB 14 1957

SUBJECT: Draft Regulation: Control of Ground-to-Air Weapons,
Fairchild Air Force Base

TO: Commander in Chief
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

1. The attached 9th Continental Air Defense draft regulation was recently received by this Headquarters for comments.
2. The regulation outlines the procedures by which the Commander, Fairchild Air Force Base may temporarily control ground-to-air weapons fire when necessary to protect friendly aircraft.
3. It is requested the draft be reviewed to determine the degree of departure from the present SAC concept.
4. It is the opinion of this headquarters that an inter-service agreement would be more appropriate than a Continental Air Division regulation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
a/s

JAN M. PARKER
Colonel, USAF
Director of Plans

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ROUTINE
ROUTINE
GENERAL

1 17 Original

UNCLASSIFIED FROM COOP-T

INFO: COMB 15 AF MARCH AFJ CALIF

UNCLASSIFIED FROM COOP-T

Reference UNCLASSIFIED letter from DPL, Headquarters 15th Air Force, Subject: Draft Regulation Control of Ground-to-Air Weapons dated 12 Feb 1957, with your let indorsement by DPL, dated 22 April 1957. COMAIR 55-6, Rules of Engagement, is presently being published. Copies of subject Regulation with a cover letter answering 15th Air Force will be forwarded your command approximately 1 June 57.

READING FILE

Capt Bailey
2088
17 May 57

R/R COMAIR 55-6 with the cover letter will answer 15th AF's letter which includes a draft on Control of Ground-to-Air Weapons

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17 22302
May 1957

COOP-T

Capt Bailey
2088

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AIR DEFENCE COMMAND

AIR STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

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225

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT INTERCEPTION, IDENTIFICATION

AND ENGAGEMENT PROCEDURES OF UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT FOR USE OVER CANADA

PRIOR TO A DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY

Purpose

1 This instruction defines the procedures, responsibilities and the authority for the interception, identification and engagement of unknown aircraft over Canada prior to declaration of a state of emergency.

Scope

2 This instruction applies to all units and formations participating in air defence over Canadian territory.

General

3 During scrambles and interceptions, all gun and rocket firing circuit breakers are to be maintained in the "safe" position unless the pilot concerned is ordered to engage in accordance with para 1b of this ASI.

4 Attached to this ASI as Appendix "A" is a list of definitions applicable to this instruction.

5 ASI 2/5/1 details the rules for interception and engagement applicable to ADC/RCAF fighter aircraft over USA.

PROCEDURES

Interception Procedures

6 Whenever operationally practicable fighter aircraft are to be committed against all tracks classified as "unknown" under established identification criteria. Initiation of immediate tactical action may, however, be delayed as follows:

- (a) Where definite evidence exists as to the friendly identity of the track, but "friendly" classification has not been possible within correlation limits.
- (b) It is clear from evaluation of track behaviour, such as range, speed, direction and height, that no immediate threat is posed.

1 Dec 56

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CAUSEADP 2-57
1 Jul 56

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7 It is to be ensured that, where initiation of tactical action is delayed to allow time for further identification effort, the success of any subsequent tactical action is not prejudiced by this delay.

8 If the AOM system cannot identify an established track within two minutes, as detailed in AOM 3/2/1, and the speed, direction, height or behaviour of the track create suspicion as to the possibility of its hostile character, fighters are to be scrambled to intercept the unknown aircraft.

9 The Sector Commander is responsible for committing fighters against such tracks and for subsequently assigning the actual control of the interception to the appropriate AOM Squadron(s). Upon occasion, depending upon the current tactical situation, the ADOC may delegate to AOM squadrons the authority to scramble certain aircraft for interception purposes.

Identification Procedures - Visual Obtained
at Greater than One Thousand Yards Range

10 The following procedures are to be observed by fighter pilots, GCI controllers and sector commanders participating in the interception of aircraft for purposes of identification by day and night or in cloud.

- (a) Fighter aircraft will fly no closer to the intercepted aircraft than is necessary for positive identification. Withdrawal (whether identification is effected or not) is to be a gentle manoeuvre and the intercepted aircraft is to be kept within the pilot's field of vision or in radar contact until the fighter is at a safe distance.
- (b) Every effort will be made by the fighter pilot to prevent startling the intercepted aircraft's crew or passengers. The effect desired is one that assures personnel in the intercepted aircraft that the fighter is making a routine investigation in the interests of Air Defence of this Continent. Fighter pilots are to remember that manoeuvres considered normal to a fighter aircraft may be considered hazardous by the crew and passengers of the intercepted aircraft.
- (c) The fighter pilot is to attempt by observation to determine the quantity, type, and ownership of the intercepted aircraft and to report this information to the GCI controller. Aircraft serial numbers will be obtained and reported only when considered necessary and the pilot is so directed. Aircraft manoeuvre signals and inter-plane communications are not to be attempted unless the pilot has been ordered to do so by the controller.
- (d) Immediately the intercepted aircraft is identified as friendly, the GCI controller is to instruct the fighter pilot to withdraw.

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- (e) When more than one fighter is employed on an interception, only one pilot is to effect identification. The remaining aircraft is/are to maintain a position from which an attack could be made against the intercepted aircraft.
- (f) At no time will fighters make tactical passes against the intercepted aircraft unless ordered to do so. If the intercepted aircraft is military and taking part in an organized exercise, and if prior mutual arrangements have been made, attacks may be carried out conforming with ASI 2/6 or 2/7 and prior briefings.

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Visual not Obtained at One Thousand Yards

11 If, on an intercept mission, the fighter pilot is not able to sight the aircraft visually from a distance of one thousand yards, he is to synchronize his speed with that of the unknown aircraft. The fighter pilot is to take the following action (procedures detailed in para 10 apply throughout):

- (a) AI radar contact must be maintained at all times or the fighter pilot must withdraw.
- (b) The fighter pilot is to advise the GCI controller that he has been unable to obtain a "visual" at 1,000 yards and other pertinent details of the unknown aircraft's behaviour (evasive action or the use of ECM).
- (c) If the fighter pilot is unable to obtain a "visual" at 1,000 yards, he is to increase speed to an overtake speed of not more than 20 knots TAS and close the range to not less than 400 yards, maintaining a vertical and horizontal displacement with respect to the unknown aircraft of not less than ten degrees.
- (d) The fighter pilot is to synchronize speed with the unknown aircraft at 400 yards. This is the minimum radar range for fighter aircraft equipped with the Mk2, E4, E5 and E6 fire control systems. If a "visual" is obtained at 400 yards and recognition is not possible, then the pilot may, as long as he maintains visual contact, close the range in order to effect recognition.
- (e) If the fighter pilot is unable to obtain a "visual" at 400 yards, he is to maintain radar contact and drop back to a minimum of 1,000 yards and keep the unknown aircraft under radar surveillance. The pilot is to advise the GCI controller that he is unable to obtain a "visual" and is to request further instructions.
- (f) If the fighter pilot has obtained a "visual" but the intercepted aircraft cannot be identified as friendly, he is to drop back to a range of not less than 1,000 yards, maintain radar surveillance and inform the GCI controller who in turn will ask the ADCC for instructions.

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Action if Identification Impossible

12 If the intercepted aircraft has/have not been identified after the requirements of paras 10 and 11 have been complied with, the sector commander is to order the fighter to maintain surveillance and is to ensure that additional interceptor aircraft are available to continue surveillance of the unknown until it is identified or an engagement is ordered in accordance with para 16.

Procedure for Directing an Intercepted Aircraft to Land

13 The sector commander may, at his own discretion instruct the fighter pilot through the GCI controller to direct the intercepted aircraft to land (in accordance with the procedure outlined in para 14 below), but is to inform the Combat Operations Centre of the action taken. In the absence of the sector commander, the Air Defence Control Centre is to refer to the Combat Operations Centre for authority to direct the intercepted aircraft to land.

Procedures to be Used to Direct an Intercepted Aircraft to Alter Course or Land

14 The following procedures only are to be used by fighter aircraft in directing an intercepted aircraft to alter course or to land:

(a) During Daylight Hours when Visual Contact is Possible:

- (i) Verbal instructions to the pilot of the intercepted aircraft. Appropriate frequencies will be used depending on availability.
- (ii) Rocking wings - attention, follow instructions.
- (iii) Porpoising motion by the fighter - land at nearest suitable airfield.
- (iv) Dipping right wing - turn right. Fighter to be positioned on the right side of the intercepted aircraft.
- (v) Dipping left wing - turn left. Fighter to be on left side.

(b) During Hours of Darkness when Visual Contact is Possible:

- (i) Verbal instructions to the pilot of the intercepted aircraft. See para 14 (a) (i) above.
- (ii) Flash light signals as follows:
 - (1) A series of three flashes - attention, follow instructions.
 - (2) One long flash - turn left.

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(3) Two long flashes - turn right.

(4) Four long flashes - Land at the nearest suitable airfield.

15 The Air Defence Control Centre is to request Combat Operations Centre to obtain a decision from the Air Defence Commander or his appointed deputy in the following situations:

(a) Procedures outlined in para 14 above have been carried out and the intercepted aircraft does not comply with an order to land.

(b) It is impossible for the fighter pilot to give an order to land because he is unable to contact the intercepted aircraft by usual means.

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(a) (b) (1)

(b) (b) (1)

(b) (1)

L. E. Wray
(L.E. Wray) A/V/M,
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Defence Command.

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APPENDIX "A"
TO ASI 2/5
DATED 1 DEC 56

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DEFINITIONS

1 The following definitions are established for the purpose of this instruction:

(a) Air Defence Commander

The Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command RCAF.

(b) Sector Commander

(i) All RCAF Sector Commanders.

(ii) ^aCommander both Air Division (Defense) USAF.

(iii) All USAF Air Division (Defense) Commanders whose radar coverage extends over Canadian territory.

^a In accordance with a signed agreement between A/C ADC RCAF and Commander Northeast Air Command.

(c) GCI Controller

(i) All GCI or Intercept Controllers at radars located on Canadian territory.

(ii) All GCI or Intercept Controllers at radars whose coverage extends over Canadian territory.

(d) Identification

The determination of an aircraft's character within one of the following categories:

(i) Friendly.

(ii) Unknown.

(iii) Hostile.

(e) Friendly Aircraft

A friendly aircraft is one which has been classified as "friendly" in accordance with the criteria detailed in ASI 3/2/1, para 7 (a).

(f) Unknown Aircraft

An unknown aircraft is one which has been classified as "unknown" in accordance with the criteria detailed in ASI 3/2/1, para 7 (b).

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REF ID: A61 275
DATED 1 DEC 58

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(g) Hostile Aircraft

An aircraft which commits a hostile act as defined in (h) below.

(h) (b) (1)

(b) (1)

(i) (b) (1)

(ii) (b) (1)

(iii) (b) (1)

(iv) (b) (1)

(j) Engage

Action taken to destroy enemy aircraft.

(k) Maintain Surveillance

To maintain a surveillance is to keep an aircraft under "close watch" by either visual or AI means from a position where it is possible to detect any suspicious or hostile act.

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1 Jul 56

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AMENDMENT LIST NO. 6

TO

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND

AIR STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

St. Hubert, Que., 15 Jun 57.

1 The following amendments are to be incorporated in the copy(ies) held by your unit:

To: Table of Contents:

Under Chapter II - OPERATIONS

Change: Fighter Aircraft Interception, Identification and Engagement Procedures of Unknown Aircraft for Use over Canada Prior to a Declaration of a State of Emergency..... 2/5

To Read: Interception, Identification and Engagement Procedures of Unknown Aircraft for Use over Canada..... 2/5

Delete: Order 2/5 dated 1 Dec 56 with Appendix "A".

Insert: New Order 2/5 dated 15 Jun 57 with Appendix "A".

P.A. Gilchrist
(P.A. Gilchrist) A/C,
For Air Officer Commanding,
Air Defence Command.

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AIR DEFENCE COMMAND
AIR STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

226
2/5

INTERCEPTION, IDENTIFICATION AND ENGAGEMENT
PROCEDURES OF UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT FOR USE OVER CANADA

Purpose

1 This instruction defines the procedures, responsibilities and the authority for the interception, identification and engagement of unknown aircraft over Canada.

Scope

2 This instruction applies to all units and formations participating in air defence over Canadian territory.

General

3 During scrambles and interceptions conducted by interceptor aircraft, all gun and rocket firing circuit breakers are to be maintained in the "safe" position unless the pilot concerned is ordered to engage.

4 Attached to this ASI as Appendix "A" is a list of definitions applicable to this instruction.

5 ASI 2/5/1 details the rules for interception and engagement applicable to ADC/RCAF fighter aircraft over USA.

PROCEDURES

Interception Procedures

6 Whenever operationally practicable fighter aircraft are to be committed against all tracks classified as "unknown" under established identification criteria. Initiation of immediate tactical action may, however, be delayed as follows:

- (a) Where definite evidence exists as to the friendly identity of the track, but "friendly" classification has not been possible within correlation limits.
- (b) It is clear from evaluation of track behaviour, such as range, speed, direction and height, that no immediate threat is posed.

7 It is to be ensured that, where initiation of tactical action is delayed to allow time for further identification effort, the success of any subsequent tactical action is not prejudiced by this delay.

15 Jun 57

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8 If the AC&W system cannot identify an established track within two minutes, as detailed in ASI 3/2/1, and the speed, direction, height or behaviour of the track create suspicion as to the possibility of its hostile character, fighters are to be scrambled to intercept the unknown aircraft.

9 The Sector Commander is responsible for committing fighters against such tracks and for subsequently assigning the actual control of the interception to the appropriate AC&W Squadron(s). Upon occasion, depending upon the current tactical situation, the ADCC may delegate to AC&W squadrons the authority to scramble certain aircraft for interception purposes.

Identification Procedures - Visual Obtained
at Greater than One Thousand Yards Range

10 The following procedures are to be observed by fighter pilots, GCI controllers and sector commanders participating in the interception of aircraft for purposes of identification by day and night or in cloud.

- (a) Fighter aircraft will fly no closer to the intercepted aircraft than is necessary for positive identification. Withdrawal (whether identification is effected or not) is to be a gentle manoeuvre and the intercepted aircraft is to be kept within the pilot's field of vision or in radar contact until the fighter is at a safe distance.
- (b) Every effort will be made by the fighter pilot to prevent startling the intercepted aircraft's crews or passengers. The effect desired is one that assures personnel in the intercepted aircraft that the fighter is making a routine investigation in the interests of Air Defence of this Continent. Fighter pilots are to remember that manoeuvres considered normal to a fighter aircraft may be considered hazardous by the crews and passengers of the intercepted aircraft.
- (c) The fighter pilot is to attempt by observation to determine the quantity, type, and ownership of the intercepted aircraft and to report this information to the GCI controller. Aircraft serial numbers will be obtained and reported only when considered necessary and the pilot is so directed. Aircraft manoeuvre signals and inter-plane communications are not to be attempted unless the pilot has been ordered to do so by the controller.
- (d) Immediately the intercepted aircraft is identified as friendly, the GCI controller is to instruct the fighter pilot to withdraw.
- (e) When more than one fighter is employed on an interception, only one pilot is to effect identification. The remaining aircraft is/are to maintain a position from which an attack could be made against the intercepted aircraft.

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- (f) At no time will fighters make tactical passes against the intercepted aircraft unless ordered to do so. If the intercepted aircraft is military and taking part in an organized exercise, and if prior mutual arrangements have been made, attacks may be carried out conforming with ASI 2/6 or 2/7 and prior briefings.

Visual not Obtained at One Thousand Yards

11 If, on an intercept mission, the fighter pilot is not able to sight the aircraft visually from a distance of one thousand yards, he is to synchronize his speed with that of the unknown aircraft. The fighter pilot is to take the following action (procedures detailed in para 10 apply throughout):

- (a) AI radar contact must be maintained at all times or the fighter pilot must withdraw.
- (b) The fighter pilot is to advise the GCI controller that he has been unable to obtain a "visual" at 1,000 yards and other pertinent details of the unknown aircraft's behaviour (evasive action or the use of ECM).
- (c) If the fighter pilot is unable to obtain a "visual" at 1,000 yards, he is to increase speed to an overtake speed of not more than 20 knots TAS and close the range to not less than 400 yards, maintaining a vertical and horizontal displacement with respect to the unknown aircraft of not less than ten degrees.
- (d) The fighter pilot is to synchronize speed with the unknown aircraft at 400 yards. This is the minimum radar range for fighter aircraft equipped with the MG2, E4, E5 and E6 fire control systems. If a "visual" is obtained at 400 yards and recognition is not possible, then the pilot may, as long as he maintains visual contact, close the range in order to effect recognition.
- (e) If the fighter pilot is unable to obtain a "visual" at 400 yards, he is to maintain radar contact and drop back to a minimum of 1,000 yards and keep the unknown aircraft under radar surveillance. The pilot is to advise the GCI controller that he is unable to obtain a "visual" and is to request further instructions.
- (f) If the fighter pilot has obtained a "visual" but the intercepted aircraft cannot be identified as friendly, he is to drop back to a range of not less than 1,000 yards, maintain radar surveillance and inform the GCI controller who in turn will ask the ADCG for instructions.

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Action if Identification Impossible

12 If the intercepted aircraft has/have not been identified after the requirements of paras 10 and 11 have been complied with, the sector commander is to order the fighter to maintain surveillance and is to ensure that additional interceptor aircraft are available to continue surveillance of the unknown until it is identified or an engagement is ordered.

Procedure for Directing an Intercepted Aircraft to Land

13 The sector commander may, at his own discretion instruct the fighter pilot through the GCI controller to direct the intercepted aircraft to land (in accordance with the procedure outlined in para 14 below), but is to inform the Combat Operations Centre of the action taken. In the absence of the sector commander, the Air Defence Control Centre is to refer to the Combat Operations Centre for authority to direct the intercepted aircraft to land if a state of air raid warning "red" or "yellow" is not in effect at the time of the incident. If a state of air raid warning "red" or "yellow" is in effect at the time, authority to direct the landing of an intercepted aircraft may be exercised by the officer carrying out the duties of the absent sector commander.

Procedures to be Used to Direct an Intercepted Aircraft to Alter Course or Land

14 The following procedures only are to be used by fighter aircraft in directing an intercepted aircraft to alter course or to land:

(a) During Daylight Hours when Visual Contact is Possible:

- (i) Verbal instructions to the pilot of the intercepted aircraft. Appropriate frequencies will be used depending on availability.
- (ii) Rocking wings - attention, follow instructions.
- (iii) Porpoising motion by the fighter - land at nearest suitable airfield.
- (iv) Dipping right wing - turn right. Fighter to be positioned on the right side of the intercepted aircraft.
- (v) Dipping left wing - turn left. Fighter to be on left side.

(b) During Hours of Darkness when Visual Contact is Possible:

- (i) Verbal instructions to the pilot of the intercepted aircraft. See para 14 (a) (i) above.

(ii) Flash light signals as follows:

- (1) A series of three flashes - attention, follow instructions.
- (2) One long flash - turn left.
- (3) Two long flashes - turn right.
- (4) Four long flashes - land at the nearest suitable airfield.

15 The Air Defence Control Centre is to request Combat Operations Centre to obtain a decision from the Air Defence Commander or his appointed deputy in the following situations:

- (a) Procedures outlined in para 14 above have been carried out and the intercepted aircraft does not comply with an order to land.
- (b) It is impossible for the fighter pilot to give an order to land because he is unable to contact the intercepted aircraft by aural or visual means.
- (c) The circumstances are such that the Sector Commander does not wish to order an engagement or does not possess authority to do so.

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(a) (b) (1)

(b) (b) (1)

(i) (b) (1)

(ii) (b) (1)

(iii) (b) (1)

(c) (b) (1)

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(b) (1)



L.E. Wray
(L.E. Wray) A/V/M,
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Defence Command.

15 Jun 57

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APPENDIX "A"
TC ASI 2/5
DATE 15 JUN 57

DEFINITIONS

1 The following definitions are established for the purpose of this instruction:

(a) Air Defence Commander

The Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command RCAF.

(b) Appointed Deputy (see paras 15 and 16)

- (i) Deputy Air Officer Commanding, ADC (RCAF)
- (ii) Deputy for Operations, ADC (RCAF)
- (iii) Commander, No. 5 Air Division (within his area of Command)
- (iv) Commander, 64 Air Division (within his area of Command and subject to the limitations contained in ADC (RCAF) - CONAD Agreement dated 1 Jan 57, para 4.
Jan)
- (v) Such other individuals as the ADC, ADC may designate.

(c) Sector Commander

- (i) All RCAF Sector Commanders.
- (ii) Commander 64th Air Division (Defense) USAF.
- (iii) All CONAD Division Commanders whose radar coverage *area of operational control* extends over Canadian territory.

(d) GCI Controller

- (i) All GCI or Intercept Controllers at radars located on Canadian territory.
- (ii) All GCI or Intercept Controllers at radars whose coverage extends over Canadian territory.

(e) Identification

The determination of an aircraft's character within one of the following categories:

- (i) Friendly.
- (ii) Unknown.
- (iii) Hostile.

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APPENDIX "A"
TO ASI 2/5
DATED 15 JUN 57

226

- 2 -

(f) Friendly Aircraft

A friendly aircraft is one which has been classified as "friendly" in accordance with the criteria detailed in ASI 3/2/1, para 7 (a).

(g) Unknown Aircraft

An unknown aircraft is one which has been classified as "unknown" in accordance with the criteria detailed in ASI 3/2/1, para 7 (b).

(h) Hostile Aircraft

An aircraft which commits a hostile act as defined in (j) below.

(j) (b) (1)

(b) (1)

(i) (b) (1)

(ii) (b) (1)

(iii) (b) (1)

(iv) (b) (1)

(k) Engage

Action taken to destroy enemy aircraft.

(l) Maintain Surveillance

To maintain a surveillance is to keep an aircraft under "close watch" by either visual or AI means from a position where it is possible to detect any suspicious or hostile act.

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OCG, 31st Air Div (Def), 4 Oct 56, Subj: Rules for Interception and Engagement by Fighter Aircraft in Canada (Unclassified)

COOOP

3rd Ind

9 Nov 56

Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Within the boundaries of Canada, the Air Officer Commanding, RCAF/ADC is responsible for air defense and has issued "Rules for Interception and Engagement by Fighter Aircraft Prior to a declaration of a State of Emergency in Canada". These "Rules" are known as RCAF/ADC Air Staff Instructions 2/5 (ASI 2/5).
2. The American Joint Air Division (Defense) Commanders whose radars and/or area of responsibilities overlap Canadian territory are by definition (ASI 2/5) Sector Commanders, with the same responsibilities as an RCAF Sector Commander.
3. The American Commander whose responsibilities are completely within Canada must follow the "Rules" as stated in ASI 2/5. The American Commander located in the United States who controls fighter interceptors over Canada must also abide by the RCAF Rules (ASI 2/5).
4. The fighter interceptor pilot and ADC Director based in the United States operate under two sets of "Rules". The "Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures for Interceptors in Air Defense" (CONADR 55-6) while operating within and over the United States and Alaska, and, by the "Rules" (RCAF/ADC ASI 2/5) while in or over Canada including the Northeast Command Area. (64th Air Division (Defense)).
5. The responsibilities of the Sector Commander, outlined in the RCAF/ADC ASI 2/5, must be understood by the Joint Air Division (Defense) Commander whose forces operate in or over Canada. An example of these responsibilities are: The Joint Air Division (Def) Commander has the authority to engage a hostile aircraft over Canada Prior to declaration of Emergency in Canada, also he has the authority to force an intercepted aircraft to change course and/or to land.
6. At the present time, paragraph 6a(4) of ADCR 55-35 (US/CANADIAN BORDER OVERFLY IN AIR DEFENSE) conflicts with the

COPY

227

OCG, 31st Air Div (Def), 4 Oct 56, Subj: Rules for Interception and Engagement by Fighter Aircraft in Canada (Unclassified)

RCAF/ADC ASI 2/5. This paragraph prohibits USAF fighter interceptors from forcing an intercepted aircraft to land or to engage and destroy an intercepted aircraft while over Canada. It is suggested this paragraph be deleted from this regulation.

7. CONADR 55-6 (Rules of Engagement), paragraph 6k authorizes tactical overfly of the Canadian border and directs that engagement will be conducted in accordance with rules of engagement promulgated by RCAF/ADC (ASI 2/5) while over Canada.

8. A request has been sent to the AOC RCAF/ADC for instructions relative to "Rules of Engagement" subsequent to a declaration of emergency in Canada. In addition, this headquarters is coordinating a revised CONADR 55-6 with AOC RCAF/ADC to make it compatible with a revised ASI 2/5 now in draft form.


9. Early revision of CONADR 55-6 - RCAF/ADC ASI 2/5 is expected and your headquarters will be advised when instructions relative to Rules "Subsequent to Declaration of Emergency in Canada" are received.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

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227


OCO, Hq 31st AD (Def), 4 Oct 56, Subj: Rules for Interception
and Engagement by Fighter Aircraft in Canada (Unclassified)

ADOCO-F

2nd Ind

17 Oct 56

Hq Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, Ent Air
Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

Forwarded as a matter pertaining to your Command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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OCO, Ltr 31st ADiv, 4 Oct 56, Subj: Rules for Interception and Engagement
by Fighter Aircraft in Canada (U)

CDOOT-0

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL AIR DEFENSE FORCE, Grandview Air Force Base, Missouri

TO: Commander, Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado

Recommend negotiations be made with the RCAF Air Defense Command
to resolve the conflicting directives outlined by basic letter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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227

Headquarters
31ST AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE)
United States Air Force
Snelling Air Force Station
Saint Paul 11, Minnesota

OCO

SUBJECT: Rules for Interception and Engagement by Fighter
Aircraft in Canada (U)

TO: Commander
Central Air Defense Force
Grandview Air Force Base
Grandview, Missouri

1. A review of directives pertinent to subject rules has indicated the following two problem areas which require clarification:

a. Conflict exists between Canadian and United States directives as to whether an intercepted aircraft may be forced to land or be engaged.

b. Rules for interception or engagement by fighter aircraft subsequent to a declaration of a state of emergency in Canada are not defined. (Will follow GCI Inst.)

2. Paragraph 6a(4), ADCR 55-5 states that a USAF aircraft conducting operational intercepts over Canada "will make no attempt to order the intercepted aircraft to land. Destruction is not authorized while the intercepted aircraft is over the other nation's territory". This is in direct conflict with the following two paragraphs of the RCAF Air Defense Command Air Staff Instruction 2/5 which is part of the Canada - United States Emergency Air Defense Plan 2-56, dated 1 January 1956.

a. Paragraph 7, ASI 2/5 states "The Sector Commander (USAF Air Division Commander) may, at his own discretion instruct the fighter pilot through the GCI controller to order the intercepted aircraft to land but is to inform the Combat Operations Center of the action taken. In the absence of the Sector Commander, the Air Defense Control Center is to refer to the Combat Operations Center for authority to order the intercepted aircraft to land".

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(1) (b) (1)

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(2) (b) (1)

3. It is requested that this headquarters be furnished an interpretation of these directives which will resolve the apparent conflict described above.

4. RCAF Air Defense Command Air Staff Instruction 2/5 pertains to the "Rules for Interception and Engagement by Fighter Aircraft Prior to the Declaration of a State of Emergency in Canada". The Canada - United States Emergency Defense Plan does not outline procedures subsequent to the declaration of a state of emergency in Canada. As an example, no provision is made whereby a track in Canada which does not meet the established standards for identification may be declared "hostile" subsequent to the declaration of an Air Defense Warning Yellow or Red.

5. It is recommended that the Canada - United States Emergency Air Defense Plan 2-56 be revised to include procedures subsequent to the institution of a state of emergency in Canada.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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16 Oct 1956

128

COOPO

SUBJECT: (SECRET) Interception, Identification and Engagement of
Unknown Aircraft over Canada - ASI 2/5

TO: Air Officer Commanding
Air Defense Command
RCAF Station, St. Hubert
St. Hubert, Quebec, Canada

1. Your letter S881-100-3/14(AOC) of 18 September 56, addressed to Commander ADC was forwarded to Continental Air Defense Command in that "Rules of Engagement" (CONADR 55-6) is a matter pertaining to this Command.
2. Since receipt of your letter, CONADR 55-6 subject "Rules of Engagement", 8 October 55, has been redrafted and is presently being coordinated with interested staff agencies in this headquarters.
3. The discrepancies outlined in your letter paragraph 3, "Signals to be used to order intercepted aircraft to alter course or land", have been reviewed and the proposed CONADR 55-6 includes your recommended procedures. Concurrence of Headquarters USAF is now pending. As you mentioned, considerable liaison will be necessary with appropriate civil agencies.
4. Attached is redraft of CONADR 55-6. You will note that a number of changes have been made, these changes are underlined for ease in editing. Your paragraph 11 ASI 2/5 is basically the same as CONADR 55-6, paragraph 8c where in ADCM-55-1 "Standard Intercept Tactics For Air Defense Lead Collision" is referred to.
5. Reference Appendix "A" ASI 2/5, paragraph 1(b)(11), this should read "Commander 64th Air Division (Defense) USAF". Also, effective 1 September Cin C HEC was discontinued and became Commander Northeast Air Command. Paragraph 1(b)(11) should also include (Defense) following Air Division.
6. Other than these comments listed above, this headquarters concurs in your draft of ASI 2/5 with Appendix "A".

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7. Attached for your comments is a draft of CONADR 55-6 to be published as soon as Headquarters USAF approves signals outlined in paragraph 7. To preclude unnecessary delay in publication, this regulation may be published with paragraph 7 blank, with following note: "Signals to be published at later date - when received insert in this space".

8. Your Headquarters will be kept advised of any future development.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

s/t HARVEY T. ALMESS
Brig General, USAF
DCC/Plans & Operations

1 Incl
CONADR 55-6 (Draft)


Comdr Air Defence Command
RCAF is authorized to receive
this classified material.

MAJ SCHIEBEL /s/t/
2722-2814
11 Oct 56

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7. Attached for your comments is a draft of CONADR 55-6 to be published as soon as Headquarters USAF approves signals outlined in paragraph 7. To preclude unnecessary delay in publication, this regulation may be published with paragraph 7 blank, with following note: "Signals to be published at later date - when received insert in this space".

8. Your Headquarters will be kept advised of any future development.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

s/t HARVEY T. ALTESS
Brig General, USAF
DCC/Plans & Operations

1 Incl
CONADR 55-6 (Draft)

Comdr Air Defence Command
RCAF is authorized to receive
this classified material.

MAJ SCHIEBEL /s/t/
2722-2814
11 Oct 56

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

READ

SPACE BELOW RESERVE

CONAD HIST FILE

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PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION ROUTINE	BOOK	AF	AP 24 RCAF	CONFIDENTIAL
INFO ROUTINE	MULTI <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
FROM: CINCONAD	SINGLE			

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: COMCFCCR STEWART AFB NY
 COMCFCCR RICHARDS-GEBAUR AFB MO
 COMCFWCR HAMILTON AFB CALIF

INFO: COM25CADD McCORD AFB WASH
 COM9CADD GEIGER FIELD SPOKANE WASH
 COM29CADD MALMSTROM AFB MONTANA
 COM31CADD SMELLING AFS ST PAUL MINN
 COM37CADD TRUAX FIELD MADISON WIS
 COM30CADD WILLOW RUN AFS MICH
 COM32CADD SYRACUSE AFS SYRACUSE NY
 AOC CANAIRDEF ST HUBERT QUEBEC

dup

[REDACTED] om COOOP-T X079

CANUSECURITY. The AOC RCAF/ADC has advised this headquarters that their Air Staff Instructions-2/5 quote Rules of Engagement unquote have been radically changed and the new Rules of Engagement will be published effective 15 June 1957. This

DATE	TIME
5	2200Z
MONTH	YEAR
June	1957

SYMBOL	COOOP-T	SIGNATURE	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)	Major Schiebel/bll	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
PHONE	2088	W. J. BIRMELE Lt Col USAF Adj	
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FORM 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CO. SITUATION SHEET		[REDACTED]	
CINCONAD	READING F	[REDACTED]	
<p>headquarters has contacted Headquarters RCAF/ADC and has requested Group Captain W. Weiser personally to visit the CONAD Region Headquarters and brief the necessary personnel on the changes that have been made. It is desired that representatives of the following CONAD Divisions be assembled at their CONAD Region headquarters for this briefing: 25th, 9th, 29th, 31st, 37th, 30th and 32nd. The following is Group Captain Weiser's itinerary: Arriving CFECR by T-33 at 1000 hrs 12 June, briefing to follow immediately; arriving CFCCR evening of 12 June for 0900 hr briefing 13 June; returning to St. Hubert following briefing; arriving CFWCR evening of 17 June by T-33 for 0900 hr briefing 18 June; departing for Ent AFB following briefing. Representatives from CONAD Regions and Divisions should include the Director of Combat Operations Center and as many of the COC duty officers and other operations personnel as can attend. A representative of CONAD Headquarters will attend these briefings.</p>			
<p>A PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION - PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION.</p>			
<p>M/R See attached message AP 24 RCAF. Above has been discussed with G/C Weiser and has his approval.</p>			
COOP-T		PAGE NR 2	[REDACTED]

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TO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING.

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RR RJEDEN
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TO RJEDEN/CINC CONAD ENT AFB COLO
INFO/RJEDEN/RCAF PLANNING LIAISON OFFICE CANAD ENT AFB COLO

*Coop: coop
27-6881*

AP24 27 MAY 57

YOUR COOP 0535Z DATED 26 OCT 56 AND MY INTERIM REPLY AP 1 DATED 26 NOV 56 AND AP 15 DATED 27 MAR 57 PD. OUR REVISED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HAVE BEEN APPROVED PD. IT IS PROPOSED TO FORMULATE THEM AS A REVISED AFI 2/5 TO BE EFFECTIVE 15 JUN 57 PD. AS DISCUSSED DURING STAFF VISIT TO YOUR HQ 17 FEB 57, THE REVISED RULES WOULD MAKE SWEEPING CHANGES IN ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY TO ORDER ENGAGEMENTS PD. YOUR DIVISION COMMANDERS CONTROLLING WEAPONS CAPABLE OF ENGAGING IN CANADIAN AIRSPACE ARE INTIMATELY INVOLVED PD. BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ORDER AND THE NUMBER OF CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE, DISTRIBUTION WILL BE MADE IN CANADA BY HAND OF OFFICER WHO WILL VISIT SECTOR COMMANDERS AND EXPLAIN NATURE OF CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE, REASONS FOR CHANGES AND WHO WILL ANSWER QUESTIONS PD. A SIMILAR DISTRIBUTION COULD BE MADE IN THE US WITH AN OFFICER VISITING EASTERN, CENTRAL AND WESTERN FORCE HQS AND YOUR HQ TO SPEAK TO CONCERNED HQ STAFF AND DIV SION COMMANDERS WHO WOULD BE CALLED IN PD. IF YOU CONSIDER THIS DESIRABLE SUGGEST ITINERARY BE ARRANGED BY PHONE WITH C/O W. WEINER.

BT
27/1655Z MAY RFENV

A--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY 3 ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INCIDENTAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR
TO DECLASSIFICATION.

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CONAD SECYT FORM 15
15 MAR 57

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- COMUSMACV GRANDVIEW AFB GRANDVIEW MISSOURI
- CINCPAC (CINCPAC)
- CINCPAC ANCHORAGE AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA
- COMUSMACV PEPPERHILL AFB ST JOHNS NEWFOUNDLAND
- COMUSMACV WETHELM AFB CANADA MICH
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CISCOMAD

SECRET FROM COOOP-T X-035

This message in three parts. Part I for Comdr ADC, Comdr CONAD Forces Eastern CONAD Region, and Comdr CONAD Forces Western CONAD Region. Reference my message COOOP 60h87, dated 22 Dec 1956, delete paragraph one delta and substitute the following: Overflights and attacks against known hostile targets over Canada will be conducted in accordance with RCAF/ADC Air Staff Instructions 2/5 during CONAD Air Defense Warning Yellow or Red. This includes emergency take-off and landings at Canadian bases during these alert periods. This authority applies between 19 Feb 1957 and 1 July 1957 only. Part II for Comdr AIG. Accidents involving the MB-1 rocket in Canada will be dealt with in accordance with procedures established by Comdr ADC, reference my letter to Comdr ADC, dated 28 Dec 56, Subject: (SECRET) "SOP for the Notification of MB-1 Accident Over Canada." Part III. Air Officer Commanding, RCAF/ADC, has been furnished with information contained in my message COOOP 60h87 with the changes indicated in Part I of this message.

Reference is made to this message and instructions relative to the status and employment of the MB-1 rocket. At that time the MB-1 was restricted to the continental United States. Instructions were issued from RCAF/ADC on 27 Dec 1956, at that time the MB-1 was authorized to fly over Canada during Air Defense Warning Yellow or Red. RCAF/ADC has been directed to advise the United States of the MB-1 accident over Canada and the procedures will advise.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

COOOP-T



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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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PRECEDENCE ROUTINE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE								
ACTION	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	AP	AFOAT 52728	SECRET								
INFO	CINCOMAD					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS								
FROM:														
TO:	OOFS USAF WASH DC													
	[REDACTED] on COOP-T X093													
<p>For the Chief of Staff, USAF as Executive Agent for CONAD.</p> <p>AFOAT 52728, 26 February 1957, authorized overflight of Canada by US aircraft armed with MB-1 rockets for the period 19 February to 1 July 1957. Letter this Headquarters, COOP-T, subject Canadian MB-1 Overflight Authority, dated 25 April 1957, requested negotiations be effected to extend this overflight authority beyond 1 July 1957. Has this authority been obtained or will overflight authority become void as of 1 July 1957. Reply requested prior to 1 July.</p> <p>M/R Not required.</p>														
<p>TO C TELETYPE BUREAU. PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL REFERENCES BY DATE. TIME START DATE TO DECLASSIFICATION.</p>														
READING FILE						<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>DATE</td> <td>TIME</td> </tr> <tr> <td>26</td> <td>1700Z</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MONTH</td> <td>YEAR</td> </tr> <tr> <td>June</td> <td>1957</td> </tr> </table>	DATE	TIME	26	1700Z	MONTH	YEAR	June	1957
DATE	TIME													
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SYMBOL	COOP-T			SIGNATURE										
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PHONE	2088	PAGE 1	NR. OF PAGES											
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	[REDACTED]													

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19 Nov 56

COOPR

SUBJECT: (Unclass) Coordination of Antiaircraft Defense Plans for Border Areas

TO: Commanding General
Army Antiaircraft Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

a. Headquarters Army Antiaircraft Command letter, subject as above, dated 24 October 1956.

b. MCC 300/8.

2. The following information is furnished as requested:

The Army Antiaircraft Command, Canada, was inactivated on 30 September 1956. The command of the antiaircraft forces is now vested in the AOC ADC RCAF who has an Antiaircraft Section on his staff.

3. Reference 1b designates CINCONAD as planning agent for the air defense of the continental United States. In this connection CINCONAD is responsible for coordinating plans, operations and exercises with appropriate U.S. and Canadian Commanders in accordance with agreed Canada-United States defense policies.

4. The CONAD staff is now examining the feasibility of revising the current "Cross Border Interceptor and Engagement Procedures Agreement," dated 31 May 1954, in order to make it applicable to missiles as well as interceptors. If this can be accomplished within the framework of the basic agreement covering cross border interceptions entered into by the governments of Canada and the United States then the requirement for a special antiaircraft or missile agreement will cease to exist.

5. In the event that the action outlined in paragraph 4 above cannot be accomplished then CONAD and ADC RCAF will have to negotiate a separate agreement for the antiaircraft defense of border installations which is mutually acceptable to both parties concerned.

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COOPR
SUBJECT: (Unclass) Coordination of Antiaircraft Defense Plans for
Border Areas

6. After this agreement has been reached, the CG ARAACOM, coordinating with CONAD, will work directly with the AOC ADC RCAF on detailed plans for border antiaircraft defense in support of the broad actions taken by CINCONAD under the responsibilities outlined in paragraph 3 above.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

/s/t/ C. H. SCOTT
Colonel, USAF
Secretary of the Joint Staff

s/t Lt/Col Telzrow
COOPR
2675
14 Nov 56

M/R This is a reply to ARAACOM request for guidance in coordinating border antiaircraft defense plans with Canada. ARAACOM is advised that CONAD is initiating action to establish a cross border agreement for antiaircraft weapons or missiles.

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HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADOAA-3 P&O 381

SUBJECT: Coordination of Antiaircraft Defense Plans for Border Areas (U)

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

- a. CANUSEADP 2-54.
- b. MCC 300/7.
- c. CANUSEADP 2-56.
- d. MCC 300/8.
- e. Annex K to AA-OP-US.

2. Appendix XI to Annex D of CANUSEADP 2-56, "Defense of Border Installations," which is to be published (date unknown), is of vital concern to this headquarters in planning and coordinating the antiaircraft defenses of border areas.

3. CANUSEADP 2-54, which was superseded by CANUSEADP 2-56, charged this headquarters and the Commander, Antiaircraft Command, Canada, with detailed planning for the antiaircraft defenses of border installations. It is understood that the Antiaircraft Command, Canada, has been inactivated. For this reason, Annex K to AA-OP-US is out of date, but cannot be revised until Appendix XI to Annex D of CANUSEADP 2-56 is published.


4. MCC 300/7, on which CANUSEADP 2-56 was based, has been superseded by MCC 300/8, but it is noted that the responsibilities of CINCONAD and the Air Officer Commanding, Air Defense Command, Canada, for developing plans and coordination in the provisions of antiaircraft defensive measures for border areas remain unchanged. It is further understood that the Air Officer Commanding, Air Defense Command, Canada, is unable, for some technical reason, to sign the draft of Appendix XI to Annex D to CANUSEADP 2-56.

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ADOOA-3 P&O 381

SUBJECT: Coordination of Antiaircraft Defense Plans for Border Areas (U)

5. In view of the above, the following information is requested:


a. Whether, in fact, the Antiaircraft Command, Canada, has been inactivated.

b. Guidance concerning interim procedures for coordinating border antiaircraft defense plans with Canada, pending the publication of Appendix XI to Annex D of CANUSEADP 2-56.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/t/ D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, GS
Chief of Staff

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DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Royal Canadian Air Force

St Hubert, Que., 14 Jun 57.

Sector Commander,
1 ADCC, RCAF Station,
Lac St Denis,
Morin Heights, P.Q.

Sector Commander,
2 ADCC RCAF Station St. Margarets,
County of Northumberland,
St. Margarets, N.B.

Sector Commander,
3 ADCC, RCAF Station Edgar,
Edgar, Ontario.

Rules of Engagement
Surface-to-Air Weapons

1 CONAD rules of engagement have recently been revised and will be promulgated in the near future as a revision to ASI 2/5/1. The following is an extract from these new rules of engagement (CONAIR 55-6 dated 13 May 57):

"Cross-border agreements are being finalized between this command and RCAF/ADC for the employment of surface-to-air weapons over Canadian territory. Until these agreements are issued, the following procedures will exist:

(1) Operational control of the following surface-to-air weapons defenses will, in all cases, be exercised by or through the CONAD division commander:

- (a) Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan - 37th CONAD Division
- (b) Fort Huron, Michigan - 30th CONAD Division
- (c) Detroit, Michigan - 30th CONAD Division
- (d) Niagara Falls-Buffalo, N.Y. - 30th CONAD Division
- (e) Loring AFB, Maine - 32nd CONAD Division

(2) Prior to ordering or authorizing the engagement of any aircraft within air space over Canadian territory, the CONAD division commander will obtain the concurrence of the division/sector commander authorized to exercise operational control within the air space in which the engagement will occur, as listed below:

- (a) 30th CONAD Division - HQ #3 ADCC/RCAF

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(c) The area of responsibility of the 37th CONAD division commander includes an area in Canada. Air defense actions taken in this Canadian air space will be on the authority of the ACC ADC (Canada) and will be conducted in accordance with procedures and instructions laid down by the ACC."

2 In addition, Annex C of the a/m order provides the following control states for surface-to-air weapons:

"a. Weapons Free. Fire at any aircraft not identified as friendly.

b. Weapons Tight. Fire only at aircraft identified or declared hostile or committing hostile acts.

c. Discreet Fire. Fire at specified targets as assigned by designated CONAD commanders.

d. Hold Fire - Do Not Open Fire - Cease Fire. "Hold Fire" may be imposed on a temporary basis for the purpose of permitting safe operation of friendly aircraft through or within predetermined corridors, altitudes, or sectors only in those exceptional instances wherein other weapons control procedures would prove unsuitable for this purpose."

3 In the event that a Sector Commander is requested to concur in the engagement of an aircraft by surface-to-air weapons, he will act in accordance with the engagement authority granted to him in ASI 2/5, para 16 (b). Under normal circumstances, concurrence will be limited to the engagement of specifically designated targets in exactly the same way as though an engagement by an interceptor aircraft were being authorized. This corresponds to a weapon control status of "Discreet Fire". However, under special circumstances corresponding generally to the tactical situation under which broadcast control would be used, a Sector Commander may concur to a "Weapons Tight" or "Weapons Free" status for all or part of his sector which is within range of surface-to-air weapons.

L. S. Wray
L.S. Wray A/W/M
ACC, ADC. *He*

cc: AFHQ
CINCONAD
Cdr, 64 Air Div
Cdr, 5 Air Div. UNCLASSIFIED
CAF Liaison Office, CONAD

CONADR 55-12

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CONADR REGULATION)
55-12)HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ft AFB, Colorado Springs, Colo.
31 August 1956

OPERATIONS

Military Air Defense Warning System Operation

1. Purpose. This Regulation prescribes the procedures for passing states of preparedness and air defense warnings to Military Air Defense Warning (MADW) Key Points and units assigned or under the operational control of CONADR, and states the policy by which MADW Key Points are established.
2. References.
 - a. CONADR 55-1.
 - b. CONADR 55-3.
3. Scope. This Regulation applies to all joint air defense forces and divisions.
4. Responsibilities.
 - a. Joint air defense force commanders are responsible for:
 - (1) Insuring compliance with the provisions of this Regulation by joint air defense divisions.
 - (2) Periodically monitoring transmissions over the MADW system to insure prompt action on the part of disseminating personnel.
 - (3) Approving or disapproving MADW key points requested by JADD's.
 - (4) Conducting necessary liaison with other commands and agencies to insure prompt acknowledgements of transmissions over MADW networks.
 - b. Joint air defense division commanders are responsible for:
 - (1) Prompt dissemination of states of preparedness and air defense warnings to MADW key points and military units assigned or under operational control of the joint air defense division.
 - (2) Prompt provision of states of preparedness and air defense warnings to Attack Warning Officers of the Federal Civil Defense Administration on duty in the control center. (Operational control of the Civil Air Defense Warning (CADW) network and the dissemination of air defense warnings to CADW key points is the responsibility of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). Until such time as the full complement of FCDA Attack Warning Officers is assigned to each control center, Air Force personnel on duty in the control center may assist FCDA personnel in the dissemination of air defense warnings.)
 - (3) Maintenance of current lists of MADW key points, to include secondary and tertiary means of communication, to be notified of states of preparedness and air defense warnings.
 - (4) Recommending approval or disapproval for establishment of military key points.
 - (5) Maintaining a complete record of transmissions made over MADW networks and prompt initiation of corrective action relative to communication failures or excessive delays in transmission or acknowledgement of receipt of alerts or emergency information including tests.
 - c. Recipients of information at key points are responsible for further dissemination of the warnings to agencies, units, and installations designated by their appropriate commanders.

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COMADR 55-12

5. General.

a. The Military Air Defense Warning System is designed to provide prompt warning of impending air attack to units assigned or under the operational control of COMAD and to other designated services and agencies. Further dissemination of air defense warnings to subordinate echelons is the responsibility of the receiving key point.

b. Within the command structure of COMAD (COMAD Headquarters, joint air defense forces, and joint air defense divisions), states of preparedness and air defense warnings are transmitted over the Alert Status network as the primary means of communication. The MADW networks are used to disseminate states of preparedness and air defense warnings from the JADC control centers to key points. The primary means of communication on each of these networks is full-period, multi-point teletypewriter service, except for voice interphone between control centers and military flight service centers. Secondary means of communication is tactical telephone service (where applicable) and long distance (LD) or toll terminal (TTL) service specifically designated for transmission of air defense warnings. A tertiary means of communications (normal commercial long distance or business service) may be employed when either the primary or secondary means of communication is inoperative.

c. Many installations receive notification of air defense warnings over Military Flight Service interphone communications and Flight Service Centers are designated as MADW key points. Transmission of states of preparedness and air defense warnings to MFS centers is accomplished over voice interphone facilities between the control center and the MFS center. Control centers will maintain lists of telephone numbers for each installation notified by MFS interphone facilities and will call the installations individually which do not acknowledge receipt of the information over MFS interphone circuits except when the particular installations are known to be inoperative.

d. Tests of the communications system are conducted frequently to insure that communications are operative and that personnel responsible for receipt and dissemination of actual states of preparedness and air defense warnings are thoroughly familiar with rapid processing of the information. All tests originated by CINCOMAD will be on an unscheduled basis.

e. Other information such as number, position, altitude, and direction of flight of attacking aircraft may be included in the transmission of air defense warnings when the information has been cleared for dissemination by the joint air defense division commander. Other actions required by the declaration of an air defense warning are outlined in COMAD Regulation 55-3 as amended.

6. Definitions and Abbreviations:

- a. CADW - Civil Air Defense Warning.
- b. FCDA - Federal Civil Defense Administration.
- c. MADW - Military Air Defense Warning.
- d. MFS - Military Flight Service.

e. Key Point - A centrally or critically located installation for receiving and disseminating notification of the declaration of an air defense warning or other emergency information.

f. Conditions of Air Defense Warning - Degrees of probability of air attack according to the following:

- (1) Air Defense Warning Yellow - Attack by hostile aircraft is probable.
- (2) Air Defense Warning Red - Attack by hostile aircraft is imminent, or is taking place.
- (3) Air Defense Warning White - Attack by hostile aircraft is improbable (all clear).

7. Policy for Establishment of Key Points.

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MILITARY AIR DEFENSE WARNING SYSTEM
OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR TELETYPEWRITER NETWORKS

A. PROCEDURE FOR SENDING AIR DEFENSE WARNINGS AND STATES OF PREPAREDNESS OVER TELETYPEWRITER NETWORKS:

1. Select proper pre-cut perforated tape for type of warning or state of preparedness to be transmitted.
2. Insure that master switch is in "ON" position. (Master switch should be "ON" at all times except when making paper changes. Master switch should be turned "OFF" only during time paper change is being made.)
3. Operate twist type key to the right and then release. (This operation will start the motor of the teletypewriter at all key points.)
4. After twist type key has returned to original position (approximately 6 seconds), insert appropriate perforated tape in automatic transmitter.
5. Operate the send-receive-break lever to the "SEND" position (up).
6. Operate the toggle switch of the transmitter to the "ON" position.
7. Allow the tape to proceed through the transmitter until the words "AUTHENTICATION IS....." appears.
8. When the word "IS" has been transmitted, turn automatic transmitter "OFF" and manually transmit current authentication word.
9. When current authentication word has been transmitted, turn automatic transmitter "ON" until tape is completed.
10. After the message has been transmitted, the key points will acknowledge in the order designated by the JADD. Each key point will send "CAR RST LINE FEED" after its acknowledgement to position the carriage of the teletypewriter for the next key point in the sequence.
11. After all key points have acknowledged, the JADD operator will type "(number) JADD OUT" and send FIGS BLANK H. This will stop the motor of the teletypewriter at each key point.
12. If any key point in the sequence fails to acknowledge in turn within 10 seconds, the next key point in the sequence will acknowledge. Any key point which missed its designated turn will wait until the end of the roll call and then acknowledge. If a key point fails to acknowledge, the JADD operator will type the name of the key point and request acknowledgement; for example:

"5TH ARMY, COME IN."

Any key points failing to acknowledge after being requested by the JADD operator, will be called over telephone facilities and given the appropriate warning message.

B. PROCEDURE FOR RECEIVING AND ACKNOWLEDGING AIR DEFENSE WARNINGS AND STATES OF PREPAREDNESS AT KEY POINTS:

1. Transmission over the MAJW teletypewriter network will be preceded by lighting of the red lamp and sounding of the bell on the teletypewriter.
2. When the red lamp lights, operate the non-locking key mounted on the table of the teletypewriter to extinguish the lamp.
3. Wait for receipt of air defense warning or state of preparedness message.
4. Acknowledge receipt of air defense warning message by typing name of your key point or authorized abbreviation, and send CAR RST LINE FEED when your position in acknowledging sequence has been reached.
5. Key points are allowed 10 seconds in which to acknowledge. If a key point misses its designated position in the acknowledging sequence, it will wait until end of list to acknowledge. If a key point fails to acknowledge, the JADD operator will

Attachment 1, COMADR 55-12, 31 August 1956.

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query the key point over the teletypewriter network. If a key point fails to acknowledge the query, the key point will be called over telephone facilities.

NOTE: The JADD has sole responsibility for starting and stopping the teletypewriters at all key points.

C. PROCEDURE FOR SENDING TEST MESSAGES OVER MILITARY AIR DEFENSE WARNING TELETYPEWRITER NETWORKS:

1. Select pre-cut perforated tape which contains the following test message:
"(Number) JADD, TEST, AIR DEFENSE WARNING, TEST, AT (ZULU TIME). AUTHENTICATION IS
..... STAND BY TO ACKNOWLEDGE."

2. Proceed as outlined in paragraphs 2 to 12, Section A, above.

D. PROCEDURE FOR RECEIVING AND ACKNOWLEDGING TEST MESSAGES AT KEY POINTS:

1. Proceed as outlined in paragraphs 1 to 5, Section B, above.

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MILITARY AIR DEFENSE WARNING SYSTEM OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
for
TELEPHONE CIRCUITS

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A. General.

1. Voice interphone facilities are used to transmit air defense warnings and states of preparedness to Military Flight Service (MFS) Centers as key points. The Flight Service center retransmits the information over interphone facilities to selected drops in the JADD sector. When the selected drops have acknowledged, the Flight Service center reports acknowledgment, or failure of any drop to acknowledge, back to the control center over the interphone circuit.

2. Long distance (LD or TML) telephone service is used as emergency service to reach key points quickly in case of failure of the teletypewriter network or portions thereof. Long distance terminals are installed at each key point for receipt of air defense warnings and states of preparedness. The LD terminal in the control center is used to contact those key points which fail to acknowledge receipt of transmissions over the primary system, either voice interphone or teletypewriter.

3. A tertiary means of communication which may be used in an emergency is regular commercial toll call to a normal business telephone at the key point. This means is used only in case of failure of either the primary or LD system.

B. PROCEDURE FOR PASSING MESSAGES (INCLUDING TESTS) OVER VOICE INTERPHONE CIRCUITS TO MILITARY FLIGHT SERVICE CENTERS:

1. Pick up handset (white lamp lights).

2. Depress signalling key (for manual code ringing) number of times indicated for MFS center or dial appropriate code (when dial selective signalling equipment is installed).

3. Pass message as follows:

a. When actual or simulated state of preparedness or air defense warning, say: "(actual or simulated condition), repeat, (actual or simulated condition) declared by (agency) at (Zulu time). Authentication is..... Standby to acknowledge."

b. When test air defense warning, say: "Test, air defense warning, test, repeat, test air defense warning, test. Authentication isAcknowledge."

4. When MFS center acknowledges completion of fan-out, or reports stations failing to acknowledge, say: "OK, (number) Joint Air Defense Division out," and hang up.

5. If an MFS center reports stations failing to acknowledge, call each station reported over LD facilities and pass message to each station individually.

C. PROCEDURE FOR PASSING MESSAGES (INCLUDING TESTS) OVER EMERGENCY (LONG DISTANCE TOLL TERMINAL) SYSTEM:

1. Pick up handset or operate toll terminal key if terminal is in 101 or 102 key equipment.

2. When toll operator answers and:

a. When actual condition, say: "Emergency, (Air Defense Warning or State of Preparedness) Emergency, (name of city and long distance number of each key point to be called) "

b. When simulated condition, say: "(Nickname of condition), (name of city and long distance number of each key point to be called)."

c. When test message, say: "Test, Air Defense Warning, Test. (name of city and long distance number of each key point to be called)."

3. When key points answer, pass message as follows:

a. When actual or simulated condition, say: "(actual or simulated condition), repeat, (actual or simulated condition) declared by (agency) at (Zulu time). Authentication is.....Acknowledge."
Attachment 2, COMAIR 55-12, 31 August 1956. (ADC-4747-6)

b. When test message, say: "Test, air defense warning, test, repeat, test, air defense warning, test. Authentication isAcknowledge."

4. When key points acknowledge, say: "OK (number) joint air defense division out," and hang up.

D. When long distance toll terminal is inoperative, place calls to individual key points as outlined in Section C above except that toll operator will be contacted over regular commercial telephone circuits.

E. PROCEDURE FOR RECEIVING AND ACKNOWLEDGING ALERTING MESSAGES (INCLUDING TESTS) AT KEY POINTS:

1. When bell rings, pick up hand set or depress appropriate key on 101 or 102 key equipment, and answer with, "(name of command or agency)."

2. Listen for applicable message.

3. When you hear, "Please acknowledge," say: "(name of command or agency), (transmitted condition or test)."

4. When control center says, "OK," hang up.

5. Proceed with dissemination of warning or condition as required.

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a. MADW Key Points will be established only where the receiving agency provides continuous (24-hour) monitoring of the key point facility.

b. The establishment of MADW Key Points is the responsibility of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

c. A single MADW Key Point will be established for each major domestic military command or governmental agency which has installations or establishments within each air defense sector when:

- (1) Determined necessary by mutual agreement between the joint air defense division commander and the command or agency concerned, and
- (2) Upon approval of JADP headquarters, or
- (3) when directed by this or higher headquarters.

d. The requirement for change of MADW Key Points will be determined in accordance with the criteria outlined in paragraphs 7a and c above.

8. Procedures.

a. Air Defense Warnings and states of preparedness (including tests) will be transmitted to key points over teletypewriter networks in accordance with detailed instructions contained in Attachment 1 and to MFS centers over voice interphone facilities.

b. Air Defense Warnings and states of preparedness (including tests) will be transmitted to key points over voice telephone communications, when required because of failure of the teletypewriter network or lack of acknowledgement from the key point(s), in accordance with detailed instructions contained in Attachment 2.

9. Communications.


a. Necessary circuits and toll terminals for establishing MADW networks will be ordered installed by appropriate authority upon approval of key points, or changes in key points, by JADP headquarters.

b. Direct communication is authorized between joint air defense divisions and appropriate commands or governmental agencies to insure prompt receipt, acknowledgement, and dissemination of air defense warnings and states of preparedness and proper functioning of the MADW system.
(COODC)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

MARSHALL S. ROTH
Major General, USAF
Acting Chief of Staff


WALTER W. ROBINSON
Colonel, USAF
Command Adjutant

2 Attachments:

1. MADW System Operating Instructions for Teletypewriter Networks
2. MADW System Operating Instructions for Telephone Circuits

DISTRIBUTION:

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(ADC-4747-6)

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*CONADR 55-12CONAD REGULATION)
55-12HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado
3 May 1957

OPERATIONS

Military Air Defense Warning System

1. Purpose. This regulation prescribes the procedures for passing states of preparedness and air defense warnings to military air defense warning (MADW) key points and units assigned or under the operational control of CONAD, and states the policy by which MADW key points are established.

2. Scope. This regulation applies to all echelons of CONAD and is for the guidance of other commands and agencies having air defense responsibilities to CINCONAD.

3. General.

a. The MADW system is designed to provide prompt warning of impending air attack to units assigned or under the operational control of CONAD and to other designated services and agencies.

b. Within the command structure of CONAD (CONAD Headquarters, CONAD regions, CONAD forces, and CONAD divisions), states of preparedness and air defense warnings are transmitted over the alert #1 warning network as the primary means of communication. The MADW networks are used to disseminate states of preparedness and air defense warnings from the CONAD division control centers to key points. Recipients of information at key points are responsible for further dissemination of the warnings to agencies, units, and installations designated by their appropriate commanders.

c. The primary means of communication on each of these networks is full-period, multi-point teletypewriter service, except for inter-phones between control centers and military flight service (MFS) centers. The secondary means of communication is long distance (LD) or tactical telephone service, where applicable. LD terminals are installed at each key point for receipt of air defense warnings and states of preparedness. The LD terminal in the control center is used to contact those key points which fail to acknowledge receipt of transmissions over the primary system. A tertiary means of communication which may be used in an emergency is the regular commercial toll call to a normal business telephone at a key point. When the primary and secondary means of communication is inoperative, this means will be employed.

*This supersedes CONADR 55-12, 31 August 1956

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CONADR 55-12

d. Many installations receive notification of air defense warnings over MFS interphone communications and these centers are designated as MADW key points. Transmission of states of preparedness and air defense warnings to MFS centers is accomplished over interphone facilities between the control center and the MFS center. Personnel in control centers will maintain lists of telephone numbers for each installation notified by MFS interphone facilities. They will also call the installations individually which do not acknowledge receipt of the information over MFS interphone circuits except when the particular installations are known to be inoperative.

e. Tests of the communications system are conducted frequently to insure that communications are operative and that personnel responsible for receipt and dissemination of actual states of preparedness and air defense warnings are thoroughly familiar with rapid processing of the information. All tests originated by CINCOMAD will normally be on an unscheduled basis.

f. Other information such as number, position, altitude, and direction of flight of attacking aircraft may be included in the transmission of air defense warnings when the information has been cleared for dissemination by the CONAD division commander. Other actions required by the declaration of an air defense warning are outlined in CONAD Regulation 55-3.

4. Responsibilities.

a. CONAD region commanders are responsible for:

(1) Insuring compliance with the provisions of this regulation by CONAD division commanders.

(2) Periodically monitoring transmissions over the MADW system to insure prompt action on the part of disseminating personnel.

(3) Approving or disapproving MADW key points requested by CONAD division commanders.

(4) Conducting necessary liaison with other commands and agencies to insure prompt acknowledgements of transmissions over MADW networks.

(5) Prompt provision of states of preparedness, air defense warnings, and releasable tactical air information to Attack Warning Officers of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) on duty in the operations center.

b. CONAD division commanders are responsible for:

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(1) Prompt dissemination of states of preparedness and air defense warnings to MADW key points and military units assigned or under operational control of the CONAD division.

(2) Maintenance of current lists of MADW key points, to include secondary and tertiary means of communication, to be notified of states of preparedness and air defense warnings.

(3) Recommending approval or disapproval for establishment of military key points.

(4) Maintaining a complete record of transmission made over MADW networks.

(5) The prompt initiation of corrective action relative to:

(a) Communication failures or excessive delays in transmission.

(b) Acknowledgement of receipt of alerts or emergency information including tests.

5. Definitions.

a. Key Point -- A centrally or critically located installation for receiving and disseminating notification of the declaration of an air defense warning or other emergency information.

b. Conditions of Air Defense Warning -- Degrees of probability of air attack according to the following:

(1) Air Defense Warning Yellow -- Attack by hostile aircraft is probable.

(2) Air Defense Warning Red -- Attack by hostile aircraft is imminent, or is taking place.

(3) Air Defense Warning White -- Attack by hostile aircraft is improbable.

6. Policy for Establishment of Key Points.

a. MADW key points will be established only where the receiving agency provides continuous (24-hour) monitoring of the key point facility.

b. The establishment and operational control of the national warning system (NAWAS) network and the dissemination of air defense warnings to NAWAS key points is the responsibility of the FCDA.

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CONADR 55-12

c. A single MADW key point will be established for each major domestic military command or governmental agency which has installations or establishments within each air defense sector when:

- (1) Determined necessary by mutual agreement between the CONAD division commander and the command or agency concerned, and
- (2) Upon approval of CONAD forces, CONAD region (CFCR) headquarters, or
- (3) When directed by this or higher headquarters.

d. The requirement for change of MADW key points will be determined in accordance with the criteria outlined on paragraphs 6a and c above.

7. Communications.

a. Necessary circuits and toll terminals for establishing MADW networks will be ordered installed by appropriate authority upon approval of key points, or changes in key points, by CFCR headquarters.

b. Direct communication is authorized between CONAD divisions and appropriate commands or governmental agencies to insure prompt receipt, acknowledgement, and dissemination of air defense warnings and states of preparedness and proper functioning of the MADW system.
(COOP-T)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

W. J. Birmele
W. J. BIRMELE
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
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10 Jul 1956

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CINCOMAD

CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

~~(SECRET)~~ COOP-D 6:199. This hq had concurred with rep of your hq to inclusion of the fol SAC bases on appropriate Mil Air Def Wng networks for receipt of notification of air def readiness and air def wng as expeditiously as possible: 1. Lincoln AFB; 2. Fairchild AFB; 3. Gray AFB; 4. Westover AFB; 5. Limestone AFB; 6. Davis-Monthan AFB; 7. Walker AFB; 8. Travis AFB; 9. Castle AFB; 10. McDill AFB; 11. Ellsworth AFB; 12. Great Falls AFB; 13. Lockbourne AFB; 14. Campbell AFB. Your hq was to furn this hq with the fol info rqr before instl can be made at each of the above listed instl:

1. Exact loc of key pt terminal equip to incl bldg and room nr where appl.
2. Name of person to be contacted by tp company rep and installers.

In view of the recent agreement between AEC and Dept of DEF for rapid trf of wpm upon declaration of air def readiness or air def wng by CINCOMAD and the dependence of certain Af Special Wpm bases for receipt of notification of these alerts from above listed bases of your cmd, req the dtl instl info outlined above be furn this hq soonest. If the Mil Air Def Wng inst at your bases is no longer considered a valid rqr, req this hq be notified by the most expeditious me ns in order that nec arng can be made to incl AF Special Wpm bases on Mil Air Def Wng networks as rqr.

C. F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
Asst Command Adj


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10 Jul 1956

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CINCOHAD

COMFLDCOMB AF SPECIAL WPN SANDIA BASE MEXI

~~(SECRET)~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 60198. UNCLASSIFIED FCCIR 7-6-6508. This msg in three parts. Part I. Notification of air def readiness and air def wng are disseminated to all pt on CINCOHAD Alert Br One network and to all pt on MIL Air Def Wng network out of each Joint Air Def Div incl pt notified by Wlt Svc Com. Specifically, Hq 4th Army will receive notification of air def readiness and air def wng as a key pt from the 33d Joint Air Def Div. The chan listed in Part I of above ref msg are accurate and are the most expeditious existing chan for notification of AF Special Wpn bases. Part II. Conf proposed in above ref msg is not considered nec since act has been initiated to obtain instl of MIL Air Def Wng key pt at AF Special Wpn bases and to Hq Fld Comd AF Special Wpn. ADC will assume compl resp for instl and leasing of nec circuits, and funding will not be req by COMFLDCOMB. No tgt date for instl can be estb until nec surveys have been made with the telephone companies involved. Nec act has been initiated to incl Fld Comd, AF Special Wpn, on Alert Br One TT network; however, this instl w/b dfr until a re-enge of this network has been compl. In the meantime, Hq Fld Comd w/b incl on the MIL Air Def Wng network of the 14th Joint Air Def Div. Nec invs is being conducted to determine desirability of radio TT backup from CINCOHAD to COMFLDCOMB. Part III. Further invs of MIL Air Def Wng key pt instl reveals that MIL Air Def Wng key pt have not been instl to date at SAC bases, which your rep were info on 25 Jun 56. Nec fol up act has been take to determine reason for lack of instl and to obtain nec instl at the EPD.

C.F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
ASST Command Ad

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3 July 1956

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 FM: COMFLDOM AFSWP SANDIA BASE WMEK
 TO: RJEKEM/CINCOMAD EXT AFB COLO
 INFO: ZKN/CHAFSWP WASH DC
 BT

// ECRST// CITE FOPDR 7-6-6508. REF CONF 25 JUNE 56 BETWEEN COL FEE,
 USAF, LT COL SCOTT, USAF, HQ FC AFSWP AND LT COL ASZMAN, YOUR HEAD-
 QUARTERS CONCERNING TIE-IN OF FLD COMD AFSWP BASES WITH MADW TELE-
 TYPE WRITER NET. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS.
 (PART 1)

1. IN VIEW OF PRESENT AUTOMATIC TRANSFER PROCEDURES WHEREBY TRANSFER
 OF WEAPONS FROM AEC TO DOD SYSTEM IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF AIR
 DEFENSE ALERTS OR WARNINGS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS
 AND DIRECT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM BE UTILIZED. DISCUSSIONS WITH COL
 ASZMAN INDICATED THAT COMAD MADW ALERT NET NR 1 PROVIDES AIR DEFENSE

PAGE TWO RUMFJCR 16H

ALERT AND WARNING TO ALL STATIONS ON THE NET WITHIN 7 MINUTES FROM
 TIME OF DECLARATION. DIRECT TELETYPE TERMINAL AT FC AFSWP BASE ON
 THIS NET WOULD SATISFY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTOMATIC
 TRANSFER PURPOSES.

2. PRESENT INFO AVAILABLE COMFLDOM LEAVES A QUESTION AS TO WHAT
 LEVEL AIR DEFENSE READINESS AND AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY ALERTS DISSEM-
 INATED. QUESTION: ARE AIR DEFENSE READINESS ALERTS AND AIR DEFENSE
 EMERGENCY ALERTS TRANSMITTED TO ALL MILITARY STATIONS ON THE NET
 BELOW AIR DIVISION? SPECIFICALLY, ARE THESE 2 ALERTS PASSED TO GRAY
 AFB, CAMPBELL AFB, HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY, ETC?

3. AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION TO NOTIFICATION OF AFSWP INSTALLATIONS
 THE FOLLOWING IS A LISTING OF AFSWP BASES AND THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS
 MADW NOTIFICATION CHANNELS:

AFSWP BASE PRESENT NOTIFICATION CHANNEL

- A. SANDIA BASE (FIELD COMMAND AFSWP) - 34TH AD HQ AT KIRTLAND AFB
- B. MANZANO BASE - 34TH AD HQ AT KIRTLAND AFB AND/
OR SANDIA BASE (FIELD COM AND AFB)
- C. KILLIKEN BASE - 33D AIR DIVISION VIA CAMPBELL FLY SVC TO
GRAY AFB TO KILLIKEN BASE
- D. CLARKSVILLE BASE - CAMPBELL AFB VIA PHONE UPON RECEIPT OF
WARNING VIA MADW NET AT THAT BASE

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PAGE THREE BUWJCR 16 H

- E. BOSSIER BASE, LA - HQ SAC VIA FOURTH AIR DIVISION VIA PHONE CALL TO CO BOSSIER BASE.
- F. MEDINA BASE, SAN ANTONIO, TEX - VIA FLT SVC AND HQ 4TH ARMY, FT SAMP HOUSTON TEX (MADW DROP)
- G. LAKE MEAD BASE, NEV - MARCH FLT SVC CENTER BY FLT SVC NET TO WELLS AFB
- H. HMD, YORKTOWN - HQ TAC, LANGLEY AFB, VA

REQUEST VERIFICATION THAT THESE CHANNELS ARE ACCURATE AND THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS EXISTING CHANNELS FOR NOTIFICATION OF AFMWP BASES.

PART II

REQUEST NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CONFERENCE BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES CINCOMAD AND COMFLDCOM TO DISCUSS AND REE ARRANGE DETAILS INCIDENT TO PROVIDING MADW NET TERMINAL AT EACH HSS, HMD, YORKTOWN AND FC AFMWP. IF POSSIBLE REQUEST CONFERENCE AT HQ COMAD ON 10 JULY 1956. REQUEST COMAD REPRESENTATIVES BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS FOLLOWING:

- A. WHO WILL PROVIDE ENGINEERING FOR CIRCUITS?
- B. WHAT EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED?
- C. WHAT EQUIPMENT COSTS, ENGINEERING COSTS, LEASE LINE COSTS, ETC. WILL REQUIRE FUNDING BY COMFLDCOM?
- D. HOW SOON CAN INSTALLATIONS BE COMPLETED?

PAGE FOUR BUWJCR 16 H

- E. CAN PROPOSED MADW NET TERMINAL AT FC AFMWP BE CONNECTED ON THE SAME TELETYPE LOOP AT THE 4TH AIR DIVISION?
- F. DESIRABILITY OF RADTEL BACKUP FROM CINCOMAD TO COMFLDCOM?

PART III

REQUEST YOU ADVISE SOONEST YOUR CONCURRENCE OF CONFERENCE DATE PROPOSED IN PART II ABOVE.

BT

03/1925Z JULY 1956

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17 July 1956

[REDACTED]
ADRESI

SUBJECT: (U) MADW in the SAGE ERA

TO: COMMANDER
Eastern Air Defense Force
Stewart Air Force Base, New York

1. The following plan for operation of the MADW network in the SAGE era is forwarded for your concurrence and/or comments and recommendations. Information copies of this plan have been sent to Western Electric ADES, and ADET for their information and advance planning. Upon receipt of your answer, this headquarters will prepare necessary instructions to appropriate agencies.

2. Military Air Defense Warning will be administered from the Air Division Combat Center during the SAGE time period. Notification of military units, other than Air Defense Command units, within the SAGE sector will be accomplished on a loop teletype network. Air Defense Command units will be notified by voice over the available tactical circuits.

3. In order to provide continuous MADW operation during the phasing of the SAGE system into the manual air defense system, the following plan has been prepared:

a. At the present time all military units that will be in the 26th Air Division (SAGE) Sector are notified by two teletype loop networks; one originating at the 26th AD (Roslyn, AFB) and the other at the 85th AD (Andrews, AFB). When the 26th AD (SAGE) is completely operational, all of these points will be notified by one teletype loop originating at the SAGE Combat Center at Syracuse AFB.

b. MADW responsibilities will be retained by the manual ADCC's until such time as they are phased out.

c. Prior to the operational date of the Combat Center at Syracuse, AFB alerting the MADW network will be accomplished as follows:

[REDACTED]
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ADRSI/SUBJECT: (U) MADW in the SAGE Era

(1) During the period when the McGuire subsector is operating alone, MADW within the subsector will be accomplished from the ADCC of the 26th AD at Roslyn AFB.

(2) At the time that the Stewart Subsector becomes operational the ADCC of the 26th AD at Roslyn AFB will be phased-out. At this time the responsibility for notifying military units within the McGuire and Stewart subsectors will be transferred to the COC at Headquarters, EADF. This arrangement will continue until the SAGE Combat Center becomes operational at Syracuse AFB.

d. Subsequent to the operational date of the SAGE combat Center, alerting the MADW network will be accomplished as follows:

(1) All military units within the SAGE area of responsibility will be notified from the Combat Center.

(2) As subsectors become operational military units within the subsector will be disconnected from the manual air defense system networks and added to the teletype network originating at the SAGE Combat Center.

(3) As SAGE subsectors become operational and manual air divisions are phased-out, some of the military units on the MADW network may not be in the SAGE area of responsibility. If this is the case, these units will be connected to the manual air division that assumes responsibility for the area.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

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AFOOP-08-S

7 Jan 57

SUBJECT: Change in Civil Defense Attack Warning Organizations

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Reference the attached letter (inclosure 1) from the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), dated 11 December 1956, which describes a new FCDA attack warning plan and requests Department of Defense comments.
2. It has been determined informally that a target date of 1 May 1957 has been established for implementing this new plan. Inclosure 2 is a resume of the plan.
3. Desire that you review the inclosures and provide this Headquarters, by 21 January 1957, information on which to base a reply to FCDA.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

2 Incls

1. Ltr from FCDA,
dtd 11 Dec 56
2. Resume of Changes
in FCDA Attack Warning
System

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AFCOP-OS-S, HQ USAF, 7 January 1957, Subject: Change in Civil Defense
Attack Warning Organizations

COOOP-P

1st Ind

16 Jan 57

Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command, Ent AFB, Colorado Springs,
Colorado

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25,
D. C.

1. This headquarters interposes no objection to supporting the new FCDA attack warning plan as outlined in inclosures numbers 1 and 2.
2. Limited operating space for FCDA representatives in the CONAD COC and in the Eastern and Western CONAD Region Operations Centers will be provided. We will continue to work closely with the FCDA representatives and will provide the essential early warning information required for civil defense warning.
3. The present 1952 FCDA/ADC agreement is being revised to reflect responsibilities assumed by CONAD under the new Joint Chiefs of Staff Terms of Reference.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

s/t HARVEY T. ALBESS
Major General, USAF
DCS/Plans & Operations

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FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
Battle Creek, Michigan

Office of the Administrator

11 Dec 1956

The Honorable Charles E. Wilson
Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is to advise you of the new Civil Defense Attack Warning plan that my Administration is about to place in effect. The plan will provide the civilian population with an earlier, more rapid and more comprehensive basis for civil defense action than it could have had in the past.

We will issue civil defense warnings, releasable air information and time estimates directly to the people from the places where the air situation is most completely displayed, Hq Continental Air Defense Command, Hq Eastern Air Defense Force and Hq Western Air Defense Force. Issuances will be based on the information on distant and approaching aircraft available at these places rather than on the terminal information available at Air Divisions where we will discontinue staffing FCDA Attack Warning positions. The plan will put to use for civil defense the air information obtained from the distant sources established and maintained by your Department.

We have discussed the new plan with Hq Continental Air Defense Command and have been assured of its continued cooperation. The NSC Special Committee on Attack Warning Channels and Procedures and Col. James E. McHugh, your Military Liaison Officer to my Administration, have both been briefed on the principles and details of the plan and have concurred in its concept. I would like to be assured of your concurrence as well.

Sincerely,

/s/ Val Peterson

Val Peterson

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RESUME OF CHANGES IN THE FCDA ATTACK WARNING SYSTEM

A new National Warning System (NAWAS) is to be placed into effect by the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) by 1 May 1957. The new system will be a combination of, and will replace, the present Civil Air Defense Warning System (CADW) and the National Warning Control System (NAWAC).

The new attack warning system is designed to pass civil defense warning information from the FCDA Attack Warning Center at Headquarters CONAD to all civil defense Key Points in the country, all State Civil Defense Centers and all FCDA offices. It is planned that this will be done simultaneously and in less than one minute, compared with estimates of up to 13 minutes for the present warning system. Design of the communications system necessary to support this warning system is complete and orders have been issued by the FCDA to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company for its implementation by 1 May 1957.

In addition to lessening the time required to warn the public of impending air attack, it is planned also that the system will provide the capability for FCDA Attack Warning Centers to issue warning times and enemy aircraft position information to civil defense Key Points, after the initial warning YELLOW has been declared by CINCONAD.

FCDA Attack Warning Centers at Air Defense Divisions will be discontinued and such centers will be maintained only at Headquarters CONAD, Western Air Defense Force and Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force. This step is planned, according to the FCDA, because distant air situation information is not usually displayed to Air Defense Division Commanders and, as a result, is not normally available to FCDA Attack Warning Officers at division level. In view of the high speeds attainable by attacking aircraft and missiles, particularly those expected to become available for operational use in the next few years, the FCDA believes dissemination of earliest possible warning of enemy air attack has become essential and that the new warning system is designed to do this job better than the present system.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND FORCES
WESTERN CONAD REGION
HAMILTON AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

20mar57

CWCOP-

SUBJECT: Change to CONAD Regulation 21-1, 21 December 1956, and
CONAD Regulation 55-3, 1 November 1955

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Hamilton Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Paragraph 9 of Attachment 2 to CONAD Regulation 21-1 directs the CONAD Division Commander to coordinate with and advise appropriate Federal Civil Defense Administration and State Civil Defense agencies and other non-military agencies on matters pertaining to air defense within the Division area of responsibility.

2. The responsibility for dissemination of information dealing with public warning and the administration of the attack warning program was assigned to the Federal Civil Defense Administration by Section 201(c), Title II of Public Law 920, 81st Congress.

Drop
3. Effective 1 May 1957, in accordance with a reorganization program, the FCDA representative on the staff of the CONAD Division Commander will be withdrawn. The broad scope of the instructions to CONAD Division Commanders referred to in paragraph 1 above may result in the initiation of attack warning arrangements at division level based on negotiation with local Civil Defense agencies. This would be in violation of the public law cited in paragraph 2 above.

4. It is recommended that the provisions of paragraph 9, Attachment 2 to CONAD Regulation 21-1 be clarified to preclude the possibility of CONAD Division Commanders becoming unintentionally involved with local Civil Defense Agencies in matters pertaining to public warning. Queries in this regard should be referred to the appropriate CONAD Force Commander where an FCDA Liaison Officer is assigned to the staff. In addition, effective 1 May 1957, nonappropriate instructions to CONAD Division Commanders pertaining to FCDA should be eliminated from CONAD Regulation 55-3.

FOR THE COMMANDER

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CFWSP
81-1
21 Mar 57, Subject: Change to CONAD Regulation
1 November 1956, and CONAD Regulation 55-3, 1 November 1955

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MAR 20 1957

Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command, 9th Air Force Base,
Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, CONAD Force Western CONAD Region, Hamilton Air Force
Base, California

CONAD Regulations 21-1 and 45-3 are presently under revision
and your recommendations will be incorporated into the revised di-
rectives.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

JOHN H. DEWES
Colonel USAF
Director of Operations

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Major Dewes

19 Mar 57

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The content of this document is not to be
classified. Retyping and other work should be
done to correct administrative errors.

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CONAD REGULATION)
55-16)

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado

19 June 1957

OPERATIONS

Exercises

1. Purpose. This regulation establishes CONAD policy for the conduct of exercises and the reporting of results of exercises to CONAD Headquarters.

2. Scope. This regulation applies to all echelons of CONAD including the air defense forces of the Alaskan Command and is for the guidance of other commands and agencies having air defense responsibilities to CINCONAD. CONAD exercises will be conducted at division, region, national, and international levels. Types of exercises are defined as follows:

a. Component exercises. Those exercises prescribed by a component commander. Forces of more than one component service may participate in these exercises after coordination in accordance with CONAD Regulation 21-1. Component exercises will include but are not limited to:

- (1) Training exercises
- (2) Tactical evaluations
- (3) Operational readiness inspections or similar inspections.
- (4) Employment and suitability tests.
- (5) Service conducted weapons firings.

b. CONAD Region and Division Exercises. Those exercises scheduled by CONAD region and/or division commanders. CONAD region and division exercises will include but are not limited to:

- (1) Joint Training exercises
- (2) Evaluation exercises

c. CONAD Exercises. Those exercises scheduled by CONAD Headquarters. CONAD exercises will include but are not limited to:

- (1) Actual firing exercises
- (2) Systems exercises

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CONADR 55-16

- (3) Specific controlled exercises
- (4) National exercises (two or more regions)
- (5) International exercises (CONAD and other countries)

3. Responsibility.

a. Component commanders are responsible for conducting the following categories of exercises.

- (1) Basic exercises for the purpose of increasing the proficiency of individual personnel and units.
- (2) Intra-unit training exercises necessary to maintain the units in the CONAD system at peak operational efficiency.

b. CONAD commanders are responsible for the conduct of joint exercises involving elements of the component services, and exercises between CONAD forces and forces not under the operational control of CONAD.

4. General. Training necessary to bring individual units of the Air Defense system to a combat-ready state and to maintain them at their peak effectiveness is a function of the component commanders. Operation and evaluation of the integrated Air Defense system is a function of the CONAD commanders. Operation and evaluation exercises will normally be conducted in conjunction with training missions being flown by the Strategic Air Command. Conduct of exercises involving SAC aircraft will be in accordance with CONAD regulation 51-1 as amended.

5. Observers. Official observers are authorized at all exercises unless so stated in the operations order for a specific exercise. Control and distribution of observer spaces is the responsibility of the commander scheduling the exercise. Requests for observer spaces of CONAD exercises from agencies other than CONAD and the component services will be forwarded to CONAD Headquarters, Attn: COOOP-E for approval. Where CONAD control facilities are utilized, prior coordination between the component commands and the CONAD control facility is required to preclude the possibility of a conflict in schedules.

6. Reports.

a. Reports will be required for all CONAD exercises and will include:

- (1) Observer Reports. Observers from CONAD Headquarters and the component headquarters participating in a CONAD exercise will

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WJB
W. J. BIRMEY
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant -

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submit an informal report to CONAD DCS/P&O, Attn: Training and Exercise Division, within two working days after return to their respective headquarters.

(2) Commanders Summary Reports. A commanders summary report will be required for all CONAD exercises. The report should consist of a general summary of the effectiveness of the Air Defense system and any appropriate comments and recommendations relative to the mission. Commanders of participating CONAD divisions will consolidate reports of components and forward the report to the CONAD region commander within five working days after completion of the exercise. Regional commanders will consolidate and indorse reports with appropriate comments to CONAD Headquarters, Attn: COOOP-E within ten working days after completion of the exercise.

(3) Evaluation Reports. Evaluation reports will be required for specific exercises. Data to be included in evaluation reports will be specified by the commander scheduling the exercise. Evaluation reports will be due 30 days after completion of the exercise.

b. The above reports are exempt from Reports Control under provisions of paragraph 7c(3), AFR 174-1 and paragraph 17x, AR335-15.

c. Reports required for exercises listed below will be prescribed by appropriate operations order as specified by the commander conducting the exercise.

- (1) CONAD controlled exercises
- (2) CONAD national exercises
- (3) International exercises
- (4) CONAD region and division exercises

(COOOP)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:


OFFICIAL:

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

W J Birmele
W. J. BIRMELE
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

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28 January 1957

Major General Jarred V. Crabb
Commanding
CONAD Forces Central CONAD Region
Grandview Air Force Base
Missouri

Dear Jimmy:

I certainly am in accord with the views you expressed in your letter of 11 January 1957, having long considered ECM one of the most serious, potential threats to the effectiveness of the air defense system.

I have petitioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the past for increased emphasis on the development of techniques and equipment to assist us in overcoming the ECM threat. It is indicated that we have been successful to a degree in this area. In the fall of last year, by JCS request, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Office of the Secretary of Defense had a group of the country's leading scientists conduct a study on the vulnerability of the air defense system to ECM and recommend a complete program for decreasing the vulnerability of the system in the shortest possible time. This study has been completed and furnished to the JCS; however, to date I have not received an expression from the JCS as to their desires on the subject. I am looking forward with interest to the outcome of this study.

We are moving ahead on the frequency diversity radar program and other development programs which should materially increase our future operational effectiveness in the presence of ECM. For the interim however, it appears that they can build jammers faster than we can get new and improved equipment in the field, and we are going to have to rely on the complete operational exploitation of the equipment we now have to improve our effectiveness.

With respect to a conference on this subject, my Deputy for C&E plans to visit you and discuss firsthand the results of this exercise. If the final critique has not been held, this would appear to be an appropriate time for the visit. I would appreciate being advised.

Sincerely,

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HQ CADF
Grandview AFB, Missouri

COPY
(Panned Comment by
Gen Partridge on face
of letter "C/S what
next") 243

11 Jan 1957

Office of the Comdr

General Earle E. Partridge
Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent AFB
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Dear General Partridge:

We had a SAC exercise come through our command last night which was certainly disappointing insofar as ADC is concerned. It proved some good points for SAC and it highlighted certain things that we must do. Following are particular points which I would like to emphasize:

- a. This is the first really successful mission on the part of SAC which has been performed in this command. They completely jammed our radar.
- b. All the normal rules of ECM were exercised by our people. We were unable to read through the jamming.
- c. SAC aircraft came into the system from the Gulf and flew through the 33rd and 20th Air Divisions. They used ECM of all kinds during this phase of the mission and then turned in the southern part of the 31st Division to come back through the system. At this time they were already in the system and our rules for identification were not adequate for us to cope with the problem. We were unable to identify them.
- d. I believe that Transponders are a necessary item in all aircraft, both civilian and military. It is recognized that this fact is known to lots of people, but it is still a fact.
- e. The SAC mission, although ninety to ninety-five percent effective, might have been solved a little better if some of our techniques had been improved upon. I am working on this problem now. Actually, some of the cross telling between sites did not work out too well, but this is understandable due to the confusion created by ECM.
- f. I had Col Marshall in the air as the head of my Tactical Evaluation Team and he was unable to determine what was happening on his fire control system scope. He was completely jammed. This, of course, we have known by the results of the IWIS at Tyndall and work is being done there to try and solve it.

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General Earle E. Partridge

g. I understand that the mission was run in WADF and that the results were similar.

This letter to you is, of course, just a flash report. I am developing a complete report as rapidly as possible, but I feel that the final report will only highlight the problems which I have itemized above.

I realize that CONAD and ADC are both working on this ECM problem, but I believe that it needs the highest precedence that we can possibly give it. Our fire control systems and our radars right now are completely helpless against expert jamming.

I am doing a few things to try to partially solve our problem, but we need lots of help. Following are some of the actions which I am taking:

- a. Strong efforts are being made to improve the ECM procedures at radar sites.
- b. Strong efforts are being made to improve the technique of operations between radar sites. When possible cross telling will be effective in blending the blips between stations.
- c. I shall use my ECM flight to the maximum extent possible in trying to develop techniques which are effective under ECM conditions. Our ECM flights, however, are not equipped with jammers such as SAC has. I shall make efforts to get SAC to help us.
- d. I am going to get some real fine experts on ECM to help us this week at our radar sites to assure that we have the proper techniques of ECM.

It is recommended that a conference be held on this subject at ADC. All expert advice available should be capitalized upon in mapping out our avenue of approach.

Sincerely,

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s/ Jimmy
t/ JARRED V. CRABB
Major General, USAF
Commander

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"Party Line" Film Commentary

GOELC

COOPO

12 March 1957
LtCol Nuckols/2795/cl

1. A presentation was given at this headquarters on 12 March 1957 by Lieutenant Birdsong and Major Smith from SAC Headquarters on the proposed "Party Line" film and commentary. General Partridge, Component Commanders and representatives from COMAD staff sections were in attendance. CIRC/MAD approved of the film and commentary in general with the following observations.

- a. Specify that radar site at which photography was taken is a CPS-6B type.
- b. Elaborate on the commentary portion concerning the actual events being presented on the radar scope. This portion to be detailed enough to make the scope presentation readily understood by the layman.
- c. Specify in the commentary that scope photography was only taken at Mill Valley radar site.
- d. Clarify in the commentary the extent of anti-jamming measures instituted on the scope being photographed.

2. As this is an AUM film, it is requested that DCS/CMA become the project office in the preparation of a letter to SAC incorporating recommended additions and deletions to the commentary portion of "Party Line" film.

3. Further request that a project officer be appointed from DCS/CMA to monitor the commentary as it is being developed at Wright Patterson. Project officer will await call from SAC Headquarters before proceeding to Wright Patterson film laboratory.

4. Inclosed are fourteen copies of "Party Line" commentary to be distributed as you deem necessary.

COPIES COOPO


Inclosure
Party Line commentary
14 copies

HARVEY T. ADAMS
Major General, USAF
DCS/Plans & Operations

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H. Adams





FILM NARRATIVE

OPERATION PARTY LINE

What you are about to see is a test from the SAC standpoint of the validity of the ECM support aircraft concept - the primary mission of the 376th Bombardment Wing.

For ADC this exercise was flown to indoctrinate the Western Air Defense Force. This mission is an example of large scale counter air defense efforts designed to be effective against all participating radars whether jammed electronically or not.

The importance of the mission is underscored by the presence of the Wing Commander at the briefing, shown here outlining the basic route to be flown. For this wing, fighting a war will consist of flying aircraft and throwing switches - no weapon to drop, just black boxes and antennas to carry.


The equipment ^{le}cradle is the heart of the ECM support operation. To insure its consistently dependable performance, the ECM configuration demanded by the mission is assembled and tested here in the hangar prior to installation in the aircraft. When these controls are properly adjusted, nothing more than a simple Off-Standby-Transmit switch in the cockpit will be required for normal operation.

Chaff presents another problem. No longer can we assume that just having an adequate supply on hand will solve our problems. We must order, deliver, unpack, inspect and carefully load dry bundles of chaff into the hoppers. Remote control and dispensing adjustments are then made and tested.

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The now ready cradle is hoisted into position and radio frequency cables and antennas hooked up.

Because of the precision individual navigation required pre-planning is longer than usual.

Briefing over - specialized briefing over - final weather briefing over, and preflight under way, crews make their final preparations. Doing a familiar job well is routine. Doing a new twist on an old story requires more determination than ever before. All the waiting is over as the mission leaps off. This is D-Day. "D" for demonstration.


A single air refueling was required and everything went off smoothly as these excellent shots show, taken from the cockpit of the receiver.

This is an FPS-10 - a simulated "Token" type air defense radar for this mission. This is the radar scope display at Mt. Tamalpais radar station near San Francisco where we will watch the mission.

There are four S-band radars of this type involved in this mission. One at Mt. Tamalpais, one at Mather AFB, one at Boron, California and one on Santa Rosa Island. This radar scope has been adjusted to show normal targets, several of which may be seen now. The adjustments of this scope will remain the same throughout the mission even though variations in display and brilliance will be seen due to counter-countermeasures and other adjustments made at the radar receiver. That is not jamming you see in the South Southwest quadrant but interference from other radars.


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Here is the control board at the 28th Air Division just prior to the mission, scrubbed of all but a few local tracks.

At 0406Z on 25 Oct 1956, 37 aircraft began their 400 nautical mile penetration of the 27th and 28th Air Divisions as all switches were thrown. The force is approximately 200 nautical miles northwest of San Francisco. All transmitters in the penetrating force were turned on at the same time. This permits the maximum jamming effectiveness at long ranges from the radar. Although the force is to the Northwest at this time, at the maximum range of the radar, some jamming can be seen at other azimuths. No targets are visible at this time, making force assessment from this site an impossibility.

The appearance of the electronic interference starts the Air Defense Net in operation. In addition to 1½ hours warning, there are a few early plots from radars outside the 28th Air Division. The first fighters are scrambled by the 28th Air Division. During the mission a total of 21 fighters were airborne in this area out of a total of 50 available.

The penetration force is approximately 170 nautical miles Northwest at this time. Jamming is heavy - no force assessment is possible. Note the IFF returns approximately 110 miles East and also in the Northwest. These could possibly be returns from fighters scrambled at 0400Z against the early plots. It is now 0415Z. By 0419 the force will be approximately 120 nautical miles to the Northwest. No targets as yet, no chaff visible here. This is ideal penetration performance. The jamming is severe all around the scope. Note the slow down of the radar antenna rotation used as a counter-measure with resultant increased brilliance of jamming. This

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[REDACTED]

jamming, which is occurring on all six beams of the radar to some degree, is typical of a force of this size at approximately 50 nautical miles. We should now see the first of the saturation and is identifiable by the sharp loss of brilliance and loss of ground clutter returns.

This is 27th Air Division Headquarters. Due to the intensity of the jamming, limited information has been received from the "S" band radar sites. No attempt has been made to electronically jam the "L" band radars during this mission. These sites ^{are} affected only by the chaff dropped by the penetrating aircraft.

Because this mission was planned to jam the "S" band sites only to determine their ability to assess and pass information concerning the attacking force, ADC has agreed that no information will be passed from "L" band radars to the "S" band sites. A second restriction agreed upon was restriction of "L" band radars from GCI activity. The 27th Air Division had 17 fighters ready to scramble. Six of these were employed. Since GCI control was restricted to the "S" band radars and the penetrating force had jammed these radars sufficiently to prevent coherent plotting, the remaining fighters were not scrambled.

Because the height finder radars employed at all sites were in the "S" band they were also affected by the jamming.

The difference in brilliance levels appearing during filming of the jamming is primarily due to the counter-countermeasures techniques employed. The jamming intensity increases steadily as the force proceeds Southward. Because of the quantity and power output of the jamming transmitters employed, clear targets are not

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[REDACTED]


visible. Fighter IFF returns are often hidden by the jamming and video must be turned off in order for them to be seen. Black strobes indicating receiver saturation are easily visible now. The force is still moving Southward and is almost overhead at this time. Because "L" band radars are not permitted to pass plots and the effectiveness of the jamming against the "S" band radars, no information can be passed to sites further South. The black areas on the scope at this time is caused by receiver saturation. This is caused by close proximity of the jammers to the radar.

As the force proceeds South and away from this radar, jamming intensity will steadily decrease until the chaff dropped by the force begins to appear as targets. See the stream of chaff in the Northeast. This is poor technique and gives away the fact that chaff is being used as well as pinpointing the aircraft. Remember that this is clearly visible to L-band radars. The force is proceeding toward the Southeast and will soon be at the 100 nautical mile point from San Francisco at 0448Z.

Boron, 300 nautical miles to the Southeast, has had jamming since the start of the mission, but it showed up in the South quadrant. This was confusing until at 0420Z the azimuth of the jamming switched to the northwest. The Boron radar experienced a condition five of jamming at 0436Z. Notice the chaff pattern developing in the northwest along the track of the force. At 0450 the force is deep in the 28th Air Division territory approximately 110 miles Southeast of Mt. Tamalpais. The other S-band radars are experiencing jamming similar or worse than this. 0455Z. Our force is now approximately 160 nautical miles to the Southeast. The IFF

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returns of the fighters to the far Southeast are visible on the scope intermittently if you watch carefully. The chaff pattern is developing nicely now along the route. At 0500Z the force is approaching a point 200 nautical miles South. Only 10 minutes more to go. Two non-mission intercepts are made in this area. None on the force.

0530Z. The jamming is almost gone now. The track of the mission is now apparent from the chaff in which, by the way, a new wave could penetrate. The mission aircraft are 100 nautical miles beyond the limits of the scope presentation to the Southeast. The force has penetrated practically the full length of California by now and is turning homeward.

6


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BCS/P&O

COOCP

Report of Staff Visit

14 Dec 56

Capt. W. Lockhart, Jr./2175/als

1. Organization visited -- 376th Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB, Shreveport, Louisiana.
2. Dates -- 12 and 13 December 1956.
3. Purpose of visit -- Joint SAC-COMAD Conference for establishing schedule of ECM exercises throughout COMAD.
4. The following personnel attended the conference:

Hq COMAD

Colonel J. H. Jeffus, COOCP
 Major P. Wine, COGPA
 Captain J. W. Lockhart, Jr., COOCP
 Major W. V. Sinkovic, G-3 AAA
 Captain J. R. Loose, G-3 AAA
 Mr. Roy Donegan, COOQA

Hq SAC

Colonel H. E. Hatch, DOPLE
 Major C. R. Denniston, DOPLE
 Major H. P. Smith, DOPLE
 Mr. W. A. Dwyer, OOA

376th Bomb Wing

Colonel MacElroy, Wing Commander
 Lt Colonel Peck
 Lt Colonel Lollar
 Major Wilcox, Technique Evaluation Laboratory

5. Brief statement of matters discussed and recommendations made:

a. A brief outline of SAC project 48 was presented by the 376th Bomb Wing. Project 48 is a test program being conducted by the 376th Bomb Wing in the Central Air Defense Force area and is designed to gain tactics and techniques information for the effective employment of ECM. This program will be conducted through March of 1957.

Starting in April 1957, "Party Line" type exercises will be conducted throughout COMAD on the average of one a month. Two exercises are tentatively scheduled for April 3rd and May 8th. On April 3rd, 45 B-47 aircraft will depart Japan, air refuel in the Alaskan Area, and proceed to Altus, Oklahoma. Sixty

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SUBJECT: Report of Staff Visit

to 75 days prior to execution of this exercise, representatives of the 15th Air Force, 376th Bomb Wing and JWADF will meet to determine the routes to be flown, penetration areas, where the 376th Bomb Wing will fit into the schedule, etc. This will insure COMAD of exercising the areas we desire to have exercised and should eliminate repetition of effort in any one area.

The exercise in May will be based on a rotation from North Africa and will exercise the JBADF area. Route planning, etc., will be coordinated with the SAC Numbered Air Force, 376th Bomb Wing and JADF concerned. Each exercise will be run on the date scheduled. If the weather is below ECM minimums (5000 ft and five miles vis) the ECM portion of the exercise will be flown but jamming equipment will not be turned on.

Reports of these exercises will be made by SAC and COMAD separately although all data will be used in compiling information for the reports.

Arrangements will be made for photographers to be granted clearance at all installations except ASAACOM units when the requirements have been determined. Observer spaces will be determined for each exercise in the final planning stage at which time space available should be known.

b. SAC has requested that the following proposal be considered: "Allow SAC ECM aircraft to turn on jamming equipment prior to entering radar coverage when making penetrations on coastal areas." COMAD representatives stated that this point would be taken under advisement in as much as it would involve a problem of identification.

c. No problems were encountered and the results of the conference would indicate that the ECM exercises to be run in the future will be equally beneficial to both COMAD and SAC.

JOHN H. JEFFRE
Colonel USAF
Director of Operations

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COM001 171A 033
RR RJWFKL RJEPEO RJWPRH RJEDEM
DE RJEDEM 47
R 131500Z
FM CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO RJWFKL/COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
RJEPEO/COMAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS
INFO RJWPRH/COMAF 15 MARCH AFB CANL
RJEDEM/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO

*Advis: Comaf
Info: Comaf
X 7-5390*

0000. SUBJ: (U) PARTICIPATION OF
PICKET SHIPS, TENDERS, AND AEWAC AIRCRAFT
DURING MONTHLY ECM EXERCISES. REFERENCE COMAD SECRET
LETTER, COOP-E, SUBJECT AS ABOVE, DATED 27 MARCH 1967.
CONCUR WITH RECOMMENDATION OF SUBJECT LETTER. REQUEST
THAT WHEN PRACTICABLE, ALL FUTURE JOINT PLANNING OF
MONTHLY ECM EXERCISES INCLUDE THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL
ELEMENTS OF THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.

1600Z APR RJEDEM

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A-959-23
MIA025RHB 116U
PP RJWPPG RJWPQA RJWPSB RJEDEN
ZEL
PP RJWPPGRJWPQA RJWPSB RJEDEN
DE RJWPRH 3259C
P 151925Z ZEX
FM COMAF 15 MARCH AFB CALIF
TO RJWFAP/COMBW 28 ELLSWORTH AFB SDAK
RJWFBGZCOMA810 BIGGS AFB TEX
RJWFFU/COMBW 96) -17 91

PRIORITY

4*21*4/COMADIV 319 DYESS AFB TEX
RJWFLK/COMADIV 47 WA
KER AFB NMEX
RJWPBD/COMADIV 3 DAVIS MONTHAN AFB ARIZ
RJWFFN/COMADIV 14 TRAVIS AFB CALIF
RJWPJM/COMBW 93 CAST
E AFB CALIF
RJWPPG/COMBW 9- FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
RJWPQA/COMBW 9 MT HOME AFB IDA
RJWPSB/COMJAADF AMILTON AFB SAN FRANCISCO CALIF
INFO RJEDEN/CINC CONAD ENT AFB COLORADO

*ACTION: COOPR
INFO: COOPD
SUBJECT: 25 JAN 57
X7-1332*

303. SUBJECT IS SAC CONAD TRAINING.
PART I. FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE MESSAGE
DO 6345 (CONFIDENTIAL), 3 NOVEMBER 1956 IS RESCINDED. POLICY ON
SAC CONAD JOINT TRAINING MISSIONS IS TO EFFECT MAXIMUM SUPPORT OF
AIR DEFENSE FORCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH ROUTINE TRAINING MISSIONS.
THIS IN ESSENCE IS SAME POLICY THAT WAS IN EFFECT PRIOR TO REFERENCED
FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE MESSAGE. PART II. SAC OBSERVERS WILL BE
ADMITTED TO CONAD UNITS (INCLUDING NIKE) AND QUALIFIED CONAD
OBSERVERS WILL BE ALLOWED ON SAC FLIGHTS. CONTROL OF OBSERVERS IS
PREROGATIVE OF HOST COMMAND. PAR III. FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE UNITS

TO: CA CMC
FILE: COOP
ACTION: NEAR

ACTION COPY

SIGNATURE: [Signature]
for Ruckelshaus

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PAGE TWO RJWPRH 3259C
WILL COORDINATE PLACEMENT OF OBSERVERS AT CONAD FACILITIES THROUGH
APPROPRIATE AIR DEFENSE FORCE, INFORMATION THIS HEADQUARTERS.
PLACEMENT OF QUALIFIED CONAD OBSERVERS MAY BE COORDINATED DIRECTLY
WITH FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE DIVISIONS AND WINGS, INFORMATION THIS
HEADQUARTERS. PART IV. EXCHANGE OF PERTINENT MISSION INFORMATION
BETWEEN SAC AND CONAD AS BEEN AGREED UPON AND WILL OCCUR AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE AFTER THE MISSION. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION DERIVED
FROM THESE MISSIONS WILL BE CONTROLLED BY SAC-CONAD HEADQUARTERS.
PART V. SUBJECT IS SCHEDULED ARAACOM NOMHLY EXERCISES FOR FIRST
QUARTER 1957. FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE UNITS ARE ENCOURAGED TO PROVIDE
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SORTIES CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS FOR PENETRATIONS OF HANFORD, SEATTLE, SAN FRANCISCO AND
LOS ANGELES TARGET COMPLEXES. PERIODS OF ACTIVITY ARE AS FOLLOWS
210100Z FEBRUARY TO 211000Z FEBRUARY 1957, 272400Z MARCH TO 280900Z
MARCH 1957. FLIGHTS OF LESS THAN FIVE AIRCRAFT FURNISHED FOR THESE
EXERCISES SHOULD CONTAIN STATEMENT "WILD AEST VICTOR 13 PASS TO WADF
RADAR" IN REMARKS SECTION OF DD 175. THIS PROCEDURE SUPERSEDES
"KEYSTONE" DESIGNATOR AND WILL PERMIT READY IDENTIFICATION BY DCSON
STRIKE AIRCRAFT. FLIGHTS OF MORE THAN FIVE AIRCRAFT PER EXERCISE
MAKING AN ADIZ PENETRATION MAY PROVIDE REALISTIC STRIKE FOR WESTERN

PAGE THREE RJWPRH 3259C
AIR DEFENSE FORCE. IN THIS CASE COMPLETE FLIGHT ROUTE DATA SHOULD
BE FURNISHED JWADF BY OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE MESSAGE FOR COORDINATION
AND FINAL ACTION. MAXIMUM ECM ACTIVITY ON THESE EXERCISES IS
ENCOURAGED.

BT

16/0917Z JAN RJWPRH

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9 April 53



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HP RJWFKL RJEPFO CJWPRM RJWPRM

DE RJEDMH 718

P 242327Z

FM CINCOSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

TO RJWFKL/COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA

RJEPFO/COMAF 8 VESTOVER AFB MISS

RJWPRM/COMAF 15 MARCH AFB CALIF INFO RJEDEN/COMCOMAD ENT AFB COLO

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PRIORITY

A. T. ...

0000P

OPPO 7437. REFERENCE 15AF SECRET DOCT 6003,
3. YOUR HEADQUARTERS WILL NOT REPEAT WILL NOT FURNISH ECM ACTIVITY
AGAINST NIKE UNLESS DIRECTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. SAC POLICY ON
FURNISHING ECM ACTIVITY AGAINST NIKE WAS FORWARDED CONAD IN SAC
SECRET MSG DO 6293, 29 SEP 56 AND IS AS FOLLOWS: "THIS COMMAND WILL
PROVIDE ECM ACTIVITY AGAINST NIKE PROVIDED CERTAIN EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION BETWEEN NIKE UNITS AND SAC CAN BE OBTAINED. MINIMUM
REQUIREMENTS FOR SAC PARTICIPATION AREA ALPHA. AT LEAST ONE SAC
OBSERVER WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO OBSERVE ACQUISITION RADAR SCOPES AT

PAGE TWO RJEDMH 718

EACH NIKE BATTERY AREA, BRAVO, SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHY TO BE ACCOMPLISHED
FOR SAC AT A MINIMUM OF TWO NIKE BATTERIES, CHARLIE. EXCHANGE OF
OPERATIONAL DATA BETWEEN SAC AND NIKE BATTERIES IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
THE EXERCISE." AIR DEFENSE UNITS REQUESTING ECM ACTIVITY AGAINST
NIKE WILL BE ADVISED THAT SUCH REQUESTS SHOULD BE PROCESSED THROUGH
CONAD HQS TO THIS HQ. THIS POLICY, HOWEVER, DOES NOT PROHIBIT
THAN ECM PARTICIPATION AGAINST NIKE. PART II. THE POLICY OF THIS
COMMAND WITH REFERENCE SUPPORT FOR AIR DEFENSE FORCES FOLLOWS (ECM
NIKE ACTIVITY EXCEPTED) "MAXIMUM AFFILIATION WITH AIR DEFENSE FORCES
IN CONJUNCTION WITH ROUTINE TRAINING MISSIONS IS ENCOURAGED, HOWEVER,
SUCH SUPPORT WILL NOT DETRACT FROM PRIMARY TRAINING MISSION."
BT

25/0015Z OCT RJEDMH

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A-241-88
RR RJWFKL RJEPEO R JEDEN
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R 071528Z
FM CINCUSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO RJWFKL/COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
RJEPEO/COMAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS
RJWFKL/COMAIRDIV 4 BARKSDALE AFB LA
RJWPRH/COMAF 15 MARCH AFB CALIF
INFO RJEDEN/CONAD ENT AFB COLO

*ACTION: COOP
INFO: COOPR
SUSPENSE: 10 JAN 57
X7-293*

OPLT 2198. SUBJECT: (U) SAC-CONAD JOINT
TRAINING MISSIONS. THIS MESSAGE IN 6 PARTS. PART I.
RECENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN CINCUSAC AND CONCONAD HAVE
INDICATED A NEED FOR INCREASED EMPHASIS UPON JOINT
TRAINING MISSIONS. SATISFACTORY AGREEMENTS, AS OUTLINED
IN PARTS 2, 3, AND 4 BELOW, HAVE BEEN MADE CONCERNING THE
EXCHANGE AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATION, THEREFORE, SAC
MESSAGE DOOPO 7437, DATED 24 OCT 56 AS PERTAINS TO SAC POLICY
ON ECM ACTIVITY AGAINST NIKE UNITS IS HEREBY RESCINDED.
THE POLICY OF THIS COMMAND IS TO EFFECT MAXIMUM SUPPORT OF

PAGE TWO RJEDMH 65
AIR DEFENSE FORCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH ROUTINE TRAINING
MISSIONS. TO FURTHER IMPLEMENT THIS
POLICY AND PROVISIONS OUTLINED IN SAC REGULATION 51-6 AND
TO PERMIT THIS COMMAND TO DEVELOP TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
FOR THE MOST EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF BOMBER AIRCRAFT AND
ECM EQUIPMENT, IT IS DESIRED THAT THE 376TH BW BE USED TO
PROVIDE ECM SUPPORT FOR ONE SCHEDULED USCM OR REDEPLOYMENT
EACH MONTH AS SELECTED BY THE RESPONSIBLE NUMBERED AIR
FORCE OUTLINED PART 6 THIS MESSAGE. SPECIFIC SERIES OF
TESTS FOR THE 376TH BW TO ACCOMPLISH DURING THIS SCHEDULE
WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE AIR FORCES BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

PART II. EACH MISSION WILL BE EVALUATED BY PERSONNEL
OF OPERATIONS ANALYSIS THIS HEADQUARTERS WITH ASSISTANCE
FROM NUMBERED AIR FORCES AS REQUESTED. TO EFFECT NECESSARY
EVALUATION PLANNING, DETAILS OF EACH MISSION WILL BE
FORWARDED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS BY THE 376TH BW NLT 30
DAYS PRIOR TO EXECUTION. JOINT EVALUATIONS MAY BE
PERFORMED WITH CONAD UNITS INVOLVED OR OTHER LEVELS WITHIN
CONAD; HOWEVER, NO JOINT REPORTS WILL BE WRITTEN NOR IS
COORDINATION REQUIRED BETWEEN COMMANDS ON EITHER "FACTS"

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OR INTERPRETATION. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION DERIVED
WILL BE CONTROLLED BY SAC-CONAD HEADQUARTERS.
PART III. DATA SUPPLIED BY CONAD UNITS WILL INCLUDE
ORIGINAL WORK SHEETS WHICH CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE TRACKS,
LOCATIONS, AND TIMES OF ALL CLAIMED ENGAGEMENTS, SUCH ECM
REPORTS AS MAY BE USEFUL, AND SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHY AS REQUIRED
AND AGREED UPON BY SAC AND COMED FOR EACH EXERCISE.
CONAD WILL PROVIDE SAC WITH BLANK OVERLAYS WHICH IN TURN
WILL BE FURNISHED TO PARTICIPATING UNITS FOR INCLUSION OF
ROUTES FLOWN AND SUCH OTHER INFORMATION AS MAY BE REQUIRED
FOR EVALUATION PURPOSES. THE EXCHANGE OF DATA AND/OR THE
JOINT ANALYSIS OF DATA WILL OCCUR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER
THE MISSION AND UNEDITED REPORT WILL BE THE BASIS OF
EXCHANGE OR ANALYSIS.

PART IV. SAC OBSERVERS WILL BE ADMITTED TO CONAD
OPERATING UNITS AND QUALIFIED CONAD OBSERVERS WILL BE
ALLOWED ON SAC FLIGHTS. THE CONTROL OF OBSERVERS IS THE
PREROGATIVE OF THE HOST COMMAND.

PART V. WHEN POSSIBLE, ALL AIR REFUELING SUPPORT OF
376TH BW WILL BE PROVIDED FROM 2AF RESOURCES. IF REFUELING

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SORTIES ARE REQUIRED FROM 8AF AND/OR 15AF. REQUEST WILL BE
SUBMITTED TO THIS HU BY 2AF. STAGING OF 376TH BW SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED IN LIEU OF THIS TO PRECLUDE LOSS OF AVAILABLE
REFUELING TRAINING SORTIES. IF STAGING IS EMPLOYED, FUNDING
WILL BE PROVIDED FROM LOCAL RESOURCES.

PART VI. THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE FOR 376TH BW SUPPORT
MISSIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH A USCM OR REDEPLOYMENT WILL

APPLY:

APR 57	15AF	"BALD EAGLE" 96TH BW REDEPLOYMENT
MAY 57	2AF	
JUN 57	8AF	
JUL 57	15AF	
AUG 57	2AF	
SEP 57	8AF	
OCT 57	15AF	
NOV 57	2AF	
DEC 57	8AF	

NECESSARY INFORMATION AS PERTAINS TO TACTICS FOR 96TH BW
FOR APR 57 MISSION WILL BE INCLUDED IN SAC REDEPLOYMENT
ORDER. SEPARATE DIRECTIVE WILL BE FORWARDED TO 2AF AND

PAGE FIVE RJEDMH 65
15AF OUTLINING SPECIFICS OF 376TH BW ACTIVITY FOR THIS
PARTICULAR MISSION. IF POSSIBLE, "BALL HAWK" 379TH BW
REDEPLOYMENT IN MAY 57 WILL BE USED FOR MAY MISSION.

BT

#7/16502 JAN RJEDMH

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AG024
A-26-31
MHA 013
PP RJEJEN RJWFKL RJEPEO RJWPRH RJWFKL
DE RJEDMH 319
P 302114Z
FM CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO RJEJEN/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO
RJWFKL/COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
INFO RJEPEO/COMAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS
RJWPRH/COMAF 15 MARCH AFB CALIF
RJWFKL/COMAIRDIV 4 BARKSDALE AFB LA
BT

*Action COOP
INFO COOP
SUSPENSE 6 Dec 56
46-5420*

DOPLT 9204 SUBJ: (UNCL) SAC PARTICIPATION IN
DEFENSE EXERCISES. THISMSG IN 2 PARTS. REURMSG
COOP 60423 DTD 22 NOV 56. PART I. REFERENCE PART I. YOUR MSG
AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS OF 26 - 27 NOV BETWEEN LT/COL
NUCKELS, YOUR HQ AND LT/COL VON INS AND MAJ DENNISTON THIS HQ.
REQUEST THAT REPRESENTATIVES FROM YOUR HQ ATTEND A PLANNING
CONFERENCE ON "PARTY LINE" TYPE ECM EXERCISES TO BE HELD AT
376 BOMB WING, BARKSDALE AFB, LA. ON 13 DEC 56. NAMES, RANKS,
SERIAL NUMBERS, AND CLEARANCE STATUS OF CONFEREES SHOULD BE
FORWARDED TO THIS HQ, ATTN: DOPLT NOT LATER THAN 7 DEC 56.

PAGE TWO RJEDMH 319
PART II. FOR 2AF. IN COMPLIANCE WITH CONAD REQUEST, THIS HQ
IS DESIROUS OF CONDUCTING "PARTY LINE" TYPE ECM MISSIONS ON A
MONTHLY BASIS IF PRACTICABLE. VALUABLE TRAINING AND TACTICAL
TESTING CAN BE OBTAINED BY USE OF 376 BW SUPPORT IN CONJUNCTION
WITH SCHEDULED USCM'S WITHIN EACH OF THE NUMBERED AIR FORCES.
REQUEST YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ABOVE AND YOUR REQUIREMENTS
FOR ADC SUPPORT OF TEST PROJECT 48 BE PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE
OUTLINED IN PART I. ABOVE.
BT
30/2141Z NOV RJEDMH

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HQ ADC

JAN 3 19 30 '57

TO: SAC, [illegible] (100-100000) FROM: SAC, [illegible] (100-100000) (P)
SUBJECT: [illegible] (100-100000) (P)
[illegible text follows]

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SAS, 22070, Subj: (U) Operational Exercise of the Air Defense
System

(1) Air operations to be conducted to avoid heavily populated areas and should terminate within 250 nautical miles of Portsmouth AFB, N.H. (Cont)

(2) Minimum altitudes to be under VFR conditions as follows: (U) (U)

(a) Water - 1000 feet.

(b) Land - 1800 feet above highest terrain or obstructions.

(3) No ECM activities to be conducted during low level penetrations. (U) (U)

c. All penetrations to originate outside of contiguous radar coverage. (U) (U)


d. For airborne intercepts, SAC Reg 51-6, as amended, will apply. (U) (U)

e. Exercises can be planned for training exercise or on a basis of a "no prior notice" test for COMNAV air division concerned. (U) (U)

4. Request you forward an outline plan to this headquarters, as your concept for this proposed penetration/attack exercise, including routes, altitudes, timing and targets, taking into consideration the limitations cited in this letter. (U) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

Copies Furnished:
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SAS/COM
SAS/OPS/COMNAV


JAMES V. EDMUNDSON
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director Of Operations

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COMADC ENT AFB COLORADO SPRINGS COLO (COURIER)
CG ARAACOM ENT AFB COLORADO SPRINGS COLO (COURIER)
COMNAVPORCONAD ENT AFB COLORADO SPRINGS COLO (COURIER)
COMDR JWADF HAMILTON AFB CALIF
COMDR JCADF GRANDVIEW AFB MO
COMDR JEADF STEWART AFB NEWBURGH NY
INFO: CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

M COOOP 60453.

Confirming conference between Major General Carter and Major General Alness, Hq CONAD, and Major General Terrill, Hq SAC, 6 November 1956. In order to provide maximum mutual training benefit CONAD-SAC joint training exercises will be continued on following cooperative basis: (1) SAC representatives will be authorized to observe operations in ADC Direction Centers, ARAACOM Fire Units, picket ships and AEW&C aircraft. (2) CONAD representatives will be authorized to fly aboard and observe operation of SAC faker aircraft provided physically qualified. (3) Required Evaluation Reports will be exchanged between SAC and CONAD at the earliest possible time following completion of each exercise. No further dissemination of reports or observations will be authorized unless mutually agreed upon by CINCSAC and CINCONAD.

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Capt J W Lockhart, Jr /s/t/
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
SEE SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING.

READING FILE

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CUNCO17
MIA052
NR RJEDEH RJEFKL RJEPEO RJUPRH
DE RJEDEH 53
R 281527Z
FM CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO RJEDEH/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO
INFO RJEFKL/COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
RJEPEO/COMAF 3 WESTOVER AFB MASS
RJUPRH/COMAF 15 HARCH AFB CALIF
BT

*Action: Corp
Info: Corp
X7-6977*



PLT 5637 SUBJ: KUJ SAC-CONAD JOINT
MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PART I.
JOINT SAC-CONAD MISSIONS ARE FLOWN WITH REGULARLY SCHEDULED
USCWS AND REDEPLOYMENTS OF SAC UNITS. AUGUST IS A FREE
TRAINING MONTH FOR ALL SAC UNITS AND NO USCWS OR
REDEPLOYMENTS ARE SCHEDULED; THEREFORE, THIS COMMAND IS
UNABLE TO SUPPORT THE AUGUST JOINT TRAINING MISSION.
SUPPORT OF SAC-CONAD MISSIONS WILL BE RESUMED IN SEPTEMBER
AS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED. PART II. FOR 2AF, PART I ABOVE
ANSWERS URMSG DODT 1092K DATED 20 MAY 1957.

BT
28/1541Z MAY RJEDEH

A--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR
TO DECLASSIFICATION.

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15.3

GROUP-2

25 Jan 57

GROUP (One) Exercises

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Allegis Air Command
C. Inlt Air Force Base
Canna, Missouri

601

1. The Continental Air Defense Command has received and is continuing to receive valuable training by participating in periodic exercises utilizing SAC deployment, profile, and unit simulated combat missions.

2. In addition to the above described training exercises, it is now necessary to program a series of controlled exercises specifically designed to evaluate the combat effectiveness of the CONAD system. Initially these exercises will be limited in scope and will involve only a few aircraft. The latter series will involve greater numbers of aircraft, but should require no more than one hour wing for any particular series.

3. Each of the series of exercises will be conducted against a particular CONAD Division and evaluation will be limited to the one division. Divisions will be selected and exercised in each CONAD Region to determine the effectiveness of a particular division. Later exercises may involve the entire region. Exercises must be as realistic as possible utilizing all known tactics and techniques on a controlled basis. Although specifically designed to evaluate the CONAD system, many joint benefits will accrue from these exercises for both commands. They also afford the opportunity for evaluation under controlled conditions.

4. Your active support of this program is essential for successful implementation. It is requested that an initial planning conference be scheduled at a time and place convenient to your headquarters in order to discuss this matter at the earliest practicable date.

GROUP-2, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

HARVEY S. ALLEN
Major General, USAF
DDE/Plans & Operations

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DISPOSITION FORM

SECRET

FILE NO. [REDACTED] SUBJECT: (Final) Summary Report on Exercise "Bald Eagle"

TO: C-111-C FROM: [REDACTED] DATE: 2 May 1957
 Lt Col. Nuckols/7604/ci

1. Attached are the Commanders Summary reports for exercise "Bald Eagle." Summary report of the 27th COMAD Division does not contain summary of Comdr 27th COMAD Division. The report was received in this headquarters on 30 April 1957.

2. Exercise "Bald Eagle" was the first of the scheduled 12 AD-SAC monthly COM exercises. The exercise was conducted during the four day period 6 through 9 April 1957. It involved a wide area of operations over an overseas base. The elements of the 27th COMAD Division of Exercise 1st were reduced to sweep teaming number 1st. The exercise was the first of its kind. It took place between 6-9 April and staff personnel arrived on 6 April.

3. The purpose of the exercise was to:

- provide a means of evaluating the 27th COMAD Division and
- provide a means of evaluating the 27th COMAD Division and
- provide a means of evaluating the 27th COMAD Division and

used in future exercises.

4. The exercise was performed under the supervision of the exercise. The weather was excellent and the exercise was successful. The weather was excellent and the exercise was successful. The weather was excellent and the exercise was successful.

5. An intelligence report was received from the 27th COMAD Division on 6 April 1957. The report was received from the 27th COMAD Division on 6 April 1957. The report was received from the 27th COMAD Division on 6 April 1957.

6. The results of the exercise were summarized as follows:

- (1) The exercise was generally ineffective. The exercise was generally ineffective. The exercise was generally ineffective.
- (2) The exercise was generally ineffective. The exercise was generally ineffective. The exercise was generally ineffective.

some confusion in the exercise. The exercise was generally ineffective. The exercise was generally ineffective. The exercise was generally ineffective.

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 2090 Subject: (b)(1) Summary report on exercise "Bald Eagle".

(3) Exercise was very disappointing, insofar as ECM training was concerned. 12th Division expected much heavier ECM activity than had been planned for this mission. All search radars in the 12th Division are L-band. However, no sweep jamming was attempted against this frequency - only random Chaff would have any effect on L-band radars.

(4) Recommend that another ECM exercise be arranged for this division and that jamming be on a much larger scale. (Large scale sweep jamming against divisions having L-band search radars is not possible at this time. SAC possesses only a very limited capability in this frequency range and no change is expected until mid-calendar year 1957.)

(5) Recommend that the tactics of using a flight of two (2) aircraft, with number two warplane at least approximately one mile behind number one (1) aircraft, be investigated in other COMAD Divisions against SAC's ECM tactics.

6. Extractions from 12th Division and Commanders reports and comments of Western COMAD Region.

(1) Electronic jamming was very effective against S-band radar at Santa Rosa Island. Jamming was strong enough to preclude tracking targets on the 6th of April 1957. On 7 April 1957, sweep jamming was moderate to weak at both Santa Rosa and Horn.

(2) Chaff jamming ordered operations at both Santa Rosa and Horn in regard to target tracking. This in turn affected the control capability of the sites. Horn had very accurate raid assessment on all phase waves.

(3) Effects of jamming on AAA radar were incomplete and inadequate to make any assessment of effectiveness. The fact that only 15 targets out of 43 that came within weapons range were engaged and that ECM activity had some effect on AAA performance. (Incomplete reports from 12th COMAD Division precluded a definite conclusion at this time.)

(4) Picket ship on station EIP was able to detect and assess raid well in advance of the initiation of ECM activity. There was little or no ECM experienced by the picket ship due to the station. Picket ship contribution proved very valuable on each phase of the exercise.

(5) Jamming had very little effect on AEWG aircraft capability. (In the spot observers noted that there were no AEWG tracks established on the 6th of April 1957.)

(6) Raid assessment was very poor by Picket Ship and E-band radar but poor at S-band radars on first day of exercise with gradual improvement thereafter.

(7) ECM activity made close control of Interception very difficult.

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30000 Subject: Summary Report on exercise "Bald Eagle"

(8) Little or no difference was noted between the effects of five (5) sweep-jump aircraft as opposed to three (3) sweep-jump aircraft.

(9) Western Region feels that a number of A-1H aircraft used on this exercise could not saturate the system to the point where effective air defense action could not be taken. Probably the number of A-1H aircraft needed to saturate would be between ten and fifteen (15).

(10) This exercise emphasized that the AEW system requires more experience with multiple aircraft raids employing modern ECM tactics. Day-to-day training against a type of raid is necessary to develop the techniques and experience required.

7. It is the conclusion of this office that the mission accomplished the desired objectives. These small-scale exercises are causing some elements of the defense system to underestimate the ECM threat. This office feels that the monthly ECM exercises, radically expanded in scope, is the best method of developing ECM tactics and techniques. Reports from the 47th CONAD Division were incomplete and necessary action was being indicated by USAF Forces, Western CONAD Region to expand reports in future exercises.

8. The General's Summary Reports have been reproduced locally and distributed to the three Component Commands and all interested CONAD staff agencies for their information and any action deemed appropriate.

Henry J. Alms
Major General, USAF
Operations

2 Incl

1. Ltr 11 Apr 57 fr 34th CONAD Div Subj: Report on exercise "Bald Eagle" w/1 Incl
2. Ltr 29 Apr 57 fr 47th CONAD Div Subj: Report on exercise "Bald Eagle" w/2 incls.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND FORCES
WESTERN CONAD REGION
HAMILTON AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

257

29 APR 1957

SWAUP

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Summary Report on Exercise "Bald Eagle"

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. This report is submitted in accordance with your Confidential message SWAUP-S 1047, dated 29 March 1957. Reports from subordinate units pertaining to Exercise Bald Eagle have been largely unsatisfactory. This headquarters will take appropriate action to improve reporting procedures for future exercises.

2. In the interest of expediency, this headquarters has summarized all available data and initiated the report at this level in lieu of the procedures specified in your message.

3. Effect of Electronic Jamming on "B" Band Radar: At Santa Rosa (F-15) on the first night the jamming was strong enough to preclude tracking targets and forced Santa Rosa to operate on the F-15 backup radar. On the second night the sweep jamming was moderate to weak and started prior to reaching Santa Rosa's maximum surveillance distance. This jamming gave early warning as to the altitude from which the aircraft were penetrating. At Soren (F-15) the electronic jamming on both nights was moderate to weak. This was attributed to the fact that the bomber stream did not pass directly overhead as it did at Santa Rosa. For overall effectiveness of the radar system to conduct intercept action under electronic jamming, see Inclosure #1 which gives a breakdown of intercepts attempted and intercepts completed under these conditions. It should be pointed out that aircraft were operating in daylight at altitude and in a heavy contrail layer. It is felt that some NA's were achieved by the pilots visually setting themselves up on the track. The number of such visual setups has not been determined.

4. Effectiveness of Chaff Jamming on the System: At both Santa Rosa and Soren the chaff on the first night hindered operation with regard to target tracking. This in turn affected the control capability of the sites. However, one aircraft which was streaming chaff was tracked quite easily through the effects of electronic jamming. Chaff drops permitted the directors to see through the electronic jamming and thus pinpoint the target aircraft. Some targets following

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OWOP, Bq CPWEL, Subject: Summary Report on Exercise "Bald Eagle"

In the chaff stream could be detected; however, accurate determination of the number of aircraft in the raid was lost due to the numerous chaff targets in the area. The chaff dispensing did not hinder target tracking or raid assessment at any of the adjacent "L" band sites (San Clemente, Laguna and Cambría). On the second night at Santa Rosa the operation was similar to the first night; however, at Boron successful raid assessment was accomplished on all three waves. This can be attributed to the experience gained on the first night and to the effectiveness of using an off-centered and expanded scope and tracking by grease pencil. Operation at the adjacent "L" band sites was the same as the first night.

5. Effect on AAA Radar: Reports received from the field to date are incomplete and inadequate to make a real assessment of effectiveness. However, the fact that only 18 targets out of 43 that came within weapons range were engaged indicates that ECM activity had some effect on AAA performance. Inquiries to the field may further clarify this matter and will be reported upon receipt.

6. Effectiveness of ECM on Picket Ships: Picket Ship Station #19 was manned for this exercise. This location was near the center of the inbound bomber stream and was considerably outside of the HA control line where ECM activity started. Therefore, the picket ships were able to detect the raid, make an accurate raid assessment and forward this information to Santa Rosa well in advance of the initiation of ECM activity against the radar system. As a consequence, picket ships experienced little or no ECM. It is the opinion of this headquarters that picket ships are invaluable in that they would force a potential enemy to initiate ECM activity very early if raid assessment is to be prevented, thus providing maximum early warning for the system. If ECM is not initiated until after arriving within detection range of the picket ship, the ground radar system is able to obtain an accurate raid assessment and be prepared to launch appropriate forces against the attack.

7. Effectiveness of ECM on AEW&C Aircraft: During the first two nights AEW Stations 7 and 9 were manned. Reports received from the 552d Wing indicate electronic jamming or chaff drops had negligible effect on tracking capability of AEW&C during this exercise. Again target aircraft were well within aircraft radar coverage of AEW&C before chaff drops were commenced, therefore, estimates of the number of aircraft in each raid were already established. The fact that the picket ships are on "L" band and the AEW&C are on "S" band would force any potential enemy to equip his bombers with both types of jamming equipment, thereby decreasing range and/or bomb carrying capability.

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Summary Report on Exercise "Bald Eagle"

8. Effectiveness of ECM Activity on Airborne Radar: Self protection, all-purpose chaff was ineffective against "I" band radar. As far as can be determined no intercepts were missed solely because of ECM activity against airborne radar.

9. Effectiveness of Raid Assessment: Because of the location of picket ships and A-10 aircraft in relation to the point where ECM activity was started, the initial raid assessment was quite easy. Tracking continuity was hampered during the first night on all tracks after the initial wave at both Santa Rosa and Boron. Investigation indicates that on the first night Santa Rosa was operating below the antenna tilt setting recommended for their operation and all sites were affected somewhat by anomalous propagation. In the second night the tilt for Santa Rosa had been corrected. Tracking continuity was still erratic and some tracking was attempted by use of crosstell from "L" band sites. This procedure was not too effective due to the delays inherent in the manual system. On the second night Boron maintained track continuity on all target aircraft.

10. Effectiveness of ECM Activity on Intercept Control: Chaff was a contributing cause for some missed intercepts due to individual targets being temporarily obscured by chaff at a critical point in the intercept. In general, ECM activity made intercept control very difficult and it is felt that most intercepts were achieved by adjacent "L" band sites or by use of "H" band backup radar. Also, it is probable that some IAs were achieved by aircrew self-positioning as a result of contrails.

11. Relative Effectiveness on the System of Five ECM Aircraft as Opposed to Three ECM Aircraft: It is felt that little or no difference was noticed between the effectiveness of five aircraft or three aircraft on the system. It is possible that all the equipment aboard the larger aircraft was not operating on first night.

12. General Remarks on Overall Effectiveness: This headquarters feels that five ECM aircraft could not saturate the system to the point where effective air defense action could not be taken as was the case in Exercise "Party Line" where 10 ECM aircraft were used. Apparently some greater number of ECM aircraft (probably between 10 and 15), carrying both "L" band and "H" band radar warning equipment, as well as general purpose chaff, would be required to completely saturate the system. While overall air defense effectiveness such as percentage of IAs is not as high as desired, it is felt other factors enter into this total effectiveness such as late warnings, crosstell, weather and other weaknesses of the current system.

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GROUP, HQ USAF, Subject: Summary Report on Exercise "Bald Eagle"

13. Comments and Recommendations: This exercise emphasized that the ACW system requires more experience with multiple aircraft raids employing modern ECM tactics. It is becoming more apparent that day-to-day training against this type of raid is necessary if we are to develop the techniques and experience required to cope with it. By and large the ECM capability within this defense force is insufficient to provide this training. It is recommended that every effort be made to expedite assignment of sufficient B-57 type aircraft to each defense force for this purpose and that some arrangement be made with SAC whereby one bomb wing can be released for an accelerated joint training program for the mutual benefit of both the air defense force and the SAC bomb wing. It is proposed that this accelerated program last approximately one month with each wing.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lynne L. Woodman
LYNNE L. WOODMAN
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

2 Incls

1. Operations Analysis
Summary of "Bald Eagle"
2. Excerpts from Appropriate
Unit Commander's Reports

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[REDACTED]
COMDR, Hq 34th Air Div (Def), 11 Apr 57, Subj: Report on Exercise
"Bald Eagle" (Uncl)

CCNCS

1st Ind

Headquarters Continental Air Defense Forces, Central COMAD Region,
Grandview Air Force Base, Missouri 18 April 1957

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, Ent Air
Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. In compliance with your message 0000P-KIOk7, basic report
is forwarded.

2. Concur in recommendations contained in basic letter. Further
tests of the two aircraft flight are planned in this region in order
to determine the effectiveness of this tactic.

1 Incl
n/c

J. F. Carroll
J. F. CARROLL
Colonel, USAF
Acting Chief of Staff

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CONAD X7.....

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FCCR 57-87

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HQ 14TH CONAD DIV, Kirtland AFB, N M, COMDR, SUBJ: Report
on Exercise "Bald Eagle"

to search for target aircraft under-heavy chaff conditions and without
any GCI assistance.

5. The Division operating staff elected to use flights of two air-
craft instead of the conventional three aircraft "wolfpack" formation.
This decision was based on flying safety considerations, the expected
conditions expressed in paragraph 4 above, and to provide greater
flexibility and maneuverability against a mass raid. The tactics em-
ployed with the two aircraft flight worked out surprisingly well and
provided the best Phase 3 success rate ever experienced in this
Division.

6. The following recommendations are offered:

a. That another ECM exercise be arranged for this Di-
vision and that the target aircraft be equipped to operate against
L-band radar, ground/air communication channels and IFF. It is
believed that the ineffectiveness of this exercise has had a deletori-
ous psychological effect upon the personnel in the squadrons in re-
gard to the impact of ECM and the necessity for ECM training.

b. That the tactic of using a flight of two aircraft, with
No. 2 man playing it loose approximately one mile to one-half mile
behind No. 1 aircraft, be tried at other divisions against SAC's ECM
tactics.

1 Incl
Mission Data
Info (trip)


WENDELL W. BOWMAN
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
34TH CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE DIVISION
(CONAD DIVISION)
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico

258

COMDR

11 APR 1957

SUBJECT: Report on Exercise "Bald Eagle" (Uncl)

TO: Commander
Central Continental Air Defense Region
Grandview Air Force Base
Missouri

1. In compliance with your message GOC FCCR 0001, the following report is submitted:

2. The 34th Continental Air Defense Division participated to the maximum extent possible in Exercise "Bald Eagle" on 6 and 7 April 1957. The mission scheduled for 8 April 1957 was postponed 24 hours. Subsequently, this Division was relieved of responsibility for participation in the exercise on 9 April 1957 by Air Defense Command message COOP-E-X051. The bomber aircraft penetrating this area on 9 April were used as targets for a Central Air Defense Force tactical evaluation mission.

3. ECM activity against ground and airborne radar and communications on 6 and 7 April 1957 was generally very ineffective. S-band height-finder radars experienced ECM jamming Condition 1 at most sites, with Condition 2 reported in one case. (See Inclosure 1). L-band search radars received no ECM. All search radars experienced chaff causing Condition 1. No difficulty was experienced in skin-painting all target aircraft through the chaff. Airborne radar detected chaff on both missions but no difficulty was experienced in contacting and locking on target aircraft.

4. Exercise "Bald Eagle" was very disappointing insofar as ECM training was concerned. Information available caused us to anticipate almost complete neutralization of the ground radar and ground/air communications system. We expected airborne radar effectiveness to be substantially reduced by chaff. In view of the above assumptions, we felt real concern for the safety of this operation. We fully expected the fighter interceptors to be forced

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MISSION DATA INFORMATION

I. Tactical Mission Data Report.

6 April 1957

<u>FIGHTER UNIT</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>VISUAL MA</u>	<u>RADAR MA</u>
15th FIS	6	0	6
93rd FIS	12	14	16
197th FIS	4	1	0
TOTALS	22	15	22

7 April 1957

<u>FIGHTER UNIT</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>VISUAL MA</u>	<u>RADAR MA</u>
15th FIS	7	3	10
93rd FIS	15	25	22
197th FIS	4	2	0
TOTALS	26	30	32

GRAND TOTALS
6 and 7 Apr 57

48 45 54

II.

6 April 1957

<u>SITE</u>	<u>TYPE EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>TYPE ECM</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>TIME</u>
P-7	HRI	Chaff	1	1340Z
	Search	Chaff	1	1302Z 1405Z 1340Z 1416Z
P-8	HRI	Electronic	1	1340Z
	Search	Chaff	1	1340Z

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MISSION DATA INFORMATION

II (CONTD)

<u>SITE</u>	<u>TYPE EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>TYPE ECM</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>TIME</u>
M-94	HRI	Electronic	1	1245Z 1340Z 1358Z
	HRI	Chaff	1	1245Z 1358Z 1340Z
	Search	Chaff	1	1245Z 1358Z 1340Z
P-51	Search	Chaff	1	1400Z
M-90	Search	Chaff	1	1346Z 1510Z
M-95	Search	Chaff	1	1355Z
M-92	HRI	Electronic	1	1333Z
	HRI	Chaff	1	1333Z 1427Z
	Search	Chaff	1	1333Z 1427Z
M-93	Search	Chaff	2	1330Z 1440Z

7 April 1957

<u>SITE</u>	<u>TYPE EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>TYPE ECM</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>TIME</u>
P-7	HRI	Chaff	1	1358Z 1425Z 1429Z 1430Z
	Search	Chaff	1	1358Z 1425Z 1429Z 1430Z
P-8	Search	Chaff	1	1357Z
M-94	Search	Chaff	1	1350Z 1410Z 1425Z
P-51	Search	Chaff	1	1257Z

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MISSION DATA INFORMATION

II (CONTD)

<u>SITE</u>	<u>TYPE EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>TYPE ECM</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>TIME</u>
M-90	HRI	Chaff	1	1405Z
	Search	Chaff	1	1405Z 1435Z
M-95		NONE		
M-92		NONE		
M-93	Search	Chaff	1	1335Z

III. Airborne Radar ECM Report.

Interceptor pilots reported considerable amounts of chaff in the air on both 6 and 7 April 1957. Pilots experienced little difficulty in distinguishing target aircraft from chaff. No cases of "breaking lock" were reported as a result of chaff.

IV. Air/Ground Communications Jamming Report.

Communications jamming was negligible.

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HEADQUARTERS CANADIAN FORCE
EASTERN CANAD REGION
Stewart Air Force Base, New York

1957

MEMO

SUBJECT: (1957) Summary report of exercise "Ball Hawk"

TO: Command-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
and Air Force Base
Georgetown, Guyana

1. The attached "Ball Hawk" summary reports from various units (CONAD divisions) are forwarded in compliance with your message COMOP-E 044, 10 April 1957.
2. Exercise "Ball Hawk" was implemented by CFSO Operations Order 1-57. As stated in the operations order, the objective of the exercise was to provide maximum joint training; it was not a minimum warning exercise. Dates and times of crossing the 8-hour control line were disseminated; however, location of the IRL, speeds, altitudes, formations, routes, and takeoff tactics (including IRL) were withheld because it was felt that dissemination would decrease the training received. Maximum participation, consistent with active air defense requirements, was directed; however, CONAD divisions were not required to utilize their most highly qualified directors, aircrews, air defense crews, and other personnel.
3. The first wave of Oker aircraft was delayed 24 hours, crossing the IRL approximately 1730Z, 7 May 1957. The second wave was delayed an additional 24 hours, crossing the IRL approximately 0530Z, 11 May 1957. On the third wave, only four aircraft from the 376th Bomb Wing at Barksdale AFB, La., headed the 379th Bomb Wing departing from Africa had been delayed another 24 hours. "Vaderus" was declared prior to penetration of the 376th Bomb Wing aircraft on the third wave, 11 May 1957. This unit could not fly the following day to join the 379th Bomb Wing in order to provide electronic sweep jamming for the combined strike; also, weather was generally poor on 11 May and was forecast to remain poor on 12 May. Wave three (11 May) and wave four (12 May) were made available to the CONAD divisions for training on an "as desired" basis.
4. Exercise "Ball Hawk" was very similar to exercise "Dawn Patrol" (AWP "Greenfield") which was conducted in March 1957. Comments and recommendations submitted in summary report of exercise "Dawn Patrol" are still considered valid and pertinent. In addition, the following comments and recommendations are submitted with reference to the "Ball Hawk" summary report of each CONAD division commander:



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CONAD X7

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OWAF, subject: "Blaw" (C-130) Exercise "Blaw" (Cont'd)

3. OWAF Recommendations

(1) Reference Section VI, Paragraph 3c. The entire problem of OAD reporting is being studied by this headquarters, and appropriate recommendations will be made to allow. At present it appears that use of additional symbology in conjunction with the track designator may offer a solution to this problem.

(2) Reference Section II, Paragraph 2. Although waves of attacking forces were spaced over too long a period to effectively test fighter turnaround capability, wave spacing did insure a rotation of ground and air crews. In view of the stated objective of the exercise, rotation of crews is considered much more important than testing turnaround capability. Fighter squadron turnaround capability can be tested during a locally planned exercise.

(3) Reference Section I, Paragraph 1a. Concur. Recommend engineered circuits be activated during all OAD and CFSOR exercises. FY 58 budget request submitted to Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force included provision for activation of engineered circuits during exercises.

(4) Reference Section I, Paragraph 1b. Concur. This matter will be referred to Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force; recommend that it also be referred to Headquarters Air Defense Command.

(5) Reference Section I, Paragraphs 2 and 3. Concur. Headquarters Air Defense Command and Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force are aware of these low standing problems and are taking corrective action.

(6) Reference Section I, Paragraph 4. Concur. OAD Forces, Eastern Air Defense Command, will attempt to plan an exercise of this type in conjunction with 8th Air Force (SAC) or C-130/Blaw.

(7) Reference Section I, Paragraph 5. Concur. Recommendations concerning additional OAD training were submitted in summary report of exercise "Blaw Patrol", an OAD message 033, and in references cited in OAD message 033.

(8) Reference Section I, Paragraph 6. This headquarters has emphasized the use of B-47 aircraft as high performance augmentation aircraft as trailers when the need for trailer aircraft arises. This was done in the critique of "Blaw Patrol" as well as the revised CFSOR Tactical Doctrine. Concur that proficiency in use of trailer aircraft will increase with more training; it is felt that joint training exercises will best provide this training.

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REF, subject: [REDACTED]

"Ball Hawk" [REDACTED]

(1) Reference is made to paragraph 5. Do not concern with the routine use of IAF by the 25th OASD Division. C/TCR approach to the problem will be to attempt to eliminate the saturation in the [REDACTED] portion of the 25th Sector.

5. Exercise "Ball Hawk" was rendered somewhat lengthy by the delays in penetrations by IAF aircraft. However, the exercise was very valuable from the standpoint of lessons learned as well as training derived. Declaration of "Fadeout" after the second wave resulted in the loss of little training; the 25th OASD divisions did participate in the "as desired" phase (waves 3 and 4). Effectiveness improved during waves 3 and 4 indicating the training value of these exercises. It is felt that had "Fadeout" been delayed until after wave 4, little or nothing would have been learned that was not learned in waves 1 and 2.

6. OASD divisions and ADW squadrons have reported that ECM alone did not reduce effectiveness seriously. However, examination of the photographs of ADW radar scopes and comparison with overlays indicate that ECM had a much greater effect than believed. Although the entire analysis has not been completed, it is evident that a great many, if not the majority of pilots reported were pilots of chaff drops and not bomber aircraft. In spite of all reports of weaving by faker aircraft and overlays which indicate that weaving tactics were employed, a close examination of the scope photos revealed that fakers did not weave. It appears that, in general, bomber aircraft were well ahead of their reported position as a result of chaff rather than aircraft being reported. It also appears that personnel at ADW squadrons do not really know the extent to which effectiveness is being reduced by ECM. Education and training in this area are of paramount importance, and it is recommended that this matter be referred to Headquarters Air Defense Command.

7. The conditions outlined in paragraph 5 above should be kept in mind when evaluating 25th OASD. It is noteworthy that during exercise "Ball Hawk" there were no reports of bombers weaving in and out of the fringes of defense areas, and it is highly possible that a number of 25th OASD were achieved against chaff bursts.

8. Even though the ECM effort was small, when it was combined with other IAF tactics, a heavy loss of penetrating aircraft, and the nature of defenses that exist in the current air defense system, the net result was a very good result. It is felt that exercises of this type are less valuable because they provide training and point up weaknesses of the defense system not thoroughly covered by all training. Therefore, it is suggested that as many exercises of this type as possible be conducted in the current air

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USAF, Subject: [REDACTED] Exercise "Ball Hawk" (SAC) [REDACTED] 2

defense system are to be improved and effectiveness increased, the amount of AD employed by penetrating forces should be increased only gradually. To launch a major AD effort against portions of the air defense system might prove that our system could be degraded critically by ECM, but it would be leading toward solution of basic deficiencies.

This letter is classified SECRET in accordance with paragraph 30b(2)(b), ref 205-1.

John E. Mannon
JOHN E. MANNON
Major, USAF

For

EDWARD H. UNDERHILL
Major General, USAF
Commander

- 3 100 34
1. 24th CWB Report
2. 32nd CWB Report
3. 85th CWB Report

[REDACTED]

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S-CFE-873-57

UNCLASSIFIED

DISPOSITION FORM

FILE NO. _____ SUBJECT: *10th Bombers Summary Reports on Exercise "Team Search"*

TO: *COMS* FROM: _____ DATE: *5 April 1951*
Colonel D. [redacted] / 26th/c1

1. Attached for your information are 27 separate Bombers Summary Reports for exercise "Team Search."
2. Exercise "Team Search" was an exercise planned by SAC in the Eastern Command region and which we were invited to participate. This was not one of our scheduled monthly exercises.
3. The exercise was run on 24-26 March 1951, beginning at 1120 hours. It involved 10 B-29 Superfortresses from overseas bases which were joined by the 30th and 37th Bombardment Groups at Air Force Base, Maine, and proceeded to our assigned target areas. The 30th and 37th provided support for the mission. Both groups were provided with weather information for the first day. Weather prevented any further missions on the second day.
4. The purpose of this exercise was to test the ability of the B-29 Superfortresses to operate against a simulated target which was a carrier task force. The primary objectives of this exercise were:
 - a. To obtain information on the ability of the B-29 Superfortresses to operate against a carrier task force.
 - b. To obtain information on the ability of the B-29 Superfortresses to operate against a carrier task force.
 - c. To obtain information on the ability of the B-29 Superfortresses to operate against a carrier task force.
5. The weather in the area of the exercise was marginal. The visibility was 1000 feet in the area of the exercise. The wind was 10 knots with gusts to 15 knots. The temperature was 50 degrees Fahrenheit. The humidity was 70 percent.
6. The weather in the area of the exercise on the first day of the exercise was below marginal. The visibility was 1000 feet in the area of the exercise. The wind was 10 knots with gusts to 15 knots. The temperature was 50 degrees Fahrenheit. The humidity was 70 percent.
7. An intelligence report was received during the exercise which stated that the carrier task force was located in the area of the exercise. The report stated that the carrier task force was located in the area of the exercise. The report stated that the carrier task force was located in the area of the exercise.
8. The number of B-29 Superfortresses detected by radar is as follows:

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200PO Subject: [Redacted] Summary Report on Exercise "Dance Party" 260

PHASE	DIVISION	NUMBER OF FAXERS	MA'S
First Phase	26th	38	0
	32nd	37	25
	85th	9	1
Second Phase	26th	9	8
	32nd	26	0
	85th	13	5
Third Phase	26th	3	3
	32nd	11	28
	85th	3	3

9. As mentioned before, sweep jacking was extremely limited due to weather and was used for a very short period on the first day in one Division. The overall degradation of the system by random chaff was estimated at approximately 20-30 percent. Confusion resulted in two Divisions from bomber tactics which resulted in missed intercepts. The crossing and weaving within the bomber formation, in addition to ECM activity, taxes the air defense system considerably. Trailer aircraft were used with favorable results.

10. In the augmentation field, Naval forces supported the 26th and 85th Divisions accomplishing 2 MA's in the 85th Division and negligible results in the 26th Division. The ANG participated in the 85th Division with very good results accomplishing 20 MA's in 15 sorties.

11. The recommendations and conclusions of Division Commanders are summarized as follows:

- a. Allow engineered circuits to be called up during such exercises.
- b. Conduct more ECM training with SAC aircraft equipped with the latest equipment.
- c. Extensive training of personnel in scope interpretation be provided by more exercises.
- d. That improved surveillance equipment be designed to provide better target definition, resolution and coverage.
- e. Devise a form of military SEARCH plan for elimination of friendly high-speed jet traffic during an exercise.
- f. Study Soviet ECM capability and tactics and the findings be employed in future exercises.
- g. Because of anticipated increase in workload resulting from implementation of operation "Red Coat" (EWP) during an actual situation, recommend phases of this operation be implemented simultaneously with an exercise of this type annually.

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COOPG Subject: (Unc) Commanders Summary Reports on Exercise "Dawn Patrol"

h. A comprehensive procedure - for data collection and evaluation has been developed by Rand - should be reviewed for future exercises.

i. More training to improve pilot - director team proficiency.

12. The conclusions and recommendations of Commander CPSCB are as follows:

a. Conduct exercises in early morning hours or institute a modified SCATER plan for usual military traffic to avoid unrealistic confusion.

b. Have some penetrations originate over water to exercise seaward extension.

c. Establish electronic warfare course in ATT geared to ADC requirements.

13. It is the conclusion of this office that the mission accomplished the objectives for Eastern CONAD Region and CONAD, however, the mission would have been of more value if maximum sweep jamming could have been accomplished. The following are general observations:

a. Weather was a degrading factor.

b. Additional training is indicated by AD&W personnel.

c. Teaming was poor due to the inability to call up engineered circuits.

d. Early-morning teaming was considered adequate though limited.

e. Brief reports (initial COM reports) were late and inaccurate.

f. The large amount of friendly traffic in the area hampered track continuity.

g. Random chaff was not excessively degrading to the system.

14. The Commanders Summary Reports have been reproduced locally and distributed to the three component commands and all interested CONAD staff agencies for their information and any action deemed appropriate.

1 Incl
Ltr fr ECR, 22 Mar 57
subj: (Unc) Summary
Report of Exercise
"Dawn Patrol" (EADF
"Green Field") w/4 incls

Harvey T. Ainess
HARVEY T. AINESS
Major General, USAF
DCS/Plans & Operations

UNCLASSIFIED

261

EASTERN CONAD WELDING
 10000 200 2000 2000 2000

MAR 1 1957

OPEOP-W

SUBJECT: (Info) Summary Report of Exercise "Dawn Patrol" (EADP)
 "Green Field"

TO: Commander-in-Chief
 Continental Air Defense Command
 Ent Air Force Base
 Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. The attached "Green Field" summary reports from participating CONAD divisions are forwarded in compliance with your Confidential message OXOP-W 1028, 26 February 1957.

2. At the outset, "Dawn Patrol" was considered to be an exercise to provide maximum ECM training rather than a maneuver to evaluate the air defense system. Therefore, Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force was directed to publish in operations order. The name "Dawn Patrol" was changed to "Green Field" in EADF Operations Order 2-57 as an additional security measure because the exercise was to be of the "no warning" type. The reports required by EADF Regulation 55-6 were considered to provide an excellent vehicle to furnish the comments requested in the above referenced message, and the requirement for these reports was included in EADF Operations Order 2-57. These reports are attached as inclosures 1, 2, 3, and 4.

3. Comments and recommendations concerning the exercise were submitted by SECRET message, WECOS 033, 21 March 1957. After a review of the reports submitted by CONAD division commanders, these comments and recommendations are still believed valid. In addition, the following comments and recommendations are submitted with reference to the report of each CONAD division commander.

a. 26th CONAD Division.

(1) Reference Section A, paragraph 1. It is believed that the objective of this exercise was to furnish ECM training, with a by-product of determining air defense capability against electronic jamming. Tests of unit capabilities can be accomplished during exercises which lend themselves to this purpose. Tests of turn around and reassemble are well within the capabilities of the CONAD divisions to plan and conduct. Concur that future exercises should be concentrated over a shorter period of time in order that valuable training time will

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OPREP-4, Subject: (U) Primary Report of Exercise "Dawn Patrol"
(EAF "Green Field") (Secret)

not be lost in anticipation of a next wave which does not penetrate until 24 hours after the preceding wave. In this respect, this headquarters will attempt to have 2nd and 8th Air Forces (SAC) concentrate missions over a shorter period of time; however, many facets of SAC operations are standardized by Headquarters SAC and it is recommended that this matter be purveyed by COMAD.

(2) Reference Section X, paragraph 2. Concur that selected engineered circuits should be activated during exercises. This recommendation was made in OPREP message 033.

(3) Reference Section X, paragraph 3. Lateness of Cliff reporting can be overcome by activation of engineered circuits. With respect to inaccuracies and requirement for emphasis and training, COMAD division commander reports are being referred to Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force for necessary action. Recommend this matter be called to the attention of Headquarters Air Defense Command.

(4) Reference Section XI, paragraph 1. This matter is being referred to Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force for necessary action. Recommend Headquarters Air Defense Command be advised.

(5) Reference Section XI, paragraph 2. These recommendations were submitted in OPREP message 033, and the references quoted in that message apply. In addition to planned ECM exercises utilizing SAC aircraft, the 4713th Radar Evaluation Flight is conducting a weekly maximum effort ECM mission against a COMAD division in this region. There is a requirement for still more electronic warfare training missions utilizing up-to-date carriers and equipment in order that the most effective defensive measures can be developed and air defense personnel thoroughly indoctrinated in them. An overriding requirement is the development of equipment which will counter or take advantage of ECM.

b. 2nd COMAD Division

(1) Reference Section X, paragraph 1. Concur that flight plan information should not be passed to ADCCs or AEDCs, whether or not an exercise of this nature is of the "minimum warning" type. This situation can be corrected only by insuring that SAC personnel include the proper remarks in flight plans. This matter will be emphasized in joint mission planning with SAC numbered air forces for future missions. ECM training has been quite limited in the past, and it seems that training should be the objective of missions of this type until effective defensive measures are developed and all personnel thoroughly indoctrinated. It is believed that the increased training which can result from prior knowledge of the time of the exercise will more than offset any benefit to be gained from a "minimum warning" exercise.

[REDACTED]

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CFEOP-W, Subject: (Incl) Summary Report of Exercise "Dawn Patrol"
(EADP "Green Field") (Cont'd)

(2) Reference Section I, paragraph 2. Do not concur that the AMIS agreement requires revision for the reasons stated in preceding paragraph.

(3) Reference Section I, paragraph 3. Concur. At this point, it is believed that the need for ECM training is greater than for "minimum warning" exercises.

(4) Reference Section I, paragraph 4. This recommendation appears to have considerable merit because the Soviet Union is our potential enemy. We have attempted to secure information on Soviet ECM capabilities. (Reference TOP SECRET JEAEDI letter from this headquarters to CINCOMAD, dated 18 January 1957, Subject: "Request for Information".) Recommend that CONAD pursue this quest for information and determine the feasibility of SAC or ADC radar evaluation flights (ECM) employing Soviet ECM tactics in exercises against the air defense system.

(5) Reference Section I, paragraph 5. Concur. Recommend CONAD investigate the feasibility of incorporating SAC's "IO Plan" in a future exercise.

(6) Reference Section I, paragraph 6. This headquarters is investigating the feasibility of this recommendation. Until another data collection and evaluation system is determined, this headquarters plans to utilize primarily the reports required by EADP Regulation 55-5, supplemented by additional CONAD or CFEOP requirements which will arise because of the objective of the exercise.

c. 58th CONAD Division

(1) Reference Section I, paragraph 2a. There are two sides to this matter; base support is available during the regular working week, but there is increased participation of ANG units on weekends. (Reference 85th CONAD Division Report.) Another factor to be considered in the timing of penetrations is the amount of high altitude high speed normal traffic which varies with the time of day. An exercise conducted late at night or in the very early morning hours would afford conditions similar to the implementation of SCATER. Recommend that the day of the week be given little consideration, but that whenever possible, exercises of this nature be conducted late at night or very early in the morning.

(2) Reference Section I, paragraph 2b. Concur. This headquarters has had little success in requesting the SAC numbered air forces to fly higher missions. Recommend that CONAD resolve this problem with Headquarters, SAC.

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CPECP-W, Subject: Overall Summary Report of Exercise "Haven Patrol"
(EADS "Green Field" (Cont'd))

(3) Reference Section I, paragraphs 2c and 2d. Future exercises will no doubt provide more activity for the 58th CONAD Division.

(4) Reference Section I, paragraph 2e. The 30th CONAD Division was not a task organization for this exercise because there were to be no penetrations in that division. This did affect the 58th CONAD Division in that there was a lack of threat warning telling on tracks coming from the 30th CONAD Division. In future exercises, if a CONAD division will be involved in this manner, even though there will be no penetrations of that division, it will be included in the exercise.

(5) Reference Section IX paragraph 1a(5), Section I paragraph 1b, and Section I paragraph 2f. The Command Post of the Eastern CONAD Region was manned during the entirety of this exercise, and the 58th CONAD Division Commander has been informed of this misunderstanding. The Command Post will be manned for all exercises involving two or more CONAD divisions and will participate as indicated by the objective of the exercise.

(6) Reference Section X, paragraph 2g. The additional command (engineered) circuits between ADCC and fighter squadrons would eliminate a small delay in scrambling fighters when the ADCC has assumed centralized control over them. Further study is required, including additional exercises in which ADCCs assume centralized control over fighters, to determine whether this additional circuit is a valid requirement prior to SAEX.

(7) Reference Section X, paragraph 2h. The use of AEW&C aircraft in areas left unprotected because of radar outages has been accomplished in simulated exercises. This will be tested during live exercises if time permits and the 551st AEW&C Wing can provide the aircraft without taking them from commitments of a higher priority.

(8) Reference Section X, paragraphs 3 a, b, c, d. These items have been referred to Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force for necessary action.

(9) Reference Section X, paragraphs 4a and 4b. Recommendations concerning activation of engineered circuits and increased ECM training with latest type equipment were made in CPECS message 033.

d. 85th CONAD Division

(1) Reference Section X, paragraphs a and b. Fighter interceptor squadrons in the 85th Region were below normal aircraft strength because of project "Follow On" and IRAN. However, even the

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CPEDP-W, Subject: (Unc) Summary Report of Exercise "Dawn Patrol"
 (NAEP "Green Field") (Cont'd)

Limited number of fighters could not be used at times because the ANW system was saturated and close control could not be provided. This was a result of radar limitations, proficiency level of personnel, and degradation resulting from a combination of SAC weaving tactics and chaff. The problem of proficiency level of personnel in the radar system is being referred to Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force. As to furnishing details of the mission to augmentation forces, this is within the capability of the CONAD divisions; furnishing details that are not in the operations order (such as routes and altitudes) would be unrealistic and compromise the exercise. The 85th CONAD Division will be advised on this matter.

(2) Reference Section I, paragraph 2a. Concur. Recommend as many ECM exercises as possible with training as the primary objective. References quoted in CPEDS message 033 apply. Suggest this matter be pursued by Headquarters Air Defense Command.


(3) Reference Section I, paragraph 2b. Concur. Reference CPEDS message 033.

(4) Reference Section I, paragraph 2c. Concur. Recommend that CONAD coordinate with SAC in an attempt to have non-participating SAC aircraft stay out of exercise areas. In an exercise, although mission aircraft may be provided from one SAC numbered air force, aircraft from another SAC numbered air force may fly through the area, thus creating confusion. By conducting exercises late at night or in the very early morning hours, SCATER will be simulated to some degree.

(5) Reference Section II, paragraph 1. Concur. See paragraph 3d(2) above.

(6) Reference Section II, paragraph 2. There was some difficulty in maintaining track continuity as mission aircraft proceeded through the southern portion of the 26th CONAD Division. This is attributed to weaving tactics, chaff, and non-participating friendly traffic. Concur that 85th CONAD Division fighter aircraft should become airborne on the basis of early warning from an adjacent division; this is evident when considering size of division areas in relation to penetrating aircraft speed. However, placing fighter aircraft on CAP should be used only as a last resort when track continuity cannot be maintained. This headquarters will place emphasis on additional training so that track continuity can be maintained and fighter aircraft can be ordered off to intercept specific penetrating aircraft.

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

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CPECR-W, Subject (Uncl) Summary Report of Exercise "Dawn Patrol"
(EADF "Green Field") (Cont'd)

These matters, together with the relative merits of centralized control of weapons as utilized by the 58th CONAD Division in this exercise, will receive additional emphasis in the CPECR Tactical Doctrine which is now being rewritten.

4. The overall exercise fell short of expectations from an ECM standpoint. Weather prevented the use of electronic sweep jamming and the chaff drops, by themselves, had little degrading effect on the system. Although limited, "Green Field" did point out the need for continual ECM emphasis in future exercises.

4 Incls:

1. Summ & Eval GREEN FIELD (26 AD)
2. " " " " (31 AD)
3. " " " " (58 AD)
4. " " " " (85 AD)


ARTHUR C. AGAN, JR.
Brigadier General, USAF

for

EUGENE F. CARDWELL
Major General, USA
Commander

UNCLASSIFIED



5-CP-477-57

0922



ARMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
Colorado Springs, Colorado

203

ADCAA-C 413-884

2 APR 1967

SUBJECT: SAC ECM Mission "Greenfield"

TO: Chief of Staff
Continental Air Defense Command
Fort Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Major F. Y. Stokovic, ER Officer, G3 Section, Hq UNRAADCOM, visited the 1st and 3d AA Regional Commands for the purpose of observing SAC ECM Mission "Greenfield" during the period 8 to 11 March 1967.

2. Summary of events which took place are as follows:

a. 1st AARC - Because of weather conditions on 8 March, no jamming was experienced. At Loring AFB some chaff was experienced but no difficulty was encountered in tracking the targets.

b. 3d AARC - Jamming was experienced during the entire mission period, 8 to 10 March.

3. The results of the exercise show that the jamming encountered during the missions had little or no effect on radar equipment. Long-range early warning from AADCM was good, but follow-up plots were inaccurate and untimely. For example, after a flight split, the ADNM for the Washington-Baltimore defense continued to call it one track. The Air Defense Direction Center did not inform the Anti-aircraft Operation Center of the whereabouts of fighter aircraft, and as a result, they were engaged.

4. Although no difficulties were reported in target recognition of multiple aircraft, AA defenses in both Regional Commands need training and practice in handling multi-plane flights.

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
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ADAAA-C 413.884
SUBJECT: SAC ECM Mission "Greenfield"

5. Emphasis should be placed on more multi-plane training missions to improve AEDC-AAOC procedures for training, identification and correlation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, GS
Chief of Staff

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OO:PO (Unclassified)

11 Dec 56

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Large Scale Exercises, 4th Quarter FY 1957

TO: Commander Naval Forces
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Reference Part 1 (a) of classified message OAGT-61, 'CIC of 15 May 1956.

2. The present international situation, which has increased commitments on participating forces, precludes the possibility of conducting the large scale maximum training exercise scheduled for the 4th quarter, fiscal year 1957. The subject exercise is, therefore, canceled, and all arrangements and planning for participation should be discontinued.

3. Local Regional Air Defense Force and Air Div's on exercises will continue to be conducted throughout the remainder of FY 1957. Continued participation in these exercises by forces with defense capabilities is invited.

4. In accordance with paragraph 2 of your letter, serial 43-4, dated 8 March 1956, it is requested that all interested Navy a dressess be notified of this cancellation.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

MARVY T. ALLEN
Major General, USAF
DDE/Plans & Operations

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

B-581-1X

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264

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND FORCE
WESTERN COMAD REGION
WASHINGTON TERRACE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

CLASS

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Exercise HAWK 68

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Fort Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) Inclosed are two copies of the interpretation of the results of Naval exercise HAWK 68. This evaluation has been prepared by the Operations Analysis Office of this headquarters.

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) A significant proportion of fighters credited against faked tracks consisted of augmentation wing-fighters rather than the first line all-weather interceptors available to this command.

3. (UNCLASSIFIED) The 6th Region, United States Army Air Defense Command participation shown in this study represents engagement of only those tracks which were identified as fakers by the direction centers. It is known that the AIGS units acquired other tracks which may have been fakers or friendlies; however, the detailed records necessary to determine the extent of this additional participation were not available at this headquarters at the time of the analysis. A further analysis of AIGS operations in the 6th Region is now under preparation at headquarters and will be available on or about 10 July. This latter material will be forwarded after receipt and analysis by this headquarters.

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) The details contained in section VII indicate that the results of HAWK 68 are not dissimilar, at least with regard to detection effectiveness, from the results of Exercise HAWK 67 conducted with the Navy last year. These findings merely confirm the long recognized inadequacy of the low altitude detection capability of the present radar system. Since this system was not designed to detect high altitude jet fighters nor small targets flying at 25 to 50 feet, it is recommended that participation in future exercises of this type be limited to the ground environment until significant technical improvements can be made in the detection system which will permit adequate commitment of air defense weapons.

DUPLICATE

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8
GWOOP, Hq COMB Forces, Western Command Region, subject: Evaluation of Exercise H&H 68N

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) In the event a further briefing on Exercise H&H 68N is conducted at your headquarters, it is requested that a representative of this command be permitted to attend.

6. (UNCLASSIFIED) This correspondence is classified UNCLASSIFIED in accordance with paragraph 30b(2)(c), AFM 205-1, 3 January 1956.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


LYMAN L. WOODMAN
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

1 incl
Report on
Exercise H&H 68N
(2 cys)

Copy furnished:
COMDC

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CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND FORCES
WESTERN CONAD REGION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
HAMILTON AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

ANALYSIS OF EXERCISE

"HOME RUN"


20 June 1957

PREPARED BY

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND FORCES
WESTERN CONAD REGION
Hamilton Air Force Base, California
3 July 1957

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Copy Nr. 1


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2. The title of this document is: ANALYSIS OF EXERCISE "HOME RUN"
20 June 1957.

3. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

4. Authority for classification paragraph 30b(2)(c), AFR 205-1.

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Summary of Evidence

"HOMER HUNT"

20 June 1957

- I. INTRODUCTION
 - II. DETAILED RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
 - III. PAPER TRACK NARRATIVE
 - IV. SUMMARY OF DETECTIONS
 - V. SUMMARY OF INTERCEPTOR ACTIONS
 - VI. SUMMARY OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE
 - VII. COMMENTS ON RESULTS
- ANNEX A
- ANNEX B
- ABBREVIATIONS


Page 1 of 20 pages.

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[REDACTED]

ANALYSIS OF EXERCISE HOME RUN

1. INTRODUCTION

[REDACTED] Exercise HOME RUN (7, 10, and 11 June 57) was a NAVY [REDACTED] CPWCR participation consisted of detection and interception of air strikes launched against the Pacific coast. HOME RUN was not a joint exercise within the meaning of AFM 1-1 and no joint command was established. CPWCR participation was effected by means of close coordination with Commander First Fleet and Commander Western Sea Frontier. Forces under CPWCR did not come under any Naval command and were free at any time to withdraw wholly or in part from the exercise. The Faker aircraft provided by the Navy flew from the carrier USS Kearsarge at sea off the California coast and penetrated the Pacific ADIZ and coastline in a number of places, concentrating mainly in the area between San Francisco Bay and the southern border of California. During the three day exercise there were 24 penetrations of the CPWCR area — 16 penetrations of the 27th Air Division and 8 of the 28th Air Division. Thirteen penetrations were by AD type aircraft, six by AJ's, and five by F9F's. Annex "A" presents a table and map which give the penetration routes as planned. Deviations of the actual routes from the planned ones were minor. The table gives the routes in terms of coded checkpoints and the map indicates the location of these points.

2. [REDACTED] Each penetration of the AD or F9F consisted of two aircraft flying together, while each AJ penetration consisted of a single aircraft. In this analysis, results are in general expressed in terms of penetrations rather than number of aircraft penetrating although the latter can easily be arrived at by looking at the aircraft type.

3. (Unclassified) The analysis is based primarily upon the records kept and assembled at division level, rather than at either CPWCR COC or Direction Center level, although use was made of each of these levels where division records were incomplete or contradictory. The analysis thus represents primarily the picture as seen at division level, which is a more accurate picture of what actually happened than is available at the higher CPWCR echelon and more complete than the records from the Direction Centers.

4. [REDACTED] The analysis is primarily of the performance of the overall integrated air defense system rather than components thereof. Detections, for instance, by COC, AEW&Con, picket ship or even by a ground radar site subordinate to a prime direction center are generally not included unless these detections were reported to, accepted and utilized by the system. Action by AAA against tracks for which

This document consists of 20 pages.
Page 2 of 20 pages.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

there is no record at director center level could not be evaluated since records from the AAA units were not available. For two component sources of detection, however, we have made special studies. These sources are the Ground Observer Corps and the ASWGCon. Even here our coverage of the GOC effectiveness against HOME RUN Fakers is not complete due to some missing records.

5. [REDACTED] Detection and tactical actions on outbound as well as inbound Fakers are presented here. One of the detections (by GOC) and all of the fighter MA's were achieved on outbound tracks.

6. [REDACTED] The general rule for "correlating", i.e. establishing whether a detection actually was of a Faker, was ± 20 miles perpendicular to the course of the Faker and ± the number of minutes it would take the particular Faker to progress 20 miles, accepting the measured or reported ground speed of the Faker to be accurate. Some correlations that fell beyond these limits were also allowed where extenuating circumstances were present, e.g., the track being visually identified by interception or by GOC as being the correct Faker type and with Faker markings.

7. [REDACTED] Procedures adopted for identification, during the exercise, of friendly Naval aircraft (Purple forces) in the Pacific ADIZ were considered unsatisfactory. Flight plans, IFF, special corridor systems and standard altitudes for return to the coast somehow proved inadequate for identification. During the exercise, 56 Purple aircraft were declared unknown because of one or more violations of the above procedures. Seventy-eight interceptors were scrambled to identify these tracks, while only 21 interceptors were scrambled against Faker tracks. In other words, CPWC expended three times as much air defense effort against friendly aircraft as against Fakers.

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[REDACTED]

III. DETAILED RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

1. (Unclassified) The detailed results of the analysis of detection and tactical action are recorded in Table 1.

2. [REDACTED] It can be seen that of the 24 Faker penetrations, 9 were "effectively" detected.¹ These were HOME RUN Numbers 1, 2, 10, 23, 35, 36, 37, 39, and 42. This 9 out of 24 (38%) represents the "effective" detection performance of the overall system during this exercise.

3. [REDACTED] In addition five (5) other Fakers (HOME RUN Numbers 7, 12, 26, 41, and 43) were detected by either G.O.C. or AEW&CON, but records of these detections were not received or utilized at Direction Centers. These additional 5 detections can not be added to the 9 above without qualification, inasmuch as detections that did not materialize into at least the "known" category could not be of help to the system. They are not included in the summaries that follow, but are treated separately in Annex B, entitled "Additional Detections".

¹ An "effective" detection is one that was not only detected, but also submitted to, and recorded as received at Direction Center.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] HOME RUN #1 was an AJ with target McChallen AFB. The approach was at low altitude. It was first detected well out to sea by AEW, but lost after 70 miles. It was next detected by Ground Radar about 90 miles offshore. One F-80J was immediately scrambled from Hamilton. At this time AAA picked up the track and the intercept was attempted using their back tell. The Faker began to climb at about this point and reached 4,000' at landfall and 30,000' just before target. AAA height assessment and tracking was good, showing changes from 4,500' to 20,000' over the same interval. However the intercept was unsuccessful. In the interim, however, AAA had engaged this Faker with NIKE and had made one MA.

2. [REDACTED] HOME RUN #2, an AJ at low altitude with target McChallen was detected by AEW, but lost after 70 miles. It then began to climb 90 miles off Golden Gate and was detected almost immediately thereafter by AAA. The F-80J previously scrambled on HOME RUN #1 was diverted to HOME RUN #2 and the intercept attempted by the G.C.I. station using AAA back tell. The intercept was unsuccessful, but AAA had engaged and MA'd the Faker in the interval.

3. [REDACTED] HOME RUN #10 consisted of 2 F3D's penetrating together at 35,000' to 20,000'. It was detected by Picket Ship, but lost after 25 miles. No further detection was made, and no tactical action taken.

4. [REDACTED] HOME RUN #13 was one AJ aircraft with Los Angeles as its target. It penetrated to within approximately 115 miles of target before starting its climb to a target altitude of 30,000'. This altitude was reached about 60 miles offshore. It was detected by Ground Radar and tracked continuously by one or more ground radars to target and out again. Two F3D's were scrambled from North Island. The lead aircraft made two successful passes, but not until the Faker had completed its attack and was outbound. Two F-102A's were also scrambled from George. One aborted before take-off; the other was airborne 5 minutes before Faker's time over target. The fighter had been scrambled on a cross tell and controlling radar did not detect Faker. Intercept was unsuccessful. The AAA, however, had acquired the Faker and had fired three NIKE's, achieving one MA before Final Defense Line.

5. [REDACTED] HOME RUN #35 was one AJ penetrating at 32,000' with Los Angeles as its target. It was detected by AEW while still 250 miles from the coast. The track was then carried by ground radars all the way to the target and back out to sea a number of miles. Two F3D's from San Diego were diverted to the Faker while it was still 200 miles from the coast. Control of the fighters had to be passed from one G.C.I. to another and no interceptions were made due to personnel errors. Also two F-80H's were scrambled from Oxnard after Faker had reached its

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[REDACTED]

target, but the track faded before intercept could be accomplished. AAA had acquired the track and claims that it could have been engaged, but was told it was friendly at the time.

6. [REDACTED] HOME RUN #16 consisted of two AD's penetrating the coast at 50 feet. After traveling 75 miles inbound they found that penetration "on the track" on the target at JJ Ranch firing area near Daggett was impossible because of low clouds. They returned to the coast and then proceeded to target at 4,000'. Two separate G.O.C. detections were made on these Fakers just before they returned to the coast to obtain altitude for target penetration. Four F-100's from George were diverted to this Faker penetration - two for each of the G.O.C. tracks. Two of the F-100's TR'd the other two F-100's at an altitude of 31,000'. The intercepted F-100's in the nearshore had TR'd three non-Faker Navy Cougars, at an estimated altitude of 35,000'. The Fakers at this time were below at 4,000'. The track was acquired by AAA radars and three NIKB's were fired against it, achieving one MA.

7. [REDACTED] HOME RUN #17 consisted of two AD's penetrating the coast at 500 feet. It proceeded 30 miles, then returned to Santa Rosa Island to re-penetrate at an altitude of 4,000'. It then headed toward target (McCarren AFB) but aborted 50 miles before reaching target and returned to carrier. This Faker was detected by Ground Radar while still 90 miles from the coast. It was tracked to the coast, but faded when the Faker turned around to obtain altitude. Tactical Action on this track included the diversion of two North Island F3D's and two George AFB F-100's. Interceptions were unsuccessful due to weather and low altitude of the Fakers at this time (before starting to climb to 4,000'). AAA acquired this track and claimed that it could have engaged it, but was told it was friendly.

8. [REDACTED] HOME RUN #18 was one AJ aircraft penetrating the coast line at 100 feet. It proceeded to target G-3 (Salton Sea Firing Area) climbing to 31,600' approximately 160 miles before target. After the Faker reached target and was outbound two G.O.C. plots were made. Two F-100's from George were diverted to each of the two G.O.C. plots. Two of the F-100's missed interception because of poor radio reception. The other two F-100's intercepted the Faker and achieved an MA. The track was acquired by AAA, but since it was outbound no attempt was made to engage it.

9. [REDACTED] HOME RUN #12 consisted of two F9F's penetrating the coast at 50,000' with Los Angeles as target. It was detected by Ground Radar while still 240 miles at sea. Two F-102's from George were immediately diverted to the track. This track merged with another track that was picked up a few minutes afterward and several miles behind it. The Faker was lost in this merger and fighters were recalled. Two F-84's on the other track intercepted 2 Navy JD's, not Faker aircraft.

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[REDACTED]

IV. SUMMARY OF DETECTIONS

1. (Unclassified) A summary of the effective detections, by types of aircraft, is shown in Table 2, and by source of initial detection and type of aircraft in Table 3.

TABLE 2 (SECRET)

EFFECTIVE DETECTIONS BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS</u>	<u>PENETRATIONS DETECTED</u>
AD	13	2 (15%)
AJ	6	5 (83%)
FQFE	5	2 (40%)
<u>ALL TYPES</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>9 (38%)</u>

TABLE 3 (SECRET)

INITIAL EFFECTIVE DETECTIONS BY SOURCE OF DETECTION AND TYPE AIRCRAFT

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DETECTIONS BY:</u>			
		<u>P.S.</u>	<u>AEW</u>	<u>GROUND RADAR</u>	<u>GOC</u>
AD	13	0	0	1	1
AJ	6	0	3	1	1
FQFE	5	1	0	1	0
<u>ALL TYPES</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>

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V. SUMMARY OF INTERCEPTOR ACTION

1. (Secret) Of the 9 Faker penetrations detected, 8 were committed against, with 24 fighters. Of these 8 Faker tracks committed against, only 2 were MA'd. In addition 12 fighters were committed against Non-Fakers that were thought to be Fakers.

2. (Unclassified) Table 4 presents a summary of the tactical action of interceptors with a breakdown by units committing the interceptors.

3. (Confidential) Both cases of successful interception (against HR #23, 39) were confirmed by the overlays from the Navy. No other cases of interception were noted by the Navy overlays although one additional case of sighting interceptors, however, was noted by HR #2.

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	<u>Faker Pen Committed Against</u>	<u>Nr. of Intcpt Committed</u>	<u>Result of Action</u>
WADF Units			
F-89H (437th FIS, Oxnard)	HR #35, 1 AJ	2	MI, late scramble
F-89J (81th FIS, Hamilton)	HR #1, 1 AJ	1	MI, Faker climbing during attempt and interceptor controlled on AAA backtell.
	HR #2, 1 AJ	1	MI, Sliphorn controlling on AAA backtell.
F-102A (327th FIS, George)	HR #23, 1 AJ	2	MI, 1 ground abort and 1 late scramble, Duly controlling on cross- tell from Swanny.
	HR #42, 2F9FB	2	MI, recalled due to confusion caused by merging of Faker track with non-Faker.
Total WADF Unit	5	8	
Augmentation Units			
F-100 (479th DFW, TAC, George)	HR #36, 2 AD	4	MI, vectored too high; 25,000 while Faker was at 4,000.
	HR #37, 2 AD	2	MI, wx and low altitude of Faker
	HR #39, 2 AD	4	2 MA by 2 F-100's, MI by other 2 F-100's due to poor radio reception. Navy reported "sighting of F-100".
F3D (FAWTFAC, Navy, North Is.)	HR #23, 1 AJ	2	2 MA's by 1 F3D, MI by other. Navy reported "Intercepted by F3D at 20,000".
	HR #35, 1 AJ	2	MI, personnel error.
	HR #37, 2 AD	2	MI, wx and low altitude of Faker.
Total Augmentation	6	16	
27th Division	9	22	
28th Division	2	2	
Total CPWCR	11 Commit- ments against 8	24 Intcpt committed against 42 Fakers.	

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VII. SUMMARY OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE

1. (Unclassified) A summary of "effective" detections and tactical actions: by date and Home Run Number is shown in Table 5; by date, Division, and type of Faker aircraft is shown in Table 6; and by number of penetrations and number of aircraft penetrating in Table 7.

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SUMMARY BY DATE AND HOME RUN NUMBER

DATE	FAKER PENETRATION			INITIAL EFFECTIVE DETECTIONS	COMMITTED AGAINST (INTOPT)	MA's by INTOPT	MA's ^a by AAA	
	Nr	Nr. & Model Faker	Div Pen					
7 Jun 57	1	1 AJ	28th	AEW	Yes	2MA's, 1 OB	2 MA's	
	2	1 AJ	28th	AEW	Yes			
	3	2 AD	27th					
	6	2 AD	28th					
	7	2 AD	27th					
	8	2 AD	28th					
	9	2 AD	28th					
	10	2 P9P8	28th	PS				
	11	2 P9P8	28th					
	12	2 P9P8	28th					
	10 Jun 57	23	1 AJ	27th	GR	Yes	2 MA's, OB	1 MA
		26	1 AJ	27th				
28		2 AD	27th					
29		2 AD	27th					
30		2 AD	27th					
31		2 AD	27th					
11 Jun 57	35	1 AJ	27th	AEW	Yes		0 ^b	
	36	2 AD	27th	GOC	Yes		1 MA	
	37	2 AD	27th	GR	Yes		0 ^b	
	39	1 AJ	27th	GOC	Yes	2 MA's, OB	2MA's, 1 OB	
	40	2 AD	27th					
	41	2 AD	27th					
	42	2 P9P8	27th	GR	Yes		0 ^b	
	43	2 P9P8	27th					
Total								
Exercise	24	42		9	8	2(1MA's, OB)	5(2MA's, 2 OB)	

- a Includes only those MA's on tracks correlated as Fakers from data received from divisions, which did not include AAA logs. Hence, MA's by AAA on tracks carried by AAA, but not by direction centers are not included.
- b AAA claims that Faker could have been engaged by AAA if track had been properly identified.

[REDACTED]

TABLE 5
SUMMARY BY DATE, DIVISION, AND TYPE OF PAKER

DATE	DIV PEN	ACFT MODEL	NR. OF PEN	EFFECTIVE DETECTIONS		NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS		
				Nr.	%	Committed Against (Intcpt)	MA'd by Intcpt	MA'd ^a by AAA
7 Jun 57	27th	AD	2	0	0	0	0	0
		AD	3	0	0	0	0	0
		AJ	2	2	100%	2	0	2
		F9PE	3	1	33%	0	0	0
Total			10	3	30%	2	0	2
10 Jun 57	27th	AD	4	0	0	0	0	0
		AJ	2	1	50%	1	1	1
		Total			6	1	17%	1
11 Jun 57	27th	AD	4	2	50%	2	0	1
		AJ	2	2	100%	2	1	1
		F9PE	2	1	50%	1	0	0
		Total			8	5	62%	5
Total Exercise		All WADP Models	24	9	38%	8	2	5

^a See Footnotes a and b, Table 5.

[REDACTED] 13 of 20 pages.

[REDACTED]

TABLE

SUMMARY BY NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS AND NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT PENETRATING

	Penetrations ^a	Acft Penetrating
Total	21	42
Detected ^b	9	13
Percent Detected	38%	31% ^c
Committed Against	8	11
MA'd by Interceptors	2	2
MA'd by AAA	5	5

- a Number of Penetrations means number of separate penetrations, regardless of number of aircraft in a penetration. (Some penetrations were by a flight of 2 aircraft, some by single aircraft.)
- b Detections shown are Effective detections, i.e. those recorded and utilized by Direction Centers as well as being merely detected.
- c If a Faker penetration is detected, the system is credited with having detected all aircraft in that penetration.

[REDACTED]
VII. COMMENTS ON RESULTS

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1. (Secret) Exercise HOME RUN demonstrated again that CPWCR radar detection capabilities are inadequate against low level attacks. A check against our demonstrated capabilities during the similar Navy exercise (HOP SCOTCH) in June 1956 shows some improvement in detection, but a decrease in interceptor results. Table 3 presents comparative rates, in terms of number of Faker aircraft, rather than number of Faker penetrations, since the HOP SCOTCH report was made in similar terms.

2. (Secret) As was the case in HOP SCOTCH, the system again in HOME RUN did not fully utilize the detections made by the AEW and G.O.C. segments of the surveillance system. While only 38% of the HOME RUN Faker penetrations (9 out of 24) were detected and used by the system, the additional 5 detections made by AEW and G.O.C. but not used by the system raises the rate for total detections to 58%.

3. (Secret) The commitment of interceptors per Faker detected in HOME RUN was comparable to that of HOP SCOTCH. In neither exercise was the commitment rate adequate to produce an acceptable kill probability. As indicated in Table 4, 2/3 of the interceptors committed in HOME RUN were from the augmentation forces. It should be pointed out that all 4 of the MA's made on two Faker penetrations were by the augmentation forces.

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COMPARISON OF RESULTS OF EXERCISES HOP SCOTCH (JUNE 1956) AND HOME RUN (JUNE 1957)

	Hop Scotch on Pen Tracks only	Home Run on Pen & Outbound	Home Run on Pen Tracks only
Nr Faker A/cft Penetrating	120	12	12
Nr Faker A/cft Detected	30	13 ^a	12 ^b
Percent Detected	25%	31% ^a	29% ^b
Nr Faker Aircraft Committed Against	28	11	10
Percent Committed Against	23%	26%	21%
Nr Faker Aircraft MA'd (Intent)	13	2	0
Percent MA'd	11%	5%	0
Fighters Committed per Faker Aircraft Detected	1.7	1.8	1.7

- a Effectively detected. When all GOC & AEW detections are included, this increases to 22 Fakers detected and a rate of 52%.
- b Effectively detected. When all GOC & AEW detections are included, this increases to 19 Fakers detected and a rate of 45%.

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STRIKE PLAN

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FLIGHT DESIG.	DATE	TARGET	NR ACFT	FLIGHT TRACK POINTS ^a	ALTITUDES	
					WATER ^b	LAND ^c
HR #1	7 Jun	McCLELLAN AFB RBS	AJ	FANCY-LINDA- BESSIE-LINDA	H	H
HR #2	7 Jun	McCLELLAN AFB RBS	AJ	FANCY-LINDA- BESSIE-LINDA	H	H
HR #3	7 Jun	C-3	2 AD	GRETA-OPHELIA- GERALDINE-OPHELIA	L	L
HR #4	7 Jun	TINEMANA	2 AD	FANCY-MARY- FLORA-MARY	L	L
HR #7	7 Jun	C-3	2 AD	GRETA-OPHELIA- GERALDINE-OPHELIA	d	d
HR #8	7 Jun	CAMP BEALE	2 AD	EVANGELINE-LINDA- ALICE-LINDA	L	L
HR #9	7 Jun	B-14B	2 AD	EVANGELINE-LINDA- CAMELIA-LINDA	L	L
HR #10	7 Jun	SAN FRANCISCO GOLDEN GATE	1 F9F8P 1 F9F8B	STUDEBAKER-FANCY- LINDA-FANCY	H	H
HR #11	7 Jun	SAN FRANCISCO GOLDEN GATE	1 F9F8P 1 F9F8B	STUDEBAKER-FANCY- LINDA-FANCY	H	H
HR #12	7 Jun	SAN FRANCISCO	2 F9F8B	STUDEBAKER-FANCY- LINDA-FANCY	H	H
HR #23	10 Jun	LOS ANGELES RBS	AJ	ADA-ROSA- LILY-ROSA	H	H
HR #26	10 Jun	T-57	AJ	ADA-ROSA- MAUD-ROSA	L	H
HR #28	10 Jun	103 A	2 AD	ADA-ROSA- NORA-ROSA	d	d
HR #29	10 Jun	95	2 AD	CLARA-YOLANDO- OLIVE-YOLANDO	L	H
HR #30	10 Jun	103 A	2 AD	BELLE-THERESA- NORA-THERESA	L	L
HR #31	10 Jun	95	2 AD	CLARA-YOLANDO- OLIVE-YOLANDO	L	H
HR #35	11 Jun	LOS ANGELES RBS	AJ	CLARA-ROSA- LILY-ROSA	H	H
HR #36	11 Jun	J. J. RANCH	2 AD	CLARA-ROSA- KATE-ROSA	L	H
HR #37	11 Jun	McCARRAN AFB	2 AD	KARIN-SARAH- IRENE-SARAH	L	H
HR #39	11 Jun	C-3	AJ	BELLE-POLLY- GERALDINE-POLLY	L	H
HR #40	11 Jun	C-3	2 AD	BELLE-POLLY- GERALDINE-POLLY	L	H
HR #41	11 Jun	SHOSHONE	2 AD	BELLE-SARAH- HELEN-SARAH	L	H
HR #42	11 Jun	LOS ANGELES RBS	1 F9F8P 1 F9F8B	BELLE-ROSA- LILY-ROSA	H	H
HR #43	11 Jun	NAS NORTH IS.	1 F9F8P 1 F9F8B	BELLE-YOLANDO	H	H

a See map Part II of Annex A for location of these points.


b Altitude over water portion of penetration. L indicates altitude at 700' or under. H indicates 4,000' or above. There were no penetrations between 700' and 4,000'.

c Altitudes over land portion of penetration. Same code.

d Altitude data not available.

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ANNEX A PART II



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ANNEX B

ADDITIONAL DETECTIONS

1. (Secret) As mentioned in the introduction, two of the several component sources of surveillance have been examined in detail, i.e. the G.O.C. reports to their Filter Centers and the AEW/Con Recorder logs, through the collaboration of WDOGD and 8th Air Division respectively. The examinations show 5 additional detections of Fakers that were not utilized or recorded as received by the Direction Centers (as judged by Division and GOC records). Three of these were by G.O.C., two by AEW/Con. These unutilized detections were:

<u>TRACK</u>	<u>DETECTED BY</u>	<u>REF OF DETECTION</u>	<u>FAKER</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DIVISION</u>
JF 293	AEW	HE 42	HR #7	7 Jun	27th
JF 254	AEW	FF 21	HR #12	7 Jun	28th
KE 416 ^a	GOC	GD 24	HR #26	10 Jun	27th
KE 432	GOC	CE 30	HR #11	11 Jun	27th
KG 468 ^a	GOC	CC 45	HR #13	11 Jun	27th (Outbound)

^a These two GOC tracks which correlated with Faker routes and were so identified in the analysis had not been identified as Faker by the Direction Centers. They were allowed, however, due to the close correlation and orange marks on the aircraft observed by the GOC.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A/cft = Aircraft
AEW = Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft
Alt = Altitude in angels (1000 feet)
Com = Committed
D = George AFB
G.O.C. = Ground Observer Corp
Gr = Ground Radar
HR # = Home Run Numbered Flight
Intcpt = Interceptor
MA = Mission accomplished
MI = Missed intercept
NI = North Island Naval Air Station
O = Oxnard AFB
Ob = Outbound (after target)
Pen = Penetration by Faker
PS = Picket Ship
Sp = speed in knots
SRF = Hamilton AFB

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[REDACTED] 266
 A/511, Cdr First Fleet, 30 Jan 57, sub): Joint Western Air Defense
 Force Participation in Naval Exercises; invitation for [REDACTED]

COOP-E

2d Ind

7 MAR 1957

Hq Continental Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado
 Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Continental Air Defense Command Forces, Western
 CONAD Region, Hamilton Air Force Base, California

1. The opportunity to participate in joint exercises with the Navy occurs so infrequently that we must participate to the maximum extent of our capabilities to add realism for the aggressor forces and to insure Navy participation in joint exercises that we are contemplating in the future. At the same time, this headquarters is not prepared to accept conditions for our participation that would in any way hinder or curtail our total capabilities for detection, identification and interception. Accordingly, it is proposed that you reply to the Commander, First Fleet, with an indorsement substantially as follows:

1. This command welcomes the opportunity to participate to the maximum extent of its capabilities in Exercise 'Homerus' in June 1957.

2. Because of large scale conversions scheduled during the exercise period, fighter-interceptor participation must of necessity be greatly reduced. However, this will have no adverse effect on our long-range detection capabilities or on the operation of our ground environment system. It is not anticipated that any conditions or limitations other than those required for safety need be imposed.

3. It is suggested that a meeting be arranged in the near future, at a time and place of your choosing, so that our respective staffs and representatives of CINCCONAD may develop necessary planning criteria for this exercise.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

Rewritten by Gen Carter

2234

3 Mar 57

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: N. R.

MARSHALL S. CARTER
 Major General, USA
 Staff

1 Incl
 n/c

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COM, The First Flt, 30 Jan 57, Subj: Joint Western Air Defense
Force participation in Naval Exercise. Invitation for

120000Z

1st Ind

8 FEB 1957

TO: Continental Air Defense Command Forces, Western CONAD Region,
San Diego AFB, California

FM: Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, East
AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Reference paragraph 6 of basic letter, this headquarters
is unable to provide interceptor participation in view of the large-
scale coverage program taking place during the exercise periods.

2. It is desired to have close liaison with the exercise force
to enable radar participation and gain information on penetrating
flights that will enable positive identification and prevent
unnecessary interception.

3. This headquarters requests your concurrence to so advise
the Commanding Officer, First Fleet.

1 Incl
a/c (1 cy w/a)

MONRO MacCLOSKEY
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

B-2X

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COMCR

20 DEC 56

SUBJECT: COMAD Objective Plan 56-66

TO: Chief of Staff, USAF
As Executive Agency for COMAD
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The Continental Air Defense Command Objective Plan for the period 1956-66, short title SABOP 56-66, was forwarded to the Department of the Air Force as Executive Agency for the JCS on 18 November 1956. This plan, copies of which have been left with the RCAF for study, has been discussed with the Chief of Air Staff of the Royal Canadian Air Force and members of his headquarters establishment, and my observations of their reactions are as follows:

a. The RCAF voiced a serious objection to any portion of the over-all Plan.

b. Insofar as the Canadian portion of the Plan is concerned, they were in general agreement with the level of forces required and the amount of ground environment necessary in Canada for an acceptable air defense. They had some reservations concerning the actual number of fighter squadrons needed, the provision of local missile defenses, and the distribution of the forces, but it seemed apparent that these differences of opinion were minor in nature and could be resolved in the future.

c. It was the consensus of those attending the conference at Ottawa that it would be inadvisable for the U. S. Chiefs of Staff to forward the Objective Plan officially to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee for comment prior to the time that a decision on the integration of the operational control of the Canada-U. S. Air Defense System is made.

2. It is suggested that there be no official communications at Chiefs of Staff level between the two countries regarding the Objective

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD N R

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COMSEC, IN COMSEC, Subj: COMSEC Objective Plan 24-46

Plan pending a decision on the integration of the Canadian, Mexican, Hawaiian, and Continental U.S. Air Defense establishments.

U.S. PARTNER
COMSEC
COMSEC-10-10

COMMA



MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

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CONAD HIST FILE

268

0000P

17 APR 1957

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) CADOP 56-66

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
as Executive Agent for CONAD
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, pursuant to his mission of defending the continental United States, Alaska, and the Northeast Area against air attack, has been charged with the responsibility of determining and recommending to the JCS requirements for forces, air defense weapons and equipments necessary to accomplish this mission. Accordingly, the Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan 56-66 (CADOP 56-66) was submitted to the JCS for review and approval on 18 December 1956. The basic concept of defense, the requirements for forces, weapons and equipments, and the planned deployment thereof, as reflected in this document, were based upon an appraisal of the enemy threat and with due regard to the ability of the United States to provide resources to combat that threat. In establishing the force objectives, this command provided a level of defense best calculated to deny the enemy the attainment of his minimum objectives.

Reply

2. The Terms of Reference for CIMCONAD specify that, "The development and procurement of air defense weapons and equipments will be responsive to the requirements laid down by CIMCONAD as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be accomplished by the Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force in accordance with existing procedures." Thus, while CADOP 56-66 presents CIMCONAD's requirements for air defense resources during this time period, JCS approval thereof is a prerequisite to Service-sponsored programs of developing, procuring, providing, and maintaining the necessary forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not, to date, approved CADOP 56-66 either in its entirety or in part. Without any recognized and approved CONAD program and goal, the air defense of North America can be, and is being, jeopardized by unilateral Service actions which, although valid insofar as the individual Service is concerned, frequently have a highly adverse effect on the Continental Air Defense System. Recent actions which have had a serious impact on CONAD involve (1) force reductions resulting from budgetary restrictions; (2) reduction of combat capability of existing forces; and (3) failure of the Services to support CONAD requirements in future programming.

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Aqs 0000, Subject: AAF 0000

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a. Force Reductions: Experience to date indicates that individual Service commanders, faced with a Service budgetary curtailment, are, without prior coordination with CINCOMAD, taking unilateral action in reducing CONAD component forces and funds. Specific cases in point include (1) deferral of the ACW construction program; (2) cancellation of programmed air base construction; and (3) deactivation of existing AAA battalions. Since neither the Department of the Air Force nor the Department of the Army is operationally responsible for the conduct of continental air defense, neither headquarters is in a position to evaluate the impact of their individual Service actions on the overall air defense system.

While recognizing that unforeseen budgetary limitations may from time to time necessitate a downward readjustment of CINCOMAD's total force table operations, it is imperative in the interests of national defense that CINCOMAD be consulted prior to any such reduction. This is necessary to insure (1) that CINCOMAD can present to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in proper perspective the requirements of Continental Air Defense in its relationship with other Defense Department activities; (2) that reductions in air defense forces and facilities are made on a CONAD-wide priority basis to insure that the overall air defense structure is degraded as little as possible; and (3) that CINCOMAD is provided with the necessary advance information to permit the timely readjustment of remaining forces to provide the best possible defense.

b. Readiness of Forces: The provision of combat-ready forces to COMAD is a responsibility of the individual Services. Combat readiness, by definition, requires the complete operational readiness of crews and equipment for combat. By the end of this fiscal year, 15 (approximately 23%) of ADF's COMUS-based fighter interceptor squadrons will have lost their combat-ready status due to Service-directed action to convert from F-100 aircraft (operational) to F-105 aircraft (not fully operational). A portion of these 15 squadrons will have been, at that time, in a reduced operational category for a period of from six months to over a year.

It is fully appreciated that practically all new equipment possesses certain design faults or omissions that can be discovered and corrected only during the initial operational test period. It is also recognized that frequently budgetary or other considerations dictate that the Services accept from production equipment which does not meet design specifications, on the basis that the equipment will be later retrofitted. Consideration must be given to the fact that the Services must maintain aircraft and other equipment totals to abide by legal ceilings imposed by Congress, thus necessitating that older equipment be phased out as new equipment is accepted into the inventory, regardless of the relative operational capability of the equipment at the time of transfer. None of the above factors, however, relieve the Services of the responsibility

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Sup COMAD, Subject: CADDP 56-66

of providing combat-ready forces to CINCOMAD, nor do they diminish CINCOMAD's requirement for combat-ready forces.

CINCOMAD can no longer accept degradation in combat readiness resulting from the failure of the Services to insure that follow-on equipment is operational prior to assigning such equipment to a COMAD component on a replacement basis.

c. Future Programming: CADDP 56-66 calls for a build-up of Surface-to-Air units (NIKE battalions or TALOS equivalents) from the present 61 to 77 by end FY 59, and to 100 by end FY 60. COMAD has placed a heavy reliance on this program in providing air defense for a number of SAC bases and other key installations. The recent decision of the Secretary of Defense to place all responsibility for the development and procurement of land-based short range SAM with the Department of the Army may have considerable impact on COMAD. Although the TALOS program had never appeared on Headquarters USAF documents, activation of 4 TALOS detachments in FY 58, 21 detachments in FY 59, and 12 detachments in FY 60 had been approved in principle by Headquarters USAF. This program, combined with the Army NIKE program, would have met the COMAD requirement. However, COMAD must now look exclusively to the Department of the Army for the provision of these SAM forces. Information available to this headquarters indicates that the total number of BONUS NIKE battalions currently programmed for end FY 60 will not exceed 100, and that the Department of the Army to date has announced no firm decision regarding procurement of TALOS. It therefore appears that NIKE/TALOS battalions in FY 60 will be 30 short of COMAD requirements.

COMAD continues to have an urgent requirement for a SAM with the capability of effectively countering a low-level air attack. CADDP 56-66 requirement for FY 60 is 16 battalions. It has been indicated to this headquarters that the 14 NIKE battalions originally programmed by the Department of the Army for FY 60 have now been reduced to 1.

CINCOMAD's stated requirements for Surface-to-Air missiles have not been reduced. Unless the Department of the Army can fulfill these requirements, COMAD's capability of meeting the potential threat in the immediate future will be seriously degraded.

3. CINCOMAD has been charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the responsibility of operating an air defense system capable of defending the continental United States, Alaska, and the Northeast Area against air attack. The force structure required to carry out this mission, currently and in the foreseeable future, has been determined and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Whereas no case is made for preferential treatment of COMAD component forces, it is considered essential to national security that COMAD requirements be recognized by the Department of Defense on the same basis

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Hqs COMAD, Subject: CADOP 56-66

as the individual requirements of the separate Services. Official recognition of COMAD requirements, however, is predicated on JCS approval. Accordingly, giving due consideration to the necessity of avoiding premature decisions in matters involving the security of the Nation, early approval of CADOP 56-66 is urgently solicited, thereby providing the foundation upon which CINGONAD can continue to build and maintain a balanced, combat-ready force, capable of carrying out his assigned mission.

COMAD

- SECRETARIAT
- INFO SERVICES
- DCS
- CG ARMY COMD
- PCAF LIAISON

Col. Seibert
2130
11 Apr 67
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ONE-ADC

m/r Not Required

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5 JUN 1957

CINCOMAD	RCF
	RCI
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OOCPA

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Nike Employment Plan for Fiscal Year 1959

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
As Executive Agent for COMAB
Washington 25, D. C.

INFO SERVICES	SPG
	ELC
	ESS
	YFM
	EEF

1. **Reference:** Terms of Reference and Memorandum by Secretary of Defense, subject: "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense, 26 November 1956.

2. This headquarters is in receipt of a letter from Headquarters, United States Army Air Defense Command concerning approval of their 1959 Fiscal Year Employment Plan.

3. The employment plan submitted by CG, USARADCOM provides for the employment of twelve additional Nike battalions in fiscal year 1959. The locations of these have been approved by both CINCOMAB and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The remaining seven have been approved by CINCOMAB. These locations are as follows:

a. ~~Wheeler, Indianapolis, and Offutt AFB - one battalion each.~~

b. Dow AFB, Blattsburg AFB, Fortsumth AFB, Westover AFB, Castle AFB, March AFB, Oak Ridge and Savannah River AEC Installations - one-half battalion each.

4. In view of the provisions contained in the references above, until the Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan 1954-1966 has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individual requirements such as site selection for these seven Nike battalions require approval prior to funding.

5. It is recommended, therefore, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the employment contained in paragraph 3 above and so advise the Department of the Army and this Command.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff



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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

1. Reference: Ltr to CINCONAD from Hq USARADCOM, subject: "Approval of USARADCOM Deployment Plan (U), 31 May 1957.
2. Reference letter stated that USARADCOM had been advised by D/A that, dependent upon the availability of funds, the Army could provide seven Nike battalions for deployment in fiscal year 1959 to areas not yet approved by the JCS. These seven are in addition to five battalions that have already been approved by the JCS. In order to proceed with site selection and design for these seven Nike battalions, D/A and USARADCOM require JCS approval of their proposed deployment under terms of the Wilson memorandum of November 1956.
3. CINCONAD approved the proposed USARADCOM deployment of the seven battalions on 26 April 1957. This letter recommends that the JCS approve the proposed deployment.

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HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADQAA-3 P&O 370

31 MAY 1957

SUBJECT: Approval of USARADCOM Deployment Plan (U)

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

- a. Letter, ADQAA-3 R 301, this headquarters, 23 April 1957, subject: "USARADCOM Deployment Plan."
- b. Letter, COOPH, Headquarters CONAD, 26 April 1957, subject: "USARADCOM Deployment Plan (U)."
- c. Message COOPR 006, Headquarters CONAD, 28 January 1957.
- d. Memorandum by Secretary of Defense, subject: "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense," 26 November 1956.

2. The Fiscal Year 1959 deployment plan submitted to your headquarters by reference 1a and approved by reference 1b provides for deployment of 12 additional NIKÉ battalions during Fiscal Year 1959. The recommended areas to which five of these battalions are to be deployed was transmitted by reference 1c to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, on 13 February 1957, concurred in the deployment of one NIKÉ battalion each to St. Louis, Cincinnati, Minneapolis-St Paul, Dallas-Ft Worth and Kansas City.

3. The Department of the Army has advised this headquarters that:

- a. Dependent upon the availability of funds, the Army can provide seven battalions for Fiscal Year 1959 deployment to areas not yet approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Subsequent limitations of construction funds and other practical considerations may require some adjustment in defense area locations and in the priority of installation of facilities at these locations.

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ADCOM-3 P&G 370

SUBJECT: Approval of USARADCOM Deployment Plan (U)

c. The type site to be constructed will be dependent on the availability of MCA funds.

d. Approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Fiscal Year 1959 deployments is required at this time if the additional deployments are to be accomplished.

4. In view of the above, approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is considered necessary for the planned Fiscal Year 1959 deployments of the seven additional battalions. The provisions of reference 1d require that "No service shall unilaterally plan for additional installations of either category (point or area defense) in support of CINCOMAD's responsibilities until and unless they are recommended by CINCOMAD to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved by that body." Because CADOP 56-66 has not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of the Army and this headquarters cannot proceed with site selection and design for new areas other than the five for which approval by Joint Chiefs of Staff has been received.

5. It is requested that the following Fiscal Year 1959 deployments of NICE units as previously approved by you be recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval: Houston, Indianapolis, and Offutt AFB-Osaha one battalion each; Dow AFB, Plattsburg AFB, Portsmouth AFB, Westover AFB, Castle AFB, March AFB, Oak Ridge, and Savannah River AEC Installations one-half battalion each.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. R. JOHNSON
Brig Gen. GS
Chief of Staff

Copy furnished:
DCSOPS DA
DCSLOG DA

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MESSAGE TRANSMITTED
WITH FOLLOWING DELIVERY TIME

PRIORITY

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AF

JCS 916755

SECRET

CINCOMAB

COPIE DEAF WASH DC

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COOPE 008

For COPIE DEAF as Executive Agent for COMAB. ~~Reference your JCS~~
 916755. This message in two parts. Part one. This part in answer
 to your specific query based on assumption that only forces
 mentioned to be provided. ~~Prerequisites for~~ installation of new
 weapons are as shown in CANAD 58-46, Part II, Section 1, Tables 2,
 3 and 4. The order of priority shown in these tables is based upon
 target evaluations given in the Key Facilities List. Recommended
 policy for programming, however, is to provide some defense for all
 critical targets, in order of priority, before building up to total
 level recommended for each target. If practical difficulties
 preclude providing defenses for any specific target in time to meet
 the priority assigned to it, the next target in order should be
 selected and the bypassed target should be picked up in the program

28 1530
 JAN 1957

COOPE

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
 LT COL L W GIBBARD
 2841 1

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CINCOSAS

at the earliest possible date. On this basis CINCOSAS
recommendations are as follows: (1) answer in program proposed for
first five HEMARC sites; (2) recommend next five WHEE units be
installed one battalion each at St Louis, Cincinnati, Minneapolis-
St Paul, Dallas-Fort Worth, Kansas City; (3) recommend first two
WAVE units be installed at New York and Washington. Note provision
of local defense for Houston not included due to fact that priority
for defense of this target likely to be reduced as result of studies
now going on at this headquarters. Part two. CINCOSAS considers
the program for additional AA defenses proposed for FY 58 entirely
inadequate. Note that CASOP 34-66 calls for a total of 77 AA units
to be operational by end FY 59. Actual requirement is considerably
in excess of this number but only 77 units were recommended due to
anticipated budgetary and construction limitations and figure was
consistent with previous tentative Army and Air Force programs for
WAVE and TALON. If 77 units to be operational by end FY 59
construction must be commenced during FY 58. CINCOSAS therefore
recommends program for FY 58 as follows: (1) five HEMARC
installations as proposed; (2) sixteen WHEE/TALON in addition to
sixty-one now programmed to be installed one each at St Louis,
Cincinnati, Minneapolis-St Paul, Dallas-Fort Worth, Kansas City,
Indianapolis, Dow, Plattsburg, Portsmouth, Westover, Castle, March,
Wright-Patterson, Barkeley, Davis-Heath and Finneyville; (3) first two
WAVE units to be installed at New York and Washington.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

2 2

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AG - 10
FM JCS DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF SECNS
TO: CINCOMAD ENT AFB

24 Jan 57

S E C R E T JCS JCS 916755. PAPA SEC DEF REQUESTS JCS RECOMMENDATIONS
IN FY 1958 CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS FOR NIKIE, HAWK AND BOMARC SITES. DEPT
AR ASKS AUTHORITY COMMENCE CONSTRUCTION 5 (5) NEW NIKIE SITES, AND 2 (2)
HAWK SITES. DEPT AF ASKS AUTHORITY COMMENCE CONSTRUCTION 5(5) BOMARC SITES
PROPOSED NIKIE SITES IN ADDITION EXISTING 61(61) NIKIE BATTALIONS PAPA MAP SENT
JCS INDICATES SITES UNDER CONSIDERATION BY OSD ARE: NIKIE AT SAN DIEGO,
MINNEAPOLIS, ST LOUIS, NORTHEAST OAK RIDGE AND SOUTHWEST OAK RIDGE, HAWK AT
NEW YORK CITY, AND BOSTON: BOMARC AT MCGUIRE AFB, SUFFOLK AFB, OTIS AFB,
DOW AFB, AND PLATTSPURG AFB PAPA REQUEST YOU SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS BY
28 JANUARY 1957, ON LOCATION OF THE 5(5) NIKIE SITES, 2(2) HAWK SITES, AND
5(5) BOMARC SITES FOR FY 1958 NEW CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM, ASSUMING THIS TOTAL
NUMBER FOR WHICH CONSTRUCTION WILL BE AUTHORIZED FOR THAT YEAR, WITH YOUR
COMMENT ON OSD SITING PROPOSALS WHERE THEY DIFFER FROM YOURS.

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6 August 1957

COMAR

SUBJECT: CON Deployment Plan 1959

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Executive Agent for COMAR
Washington 25, D.C.

1. References:

a. Letter, this headquarters, dated 5 June 1957, subject: "Request for approval of Nike Deployment Plan for Fiscal Year 1959."

b. Executive agency message, Headquarters USAF, AFMPC 57662, dated 27 June 1957, which requested this headquarters to submit all recommended air defense programs for Fiscal Year 1959 approved by this headquarters for referral with the recommended Nike deployments in letter referenced above to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. In compliance with message referred to in paragraph 1b, above, Incl 1 contains information relative to CON plans and Service programs for FY 1959.

a. Column I. "CON Requirements for FY 59." These requirements for FY 1959 are based on the Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan (OAP 56-06), dated 15 December 1956, published by this headquarters and forwarded to your headquarters for approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CON 56-06 requirements for FY 59, with changes as approved and recommended by this headquarters, comprise the CON approved program for FY 1959.

b. Column II. "Programs to be Operational - FY 58." These figures represent the status of the implementation of Service programs for air defense at the end of FY 58 for comparison with the programming figures in Column III.

c. Column III. "Service Recommended or Approved to be Operational in FY 59." These figures represent the Service programs for FY 59. Service programs for deployment in FY 59, such as USAF

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COOPR, Hq COMAD, subj: COMAD Deployment Plan 1959

Program-PL-59-1 "Program Guidance," have not been submitted to this headquarters for approval of that portion affecting air defense. CINCOMAD's requirements remain as stated in COMAD 5646 with the COMAD approved and recommended changes, as indicated in Column 1.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Incl
COMAD Plans & Service
Programs

Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:
Cdr ADC
CG US PACOM
COMNAVFORCEN

Lt Col O E Griest
2397
19 July 57

M/R: See attached.

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

1. Reference letter to USAF, as executive agency, subject: "Request for Approval of NIKE Deployment Plan for FY 1959" requested JCS approval of the deployment of 12 new NIKE Battalions at 16 new sites in FY 59. This letter was dispatched in accordance to a letter from ARADCOM, Subject: "Approval of USARADCOM Deployment Plan" dated 31 May 1957, which stated that the Dept. of Army advised that Joint Chiefs of Staff approval of these FY 1959 deployments was required.

2. USAF executive message AFODC 57662 indicated all air defense programs approved by CONAD, including Manned Interceptor, Guns, and ground environments were required. Such a request is misleading. For example: Hq USAF published a USAF Program-PC-59-1 "Program Guidance" to be used by AF units for planning. This document was not submitted to CINCONAD for approval, and is in variance with CADOP. The Army program has been submitted to CONAD in a piecemeal manner. The Navy is not planning expansion of their forces as a result of CADOP and have not submitted a program for approval of this headquarters. The result is that, outside of the missile deployments, which this headquarters has close control over plans for deployment, CADOP is the only CONAD approved plan and program for 1959. CADOP is not approved by the JCS but this headquarters has been requesting approval of the JCS for those deployments of the services toward meeting CADOP requirements, when requested to do so by the services through the component commands or in the case of Alaska, CINCAL.

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COMBAT PLANS AND SERVICE PROGRAMS

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	I COMBAT REQUIREMENTS - FY 59	II PROGRAMMED TO BE OPERATIONAL - FY 58	III SERVICE RECOMMENDED OR APPROVED TO BE OPERATIONAL IN FY 59
<u>MANNED INTERCEPTORS</u>			
UNITED STATES	66 Sqdns	64 Sqdns	68 Sqdns*
		<p>*NOTE: 1. Reference USAF Program-FG-59-1. 2. 70 Sqdns if 2 Sqdns for Alaska are returned to U.S. in operational status.</p>	
NORTHEAST AREA	3 Sqdns	3 Sqdns	3 Sqdns
ALASKA	2 Sqdns	4 Sqdns	4 Sqdns
		<p>NOTE: In top secret letters to C/S, USAF as executive agent, Subjects: "Fighter Interceptor Requirements for the Alaskan Command" dated 28 May 1957, and "Air Defense Requirements for Alaska" dated 6 June 1957, this headquarters recommended reduction to 2 Interceptor Squadrons in Alaska.</p>	
<u>BOMARS</u>			
UNITED STATES	1 Sqdn	None	None
		<p>NOTE: Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 1899/311 dated 13 February 1957, approved construction of five Bomars sites at:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) McGuire AFB, N.J. (2) Suffolk AFB, N.Y. (3) Otis AFB, Mass. (4) Dow AFB, Maine (5) Plattsburg AFB, N.Y. <p>The first 4 Bomars sites are under construction. USAF Program-FG-59-1 provides four Bomars units to be operational in FY 60.</p>	
<u>NIKE/TALOS</u>			
UNITED STATES	77 Bn's(Nike)	61 Bn's(Nike)	73 Bn's(Nike) (12 new Bn's at 16 new sites)
		<p>NOTE: 1. Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 1899/311 dated 13 February 1957 approved the construction of five new Nike sites at:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) St. Louis, Mo. (2) Cincinnati, Ohio (3) Minneapolis-St Paul, Minn. (4) Dallas, Texas (5) Kansas City, Mo. 	

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	I COMAD REQUIREMENTS - FY 59	II PROGRAMMED TO BE OPERATIONAL - FY 58	III SERVICES RECOMMENDED OR APPROVED TO BE OPERATIONAL IN FY 59
		<p>2. CINCOMAL in letter to the C/S, USAF, as executive agent, subject: "Request for Approval of Nike Deployment Plan for Fiscal Year 1959," dated 5 June 1957, recommended for approval of the JCS the following additional Nike sites:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Houston, Texas - 1 Bn. (2) Indianapolis, Ind. - 1 Bn. (3) Dow AFB - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn. (4) Plattsburg AFB - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn. (5) Portsmouth AFB - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn. (6) Westover AFB - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn. (7) Castle AFB - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn. (8) March AFB - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn. (9) Offutt AFB - 1 Bn. (10) Oak Ridge - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn. (11) Savannah River - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn. <p>3. Army Nike deployment for FY 60 is under study.</p>	271
ALASKA	2 Bn's	None	2 Bn's
		NOTE: Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 1899/298, dated 19 November 1956, approved 3 Nike Bn's for Alaska, to be operational by FY 1960.	
HALE	None	None	None
		NOTE: 1. Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 1899/311, 13 February 1957, approved construction of 2 Hawk sites at the following locations:	
		(1) New York, N.Y.	
		(2) Washington, D.C.	
		One Hawk Bn (New York) is planned to be operational in FY 60, the current "USARADCOM Operation Plan - 1957."	
<u>CONUS (CG & JCS mil)</u>	59		
UNITED STATES	20 $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn's	17 BA 25 $\frac{1}{2}$ NO 42 $\frac{1}{2}$ Total Bn's	3 BA 25 $\frac{1}{2}$ NO 29 $\frac{1}{2}$ Total Bn's
NORTHEAST AREA	1 Bn	1 Bn	1 Bn
ALASKA	1 Bn	3 Bn's	3 Bn's (2 Bn's approved by COMAD in lieu of 2 Skyweeper Bn's which are planned for conversion to Nike)
<u>REMARKS</u>	6		
UNITED STATES	3 Bn's	3 Bn's	3 Bn's
NORTHEAST AREA	2 $\frac{1}{3}$ Bn	2 $\frac{1}{3}$ Bn	2 $\frac{1}{3}$ Bn

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LAND BASED AND OFFICE RADARS

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	I COM'D REQUIREMENTS - FY 59	II PROGRAMED TO BE OPERATIONAL - FY 58	III SERVICE REQUIREMENTS OR APPROVED TO BE OPERATIONAL IN FY 59
<u>LAND BASED RADARS</u>			
UNITED STATES	148	144	144
		NOTE: USAF Program PG-57-1 provides 1 additional prime radar in FY 1960.	
NORTHEAST AREA	12	10	10
ALASKA	18 21	18	18
		NOTE: Recommended to C/S USAF as executive agent in TS letter subject "Air Defense Requirements for Alaska" dated 6 June 1957, to be reduced to 18 from original COMOP requirement for 21.	
CANADA	35	11 U.S. Manne & Financed 4 U.S. Financed 11 Canadian 26 Total	26
<u>OFF SHORE RADARS</u>			
UNITED STATES	167	142	158
		NOTE: Reference USAF Program PG-59-1.	
NORTHEAST AREA	6	6	6
ALASKA	6	6	6 (Project West Wall)
		NOTE: Recommended to C/S USAF as executive agent in TS letter subject "Air Defense Requirements for Alaska" dated 6 June 1957.	
CANADA	82	None	None
<u>OFF SHORE RADARS</u>			
TEXAS TOWERS	3	3	3
PICKET SHIP STATIONS	13	10	10
AEWAC STATIONS	13	8 Day to Day Basis 2 Increased Readiness	8 Day to Day Basis 2 Increased Readiness Basis

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COMB FLD OP - 3 & 4 (V) (M) (S)

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	I	II	III
	COMB REQUIREMENTS - FY 59	PROGRAMS TO BE OPERATIONAL - FY 58	TELETYPE RECEIVERS OR APPROVED TO BE OPERATIONAL IN FY 59
<u>BAGE DIRECTIVE CENTERS</u>			
UNITED STATES	8	None	7
		NOTE: Reference "S/DE Systems Schedule No. 6," issued by ADEB Project Office, dated 23 Jan 57.	
<u>BAGE COMBAT CENTERS</u>			
UNITED STATES	1	None	1
<u>BAGE</u>			
NORTHEAST AREA	To be deter- mined	None	None
ALASKA	Modified Badge System	None	2 Colocated AAGC-ADCC's in modified Badge system.
		NOTE: A modified Badge system was recommended by this headquarters to USAF, as executive agent, in letter, subject: "Air Defense Requirements for Alaska" dated 6 June 1957.	
<u>DEW LINE</u>			
ALASKA & CANADA	Not included in CADGP 56-66	40 (Northern Dew Line Project) 6 (Project Stretchout)	40 6
CANADA-N.E. AREA	Not included in CADGP 56-66	11 (Northern Dew Line)	11

SECRET



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7 MAR 57

CCOPA

SUBJECT: (U) Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
As Executive Agent for CONAD
Washington 25, D. C.

1. During the past eighteen months, we have expressed deep concern over the future threat of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. On 3 April 1956, in Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, USAF, As Executive Agent for JCS, this concern was reiterated. Reference is also made to Part 2 of CADOP 56-66, dated 15 December 1956.

B. 1.2

2. From the National Intelligence Estimates and all other available intelligence, it appears that the USSR can achieve an ICBM capability as early as 1959, and almost certainly by 1961. Evaluation of all available information concerning the current U. S. anti-ICBM development effort makes it apparent that a successful defense system will not be available in that same time period unless a greatly accelerated and intensified program is undertaken.

3. The most urgent future CONAD requirement is an adequate and timely defense system against Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. It is of the utmost importance that full recognition be accorded this critical requirement for ballistic missile defense and that immediate and definitive action be taken to bring an adequate defense system into being in time to meet the calculated threat.

E. E. PARTRIDGE
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD



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FILE NO.	SUBJECT		
TO: To c/s	FROM	DATE	COMMENT
COMMA			
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R-IX [REDACTED]			

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1 JUN 1957

COMCS

SUBJECT: Continental Air Defense Requirements

TO: Chief of Staff United States Air Force
As Executive Agent for CONAD
Washington 25, D. C.

1. This command has an immediate operational requirement to defend against cruise and ballistic missiles launched from surface vessels and surfaced or submerged submarines. Present defensive systems are limited in their capability to acquire and react against small, high speed targets. The requirement exists now for a quick reacting anti-missile capability with means to detect and destroy short and intermediate range, high speed surface-to-surface missiles and underwater-to-surface missiles, both cruise and ballistic types.

2. It is highly desirable that such anti-missile capability be incorporated into existing or contemplated air defense systems to avoid the high dollar, materiel and manpower costs of an independent, one-purpose system. Defense against the threat demands a combination of effective anti-submarine warfare and effective missile defenses.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

2804
27 June 57

Copies Furnished:
USARAFCON
NAVFORCONAD
ADC

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

6/27/57
H. J. [unclear]

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COHCS

Sub-Launched Missile Defense
COOPO

12 June 57
Maj Wilkinson/2437/bh

1. The attached letter outlines CONAD requirements for defense against sub-launched missiles. This requirement is not formally stated in CADOP.
2. CINCONAD support to the research now in progress in this problem area is desirable and places CONAD on record with an official position in this matter.

1 Incl
a/e

HARVEY T. ALNESS
Maj Gen, USAF
DCS/Plans & Operations

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