THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

[redacted]

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMM

AND

AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

History

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

160

PERMANENT ALERT PLAN

1. ANG Units to be removed from alert:

EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE

ANG UNIT	LOCATION	PHASE-OUT DATE
~~101 FIS~~	~~Boston, Mass.~~	~~[illegible]~~ 31 July 56 [6]
~~131 FIS~~	~~Westfield, Mass.~~	~~30 June 56~~
~~137 FIS~~	~~White Plains, N. Y.~~	"
~~138 FIS~~	~~Syracuse, N. Y.~~	"
~~171 FIS~~	~~Romulus, Mich.~~	"
~~164 FIS~~	~~Mansfield, Ohio~~	"
~~126 FIS~~	~~Milwaukee, Wisc.~~	"
158 FIS	Savannah, Ga.	30 Sep 56 [2]
166 FIS	Columbus, Ohio	31 Dec 56 [2]
163 FIS	Fort Wayne, Ind	31 Dec 56 [3]
133 FIS	Manchester, N. H.	30 Jun 57 [4]

WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE

115 FIS	Van Nuys, Calif.	31 Dec 56 [5]

2. ANG Units to assume alert:

EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE

ANG UNIT	LOCATION	PHASE-IN DATE
132 FIS	Bangor, Me.	1 Jul 56
156 FIS	Charlotte, N. C.	[illegible] 56 [6]
128 FIS	Marietta, Ga.	1 Oct 56 [1]

(43)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

305

EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE (Continued)

ANG UNIT	LOCATION	PHASE-IN DATE
159 FIS	Jacksonville, Fla.	1 Jan 58 [3]
165 FIS	Louisville, Ky.	1 Jul 57 [4]

CENTRAL AIR DEFENSE FORCE

ANG UNIT	LOCATION	PHASE-IN DATE
173 FIS	Lincoln, Nebr.	1 Jul 56
111 FIS	Houston, Tex.	1 Jul 56
125 FIS	Tulsa, Okla.	1 Jul 56
127 FIS	Wichita, Kans.	1 Jul 56
197 FIS	Phoenix, Ariz.	1 Jul 56
124 FIS	Des Moines, Iowa	1 Jul 56
182 FIS	San Antonio, Tex.	1 Jan 57 [2]

WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE

ANG UNIT	LOCATION	PHASE-IN DATE
192 FIS	Reno, Nev.	1 Jul 56
190 FIS	Boise, Idaho	1 Jan 57 [5]

3. ANG Units to remain on alert are as follows:

178 FIS	Fargo, N. D.
175 FIS	Sioux Falls, S. D.
181 FIS	Dallas, Texas
170 FIS	Springfield, Illinois
194 FIS	Fresno, California

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

305

1) The 158th FIS, Savannah, will remain on alert for the 128th FIS, Marietta, until 30 Sep 56 or until such time as ADC radar in the vicinity of Marietta is operational.

2) The 166th FIS, Columbus, will remain on alert for the 182nd FIS, San Antonio, until 31 Dec 56, to allow the 182nd time to convert to new type aircraft.

3) The 163rd FIS, Fort Wayne, will remain on alert for the 159th FIS, Jacksonville, until 31 Dec 56, to allow the 159th time to convert to new type aircraft.

4) The 133rd FIS, Manchester, will remain on alert for the 165th FIS, Louisville, until 30 Jun 57, to allow time for the 165th to convert to new type aircraft and for completion of runway construction.

5) The 115th FIS, Van Nuys, will remain on alert for the 190th FIS, Boise, until 31 Dec 56, or until such time as ADC radar in the vicinity of Boise is operational.

43

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

306

24 JAN 1956

[redacted]

[redacted]: (Unclassified) Air Force Reserve Augmentation

To: Commander
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, L.I., N.Y.

FILE NUMBER 3555.6

1. The Continental Air Defense Command has established a requirement for an augmentation alert detachment in the Memphis, Tenn. area, which was generated by the [redacted] on 1 December 55 of the Eastern Air Defense Identification Zone. Although an ADC radar site is now being constructed at Walnut Ridge, Arkansas, with an operational date of 1 March 56, ADC has no in place or programmed fighter interceptor units to provide CONUS air identification capability in this area.

2. Representatives of the 12th Air Force have indicated to this headquarters that the 319th Fighter Bomber Wing (Reserve) at Memphis Municipal Airport is capable of performing a daylight air alert mission similar to the mission now being performed by certain units of the Air National Guard. This, in brief, consists of furnishing two (2) fighter aircraft on five-minute alert under the operational control of the 24th Air Defense Division at Grandview, Missouri, since the parent [redacted] also lies within that area.

3. To support this type of operation, experience has indicated that five (5) officer spares must be allocated to the unit performing the mission. To obtain maximum training benefits from this mission, these spares should be rotated among the combat ready unit pilots. It is anticipated that maintenance support for the mission could be furnished by the 319th Air Reserve Flying Center at Memphis.

4. Request your comments on the following:

a. The capability of the 319th Fighter Bomber Wing (Reserve) to perform this mission;

b. The capability of your command to furnish the entire duty pilot spares in support of this mission;

c. In the event your comments to paragraphs 4.a. and 4.b. above are favorable, the feasibility of beginning the Air Force Reserve alert on 1 March 56.

[redacted]

Will be Combined in DD F Information Form Under Par 3c, AFR 205-1

NO

Prepared by [redacted] /Cmt

Telephone 2175-85

23Jan56

Date to Funded No.

ADC, Form 11 (REV) S-563-1 This correspondence is class[redacted]ordance with Par 23F, AFR 205-1, [redacted]son (s) stated.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Hq ADC ADOOT-B3 Subj: (Uncl) Air Force Reserve Augmentation (Cont'd) 3016

5. If your headquarters concurs in this proposal and is capable of furnishing the pilot spaces, immediate action will be taken by ADC to install appropriate communications facilities into Memphis airport. The 20th Air Defense Division will establish liaison with the 2501st ARFC in order to facilitate early implementation of this program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
Asst Command Adj

cc: Comdr, CAIW
Comdr, 14th AF

N/R not required.

COMEBACK COPY
Not requested, not furnished
Furnished 24 JAN 1956 (Date) (Initials)

C of S
CG AAA
COMMAYFORCOMAD
RCAF
Inst Prog
Pln Shy
COMD ADJ
Adm
Rcds Mgt
Class
Pers
Pub
COMD SURG
COMD STF JA
COMD CHAP
COMD IG
Insp Svs
Pol
OIS
DCS-C
Bud
Fin
Mgt Anlys
Stat
DCS-P
Civ Pers
Mil Pers
Assmts
Spec Ser
Res Adm
Cols & Rcds
DCS-O
Ops Sv
Tr & T
MAP
DCS-I
OI
R & E
IR
DCS-M
CCA
C & E
M & D
OCD
Ops Anlys
O & T
P & R
Res D
DCS-W
Auth
Elect
Ga Sup & Svs
Insp
Log Plans
War Con
HQ SO SEC
PCDA
CAA

Will be Confirmed in SAC Publication Form Under Par 3c, 12CSm
S-3
Prepared by
Initials to Punched No.

MAR 26 1956

S-563-2K

ADC FORM 11 (REV)

This correspondence is clas[redacted]ordance with Par 22 k, AFR 205-[redacted]n (s) stated.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

307

Chapter 13

AUGMENTATION FIGHTER BUILD-UP AND DEPLOYMENT

13-1. Introduction

A conscientious review of the results of augmentation fighters participating in Operation CRACKER JACK really requires a glance at the results of two previous exercises in which these forces participated.

During Exercise TAIL WIND, held in 1953, approximately 450 aircraft from the USAF Commands and Navy and Marines participated. The average time to deploy the USAF forces was approximately nine (9) hours. It required approximately six (6) hours to bring the Navy and Marine forces to strength since they were used in-place. The Guard participated, but with very little effort.

During CHECK POINT, of the following summer, a significant increase in augmentation forces was noted. More than 1700 aircraft and crews participated compared with 450 in the previous year. This was due to the large participation by the Guard. It required an average of fourteen (14) hours for these forces to reach peak strength; however, since there was plenty of advance warning, a significant portion had been made available within four (4) hours. Again, the forces which were used in-place —

44-1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the Navy, Marines and Guard — contributed the first aircraft to force.

TAIL WIND, also being a no-warning type exercise, indicates a more true comparison of the fighter force build-up of the participating augmentation forces.

13-8. Augmentation Fighter Availability and Employment

During GRAPHIC JAMB, four (4) hours was established as the planning factor for the availability of USAF augmentation forces. That is, with less than four (4) hours warning, the USAF forces would be employed in-place. As it turned out, approximately four and one half (4½) hours warning was available from the time "Alerted Alert" was declared until the first Fulcrum entered the U. S. system.

Planning factors for the use of the Guard were based on two (2) practice mobilization tests conducted within the past year. From these tests it was determined that we could expect at least fifty percent (50%) of the aircraft and crews to be available within two (2) hours warning, since these forces are employed in-place. In that the Navy, Marines, and Air Force Reserve were also employed in-place, the same two (2) hour factor was applied to them.

Exercise GRAPHIC JAMB began officially at 0147 Z, August 4, 0700 CDLAS 4-65 — plan for in-place use of USAF forces — was implemented by 0145 Z, Fifteen (15) minutes later, August 5 — plan for deployment of USAF augmentation forces — was implemented.

[illegible]

44-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

162

[redacted]

The point from which the build-up begins (as depicted on Chart 13-9) is the average time the forces received the exercise alert — approximately one hour after the exercise began. A significant force contribution of augmentation forces appeared within our four (4) hour expectation; however, most of this force consisted of day fighters and thus were of little value this late in the day. The probable reason for the large participation by the Guard was that the Bureau had authorized extra paid training days for personnel who participated. The USAF forces were less in number than during the previous year. This was due to TAC's wings being engaged in Operation SAGE BRUSH. The Navy and Marines contribution was less than the previous year also. It is believed that more of their forces would have been committed, had the exercise lasted longer. As Chart 13-9 shows, the Guard and Reserve had a rapid build-up of strength. However, since all of these aircraft were day fighters, or were to be used as day fighters since there were no combat ready NO's in the F94 and F89 squadrons, this force was released until the following morning. Since the exercise was terminated by the following morning and the Guard Bureau had allocated $7,000 to be spent over a four (4) day exercise, there were many disappointed Guard people.

44-3

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

162

301

Approximately one-fifth of the 243 aircraft committed to Navy and Marines were all-weather fighters. The remainder were day fighters and were released, as were those of the USAF Commands and the Guard.

As indicated by Charts 13-2, 13-4, and 13-5, the fighter augmentation participation in Exercise CRACKER JACK was very poor. It required in excess of twelve (12) hours, on the average to deploy USAF forces, as compared with nine (9) hours during Exercise TAIL WIND. Less than 1500 aircraft and crews participated in CRACKER JACK as compared with more than 1700 during GHOST FORCE. Reports show that not one USAF aircraft got into the air battle during CRACKER JACK, although it was informally learned that one F86-D, which had been diverted into O'Hare, accomplished one intercept. The Navy all-weather fighters contributed the most action during this exercise. Twenty-nine intercept attempts were made by the all-weather fighters with one successful.

13-3. Summary Results

Apparent reasons for lack of effective participation were:

(1) Too much time spent preparing detachments for deployment.

(2) Too much time wasted at enroute refueling stops.

(3) In some cases, ANTU delayed deploying detachments awaiting air traffic clearances.

(4) Day fighters were unable to participate since the exercise occurred during darkness.

With long deployment routes and enroute refueling stops, it is impractical to count on the USAF forces under no-warning conditions, other than for in-place employment. Using Exercise CRACKER JACK as a

44-4

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]

[illegible] due to any fighter augment[illegible]

1[illegible]. [illegible]

Effective use of [illegible] augmentation fighter forces in the future can only be realized through close consideration of the following critical guidelines:

(1) Rapid initial notification directly from [illegible] to the augmentation units; all other instructions (to deploy, how many, state of alert, back-up status, etc.) should be furnished by a controlling JADIV via an activated engineered circuit between the JADIV control center and augmentation unit home base.

(2) A detachment of sixteen (16) aircraft on a first priority basis should form and remain at the home base for an immediate air defense role.

(3) At each fighter augmentation home base, subsequent detachments, using an established priority, should form under the control of the commander of the first detachment until ordered by the controlling JADIV to deploy.

(4) Deployment should be of no greater distance than can be accomplished and ready for air defense within four (4) hours after an alert. Significantly, enroute refueling can not be attempted and should not be required.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

FILE NUMBER 339

308

25 MAY 1956

ADC or CONAD

Comm

Adj Prog

Fit Sfty

C of S

Press Rev

Protocol

C G ARAACom

COMNAVFORCONAD

Spec

COND 3(D)

COND EURO

COND STF JA

COND CHAP

COND 30

Insp Svs

PM

OES

DCS/C

Bud

Fin

Mgt Analys

Stat

DCS/P

Civ Pers

Mil Pers

Assts

Spec Act

Res Adm

Cols & Reds

OS

Pers Sv

DCS/T

OS

E & R

R

DCS/O

OCA

C & E

M & O

OCD

Gen Asst

Subject: Proposed CONAD Operations Plan 4-56 (Unclassified)

To: Commander in Chief
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Nebraska

1. Enclosed for your comments and/or concurrence is the draft of CONAD Operations Plan 4-56 covering [illegible] and [illegible] utilization of NORAD Regional Operations Centers. Although the operations for one of these forces is opposite now and will remain so indefinitely, major changes in the employment plan of CONAD operations Plan 4-55 are as follows:

a. We have incorporated some changes that did have complaints associated with published target priorities. (See Enclosures 1, 2, and 3)

b. Distribution of [illegible] underwater night [illegible] operations [illegible] (See Enclosure 4)

c. The present [illegible] plan calls existing [illegible] in our [illegible] regional sub [illegible] (See Enclosure 5)

2. [illegible] in regard to this plan do not [illegible] in CONAD Operations Plan [illegible] (See Enclosure 6)

3. The [illegible] support required under this plan will [illegible] CONAD [illegible] to [illegible] (See Enclosure 7)

4. [illegible]

Enclosures:
1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. [illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

FEEDBACK COPY

30th. AFS 101-1, [illegible]

Not required, AF Form [illegible]

ADC FO 1, [illegible] PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

Furnished 25 MAY 1956 (Date) (Initials)

20

S-58145 M-69T-1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

308

REQ

Incls not req for AG files

[redacted]

ADC HQ, FORM JAN 54 11 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

21

M-697-2X

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

38

FILE NUMBER 309

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AFOCP-OC-P/2

MAR 5 1956

SUBJECT: Revised ANG Air Alert Plan

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base, Colorado

1. References:

a. Letter, Headquarters ADC, subject: (U) Revision of the Air National Guard Air Alert Plan, dated 13 May 1955.

b. Memo to Chief of Staff, USAF, subject as above, from Chief, AF Division, Air National Guard Bureau.

c. Letter, Headquarters USAF, subject as above, dated 15 October 1955, with 1st Indorsement, Headquarters ADC, dated 23 November 1955.

2. The proposal for revision of the current Air National Guard Air Alert Plan has been the subject of considerable study within this Headquarters. The desirability of peacetime utilization of portions of the ANG in support of the air defense mission is concurred in subject to availability of the personnel and monetary resources.

3. Currently, serious problems are being faced in meeting the 137 Wing Program under existing manpower ceilings. In view of the programmed deficit in officer spaces during FY 57 and the present over allocated situation existing, the manpower costs of this increased Air National Guard Air Alert Program can only be met by a reduction of programmed units or activities.

4. In view of the shortage of personnel spaces cited in paragraph 3, above, the proposed increase in the ANG Air Alert Program cannot be approved or funded unless the deficit in officer spaces can be met from resources currently available to your command.

5. It is recommended that ADC supervision of ANG training be increased to a maximum and that training of those squadrons not on alert be accomplished on a week-to-week basis in coordination with CONAC and the AF Division of the National Guard Bureau.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Perm

NFAR

M-582-1X

Kenneth P. Bergquist

KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Major General, USAF
Director of Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

15 MAR 1956

0461

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

162

310

Hq 102nd Fighter Group (Air Defense), OPS, Subject: Air National Guard Air Alert Plan

ADOOR-B (16 May 56) 9th Ind

Hq Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Eastern Air Defense Force, Stewart AFB, Newburgh, N. Y.

1. The request to retain the 101st ANG FIS on alert can not be favorably considered.

2. The entire ANG Alert Program was recently studied and reevaluated in light of changing air defense requirements and manpower ceilings. The conclusions indicated a definite need for realignment of most of the units participating in the program for the following reasons:

a. We have a firm requirement for alert augmentation by ANG fighter interceptor units located in or near ADIZ areas in which we have no existing ADC squadrons.

b. Increased emphasis has been placed on the air defense of SAC bases. Some of these bases are located in areas without ADC fighter units but with ANG squadrons nearby.

c. There are several areas in which we have ADC squadrons and no fighters available to exercise them. The ANG fighters located in these areas can help train our ADC squadrons as well as increase our air defense capability in these areas.

3. In view of the above and the critical shortage of officer spaces, we were compelled to remove the 101st FIS from alert status.

4. This headquarters is well aware and is appreciative of the excellent job that the 101st has performed while on alert.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

Incl not req for AG file

1 Incl
n/c

[redacted]

M-744-1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

310

B/Ltr fr Hqs 102d Ftr Gp (AD) OPS Subject: ANG Air Alert Augmentation

EAOOT-TR (16 May 56) 4th Ind

HQ EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE, Stewart Air Force Base, Newburgh, New York

TO: Commander, Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Forwarded for appropriate action.

2. This Indorsement is UNCLASSIFIED.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
n/c

[redacted]

M-744-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

310

102nd FTRGP (AD), OTS, Subj: "ANG Air Alert Augmentation"

26ADOOT (16 May 56) 3rd End

HEADQUARTERS, 26TH AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE), Roslyn Air Force Station, Roslyn, New York

TO: Commander, Eastern Air Defense Force, Stewart Air Force Base, Newburgh, New York

1 Encl
n/c

G. L.

[redacted]

M-744-3

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

310

102ND FTRNF(AD), OPS, SUBJ: "ANG Air Alert Augmentation"

COMD (16 May 56) 1ST IND CMS/mjk

HQ 102ND AIR DEFENSE WING, Logan Airport, East Boston, MASS. 16 May 56

TO: TAG MASS, 905 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston 15, Massachusetts

1. This Headquarters concurs in the request that reconsideration be given to amending the list of ANG units to be retained on Air Alert Augmentation to include the 101ST Fighter-Interceptor Squadron as a properly manned all-weather committed unit.

2. Combat training in conjunction with the Air Alert Augmentation has been highly effective. The great and vital interest generated in aircrews by the reality of the ADC missions, has welded our Fighter Interceptor Squadrons into excellent fighting forces. These units are ready at any time to perform their M-Day Missions in a most capable manner.

3. Favorable consideration is strongly recommended.

4. In accordance with paragraph 9, basic letter, it is requested that this correspondence be forwarded directly by your office to Commander, 26TH Air Division (Defense), Roslyn Air Force Station, Roslyn, New York.

1 INCL
B/C

CHARLES W. SWEENEY
Colonel, MASS ANG
Commander

AI 97 2nd Ind WHM/EO'N/reg

AGO Mass., 905 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston 15, 17 May 1956

TO: Commander, 26th Air Division (Defense), Roslyn Air Force Station, Roslyn, N. Y.

1. Inviting attention to basic letter, and particularly to the qualifications of the 101st Fighter Interceptor Squadron as an all-weather unit.

2. There can be no question of the value of flying time performed under such realistic conditions to the combat readiness status of the Squadron, and favorable consideration of the request for its retention in the Air Alert Program is recommended.

1 Incl
m/e

WILLIAM H. HARRISON, JR.
Major General, AGO, Mass NG
The Adjutant General

[redacted]

M-744-4

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

310

HEADQUARTERS 102ND FIGHTER GROUP (AIR DEFENSE)
MASSACHUSETTS AIR NATIONAL GUARD
Logan Airport, E. Boston, Mass.

CPG

16 May 1956

SUBJECT: Air National Guard Air Alert Plan

THRU: Commander
102nd Air Defense Wing
Logan Airport
E. Boston, Massachusetts

The Adjutant General, Mass.
905 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts

Commander
26th Air Division (Defense)
Roslyn Air Force Station
Roslyn, New York

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. This Headquarters is in receipt of correspondence from the National Guard Bureau, subject: "Air National Guard Air Alert Plan" dated 24 April 1956. Subject correspondence states that certain ANG Air Alert Detachments will be phased out of operation on 1 July 1956.

2. The 101st Fighter Interceptor Squadron, based at Logan International Airport, E. Boston, Mass., is listed as one of the detachments being phased out of operation on the above date.

3. As a result of the foregoing, re-consideration for withdrawal of the 101st Fighter Interceptor Squadron from the Air Alert plan is hereby requested based on the following factors:

a. The 101st Fighter Interceptor Squadron has thirteen (13) complete aircrews currently assigned as against twenty-four (24) required by T/O.

b. Seven (7) of the thirteen complete aircrews are all-weather qualified in F-94B type aircraft and are on hand daily.

c. Three (3) of the remaining six aircrews are presently attending the Advanced Intercept School at Moody AFB, and will be available to this unit fully qualified for all-weather participation on or before 1 July 1956.

[redacted]

M-744-5

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. The remaining three (3) aircrews are nearing the final phase of AFSC Training locally and are estimated to be fully qualified and available by 1 September 1956.

5. Based on these factors, the 101st Fighter Interceptor Squadron at present, is capable of providing a minimum of at least five (5) fully qualified crews to perform all-weather coverage during the hours of dawn to dusk, presently in effect at this station. Further, this unit will be capable of providing a minimum of at least ten (10) fully qualified all-weather crews by 1 July 1956, for air alert.

6. In addition to the above factors, the 101st Fighter Interceptor Squadron has been actively participating in the air alert plan from 15 September 1954 to the present. During this period, this unit has accomplished the following in support of Air Defense:

a.	No. Practice Scrambles Effected	486
b.	No. Actual Scrambles Effected	109
c.	No. Practice Intercepts Effected	1628
d.	No. Actual Intercepts Effected	50
e.	Days Standown for Weather	150
f.	Days Standown for Maintenance	57
g.	Aborts	35
h.	Combat Air Patrol (Missions)	411
i.	Total ADC Flying Time	1990:45

Further support relative to Air Defense Exercises and Training missions, rendered by the 101st Fighter Interceptor Squadron, is outlined in attached letter of commendation from the 762nd ACAW Squadron based at North Truro, Massachusetts.

7. In view of all factors listed in previous paragraphs, it is sincerely requested that re-consideration be given to amending the list of ANG units to be retained on Air Alert to include the 101st Fighter Interceptor Squadron as an all-weather committed unit, during the normal periods of current air alert. Retention of the air alert program would also be of immense value to this unit in accelerating the completion of AFSC training of pilots and radar observers presently undergoing training at this base.

8. It is further believed that since the majority of Air National Guard units, to be retained on the Air Alert Program, are standing alert as "Day" Non-AI fighters, the addition of a unit qualified and capable of performing the all-weather mission will increase the air defense potential for identification of unidentified aircraft in the Boston Area.

[redacted]

M-744-6

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

310

Ltr, Subj: "ANG Air Alert Plan" Hq 102nd Ftr Gp (AD) dtd 16 May 56 (Cont'd)

9. On 6 February 1956, during a special conference on the re-organization of Air National Guard units to the Air Defense Command structure, approval was obtained from the Deputy Chief of the National Guard Bureau by the undersigned in dealing direct with Headquarters Air Defense Command, in this matter.

CHARLES T. GILBERT II
Colonel, Mass ANG
Commander

1 Incl:
Ltr of Commendation fr 762nd ACAW Sq

M-744-7X

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

FILE NUMBER 332.7

311

6 FEB 1956

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Operational Control of Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Squadrons (AFR Operations Plan 5-56)

TO: Commander
Joint Eastern Air Defense Force
Stewart Air Force Base
Newburgh, N. Y.

1. Reference letter your headquarters, subject as above, 16 January 1956. AFR Operations Plan 5-56 will be revised to reflect USAF operational control of Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Squadrons in accordance with the following quoted paragraph, 3a(3), USAF Wartime Organization Plan (WP-1):

"The mobilization, under ten active military service as 2-day, Air Reserve Fighter Bomber Squadrons from the continental air defense system, during the initial period of mobilization. For planning purposes, these units will remain under operational control of Air Force Air Defense MAJCOM Commander, after which operational control will revert to the jurisdiction of the unit in the fighter bomb wing, as required."

2. Supporting directives to AFR Operations Plan 5-56 should be revised with this letter as guidance until such time as the revised plan is published.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

R. E. PALMER
Major USAF
Asst Comd Adj

COMEBACK COPY
Not requested, not required
FEB 1956

M-505-1

Similar letter being sent to CADF & AFOAF

Maj R. E. Smith/TS
2841/2845
30 Jan 56

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

17

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
STEWART AIR FORCE BASE, NEWBURGH, N. Y.

JEAOPR

JAN 16 1956

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Operational Control of Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Squadrons (ADC Operations Plan 8-55)

TO: Commander in Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

a. ADC Operations Plan 8-55

b. Department of the Air Force Letter, subject: Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), dated 27 August 1954, Inclosure 1, Terms of Reference and Mission.

c. Air Defense Plan Continental United States 1-55

d. ADCCMP 1-55R

2. The following are excerpts from reference 1 a above:

a. Paragraph 1, second sentence. "As part of the air defense augmentation force, ADC has been given operational control of twenty-seven (27) Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber squadrons immediately after D-Day."

b. Paragraph 4a(2). "Operational control of the Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber units will be further delegated from ADC through Air Defense Forces to Air Defense Divisions in whose areas the Fighter Bomber units are located."

3. Instructions contained in paragraph 2 a above do not appear to be in consonance with the instructions contained in the following excerpts from reference 1 b, c, and d:

a. Reference b.

14 F 1955 M-505-2

[redacted]

S-JEADF-13-56

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

18

[redacted]

JEACPR Subject: (Unclassified) Operational Control of Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Squadrons (ADC Operations Plan 8-55) (Cont'd)

(1) Paragraph 2. "The Commander-in-Chief (CINC) will exercise operational control # over all forces assigned or otherwise made available by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other proper authority, for defense of the continental United States against air attack."

(2) Paragraph 6g. "In coordination with commanders concerned, prepare and submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval, plans for the full utilization of all military forces, including reserve forces, which have an air defense capability and which can temporarily augment the air defense forces in event of emergency."

(3) Paragraph 6h. "When there exists an imminent threat of air attack upon the continental United States, or in case such an attack develops, assume operational control of those forces specifically having been made temporarily available from other commands (augmentation forces)."

b. *Reference c.*

(1) Paragraph 3a(1). "Provide for operational control by the CINCONAD all Air Force forces assigned or otherwise made available for air defense of the continental United States."

(2) Paragraph 3d(2). "Exercise operational control over all Air Force, Army, and Naval forces assigned or otherwise made available for air defense."

c. Reference d.

(1) Annex B, paragraph 1b(6). "Make available to CONAD for incorporation within the air defense system all Air Force Reserve fighter bomber units when mobilized."

(2) Annex C, paragraph 3. "Upon commencement of hostilities the operational control of all augmentation and Air National Guard forces possessing an air defense potential will be assumed by CONAD."

M-505-3

14 FEB 56

[redacted]

~~0119~~

156204

S-JEADF-13-56

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

19

[redacted]

311

JEAOPR Subject: (Unclassified) Operational Control of Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Squadrons (ADC Operations Plan 8-55) (Cont'd)

4. In view of these conflicting instructions, this headquarters is experiencing difficulty in writing supporting directives to ADC Operations Plan 8-55. Earliest clarification is requested.

5. This letter is classified Secret in accordance with paragraph 23c, AFR 205-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Zenobia Skipworth

ZENOBIA SKIPWORTH
Captain, USAF
Asst Adjutant

14 FEB 1956

M-505-4X

3

[redacted]

~~0113~~

0472

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

167 Hq ConADC, COOOT-B3, Subject: (U) CONAD Operations Plan 8056 312

CNTDP (18 May 56) 1st Ind 9 Jul 1956

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commander, Continental Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Comments and recommended changes to the attached draft of CONAD Operations Plan 8-56 are as follows:

a. Reference paragraph 3a(1). It is believed that the intent is to have fifty percent of the air defense capability available within three (3) hours rather than fifty percent of the specified resources of aircraft and personnel. Although the objective of fifty percent capability may be inferred as written in the draft, the unit is allowed more flexibility in achieving the objective if the paragraph is written as follows: "Require all Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Squadrons to prepare alert plans which will require them to have sufficient aircraft, pilots and support personnel available to provide fifty percent (50%) of their air defense capability within three hours after the initial recall is received by the unit. The squadrons are expected to be able to provide the remaining fifty percent (50%) of their air defense capability within twenty-four (24) hours after the initial recall notice is received." (SECRET)

b. Reference paragraph 3b. A basic premise used in developing the ConAC war plan was that during the following an attack, communications systems would provide only limited service or would be completely disrupted for a short period of time. Our plan and subordinate plans must include sufficient guidance to permit almost automatic implementation. It is desired that Reserve unit commanders work with only two plans; one from our numbered Air Force which would contain pre-D-Day guidance for planning and general information concerning D-Day employment, and another from the ADC advisory unit, which would include the tasks to be accomplished and details for the execution of those tasks. To accomplish what we consider the optimum in planning for the immediate employment of Reserve units, we propose: That the plans developed by ADC provide the Reserve unit commander with the necessary guidance concerning the employment of his unit on D-Day; and that all such plans be coordinated at respective command levels of ConAC and ADC prior to publication. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Reference paragraph 4a(1). This paragraph should agree with the Secretary of the Air Force Order 315.1, 10 May 1956, which designated each major air command as specified in the document entitled

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

312

Hq ConADC, COOOT-B3, Subject: (U) CONAC Operations Plan 8-56

CNTDP (18 May 56) Lst Ind (contd) 9 Jul 56

"USAF Command Organization Function," RCS: AF-02A, as competent authority to order units of the Reserve components to active duty pursuant to Section 233 of the Air Force Reserve Act. Headquarters USAF has indicated that implementing instructions to commands should be published within the very near future. It is expected that major commands will have authority for the direct recall of Reserve units committed for immediate utilization without reference to ConAC. Therefore, suggest this paragraph be rewritten as follows:

(1) "In the event of an attack or imminent attack upon this nation, the CINCONAD will order Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Squadrons into active military service and will concurrently notify ConAC of the recall action. While operational control of the Fighter Bomber Squadrons will be retained by ConAD, ConAC will assume command jurisdiction and will also order the remaining units of the wings into active military service." (SECRET)

d. Reference paragraph 4a(5). Suggest a provision be added for using permanent party personnel as follows:

(1) "(5) Subsequent to the recall of Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Squadrons, ConAC will fill these units to authorized personnel strength from other Air Force Reserve resources and/or supporting personnel of the unit concerned." (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Annex B has been revised to indicate units and locations as currently programmed (see Inclosure # 2) (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. This indorsement is classified SECRET in accordance with paragraph 23b, AFR 205-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W.C. PIERSON
Captain USAF
Asst. Adjutant

2 Incls
1. n/c
Added 1 Incl
2. Revised Annex B

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

312

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
ENT AIR FORCE BASE
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

COOOT-B3

18 May 1956

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) CONAD Operations Plan 8-56

TO: Commander
Continental Air Command
ATTN : Deptuy of Plans
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. The attached draft of CONAD Operations Plan 8-56 is forwarded for your comments and/or concurrence.

2. Request your early consideration and return of this plan.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

R.E. PALMER
Major USAF
Asst Comd Adj

1 Incl:
Draft of CONAD
OPLAN 8-56

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

DOC # 313

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADOAA-3 P&O 601 27 January 1956

SUBJECT: NIKE Deployment and Site Availability Plan (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Totten 59, New York
Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois

1. Reference letter ADOAA-3 I&O 471.94, this headquarters, 14 June 1955, subject: "CONUS NIKE Program (U)".

2. Information extracted from District Engineer, NIKE Construction Status Reports (Inclosure 1) indicates that construction of NIKE facilities has been delayed to such a degree in several areas that the NIKE Deployment and Site Availability Plan contained in the inclosures to the letter referenced in paragraph 1 should be revised, in order that administrative and tactical facilities will be available in time for the NIKE units to become operational at the earliest possible date after arrival of the packages on-site.

3. Based on the information contained in Inclosure 1, it is proposed that the NIKE Deployment and Site Availability Plan (Inclosure to letter referenced in paragraph 1) be changed as indicated in Inclosure 2.

4. Request that your concurrence or comments and recommendations on the proposed NIKE Deployment and Site Availability Plan (Inclosure 2) be submitted to arrive in this headquarters not later than 20 February 1956. Where applicable, include the following information:

a. Availability and utilization of temporary facilities. (If necessary to determine requirements for temporary facilities, your headquarters should request the District Engineer to furnish beneficial occupancy dates for Troop housing, administrative facilities, and tactical facilities at the control and launching areas).

b. Appropriate explanation, in case any of the NIKE units under the proposed deployment plan will not be capable of becoming operational within two months after the scheduled on-site date.

REGRADING DATA CANNOT
BE PREDETERMINED.

Copy___of ____Copies

S151-56

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 P&O 601 27 January 1956

SUBJECT: NIKE Deployment and Site Availability Plan (U)

c. If facilities will not be available in time to accommodate the NIKE units, as required by the proposed deployment plan, explain, and indicate the earliest on-site date on which the unit can be accommodated.

d. If facilities will be available to accommodate the NIKE units at an earlier date than required by the proposed deployment plan, explain, and indicate the earliest on-site date the unit can be accommodated.

5. Facilities will not be available in time for the 51st AAA Battalion (Philadelphia, priority 41) and the 465th AAA Battalion (Niagara, priority 42) to become operational as required by the present deployment plan. Because of the imminent movement dates of the NIKE packages for priority 41 and 42 from Fort Bliss and the requirement for early action on priorities 43 and 44, your comments and recommendations on the proposed deployment plan for priorities 41 thru 44 are requested by electrical massage not later than 3 February 1956. The following information is furnished for your guidance:

a. This headquarters has requested the 852d AAA Missile Battalion be activated at U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, effective 1 March 1956.

b. This headquarters is withholding the request for activation of 465th AAA Missile Battalion for Niagara pending receipt of replies to paragraph 5 above.

6. If priority 41 thru 44 of the proposed deployment plan are acceptable to the Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, request the Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command forward to this headquarters, at an early date, the request for activation of the Hartford and Bridgeport battalions (Priority 43 and 44, proposed deployment plan), with activation dates to be effective during the month of March 1956.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICKELSEN:

2 Incl
1. NIKE Construction Progress Report
2. Proposed NIKE Deployment Plan

R. T. ASHWORTH
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:
DCSPER:DA
DCSOPS:DA

(Continued on page)

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 P&O 601
SUBJECT: [redacted] Deployment and Site Availability Plan (U)

Copies furnished: (Cont'd)
DCSLOGDA
TAGDA
TAGDA, Attn: CMD-Arty
CofEngr
CofOrd
CG, CONARC
CG, AAA&GM Cen
CG, 6th AA Rgn Comd
CO, Cen AA Rgn Comd
CG, 53d Brig
CG, 52d Brig
CO, 15th Gp
CO, 2d Gp
CO, 67th Gp
CO, 18th Gp
CO, 24th Gp
CO, 22d Gp
CO, 28th Gp

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

STATUS OF NIKE SITES
AS OF 15 JANUARY
From Engineer Construction Status Reports (U)

Battalion Priority Number	Unit	Defense Area	Site Number	Scheduled Battalion On-Site Date	Beneficial Occupancy	Const Complete
41	51	Philadelphia	23	May 56	Mar 57	Mar 57
			43		Mar 57	Mar 57
			78		Mar 57	Mar 57
			97		Mar 57	Mar 57
42	465	Niagara-Buffalo	05	May 56	Aug 56	Oct 56
			06		Sep 56	Nov 56
			23		Sep 56	Nov 56
			34		Oct 56	Dec 56
43	967	Bridgeport	15	Jun 56	Feb 56	Feb 56
			17		Feb 56	Feb 56
			65		Feb 56	Feb 56
			73		Feb 56	Mar 56
44	852	Milwaukee	96	Jun 56	Jun 56	Dec 56
			64		Mar 56	Oct 56
			74		Mar 56	Oct 56
			80		Mar 56	Oct 56
45		Hartford	08	Jul 56		Apr 56
			25			Jul 56
			36			Apr 56
			43			Oct 56
			67			Apr 56
			85			Apr 56
46	74	Pittsburgh	03	Jul 56		Nov 56
			37			Dec 56
			43			Nov 56
			93			Nov 56

REGRADING DATA CANNOT
BE PREDETERMINED

Copy ____of___Copies

SECRET

313

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

STATUS OF NIKE SITES (Cont'd) (U)

Battalion Priority Number	Unit	Defense Area	Site Number	Scheduled Battalion On-Site Date	Beneficial Occupancy	Const Complete
47		Cleveland	13	Aug 56	Sep 56	Oct 56
			69		Sep 56	Oct 56
			48		Aug 56	Sep 56
			59		Jul 56	Aug 56
48		Providence	38	Aug 56	Jul 56	Jul 56
			69		Jul 56	Jul 56
			99		Jul 56	Jul 56
49		Niagara-Buffalo	33	Sep 56	Apr 57	Jun 57
			35		Oct 56	Dec 56
			43		Oct 56	Dec 56
			44		Oct 56	Dec 56
50		Milwaukee	02	Sep 56	Jun 56	Oct 56
			20		Feb 57	Feb 57
			54		May 56	Oct 56
			42		May 56	Oct 56
51	496	Chicago	46	Oct 56	Nov 56	Nov 56
			54		Jul 56	Jul 56
			70		Jun 56	Jun 56
			84		Jul 56	Jul 56
52	605	Boston	05	Nov 56		Sep 56
			15			Sep 56
			38			Sep 56
			85			Sep 56

SECRET

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

STATUS OF NIKE SITES (Cont'd) (U)

Battalion Priority Number	Unit	Defense Area	Site Number	Scheduled Battalion On-Site Date	Beneficial Occupancy	Const Complete
53	34	New York	05	Nov 56	Jan 57	Mar 57
			79		Jun 57	Mar 57
			94		Jan 57	Feb 57
			24		Dec 56	Jan 57
54		Cleveland	21	Dec 56	Nov 56	Dec 56
			29		Nov 56	Dec 56
			67		Nov 56	Dec 56
			34		Nov 56	Dec 56
55	18	Detroit	17	Dec 56	Aug 56	
			55		Cancelled	
			57		Jan 57	May 57
			58		Cancelled	
56		Bridgeport	04	Jan 57		Oct 56
			40		Nov 56	Jun 57
			94			Oct 56
57	13	Chicago	03 Dual	Jan 57	Mar 57	
			44		Nov 56	Nov 56
			31		Dec 56	Dec 56
			47		Dec 56	Dec 56
58		Loring Air Force Base	13	Feb 57	Dec 56	Dec 56
			31		Dec 56	Dec 56
			68		Dec 56	Dec 56
			85		Dec 56	Dec 56

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

STATUS OF NIKE SITES (Cont'd) (U)

Battalion Priority Number	Unit	Defense Area	Site Number	Scheduled Battalion On-Site Date	Beneficial Occupancy	Constr Complete
59		Ellsworth Air Force Base	02	Feb 57	Feb 57	Feb 57
			21		Feb 57	Feb 57
			54		Feb 57	Feb 57
			83		Feb 57	Feb 57
60		Fairchild Air Force Base	07	Mar 57	Oct 56	Oct 56
			37		Oct 56	Oct 56
			45		Oct 56	Oct 56
			87		Oct 56	Oct 56
61		Travis Air Force Base	10	Mar 57	Oct 56	Oct 56
			33		Oct 56	Oct 56
			53		Oct 56	Oct 56
			86		Oct 56	Oct 56

SECRET

SECRET

313

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

NIKE DEPLOYMENT AND SITE AVAILABILITY PLAN (U)

CURRENT PLAN			PROPOSED PLAN				
PRIORITY	UNIT & DEFENDED AREA		PRIORITY	UNIT & DEFENDED AREA		#ONSITE DATE	BENEFICIAL OCCUPANCY DATE
41	51	Philadelphia	41	*967	Bridgeport	May 56	Mar 56
42	*465	Niag - Buffalo	42	*852	Milwaukee	May 56	Mar 56 (a)
43	*967	Bridgeport	43	*___	Hartford	Jun 56	Apr 56
44	*852	Milwaukee	44	*___	Providence	Jun 56	Jul 56
45	*___	Hartford	45	*___	Milwaukee	Jul 56	Jun 56 (a)
46	74	Pittsburgh	46	605	Boston	Jul 56	Sep 56
47	*___	Cleveland	47	496	Chicago	Aug 56	Jul 56 (a)
48	*___	Providence	48	*465	Niag-Buffalo	Aug 56	Sep 56
49	*___	Niag-Buffalo	49	*___	Cleveland	Sep 56	Dec 56
50	*___	Milwaukee	50	*___	Niag-Buffalo	Sep 56	Oct 56 (a)
51	496	Chicago	51	*___	Bridgeport	Oct 56	Nov 56
52	605	Boston	52	74	Pittsburgh	Nov 56	Nov 56
53	34	New York	53	34	New York	Nov 56	Jan 57 (a)
54	*___	Cleveland	54	13	Chicago	Dec 56	Dec 56 (a)
55	18	Detroit	55	*___	Cleveland	Dec 56	Nov 56
56	*___	Bridgeport	56	51	Philadelphia	Jan 57	Mar 57
57	13	Chicago	57	18	Detroit	Jan 57	Jan 57 (b)
58	*___	Loring AFB	58	*___	Fairchild AFB	Feb 57	Oct 56
59	*___	Ellsworth AFB	59	*___	Travis AFB	Feb 57	Oct 56
60	*___	Fairchild AFB	60	*___	Loring AFB	Mar 57	Dec 56
61	*___	Travis AFB	61	*___	Ellsworth AFB	Mar 57	Feb 57

NOTES: # - Onsite month during which the first battery of the battalion arrives on-site. Battalions will normally be deployed a battery at a time.

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED.

[redacted]

Copy___of___Copies

Incl 2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

NIKE DEPLOYMENT AND SITE AVAILABILITY PLAN (Cont'd) (U)

NOTES: * - Unit activated on-site 3 months prior to the indicated on-site date.

(a) - Fourth battery position may not be available for beneficial occupancy by this date.

(b) - Two battery sites cancelled due to recommended siting in Canada.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 T&O 25 January 1956

CONUS NIKE Program

a. Letter, ADOAA-3 T&O 471.94, this headquarters, 14 June 1955, subject as above, contains the DA approved NIKE Deployment and Site Availability Schedule.

b. Letter, BARC-4 6001., 2d Regional Command, 4 Jan 56, subject: "Status of NIKE Construction Program" (attached contains following information:

(1) Construction at Philadelphia and Pittsburgh has slipped to such a degree that facilities will not be available for many months after the packages are scheduled to arrive on-site.

c. Message 1st Army Coord ARC-CL-256-6, 24 Jan (attached) contains information that if priority 45 (465 Bn-Niagara(activation has not been requested)) is shipped to Niagara in May 56 as presently scheduled one (1) battery will become operational utilizing temporary facilities and three (3) batteries will not be operational

(over)

Letter to 1st, 2d and 5th Regional Commands with a proposed NIKE Deployment and Site Availability Plan (based on the beneficial occupancy dates contained in incl 1 to attached letter) for concurrence or comments and recommendations.

E

G1	G1	G3, O&T
G4	G4	G3, P&M
Engr	Eng	
Ord	Ord	
Sig	Sig	
Trans	Trans	

L. A. LUDLIN

Lt Colonel, A 219

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

313

until completion of facilities in November and December 1956.

d. If packages for priority 41 and 42 are shipped to 51 Bn (Phila) and 465 Bn (Niagara) in May 56 as presently scheduled these NIKE units will not be operational for many months pending completion of permanent facilities.

e. Based on the beneficial occupancy dates (completion of tactical facilities) contained in District Engineer Construction Status Report, 15 January (Incl 1) indicates that packages for 41 and 42 should be diverted to Hartford and Bridgeport in lieu of Philadelphia and Niagara, respectively and that other NIKE priority should also be adjusted to fit the availability of facilities for NIKE units.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

314

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADOAA-3 R&O 471.94 23 April 1956

SUBJECT: CONUS NIKE Program (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Totten 59, New York
Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois
Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Baker, California
Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Command, Grandview Air Force Base, Grandview, Missouri

1. Letter OPS OD AD-2, Department of the Army, 7 April 1956, subject as above, is attached for your information and necessary action.

2. Letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, 14 June 1955, with 1 Inclosure as revised, is rescinded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. R. ANDERSON
Capt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
Ltr OPS OD AD-2, D.A.
7 Apr 56, subj as above
w/3 incls (5 cys of Incl)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
1 CLOSURES

COPY ____ OF ____ COPIES

S 598-6

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Washington 25, D. C.

OPS OD AD-2

7 Apr 1956

SUBJECT: CONUS NIKE Program (U)

TO: Commanding General, Continental Army Command
Ft. Monroe, Virginia
Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Department of the Army letter, OD OP NA 3, subject as above, dated 2 June 1955, with three (3) inclosures as revised, is rescinded.

2. Attached are revised general instructions (Incl 1), NIKE I equipment production and allocation schedule (Incl 2), and NIKE I deployment and site availability schedule (Incl 3).

/s/ illegible
C. D. EDDLEMAN
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
For Military Operations

3 Incls
1. General Instructions
2. NIKE I Equip Prod & Alloc'n
3. NIKE I Depl & Site Avail
(CONARC - 5 cys of Incls)
(ARAACOM - 10 cys of Incls)

Copies Furnished:
CG's ZI Armies (1 cy ea)
CG AAA & GM Ctr (5 cys of Incls)
CG MDW (1 cy)
CG Redstone Arsenal (3 cys of Incls)

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED
~~When separated from~~
classified inclosures

COPY ___ OF ___ COPIES

9-4

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Shipment of Battery Control Sets from Factory:

a. All sets allocated for non-tactical use will be shipped in accordance with instructions to be furnished by the recipient of the set to Office, Chief of Ordnance.

b. All sets for new ARA/COM missile units will be shipped to Fort Bliss except those sets to be proof-tested. Proof-test sets will be shipped to White Sands Proving Ground as indicated in paragraph 3, below.

c. In the event a replacement set is required by an onsite NIKE I battalion, the set will be provided from sets available to the Chief of Ordnance.

2. Ring-out: Formal Ordnance Corps ring-out will be given at Fort Bliss by contractor personnel on sets numbered 24, 29, 36, 41, 47, 53, 59, 65, 71, 77, 82, 90, 97, 106, 113, 122, 129, 138, 146, 154, 162, 170, 178, 186, 194, 203, 212, 221, 230, 239, 248, 257, 266, 275, 284, 293 and 302.

3. Proof-test: Proof-test and ring-out will be accomplished at White Sands Proving Ground by Ordnance personnel on sets numbered 3, 5, 8, 9, 16, 23, 30, 35, 40, 45, 54, 60, 63, 67, 78, 86, 94, 102, 110, 118, 126, 134, 142, 166, 190, 206, 225, 252, 270 and 297. Upon completion of the tests, the sets will be moved to Fort Bliss.

4. Package Movement to Onsite Positions: Package personnel and equipment will move to assigned defense areas as battery units complete training. The NIKE I battalion deployment schedule is based upon arrival in the defense area of the first battery package during the month shown. Every effort will be made to meet the scheduled onsite dates. Variations in package movement from Fort Bliss which will result in not more than one month change in the onsite dates will be coordinated by AA&GM Center with ARAACOM and Fourth Army, with notification to the Department of the Army. Developments which would result in delaying the onsite schedule by more than one month will be reported to Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, at once.

5. Operational Date: Every effort will be made to have the NIKE I units operational not later than two (2) months after the scheduled onsite date. The interval between scheduled arrival of equipment and the operational date of the unit may be used for emplacement and checking of equipment and for unit training.

Incl 1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

April 1956

NIKE I EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION AND ALLOCATION SCHEDULE

1. NIKE I Battery Control Set Forecast Delivery:

	THRU Dec 55	1956 J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Monthly Prod		8	14	13	9	9	9	4	9	9	9	9	9
Cumulative	201	209	223	236	245	254	263	267	276	285	294	303	312
Non-Tactical Alloc.	48	2	2			2	1		1	2	2	2	2
Avail for Tactical Units	153	159	171	184	193	200	208	212	229	227	234	241	248

2. The non-tactical allocations shown in paragraph 1, above, are assigned as follows:

Recipient	Set Numbers	Total Sets
AA&GM Br, TAS	7, 13, 28, 37, 94, 126, 142, 154, 157, 158, 162, 166, 170, 174, 178, 186, 198, 206	18
1st GM Brig	2, 3, 36, 51	4
495 AAA Msl Bn	10, 16	2
AA&GM Ctr (Svc Practice)	103, 111, 190, 191, 305, 310	6
CONARC Bd #4	4	1
Ord GM School	1, 38, 42, 168, 184	5
Ord Support Activities	39, 64, 86, 169, 185, 193, 201, 202, 211, 220	10
Universal Set Prototypes	253, 274, 282, 290, 298	5
WE Co.	6, 14, 15	3
Bell Tel. Lab.	11, 108	2
Air Force	101	1

Incl 2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Recipient	Set Numbers	Total Sets
Cold-Weather Test	81	1
OCSigO (AN/MSG-4 Test)	260, 280	2
OCSigO (PCM test) For 6 months	247	1
OCSigO (Missile Master-Test)	287, 295	2
Burned	5 (3 May 54)	1
		64

3. Assembly Equipment

a. The initial basis for issuing assembly and test equipment was one (1) battalion assembly set per NIKE I battalion. Non-tactical allocations of these battalion sets are:

5 sets (#1, 3, 9, 10, 17) to AA&GM Center
1 set (#2) to WE Co.
1 set to APG Bd #4
1 set to OCofOrd

b. The concept of battery missile assembly and test has been adopted for CONUS NIKE I battalions. Missile assembly and test equipment will be issued to tactical units in accordance with the appropriate TOEs.

c. Normally, missile assembly and test equipment will not be issued with battery control sets which are allocated for non-tactical purposes and which will not be required to actually control missiles in flight. Where missile assembly and test equipment is required for instruction purposes, it may be requisitioned by the user in quantitites not to exceed the TOE allowance authorized for each control set in his possession.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

314

April 1956

NIKE I DEPLOYMENT AND SITE AVAILABILITY PLAN

PRIORITY	LOCATION	UNIT	ONSITE#	CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED
1.	Washington-Baltimore	36	Dec 53 (T)	Jun 55 (a)
2.	New York	526	Jan 54 (T)	May 55
3.	Chicago	86	Mar 54 (T)	May 55
4.	Detroit	516	Mar 54 (T)	Jul 55
5.	Washington-Baltimore	71	Apr 54 (T)	Mar 55
6.	New York	505	May 54 (T)	Oct 55
7.	Philadelphia	738	May 54 (T)	Apr 55
8.	Hanford	83	Jun 54 (T)	Jan 55
9.	San Francisco	740	Jun 54 (T)	Apr 55
10.	Los Angeles	551	Jun 54 (T)	Jul 55 (a)
11.	Seattle	29	Jul 54 (T)	May 55
12.	New York	66	Aug 54 (T)	Apr 55
13.	San Francisco	9	Sep 54 (T)	Feb 55
14.	Los Angeles	554	Sep 54 (T)	Feb 55
15.	Washington-Baltimore	75	Oct 54 (T)	Feb 55
16.	Seattle	513	Nov 54 (T)	Jan 55
17.	Chicago	79	Nov 54 (T)	May 55
18.	Philadelphia	506	Dec 54 (T)	Mar 55
19.	Detroit	504	Jan 55	Feb 55
20.	Norfolk	38	Jan 55	Feb 55
21.	Boston	514	Feb 55	Mar 55
22.	Pittsburgh	509	Mar 55	May 55
23.	Washington-Baltimore	54*	Mar 55 (T)	May 55

Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

Incl 3

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY	LOCATION	UNIT	ONSITE	CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED
24.	Norfolk	56	Apr 55	Mar 55
25.	Niagara-Buffalo	44	Apr 55 (T)	Nov 55
26.	Philadelphia	176*	May 55	Dec 55
27.	New York	483*	Jun 55 (T)	Jan 56 (a)
28.	Chicago	485*	Jun 55 (T)	Aug 55
29.	Pittsburgh	1*	Jul 55	Jan 56
30.	Detroit	85*	Aug 55 (T)	Oct 55 (a)
31.	Boston	24*	Sep 55	Oct 55
32.	Los Angeles	865*	Sep 55 (T)	Jul 56
33.	Washington-Baltimore	602	Oct 55 (T)	May 56
34.	San Francisco	441*	Nov 55 (T)	Feb 57 (a)
35.	Seattle	433*	Dec 55	May 56 (a)
36.	Chicago	78*	Jan 56 (T)	Mar 56
37.	Washington-Baltimore	**	Feb 56	May 56 (a)
38.	Los Angeles	933*	Mar 56	Sep 56 (a)
39.	New York	737	Apr 56	Nov 56 (a)
40.	Providence	739*	Apr 56	Apr 56 (a)
41.	Philadelphia	**	May 56	Dec 56
42.	Boston	605	May 56	May 56 (a)
43.	Bridgeport	967*	Jun 56	May 56 (a)
44.	Milwaukee	852*	Jun 56	Mar 56 (a)
45.	Hartford	11*	Jul 56	Jun 56 (a)
46.	Milwaukee	401*	Jul 56	Jun 56 (a)
47.	Chicago	13	Aug 56	Jul 56 (a)
48.	Providence	751*	Aug 56	Jul 56
49.	Pittsburgh	74	Sep 56 (T)	Apr 57

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

314

PRIORITY	LOCATION	UNIT	ONSITE	CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED
50.	Niagara-Buffalo	465*	Sep 56	Sep 56 (a)
51.	Cleveland	*	Oct 56	Jan 57
52.	Chicago	49	Nov 56 (T)	Mar 57 (a)
53.	New York	34	Nov 56 (T)	Mar 57
54.	Cleveland	*	Dec 56	Mar 57
55.	Niagara-Buffalo	**	Dec 56	Oct 56 (a)
56.	Bridgeport	*	Jan 57	Jan 57
57.	Detroit	18	Jan 57 (T)	Mar 57 (b)
58.	Fairchild AFB	*	Feb 57	Dec 56
59.	Travis AFB	*	Feb 57	Dec 56 (a)
60.	Ellsworth AFB	*	Mar 57	Feb 57 (a)
61.	Loring AFB	*	Mar 57 (T)	Jan 57

NOTES:

#Onsite month is month during which the first battery of the battalion arrives onsite. Battalions will normally be deployed a battery at a time.

(T) Indicates unit will initially occupy temporary sites in the defended area.

*Activated battalion

(a) Fourth battery position may not be completed by this date

(b) Two battery positions may not be completed by this date.

**Equipment and package personnel form dual control batteries with existing NIKE I units in the defense area. A new NIKE I Bn is not formed under this priority.

3578-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

315

12 MAY 56

Major General M. S. Carter
Commanding General
5th Antiaircraft Regional Command
Fort Sheridan, Illinois

Dear Pat:

I have received your letters of 23 March and 13 April concerning the integration of National Guard Special Security Force units into the air defense of CONUS.

The question you have raised concerning funds to support the ceremonies and social functions suggested is being studied but it is not likely that additional funds can be authorized by Department of the Army. The overall departmental authorization of such funds is quite limited and this headquarters is already getting a relatively large share.

With reference to your concern over the delays in National Guard units becoming operational, Department of the Army has already made realistic revisions of the on-site objectives. The end FY 56 objective is now 75 batteries on-site instead of 104 batteries and the end FY 57 objective is 121 batteries instead of 200, with the balance of 79 batteries to be on-site by end FY 58. While this revision may help us to meet the FY 56 objective, it should not, of course, be interpreted as a reason for not making sites available when such is possible. When Department of the Army furnishes the breakdown of the revised schedule by defences, we will furnish it to you immediately.

Our experiences in other areas indicate that you may be able to assist the National Guard units in obtaining quantity-distance safety waivers in preparation for drawing ammunition. We have and are continuing to experience considerable delays in on-site Special Security Force units becoming operational because of delays in processing waiver requests. It seems to me that waiver requests could be submitted far enough in advance to have them approved by the time ammunition is required.

On 16 April, Colonel Kenorick indicated that he discussed with you, during the recent Department of the Army team visit to your headquarters, a solution to the problem of making sites available to the National Guard in Chicago. Your early comments and recommendations concerning this proposal will be of assistance to us in preparing our comments to Department of the Army.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

315

General Carter

Your continued personal interest in this important program is appreciated.

Sincerely,

S. R. MICKELSEN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

316

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADCAA-APM 330.11 20 July 1956

SUBJECT: Monthly Statistical Summary

TO: See Distribution

1. Attached as inclosure 1 is a copy of Monthly Statistical Summary for the month of June 1956.

2. a. Units achieving USAACIC standards or better:

AWOL	1st AAAC; 2d AAAC; 5th AAAC; 6th AAAC; 4th AAAC
Confinement	None
Courts-Martial	1st AAAC; 2d AAAC; 5th AAAC; 4th AAAC
Motor Vehicle Accidents	None
Personnel Injuries	1st AAAC; 4th AAAC

b. Best results were attained during the month by the following:

AWOL	6th AAAC (.2[illegible]% of Bnd Pop)
Confinement	5th AAAC (.28% of Bnd Pop)
Courts-Martial	1st AAAC (.36% of Bnd Pop)
Motor Vehicle Accidents	2d AAAC (1.77% per 100,000 Miles)
Personnel Injuries	1st AAAC (3.57% per 100,000 Miles)
Reenlistments	6th AAAC (16.4% of those separated)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Monthly Stat Summary

J. A. PONGONIS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: N & C

Copies furnished:
TAG DA, ATTN: AGST (1)
DCSPERDA, ATTN: Army Safety Dir (1)
CO, 18th AAA Group (1)

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified inclosures

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

MONTHLY STATISTICAL SUMMARY (U) Month Ending 30 June 1956

UNIT	AVERAGE ASSIGNED STRENGTH		AWOL				COURTS MARTIAL							
							GENERAL		SPECIAL		SUMMARY		TOTAL	
	EM	AC MIL	NO	RATE PER 1000 ASG		RATE PER 1000 ASG	CASES	CONVIC	CASES	CONVIC	CASES	CONVIC	CASES	RATE PER 1000 ASG
7285th GU	203	4[illegible]	2	.71	0	.00	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	.20
1st AARC	10281	11[illegible]	[illegible]	.46	[illegible]	.03	0	0	16	15	24	23	40	.36
2d AARC	11512	[illegible]	[illegible]	.56	47	.37	0	0	37	33	32	31	69	.55
5th AARC	7430	81[illegible]	24	.32	23	.20	0	0	17	16	19	18	35	.44
6th AARC	9877	10773	[illegible]	[illegible]	34	.32	1	1	16	12	35	34	47	.44
4th AARC	565	718	[illegible]	[illegible]	2	.70	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	1.35
TOTAL	40000	43[illegible]0	1[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	1[illegible]	81	115	112	202	.46

Incl 1

DOWNGRADED UNCLASSIFIED 90 DAYS AFTER INDICATION

Page 1 of 2 Pages

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ARMACOM MONTHLY STATISTICAL SUMMARY (U)

Month Ending 30 June 1956

UNIT	ARMY MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS			MOTOR VEHICLE FATALITIES		PERSONNEL INJURIES				SEPARATIONS & REENLISTMENTS					
	NO.	MILES OF EXPOSURE	RATE PER 100,000	NO.	FATALITY RATE	NO.	MAN DAYS	INJURY RATE	DEGREES CONFERRED	TOTAL NO. (ELIGIBLES)	NO. REENL	% REENL	TOTAL NO. SEP (ELIGIBLES)	NO. RA REENL	% RA REENL
7285th GU	0	10540	.00	0	.00	1	14889	6.72	0/0	16	2	12.50	2	2	100.00
1st AARC	13	611280	2.13	0	.00	12	336540	1.57	5/4	446	34	7.62	85	33	38.82
2d AARC	18	1016372	1.77	0	.00	37	378120	9.79	6/1	527	58	11.00	125	51	40.80
5th AARC	10	477682	2.09	2	.83	13	243030	5.35	0/3	191	21	10.99	99	21	21.21
6th AARC	15	779119	1.93	2	.62	19	323100	5.88	3/2	256	42	16.41	104	36	34.62
4th AARC	2	46093	4.34	0	.00	1	21540	4.64	0/0	39	4	10.26	8	4	50.00
TOTAL	58	2941086	1.97	4	.30	83	1317300	6.30	14/10	1475	161	10.92	423	147	34.75

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

317

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Washington 25, D. C.

OPS OD NA 5 15 Mar 1956

SUBJECT: Revision of National Guard Antiaircraft Onsite Objectives (U)

TO: Commanding Generals
Continental Army Command
Army Antiaircraft Command
Zone of Interior Armies
Military District of Washington

1. Reference is made to letters, OD OP NA 5, 3 September 1955, subject: "Antiaircraft Deployment Schedules (U)" and inclosures thereto.

2. The National Guard antiaircraft onsite objectives are revised as follows:

End-FY 1956 - 75 batteries onsite, equivalent to 15-½ battalions.
End-FY 1957 - 121 batteries onsite, equivalent to 30-½ battalions.

3. National Guard antiaircraft onsite objectives for End-1958 are not yet developed.

4. The lists of National Guard battalions designated in the Inclosure to the reference above for employment in the onsite program remain unchanged.

/s/ James S. Henderson, Col GS
for C. D. EDDLEMAN
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY

ATA 65-29

Routine 291436Z

FROM: ODCSOPS

TO: CG ARAACOM

INFO: CG CONARC

CG AAA&GM CEN

CG 1ST AARC

CG 2ND AARC

CG 5TH AARC

CITE: DA 905669

Your letter ADOAA-3 P&O 322, subject: "Proposed RORG of AA Defenses (New York, Chicago, and Washington-Baltimore) (U)," dated 27 March 56.

1. The following actions, all effective 15 July 56, will be taken to implement the recommendation in referenced letter:

a. Inactivate the 53d AAA Brigade, Headquarters & Headquarters Battery.

b. Transfer the 56th AAA Brigade, Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, less personnel and equipment from Ft Totten to Ft Devens.

c. Inactivate the 330th, 364th, 503d, 511th, and 514th AAA Detachments (OPN).

d. Reorganize the 35th, 45th and 52d AAA Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, to provide the proposed augmentation less lines 4, 5, 12, 13, and 14, paragraph 04.3 (inclosure 2).

e. Reorganize the 16th, 17th, 19, 22d, 23d, and 80th AAA Groups, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, to proposed organization.

f. Reorganize and designate the 15th AAA Group as high priority and special category in lieu of the 80th AAA Group.

3. Action is being taken to implement the proposed TDS with minor exceptions for Hq ARAACOM, the major field commands, effective 15 July 56.

PIO 425 History

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE IF DATE TIME GROUP IS QUOTED // gmw

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

319

ROUTINE X ORIG

CGAAMACON ENTAFB COLO

CGFIRSTAARG FTYOTTER NY

CGSIXTHAARG FTBAKER CALIF

CGCENAARG GRANDVIEWAFB MO

169 ADOAA DASH THREE PAPA AND OSCAR PD THIS HQ RECEIVED ON ONE NINE MARCH INFO COPY OF MSG FROM CINCONAD TO JOINT AIR DEF FORCES REQ THAT THEY STUDY THE JOINT ORGANIZATION AT JOINT AIR DEF LEVEL AND BELOW FOR THE PURPOSE OF INSURING CINCONADS EXERCISE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL PD IT IS PRESUMED THAT YOU WILL BE CONSULTED DURING THIS STUDY PD THIS HQ MADE AN INFORMAL STUDY OF THIS SAME PROBLEM RECENTLY AND SOME OF THE ARMY STAFF MEMBERS OF THE JOINT AIR DEF FORCES WERE INFORMALLY CONSULTED DURING THIS STUDY PD THE TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THIS HQ WERE THAT THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE THE MAX ARMY REP ON RESPECTIVE JOINT STAFFS GIE JOINT EASTERN AIR DEF FORCE AND JOINT WESTERN AIR DEF FORCE DASH ONE COL CMH TWO LEGCLS CMH CER MAJ SMCIN

MAR 56

ADOAA-3 PBO

H. L. YARNALL/Colonel/gmt

2239 1 2

(19)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

319

CHARACOM ENTAFD COLO

JOINT CENTRAL AIR DEF FORCE DASH ONE LTCOL SMITH EACH JOINT AIR DIV PAREN DEF PAREN EXCEPT THREE ONE CMA THREE TWO CMA THREE THREE CMA THREE FIVE AND FIVE EIGHT DASH ONE LTCOL AND TWO MAJS SMITH THREE ONE CMA THREE TWO CMA THREE THREE CMA THREE FIVE AND FIVE EIGHT JOINT AIR DIV PAREN DEF PAREN DASH ONE LTCOL PD REQ THAT IF CONSULTED YOU GIVE YOUR UTMOST COOPERATION IN ASSISTING IN THE STUDY DIRECTED BY CINCONAD PD NO COMMITMENT WILL BE MADE CONCERNING FMES AVAL TO FILL ARMY POSITIONS ON JOINT STAFFS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE PRESENTLY PROV PD FOR YOUR INFO CMA AT THIS LEVEL A SEP CONAD HQ IS BEING PLANNED AND ACTION IS UNDERWAY TO IMPLEMENT THIS SEPARATION

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

319

ADCAA-3 P&O

22 March 1956

Reorganization of CONAD

See attached DF from G3 to CS, dated 20 March 56, subject as above.

Msg to 1st, 6th and Con AA Bgn Comms telling them to give their utmost cooperation in assisting in study directed by CINCONAD.

As indicated.

XX

September 56

None

G1
Hist O

K. L. Yarnall

Colonel

2239

UNREADABLE - POOR ORIGINAL

[redacted]

320

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADCAA-1 [illegible]

24 February 1[illegible]

SUBJECT: Continental Air Defense Command (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort [illegible], New York
Commanding General, [illegible] Antiaircraft [illegible] Command, Fort [illegible], Maryland
Commanding General, [illegible] Antiaircraft [illegible], Fort Sheridan, Illinois
Commanding General, [illegible] Antiaircraft [illegible], Fort [illegible], California
Commander (Sector, Central) Antiaircraft [illegible], Ent Air Force Base, Colorado

1. The Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) was activated effective 1 September 1[illegible], [illegible] and is [illegible].

2. Inclosure to this letter outline [illegible] mission of CONAD, the responsibilities of [illegible] and command arrangements [illegible] control charts is also included.

3. The inclosures are furnished for your information and guidance.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. T. ASHWORTH
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

6 Incls:
1. Terms of Reference
2. Responsibilities of CG, ARAACOM
3. Responsibilities of Comdr, NAVFORCONAD
4. Responsibilities of Comdr, ADC
5. Coord Arrangements
6. Coord and Cont Control Chart

REGRADING DATA CANNOT
BE PREDETERMINED

[redacted]

6

[redacted]

TERMS OF REFERENCE AND MISSION (#)

1. The Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) is established as a joint command for the defense of the continental United States against air attack. The Department of the Air Force has been designated as the executive agency therefor. Headquarters USAF Air Defense Command is additionally designated as Headquarters, CONAD, the staff of which will be augmented by appropriate representation from all Services.

2. The Commander-in-Chief (CINC) CONAD will exercise operational control # over all forces assigned or otherwise made available by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other proper authority, for defense of the continental United States against air attack. The command will be established in accordance with the appropriate provisions of Joint Action Armed Forces (JAAF), and the directives contained herein. The command shall consist initially of the U.S. Air Force Air Defense Command, the U.S. Army Antiaircraft Command, and a Naval Command composed of the naval forces of the contiguous radar coverage system. During the periods that augmentation forces of the Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force are employed in air defense of the continental United States, operational control of such forces shall be temporarily vested in CINCONAD.

3. The CINCONAD will be a U.S. Air Force general officer who will be designated Commander, U.S. Air Force Air Defense Command. The Commanding General, Antiaircraft Command, will be the principal advisor to CINCONAD on Army matters pertaining to the CONAD. An appropriate Naval Command, under a flag officer, will be established with Headquarters at ENT Air Force Base and the Commander will also be the principal advisor to CINCONAD on Navy matters pertaining to the CONAD. An appropriate Marine Corps representative will be assigned to the Staff of CINCONAD as principal advisor on Marine Corps matters pertaining to the CONAD. In the absence of the Joint Commander, the Senior Component Commander will assume temporary command.

4. Forces and operations of the seaward extensions of the early warning system will continue under the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), and early warning installations in Alaska and the Northeast Command under the Commander-in-Chief, Alaska (CINCAL) and the Commander-in-Chief, Northeast Command (CINCNE). However, the above commanders will support CINCONAD in accordance with plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and mutual agreements by the Commanders concerned, to insure that plans for, and the operations of, these elements of the early warning system will be responsive to the needs of CINCONAD.

"Operational control" wherever used in this paper is as defined in Incl 5.

Incl 1 REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

"Terms of Reference and Mission" (Cont'd)

5. The mission of the CINCONAD will be to:

a. Defend the continental United States against air attack.

b. Support CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CONSAC, CINCAL and CINCNE in their missions to the maximum extent consistent with the primary mission outlined in subparagraph a. above.

6. In carrying out his mission, CINCONAD will:

a. Conduct operations to the limit of the capabilities of available forces in the defense of the continental United States against air attack.

b. Prepare joint plans and requirements for the defense of the continental United States against air attack and submit these plans and requirements to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

c. Implement JCS approved plans, through the appropriate component commands; and exercise such emergency powers as may be delegated to him by proper authority.

d. Coordinate plans, operations and exercises with appropriate United States Commanders and with Canadian and Mexican Commanders in accordance with agreed Canada-United States and Mexico-United States defense policies.

e. In coordination with # appropriate U.S. and allied commanders, plan for early warning systems and procedures which will provide early warning of air attack for the defense of the continental United States to insure that their systems are designed and operated in a manner responsive to continental air defense requirements and in consonance with national policy.

f. In coordination with commanders concerned, establish procedures and methods of operation for all forces allocated, attached or otherwise made available for the air defense of the continental United States.

g. In coordination with commanders concerned, prepare and submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval, plans for the full utilization of all military forces, including reserve forces, which have an air defense capability and which can temporarily augment the air defense forces in event of emergency.

"In coordination with" whenever used in this paper is as defined in the "Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage (Second Revision).

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

320

"Terms of Reference and Mission" (Cont'd)

h. When there exists an imminent threat of air attack upon the continental United States, or in case such an attack develops, assume operational control of those forces specifically having been made temporarily available from other commands (augmentation forces). Such operational control over forces having been made temporarily available from other commands, will be relinquished when the imminence of the threat has dissipated or when the attack is ended. In the event that the commander who made the forces available should consider that his primary mission requires their return to their permanent command assignments, he should first make appropriate requests to the Air Defense commander; if such request is not granted his next recourse is to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

i. Plan for and conduct air defense exercises, including participation by augmentation forces, coordinating plans as appropriate with other U.S. commands and military agencies of Canada and Mexico.

j. Plan for, train, exercise and operate in coordination with appropriate authorities a Ground Observer Corps of necessary military personnel, and civilian volunteers.

k. Coordinate with appropriate military, governmental and non-governmental agencies in the development of plans, policies and procedures for the security control of air traffic, the control of electro-magnetic radiations, and the control of illumination and, when appropriate, initiate implementing actions therefor in the defense of continental United States against air attack.

l. Coordinate with the Federal Civil Defense Administration, State Civil Defense agencies, and other non-military agencies on matters of participation in air defense.

7. Based on missions or tasks assigned by CINCONAD in consonance with JCS approved plans, detailed planning as to forces and their deployments will be accomplished by component commanders coordinated as necessary with other commanders of their Services.

8. In matters not covered by JCS approved joint plans, doctrines or procedures, interim directives, promulgated by CINCONAD will govern all Air Defense operations. These will be formulated in consonance with existing inter-Service and inter-Command agreements and decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[redacted]

UNREADABLE - POOR ORGINAL

[redacted]

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND (U)

1. Serve as the Commander of the Army Component of the CONAD.

2. Command all Army forces assigned or otherwise made available for air defense of the continental United States.

3. Provide above forces for operational control by the CINCONAD, in accordance with Incl 5, on the basis of JCS approved plans, doctrines and procedures pertaining to the air defense of the continental United States.

4. Develop detailed plans for Army forces and their deployments allocated for the air defense of the United States based on missions or tasks assigned by the CINCONAD in consonance with approved JCS plans.

5. Organize and establish a suitable Headquarters and subordinate Headquarters and commands as deemed necessary to accomplish the assigned missions or tasks.

6. Participate in ground defense, harbor defense, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies when such participation will not interfere with the air defense mission.

7. Coordinate with the Department of the Army and other Army agencies on matters pertaining to the support, administration, organization, and equipping of Army units assigned or otherwise made available for the air defense mission.

8. Prepare combat Army air defense units for overseas deployment as required, to include organizing, training, and equipping.

REGRADING DATA CANNOT
BE PREDETERMINED

Incl 2

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER, NAVAL FORCES
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND (U)

1. Organize a suitable command under a flag officer with appropriate headquarters necessary to meet the requirements set forth by higher authority.

2. Serve as the Commander of the Naval component command of the CONAD.

3. Coordinate with the other Service component commanders on matters of mutual interest.

4. Command all Naval forces assigned or otherwise allocated for employment in the contiguous radar coverage of the continental United States air defense system.

5. Coordinate with appropriate fleet and training command for provision of naval augmentation forces for continental air defense.

6. Provide above forces for operational control by the CINCONAD in accordance with Incl 5, on the basis of JCS approved plans, doctrines and procedures pertaining to the air defense of the United States.

7. Provide appropriate Air Defense Commanders with required information relative to the status and operating characteristics of all Naval forces allocated for the air defense of the continental United States, and Naval augmentation forces and facilities capable of emergency employment in air defense of the United States.

8. Provide for the control of fire of the Antiaircraft batteries of vessels in port by the Air Defense Commander through the local Army Antiaircraft Control Center, if one is established; otherwise through a Navy AA Control Center.

REGRADING DATA CANNOT
BE PREDETERMINED

Incl 3

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

320

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER AIR DEFENSE COMMAND (U)

The responsibilities of the Commander, Air Defense Command, are as follows:

1. Serve as the Commander of the Air Force component command of the CONAD.

2. Command all Air Force forces assigned or otherwise made available for air defense of the continental United States.

3. Coordinate with the other Service component commanders on matters of mutual interest.

4. Organize, administer, equip, train, and prepare for combat, units and combat crews of the Air Force as may be designated, assigned or attached to the Air Defense Command.

5. Recommend plans and policies for the employment of the military reserve forces of the Air Force in the air defense of the United States.

6. Develop tactics, techniques, and recommend equipment employed by Air Force forces in defense against air attack.

7. Participate in disaster relief and other domestic emergencies as required.

8. Prepare combat Air Force air defense units for overseas deployment as required, to include organizing, training, and equipping.

Incl 4

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS (U)

SECTION I

Operational Control

1. The operational control exercised by CINCONAD over all forces assigned or otherwise made available, will consist of the following:

a. Direct the conduct of the tactical air battle including the engagement and disengagement of air defense weapons. (This is construed as being limited to engagement and disengagement of AA weapons.)

b. Control of fighters.

c. Specify the conditions of alert.

d. Station the early warning elements of the command and their control elements.

e. Locate and deploy the combat elements of the command in accordance with plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SECTION II

Implementation of Operational Control

2. Operational control as defined above will be implemented in accordance with the chart, shown in Incl 6, in the following manner:

a. When reporting on station, naval forces in contiguous radar coverage system come under operational control of the appropriate regional headquarters through the appropriate naval regional component channel.

b. Naval surface forces made available in case of emergency will report for operational control to the Commander-in-Chief through the appropriate Naval Regional Component Commander. Limitations on the deployments of these surface forces may be prescribed by the fleet commander making the forces available.

c. Naval aviation augmentation forces, provided in case of emergency, will report for operational control to the appropriate Air Division Command. The Fleet or Naval Air Training Command Commander making the forces available will prescribe whether such forces may be deployed to other than home bases.

Incl 5

REGRADING DATA CANNOT
BE PREDETERMINED

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

"Command Arrangements, Section II" (Cont'd)

d. Operational control, as defined in paragraph 1 Section 1, above, will be exercised by the joint air defense commanders in accordance with the chart in Incl 6.

e. Operational control will be exercised over all forces assigned or otherwise made available in a geographical area by the appropriate joint regional or sector air defense commander thereof.

f. Army antiaircraft units will pass to the operational control of the appropriate air defense commander upon deployment to tactical air defense positions.

SECTION III

Organization and Command Arrangements

1. The mission of air defense is a functional mission carried out on a geographical basis. Since time of reaction to the threat is all-important, successful Air Defense must be predicated upon decentralization of control. The United States is now divided into three Air Defense regions which are further subdivided into sectors; each region having an Air Defense Force Commander responsible for the defense of his area against air attack and utilizing all available forces of the military establishment which have an air defense capability.

2. The existing organization of the USAF Air Defense Command, with its air defense system for surveillance, warning and control, and combat is the basic structure which will be utilized for the Joint Command. Each USAF Headquarters from command down to air division level will be additionally designated as a joint headquarters commanded by an Air Force officer and with appropriate representation from each Service. The Army Antiaircraft Command and the Naval Command will parallel this organization through the regional level and with a Component Commander or staff representation below regional level as experience dictates. The numbers of personnel who will represent each component commander at the Joint Regional Air Defense Force level will be a matter for agreement between him and the Commander, Joint Regional Air Defense Force.

3. The Chart, Incl 6, shows the lines of operational control and command as set forth in Incl 5.

4. The Service component commanders at regional or lower levels, in addition to their uni-service functions, shall be Army Deputy and Navy Deputy, respectively, to the joint commanders for matters of concern to their Services.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

320

"Command Arrangements, Section III" (Cont'd)

5. The Component Commanders will be responsible for the military command of their components in accordance with directives and procedures of their Services. Logistic and administrative support of the Service components will be provided as directed by the Service concerned.

6. The Joint manning of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, due to the proximity of the headquarters of the component commands should be kept to a minimum. Thus, augmentation of the Command will be approximately as follows:

	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE
Operations and Training	1	1	-
Operations Analysis	1	1	-
Communication and Electronics	1	1	-
Plans and Requirements	1	2	-
Assistant to the DCS/O	1	1	1
Intelligence	1	1	-
Materiel	-	1	-
Comptroller	-	1	-
Information Services	1	1	-
	7	10	1

7. The command of naval forces in the contiguous radar coverage system will be exercised at the regional (second echelon) level for the east and west coasts.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CHART



* Naval Surface augmentation forces and Naval Contiguous coverage radar.
** Naval air augmentation forces
*** Army augmentation forces
**** USAF air augmentation forces

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

Incl 6

[redacted]

UNREADABLE - POOR ORIGINAL

[redacted] Feb 56 **320**

ADOAA-1

Continental Air Defense Command

1. Field commanders of ARAACOM have not been furnished copies of SM 688-56, which is that version of JCS 1899/113 possible of being disseminated. No guidance has been furnished this command by DA on this subject, although OCD DA was provided a draft of a suggested letter of instructions to ARAACOM some time ago.

2. Inasmuch as numerous queries have been received from ARCOMs in securing copies of SM 688-56, it is deemed advisable to publish that document for use of ARAACOM field commanders.

Publish SM 688-56 to ARCOMs with sufficient copies for distribution to defense levels.

Use to ARCOMs is as SM 688-56.

I

D1, D2, D3 (4 cys), A4,
Hist C, Sig, [illegible]

CHERI A. HAIN

Colonel, [illegible]

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

S: 1 October 1956

341

ADGAA-3 P&O 381

15 May 1956

SUBJECT: Preparation of Operations Plans (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Totten 59, New York
Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois
Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Baker, California
Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command, Grandview Air Force Base, Grandview, Missouri

1. Memorandum Number 3, this headquarters, 19 February 1953, subject: "Operations Plans - AA-OP Series", as amended, is rescinded.

2. It is considered that detailed instructions prescribed by this headquarters for the preparation of subordinate echelon operations plans down to and including defense level are no longer required or appropriate. Sufficient experience has been gained and adequate examples of plans are available to warrant rescission of the detailed directive. General instructions as to minimum requirements for information to be included in subordinate echelon operations plans are as follows:

a. Each echelon of command, down to and including defense level, will prepare appropriate operations plans based on plans of the next higher headquarters. Operations plans prepared by major field commands will be approved by this headquarters. Operations plans of echelons below major field commands will be approved by the appropriate next higher headquarters. One copy of all plans down to and including AA defense plans will be forwarded to this headquarters. These plans will be revised by the preparing headquarters at least once a year. All present plans will be revised as required, approved by appropriate headquarters as stated above, and forwarded to this headquarters by 1 October 1956.

b. Operations plans for those defenses lying along the Canada-U.S. international border will be approved and signed jointly by appropriate Canadian and U S commanders in accordance with existing directives.

c. Defense plans will include, as a minimum:

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 P&C 381 15 M[redacted] 1956

SUBJECT: Preparation of Operations Plans (U)

(1) Task organization, including each assigned or allocated unit.

(2) Site designation of each assigned or allocated unit, and of each surveillance radar, using geographic or georef coordinates.

(3) Designation of the target center of each defended area, using geographic or georef coordinates, as shown in AA-OP-US.

(4) Location of defense ADCC and appropriate ADCC and ADDC.

(5) Appropriate administrative orders or annexes consistent with the format prescribed in AR 101-5.

d. Prohibited Statements. Plans will not indicate nor state the maximum dollar damage to industry nor the number of population casualties that could be caused by nuclear weapons.

e. Defense commanders will forward copies of appropriate operations plans through the appropriate State Adjutant General to the commander of each National Guard unit which has been assigned an A-Day or on-site mission for that defense.

3. Leases and Construction. The authority to prepare and publish operations plans does not constitute authority to institute action to procure tactical sites and construct tactical facilities, including communication facilities. Such action will be as specifically directed by this Headquarters.

4. The above instructions will be included in the next revision of AA-OP-US.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, GS
Chief of Staff

Copies Furnished:
CG First Army
CG Second Army
CG Fifth Army
CG MDW
Chief, NOB
CG 40th AAA Brig
Comdt AAAGM School
Comdr, Iceland Def Force

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Preparation of Operations Plans (U) 9 May 56

(See attached D/F)

321

Letter to Major Field Commands rescinding Memo Nr. 3, 19 Feb 53 and info copies to other interested agencies

X

X

(See attchd D/F)

G/S Policy (2)
G3 Policy
Mist Off
G2
G4
AG
G3 Comebook
Gen File

JESSE J. MAYES, Capt

G3 2954

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

322

JAA-3 [illegible] 322

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Totten, N.Y., New York
Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois
Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Baker, California
Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command, Grandview Air Force Base, Kansas City, Missouri

1. Reference: [illegible] letter, [illegible] Headquarters, [illegible] February 1950, subject: "Continental Air Defense Command [illegible]."

2. As prescribed in the Joint Action Staff [illegible] Continental Air Defense Command, the [illegible] responsibilities are charged to the respective commanders named, in addition to current assignments. These responsibilities are effective upon receipt of this letter. No permanent change of station is desired.

a. The Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command is designated Army Deputy to the Commander, Joint Eastern Air Defense Force (JEADF). The direct command, except operational control (as defined in JCS 5011/1-5), which is vested in the Commander, Joint Eastern Air Defense Force, of all Army Air Command Major Field units in the Eastern Air Defense Force Region is retained by this headquarters.

b. The Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command is designated Army Deputy to the Commander, Joint Western Air Defense Force (JWADF).

c. The Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command is designated Army Deputy to the Commander, Joint Central Air Defense Force (JCADF).

3. The Commanding Generals 1st and 6th Antiaircraft Regional Commands will arrange with the Commanders, JEADF and JWADF, respectively, to provide, as primary duty, Army officer augmentation to the Joint Staffs of the Commanders, JEADF and JWADF in the numbers and grades mutually agreed upon, from sources currently available to 1st and 6th Antiaircraft Regional

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

Commands. Duty assignments of the Army officers furnished to the Joint Staffs will be discussed in advance of their assignment. The Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command will take similar steps to provide Army Officer augmentation to the Joint Staff of the Commander, JCADF; in this case, the assignments made will be as additional duty in view of the propinquity of the two headquarters concerned and the lack of available Army personnel for full-time duty on the Joint Staff.

4. Command responsibilities for defenses remain as presently assigned.

5. The Commanders of the units named as addressees of this letter are responsible for performance of the following general missions and functions for defenses assigned to their respective commands:

a. Provide antiaircraft forces for the operational control (as defined in JCS SM 688-54) of the appropriate joint air division (defense) commander to the extent appropriate units are available and in accordance with instructions contained in AA-OP-US and changes thereto.

b. Prepare plans for additional defenses in accordance with responsibilities established in AA-OP-US and changes thereto, and in directives issued by this headquarters.

c. Insure that each AA defense plan is prepared by a group or higher headquarters.

d. In coordination with appropriate ZI army commanders, Strategic Air Command base commanders, and Joint Air Division (Defense) commanders, prepare detailed plans for use of antiaircraft units or portions thereof in ground defense and domestic emergency missions at critical localities where these units are stationed, as outlined in AR 10-50 and SR 10-5-1, to include conditions under which assigned antiaircraft units will pass to the temporary operational control of ZI army commanders and Strategic Air Command base commanders concerned. Under conditions requiring such action, in cooperation with the ZI army commander and Strategic Air Command base commander concerned, and after coordinating with the Joint Air Division (Defense) commander concerned, implement the subject plans to the extent practicable without jeopardizing the performance of the primary mission of antiaircraft defense. Care will be exercised at the time domestic emergency missions are implemented to insure that due consideration is given to the type and location of the emergency for which troops are to be diverted from the AA mission. For example, a domestic emergency created completely by a natural disaster may warrant the diversion of more effort than a man-made emergency which might be accompanied by an air attack. When, in the opinion of the defense commander, it becomes necessary to divert troops to the ground role, NIKE units will not be reduced below minimum manning crews without the approval of this headquarters and specific coordination with the Joint Air Division (Defense) Commander, unless communications with higher headquarters are severed and the defense commander is, as a result of the emergency, meeting the ground situation without the benefit of normal air defense intelligence and direction.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 P&O 322 27 June 1956
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

e. In coordination with ZI army and other commanders concerned, develop and maintain current plans for the temporary utilization, in case of emergency, of designated antiaircraft units in the Continental United States not assigned to Army Antiaircraft Command.

f. Within the policies established by this headquarters, effect all necessary and desirable coordination with the appropriate headquarters in all aspects of the National Guard AA program and provide training support to designated National Guard Special Security Force units, as outlined in current directives of this headquarters.

g. Coordinate with pertinent Naval commanders regarding the provision of AAOC facilities for coordination of fire of Naval antiaircraft weapons during an emergency.

h. In coordination with appropriate agencies of the Navy, provide shore gunfire support from tactical positions when such support is possible and will not jeopardize the antiaircraft mission.

i. Implement joint operational and joint exercise policies and directives issued by the Commander-In-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command and his joint subordinate commanders. Normally, information of such policies and directives issued by the Commander-In-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command that are command-wide in scope will be disseminated by this headquarters with implementing instructions included. In the case of Army Antiaircraft Command units in the JEADF Region, the Army Deputy to the Commander, JEADF will act as executive to that commander in promulgating these joint operational and joint exercise policies and directives. Bilateral antiaircraft operational policies and implementing instructions will follow ARAACOM command channels.

j. Each Army Antiaircraft Command major field commander represented at an air division (defense) by an antiaircraft representative is responsible that other Army Antiaircraft Command units located within the area of the air division (defense), but not under the command of the Army Antiaircraft Command major field commander represented, are kept fully informed on operational and exercise matters of interest. The represented Army Antiaircraft Command major field commanders in the JEADF Region are further responsible that a full flow of information is maintained in both directions between the antiaircraft representative at the air division (defense) and the Army Deputy, JEADF, Stewart Air Force Base, Newburgh, New York.

k. Collaborate with the appropriate Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders in the preparation and execution of joint defense plans as required by the "Basic Planning Directive for Defense, Other Than Air Defense," of the Continental United States; act as Antiaircraft Command

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]322

signatory, when required, to such pertinent joint documents as are developed by this collaboration. The Commanding General, 5th AA Regional Command will coordinate matters of direct interest arising therefrom with the Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command.

6. In addition to the general missions enumerated in paragraph 4 above, the following additional missions and functions are assigned specifically as follows:

a. Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command:

(1) Effect necessary and desirable coordination and liaison with the JEADF on operational matters in the Eastern Air Defense Force region. This coordination and liaison will include matters pertaining to joint plans, programs, and exercises, and also the operational capabilities and status of AA units for both Army AA Command and major field commands thereof concerned.

(2) Establish and maintain Army AA representatives at the Headquarters of the 26th and 32d Joint Air Divisions (defense), respectively. These officers will serve the Army AA Command major field commanders whose areas of responsibility lie within, or partly within, the air defense division areas concerned.

(3) Coordinate with the Anti-Aircraft Command, Canada, on matters pertaining to the antiaircraft defense of those critical areas within the JEADF region of the United States which lie along the Canada-United States international boundary; act as Army Antiaircraft Command signatory, as necessary, to documents drawn up as a result of this coordination. Forward to the Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, for approval or other appropriate action all proposals by Anti-Aircraft Command, Canada, concerning plans for the antiaircraft defenses of Sault Ste Marie and Detroit.

(4) Coordinate with pertinent Naval commanders regarding the provision of AACC facilities for coordination of fire of Naval antiaircraft weapons in the JEADF region during an emergency.

(5) Represent the Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command and coordinate with the Commanding General, First Army for the operation of firing ranges and for fulfillment of administrative and logistical support requirements of all Army Antiaircraft Command units located in the First Army area; this does not include that portion of the Philadelphia antiaircraft defense located in New Jersey.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADCRA-3 PRO 322 2 June 1944
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

b. Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command:

(1) Represent the Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command and coordinate with the Commanding Generals of First, Second and Third Armies and Military District of Washington for the operation of firing ranges and for fulfillment of administrative and logistical support requirements of all Army Antiaircraft Command units located in the Second and Third Army areas and in the Military District of Washington; this includes that portion of the Philadelphia antiaircraft defense located in New Jersey.

(2) Establish and maintain Army AA representatives at the headquarters of the 35th, 58th (when the Oak Ridge Defense becomes active) and the 85th Joint Air Divisions (Defense), respectively. These officers will represent the Army AA Command Major Field Commanders whose areas of responsibility lie within, or partly within, the Air Defense Division areas concerned.

c. Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command:

(1) Represent the Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command and coordinate with the Commanding General, Fifth Army for the operation of firing ranges and for the fulfillment of administrative and logistical requirements of all Army Antiaircraft Command units located in Fifth Army area. Support for Army Antiaircraft Command units of the Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota and St. Louis, Missouri antiaircraft defenses will be coordinated for the Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command. Direct communication is authorized the Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command with the Commanding General, Fifth Army on routine administrative and logistical matters.

(2) Prepare and approve defense plans for Sault Ste Marie and Detroit and forward these plans to the Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command for coordination with the Anti-Aircraft Command, Canada.

(3) Establish and maintain Army AA representatives at the headquarters of the 30th and 37th Joint Air Divisions (Defense) respectively. These officers will represent the Army AA Command Major Field Commanders whose areas of responsibility lie within, or partly within, the air defense division areas concerned.

d. Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command:

(1) Represent the Commanding General, Army antiaircraft Command and coordinate with the Commanding General, Sixth Army for the operation of firing ranges and for fulfillment of administrative and logistical support requirements of all Army Antiaircraft Command units located in the Sixth Army areas.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 R&O 322 June 1956
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

(2) Establish and maintain Army AA representatives at the Headquarters of the 9th, 25th, 27th, and 28th Joint Air Divisions (Defense), respectively. These officers will represent the Army AA Command Major Field Commanders whose areas of responsibility lie within, or partly within, the air defense division areas concerned.

e. Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command:

(1) Represent the Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command and coordinate with the Commanding General, Fourth Army for the fulfillment of administrative and logistical support requirements of Army Antiaircraft Command units located in the Fourth Army area. On those matters of such nature as to be of interest to the Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command, effect coordination with the Commanding General, Fifth Army through the Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, for the Army Antiaircraft Command units located at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota and at St. Louis, Missouri; direct communication is authorized with the Commanding General, Fifth Army on routine administrative and logistical support matters.

(2) Establish and maintain Army AA representatives at the Headquarters of the 29th and 33d Joint Air Divisions (Defense), respectively. These officers will represent the Army AA Command Major Field Commanders whose areas of responsibility lie within, or partly within, the air defense division areas concerned.

7. Missions and functions previously prescribed for addressees, and not changed by this letter remain effective.

8. As prescribed by appropriate Department of the Army instructions, ZI Armies will continue to render administrative and logistical support to all echelons of the Army Antiaircraft Command.

9. All publications of this headquarters, still effective, in which directives were issued to the Commanding Generals, Western, Eastern, and Central Army Antiaircraft Commands, respectively, will continue to be interpreted as being currently applicable to major field commanders of the Army Antiaircraft Command.

10. Rescissions:

Letter, ADOAA-3 R&O 322, this headquarters, 16 December 1955, subject: Letter of Instructions (U).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, GS
Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:
(See next page)

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 P&O 322 27 June 1956

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

Copies furnished:
TAG, DA
DCSOPSDA
CINCONAD
CINSAC
COMNAVFORCONAD
CG, CONARC
CG, First Army
CG, Second Army
CG, Third Army
CG, Fourth Army
CG, Fifth Army
CG, Sixth Army

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADOAA-3 P&O 322 16 December 1955

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Totten 59, New York
Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois
Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Baker, California
Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command, Grandview Air Force Base, Grandview, Missouri

1. As prescribed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff publication establishing Continental Air Defense Command, the following responsibilities are charged to the respective commanders named, in addition to current assignments. These responsibilities are effective upon receipt of this letter. No permanent change of station is desired.

a. The Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command is designated Army Deputy to the Commander, Joint Eastern Air Defense Force (JEADF). The direct command of all Army Air Command Major Field units in the Eastern Air Defense Force Region is retained by this headquarters.

b. The Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command is designated Army Deputy to the Commander, Joint Western Air Defense Force (JWADF).

c. The Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command is designated Army Deputy to the Commander, Joint Central Air Defense Force (JCADF).

2. The Commanding Generals 1st and 6th Antiaircraft Regional Commands will arrange with the Commanders, JEADF and JWADF, respectively, to provide, as primary duty, Army officer augmentation to the Joint Staffs of the Commanders, JEADF and JWADF in the numbers and grades mutually agreed upon, from sources currently available to 1st and 6th Antiaircraft Regional Commands. Duty assignments of the Army officers furnished to the Joint Staffs will be discussed in advance of their assignment. The Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command will take similar steps to provide Army Officer augmentation to the Joint Staff of the Commander, JCADF; in this case, the assignments made will be as additional duty in view of the

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

propinquity of the two headquarters concerned and the lack of available Army personnel for full-time duty on the Joint Staff.

3. Command responsibilities for defenses remain as presently assigned.

4. The Commanders of the units named as addressees of this letter are responsible for performance of the following general missions and functions for defenses assigned to their respective commands:

a. Provide antiaircraft defenses to the extent appropriate units are available and in accordance with instructions contained in AA-OP-US and changes thereto.

b. Prepare plans for additional defenses in accordance with responsibilities established in AA-OP-US and changes thereto, and in directives issued by this headquarters.

c. Insure that each AA defense plan is prepared by a group or higher headquarters.

d. In coordination with appropriate ZI army commanders, Strategic Air Command base commanders, and Joint Air Division (Defense) commanders, prepare detailed plans for use of antiaircraft units or portions thereof in ground defense and domestic emergency missions at critical localities where these units are stationed, as outlined in AR 10-50 and SR 10-5-1; to include conditions under which assigned antiaircraft units will pass to the temporary operational control of ZI army commanders and Strategic Air Command base commanders concerned. Under conditions requiring such action, in cooperation with the ZI army commander and Strategic Air Command base commander concerned, and after coordinating with the Joint Air Division (Defense) commander concerned, implement the subject plans to the extent practicable without jeopardizing the performance of the primary mission of antiaircraft defense.

e. In coordination with ZI army and other commanders concerned, develop and maintain current plans for the temporary utilization, in case of emergency, of antiaircraft units in the Continental United States not assigned to Army Antiaircraft Command. Such units include Regular Army AA units, National Guard AA units, U. S. Army Reserve AA units, and USMC AA units having an effective air defense capability. Availability of these units will be determined by the ZI army commander concerned, or by the senior USMC field commander concerned, as the case may be.

f. Within the policies established by this headquarters, effect all necessary and desirable coordination with the appropriate headquarters in all aspects of the National Guard AA program, as outlined in current directives of this headquarters.

g. Coordinate with pertinent Naval commanders regarding employment of Naval (including Marine Corps) antiaircraft weapons.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 P&O 322
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

h. In coordination with appropriate agencies of the Navy, provide shore gunfire support from tactical positions when such support is possible and will not jeopardize the antiaircraft mission.

i. Implement joint operational and joint exercise policies and directives issued by the Commander-In-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command and his joint subordinate commanders. Normally, information of such policies and directives issued by the Commander-In-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command that are command-wide in scope will be disseminated by this headquarters with implementing instructions included. In the case of Army Antiaircraft Command units in the JEADF Region, the Army Deputy to the Commander, JEADF will act as executive to that commander in promulgating these joint operational and joint exercise policies and directives. Unilateral antiaircraft operational policies and implementing instructions will follow ARLACOM command channels.

j. Each Army Antiaircraft Command major field commander represented at an air division (defense) by an antiaircraft representative is responsible that other Army Antiaircraft Command units located within the area of the air division (defense), but not under the command of the Army Antiaircraft Command major field commander represented, are kept fully informed on operational and exercise matters of interest. The represented Army Antiaircraft Command major field commanders in the JEADF Region are further responsible that a full flow of information is maintained in both directions between the antiaircraft representative at the air division (defense) and the Army Deputy, JEADF, Stewart Air Force Base, Newburgh, New York.

5. In addition to the general missions enumerated in paragraph 4 above, the following additional missions and functions are assigned specifically as follows:

a. Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command:

(1) Effect necessary and desirable coordination and liaison with the JEADF on operational matters in the Eastern Air Defense Force region. This coordination and liaison will include matters pertaining to joint plans, programs, and exercises, and also the operational capabilities and status of AA units for both Army AA Command and major field commands thereof concerned.

(2) Establish and maintain Army AA representatives at the Headquarters of the 26th and 32d Joint Air Divisions (defense), respectively. These officers will serve the Army AA Command major field commanders whose areas of responsibility lie within, or partly within, the air defense division areas concerned.

(3) Collaborate with the appropriate Army, Navy and Air Force commanders in the Joint Defense Plan, Northeastern United States, as required by the Basic Defense Plan for the Continental United States; act

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

as Army Antiaircraft Command signatory, when required, to such pertinent joint documents as are developed by this collaboration. Coordinate matters of direct interest arising therefrom with the Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command.

(4) Coordinate with the Anti-Aircraft Command, Canada, on matters pertaining to the antiaircraft defense of those critical areas within the JEADF region of the United States which lie along the Canada-United States international boundary; not as Army Antiaircraft Command signatory, as necessary, to documents drawn up as a result of this coordination. Forward to the Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, for approval or other appropriate action all proposals by Anti-Aircraft Command, Canada, concerning plans for the antiaircraft defenses of Sault Ste Marie and Detroit.

(5) Coordinate with pertinent Naval commanders regarding employment of Naval (including Marine Corps) antiaircraft weapons in the JEADF region.

b. Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command:

(1) Represent the Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command and coordinate with the Commanding Generals of Second and Third Armies and Military District of Washington, for the operation of firing ranges and for fulfillment of administrative and logistical support requirements of all Army Antiaircraft Command units located in the Second and Third Army areas and in the Military District of Washington; this includes that portion of the Philadelphia antiaircraft defense located in New Jersey.

(2) Collaborate with appropriate Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders in the Joint Defense Plan, Southeastern United States, as required by the Basic Defense Plan for the Continental United States; not as Army Antiaircraft Command signatory, when required, to such pertinent joint documents as are developed by this collaboration.

c. Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command:

(1) Represent the Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command and coordinate with the Commanding General, Fifth Army for the operation of firing ranges and for the fulfillment of administrative and logistical requirements of all Army Antiaircraft Command units located in Fifth Army area. Support for Army Antiaircraft Command units of the Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota and St Louis, Missouri antiaircraft defenses will be coordinated for the Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command. Direct communication is authorized the Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command with the Commanding General, Fifth Army on routine administrative and logistical matters.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

(2) Collaborate with the appropriate Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders in the North Central Basic Defense Plan area as required by the Basic Defense Plan for the Continental United States, and act as Army Antiaircraft Command signatory, when required, to such pertinent joint documents as are developed by this collaboration. Coordinate matters of direct interest arising therefrom with the Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command.

(3) Prepare and approve defense plans for Sault Ste Marie and Detroit and forward these plans to the Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command for coordination with the Anti-Aircraft Command, Canada.

d. Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command: No additional missions and functions.

e. Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command:

Represent the Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command and coordinate with the Commanding General, Fourth Army for the fulfillment of administrative and logistical support requirements of Army Antiaircraft Command units located in the Fourth Army area. On these matters of such nature as to be of interest to the Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command, effect coordination with the Commanding General, Fifth Army through the Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, for the Army Antiaircraft Command units located at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota and at St Louis, Missouri; direct communication is authorized with the Commanding General, Fifth Army on routine administrative and logistical support matters.

6. Missions and functions previously prescribed for addressees, and not changed by this letter remain effective.

7. As prescribed by appropriate Departmental of the Army instructions, Continental Armies will continue to render administrative and logistical support to all echelons of the Army Antiaircraft Command.

8. All publications of this headquarters, still effective, in which directives were issued to the Commanding Generals, Western, Eastern, and Central Army Antiaircraft Commands, respectively, will continue to be interpreted as being currently applicable to major field commanders of the Army Antiaircraft Command.

9. ~~Rescissions:~~

a. Letter, ~~ADOAA-3 320, this headquarters~~, 28 February 1955, subject: "Letter of Instructions".

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

322

ADOAA-3 P&C 322
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (U)

b. Letter, ADOAA-3 320, this headquarters, 15 March 1955, subject: "Letter of Instructions" as amended by letter, this headquarters, 12 May 1955, same subject.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICKELSEN:

E. T. ASHMOREH
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:
TAG, DA
ADofS, G3, DA
CINCUNC
CINCSAC
COMNAVFORCOMEAST
CG, CONUS
CG, First Army
CG, Second Army
CG, Third Army
CG, Fourth Army
CG, Fifth Army
CG, Sixth Army

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

323

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ATAAA-3 P&O 471.94 2 June 1956

SUBJECT: Dual Control NIKE Program (U)

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. References:

a. Letter (SECRET) ATAAA-3 P&O 471.94, this Headquarters, 29 April 1955, subject as above.

b. Letter (SECRET) ATAAA-3 471.94, this Headquarters, 2 August 1955, subject as above.

2. In accordance with an informal review made by Lieutenant Colonel Hirsch, your Office, a review of NIKE sites [illegible] expressed as capable of expansion for dual control has been [illegible] this command. This review resulted in the withdrawal [illegible] from those previously reported as capable of future [illegible] of these sites would require excessive expenditures. It should be noted that NIKE site C-32 in Chicago has been added to the [illegible] since the last report. This review has reduced the [illegible] capable of dualing. Withdrawn:

a. San Francisco, SF-31, SF-[illegible], SF-[illegible], SF-[illegible].

b. Los Angeles, LA-78, LA-[illegible].

c. Seattle, S-20, S-72, S-81.

d. Cleveland, CL-21, CL-67.

3. The suitability for expansion to dual control of NIKE sites listed below is questionable due to the amount of radar clutter being experienced at these sites. Should further study reveal full justification for withdrawal of these sites from the future dual control list, subsequent reports will be submitted. Such further study is now being made.

a. Los Angeles, LA-04, LA-14, LA-29, LA-88, LA-93.

b. Hanford, H-06, H -52.

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 P&O 471.94 June 1956
SUBJECT: Dual Control NIKE Program (U)

4. Inclosure 1, with Appendices A thru E, contains the present status of NIKE sites within this command as follows: 25 dual control sites in the present 61 NIKE battalion program; 25 sites to lose their identity; 12 sites not considered for expansion to future dual control because they are "adjacent"; 32 sites not considered for expansion to future dual control due to real estate limitations or technical considerations; 150 sites considered capable of future expansion to dual control.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. T. CASSIDY
Lt Col, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff

1 Incl
List of NIKE Sites w/5 Appendices

Copies furnished:
DCSPER, DA
DCSLOG, DA
CofEngr, DA
Compt of the Army, DA
CG, CONARC

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

STATUS OF NIKE SITES (U)

Defense	D	LI	Adj	T	FD	Total
Boston					12	12
Bridgeport					7	7
Chicago	3	3	2	2	14	24
Cleveland				2	6	8
Detroit	2	2	4	3	5	16
Ellsworth					4	4
Fairchild					4	4
Hartford				3	3	6
Hanford					4	4
Los Angeles			2	4	10	16
Loring					4	4
Milwaukee					8	8
New York	5	5	2	1	11	24
Niagara	5	5			2	12
Norfolk					8	8
Philadelphia	4	4			8	16
Pittsburgh				6	3	12
Providence					7	7
San Francisco	1	1		5	5	12
Seattle	1	1	2	3	5	12
Travis					4	4
Wash-Balt	4	4	—	—	16	24
Totals	25	25	12	32	150	244

Legend: D-Dual Sites; LI-Sites to Lose Identity; Adj-Adjacent Sites; T-Technically incapable of future dual; FD-Sites capable of expansion to future dual-control.

5 Appendices
A thru E

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

Incl 1

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

323

1st AA Regional Command

New York	Boston	Providence	Niagara	Hartford	Bridgeport	Loring AFB
04- D	03	19	NF03-D	06-T	04	13
05-LI	05	29	NF15-D	25	15	31
09	15	38	NF05-LI	36	17	58
15-T	17	58	NF16-LI	48	40	85
20	36	69	BU09	67-T	65	
23	37	79	BU18	85-T	73	
24	38	99	BU34-LI		94	
29-LI	55		BU35-D			
30-D	63		BU51-LI			
48-Adj	73		BU52-D			
49-Adj	94		NF41-D			
56-D	85		BU42-LI			
57-LI						
53						
54						
60						
65						
73						
79-LI						
80-D						
86						
93-D						
94-LI						
99						

D - Dual Sites 10

LI - Sites to lose identity 10

T - Sites technically incapable of future dual . 4

Adj - Adjacent sites 2

FD - Sites are listed as capable of expansion to future dual-control 46

TOTAL 72

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

Appendix A

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

2d AA Regional Command

Wash-Balt	Philadelphia	Cleveland	Norfolk	Pittsburgh
W 05-LI	07	13	02	02-T
W 25	15	21-T	25	03-T
W 26	23-LI	29	36	25-T
W 35	25-D	34	52	36
W 36	32	48	63	37
W 44	41-D	59	75	42-T
W 45	43-LI	67-T	85	43-T
W 54	49	69	93	52-T
W 64-D	58			62-T
W 65-LI	67			71-T
W 74	75-D			92
W 83	78-LI			93-T
W 92	82			
W 93	91			
W 94	97-LI			
BA 03	99-D			
BA 09				
BA 1[illegible]-LI				
BA 18-D				
BA 3[illegible]-D				
BA 31-LI				
BA 43				
BA 79-D				
BA 92				

D - Dual Sites	8
LI - Sites to lose identity	8
T - Sites technically incapable of future dual	11
Adj - Adjacent Sites	0
FD - Sites are listed as capable of expansion to future dual-control	41
TOTAL	68

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

Appendix B

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

5th AA Regional Command

Detroit	Chicago	Milwaukee
06	03-D	[illegible]
11-Adj	05-[illegible]	
20-Adj	30	
23	[illegible]	
23-Adj	[illegible]	
26-Adj	[illegible]	
31-[illegible]	[illegible]	
34-D	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
57-[illegible]		
59-[illegible]		
[illegible]		
59-[illegible]		
[illegible]		
87		
87-[illegible]		

D - [illegible] sites

LZ - Sites [illegible] Lansing

T - Sites technically [illegible]

Adj - Adjacent [illegible]

M - Sites are listed as capable of [illegible]
[illegible] sites [illegible]

[illegible]

READING DATA CANNOT BE PRESERVED

[redacted]

Appendix C

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

323

6th Antiaircraft Regional Command

San Francisco	Fairchild	Los Angeles	Seattle	Hanford	Travis
08-LI	07	04	03	06	10
09-D	37	09-T	13-D	12	33
25	45	14	14-LI	52	53
31-T	87	29	20-T	83	86
37		32	32-Adj		
51		40	33-Adj		
59		43	52		
87-T		55	61		
88-T		57	62		
89-T		70-Adj	72-T		
91-T		73-Adj	81-T		
93		78-T	92		
		88			
		94-T			
		95-T			
		98			

(Travis Site 10 is selected for above ground launcher installation.)

D - Dual Sites	2
LI - Sites to lose identity	2
Adj - Adjacent Sites	4
T - Sites technically incapable of future dual	12
FD- Sites are listed as capable of expansion to future dual-control	32
TOTAL	52

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

[redacted]

Appendix D

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

323

Central AA Regional Command

Ellsworth AFB

02
21
54
83

(All sites capable of expansion to future dual-control. Site 83 is selected for above-ground launcher installation.)

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

[redacted]

Appendix E

UNREADABLE - POOR ORIGINAL

[redacted]

324

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADCAA-3 [illegible]

11 May 19[illegible]

SUBJECT: ARAACOM Training Support for National Guard SSF Units with On-Site and M-Day CONUS Missions (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Totten [illegible], New York
Commanding General, [illegible] Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort [illegible], Maryland
Commanding General, [illegible] Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois
Commanding General, [illegible] Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort [illegible], Washington
Commanding Officer, [illegible] Antiaircraft Regional Command, [illegible] Air Force Base, [illegible]

1. Reference:

a. [illegible]

Department of [illegible]
Supervision of [illegible]
Units [illegible], [illegible]

b. Department of the [illegible]
G3, Office of the Adjutant General, [illegible]
ment for National Guard [illegible]

2. The purpose of this letter is [illegible] training instructions of Department of the [illegible] above. Other phases of this program [illegible] Army directives. Pending publication by this headquarters of detailed training directives on the National Guard Special Security Force program, the following Army Antiaircraft Command policy will apply.

a. Regional commanders will monitor the training program of designated National Guard non-divisional antiaircraft units which have been designated to the Special Security Forces (including those with an interim designation) and which have been assigned a CONUS defense mission. This includes National Guard Signal Radar Maintenance Detachments which have been designated to the Special Security Forces and have a CONUS mission, but excludes Ordnance Integrated Fire Control Detachments. This new mission will be incorporated into a change to letter, this headquarters, ADCAA-3 P&O 322, 16 December 195[illegible], subject: "Letter of Instructions (U)."

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from
classified inclosures

[redacted]

0541

[redacted]

11 May 1956

ADOAA-3 O&T 353
SUBJECT: ARRACOM Training Support for National Guard SSF Units with On-Site and M-Day CONUS Missions. (U)

b. National Guard units for which this command has training support responsibility will continue to follow their present training programs. ARRACOM supervision for the time being should consist primarily of familiarization visits and advice.

c. The annual field training periods for all National Guard units for calendar year 1956 will be as planned and scheduled by the respective ZI Armies. Necessary changes and modifications will continue to be processed through the appropriate ZI armies. Regional commanders will maintain cognizance of the summer training of National Guard units for which they are responsible. Necessary arrangements and schedules for subsequent summer training periods will be accomplished by regional commanders in coordination with appropriate State Adjutants General and ZI Armies. These schedules will be forwarded to ZI armies with information copies to this headquarters.

d. Training Inspection Reports (NGB Form 115) must be accomplished annually for all National Guard units. ZI Armies have been instructed by CONARC to accomplish and process these reports for all National Guard units, including those for which ARRACOM has training support responsibility, for the calendar year 1956 summer training period. Regional commands will assist ZI armies in this task by furnishing necessary technically qualified personnel. After the 1956 summer training period, training inspection reports (NGB Form 115), covering units for which ARRACOM has training support responsibility, will be accomplished and processed by ARRACOM agencies.

e. ZI Armies have been instructed by CONARC to conduct Army Training Tests for National Guard units designated Interim Special Security Forces during the 1956 summer field training period. Regional commanders will assist the ZI armies in this task by furnishing necessary technically qualified personnel. All subsequent Army Training Tests for Interim Special Security Force units, for which ARRACOM has training support responsibility, will be accomplished by the ARRACOM agencies.

f. At the present time the National Guard Bureau programs for service school quotas for all National Guard units. Regional commanders should maintain cognizance of the service school program insofar as they pertain to their respective National Guard units. This headquarters should be advised in the event that deficiencies in this program cannot be corrected through National Guard channels. Care must be exercised to insure that appropriate school spaces have been programmed, in advance, for units scheduled to receive new type of antiaircraft equipment.

ADC...-3 O&T 552 11 May 1956

SUBJECT: ARADCOM Training Support for National Guard SSF Units with On-Site and M-Day CONUS Missions (U)

g. Present ARADCOM policy for the utilization of 48-man augmentation teams will continue.

h. ARADCOM has an interest in all National Guard non-divisional antiaircraft units and Signal Radar Maintenance Detachments assigned a CONUS air defense mission but not yet designated Special Security Force. Regional commanders will arrange with ZI Army Commanders for familiarization visits to these units semi-annually.

3. Antiaircraft regional commanders will assume active responsibility for the training support of their respective National Guard units at the conclusion of their 1956 summer training periods. Training support includes the general supervision of all phases of training, conducting necessary inspections and Army Training Tests, rendering appropriate assistance, and making appropriate arrangements for use of active Army training areas and facilities. In order to facilitate the transition of these units to ARADCOM supervision, AA regional commanders will insure that interested personnel become thoroughly familiar with all phases of the National Guard training program. Familiarization visits to ZI Army headquarters and National Guard units, especially during the summer training periods, are encouraged.

4. Department of the Army letter, reference at above, outlines the technical instruction team program for National Guard antiaircraft units. Technical instruction teams may be established to fill specific requirements on the basis of one team per two battalions. No specific agreements have been reached between this headquarters and CONARC concerning the supervision of technical instruction teams supporting National Guard units for which this command has training support responsibility. It is anticipated that technical instruction teams will be required only in those areas where active Army AA units are not deployed. Request that regional commanders conduct a survey to determine the present and future requirements for technical instruction teams for their respective areas. Specific recommendations will be submitted to this headquarters prior to 1 July 1956 to include the following:

a. Number and location of technical instruction teams required in respective areas.

b. Number and location of technical instruction teams now available for support of those National Guard antiaircraft units for which ARADCOM has training support responsibility.

c. Number and location of such technical instruction teams now available but not needed.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOaa-3 O&T 353 11 May 1956

SUBJECT: ARAACOM Training Support for National Guard SSF Units with On-Site and M-Day CONUS Missions (U)

5. Unit advisers for those units for which ARAACOM has training support responsibility will remain assigned to the respective ZI Armies. Regional commanders will exercise operational control over the training and operational functions of advisers accredited to the units coming under ARAACOM supervision. In the event that an adviser is assigned a dual advisory mission, this operational control will be applicable only to those units under ARAACOM responsibility. ZI Army Commanders have been instructed by CONARC to continue to supervise the administrative and logistical functions of advisers accredited to units for which ARAACOM has training support responsibility. Advisers' efficiency reports will continue to be processed within the CONARC adviser system channels. Regional commanders will furnish to rating officers, for use in supporting advisers' officer efficiency reports, information on the manner in which an adviser has performed his training and operational functions with respect to units under ARAACOM supervision, by submission of a letter report similar to that set forth in paragraph 8g, SR 600-185-1. Direct communication between appropriate regional commanders and rating officers is authorized in order to effect timely action required in submitting efficiency reports.

6. The ZI Army Commanders have been instructed by Department of the Army to provide administrative and logistical support for National Guard units in accordance with current directives and regulations.

7. The Army Antiaircraft Command policy concerning the National Guard units for which it has training support responsibility is that these National Guard units must be capable of contributing efficiently to the antiaircraft defense of the continental United States. All regional commanders will assist these units to achieve this goal. Training support furnished by all regional commanders should be tailored to fit specific situations and should be aimed at training all National Guard units to be self-sufficient.

8. Attached as Inclosure 1 is a list of National Guard on-site and M-day units that have been designated to the Special Security Forces, indicating the ARAACOM major field commander responsible for providing the training support outlined in this directive.

9. Attached as Inclosure 2 is a list of National Guard on-site and M-Day units that have not been designated to the Special Security Forces, indicating the ARAACOM major field commander who will become

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ADCAA-3 O&T 353 11 May 1956
SUBJECT: ARAACOM Training Support for National Guard SSF Units with On-Site and M-Day CONUS Missions (U)

responsible for providing training support when the unit is designated Special Security Force.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
1. NG AA On-site & M-Day Prog Units Designated SSF
2. NG AA On-site & M-Day Prog Units Not Designated SSF

D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, US
Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:
DCSOPSDA
Chief, NGB
CGCONARC
CG,RMYONE
CG,RMYTWO
CG,RMYTHREE
CG,RMYFOUR
CG,RMYFIVE
CG,RMYSIX
CONUS

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL GUARD ANTIAIRCRAFT ONSITE AND M-DAY PROGRAM UNITS

DESIGNATED AS SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES AS OF 8 MARCH 1956 (U)

Unit Designation	Mission	Defense Area	NFC Responsible
51st AAA Brigade, Penn NG	M-Day	5th AA Rgn Comd	2nd AARC
102d AAA Brig, N.Y. NG	M-Day	New York	1st AARC
104th AAA Brigade, Mass NG	M-Day	53d AAA Brig Def	1st AARC
105th AAA Brigade, NY NG	M-Day	1st AAA Rgn Comd	1st AARC
114th AAA Brigade, Calif NG*	M-Day	47th AAA Brig Def	6th AARC
115th AAA Brigade, Wash NG	M-Day	31st AAA Brig Def	6th AARC
261st AAA Brigade, Delaware NG	M-Day	2d AA Rgn Comd	2nd AARC
118th AAA Group, Penn NG	M-Day	Philadelphia	2nd AARC
198th AAA Group, Delaware NG	M-Day	Baltimore	2nd AARC
205th AAA Group, Wash NG	M-Day	Seattle	6th AARC
209th AAA Gp, NY NG	M-Day	Niagara-Buffalo	1st AARC
211th AAA Group, Mass NG	M-Day	Boston	1st AARC
212th AAA Group, NY NG	M-Day	New York	1st AARC
213th AAA Group, Penn NG	M-Day	Chicago	2nd AARC
214th AAA Group, Georgia NG	M-Day	Oak Ridge	2nd AARC
216th AAA Group, Minn NG*	M-Day	Milwaukee	5th AARC
218th AAA Group, Penn NG	M-Day	Pittsburgh	2nd AARC
224th AAA Group, Virginia NG	M-Day	Norfolk	2nd AARC
228th AAA Group, SC NG	M-Day	Savannah River	2nd AARC
234th AAA Group, Calif NG	M-Day	Los Angeles	6th AARC
236th AAA Group, Wash NG	M-Day	Hanford	6th AARC
242nd AAA Group, Conn NG*	M-Day	Bridgeport	1st AARC
244th AAA Group, NY NG	M-Day	New York	1st AARC
250th AAA Group, Calif NG*	M-Day	San Francisco	6th AARC
251st AAA Group, Calif NG*	M-Day	San Diego	6th AARC
260th AAA Group, DCNG	M-Day	Washington	2nd AARC
371st AAA Group, Ohio, NG	M-Day	Cleveland	2nd AARC
101st AAA Det (Opr), Minn NG*	M-Day	Milwaukee	5th AARC
102nd AAA Det (Opr), NY NG*	M-Day	New York	1st AARC
103rd AAA Det (Opr), Ohio NG	M-Day	Cleveland	2nd AARC
105th AAA Det (Opr), NY NG*	M-Day	Niagara-Buffalo	1st AARC
110th AAA Det (Opr), Wash NG	M-Day	Seattle	6th AARC

READING DATA CANNOT BE PRESERVED

324

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

NG AA ONSITE AND M-DAY PROGRAM UNITS DESIGNATED AS SSF AS OF 8 MAR 56 (U) (Continued)

Unit Designation	Mission	Defense Area	MFC Responsible
114th AAA Det (Opr), Delaware NG	M-Day	Baltimore	2nd AARC
121st AAA Det (Opr), NC NG	M-Day	Youngstown	2nd AARC
142nd AAA Det (Opr), Ala NG	M-Day	Oak Ridge	2nd AARC
143rd AAA Det (Opr), Maine NG*	M-Day	Sault Ste. Marie	1st AARC
147th AAA Det (Opr), RI NG*	M-Day	New York	1st AARC
149th AAA Det (Opr), Penn NG	M-Day	Pittsburgh	2nd AARC
151st AAA Det (Opr), Penn NG	M-Day	Philadelphia	2nd AARC
172nd AAA Det (Opr), Conn NG*	M-Day	Hart-Bridgeport-Westover	1st AARC
173rd AAA Det (Opr), Mass NG*	M-Day	Boston-Providence	1st AARC
175th AAA Det (Opr), Wash NG	M-Day	Hanford	6th AARC
181st AAA Det (Opr), New Mexico NG	M-Day	San Diego	Cen AARC
286th AAA Det (Opr), Delaware NG	M-Day	Washington	2nd AARC
101st AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Georgia NG	M-Day	Oak Ridge	2nd AARC
102nd AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm) NY NG*	On-Site	Niagara-Buffalo	1st AARC
124th AAA Bn (AW)(Mbl), Vermont NG*	M-Day	Plattsburg AFB	1st AARC
125th AAA Bn (Gun, 120mm), Virginia NG	On-Site	Washington	2nd AARC
150th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), NC NG*	M-Day	Washington	2nd AARC
156th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Delaware NG	M-Day	Baltimore	2nd AARC
177th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Ohio NG	On-Site	Youngstown	2nd AARC
179th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Ohio NG	On-Site	Cleveland	2nd AARC
180th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Ohio NG	M-Day	Detroit	2nd AARC
182nd AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Ohio NG	On-Site	Youngstown	2nd AARC
193rd AAA Bn (AW)(Mbl), Delaware NG	M-Day	Loring AFB	2nd AARC
210th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm) NH NG*	M-Day	New York	1st AARC
211th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Conn NG*	On-Site	Bridgeport	1st AARC
213th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Penn. NG	M-Day	Philadelphia	2nd AARC
238th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Conn NG*	On-Site	Hart-Bridgeport-Westover	1st AARC
240th AAA Bn (Gun, 120mm), Wash NG	On-Site	Seattle	6th AARC
243rd AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), RI NG	On-Site	Providence	1st AARC
245th AAA Bn (Gun, 120mm) NY NG*	On-Site	New York	1st AARC
250th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Georgia NG	M-Day	Savannah River	2nd AARC
257th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Minn NG*	M-Day	Chicago	5th AARC
271st AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Calif NG*	On-Site	San Francisco	6th AARC
283rd AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Conn NG*	On-Site	Bridgeport	1st AARC

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

NG AA ONSITE AND M-DAY PROGRAM UNITS DESIGNATED AS SSF AS OF 8 MAR 56 (U) (Continued)

Unit Designation	Mission	Defense Area	MFC Responsible
300th AAA Bn (Gun, 75mm) (Mbl), Mich NG*	M-Day	Sault Ste Marie	5th AARC
314th AAA Bn (AW) (Mbl), Maine NG*	M-Day	Dow AFB	1st AARC
337th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Penn. NG	M-Day	Pittsburgh	2nd AARC
418th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Va NG	M-Day	Norfolk	2nd AARC
420th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Wash NG	M-Day	Hanford	6th AARC
530th AA Bn (AW)(Mbl), Wash NG	M-Day	Fairchild AFB	6th AARC
598th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Minn NG*	M-Day	Chicago	5th AARC
615th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Va NG	On-Site	Norfolk	2nd AARC
678th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), SC NG	M-Day	Oak Ridge	2nd AARC
685th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Mass NG*	M-Day	Boston-Providence	1st AARC
703rd AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Maine NG*	M-Day	New York	1st AARC
704th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Mass NG*	On-Site	Boston-Providence	1st AARC
705th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), RI NG*	On-Site	Boston-Providence	1st AARC
707th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Penn NG	On-Site	Philadelphia	2nd AARC
708th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Penn NG	On-Site	Pittsburgh	2nd AARC
709th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Penn NG	On-Site	Philadelphia	2nd AARC
710th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Va NG	On-Site	Norfolk	2nd AARC
711th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Alabama NG	M-Day	Washington	2nd AARC
713th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), SC NG	M-Day	Washington	2nd AARC
717th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm) NM NG	M-Day	Hanford	Cen AARC
724th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Penn NG	On-Site	Pittsburgh	2nd AARC
728th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Calif NG*	On-Site	San Francisco	6th AARC
736th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Delaware NG	M-Day	New York	2nd AARC
744th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), NH NG*	M-Day	New York	1st AARC
745th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Conn NG*	On-Site	Hart-Bridgeport-Westover	1st AARC
747th AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Mass NG*	M-Day	New York	1st AARC
770th AAA Bn (Gun, 120mm), Wash NG	On-Site	Seattle	6th AARC
772d AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm), Mass NG*	On-Site	Boston	1st AARC
804th AAA Bn (AW)(Mbl), NM NG	M-Day	Carswell AFB	Cen AARC
945th AAA Bn (AW)(Mbl), Delaware NG	M-Day	Westover AFB	2nd AARC
950th AAA Bn (AW)(Mbl), Georgia NG	M-Day	Savannah River	2nd AARC
110th Sig Det (RMU, Type E), NM NG	M-Day	Hanford	Cen AARC
123rd Sig Det (RMU, Type E), NC NG	M-Day	Washington	2nd AARC
130th Sig Det (RMU, Type E), Tenn NG	M-Day	Oak Ridge	2nd AARC

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Unit Designation	Mission	Defense Area	MFC Responsible
359 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) R.I.	M-Day	Hartford-Providence-Bridgeport	1st AARC
361 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) Del.	M-Day	Philadelphia	2d AARC
368 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) N.Y.	M-Day	Niagara-Buffalo	1st AARC
372 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) Penn.	M-Day	Philadelphia	2d AARC
373 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) Penn.	M-Day	Pittsburgh	2d AARC
377 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) Va.	M-Day	Washington	2d AARC
378 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) Ala.	M-Day	Travis AFB	2d AARC
383 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) S.C.	M-Day	Savannah River	2d AARC
385 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) N.M.	M-Day	Carswell	Central AARC
395 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) N.M.	M-Day	Castle	Central AARC
398 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) Delaware	M-Day	Baltimore	1st AARC
400 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) Conn.	M-Day	Hartford-Providence-Bridgeport	1st AARC
419 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) Oregon	M-Day	Hanford	6th AARC
420 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) Georgia	M-Day	Savannah River	2d AARC
421 Sig Det (RMU, Type E) N.Y.	M-Day	Niagara-Buffalo	1st AARC

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

NG AA ONSITE AND M-DAY PROGRAM UNITS DESIGNATED AS SSF AS OF 8 MAR 56 (U) (Continued)

Unit Designation	Mission	Defense Area	MFC Responsible
151st Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Va NG	M-Day	Norfolk	2nd AARC
164th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Ohio NG	M-Day	Youngstown	2nd AARC
166th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Ohio NG	M-Day	Cleveland	2nd AARC
181st Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Maine NG	M-Day	Dow AFB	1st AARC
184th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), NH NG	M-Day	Plattsburg AFB	1st AARC
189th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Ohio NG	M-Day	Detroit	2nd AARC
356th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Mass NG*	M-Day	Boston	1st AARC
357th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Mass NG	M-Day	Boston	1st AARC
358th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), NH NG	M-Day	Westover AFB	1st AARC
367th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), NY NG	M-Day	Niagara-Buffalo	1st AARC
379th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Fla NG	M-Day	New York	2nd AARC
382nd Sig Det (RPU, Type E), WC NG	M-Day	Washington	2nd AARC
404th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Wash NG	M-Day	Seattle	6th AARC
405th Sig Det (RPU, Type E), Wash NG	M-Day	Seattle	6th AARC

* Indicates Interim SSF designation. See paragraph 2e of basic.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL GUARD ANTIAIRCRAFT ON-SITE AND M-DAY PROGRAM UNITS

NOT DESIGNATED AS SPECIAL SECURITY FORCE AS OF 8 MARCH 1956 (U)

Unit Designation	Mission	Defense Area	MRC Responsible
191 Gp, Ohio, NG	M-Day	Youngstown	2d AARC
202 Gp, Ill. NG	M-Day	Chicago	5th AARC
203 Gp, Mo, NG	M-Day	St. Louis	Central AARC
209 Gp, NY	M-Day	Niagara-Buffalo	1st AARC
210 Gp, Michigan	M-Day	Detroit	5th AARC
111 Det (Opr) Missouri	M-Day	St. Louis	Central AARC
131 Det (Opr) N.C.	M-Day	Youngstown	2d AARC
177 Det (Opr) Va.	M-Day	Norfolk	2d AARC
184 Det (Opr) Calif.	M-Day	San Francisco	6th AARC
186 Det (Opr) Calif.	M-Day	Los Angeles	6th AARC
106 AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm) NY	M-Day	Niagara-Buffalo	1st AARC
109 AAA Bn (Gun,120mm) NJ	On-Site	New York	1st AARC
110 AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm) Ohio	On-Site	Cleveland	2d AARC
114 AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm) Tenn.	On-Site	Oak Ridge	2d AARC
128 AAA Bn (AW)(Mbl) S.D.	M-Day	Ellsworth AFB	Central AARC
201 AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm) Missouri	On-Site	St. Louis	Central AARC
202 AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm) Missouri	On-Site	St. Louis	Central AARC
227 AAA Bn (Gun, 90mm) Michigan	On-Site	Detroit	5th AARC
248 AAA Bn (Gun,120mm) Ill.	On-Site	Chicago	5th AARC
259 AAA Bn (Gun,120mm) N.Y.	On-Site	New York	1st AARC
286 AAA Bn (Gun,120mm) Wash, D.C.	M-Day	Seattle	6th AARC
336 AAA Bn (Gun,120mm) N.Y.	On-Site	New York	1st AARC
340 AAA Bn (Gun,120mm) Wash, D.C.	On-Site	Washington	2d AARC
380 AAA Bn (Gun,120mm) Wash, D.C.	On-Site	Washington	2d AARC
421 AAA Bn (AW)(Mbl) Nevada	M-Day	Travis AFB	6th AARC
422 AAA Bn (AW)(Mbl) Nevada	M-Day	March AFB	6th AARC

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

324

[illegible] 28 April 1958

[illegible]

ARNGUS Training Support for National Guard AA Units

[illegible]

1. a. [illegible] Ltr ARNGB-P (M) 385 (31 Dec 57) [illegible], Dept of the Army, subj: Reassignment of Responsibilities for Supervision of Training of National Guard Non-Divisional Antiaircraft Units (U), dated 11 January 1958.

b. Department of the Army letter (U) ARAD-C (M) 385 (5 Dec 57) [illegible], Office of the Adjutant General, subj: Tng Support and Mgt for NG AA Units in Air Def, [illegible]

2. ARADCOM has been assigned tng support responsibility for all non-divisional AA units which have been designated [illegible] and which have been assigned a [illegible] defense mission.

3. A requirement exists to publish general instructions concerning the training [illegible] objectives of this responsibility to the [illegible] (pending publication of more detailed [illegible] instructions at a later date) and to assign specific NG units [illegible] for training support.

ACTION REQUIRED: Publish ARADCOM policy on training support of NG AA units.

As required.

[illegible]

[illegible]

P. P. Genero
P. P. GENERO

[illegible] c/S Policy
[illegible] Policy

Major

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

325

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADCAA-3 P&O 320.2 10 April 1956

SUBJECT: Mobilization of Antiaircraft Units (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Totten 59, New York
Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois
Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Baker, California
Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command, Grandview Air Force Base, Grandview, Missouri

1. Reference: Department of Army letter, OPS II MF, 23 February 1956, subject as above, copy of which is attached as Inclosure 1 for information and guidance.

2. Paragraph 3d of reference 1 indicates that National Guard Antiaircraft M-day units scheduled to replace High priority active Army units during D + 1 month should be combat ready at all times. The release of a high priority Active Army unit is not contingent upon the availability of a qualified National Guard unit to assume the CONUS mission. Moreover, the overlap period may be only a few days at the most.

3. This headquarters is taking action to report to Department of the Army those non-Special Security Force National Guard units with the M-day mission of replacing Active Army high priority units. Department of the Army is being requested to replace these non-Special Security Force National Guard units with Special Security Force units. Although Special Security Force units are assumed to be combat ready, cases will arise requiring such units to be placed on probation and even to requalify. Should this become necessary in the case of a Special Security Force unit with an M-day mission of replacing a high priority unit, the ARAACOM major field commander will

ADCAA-3 ARO 450.5

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

Copy_____of_____Copies

PIO 329

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 F&O 320.2 10 April 1956
SUBJECT: Mobilization of Antiaircraft Units (U)

notify this headquarters of the situation, and furnish sufficient information on which to base a recommendation to the Department of Army.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1-Incl
DA ltr, 23 Feb 56

Jack E. Barton
JACK E. BARTON
Lt Colonel, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff

Copy furnished:
CNGB

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OPS PL MP 23 Feb 1956

SUBJECT: Mobilization of Antiaircraft Units (U)

TO: Commanding General
Army Antiaircraft Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

a. Letter, Headquarters, Army Antiaircraft Command, subject: "Army Mobilization Troop Program FY 55 (U)," dated 20 July 1955.

b. Department of the Army letter, subject: "Reassignment of Responsibilities for Supervision of Training of National Guard Non-Divisional Antiaircraft Units (U)," dated 11 January 1956.

c. AA-OP-US, Headquarters, Army Antiaircraft Command, 1 November 1953, with Change 3, dated 15 December 1955.

d. Army Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 1956 (ASCP).

2. Comments and recommendations in your letter, reference 1a, were considered in development of the AA Mobilization Troop Basis for FY 1956, and in Department of the Army review of the National Guard antiaircraft program which resulted in establishement of the revised responsibilities indicated in Department of the Army letter, reference 1b.

3. The AA Mobilization Troop Basis for FY 1956, which will be distributed in the near future, is based on the current active army and National Guard task organizations as indicated in Change 3, AA-OP-US, reference 1c. This troop basis reflects the current training status of National Guard units and the continuation into mobilization of those responsibilities for supervision of National Guard units as indicated in Department of the Army letter, reference 1b, and inclosure thereto. According to these terms, Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command is responsible for supervision of National Guard units assigned a specific CONUS defense mission, and which have qualified for and been designated Special Security Force (SSF) units. The Commanding General, Continental Army Command retains responsibility for supervision of National Guard units with CONUS defense missions until such units have qualified for and been designated SSF units. The AA Mobilization Troop Basis for FY 1956 provides for mobilization of National Guard units with CONUS defense missions as follows:

REGRADING DATA CAN NOT BE PREDETERM[redacted] Copy_____of_____Copies

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

GPS FL MB

SUBJECT: Mobilization of Antiaircraft Units (U)

a. Units with an onsite mission which have been designated SSF, and units with some elements onsite pre-M-Day whether or not designated SSF, will be assigned directly to prescribed defense sites during M/1 month. Further details on procedures for ordering these units into active Federal service are being developed.

b. Units with an M-Day mission which have been designated SSF and are scheduled to augment a defense, form new defenses, or replace active Army units, will be assigned to prescribed defense sites during M/1 month.

c. Non-SSF qualified units will be assigned to training centers during M/1 and M/2 months and are indicated as available for assignment to CONUS missions under jurisdiction of Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command or for oversea deployment when qualified, contingent on conditions in CONUS.

d. Mobilization and deployment of AA units (both CONUS and oversea) are scheduled in detail to meet requirements established in Annex E of the ASCP (reference 1d) and AA-OP-US for the period D-Day through D/6 months (M-Day and D-Day are assumed to coincide). Oversea deployment of active army units is scheduled contingent on the availability of qualified National Guard units to assume CONUS defense missions (M-Day units). Except for certain high priority active army units deployed overseas during D/1 month (as indicated in the current Troop Program, Annex 1, Section VI) an overlap of at least two months is provided in the assignment of qualified National Guard M-Day units and the release of active army units from prescribed defense positions.

e. Annex E of the ASCP reflects a "thinning out" of CONUS defense units commencing at D/6 months. AA-OP-US provides guidance for the initial assignment of qualified units to specific defense positions; however, it does not indicate the defense areas or strengths within defense areas which should be maintained once the "thinning out" concept is implemented. Under these conditions, the Mobilization Troop Basis is designed to permit determination after D-Day of specific units to be released from CONUS defense, and the time phasing of such release.

4. National Guard supervisory and support units designated for CONUS AA missions are located, to the extent that such units are available, in the vicinity of the positions they are scheduled to occupy. Action is continuing to realign the National Guard administrative command organization to parallel the planned tactical structure. However, as stated in letter, reference 1b, these are long-term objectives and their accomplishment is

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

325

OPS PL MP
SUBJECT: Mobilization of Antiaircraft Units (U)

limited by current State unit allocations and budgetary considerations. The extent to which the training of these units can be integrated with the training of active army units is dependent on their location and the training programs developed by Commanding General, Continental Army Command and Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command, respectively, for units under their jurisdiction. The providing of an overlap period in mobilization between the assignment of National Guard units and release of active army units from defense positions serves to alleviate the requirement for integrated training in peacetime.

5. The advantages of organizing National Guard units assigned a CONUS AA mission under CONUS-type TOEs are recognized. These advantages must be weighed against requirements for AA units for other type missions. The current plan for world-wide employment of AA units in mobilization, as reflected in Annex E of the ASCF, is predicated on the assumption that conditions in CONUS will permit overseas deployment of AA units in large numbers commencing at D/6 months. It is not feasible to attempt to determine, prior to D-Day, the exact numbers or locations of AA units which can be diverted from CONUS defense missions to support overseas operations, or the time schedule by which such diversions can be accomplished. Under these conditions, all units assigned to CONUS defense must be considered to be eligible for overseas deployment. Minimum requirements for reorganization and training prior to redeployment overseas from CONUS defense missions should be established. Department of the Army is currently considering criteria for withdrawal from National Guard onsite units of equipment that is not necessary for the onsite mission. This equipment would remain authorized under applicable TOE and would be available in supply channels for issue in the event the unit is redeployed to another mission.

Copies furnished:
Chief National Guard Bureau
CG, CONARC

/s/t/C. D. ELLEMAN
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

325

AGO44.3 PGO 320.2 29 March 1956

Mobilization of Antiaircraft Units (U)

See MF to GS Area 63, dated 16 Mar 56, same subject.

a. Forward ref 1 of MF to NGB for info and [illegible] and req report when there is any question concerning the status of a AA unit with Sunday mission of replacing high priority active Army unit.

b. Send msg to NGB & C NARG with info to DOS/NMA & AFLC requesting NGB to insure that NG units scheduled [illegible] are [illegible] Ref 3 requesting C NARG to give priority to inspecting [illegible] units [illegible] the mission of replacing MF & [illegible] indicated in a above.

XX

Room

G3 Policy
G3 Policy (2)
G4
G3 Chf
Rint 6 (PTO)

D. Y. Hannay

Lt Colonel 2239

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

326

ADOAA-3 P&O 337 (10 May 56) 1st Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Conference with Pennsylvania National Guard (U)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 6 June 1956.

TO: Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

1. Reference paragraph 1, inclosure 1 to basic. The advisability of using the term "retroactive" is questionable. In recent discussions between the National Guard Bureau and the various states, an effort was made to determine whether or not orders of National Guard units to Federal service would be retroactive to the time a unit was notified that a "military emergency" existed. For legal reasons, the details of which are not known at this headquarters, such an agreement was not considered feasible. Accordingly, Department of the Army by letter OP NA 12 (C), 4 October 1955, subject: "Special Security Forces", informed this headquarters that the National Guard Bureau had been unsuccessful in reaching an agreement with the various states whereby National Guard units could be utilized as state troops pending orders to Federal service and, further, that Department of the Army would publish appropriate instructions during an emergency.

2. It is understood that Department of the Army is recommending that the Commanding General ARAACOM be delegated authority to order National Guard units in the AA Task Organization to mobilization positions in the event of emergency and that Department of the Army orders to Federal service will be published accordingly. Although such a procedure would, in effect, be "pending retroactive orders to Federal service" as contemplated in your proposed agreement with the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, authority to use this assumption does not exist at this time.

3. Unless the governor of each state concerned will agree to the utilization of National Guard troops "as state troops" pending orders to Federal service, there is no way at present to insure their timely availability during an emergency. Even though it is contemplated that orders to Federal service will be published expeditiously enough to warrant acceptance by the states of the risk of a delay, it is emphasized that the risk is that of the states, pending the delegation of specific authority to this headquarters.

4. For your information in pursuing this matter further, there is attached as inclosure 2 a copy of a local agreement between active Army and National Guard commanders in the state of Washington which appears to be workable.

5. Reference paragraph 2, inclosure 1 to basic, it is pointed out that Department of the Army policies and procedures require that the training status of National Guard Special Security Force units be continuously under surveillance, and that those units not considered qualified be placed in a probationary status for a specified period of time. At the end of the

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 R&O 337 1st Ind (C) 6 June 1956
SUBJECT: Conference with Pennsylvania National Guard (U)

probationary period the units will be inspected to determine if Special Security Force standards have been met. If not, an appropriate recommendation to Department of the Army is required concerning whether or not the Special Security Force designation should be withdrawn. Under these conditions, periodic testing of all Special Security Force units will be required even though such tests need not be the standard modified Army training tests specified by letter AOAC-C(M) 325 (13 Jun 55) G3, Department of the Army, 21 June 1955, subject: "Criteria and Procedures for Nomination of National Guard Antiaircraft and Service Support Units for Designation as Special Security Forces (U)," unless the unit, in fact, is being tested under the Special Security Force criteria for redesignation.

6. Accordingly, it is desired:

a. That the word "retroactive" not be used in local mutual agreements with National Guard commanders, pending delegation by Department of the Army of appropriate authority to this headquarters.

b. That agreements concerning testing and re-testing of Special Security Force units be so worded that present Department of the Army policies and procedures concerning surveillance of training standards, probationary periods, withdrawal of Special Security Force designations and redesignations are clearly understood.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
Added 1 Incl
2. Copy of Mutual
Agreement, 9 Nov 54

R. T. CASSIDY
Lt Col, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:
DCSOPS DA
Chief, NGB
CG CONARC
CG 1st AA Rgn Comd
CG 5th AA Rgn Comd
CG 6th AA Rgn Comd
CO Cen AA Rgn Comd

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
2D ANTIAIRCRAFT REGIONAL COMMAND
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

BARC-3 325 10 May 1956

SUBJECT: Conference with Pennsylvania National Guard (U)

TO: Commanding General
Army Antiaircraft Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado
ATTN: ADGAA-3

1. Inclosure 1 forwarded for your information.

2. The use of the phrase "pending retroactive orders to Federal Service" in paragraph 1a(2) is based on the assumption that the Department of Defense will authorize orders retroactive to the time National Guard units are notified by proper authority that a "Military Emergency" exists.

BY THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Summary of Conference

s/ J. . . ROTH, CW
for t/ H. . . TUNSLEY
Major, A.G.
Adjutant General

REGRADING DATA CANNOT
BE DETERMINED

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
2D ARTIAIRCRAFT REGIONAL COMMAND
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

326

Summary of Conference with Pennsylvania National Guard

Conference with representatives of Pennsylvania National Guard and representatives of the 18th and 24th Groups and this headquarters was held 7 May 1956. The following personnel was present:

Name	Rank	Org	Duty Assignment
Pennsylvania NG			
MICHAEL, K. A.	Col	Hq, 51st Brig	EXO
EARP, R. H.	Col	Hq, PANG	G-3
BERTOLETT, A. D.	Col	Hq, 118th AAA Gp	CO
HILL, C. F.	Lt Col	Hq, PNGAGO	State AAA Supr.
GREER, W. S.	Maj	Hq, 218th Group	S-1
OSWALD, John R.	Maj	Hq, 51st Brig	S-1
2D AA Regional Command			
SAMUELS, A.	Col	Hq, 2d AA Rgn Comd	DC
STEVENS, Pat M III	Col	Hq, 24th AAA Group	CO
PIRAM, Joseph S.	Col	Hq, 35th AAA Brig	Exec
MOORE, Robert F.	Lt Col	Hq, 35th AAA Brig	S-3
HARVEY, R. W.	Maj	Hq, 18th AAA Group	S-3
BROOKS, E. R.	Maj	Hq, 24th AAA Group	S-3
SKRIEN, Cyrus A.	Maj	Hq, 2d AA Rgn Command	P&O

The conference was held to discuss the integration of National Guard units into the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia defenses. Copy of the agenda items, together with notes and summaries of agreements reached, is attached hereto.

Incl 1

REGRADING DATA CANNOT [redacted]
BE PREDETERMINED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

Conference on Integration of National Guard Units
2d AA Regional Command 7 May 1956

AGENDA

1. Assignment of operational responsibilities

a. Terms and wording

State of Pennsylvania objected to the use of words "as state troops" in the wording used to assign operational responsibilities and also requested that the word "retroactive" be applied to the orders to federal service. The changed wording of operational responsibilities is as follows:

(1) Under supervision of and in accordance with the tactical instructions of the defense commander, be prepared to become operational on-site by maintaining a state of preparedness that will enable the delivery of effectively controlled fire against hostile targets utilizing all primary armament and fire control equipment.

(2) When an attack occurs without warning, or upon notification that a "Military Emergency" exists, become operational on-site, as soon as possible after such notification or attack, under the operational control of the defense commander pending retroactive orders to Federal Service.

A letter is being sent to the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, indicating the changed wording and requesting his concurrence in assignment of operational responsibilities.

b. Publicity
(1) Jointly signed document.

The document prepared by this headquarters was accepted in format. Col Earp took the document back with him to the Adjutant General's office for concurrence or suggestions for changes and additions.

(2) Ceremonies and functions

It was agreed that appropriate ceremonies and functions would be held at the time units became operational in the defenses. Details will be worked out by the defense commander and local National Guard Group Commander.

2. Re-testing of SSF Units.

It was explained to the Pennsylvania National Guard that there is no requirement for re-testing Special Security Force Units; however, this headquarters feels that from the viewpoint of supervision of training and in attempt to get better acquainted with the current capabilities of the National Guard Battalions, a re-test of firing and detection phases will be undertaken for all battalions. Those batteries which can take detection phase on-site will do so. M-Day battalions will take both detection and firing phase

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

at Camp Perry. Operations detachments will be tested concurrently with gun battalions during the detection phase of the ATT. Brigades and Groups will complete their ATT (map exercise) under supervision of the senior advisor, prior to summer encampment.

3. Inquiry was made by Guard representatives as to availability of tactical instructions and they were informed that our revised tactical instructions would be distributed to battery level. National Guard was also informed that we had answered their recent query regarding ammunition regulations, the use of the interrogator on the IFF equipment, and the tactical requirements for ready ammunition. The question was raised as to what extent on-site units would participate in exercises with Active Army defenses, and as to what additional requirements would be placed upon National Guard units by Defense Commanders. The Guard was advised that ARAACOM is now in the process of co-ordinating the reassignment of responsibilities for supervision of training and that in connection with this new program, a revised training schedule is being completed which will apply to Special Security Force Units with a CONUS mission. It is expected that when the implementing instructions are published and the revised training program is applied to National Guard units, the degree of participation in exercises, the amount of time to be spent on AA subjects and joint training will be prescribed. This headquarters recommended that National Guard Commanders spend as much time as they can in exercises and such training as will further the integration of their units into the defenses.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

COPY

326

HEADQUARTERS 115TH AAA BRIGADE
Washington National Guard Armory
515 South Eastside Street
Olympia, Washington

HEADQUARTERS
31st AAA BRIGADE
McChord AFB, Washington

325

9 November 1954

SUBJECT: National Guard Antiaircraft On-Site Program

TO: Commanding Officer, 26th AAA Group, Fort Lawton, Washington
Commanding Officer, 205th AAA Group, Seattle, Washington

1. References:

a. Letter, DA, file AGAC-C (M) 601 (11 Oct 54) 03, Subject, (National Guard Antiaircraft On-Site Program", dated 18 October 1954.

b. Letter, Hq WAAD, file WAAC-3P 322, subject, "Designation of Special Security Forces Units", dated 15 October 1954.

c. Letter, DA, file AGAC-C (M) 601 (9 Dec 53) 03, subject, "NG AAA Site Requirement", dated 15 December 1953,

d. Joint Letter, Hq 115th AAA Brigade, Olympia, Washington and Hq 31st AAA Brigade, McChord AFB, Washington, file 325, subject, "National Guard Antiaircraft Program", undated.

e. Letter, NGB, file NG-OT 325.4 (Wash) (20 Nov 52), subject, "Integration of National Guard AAA Units", dated 20 November 1952.

f. Annex 5 AAA Defense Plan Seattle AA-OP-SEA-D.

2. Scope:

a. The purpose of this directive is to outline joint interim operational and training policies for the Washington National Guard antiaircraft artillery on-site program agreed upon by the undersigned.

b. Any area of agreement within the scope of this directive or corrections of serious deficiencies that cannot be solved at the local level will be forwarded through respective command channels for decision or necessary action.

[redacted]

Incl 2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

C O P Y

Joint Ltr, Hq 115th AAA Brig & Hq 31st AAA Brig, subj: "NG AA On-Site Program", dated 9 Nov 54, cont'd.

3. Ordering of National Guard AAA On-Site Units into Federal Service:

a. The procedure of alerting and ordering National Guard AAA on-site units into Active Federal Service with dispatch in an emergency needs clarification from higher headquarters.

b. National Guard and Active Army commanders are making efforts through respective channels to have the situation clarified.

c. Pending clarification, present methods of ordering National Guard AAA on-site units to Federal Service remain unchanged, but the Area Defense Commander is authorized, at his discretion, to keep National Guard Commanders informed on emergency conditions.

4. Command - Command of National Guard AAA on-site units rests with the National Guard commanders except in the event of such units being ordered into Active Federal Service.

5. Operational Control - The Area Defense Commander exercises operational control (as defined in SR 320-5-1) over the elements of the National Guard in the defense and assumes the responsibilities which such control entails.

6. The Defense Commander will inform the Commanding Officer of the 205th AAA Group, Washington National Guard, of air activities when his intelligence indicates that a raid is probable or imminent and he desires the National Guard Site facilities to bolster the defense. He will notify each National Guard battery in the defense, normally through existing AAAOC communication facilities, of the desirability of having the personnel of the fire units on-site. The National Guard units will implement their SOP for manning the sites and when enough personnel are present on-site to fire will so notify the Defense Commander through AAAOC channels. In the absense of orders calling the National Guard units into active Federal Service, the appropriate National Guard Commanders will designate such calls to the gun sites as drills. However, if the emergency is an actual enemy raid, and the call or order to active Federal Service has not yet been formally received, National Guard units will conduct fire as directed by their Area Defense Commander.

7. Training:

a. Training of National Guard on-site units is the responsibility of the National Guard Commanders concerned.

b. Active Army units will lend all training assistance possible, as requested by the National Guard, commensurate with their ability to continue to accomplish the assigned tactical mission.

c. Joint Army and National Guard exercises will be conducted frequently to insure that all units within the defense reach and maintain the highest possible degree of combat effectiveness. The times and dates will be determined by the local Army and National Guard commanders concerned.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

326

COPY

Joint Ltr, Hq 115th AAA Brig & Hq 31st AAA Brig, subj: "NG AA On-Site Program", dated 9 Nov 54, cont'd.

d. National Guard units concerned with the on-site program will conduct training in accordance with Active Army tactical publications to insure that all key personnel are familiar with the current SOP's, SOI's, SSI's, etc, to enable complete functions with the Army in Air Defense Exercises, Detection Exercises and in the event of an emergency. Emergency as used herein may be determined to exist by the Defense Commander.

8. Inspections:

a. Command, training, administrative, supply and technical inspections of National Guard on-site units is the responsibility of the Washington National Guard.

b. Joint Army and National Guard operational training inspections of National Guard on-site units are authorized by respective brigades and groups by mutual agreement of the commanders concerned.

9. Communication and Liaison Channels:

a. Communications and liaison activities that come within the scope of and to further the provisions of this agreement will be from Army AAA Group to National Guard AAA Group and vice-versa.

b. Distribution of routine publications between Army and National Guard will be as directed by the group commanders.

10. Administrative Matters:

a. The Active Army will make available to the National Guard all the tactical publications necessary for their complete functioning in the defense.

b. Times and frequency of routine reports shall be worked out by mutual agreement of the group commanders.

c. Disciplinary and court-martial jurisdiction remains with the Washington National Guard until on-site units are ordered into Active Federal Service.

/s/NOEL P MCKAY
/t/Brigadier General, NGUS
Commanding

ARTHUR ROTH
Colonel, Arty
Commanding

C [redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADOAA-3 P20 325 23 February 1956

SUBJECT: Integration of National Guard On-Site Special Security Force Units into the Air Defense of Continental United States (U)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Totten 59, New York
Commanding General, 2d Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
Commanding General, 5th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois
Commanding General, 6th Antiaircraft Regional Command, Fort Baker, California
Commanding Officer, Central Antiaircraft Regional Command, Grandview Air Force Base, Grandview, Missouri

Copy furnished: Hist C (PIO)

1. References:

a. Letter, NG-CO 325.4 (20 Nov 52) National Guard Bureau, 20 November 1952, subject: "Integration of National Guard Antiaircraft Artillery Units into the Army Antiaircraft Defense of the Continental United States."

b. Letter, G-3 381 N.A. (7 Jan 53) Department of the Army, 22 January 1953, subject: "Integration of NG AA Units Into the Air Defense of U.S."

c. Paragraph 4b, letter, AGAC-C (M) 601 (11 Oct 54) G-3, Department of the Army, 18 October 1954, subject: "National Guard Antiaircraft On-Site Program."

d. Letter, AGAC-C (M) 325 (22 Mar 55) G3, DA, Office of the Adjutant General, 30 March 1955, subject: "Nomination of National Guard Antiaircraft On-Site Units for Designation as Special Security Force (U)."

2. At each stage of integration of National Guard units into the Air Defense System, it must be remembered that the Commanding General Army Antiaircraft Command does not have command control over these units in normal times. However, reference 1a establishes the general principle that the AA Defense Commander who will command the respective on-site National Guard units when they are ordered to active duty during an emergency should have

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

[redacted]

(21)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

continuous cognizance of the readiness status of the unit. In reference 1b, Department of the Army directed each ZI Army to effect an agreement with each state concerned to cover the specified channel for supervision of operational training, and further, to prepare an operations plan to insure that these National Guard AA units are ordered promptly to active duty.

3. Reference 1c directs the Commanding General Army Antiaircraft Command to integrate National Guard on-site Special Security Force units into the Air Defense System. Reference 1d requires the concurrence of the Adjutant General of the State concerned at time operational responsibilities are assigned.

4. The sequence of major actions to be followed in integrating on-site Special Security Force National Guard AA units into the Air Defense of Continental United States, are as follows:

a. When Unit is assigned by National Guard Bureau to the National Guard AA Task Organization - The major field commander will insure that a copy of the appropriate defense plan is forwarded to the National Guard unit through the State Adjutant General as required by Memorandum Number 3, this headquarters, 1953.

b. When Unit is nominated for Special Security Force designation - The major field commander will:

(1) Initiate action to obtain the written concurrence of the State Adjutant General in assigning operational responsibilities to the unit under the provisions of letter, AGAC-C (M) 325 (22 March 55) GJ, DA, Office of the Adjutant General, 30 March 1955, subject: "Nomination of National Guard Antiaircraft On-Site Units for Designation as Special Security Force (U)."

(2) Ascertain, if not already known, whether or not the State Adjutant General desires to participate in the preparation of an appropriate document announcing the change in status of the National Guard unit.

c. When unit is on-site and designated Special Security Force - Major field commanders or defense commanders, as appropriate, will:

(1) Take all actions indicated herein and in Operations Directive Number 2, this headquarters, 1955.

(2) Recommend to this headquarters an appropriate time for the assignment by this headquarters of operational responsibilities to the National Guard unit. Dispatch this recommendation as item to the National Guard Weekly Status Report required by Operations Directive Number 2, this headquarters, 1955.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

326

ADOAA-3 M&O 325 23 February 1956

SUBJECT: Integration of National Guard On-Site Special Security Force Units into the Air Defense of Continental United States (U)

(3) In order to establish merited recognition of the assumption by the National Guard unit of an operational role in the defense of the United States, the major field commander will personally sign, jointly with the State Adjutant General, if agreeable to him, an appropriate document announcing the change in status of the unit with accompanying appropriate publicity releases.

(4) Furnish copies of all correspondence with State Adjutants General to this headquarters.

4. When Unit is recommended to this headquarters for assumption of operational responsibilities - This headquarters will:

(1) Send electrical message to the defense commander announcing the integration of the National Guard unit into the Air Defense of Continental United States, with information to Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations; Chief, National Guard Bureau; Commanding General, Continental Army Command; and Major Field Commanders.

(2) The Commanding General will personally sign a letter to the National Guard unit recognizing the importance of the occasion to the unit, Army Antiaircraft Command and the Armed Forces as a whole.

5. In addition to the action in paragraph 4, the following specific steps will be taken by the AA Defense Commander, or by the major field commander in the case where an entire AA defense may be manned by the National Guard units:

a. Make known to the National Guard On-Site Special Security Force Unit Commander the active Army operational standards and procedures for the defense concerned by means of a standard package of appropriate documents including SOPs, SOIs, and SSIs.

b. Request the National Guard unit commander to report those operational standards and procedures his unit cannot meet.

c. Analyze the report rendered by each National Guard unit commander and make recommendations through AA command channels to this headquarters concerning the length of time required for the unit to become operational after receipt of notice that a "military emergency" exists. Based on this information and recommendations of AA major field commanders, a readiness status consistent with the local situation will be approved by this headquarters for each unit. In the event future tests indicate the need to change the previously approved readiness status, a new readiness status will be recommended through AA channels to this headquarters for review. The Department of the Army objective is for National Guard on-site

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

327

24 MAR 56

ATAA-3 G.T 413.684

SUBJECT: Training of Army Personnel for the Army AA/TSC-1 System and for Duty with the Air Force SAGE System

TO: Commanding General
Continental Army Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia

1. This headquarters is cognizant of the many headquarters and agencies that are involved and interested in the above subject and it is considered that past actions have resulted in misunderstanding.

2. This headquarters would like to pose several problem areas, the resolution of which would clarify future actions regarding the subject.

a. The responsibility for the conduct of a school for training Army personnel for duty at operational AA installations is one problem area. This headquarters has inferred [illegible] officer at Fort Bliss, Texas, that it is considered the responsibility of [illegible] to implement the school program for this training.

b. The responsibility for personnel input and conduct of a school for training Army personnel for duty with the AA/TSC-1 system is another problem area that should be resolved. Across this headquarters is initiating action to integrate the present antiaircraft operations detachment (TOE 44-76) into the TOE of applicable defense headquarters, it is considered that, due to the magnitude of AA/TSC-1 operations, a separate TOE probably will be required for the type unit (detachment or battery) that will support operations in designated AA/TSC-1 defenses. This headquarters considers that CONAC is the responsible agency for the development of the aforementioned TOE for the AA/TSC-1 system, as well as for the implementation of the proper schooling program to ensure an output of operational and maintenance type personnel to fill the positions envisaged in the proposed TOE. It is also considered that Department of the Army will provide an input of personnel into the school, this input to be based on the requirements of the proposed TOE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ADDAA-3 (ST 413.68)

SUBJECT: Training of Army Personnel for the Army AN/FSG-1 System and for Duty with the Air Force SAGE System

1. Reference is made to letter from [illegible] Liaison Officer at Lincoln Laboratory to your headquarters, dated 28 January 1956, subject: "Personnel for SAGE Subsector". This headquarters had directed the Commanding General, 1st AA Regional Command to cooperate with the personnel of the Lincoln Laboratory to the maximum possible extent, consistent with the fulfillment of the AA operational mission, in the conduct of any local testing desired. This directive was the result of a request from the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command; however, support of the test requested by CINCONAD was not of the magnitude nor as time consuming as the support of the test mentioned in [illegible] Liaison Officer's letter. This headquarters considers the referenced test to be beyond the purview of an operational unit such as the 15th AA Group at [illegible], and that support of any such test should be the responsibility of your headquarters.

2. Your comments are requested regarding the concept of this headquarters as indicated in paragraph 2, above. Representatives of this headquarters will be available to discuss any of these problems, if desired.

[illegible]

Copies furnished:
[illegible], DA
[illegible], DA
[illegible], DA
Pres, Board 4 [illegible]
CG, 1st AA [illegible]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

327

AFCAA-3 067 [illegible] 22 March 1956

Training of Army Personnel for the Army AN/TSQ-1 System and for Duty with the Air Force SAGE System

See attached DF with approval of CofS and CG.

X

October 56

CG
COMBAT LAB

G3 Policy
CofS Policy (2)
CG
Hist O (PIO)

JAMES P. CAREY, JR.
Major

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

DOC 328

ADOAA-3 SLT 353

SUBJECT: Training Problems Relative to the Surface-to-Air Missile Program

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter [illegible] ADOAA-3 [illegible] (7 Mar 56), this headquarters, 23 April 1956, to letter [illegible], [illegible] No. 3, Department of the Army, 7 March 1956, subject: "Universal [illegible] Ground Equipment Sets ( )".

2. The present [illegible] program includes the objective of [illegible] active Army [illegible] battalions on-site by 30 June 1957. [illegible] is committed to this Department of the Army program in having certain [illegible] units on-site by specified dates; this requires an uninterrupted flow of school-trained technicians and [illegible] equipment into these units.

3. This headquarters recognizes the shortage of technically qualified instructor personnel and [illegible] equipment at the [illegible] which is taxing the ability of that command to provide all of the school-trained [illegible] personnel required by [illegible]. In the near future, similar additional problems will be added by the conversion program of [illegible] to [illegible] and the activation of new [illegible] battalions. The load that required in order to prepare for these additional workloads is growing short, and early action will be necessary in order to insure that sufficient numbers of school-trained technicians will be available at the proper times.

4. In connection with the training of technical personnel at Fort Bliss to meet [illegible] requirements, this headquarters is especially interested in the output of the following courses:

a. [illegible] Fire Control System Maintenance Course, [illegible]-30, MOS 227.6 (42 week course).

b. [illegible] Electronic Material Maintenance Course, [illegible]-32, MOS 223.6 (28 week course).

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ARDAA-3 OCT 353
SUBJECT: Training Problems Relative to the Surface-to-Air Missile Program

a. SAM Mechanical Material Maintenance Course, 44-5-38, MOS 221.6 (8 week course).

It is felt that in order to relieve some of the pressure under which the AAA and CM School will be operating in order to provide school-trained technicians for the SAM programs, and to reduce the number of NIKE sets diverted from production to non-tactical use, certain ARAACON tactical equipment could be utilized in a double role, as outlined below, for training at least part of the personnel in the courses listed in subparagraphs a, b, and c above.

5. Branches of the AAA and CM School should be established at selected Army posts where ARAACON NIKE units are located and where existing facilities are available to accommodate such branch schools.

a. Tactical NIKE equipment of ARAACON on-site units would be used for instructional purposes.

b. Instructors for the branch schools would be provided by the AAA and CM School, Fort Bliss.

c. The ARAACON tactical units assigned to the sites concerned would act as school troops, reverting to the air defense division in emergency, on order of this headquarters.

d. The XI Armies concerned would provide the necessary administrative and logistical support of the respective branch schools.

e. Branch schools would teach the courses listed in subparagraphs 4a, b, and c above. If desirable, any one branch school could be limited to concentrating on but one of the courses. As a matter of fact, there appears to be no reason why the two courses listed in subparagraphs 4b and 4c should not be combined into a single course; in effect, this would amount to deletion of MOS 221 from TOEs and personnel would be trained in MOS 223 for maintenance and repair of NIKE materiel, both electrically and mechanically.

f. Branches of the AAA and CM School could be located so that it would be convenient to contract with a nearby civilian institution for provision of a program of instruction in the basic electronics portion at the beginning of each course.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] 328

AIOAA-3 OAT 353
SUBJECT: Training Problems Relative to the Surface-to-Air Missile Program

6. In view of the urgency for early implementation of a program which will provide the necessary technically trained personnel for the NIKE program at the proper times, it is recommended that the foregoing principles be adopted and action be initiated along these lines in the immediate future. This headquarters is prepared to participate as indicated herein, beginning at any time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copies furnished:
CO, COMARC
CO, AAA & GM Center

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Training Problems Relative to the Surface-to-Air Missile Program 22 May 1956

328

Commanding General gave oral instructions to G3 to study possibility of augmenting Fort Bliss capability of training key NIKE technicians. CG announced basic concept of utilizing on-site equipment and limited use of on-site personnel.

Letter to DCSOPS, DA, proposing establishing required school augmentation.

X

X

G1

G4

G1
G4
PIO (Hist Off)
G3 Policy

} IN TURN

JAMES P. CAREY, JR.
Col
James P. Carey, Jr., Major
G3 OAT 2882

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

329

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

AMAAA-3 O&T 381 11 June 1964

SUBJECT: States of Alert for AA Units (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. References:

a. OCMAD Regulation 55-8, [illegible], Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command, 31 Mar 1956.

b. [illegible] Circular Number 5, Headquarters, Continental Air Defense Command, Check and [illegible] Procedures, [illegible] June 1960.

c. [illegible] Number 1, [illegible] of [illegible] Units, [illegible]

2. The [illegible] of alert [illegible] for [illegible] the minimum readiness [illegible] may [illegible] alert [illegible] air defense requirements.

3. The AA alert fire units prescribed by paragraph 1a, Reference 1a, will be designated in each AA defense to insure a balance AA defense effectiveness.

4. The following instructions supplement the provisions of reference 1a.

a. 90mm - 120mm fire units: Fifty percent (50%) of the fire units on-site in an AA defense will be capable of accomplishing an effective engagement within thirty (30) minutes of receipt of signal or warning, and of maintaining sustained fire thereafter. Fire units at firing ranges conducting annual service practice are not considered to be on-site.

b. 75mm fire units: Two-thirds of the fire units on-site in an AA defense will be capable of accomplishing an effective engagement within thirty (30) minutes of receipt of signal or warning, and of maintaining sustained fire thereafter. Fire units at firing ranges conducting annual service practice are not considered to be on-site.

c. NIKE fire units:

RECRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

[redacted]

Copy_____of_____copies

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

329

ADOAA-3 O&T 381
SUBJECT: States of Alert for AA Units (U)

11 June 19[illegible]

(1) Twenty-five (25) percent of the fire units on-site will be capable of launching one effectively controlled missile within fifteen (15) minutes of receipt of signal or warning, and of maintaining sustained fire thereafter until the supply of ready missiles is exhausted. These batteries will operate pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 9, reference 1b. Fire units conducting annual service practice at Red Canyon Range Camp will operate pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 11, reference 1c.

(2) Twenty-five (25) percent of the fire units on-site will be capable of launching one effectively controlled missile within thirty (30) minutes of receipt of signal or warning, and of maintaining sustained fire thereafter until the supply of ready missiles is exhausted. These batteries will operate pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 10, reference 1b. Fire units conducting annual service practice at Red Canyon Range Camp will operate pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 11, reference 1c.

d. The remaining fire units on-site will be on a training and maintenance cycle for a period normally not less than seven (7) days. These fire units will retain the capability of returning to an operational status described in subparagraphs c(1) and (2) above within three (3) hours from receipt of signal or warning. If required maintenance precludes their becoming operational within the prescribed three (3) hours, the appropriate defense headquarters will be notified and requested to waive the three (3) hour limitation. Defense commanders will notify this headquarters by electrical message (ATTN: G3 (O&T) of any waivers granted. It is anticipated that there will be only an infrequent need for requesting a waiver of the three (3) hour limitation.

5. In the event that one of the alert fire units mentioned in paragraph 4b(1), (2), or (3), reference 1a, becomes inoperative, a fire unit in the training and maintenance cycle will be required to resume an appropriate state of alert if in the opinion of the defense commander the inoperative status will be of such duration to warrant such change.

6. Rescissions:

a. Letter, (CONFIDENTIAL), ADOAA-3 O&T, this headquarters, "Increased Combat Readiness of AA Units (U)," 24 August 1955.

b. ARAACOM message 659 (CONFIDENTIAL), 212043Z October 1955.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D. B. Johnson

D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, GS
Chief of Staff

1 Incl
CONAD Reg 55-8

DISTRIBUTION and Copies Furnished
(See Page 3)

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 O&T 381 11 June 1956
SUBJECT: States of Alert for AA Units (U)

DISTRIBUTION: X
Regional Commands (1)
Army Dep, JEADF (1)
Brigades (1)
Groups (1)
75mm AA Bns (1)

Copies furnished: (w/o incl)
DCSOPSDA
DCSLOGDA
CG, First Army
CG, Second Army
CG, Third Army
CG, Fourth Army
CG, Fifth Army
CG, Sixth Army
CG, AAAA&GM Cen
CG, Redstone Arsenal
Pres, Bd 4, CONARC
Res ArmyO, BTL, Whippany, NJ

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ADMA-3 OMT
States of Alert for AA Units (U) 6 Jan 56 329

CONAD reg 55-8, States of Alert for CONAD units, basically provides for 50% NIKE and Gun units and one-third of the Skysweeper units on a 3-hour training and maintenance status.

Implement and supplement [illegible] 5- and 6- [illegible] previous instructions which are in conflict with the above.

(45th and 56th Brigs will not receive distribution)

X

X

X

Circulate 1 cy
to all ARMADA Staff
Sections.

LEE N. [illegible], Lt Col

03 Policy (1) 03 MT 2172

OS Policy (2)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

[redacted]

330

CONADR 55-8

CONAD REGULATION 55-8

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colo.
31 May 1956

OPERATIONS

(Unclassified) State of Alert for Air Defense Units

1. Purpose. This directive establishes the normal State of Alert to be maintained by units under the operational control of CINCONAD.

2. Scope. This directive applies to all echelons of command under the operational control of CINCONAD.

3. Responsibility. The commanders of all organizations participating in air defense operations are responsible for insuring that:

a. The normal States of Alert as outlined in paragraph 4 are complied with.

b. During an air defense emergency, warning and/or readiness, commanders of all echelons will make available all operationally-ready weapons for the operational control of CINCONAD.

4. Normal States of Alert.

a. Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons:

(1) At a one-squadron base, two operationally-ready aircraft will be placed on "Readiness" (5 minutes), four aircraft on "Back-Up" (1 hour), and the remaining aircraft which can be operationally-ready within three hours on "Reserve" (3 hours).

(2) At a two-squadron base, two operationally-ready aircraft will be placed on "Readiness" (5 minutes), eight aircraft on "Back-Up" (1 hour), and the remaining aircraft which can be operationally-ready within three hours on "Reserve" (3 hours).

(3) Air National Guard fighter-interceptor squadrons committed to active air defense operations will provide two aircraft on "readiness" (5 minutes) from one hour before sunrise until one hour after sunset, provided such a schedule does not exceed fourteen hours a day. When this schedule will exceed fourteen hours a day, ANG squadrons will assume the alert commitment one hour before sunrise and will be released from the commitment fourteen hours later.

b. Army Antiaircraft Fire Units:

(1) 90mm and 120mm Fire Units: Fifty percent (50%) of the fire units will retain the capability of assuming battle stations within thirty minutes.

(2) 75mm Fire Units: Two-thirds of the fire units will retain the capability of assuming battle stations within thirty minutes.

(3) NIKE Fire Units:

(a) Twenty-five percent of the fire units will retain the capability of assuming battle stations within fifteen minutes.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

(b) Twenty-five percent of the fire units will retain the capability of assuming battle stations within thirty minutes.

(4) Remaining operational fire units will be capable of assuming battle stations within three hours.

c. Picket ships, while on station, will operate in accordance with instructions contained in CONAD OPLAN 9-56 and supporting OPORDS issued by Naval Forces Regional Commanders.

d. Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons:

(1) Aircraft control and warning squadrons will maintain continuous radar surveillance and control capability in accordance with current operating procedures.

(2) Aircraft control and warning squadrons which are on limited operational status will be operated at least during a four hour period beginning two hours before sunrise and a four hour period beginning two hours before sunset.

e. AEW&Con aircraft, while on station, will maintain radar surveillance and report to the appropriate joint air defense division in accordance with established procedure.

f. The Ground Observer Corps will conduct Skywatch operation in designated filter center areas in accordance with reporting procedures outlined in CONAD Manual 55-1, as amended.

5. General.

a. Joint air defense force commanders may deploy fighter-interceptor squadrons and/or detachments thereof when, in the opinion of the commander concerned, deployment is necessary to increase defense capabilities in certain areas.

b. When the squadron from a one-squadron base is deployed, the alert requirement will be at the discretion of the joint air defense force commander concerned.

c. Joint air defense force commanders are authorized to permit maximum of twenty percent of possessed fighter-interceptor aircraft to be absent from home stations on navigational flights which are more than three hours flight distance from their base. This will be authorized provided that alert commitments up to and including "Back-Up" (1 hour) are met.

d. Commanders concerned will insure that all fighter-interceptor aircraft capable of aiming and firing armaments operate with a full combat lead of weapons on all missions except: transition, engineering test flights, weapons training missions, and air shows.

e. Upon notification that an air defense warning exists, or upon declaration of an air defense emergency and/or air defense readiness, the following policy is established for control of fighter-interceptor squadrons deployed to a weapons employment center:

(1) If an attack occurs without warning, operational control of aircraft will go to the joint air defense division commander in whose area the interceptors are located. Further deployment will be directed by CINCONAD.

(2) If sufficient warning of attack is received to allow deployment,

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

~~373~~
330

CONADR 55-8

instructions for fighter-interceptor squadrons will be issued by CINCONAD.

(COOCO)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

W J Birmele

W. J. BIRMELE
Lt Col, USAF
Asst Comd Adj

MARSHALL S. ROTH
Major General, USAF
Acting Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Air Def Forces	5 cys
Air Divisions	5
Wings	2
Ftr Gps	1
Air Def Gps (Wpns)	2
AEW&Con Sqs	1
ACW Sqs	1
Air Def Sqs (Wpns)	1
Ftr Incp Sqs	1
GO Sqs	1
ARAACOM, Hq ADC	45

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2

~~344~~
331

Report on Project BOW
Col J R Kullman, Chairman
Project BOW Committee

24 Aug 56

VC
THRU: C/S

1. Project BOW was initiated by ADC Staff Memo 30-1, dated 12 March 1956, (See Inclosure 1). As outlined in Staff Memo 30-1, the primary purpose of Project BOW is to consider methods of improving the "esprit de corps" and the attractiveness of service in the ACW system within this command. Project BOW was established to do for the ACW system what "Project Arrow" did for the fighter interceptor units and emphasize the ACW-interceptor team concept.

2. The intercept controller career field was used as a starting point for consideration by the Committee, since it was felt that it would be impossible to consider ways to improve the controller career field without automatically including ways to improve the career fields for all ACW personnel. The controller career field was also considered in view of the fact that while the role of the intercept controller has become, and will continue to become, increasingly important in the successful accomplishment of the air defense mission, the controller experience level has been steadily decreasing with a resultant reduction in the air defense capability throughout the command.

3. Project BOW Committee held eleven meetings between 24 January and 9 July 1956, with representatives of all directorates participating in the meeting on 9 July. Letters have been sent to each Defense Force regarding designation of "Project BOW" Committees at Defense Force level. A meeting will be held at Headquarters EADF with representatives of all three Defense Force Project BOW Committee Members attending, as soon as Defense Force projects have been established.

4. In view of the world-wide aspects of the ACW problems which must be considered, Headquarters USAF has been requested to sponsor this project on an Air Force-wide basis.

5. Problem areas and discussion points by Project BOW to date include the following:

a. <u>Review of the Sixty-Three Recommendations of the World-Wide Controller Conference</u>. This conference was held at Tyndall Air Force Base in March of 1955 with representatives of USAF and all commands utilizing controllers.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

331

b. Use of Airmen and Warrant Officers as Controllers. As an interim solution to the controller shortage, Defense Forces have been authorized to use qualified 27300 career field NCO's as controllers provided they act under the supervision of a qualified officer controller, (Message ADPRT 13183, 21 March 1956). In view of the responsibilities and requirements which are placed on the intercept controller, this committee feels that the use of airmen as controllers should be discontinued at the earliest possible date. The present program calls for 480 Warrant Officers to be phased into the ACW system of this command by the end of calendar year 1958. These 480 Warrant Officers should do much to alleviate the present shortage of intercept controllers in the manual system. A study is continuing on the possible use of civilians in ACW activities.

c. Career Development Plan for Intercept Controllers. The increased authorization and appointment of Warrant Officers into the intercept controller career field has provided a necessary element of career progression within the 27000 career field. The Warrant Officer Program will do much to increase the stability of operations personnel and provide an incentive toward which airmen can work.

The problem of career progression for the non-rated controllers as well as rated controllers, is still under study. As non-rated controllers gain experience and advance in grade, the career progression should enable them to go into staff positions or assignments as ACW unit commanders. Headquarters USAF is considering a revision and a redesignation of the Air Force specialty for AFSC 1644, (intercept controller), AFSC 1616 (ACW staff officer) to a new AFSC of 1744 (weapons director) and 1716 (weapons direction staff officer) which will entirely separate the ACW and AACS functions. It will also more clearly define the functions and responsibilities of the present ACW staff officer and controller in the ACW system. Publication of this new AFSC and its implementation by ADC should resolve a number of the problems connected with the career progression for non-rated controllers.

Rotation of rated pilots from interceptor crew positions to the ACW field as controllers and back to cockpit positions is also under consideration by this Committee. Such a program would better enable interceptor pilots to understand the ACW functions and give them a better understanding of the Air Defense mission. This program must be sold to the interceptor crews and assignment policies must be established to preclude loss of combat potential of the pilot or loss through separation of the pilots as a result of being taken out of the cockpit and given a ground assignment. The end result of such a program would be a marked increase in our control capability.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~347~~
331

Report of Project BOW

VC
THRU:C/S

Col J R Kullman, Chairman
Project BOW Committee

24 Aug 56

d. Utilization of ACW Staff Officers, AFSC 1616 and Intercept Controllers, AFSC 1644. This problem is being considered in order to effect a more equitable authorization for ACW operations staff positions in our headquarters. A review of the manning documents for all Air Division Headquarters, Air Defense Forces and ADC Headquarters reveals the following:

(1) The 27th Air Division (Defense) has no authorization for a single ACW staff officer, AFSC 1616, in Division Headquarters.

(2) Five Air Divisions (Defense) authorize only one AFSC 1616.

(3) ADC COC has no authorizations for either 1644 or 1616 AFSC. Authorizations for COC staff positions in practically all headquarters are for AFSC 1416's.

e. Increased Grade Structure Within the ACW System. As a means of increasing the attractiveness of the controller career field and to aid in the retention of qualified controllers, this committee has recommended that ACW squadron commander authorizations be increased to Lt Colonels and Colonels. The responsibilities assigned to commanders of ACW squadrons are considered to be of sufficient importance to authorize the grade of at least Lt Colonel, the same as for fighter interceptor squadrons. ACW unit commanders are, in effect, base commanders and should have sufficient background and experience to be able to cope with the problems faced by base commanders. Headquarters USAF has approved Lt Colonels in those ACW squadrons having an identification function and scramble authority over an ADC squadron or an Air National Guard Squadron standing alert, or a squadron which has scramble authority in excess of two ADC squadrons or ANG alert squadrons. By using this criteria we have 39 squadrons which are authorized Lt Colonel grades. An additional 99 Lt Colonel spaces are required to provide one per squadron. There are 24 ACW squadrons where it was anticipated that full Colonel grades will be required because of consolidation of the direction center and AACC activation. A letter to USAF is being prepared by M&O to reiterate a command requirement for Lt Colonel and Colonel spaces considered commensurate with the responsibilities of the ACW squadron commanders.

f. ACW Site Manning Increase. This problem area was considered in order to provide adequate manning of the positions requiring 24 hour operations. M&O states that ADCSM 25-1A will take care of the increased personnel the Defense Forces may require if the Defense Forces will forward necessary justification to ADC. The authorizations specified by this manual are adequate to meet requirements of all ACW units. For example, the manual provides a 6.0 manning per intercept director position.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

331

Report on Project BOW

VC
THRU:C/S

Col J R Kullman, Chairman 24 Aug 56
Project BOW Committee

g. Flying Time for Rated Intercept Controllers. A proposal was forwarded to USAF on this problem and the recommendations were sent to the Chief of Staff for signature authorizing payment for transportation only for fifteen trips per Fiscal Year, provided the distance traveled was in excess of fifty miles one way. Message from USAF, AFPDR-3 36958, 26 July, stated that since this proposal represents an unprogrammed requirement it cannot be implemented during FY 57. Consideration will be given for implementation in FY 1958.

h. Distinctive Controller Insignia. This problem area has been considered as part of the project since it was felt that there is a definite need for a distinctive insignia for the controller in his role as a member of the operational controller-pilot Air Defense team. Although approval of distinctive insignias is theoretically against Air Force policy, the committee feels that such an insignia will be one of the things which will improve the controller-pilot relationship and increase the prestige of personnel in this field. The Defense Forces were requested to forward proposals and to date thirty-three proposals have been received at this headquarters. Recommended insignias will be screened and those selected forwarded to Headquarters USAF for final consideration.

i. Assignment of ACW personnel to isolated sites. This is one of the most frequently heard complaints against the ACW system. On checking into this problem this Committee learned that it is the policy of this headquarters not to assign ACW personnel to isolated sites in the ZI upon return from isolated overseas stations; also, this headquarters monitors assignments to insure, insofar as possible, thatACW personnel are not assigned to isolated overseas stations from isolated stations in the ZI. A list of isolated sites within ADC is maintained at this headquarters and at Headquarters USAF. Headquarters USAF also maintains a list of overseas isolated stations.

j. ACW Squadron Commanders to be "Alert Ready". This problem has been considered along with General F. Smith's announced policy that"ACW Squadron Commanders be competent intercept directors". Defense Forces have been advised to take action to establish programs which will enable all ACW squadronsquadron commanders to meet the "Alert Ready" requirements established by ADC Regulation 50-12 prior to 1 January 1957. Since institution of this program, some Captains, Majors and Lt Colonels are going through the Controller's School at Tyndall, where previously only Second and First Lieutenants were attending.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~341~~
331

Project BOW

VC
THRU:C/S

Col J R Kullman,Chairman
Project BOW Committee

21 Aug 56

Continued

k. Increased ACW prestige and "Esprit de corps" through news releases, TV, radio and similar media. As a result of action by this committee, OIS has initiated a number of projects which will emphasize the ACW system and the intercept controller. Among these projects are:

(1) Fact sheet on the intercept controller was distributed to 350 aviation writers in convention at San Francisco at the end of May.

(2) The same fact sheet, along with illustrative photographs furnished by OIS, provided the basis for an article on the Intercept Controller on Page 205 of the August issue of the Air Force magazine.

(3) Ten articles on the controller have been done since 1 January by CONAD News Service which is distributed to all newspapers in the Air Defense Command.

(4) The Air Defense Command Show in the Columbia Broadcasting System "Airpower" Series this fall will indicate the importance of the controller. It will be a one hour show.

(5) The OIS is currently working with the General Electric Company on a 15 minute film which will illustrate the importance of and raise the status of the aircraft controller.

(6) OIS has prepared a slide series on the aircraft controller which will be distributed internally within the Air Defense Command in the near future.

(7) The aircraft controller was featured in a "Monitor" broadcast on NBC on 27 June during the detection-identification sequence on the show.

(8) At the suggestion of this office, an article on the aircraft controller was recently carried in the Aircraft Flash, GOC publication.

(9) A Convair movie, now in production in connection with the ADC-Convair community relations program, will feature the aircraft controller's importance in relation to the F-102.

(10) The aircraft controller will be featured wherever possible in publicity material emanating from the USAF Worldwide Rocketry Meet at Yuma.

(11) The controller's importance will be emphasized at a Convair F-102 press conference just prior to the Yuma Show.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Project BOW

VC
THRU: C/S

Col J R Kullman, Chairman
Project BOW Committee

24 Aug 56

continued

(12) An insert on the importance of the controller is being prepared by Convair for distribution this fall with all command newspapers.

(13) RCA will present special awards to the intercept controllers who are members of the winning team at the USAF Rocket Meet at Yuma in October.

1. Redesignation of ACW Squadrons and Assignment of World War II Fighter Control Squadron designations. This committee feels that the World War II Fighter Control Squadron numbers should be made available for assignment to our present ACW Squadrons. Such a program would help build pride in an ACW Squadron and give the unit some history and tradition from World War II, particularly when the unit received official commendation citations or awards. A letter was sent to the Air Force Historical Branch at Maxwell Air Force Base asking that this Headquarters be furnished a list of all World War II Fighter Control Squadrons with the theaters in which they were active and the decorations received. The reply to this letter stated that the information would be forwarded on or about September 15, 1956. Upon receipt of this information a letter will be sent to Headquarters USAF requesting that action be taken to accomplish the redesignation of some ACW units by assignment of the World War II Fighter Control Squadron designations.

6. Some of the problem areas on which the Committee has not yet completed study include:

a. Methods of enabling rated interceptor controllers to maintain efficiency with tactical units.

b. Inclusion of ACW System, in particular the interceptor controller field, in AFROTC courses of instruction at universities throughout the U.S.

c. Methods of increasing the attractiveness of the controller career field to such an extent that mandatory assignments to the controller school at Tyndall can be discontinued.

d. Feasibility of medical allowances for dependents of ACW personnel who are at isolated stations and do not have access to station hospitals.

e. Feasibility of station allowances for ACW personnel at isolated sites where the cost of living index is abnormally high.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~344~~
331

Project BOW

VC
THRU:C/S

Col J R Kullman, Chairman
Project BOW Committee

24 Aug 56

continued

f. The feasibility of freezing ACW station commanders and key operations people for two to three years to stabilize the field and enable the system to remain "on its feet".

g. The development of a satisfactory career program for the intercept controllers.

1 Incl
ADCSM 30-1

J. R. KULLMAN
Colonel, USAF
Chairman
Project BOW Committee
Ext 2582/2700

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~375~~ ADC SM 30-1

STAFF MEMORANDUM)
30-1)

HEADQUARTERS AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colo.
12 March 1956

3

332

PERSONNEL

"Project BOW" Committee

1. Purpose. This Memorandum establishes staff responsibility for improvement of "esprit de corps" and attractiveness of service in the ACW system of this command under "Project BOW."

2. Responsibilities. Each staff section is responsible within its respective area for taking all possible actions to accomplish the purpose of this directive.

3. Committees. a. A steering committee, designated the "Project BOW" Committee, is established, composed of five representatives from the following staff sections:

(1) DCS/P (Director of Requirements and Training, Chairman)

(2) DCS/O (Two members: Director of Tactical Evaluation & Training Division; Ch, ACW Evaluation & Training Branch)

(3) DCS/M (Assistant DCS/M for Logistic Plans)

(4) Chief of Information Services

b. Each directorate not represented on the steering committee will designate a senior officer to work with the steering committee on an on-call basis.

4. General. This committee will make recommendations and monitor actions taken to improve the "esprit de corps" and attractiveness of the ACW field in the Air Defense Command and will advise the Vice Commander of the adequacy of the actions and the general progress of the project.
(ADPDP)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

Walter W. Robinson

WALTER W. ROBINSON
Colonel, USAF
Command Adjutant

GEORGE F. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

(ADC-1068-6)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CONADR 55-6A

CONAD REGULATION)
55-6A)

HEADQUARTERS CONTIN[illegible] AIR [illegible] COMMAND
Ent AFB, [illegible] Springs, Colo.
[illegible] 1956

OPERATIONS

Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures for Interceptors in Air Defense

CONADR 55-6, 8 October 1955, is changed as follows:

333

* * *

4. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this Regulation:

* * *

c. Hostile Act. An action whereby weapons are employed against ground, water, or air targets (other than on established weapons ranges) unless previous notification has been received of scheduled operations or training for the specific area at the specific time which the act is observed. Weapons will include bombs, rockets, guns, mines, missiles, etc. Subsequent to the declaration of an Air Defense Warning Yellow or Warning Red, opening bomb bay doors or the operation of an aircraft which does not meet the established standards required for identification will constitute a hostile act. (Standards required for identification are those established for flight plan correlation within an Air Defense Identification Zone. The use of the "Unknown" category for aircraft is permitted until Security Control of Air Traffic plans have been implemented.)

d. Hostile Aircraft. An aircraft which:

* * *

(3) Is declared (classified) hostile by a joint air defense force commander, or higher authority, based on the commander's judgment that the aircraft's pattern of action(s) indicates it is hostile, or

(4) Is designated hostile by JCS authorized commanders of forces operating in Coastal Air Defense Identification Zones, or

(5) Does not meet the established standards required for identification subsequent to the declaration of an Air Defense Warning Yellow or Warning Red. (Standards required for identification are those established for flight plan correlation within an Air Defense Identification Zone. The use of the "Unknown" category for aircraft is permitted until Security Control of Air Traffic plans have been implemented.)

* * *

(7) Is cross-told as hostile or determined to be hostile through intercept action.

* * *

5. Engagement. a. An aircraft will be engaged by an interceptor pilot or by direction of a direction center director whenever the aircraft is classified as hostile under any of the provisions of paragraph 4d, above.

Delete 5(1), (2), and (3).

* * *

(ADC-861-6)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6. Interception and Recognition. All aircraft which are classified unknown by the ACW system will be intercepted for recognition purposes. Practice intercepts will not be conducted against civilian aircraft. The following procedures will be observed during recognition intercepts:

* * *

(COODO)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

GEORGE F. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

WALTER W. ROBINSON
Colonel, USAF
Command Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
A

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~317~~
334

[redacted]

B-567-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

~~317~~

334

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

3rd 334

20 FEB 1956

FILE COPY

6-3062

COMEBACK COPY

REQ

D/O ITEM

D/O POLICY

M/R

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CONAD REGULATION)
55-2)

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL [redacted] COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado [redacted]
5 [redacted] 1956

OPERATIONS

Rules of Engagement for Ground-to-Air Weapons (Manual System)

1. Purpose. This Regulation outlines the concept of operational control of ground-to-air weapons and prescribes the basic rules of engagement for ground-to-air weapons under the operational control of this command.

2. Scope. This Regulation applies to all ground-to-air weapons which are, or may come, under the operational control of this command.

3. Concept. Efficient employment of air defense weapons requires that operational control be exercised through a single chain of command. This single chain of command is designated as the joint chain of command from this headquarters down to joint air defense divisions. States of fire of ground-to-air weapons will be prescribed by joint air defense division commanders, except that "Hold Fire" authority will be exercised by direction centers, as specified herein. Transmission of necessary orders to ground-to-air units will be accomplished through direction centers.

4. Responsibilities. a. Joint air defense force commanders will:

(1) Insure complete coordination with component commanders and service representatives of the rules and concepts specified herein.

(2) Establish procedures designed to effect maximum combined effectiveness of air defense weapons.

(3) Review joint air defense division plans and procedures to insure maximum combined effectiveness of air defense weapons in the region.

b. Joint air defense division commanders will:

(1) Prepare and maintain plans for the operation of all ground-to-air weapons defenses in the sector.

(2) Insure that responsible personnel are thoroughly trained in the provisions of this Regulation.

(3) Designate the direction center with prime responsibility for control of ground-to-air weapons fire whose capability extends into other sub-sectors.

(4) Exercise operational control over all ground-to-air weapons in the sector.

(5) Prepare procedures affording commanders of bases defended by ground-to-air weapons means of temporarily controlling ground-to-air weapons fire when necessary to protect friendly aircraft.

(6) Issue instructions for "Weapons Free" and "Weapons Tight" status for all ground-to-air weapons in the sector through appropriate direction centers.

(7) Verify immediately the requirement for any "Hold Fire" instructions issued by the direction centers.

c. Army Antiaircraft representative will:

(1) Advise joint air defense division commander of status of Army Antiaircraft weapons.

(2) Recommend changes in states of fire for Army Antiaircraft weapons as deemed necessary.

(3) Inform Army Antiaircraft defense commander of air situation and reasons for current states of fire of Army Antiaircraft weapons.

(ADC-1578-6)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CONADC 65-4

5. Definitions. a. Hostile Act. An action whereby weapons are employed against ground, water, or air targets (other than on established weapons ranges) unless previous notification has been received of scheduled operations or training for the specific area at the specific time at which the act is observed. Weapons will include bombs, rockets, guns, lines, missiles, etc. Subsequent to the declaration of an Air Defense Warning Yellow or Warning Red, opening bomb bay doors or the operation of an aircraft in violation of established identification standards will constitute a hostile act. (Standards required for identification are those established for flight plan correlation within an Air Defense Identification Zone. The use of the "Unknown" category for aircraft is permitted until Security Control of Air Traffic plans have been implemented).

b. Hostile Aircraft - An aircraft which:

(1) Commits a hostile act, or

(2) Bears the military insignia of a known enemy nation or of the nation(s) which prompted the declaration of an Air Defense Emergency, or

(3) Is declared (classified) hostile by a joint air defense force commander, or higher authority, based on the commander's judgment that the aircraft's pattern of actions indicates it is hostile, or

(4) Is designated hostile by JCS authorized commanders of forces operating in Coastal Air Defense Identification Zones, or

(5) Does not meet the established standards required for identification subsequent to the declaration of an Air Defense Warning Yellow or Warning Red. (Standards required for identification are those established for flight plan correlation within an Air Defense Identification Zone. The use of the "Unknown" category for aircraft is permitted until Security Control of Air Traffic plans have been implemented), or

(6) Is designated hostile by nations which border on the United States in accordance with current cross-border agreements, or

(7) Is cross-told as hostile or determined to be hostile through intercept action.

c. Identification. The determination of an aircraft's friendly or enemy character by any means, or combination of means, including visual recognition, flight plan correlation, electronic interrogation, track behavior, etc.

d. Ground-to-Air Defense. Any ground-to-air weapons, or system of ground-to-air weapons, including Army Antiaircraft weapons, employed to defend a specific target or complex against air attack.

e. States of Fire of Ground-to-Air Weapons:

(1) Weapons Free - Fire at any target not identified as friendly.

(2) Weapons Tight - Fire only at targets identified as hostile.

(3) Hold Fire - Do not open fire. Cease fire.

6. General. a. Normally, the following states of fire will be observed by all ground-to-air defenses during states of preparedness and conditions of warning specified:

(1) Normal Preparedness - "Weapons Tight."

(2) Increased Readiness - "Weapons Tight."

(3) Air Defense Readiness - "Weapons Tight."

(4) Air Defense Warning White - "Weapons Tight."

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(5) Air Defense Warning Yellow - "Weapons Free," except that [illegible] division commanders may designate a state of "Weapons Tight" [illegible] prolonged Warning Yellow.

(6) Air Defense Warning Red - "Weapons Free."

b. "Weapons Free" applies automatically to any ground-to-air defense subjected to a hostile act.

c. "Hold Fire" will not be ordered for an entire ground-to-air defense but will be applied to specific targets, tracks, sectors, altitudes, or corridors on a temporary basis as required for the protection of friendly aircraft.

d. Temporary restrictions (i.e., "Hold Fire" or "Weapons Tight") will be imposed:

(1) Only when essential to the combined effectiveness of the air defense, and

(2) For the minimum length of time, and

(3) To the least possible degree.

e. Temporary restrictions are automatically terminated if communications fail between direction centers and the ground-to-air weapons control. The normal status that existed prior to the imposition of the temporary restriction will than apply.

7. Procedures. The following procedures will be adhered to for all ground-to-air defense:

a. Joint air defense division commanders, or their designated representatives, will:

(1) Pass necessary alerting information through appropriate direction centers to ground-to-air weapons control.

(2) Designate "Weapons Free" or "Weapons Tight" status for all ground-to-air weapons defenses in the sector.

(3) Pass all orders affecting states of fire for ground-to-air weapons defenses through appropriate direction centers.

(4) Grant or deny requests from direction centers for changes in states of fire of ground-to-air weapons defenses.

(5) Verify immediately the requirement for any "Hold Fire" orders issued by the direction centers.

b. Direction center directors will:

(1) Relay all information required from control center to ground-to-air weapons control.

(2) Request authority from the control center to effect changes in states of fire of ground-to-air weapons when the tactical situation requires.

(3) Direct "Hold Fire" in accordance with paragraph 6c above.

(4) Notify control center immediately of any "Hold Fire" orders issued.

c. Army Antiaircraft operations center commanders will:

(1) Maintain states of fire of Army Antiaircraft weapons as directed.

(2) Advise joint air defense division commander of current status of Army Antiaircraft weapons by relay through the appropriate direction center.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

8. Communications. Direct communications are authorized between appropriate commanders to establish procedures for maximum combined effectiveness of air defense weapons and to promulgate policies and procedures established herein.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

GEORGE F. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

WALTER W. ROBINSON
Colonel, USAF
Command Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
A

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

336

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

16 April 1956

SUBJECT: (U) SAGE Program

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado

1. References:

a. Letter, Headquarters United States Air Force, subject: "(U) Management Review of SAGE, "9 December 1955.

b. Message, Headquarters United States Air Force, AFOAC 53644, 20 December 1955.

2. The decision by the Secretary of the Air Force to revise the SAGE Program Implementation Schedule is a matter of record. Factors which made this decision necessary are covered in inclosures to letter referenced in paragraph 1a. These factors show clearly that it is not feasible to expect SAGE to become operational according to the original SAGE Program Implementation Schedule.

3. The original schedule for implementing the SAGE program was established to meet the most optimistic predictions for a program "to improve the Air Defense capability of the United States within the earliest possible time" as directed by the National Security Council. It was centered on an accelerated development-production program for the basic components of SAGE — the Combat Direction Central, AN/FSQ-7, and the Combat Control Central, AN/FSQ-8. This approach was dictated by the military urgency for an Air Defense system capable of coping with the air threat posed by existing, as well as future, air weapons. As the SAGE program progressed, many and varied problems arose in all areas of the program.

4. Although no important technical deficiencies in the SAGE system are known definitely at the present time, it is certain that the results of testing in the Experimental SAGE Sub-sector will indicate requirements for modifications. It is desirable to incorporate such modifications in the production line rather than to make retrofits to installed equipment. Under the original schedule, 27 computers would have been under contract when the Experimental SAGE Sub-sector tests are evaluated; according to the revised schedule, only 18 will be under contract.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

336

Basic Ltr to ADC, subj: (U)SAGE Program (cont)

Thus, modifications, as a result of experience to that time, can be incorporated in the production contracts for 22 computers instead of only 13. The situation for other equipment, such as the AN/FST-2, will be comparable.

5. In considering the procurement-production aspects, the SAGE computer could have been produced in accordance with the original schedule. This would have resulted in committing to quantity production many units before the prototype and first production article were adequately tested. In the interest of minimizing the dollar investment before more information was available for tests, it was necessary to defer the previously scheduled acceleration of production rate.

6. Training difficulties arose because of the limited availability of console training time as well as the nonavailability of a full-time training facility during the early phases of the implementation program. The stated qualitative and quantitativespecial training requirements imposed demands upon the Experimental SAGE Sub-sector Direction Center consoles that would have unacceptably reduced the capability to accomplish the testing program.

7. Competent computer programmers will not be available in sufficient numbers to meet the requirements of the original schedule for implementing the SAGE program. Continuing on the original schedule would result in inadequate computer programs even if the system was otherwise operational.

8. The problem of integrating pilotless intercept weapons (missiles) in the Air Defense System cannot be solved by a compression of the schedule for implementing the SAGE program in the face of probable difficulties. The Air Force position on the employment of Air Defense missiles has not been altered in any way by the revision of the schedule for implementing the SAGE program. When SAGE becomes operational, all missiles will be under the operational control of SAGE. Until SAGE is implemented, TALOS and NIKE will be deployed on an island defense basis where technically feasible. In such instances, control will be exercised through the nearest prime radar. During the time period in question, there should be no serious degradation of Air Defense capability from this action.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

336

Basic Ltr to ADC, Subj: (U) SAGE Program (cont)

9. In considering the BOMARC program through Fiscal Year 1961, 23 of the 29 BOMARC sites programmed for the United States will be operational after the appropriate SAGE sub-sector becomes operational. Time delays for the six (6) remaining sites will be from three (3) to six (6) months. These delays can be absorbed with no great risk or reprogramming action can be taken to preclude any of the sites becoming operational prior to the appropriate SAGE sub-sector without altering the end Fiscal Year 1961 position.

10. Under present Air Force missile plans a complete BOMARC and TALOS Operational Suitability Test with SAGE cannot be conducted until the Gunter Sub-sector becomes operational. Action has been taken to reprogram the Gunter Sub-sector to a higher priority. Based on normal construction and communications lead time, this sub-sector is expected to be operational in March 1959.

11. As pointed out in previous correspondence, a reevaluation of the SAGE program will be made prior to the Fiscal Year 1957 buying program. If the results of the SAGE test program warrant, the implementation schedule for the SAGE program will be revised again to provide for an earlier completion of the program.

N.F. TWINING
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

16 May 1956

337

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander

SUBJECT: AN/GPA-37 Program

1. The following summarizes the AN/GPA-37 Program status:

a. Description. The GPA-37 Radar Course Directing Group is a computing and data processing (data link) system designed to increase control capacity of intercept directors to six intercepts per position. Inclosures #1 and #2 show the three equipment groups of the GPA-37 and their functions. These are the GPA-23, GPA-24, and GKA-1.

b. Program. One GPA-37 is programmed for each ACW site, a total of 149 for the ZI. Each site will have from 2 to 8 director positions (or GPA-23 consoles). Installation is phased between August 1956 and December 1957. See Inclosure #3.

c. Annex Construction Problem. Approximately 450 square feet floor space is needed in an air conditioned annex to Operations Buildings to house the GPA-37 components, as shown on Inclosures #1 and #4. Annexes were not programmed and are not being made available in phase with equipment production. See Inclosure #3. Although production has already slipped about six months, there will be a deficiency in annexes throughout 1957, varying between 17 and 51 in each month.

2. The GPA-37 has electronic features permitting an increase in an intercept director's capacity to six intercepts, from the current average figure of two. Field experience will probably be that 4-5 intercepts per position will be the maximum. This increase in manual system capability is critically needed because it not only increases capacity, but it also should lessen the controller problem as the equipment will permit better intercepts with controllers of lesser capability. Highest priority should be given to expediting annex construction.

4 Incls
1. Eqp Grouping w/Functions
2. Eqp Pictures
3. Cpx Bldg Annex Deficiency
4. GPA-37 Eqp Layout

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

18

[redacted]

ADC or CONAD
Asst Prog
Fit Sfty
C of S
Prem Rev
Protocol
C G ARAACom
CONNAVFORCONAD
RCAF
COMD ADJ
COMD SURG
COMD STF JA
COMD CHAP
COMD IG
Insp Svs
FM
OIS
DCS/C
Bud
Fin
Mgt Anlys
Stat
DCS/P
Civ Pers
Mil Pers
Assts
Spec Act
Res Adm
Cols & Rods
WAF
DCS/I
OI
R & E
IN
DCS/O
M & O
OCD
Ops Anlys
O & T
P & R
ENGWG
Wea O
DCS/M
Asst
Gn Sup & Svs
Inst
Log Plans
MNC
Contr Tech Svs
FCDA
CAA

Hq WADF, WDOCB-E, Subj: (Uncl) ACN Opns Bldg Annexes

ADOCB-A (15 Mar 56) 1st Ind 4 APR 1956

HQ AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Western Air Defense Force, Hamilton AFB, California

1. This headquarters is aware of the discrepancy between beneficial occupancy dates for operations building annexes and the required operating dates for gap-fillers and the AN/GPA-37 equipment. However, due to program limitations in the FY56 MCP, no additional authorization can be made available for operations building annexes until the FY57 MCP. At the present time the annex is programed in the FY57 MCP for all radar sites.

2. Rome Air Force Depot has advised this headquarters that interim installation of the FPA-10 and FPN-1 equipment at the radar site is feasible; therefore, no change in the gap-filler program is contemplated because of unavailability of the annexes.

3. Since an interim installation of AN/GPA-37 equipment is apparently not feasible, this program is being re-phased to coincide with annex availability and new production schedules for the AN/GPA-37.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

FILE NUMBER 279.2

C. F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
Asst Command Adj

1 Incl
Inv'd 2 cys

Cy to:
Comdr 9th ADiv (Def)
Comdr 25th ADiv (Def)
Comdr 27th ADiv (Def)
Comdr 29th ADiv (Def)
Comdr ODAMA
Comdr EDAMA
Comdr SDAMA

COMEBACK COPY
requested, not furnished
Furnished 4 Dec APR 1956 (Final)

No M/R or diary item rqrd.

V-33042/0167
E-9184
E-9185
E-9186
E-9187
E-9188
E-9189

Will be Confirmed in Sol Publication Form Under, ADCSM
S-1 NO
prepared by LE Col WALafrenz/id
Telephone 27411
Date 3 Apr 56
Refer to Control No. G-2576
B-80 G-1
This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance [redacted] AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 55, or for the reason (s)

HASKELL E. NE
Brig. General US
Dir. Comm. & El

ADC HQ FORM 11 JAN 56 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
HAMILTON AIR FORCE BASE
HAMILTON, CALIFORNIA

15 March 1956

WDOCE-E

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Aircraft Control and Warning Operations Building Annexes

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

a. Letter Headquarters ADC, ADOCE-A, subj: "Revised ADC Gap-Filler Program", dated 9 February 1956.

b. USAF PC Document, as of 31 October 1955.

2. Attached as inclosure 1 is a compilation of available estimated BOD's of all WADF ACW Operational Building Annexes. The required operational dates of electronic equipment to be housed in this annex is also shown for comparison.

3. The estimated BOD dates are for the manual portion of the annex and were received from the AFIRO of the South Pacific Region. This estimate was based upon anticipated funding in October of 1956. The AFIRO of the North Pacific Region advises that BOD's are being determined and will not be available prior to the ACW Conference tentatively scheduled on 13 April 1956.

4. The BOD's for stations P-1, P-38 and P-59 are based upon FY-56 funding and are realistic dates.

5. It is believed that interim installation of the Radar Course Director System and the Gap Filler processing equipment within the existing operations building is not feasible. If adequate space could be located, existing air-conditioning will not have the capacity to dissipate the tremendous amount of heat generated by these equipments.

6. It is requested that action be taken to realign the annex construction program and the equipment schedules to provide a common target date for all concerned agencies.

[redacted]

6C-4096

B-806-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

Bsc Ltr Hq WADF, WDOCE-E, Subj: (Uncld) Acft Control and Warnin[illegible]
Bldg Annexes

7. Upon withdrawal of inclosures this correspondence will be downgraded to unclassified.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. F. HERRICK, JR
CWO (W-2), USAF
Asst Adjutant

1 Incl
a/s (3 cys)

cc: Comdr, 9th ADiv (Def)
Comdr, 25th ADiv (Def)
Comdr, 27th ADiv (Def)
Comdr, 28th ADiv (Def)
Comdr, OOAMA
Comdr, SBAMA
Comdr, SMAMA
(1 cy ea cc addressee
w/1 cy Incl 1)

[redacted]

B-806-3

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ACW ANNEX BLDG AND ASSOC[redacted]NEFICIAL OCCUPANCY

SITE	BLDG ANNEX	GPA-37(PC)	FSA-10(PC)	OPS D[redacted] GAP [redacted]
P-1	1/57 (31 Aug 56)	2/57	Not PC'd	
P-2	4/57 (Apr 57)	1/57	4/57	
P-6		2/57	-	
P-11		2/57	1/57	1/57 (Sep 56)
P-12		3/57	2/57	2/57 (Dec 56)
P-15	4/57 (Apr 57)	1/57	-	
P-32		4/57	-	
P-33	2/58 (Oct 57)	2/57	4/56	2/57 (Dec 56)
P-37	2/58 (Oct 57)	2/57	2/57	3/57 (Jan 57)
P-38	2/57 (Nov 56)	1/57	-	
P-39	4/57 (Apr 57)	1/57	3/57	
P-40		4/57	-	
P-44		2/57	-	
P-46		2/57	4/57	
P-57		2/57	-	
P-58	2/58 (Oct 57)	4/56	(4/56)	
P-59	1/57 (Sep 56)	1/57	3/57	
P-60		2/57	3/57	3/57 (Jan 57)
P-74	3/57 (Mar 57)	4/56	(4/56)	
P-76	4/57 (Apr 57)	1/57	4/56	1/57 (Sep 56)
M-96	4/57 (Jun 57)	3/57	-	
M-100		4/57	4/57	
M-118		4/57	3/57	
M-127	2/58 (Oct 57)	4/57	3/57	
M-128	4/57 (Apr 57)	1/58	2/57	
SM-149		2/57	-	
SM-150		4/57	2/57	
SM-151		2/57	-	
SM-153				
SM-156	2/58 (Oct 57)	1/58	3/57	
SM-157	2/58 (Oct 57)	4/57	3/57	
SM-162	4/57 (Apr 57)	3/57	3/57	1/57 (Sep 56)
SM-163	4/57 (Jun 57)	3/57	2/57	
SM-164	2/58 (Oct 57)	1/58	4/57	
TM-180		4/57	4/57	

Incl #1

B-806-4X

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

ADC or CONAD

CONDR
VC
C&S
[redacted]AVFORCONAD
RCAF
SAGE
Asst Prog
Fin Sfty
COND ADJ
Adj
Ass Mgr
Tess
Mar
Pub
COND SURG
COND STF JA
COND CHAP
COND IG
Insp Srv
Pol
GS
DCS/C
Gud
Fin
Mgt Anlys
Sur
DCS/P
Civ Pers
Mil Pers
Assets
Spec Act
Res Adm
Cols & Rcds
GS
Pers Sr
[redacted]R & T
[redacted]AP
DCS/I
OI
X & E
IR
DCS/O
CCA
C & E
M & O
OCD
Ops Anlys
O & T
P & R
Gen S
DCS/M
Auth
Elect
Gr Inv & Svc
Insll
Log Plans
Mat Con
HQ 30 SEC
FCDA
CAA

21 MAY 1956

FILE NUMBER 219.2

General Thomas D. White
Vice Chief of Staff
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Tommie:

We have a serious problem which I feel requires your personal assistance in its solution. The problem is to increase our control capability from two to six interceptor per controller by installation of the AN/GPA-37 Radar Operator Interceptor Group. The program has already slipped six months, and throughout 1957 we will have GPA-37's awaiting installation because building problems in our heavy radar sites will not be available to house the equipment.

I consider the installation of the GPA-37 Control Group and Data Link to be the most critical item in the improvement of our effective manual control capability both prior to and in a hostile for SAGE. This specific problem was presented in a letter to your office 15 October 1954, copy attached.

I strongly recommend that you take action to insure that all funds are funded in FY 1957, that funds are released immediately after 1 July 1956, and that direction be issued to complete conversion of these sites in phase with equipment production.

Sincerely,

E. E. PARTRIDGE
General USAF
Commander

C-6-616

Still to Continued in
3rd Publication Form
Under Par 3c, AFR
No. 9-11
Telephone 2110
Date 21May56
Refers to Footnote No.

1 Incl.
Ltr ADC Lor 494
Subject: Control Group
Data Link Problem,
Delays, w/ attach.

Comeback reqrd for Comm File.
No Memo for Record. No diary item.
AC not has cy of incl.

[redacted]

HASKELL E. NEAL
Brig. General USAF
Dir. Comm. & Elect

This correspondence is cl[redacted]ccordance with Par 23c, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

B-1041-1X