


Joint Publication 3-42



Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal



09 September 2016



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess explosive ordnance disposal support across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Describes Explosive Ordnance Disposal within the Department of Defense**
 - **Covers Joint Explosive Ordnance Activities**
 - **Explains Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command and Control**
 - **Presents Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Planning Considerations**
 - **Discusses Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Execution and Assessment**
 - **Clarifies the Definition and Roles of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Explosive Ordnance Disposal During Domestic and Overseas Incidents**
 - **Clarifies Explosive Ordnance and Explosive Hazard Definition and Associated Terms**
 - **Addresses Secretary of Defense Authority to Support Reporting of “Immediate Response Requests from Civil Authorities”**
-

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Within the Department of Defense

Introduction

Joint explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) forces support freedom of maneuver and force protection (FP) and provide a critical enabling capability in the form of collection and exploitation of weapons and explosive materiel. This capability is essential for operational success during military operations.

Mission

The primary mission of joint EOD forces is to enable accomplishment of the joint force and/or the geographic combatant commander's mission objectives in support of US national security by maintaining access to areas denied by explosive ordnance to facilitate awareness of the operational environment (OE), FP, operational mobility, and maneuver. Joint EOD forces enable access to areas denied by explosive and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards, providing mobility, maneuver, and awareness of the OE to the joint force commander (JFC).

Weapons Threat in the Operational Environment

Current and future threats include dynamic systems that reflect new enemy acquisitions, modifications of older weapons, or an innovative use of weapons and associated paraphernalia, which may include military, commercial, or homemade explosives. EOD capabilities help identify and trace materials and support a more robust intelligence picture of the networks, groups, and individuals that create and use these weapons.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities

Common EOD training, equipment, and technical manuals (TMs) provide each Service with the capability to detect/locate, access, identify, triage, diagnose, stabilize, render safe/neutralize, recover, exploit, and dispose of weapons and explosives. This includes conventional munitions, CBRN munitions, unexploded explosive ordnance, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), homemade explosives, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to include those enhanced with chemical, biological, and radiological fillers. Nuclear weapons and some WMD are capabilities not common to all EOD personnel. The following capabilities are exercised through specific procedures (access, diagnostic, render safe, recovery, and final disposition) unique to EOD forces.

Joint Nature of Explosive Ordnance Disposal

The Secretary of the Navy is designated by the Secretary of Defense to serve as the Department of Defense (DOD) single manager for explosive ordnance disposal technology and training (EODT&T) and to manage and administer the elements of the EODT&T programs for DOD. This includes common-type individual EOD training: research and development (R&D) (including product improvement of common EOD tools and equipment) and development, joint verification, and fielding of EOD procedures and publications.

Unified Action

The Services (except the US Coast Guard) provide common EOD capability to the JFC. EOD achieves this uniformity through multi-Service training manuals and TMs, common equipment, and jointly supported R&D programs. EOD maintains relationships with the Department of

Homeland Security; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the US Secret Service; and the Department of State. Bilateral agreements facilitate the sharing of capabilities and information between DOD and international defense EOD organizations.

Joint Explosive Ordnance Activities

Introduction

EOD plays a major role in all phases of joint operations. Prompt and accurate explosive event assessment (tactical and technical), material exploitation, and reporting are critical to developing intelligence that supports operations. EOD missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure protection, or humanitarian relief.

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence Activities

Joint EOD provides support to US, multinational, and host nation (HN) forces for sustainment activities related to ammunition and explosives. This includes installation support, training, and explosive safety. EOD may provide a response capability in support of installation FP. When tasked, EOD support off installation will typically be performed by the closest EOD unit, regardless of Service.

Supported Agencies

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Joint EOD partners with DIA in the areas of measurement and signature intelligence, technical intelligence (TECHINT), and counterintelligence. As primary collectors for all foreign ordnance and weapons-related technical information, DIA relies on joint EOD operations support for strategic systems analysis.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). EOD forces may provide subject matter expert support when requested for countering WMD operations to DTRA/US Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. EOD support includes arms control and treaty verification, stockpile stewardship,

WMD disposal, Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group, joint working groups and the Nuclear Weapons Effects User's Group, demilitarization, and special access programs.

Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command and Control

Command and Control Fundamentals

In addition to the national strategic direction and guidance that assign missions and responsibilities to combatant commanders (CCDRs), there are some Presidential policy directives (PPDs) that EOD commanders and staff should be aware of because they focus on EOD support to joint operations. One of these, PPD-17, *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices*, directs the building and maintaining of capabilities and technologies to continue to counter the IED threat in the homeland.

The role of EOD in relation to national security policy is significant, especially in the areas of counterterrorism and national preparedness; arms control; proliferation, counter-proliferation, and homeland defense; intelligence; protection/mitigation; prevention; and response.

The JFC establishes the EOD command relationships and tasking of forces to accomplish mission objectives. The JFC may delegate operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON), or establish support command relationships to subordinate commanders in order to ensure effective command and control (C2) and to facilitate decentralized execution of EOD activities. The joint EOD staff synchronizes EOD support to operations in the joint operations area (JOA) to meet the needs of the JFC and maintain the tactical and operational integrity of EOD C2. The primary difference between planning for single-Service EOD employment and joint EOD operations is integrating the unique capabilities to mitigate the limitations of each force (to include multinational force [MNF]), and interagency elements, to achieve unity of effort.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command and Control

EOD C2 considerations include flexibility, sustainability, and interoperability. All EOD

Considerations and Options

teams/elements, to include multinational, should maintain unit integrity. EOD C2 structure must be flexible to accommodate the OE. There are three C2 options to the JFC for structuring a joint EOD force to accomplish the mission. They are Service component responsibility, lead Service or part of an existing functional component command, and EOD joint task force (JTF).

Utilization and Employment Considerations of Command and Control Options

The **Service component responsibility option** is used when each Service component provides for and controls its own EOD forces and requirements. In this option, a mutual support relationship may be established between components with direct liaison authorized between the senior EOD commands of each component. The JFC may designate a **lead Service or existing functional component** (joint force land or maritime component command) to support limited duration missions or to provide more efficient EOD support. This option may be preferable for short-notice, austere environment missions. In this option, the JFC attaches specific EOD personnel to a lead Service component commander or the functional component commander.

In operations where the duration, scope of activity, or force requirements exceed single-Service EOD capacity, the JFC may elect to form a **JTF or subordinate JTF for EOD**. The JTF commander would exercise TACON or OPCON over attached forces as designated. Based on JFC guidance and other considerations, such as operation plans and existing agreements, each Service component provides assets to fulfill common EOD support requirements.

However, even when an EOD JTF is established, Service-unique EOD requirements and selected EOD units may remain under the control of the individual Service components. Task-organizing EOD forces under a JTF provides unity of command over EOD assets.

Organizing an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Joint Task

JTF headquarters (HQ) should be formed around an existing C2 structure. EOD groups/battalions/mobile unit HQ may be

Force

designated as the EOD JTF HQ. Service EOD forces should provide EOD liaison officers to advise and assist the EOD JTF commander on Service capabilities and resolve administrative control and OPCON issues. The JFC may also augment the EOD JTF HQ staff in areas such as security, health services, administration, and logistics through the joint manning document. The EOD JTF HQ includes, or may include:

EOD JTF Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-2). Members of the EOD JTF J-2 plan, coordinate, direct, integrate, and control intelligence efforts focused on enemy interest. The J-2 acquires, produces, requests, and disseminates intelligence to support operations. The EOD JTF J-2 serves as the single point of contact within intelligence channels for the collection and dissemination of TECHINT/weapons TECHINT products and provides intelligence input to operation orders.

EOD JTF Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-3). The J-3 conducts current operations planning and coordinates and integrates EOD operations across the JOA. The joint explosives ordnance disposal operations center (JEODOC), operating as part of the EOD JTF J-3 staff, oversees all EOD JTF operations in theater, tracks EOD assets, monitors and recommends changes in priorities, and resolves issues between Service components.

EOD JTF Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW). The CREW section includes electronic warfare officers. It provides theater-specific training; monitors the radio-controlled IED threat; resolves interoperability and compatibility issues between CREW and other systems; and assesses for new hardware, firmware, and software (including threat loads as well as spectrum deconfliction) prior to fielding with units in theater.

EOD JTF Training and Partnership. In any prolonged conflict, the EOD JTF may be tasked to

provide training to MNFs on the recognition of, and proper tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for, dealing with explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards.

EOD JTF Science and Technology (S&T) Element. The S&T element identifies capability gaps and drafts requirements and communicates those requirements to the S&T and acquisitions communities.

*Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Cells and Working Groups*

The JFCs may form planning groups that include members of the CCDR's staff and EOD representatives of associated planning and advisory elements. A JFC may also establish a cell or working group to manage EOD-intensive activities and to ensure the effective use of resources to meet mission requirements. Examples are the JEODOC and the explosive hazards coordination cell. MNF commanders may establish cells in accordance with Standardization Agreement 2282, Allied Tactical Publication-72, *Interservice EOD Operations on Multinational Deployments*. These include combined joint EOD cells and multinational explosives ordnance disposal control center.

*Interorganizational and
Multinational Coordination*

US joint forces in a multinational operation have two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. The MNF commander's command authority is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. EOD technical support elements are not all trained to the same level of proficiency, to include multinational partners. Support element capabilities must be considered when assigning EOD roles and responsibilities.

Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Planning Considerations

Strategic

Planning for EOD support to joint operations includes force planning, deployment planning, operation planning, campaign planning, and crisis action planning. To determine the depth and breadth of a country-specific or regional explosive threat, planners should consider both military

ordnance and industrial capacity. Planners should consider the military capability in terms of government and nongovernmental forces, capital equipment, and manpower, and should also analyze the ancillary items such as munitions and bulk explosives, chemicals, WMD, and storage facilities. Threat assessment should also include the capability of the country and neighboring states to produce conventional weapons and munitions.

Operational

Subordinate commanders will be allocated EOD forces to meet anticipated weapons and explosive threats. The commander and the staff should evaluate the size of the operational area and the range of threats to tailor the EOD resources necessary to support the joint force. Additionally, the staff considers the duration of the operation to inform the allocation of EOD resources.

Tactical

Intelligence collected at the tactical level, where friendly forces meet enemy forces, may have strategic or operational value. Operational planners should review this intelligence and other information coming from the tactical level and anticipate the EOD support required to mitigate and exploit the explosive threat in the OE.

Planning Process

Operational planners use the joint planning process (JPP) when planning for EOD support to joint operations. JPP is an orderly, analytical process, which consists of a set of logical steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action (COAs); select the best COA; and produce a plan or order.

General Planning Considerations

In tailoring EOD support to operations, the joint EOD staff should address a number of general considerations to determine the most efficient and effective use of the allocated EOD force. Considerations include the weapons threat, planning and dissemination of resources, EOD mission planning, unique EOD characteristics, and coordination of support. The high demand on EOD force support requires deliberate planning and careful dissemination of resources.

Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Execution and Assessment

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Reporting

Prompt EOD reporting allows commanders to assess EOD activities throughout the OE and provide intelligence that informs current and future operations. Reporting will help determine EOD force requirements, feed intelligence, and support operational planning.

Execution of Support

EOD activities at the operational level are generally executed by EOD battalion/mobile units or groups. These organizations provide C2 of the majority of EOD forces. They may also provide C2 for other forces that support EOD activities.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operational Assessment

The EOD operational assessment helps organize and analyze data to develop recommendations for commanders. Data collection for EOD assessment focuses on weapons-related information, technology, acquisition, sources, design, capabilities, and potential destructive effects. The framework for EOD assessment establishes individual supporting elements at the tactical and operational level that feed the overall hierarchical strategic framework.

Activity Assessment

Information and intelligence obtained via such as activities as biometrics-enabled intelligence, forensic-enabled intelligence, and document and media exploitation can be used to help identify people and groups who develop, sell, or transport weapons for hostile actors in the OE. The value of information collected by EOD forces during operations fused with information related to individuals to other persons, places, events, or materials can be assessed by the disruption of IED events following the identification and targeting of IED makers.

Assessments should evaluate HN capabilities to counter weapons threats. In coordination with interagency partners, the JFC can use this data to design training for HN EOD forces and allocate resources. All EOD tasks are assessed to evaluate risk to EOD technicians versus reward to the supported unit.

Damage assessments determine the effectiveness of enemy weapons systems against personnel, equipment, and infrastructure, as well as intended or unintended effects on civilians. The assessment enables the development and modification of TTP, training, and materiel. Vulnerability and threat assessment contributes to infrastructure-related risk management programs by providing information on entry control points, port operations, and forcible entry operations.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess EOD support across the range of military operations.

CHAPTER I

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. Introduction

a. Joint force commanders (JFCs) face a strategic environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. This fluid environment can involve shifting alliances and partnerships with persistent national and transnational threats. In addition to the continuing challenges of traditional conflicts, other significant challenges will include irregular warfare (IW), terrorists employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and threats which disrupt the nation's power projection capabilities.

b. Joint explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities feed intelligence and operations. EOD contributes key data regarding adversary/enemy identities and enemy supply chain (sourcing), as well as force protection (FP), and assists with building partner nation (PN) capacity and capabilities. These efforts enable commanders to tie individuals to networks, items, events, and locations.

c. EOD-related strategic direction is provided in a number of national-level documents, including the National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategic Guidance, the National Military Strategy, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Response Framework, the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the National Incident Management System, the Unified Command Plan, and the White House Policy Statement on Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. The United States Government (USG) recognizes the weapons threat in the operational environment (OE) is adaptive and expanding, increasing the requirement for EOD forces to serve as a necessary link between intelligence and operations. JFCs should integrate EOD operations with broader USG actions, to include security cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA), to ensure they are mutually supportive and achieve unified action. This publication builds upon existing policy and strategy, which establishes and implements measures to discover, prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate explosive attacks and their consequences at home or abroad.

For additional information, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

d. Joint EOD forces support freedom of maneuver and FP and provide a critical enabling capability in the form of collection and exploitation of weapons and explosive materiel. This capability is essential for operational success during military operations. EOD capabilities may directly support the following missions of the US Armed Forces:

- (1) Conduct counterterrorism (CT) and IW.
- (2) Deter and defeat aggression.
- (3) Project power despite antiaccess/area denial challenges.

- (4) Counter WMD.
- (5) Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
- (6) Provide homeland defense (HD) and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).
- (7) Conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
- (8) Conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and other operations.
- (9) Support stabilization efforts, as required.

2. Mission

The primary mission of joint EOD forces is to enable accomplishment of the joint force and/or the geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) mission objectives in support of US national security by maintaining access to areas denied by explosive ordnance in order to facilitate awareness of the OE, FP, operational mobility, and maneuver. Joint EOD forces enable access to areas denied by explosive and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards, providing mobility, maneuver, and awareness of the OE to the JFC.

3. Function

Joint EOD forces detect, locate, access, identify, diagnose, render safe/neutralize, recover, exploit, and dispose of weapons and explosives that threaten personnel, property, and lines of communications.

4. Weapons Threat in the Operational Environment

Future adversaries may adopt combinations of weapons systems for use in all OEs. Threats include conventional weapons, improvised weapons, and WMD. Current and future threats include dynamic systems that reflect new enemy acquisitions, modifications of older weapons, or an innovative use of weapons and associated paraphernalia, which may include military, commercial, or homemade explosives. Adversaries may obtain weapons through criminal groups that smuggle and launder illicit weapons to obtain revenue. Adversaries will continue to adapt weapons systems to overcome Department of Defense (DOD) FP countermeasures. EOD capabilities help identify and trace materials and support a more robust intelligence picture of the networks, groups, and individuals that create and use these weapons.

5. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities

- a. EOD personnel receive special training and equipment to render explosive ordnance safe, produce appropriate reports on such ordnance, and supervise the safe removal thereof. Explosive ordnance is all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials, and biological and chemical agents. DOD and joint issuances prescribe specific

responsibilities for each Service (see Appendix A, “Multi-Service Capability Matrix.”) Common EOD training, equipment, and technical manuals (TMs) provide each Service with the capability to detect/locate, access, identify, triage, diagnose, stabilize, render safe/neutralize, recover, exploit, and dispose of weapons and explosives. This includes conventional munitions, CBRN munitions, unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO), WMD, homemade explosives, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to include those enhanced with chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) fillers. Nuclear weapons and some WMD are capabilities not common to all EOD personnel.

b. The following capabilities are exercised through specific procedures unique to EOD forces.

(1) **Access Procedures.** Those actions taken to exactly locate and gain access to explosive ordnance.

(2) **Diagnostic Procedures.** Those actions taken to identify and evaluate explosive ordnance.

(3) **Render Safe Procedures.** Those actions taken to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of explosive ordnance to prevent unacceptable detonation.

(4) **Recovery Procedures.** Those actions taken to recover explosive ordnance for exploitation.

(5) **Final Disposition Procedures.** The final disposal of explosive ordnance, which may include demolition or burning in place, removal to a disposal area, or other appropriate means.

6. Joint Nature of Explosive Ordnance Disposal

a. The Secretary of the Navy is designated by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to serve as the DOD single manager for explosive ordnance disposal technology and training (EODT&T) and to manage and administer the elements of the EODT&T programs for DOD. This includes common-type individual EOD training: research and development (R&D) (including product improvement of common EOD tools and equipment) and development, joint verification, and fielding of EOD procedures and publications.

b. **Initial EOD Training.** Naval School Explosive Ordnance Disposal (NAVSCOLEOD), located at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is a Navy command. Each Service maintains a detachment at the school for staff and students. The EOD course of instruction is approximately six months in length for Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel and nine months for Navy personnel. Navy personnel receive additional instruction in diving procedures and underwater ordnance operations. NAVSCOLEOD trains officer and enlisted personnel from all Services in munitions identification, render safe procedures, explosives safety, and EOD-unique equipment. The school’s mission is to provide qualified EOD-trained personnel to operating forces of all Services and provide training to various federal agencies and international students.

c. **R&D.** Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NSWC IHEODTD) is located in Indian Head, Maryland. NSWC IHEODTD conducts R&D of specialized EOD tools, equipment, techniques, and procedures common to two or more Services. R&D provides EOD units with modern capabilities to detect/locate, access, identify, triage, diagnose, stabilize, render safe/neutralize, recover, exploit, and dispose of weapons and explosives. Each Service has a detachment collocated with NSWC IHEODTD. All Services can submit notional concepts to their respective detachments for capability development and also provide input for prioritization and selection of technology development projects.

d. **Common Equipment.** All military EOD teams or elements possess the same basic tools and equipment to employ techniques and perform procedures to defeat, render safe/neutralize, and dispose of hazardous explosive ordnance. These tools include, but are not limited to, portable x-ray equipment, unmanned systems (UMSs), specialized demolition charges, and specialized tools for removing fuses. Each Service also has specialized EOD equipment to perform Service-specific EOD missions.

e. **Automated Explosive Ordnance Disposal Publication System (AEODPS).** The NSWC IHEODTD develops and maintains the AEODPS for the joint EOD community. AEODPS is a compilation of classified and unclassified explosive ordnance disposal bulletins (EODBs)/TMs/technical orders (TOs) 60-Series publications that provide descriptive and procedural information; the publications are disseminated globally to enable the joint EOD personnel to make timely decisions to render safe and/or dispose of explosive ordnance, IEDs, WMD, and other hazardous materials that pose a threat to life, property, and material, all in accordance with Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5160.62, *Single Manager Responsibility for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T)*.

f. **EOD Program Board.** The EOD Program Board is comprised of the executive manager and a general or flag officer from each of the Services. The board resolves EODT&T issues for the EOD community, serves as the Services' focal point, and advocates for EOD program requirements. The board meets periodically to make recommendations on policy and issues of common concern. It also negotiates the annual program content in its role of establishing the program and approving the plan and budget and approving the annual EOD science and technology (S&T) plan that validates and identifies future areas of interest for joint EOD research and acquisition.

g. **Military Technical Acceptance Board (MTAB).** The MTAB, as authorized by the EOD Program Board, approves joint Service use of all EOD-specific tools, equipment, procedures, EODB/TM/TO 60-Series publications, and single-Service EOD-specific tools by military Service request. The MTAB is headed by a chair that rotates on an annual basis and a member from each of the other Services.

h. **Technical Training Acceptance Board (TTAB).** The TTAB, as authorized by the EOD Program Board, coordinates, approves, and standardizes all EOD common-type individual training and performs other functions as designated by the Program Board. The

TTAB is headed by a chair that rotates on an annual basis among the Services and a member from each of the other Services.

For additional information on joint EOD technology and training, see DODD 5160.62, Single Manager Responsibility for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T).

i. **Reachback Capability.** EOD forces provide a link to technical and scientific support that assists the forward commander during operations. This linkage facilitates the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and the rapid development of equipment based on current and future threats. The following are examples of sources that EOD reachback can access:

(1) **Joint EOD Technical Support Center.** The Joint EOD Technical Support Center provides single point access to the NSWC IHEODTD's corporate knowledge base of explosives, explosive ordnance, IEDs, and WMDs through the use of multiple databases, the technical information library, and subject matter expert (SME) resources for EOD technicians worldwide with real-time information to counter rapidly developing explosive threats.

(2) **Expeditionary Exploitation Unit One (EXU1).** The EXU1 is an operational command attached to NSWC IHEODTD task-organized into exploitation platoons (PLTs) and foreign materiel acquisition (FMA) PLTs to collect, process, exploit, and analyze enemy improvised and conventional weapons and components to provide near real-time technical intelligence (TECHINT) to the tactical commanders and EOD forces. It maintains the ability to provide continental United States (CONUS) reachback support to its deployed forces and the supported commander. This support includes, but is not limited to, advanced electronic exploitation and all-source intelligence analysis.

(3) **United States Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC).** The ARDEC EOD Technology Division provides information, analysis, equipment, and technology to joint EOD personnel, as well as non-DOD counter explosive hazard first responders. The ARDEC EOD Technology Division works closely with the EOD Technology and Training Single Service Manager in accordance with DODD 5160.62, *Single Manager Responsibility for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T)*.

(4) **Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA).** The MCIA Identity Intelligence Analysis Cell, in coordination with DOD and intelligence community (IC) partners, provides 24/7 identity intelligence reachback support to Marine Corps operating forces worldwide. MCIA also provides in-depth analysis on foreign marine and naval infantry forces and foreign police forces, scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI), expeditionary foreign weapons acquisition and exploitation, and foreign amphibious and antiaccess/area denial capabilities.

(5) **National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).** The NGIC provides weapons technical intelligence (WTI) products to support targeting, S&TI, foreign weapons exploitation, and reachback battle damage assessment.

(6) **Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC).** The TEDAC is a division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that serves as the single interagency organization to receive, analyze, and exploit all terrorist IEDs of interest to the US.

(7) **US Bomb Data Center.** The US Bomb Data Center is a national collection center for information on arson- and explosives-related incidents throughout the US. The US Bomb Data Center database incorporates information from various sources, such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); the FBI; and the United States Fire Administration. Information maintained by the national repository is available for statistical analysis and investigative research by scholars, the law enforcement community, and DOD.

For additional information on EOD reachback capabilities, see Appendix H, “J-2 Technical Intelligence.”

7. Unified Action

a. **Services.** The Services (except the United States Coast Guard) provide common EOD capability to the JFC. EOD achieves this uniformity through multi-Service training manuals and TMs, common equipment, and jointly supported R&D programs. Multi-Service EOD forces worked side-by-side in numerous operations during recent contingencies and conflicts. During combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Navy and Air Force EOD units were integrated into Army and Marine Corps formations to support land-based maneuver operations. These joint EOD operations demonstrate current operational differences and identify the potential for greater planning and operational efficiency in the future.

b. **Interagency.** EOD maintains relationships with the Department of Homeland Security, the ATF, the FBI, the United States Secret Service (USSS), and the Department of State (DOS). Joint EOD supports these agencies’ and departments’ exercises and operations when requested and approved by SecDef.

c. **International Partners.** Bilateral agreements facilitate the sharing of capabilities and information between DOD and international defense EOD organizations. Theater and international program offices instructions govern multinational capabilities and information sharing within an operational area. NSWC IHEODTD serves as a source for international exchange agreements/programs with foreign countries and international organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on EOD technology issues. Additionally, NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2834, *The Operation of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Information Centre (EODTIC)*, states the following:

(1) Participate in establishment and maintenance of the NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Information Centre (EODTIC) to provide for the exchange of explosive ordnance reconnaissance and EOD information (STANAG 2186, Allied Explosive Ordnance

Disposal Publication [AEODP]-7, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal Information Security Standards*, and STANAG 2897, *EOD Equipment Requirements and Equipment*).

(2) Provide the EODTIC library with national publications that pertain to EOD tools, equipment, procedures, training, and operations (STANAG 2369, *The NATO EOD Publications Set (NEPS)—Identification and Disposal of Surface, Air and Underwater Munitions*).

(3) NSWC IHEODTD liaison with EODTIC and provide funding for the EODTIC in accordance with NATO STANAG 2834.

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CHAPTER II

JOINT EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES

1. Introduction

a. Phasing is used in joint planning to integrate and synchronize operations in time, space, and purpose and represents a natural progression through an operation. EOD plays a major role in all phases of joint operations. Though the phases are designed to be sequential, EOD mission sets, like other activities, may begin in one phase and continue into subsequent phases. Prompt and accurate explosive event assessment (tactical and technical), material exploitation, and reporting are critical to developing intelligence that supports operations. EOD contributes to information gathering during operations and serves to enable the common operational picture (COP) and the safe conduct of operations within an operational area. EOD reports provide near real-time situational awareness to the commander. They are a record of tactical and technical facts that directly support the intelligence cycle, while also providing a detailed record of the incident. Commanders should understand that, due to the complexity of EOD tasks and the training required, host nation (HN) EOD forces may not achieve a suitable level of proficiency at the same rate as the HN's combat forces. As such, commanders should anticipate that the joint force may have to provide EOD support to HN combat units.

b. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare, and during all military operations, civil-military operations are essential activities to develop relations between military forces, and indigenous populations and institutions for the purpose of achieving objectives that reestablish or maintain stability within a region or HN. Similarly, the nature of the environment may elevate EOD activities to essential in pursuit of national security and military strategy and function as a key enabler to achieving national security objectives.

c. EOD missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure protection, or humanitarian relief. Other than theater SC, the preponderance of EOD missions, tasks, and activities during shaping operations will be in support of FHA or other life-saving or critical infrastructure protection activities. These activities are often in support of another USG department or agency. The majority of EOD missions, tasks, and activities during DSCA will be in support of law enforcement/emergency support agencies for the same reason. Defense support of civilian law enforcement activities may be executed in conjunction with a planned event or as an emergency response.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; and JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

d. **SC.** SC comprises all DOD interaction with foreign partners to build defense relationships, promote specific US security interests, and develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, while providing peace time and contingency access to an HN. An essential element to SC is SA, which is a DOS-funded and DOD-administered SA program that provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to promote national policies and objectives. Joint EOD forces

perform a significant role in SC by supporting SA activities that promote and encourage international partners to work with the US in pursuit of strategic objectives. When effectively employed during the shape and deter phases, joint EOD forces can have a significant impact on remaining phases.

For additional information, refer to DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, and JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Activities Across the Phases of Joint Operations

a. Phase 0 (Shape)

(1) **EOD International Military Education and Training (IMET).** The EOD IMET program is an instrument of US SA that provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations.

(a) EOD IMET improves PNs' defense capabilities and develops professional and personal relationships through formal and informal EOD education. International students attend NAVSCOLEOD through appropriated or non-appropriated means. The IMET's traditional purpose of promoting more professional PN militaries through training strengthens military alliances against terrorism.

(b) EOD capabilities during phases 0 and I include communicating EOD skills and knowledge that help PNs develop new capabilities and better utilize existing resources through orientation tours, mobile training teams, and the establishment of an in-country EOD training venue (see Figure II-1).

For additional information, refer to DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM); Army Regulation (AR) 12-15/Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 4950.4/Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-105, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training; and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5410.17, United States Field Studies Program (FSP) for International Military and Civilian Students and Military-Sponsored Visitors.

(2) **Stockpiled Conventional Munitions Assistance.** The DOD humanitarian mine action (HMA) program assists nations plagued by land mines and explosive remnants of war by executing "train-the-trainer" programs of instruction designed to develop indigenous capabilities for a wide range of HMA activities. The USG Policy Coordination Committee for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations Subgroup on HMA approves support for PNs. The DOD representative to this interagency Policy Coordination Committee for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations Subgroup on HMA is the Chief, HMA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict).




Figure II-1. Notional Explosive Ordnance Disposal Tasks Across the Joint Phases

(a) The DOD program utilizes EOD subject matter expertise to educate, train, and provide technical assistance to PN personnel with respect to explosive safety; the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war; and the disposal,

demilitarization, physical security, and management of potentially dangerous stockpiles of explosive ordnance.

For additional information, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3207.01, Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Action.

(b) EOD personnel are trained to identify safety requirements with respect to ammunition storage and compatibility issues associated with stockpile management. In regions with insufficient infrastructure or instable governance, inadequately secured explosive ordnance can further challenge struggling institutions and may present opportunities for terrorists, criminals, or insurgents to disrupt public order, impede economic development, or perpetuate conflict. Uncontrolled explosions are a safety hazard for local populations and can impede development. Securing and disposing of munitions facilitates safety, security, and well-being of the local populace. This may include the rendering safe, or disposal of, explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration, when the disposal of such explosive ordnance requires techniques, procedures, or equipment that exceed normal requirements for routine disposal.

For additional information, refer to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe website at <http://www.osce.org/>.

b. Phase I (Deter)

(1) Continue any relevant activity or program during the shaping phase based on requirements.

(2) **Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Support.** CWMD requires a coordinated, whole-of-government effort to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD-related expertise, materials, and technologies.

(a) EOD forces provide operational response capability and SME support to lead agencies when requested through appropriate channels for CWMD lines of effort: prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crises.

For more information on lines of effort and the importance of the CWMD relationship to other programs, refer to JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(b) DOD has a responsibility for ensuring a joint 24-hour-a-day capability to meet the initial DOD time-sensitive management requirements for an accident or incident involving US nuclear weapons in DOD or Department of Energy custody, or a military reactor, occurring anywhere in the world. Should DOS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), or the Department of Energy request DOD assistance in handling an accident or incident involving nuclear weapons, nuclear material, or improvised nuclear devices, joint EOD will provide support as directed. A nuclear accident or incident involving US nuclear weapons or a nuclear reactor could occur with little or no warning. Such an occurrence requires a timely DOD response and effective communications in order to provide the optimum USG response. Joint EOD supports the Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures, the Joint

Staff, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)/United States Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD), or combatant commands (CCMDs) when necessary.

For additional information, refer to CJCSI 3431.01, Joint Nuclear Accident and Incident Response Team, and Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 3150.08, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP).

(3) **SC.** SC during this phase helps build defense relationships to promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to an HN. As an example, SC reinforces the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. NATO initiated the PfP program for countries seeking cooperative military and peacekeeping relations with NATO. In the US support of PfP, DOD and DOS combined to establish the Warsaw Initiative Fund. DOD uses Title 10, United States Code (USC), appropriations to support an array of programs, conferences, exchanges, seminars, military exercises, and studies. Joint EOD supports SC through:

- (a) Humanitarian and civic assistance.
- (b) Government-to-government agreements (e.g., foreign military sales).
- (c) CT operations.
- (d) Military-to-military contact program.
- (e) Bilateral, multilateral, or regional conferences, meetings, or seminars.
- (f) Combined exercises.
- (g) National Guard State Partnership Program.
- (h) Personnel exchange agreements.
- (i) Training of PN military personnel.
- (j) FP.
- (k) International air and trade shows as approved by SecDef.

c. **Phase II (Seize Initiative).** During the seize the initiative phase, joint EOD capabilities enable joint force and friendly freedom of action, access to theater infrastructure, and protection of critical infrastructure. This may enable the HN to establish dominant capabilities, with or without US combat operations. Joint EOD activities in combat operations enable transition to phase IV.

(1) **Support to Special Operations Forces (SOF) Core Operations and Activities.** EOD supports, enhances, and enables SOF operations, planning, and training

across direct and indirect lines of effort. EOD competencies specifically provide organic FP capability, elevate and deepen the level of training assistance to indigenous forces, and reduce risks to missions and to forces during direct action missions, as well as other specialized tasks. EOD units provide both general support (GS) to SOF based on requested theater allocations, as well as direct support (DS), with specialized and designated EOD units, to specified SOF units. The increasing proliferation and technological complexity of improvised weapons and other CBRN hazards drives this critical requirement of continued and embedded EOD support to all SOF units, in order to maintain required SOF core mission capabilities.

(a) **Special Assets for CBRN and Explosive Threats.** All EOD units have received a level of specialized training, in order to provide rapid triage, threat assessment, and initial diagnostic data as necessary, to an interagency technical network to adjudicate CBRN and explosive threats and determine level of response required, to include WMD. This capability, properly employed, maximizes the GCC and USG's evolving understanding of the threat and response options during crises. Specifically, designated EOD units have received unique training and maintain peculiar capabilities to further assess and provide counter WMD expertise in support of national tasking and security.

(b) **Counterproliferation.** EOD provides significant expertise in the reduction of WMD stockpiles, supporting TECHINT collection and exploitation, providing guidance on protective measures, assisting in destruction or transfer activities, and supporting monitoring and redirection efforts. EOD enables SOF in core tasks to locate WMD-associated system nodes and program elements, to include production facilities, storage/stockpile sites, and key program personnel.

(2) **EOD Support to Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).** EOD forces provide FP support and response for explosive ordnance that may be encountered during the conduct of a NEO. EOD technicians should be included in the NEO forward command element in order to advise the embassy staff on bomb identification measures and to inspect the embassy and potential evacuation control center sites. EOD personnel provide DS to a NEO, to include embassy emergency action plans, when necessary. EOD personnel may be pre-positioned for crisis support or to help sustain the embassy in a hostile or uncertain environment.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and DODD 3025.14, Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad.

d. **Phase III (Dominate)**

(1) **Countering Conventional and Improvised Weapons**

(a) Joint EOD forces conduct operations to detect, access, identify, render safe, exploit, and dispose of conventional and improvised weapons and explosives. Improvised weapons are a subcategory of weapons that includes modified munitions and IEDs. The exploitation of improvised weapons was one of the major contributions EOD forces made

during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Joint EOD core skills protect joint forces, civil populations, and critical infrastructure, and assist in protecting lines of communications. They enhance mobility and intelligence collection.

(b) **Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Operations.** Meeting the IED threat requires a national effort based on a whole-of-government approach that addresses the device, the network that designs and emplaces the device, and the sociopolitical aspects of the OE that facilitates IED employment. DOD has chosen to respond to the IED threat along three basic lines of operation (LOOs): attack the network, defeat the device, and train the force. EOD forces provide a required on-site specialized exploitation capability. The recovered materials and data are submitted to the proper channels in order to enable full exploitation and the subsequent dissemination of valuable network intelligence to units. EOD forces provide the capability to detect, locate, render safe, and dispose of the device. Operations are further enabled through better device and explosive detection, improved EOD robots, and better vehicle and personnel protections. EOD procedures allow for the exploitation of key components by preservation of the device. EOD provides technical assistance and advice on EOD, FP, and combat tactics regarding the threat posed by IEDs. EOD assists in the development of the C-IED concept of operations (CONOPS) and C-IED operation plan (OPLAN) and, at a minimum, executes staff supervision over the EOD operational aspects. EOD also assists in organizing and providing individual and unit IED awareness training or specialized EOD training to multinational partners who may lack the requisite capability.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations.

(2) **Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP).** The DTIRP is a DOD security preparedness and outreach program designed to provide security education and awareness concerning arms control implementation operational activities. It provides arms control implementation advice and assistance to sites subject to on-site inspection and overflight through the use of specially trained personnel, analyses, and educational activities, utilizing expertise from established facilities and services in DOD and other USG departments and agencies, whenever practicable, to avoid duplication and achieve maximum efficiency and economy.

For additional information, refer to Executive Order (EO) 12968, Access to Classified Information; DODI 5205.10, DOD Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3150.29, Code Word, Nicknames and Exercise Terms (NICKA) System; and the National Disclosure Policy.

(3) **Alternative Compensatory Control Measures.** EOD is a critical enabler of several alternative compensatory control measures and special access programs (SAPs). An EOD joint task force (JTF) should have the appropriate security mechanisms to interface at the appropriate classification level to synchronize EOD efforts across the operational area.

For additional information, refer to DODM 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

(4) **Special Technical Operations (STO).** STO are classified, compartmented operations within the headquarters (HQ) planning teams. EOD forces can employ certain STO capabilities to counter explosive devices and should be incorporated into early combatant commander (CCDR) planning. As an example, certain EOD-relevant information-related capabilities need to be deconflicted and synchronized with CCDR STO planners.

e. **Phase IV (Stabilize).** Joint EOD tasks in phase IV support security by preparing the HN to assume responsibility for internal and external security during the transfer of authority to civil authorities and redeployment of US and multinational forces (MNFs), while continuing phase III activities, as required. Phase IV joint EOD tasks generally focus on building HN security force EOD response capability and capacity for transition to phase V, and supplementing HN security force capabilities for more advanced tasks.

(1) **TECHINT Activities.** TECHINT is derived from the exploitation of foreign materiel and scientific information, and begins with the acquisition of a foreign piece of equipment or weapon system. TECHINT includes the components of S&TI, foreign materiel program, and WTI. As a function of C-IED operations, WTI is a category of intelligence and processes derived from the technical and forensic collection and exploitation of IEDs, associated components, improvised weapons, and other weapon systems. WTI operationalizes TECHINT and focuses on immediate exploitation of captured weapons and munitions to rapidly respond to the tactical commanders' priority intelligence requirements and other requirements. EOD forces, in conjunction with intelligence activities and other forces, support the TECHINT process by collecting, exploiting, and reporting on first-seen foreign ordnance, aircraft, weapons systems, or sabotage devices encountered by joint forces. EOD forces provide technical information on foreign and US ordnance and conduct crater or munitions fragmentation analysis, as part of an accident or incident investigation. EOD personnel reside in several intelligence organizations. They provide the expertise to collect information to target adversarial weapons and ordnance.

(a) Joint EOD teams are primary collectors and exploiters of weapons and explosive materiel. They are the only USG organizations manned, trained, and equipped to identify, render safe, and dispose of foreign ordnance and associated delivery systems. TECHINT assesses the capabilities and vulnerabilities of foreign materiel and provides detailed assessments of foreign technological threat capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.

(b) These activities help joint forces maintain the advantage over current or possible adversarial weapons and technology. EOD expertise develops countermeasures and produces a clearer intelligence picture of threat weapons and capabilities. EOD teams are the primary collectors of information on explosive ordnance and their related weapons systems, and perform the first technical assessment of found or captured weapons and ordnance.

(c) In-theater identification and acquisition of unknown foreign ordnance and packaging for shipment to US locations for further exploitation by the intelligence and S&T communities is necessary to develop assessments of foreign technological threat capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities, as well as the rapid development of TTP and EOD render

safe procedures. After the material has been rendered safe, it should be processed through an expeditionary or CONUS-based weapons exploitation (technical and forensic) facility. Joint EOD may facilitate the transportation of explosives by certifying they are packaged correctly and that they are safe to ship. Packaging, certifying that material is safe to ship, and transporting explosives requires the involvement of trained and certified personnel with an EOD background.

For additional information, see DODM 4140.01, Volume 11, DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures: Management of Critical Safety Items, Controlled Inventory Items Including Nuclear Weapons-Related Materiel, and Appendix H, “J-2 Technical Intelligence.”

(2) **Security Force Assistance (SFA).** EOD personnel may conduct SFA throughout the OE and across the spectrum of conflict, as well as during all phases of military operations. SFA activities are referred to as organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA) foreign military forces in support of overall SC initiatives.

(a) Joint EOD SFA activities assist HNs in defending against internal, transnational, and external threats by improving the capacity or capability of the HN security force or its supporting institutions. Joint EOD also contributes to MNF OTERA operations, or another country’s security forces or supporting institutions.

(b) EOD contributes to the DOD role in USG security sector reform initiatives, specifically as it relates to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration that attempts to stabilize the OE by disarming and demobilizing armed groups and by helping return former combatants to civilian life.

For additional information, refer to DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW); CJCSI 3210.06, Irregular Warfare; JP 3-07, Stability; JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency; JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations; DODI 5000.68, Security Force Assistance (SFA); and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (DOS) Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.

(3) **Captured or Confiscated Weapons.** Captured and confiscated conventional weapons must be handled similarly to US-owned weapons. They have an additional control requirement in that they must be entered into the DOD Small Arms Serialization Program by the Service component that captures or confiscates them prior to any demilitarization action. Consult the staff judge advocate (SJA) with questions regarding the laws pertaining to the disposition of captured and/or confiscated conventional weapons. Any weapon of intelligence value should be kept and provided to the appropriate TECHINT organization that can further exploit the weapon. FMA and foreign material exploitation of first seen or captured/confiscated conventional weapons has TECHINT value. Captured and confiscated conventional weapons are normally destroyed by the Services and/or retrograded to CONUS for destruction. Captured and confiscated CBRN weapons must be handled in accordance with applicable environmental, safety, and other pertinent laws and regulations, to include international and bilateral treaties. Consult the commander’s guidance and the SJA for information pertaining to the disposition of captured and/or confiscated CBRN weapons.

For additional information, see DODM 4140.01, Volume 11, DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures: Management of Critical Safety Items, Controlled Inventory Items Including Nuclear Weapons-Related Materiel.

f. **Phase V (Enable Civil Authorities).** In phase V, the HN government is conducting security operations with minimal direct US assistance and continues to work with the US through normal DOS and DOD channels to access US SA programs. EOD support to legitimate civil governance in the HN enables the viability of the civil authority and its ability to provide essential services to the majority of its people. EOD units help build indigenous military and police EOD and exploitation capability.

(1) **Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism (AT), Demining, and Related Programs.** DOS administers a series of appropriated grant programs. These programs are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act, the Freedom Support Act, and the Arms Export Control Act, and their focus is on demining activities, the clearance of UXO, the destruction of small arms, border security, and related activities. Related defense articles, services, and training can be provided through this program. Funding support for the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission is provided through this program. Joint EOD teams assist with weapons removal and abatement, and DOS can purchase demining, UXO clearance, and AT systems with this funding.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and the DOS websites: Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (<http://www.state.gov/t/>), Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/>), and Conventional Weapons Destruction (<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c3670.htm>).

(2) **Humanitarian Demining Assistance.** The DOD HMA program, which includes both humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance, is supervised by the GCC. It is a component of SecDef's Guidance for Employment of the Force and the overall USG mine action program. EOD personnel conduct train-the-trainer HMA missions.

For additional information, refer to CJCSI 3207.01, Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Action.

(3) **SA.** SA is an element of SC funded and authorized by DOS to be administered by DOD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency. SA differs from SC in that it is funded and authorized under Title 22, USC, as opposed to other SC programs that are funded and authorized under Title 10, USC. SA programs fund and enable SFA activities to enhance a host country's defense. EOD skills can be taught to PN military and civil authorities. EOD forces help link theater SC activities, such as military-to-military engagements and DOS SA missions. One example of SA is the May 2008 Technical Cooperation Agreement between the US and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The EOD mission is the protection of critical infrastructure facilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Joint EOD forces assisted the

Saudis by establishing an EOD cell in the Office of the Program Manager-Facilities Security Forces Advisory Division for the Ministry of Interior for training and advisory support.

(4) **US Embassy Support.** EOD personnel may be pre-positioned for crisis support or to help with emergency action plans in a hostile or uncertain environment. DOD EOD provides the full range of EOD capabilities to the defense attachés upon request through appropriate channels.

For additional information, refer to DODD 5205.75, DOD Operations at US Embassies, and DODI C-5105.81, Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US Embassies (U).

3. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence Activities

a. **Ammunition/Explosive Safety.** Joint EOD provides support to US, multinational, and HN forces for sustainment activities related to ammunition and explosives. This includes installation support, training, and explosive safety. UXO is considered the most dangerous category of military munitions. However, other military munitions, to include discarded military munitions, that are encountered outside the DOD munitions logistics management system, particularly those that have experienced an abnormal environment, should be considered equally dangerous and managed as UXO until assessed and determined otherwise by EOD personnel. Military munitions that have experienced abnormal environments include, but are not limited to, munitions remaining after attempted demilitarization by open burning or open detonation, munitions involved in accidents or fires, and munitions or components subjected to certain tests (e.g., fuze arming tests, jolt, and jumble tests) that might cause arming. UXO will most likely be found in areas that the DOD currently uses (e.g., operational ranges) or once used (e.g., former ranges) for military munitions training or testing. For a variety of reasons, UXO can also be encountered in other areas, to include where contingency, combat, or military operations other than war have occurred. DOD is responsible for protecting people, property, and the environment from potential explosive hazards (e.g., blast and fragmentation) or chemical agent hazards (e.g., downwind hazards and environmental impact) associated with DOD-owned UXO. DOD is equally responsible for protecting personnel who respond to address such hazards. Joint EOD supports the following sustainment activities:

- (1) Recurring operational range clearance requirements.

For additional information, refer to DODD 3200.15, Sustaining Access to the Live Training and Test Domain; DODI 3200.16, Operational Range Clearance (ORC); DODD 4715.11, Environmental and Explosives Safety Management on Operational Ranges Within the United States; and DODD 4715.12, Environmental and Explosives Safety Management on Operational Ranges Outside the United States.

- (2) Clearance of specific UXO on a case-by-case basis.

- (3) USG and PN initiatives to develop on- and off-post range safety and dud awareness educational programs.

- (4) Under certain conditions, explosive ordnance reconnaissance of impact areas.

- (5) Demilitarization of damaged or deteriorating explosive items.

For additional information, refer to DODM 4160.28, Volume 1, Defense Demilitarization: Program Administration.

(6) Coded Munitions. Coded munitions are the management of unserviceable materiel that do not meet repair criteria. This includes condemned items that are radioactively contaminated, Type I shelf-life materiel that has passed its expiration date, and Type II shelf-life materiel that has passed its expiration date and cannot be extended. EOD disposes of UXO, discarded military munitions, IED, weapons cache, and captured enemy ammunition, and destroys unserviceable military munitions.

For additional information, refer to Defense Logistics Manual 4000.25, Defense Logistics Management Standards (DLMS), and DODM 4140.27-M, Shelf-Life Item Management Manual.

(7) Emergency response on an installation to UXO/discarded military munitions/IEDs or other intentional incidents involving explosives.

(8) The Installation Emergency Management “All-Hazards” Program intends to prepare DOD installations for emergencies so they respond appropriately, protect personnel, and save lives, allowing them to promptly recover and restore operations after an emergency. This program includes first responders such as firefighters, law enforcement and security personnel, and emergency medical technicians. EOD personnel can provide immediate response to an all-hazards incident. To ensure optimal support and integration, joint EOD personnel should receive emergency first-responder training. All emergency first responders should be trained to operate with the incident command system, emergency medical services, hazardous material, and task-specific activities.

For additional information, refer to DODI 6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program; Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response; and National Fire Protection Association 472, Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents.

(9) Implementing effective explosives safety and munitions risk management procedures to identify and address the potential threats/consequences/risks associated with weapons/munitions is a command priority. When accomplished as part of the planning process and performed consistently in training and during execution, explosives safety and munitions risk management is an enabler that directly contributes to mission success. Explosives safety and munitions risk management identifies risks associated with munitions in all phases of operations and training. Joint EOD personnel often serve on assessment teams at the request of safety centers, DOD Explosive Safety Board, US Army Corps of Engineers, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, DTRA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), US defense attachés, Air Mobility Command, or Military Sealift Command. Joint EOD personnel can also advise HNs on explosive safety site plans.

For additional information, refer to CJCSI 4360.01, Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management for Joint Operations Planning, Training, and Execution; DODM 6055.09-M, DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards; DODD 6055.9E, Explosives Safety Management and the DOD Explosives Safety Board; DODD 5530.3, International Agreements; and DODI 6055.16, Explosives Safety Management Program.

b. **FP.** EOD may provide a response capability in support of installation FP. Installation memoranda of agreement/memoranda of understanding and other special arrangements can allocate HN and US military police forces; fire and emergency services; medical services; federal, state, and local agencies; SOF; engineers; CBRN units; and EOD. Agreements with HN authorities are often adapted to grant the US commander security responsibility within the installation boundary and the HN security responsibility outside this boundary.

(1) **Partnerships.** EOD forces may be used to establish FP detachments. In 2003, a memorandum of understanding between DOS and DOD established FP detachments with the primary mission to support GCC in-transit FP requirements when military criminal investigative assets are not available. FP detachments activities include preparing threat assessments and informational documents, coordinating with foreign law enforcement and security officials, producing AT surveys, assessing route and travel threats, briefing antiterrorist and counterintelligence (CI) threats, assisting in investigations and operations, assisting in protective service operations, and serving as a point of contact in embassies for DOD CI and law enforcement organizations.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism; DODI 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program; DODI 5240.22, Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection; and the DOD Counterintelligence Field Activity Regarding Force Protection Detachments, 24 September 2009.

(2) **FP Training.** Joint EOD forces support integration by fostering training relationships with their supported unit command training cycle. This includes local installation training and training center rotations. This participation may also include larger scale national/international exercises, command post exercises, and other events. Joint EOD forces can provide training in explosive ordnance and IED recognition and reporting, bomb threat search procedures and evacuation, site vulnerability assessments, and standard operating procedure preparation and validation. This training supports the commander's FP program.

c. **EOD Support to Domestic CT.** The Secretary of Homeland Security coordinates federal operations within the US to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. The Attorney General of the United States, generally acting through the Director of the FBI, leads law enforcement response to, and criminal investigations of, terrorist acts or threats within the US and its territories. SecDef may, at the request of the Attorney General, support domestic CT activities and operations. If a terrorist incident exceeds the FBI's capacity, the President may direct DOD to provide domestic CT assistance within Constitutional and statutory limits. When tasked, EOD support off installation will typically be performed by the closest EOD unit, regardless of Service.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, and Title 18, USC, Section 2332a.

(1) **Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP).** It is DOD policy to reduce risk to human health and the environment because of its activities. Environmental restoration pursuant to DERP includes response actions that address UXO, discarded military munitions, and munitions constituents at defense sites, which are categorized as munitions response areas and munitions response sites. Defense sites do not include operational ranges, operating storage or manufacturing facilities, or facilities that are used for or were permitted for the treatment or disposal of military munitions. EOD may be called upon to conduct site characterization or disposal operations in support of DERP.

For additional information, refer to DODI 4715.07, Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), and DODM 4715.20, Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) Management.

(2) **Military Munitions Response Program/Immediate Response.** The Military Munitions Response Program was established to meet DERP's statutory directives. Joint EOD will provide immediate response in support of civil authorities, when requested, and may dispose of military munitions in accordance with Title 40, CFR, Parts 260-270. Military munitions, discarded military munitions, and UXO outside of military control, and in the public domain, present an imminent and substantial danger to public safety and health and to the environment, and may require an immediate EOD response.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Title 40, CFR, Parts 260-299; Title 42, USC, Section 6901); and DODM 6055.09-M, Volume 7, DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards: Criteria for Unexploded Ordnance, Munitions Response, Waste Military Munitions, and Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard.

(3) **Domestic EOD Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.** EOD units from all Services may provide render safe, disposal, and technical advice for all explosive ordnance, to include IEDs, to law enforcement agencies throughout the US and its territories when the explosive ordnance is a DOD munition or when necessary under immediate response authority to save lives. Prior to September 11, 2001, law enforcement bomb disposal was limited to large metropolitan areas. Federal and civilian authorities relied on DOD EOD units to provide a bomb disposal capability to most of the US and its territories. Civilian law enforcement agencies have expanded their bomb disposal capabilities in response to terrorists' threats. Although the number of civilian bomb disposal units across the US has grown, law enforcement agencies can be overwhelmed and require assistance from military EOD resources. Joint EOD can provide DSCA under immediate response authority to assist federal, state, tribal, and local authorities. Such an immediate response may include advice and assistance. EOD assistance includes the mitigation, rendering safe, and disposition of suspected or detected explosive ordnance. Additionally, aid can be

provided for other potentially explosive material or harmful military munitions that create an actual or potential imminent threat to public safety.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA); DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies; the Military Munitions Rule: Hazardous Waste Identification and Management; Explosives Emergencies; Manifest Exemption for Transport of Hazardous Waste on Right-of-Ways on Contiguous Properties; and Appendix G, “Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support to Law Enforcement.”

(4) **Defense Critical Infrastructure Program.** Joint EOD links risk management program activities and security-related functions to enable FP, AT, critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, continuity of operations, CBRN defense and readiness, and installation preparedness. The joint EOD role is to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment by supporting critical infrastructure protection and response capabilities. Critical infrastructure protection programs help identify and mitigate vulnerabilities to defense critical infrastructure, which includes DOD and non-DOD domestic and foreign infrastructures that are essential to plan, mobilize, deploy, execute, and sustain US military operations on a global basis. Coordination between DOD entities and other USG departments and agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and equivalent foreign entities enables protection of critical assets, whether those assets are controlled by DOD or private entities. Joint EOD helps identify vulnerabilities and mitigate risks. Vulnerability mitigation decisions consider all available program areas, including AT, FP, military deception, and operations security. Standing rules for the use of force provide operational guidance and establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions taken by DOD forces performing DSCA missions during DOD response to natural or man-made disasters occurring within US territory and at all DOD installations (and off installation, while conducting official DOD security functions), unless otherwise directed by SecDef. HN laws and international agreements may limit US forces means of accomplishing law enforcement or security duties.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters; Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection; DODD 3020.40, DOD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure; DODI 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management; and Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

(5) **Support to Special Events.** EOD may support local, state, and federal law enforcement. Support typically occurs upon receipt of a request for assistance (RFA) through appropriate channels or through immediate response authority in the interest of public safety to save lives and prevent human suffering and damage to critical infrastructure and key resources. Examples include:

(a) National special security events (NSSEs) (e.g., State of the Union address, presidential inaugural address).

(b) Other special events include sporting events (e.g., 1996 Summer Olympics, Boston Marathon).

For additional information, refer to DODD 3025.13, Employment of DOD Capabilities in Support of the US Secret Service (USSS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS); DODI 3025.19, Procedures for Sharing Information with and Providing Support to the US Secret Service (USSS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS); DODI 3025.20, Defense Support of Special Events; and DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

(6) Joint EOD Very Important Personnel Protection Support Activity (VIPPSA) Mission. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is designated the supported CCDR for providing routine EOD very important person mission support to the USSS and DOS in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR), and coordinates routine (25 or fewer teams) EOD very important person mission support to the USSS and DOS CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR) is the lead agency for the joint EOD VIPPSA mission. JFHQ-NCR serves as action agent for USNORTHCOM. It processes USSS and DOS requests for routine reimbursable and nonreimbursable EOD protective support. JFHQ-NCR receives, approves, tasks, and coordinates these requests for locations worldwide.

(a) Non-routine requests (more than 25 teams) for EOD or related capabilities under DOD support of special events are coordinated through the DOD Executive Secretary. RFAs for NSSEs are considered nonroutine and coordinated through the Executive Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security). DOD provides services, equipment, and facilities in support of the USSS when performing its protective duties under Title 18, USC, Section 3056, and Public Law 94-524 when requested by the Director of the USSS and approved by SecDef.

(b) The USSS and DOS request EOD support directly to joint EOD VIPPSA. Services report qualified EOD team/element leader and team/element member availability weekly to joint EOD VIPPSA. For missions within CONUS, joint EOD VIPPSA selects EOD teams/elements based on the availability and geographic proximity to the mission support site. For OCONUS missions, the joint EOD VIPPSA tasks Services and the GCC to provide EOD teams, based on availability.

(c) For CONUS missions, EOD teams/elements tasked to support the USSS or DOS are attached with specification of tactical control (TACON) to Commander, USNORTHCOM at the mission site for the duration of the support mission. For OCONUS, EOD teams/elements are attached with specification of TACON to the supported GCC. EOD teams/elements receive daily mission tasking from the lead USSS or DOS agent on site.

4. Supported Agencies

a. DIA

(1) Joint EOD partners with DIA in the areas of measurement and signature intelligence, TECHINT, and CI. As primary collectors for all foreign ordnance and weapons-related technical information, DIA relies on joint EOD operations support for strategic systems analysis. Electro-optical data, radar data, radio frequency/electromagnetic pulse emissions, geophysical data (to include seismic intelligence, acoustic intelligence, and magnetic intelligence), materials data, and nuclear radiation data provide information regarding foreign weapon systems and production facilities.

(2) Exploitation of captured adversary equipment can provide critical information on threat strengths and weaknesses that supports operational planning. Exploitation of adversary equipment, excluding computer storage media, video and digital recording media, and media equipment, is generally performed in the CCMD by a joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC). The JCMEC, through the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) exploitation cell, tasks the EOD group, or senior EOD HQ on the operation, with technical collection requirements for weapons and explosive ordnance, including IEDs, UXO, foreign ordnance, and ordnance containing CBRN materials, and associated manufacturing and storage facilities (see Figure II-2). The JCMEC coordinates, through the theater HQ, for EOD support to assist in clearing and recovering damaged enemy weapons systems, vehicles, munitions depots, and ordnance manufacturing facilities, and to perform triage at collection locations.

(3) Joint EOD developed more responsive exploitation and collections activities to address the enemy's technical innovations and rapid improvisation of weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan. To meet the asymmetric weapon threat, joint EOD operationalized TECHINT by addressing WTI and utilizing nontraditional support, integrating newly formed capabilities, and incorporating technical and forensic exploitation processes at all levels of command. Commanders require battlefield recovery and exploitation of captured or found enemy materials and weapons, both conventional and improvised. They demand rapid feedback from the exploitation process at all levels. This is driven by the operational imperative to maximize the intelligence value of an explosive ordnance and IED event, or cache to facilitate FP, support dynamic targeting, identify the sources of IED and ordnance components and weapons, and provide evidence to link individuals to a particular event, weapon, or device.

(4) WTI operationalizes traditional TECHINT of improvised weapons and explosives and leverages an enterprise architecture that spans tactical collection through strategic technical/forensic exploitation and analysis with a primary focus on IEDs, their associated components, improvised weapons, and other weapons systems. This includes site exploitation, forensic material handling and chain of custody, technical categorization, tactical characterization, biometric collection and analysis, electronic engineering, and the application of forensic science and the analysis of its findings. WTI utilizes the processes and capabilities of biometrics-enabled intelligence (BEI) and forensic-enabled intelligence (FEI) to support targeting, FP, component materiel sourcing, signature characterization, and legal prosecution of detainees.




Figure II-2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Captured Materiel Relationships

(5) TECHINT products are used by US weapons developers, countermeasure designers, tacticians, and operational forces to mitigate technological surprise, neutralize an adversary's technological advantages, enhance FP, and develop and employ effective countermeasures to new adversary equipment. At the strategic level, the exploitation and interpretation of foreign weapon systems, materiel, and technologies is referred to as S&TI.

(6) The DIA provides enhanced S&TI to CCDRs and their subordinates through the technical operational intelligence program. The technical operational intelligence program uses a closed-loop system that integrates all Service and DIA S&TI centers in a common effort. The program collects, analyzes, and disseminates theater-specific S&TI to CCDRs and their subordinates to plan, train, and execute joint operations.

(7) CI encompasses five functions (collection, analysis and production, investigations, operations, and functional services) conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. Joint EOD-managed exploitation feeds CI

applications (BEI, FEI, document and media exploitation [DOMEX], and identify intelligence) in a DS role to DIA.

For additional information, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations; and Appendix H, “J-2 Technical Intelligence.”

b. **DTRA.** DTRA is a combat support agency whose mission is to integrate, synchronize, and provide expertise, technologies, and capabilities to safeguard the US and its allies from global WMD threats. DTRA is collocated with the SCC-WMD and shares a director.

(1) DTRA provides operation, planning, and exercise support, real-time technical reachback for the CCMDs, technical development, and capabilities analysis. DTRA also manages and oversees research, development, testing, and evaluation needed to counter the threat and use of WMD.

(2) EOD forces may provide SME support when requested for CWMD operations to DTRA/SCC-WMD. EOD support includes arms control and treaty verification, stockpile stewardship, WMD disposal, Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group, joint working groups and the Nuclear Weapons Effects User’s Group, demilitarization, and SAPs. Joint EOD provides technical assistance and support as needed in developing requirements and operational procedures dealing with the disposal of nuclear weapons or devices. Joint EOD also assists with the safety and storage requirements for ammunition, explosives, associated components, and delivery systems. EOD forces inspect and destroy foreign ammunition and explosive ordnance/components as required. DTRA provides security advisors, as requested, to the DOD components and other USG departments and agencies having cognizance over SAPs, in the direction, management, and coordination of arms control policy development, oversight, and implementation initiatives potentially affecting the SAP community, consistent with DOD issuances.

(3) EOD forces should take into account special considerations when supporting CWMD operations. Adversary WMD programs can vary with each actor. They can be large-scale state programs or actors of concern that have acquired WMD. Adversary WMD programs include weapon systems and associated stockpiles, raw sources/agents or precursor stockpiles, and delivery systems. Adversary WMD delivery systems can include artillery or rocket systems (e.g., mortars, howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers), motor vessels, missiles and missile systems, aircraft, unmanned aerial surveillance, and other unconventional delivery means. A program may also be dual-use in nature. Infrastructure, materials, and expertise that have legitimate civilian research and industry utility, but could be converted or employed to support WMD programs, are of particular concern in WMD operations. Such facilities include commercial nuclear power facilities; nuclear research reactors; civilian or academic R&D facilities, laboratories, or production facilities; facilities with capacities exceeding amounts deemed necessary for civilian or peaceful purposes; pharmaceutical research and production facilities; medical vaccination production/formulation programs; radioisotope thermoelectric generators; and food irradiation facilities.

For additional information on DTRA capabilities and CWMD, see DODD 5105.62, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); DODD 2060.1, Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements; DODI 5205.10, DOD Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP); and JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

CHAPTER III

JOINT EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

“The Army EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] Group and Navy EOD Group are the two organizations that contain personnel with the requisite skills and qualifications to provide mission command [command and control] for joint EOD forces. These solutions are preferred for the CIED [counter-improvised explosive device] JTF [joint task force] headquarters primarily because of their technical capabilities and requisite understanding of subordinate elements.”

**Colonel S.E. Jesenlink, Director, Counter Improvised Explosive Device
Directorate, US Army Engineer School, 31 May 2011**

1. General

The responsibilities and functions of CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs are specified and described in the Unified Command Plan and JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. This chapter discusses general EOD coordination and control fundamentals, EOD command and control (C2) principles and options, utilization and employment considerations of C2 options, organizing an EOD JTF, EOD cells and working groups, and additional multinational and interorganizational considerations.

2. Command and Control Fundamentals

a. Strategic Direction and Guidance

(1) In addition to the national strategic direction and guidance that assign missions and responsibilities to CCDRs, there are some Presidential policy directives (PPDs) that EOD commanders and staff should be aware of because they focus on EOD support to joint operations. The role of EOD in relation to national security policy is significant, especially in the areas of CT and national preparedness; arms control; proliferation, counter-proliferation, and HD; intelligence; protection/mitigation; prevention; and response. Because of this, vacant posts in the EOD C2 or staff structures will have negative effects on the joint forces' ability to execute EOD-related activities as required in national strategic direction and guidance.

(2) PPD-17, *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices*, directs the building and maintaining of capabilities and technologies to continue to counter the IED threat in the homeland by:

(a) Identifying IED threats through:

1. Engaging with domestic and international partners.
2. Exploiting information and materials from IED attacks.
3. Advancing innovative intelligence and information analysis.

(b) Synchronizing prevention, protection, and response capabilities:

1. Maintaining deployable C-IED resources.
2. Screening, detecting, and protecting.
3. Safeguarding explosives and select precursor materials.
4. Coordinating and standardizing training and equipment.
5. Developing OPLANs for IED contingencies.

(3) Existing national policy outlines authorities and responsibilities across the USG when military action has been authorized by the President or SecDef to conduct CWMD operations. The policy describes GCC responsibilities and clarifies the role of EOD support during CWMD operations during both domestic and overseas events. This includes specific direction on the authorities needed, and who may receive them, to conduct these operations and includes guidance on when the policy is enacted. Joint EOD recognizes the distinctive strategic ramifications and impacts of CWMD operations and their nuanced complexity. It is imperative, in order to keep US citizens and interests safe, that the JFC adhere to and understand the requirements during a CWMD response.

(4) EOD personnel are considered installation emergency responders and assist in maintaining DOD readiness through participation in the all-hazards installation emergency management program on DOD installations worldwide. In this EOD emergency response role, EOD commanders coordinate preparedness, response, and recovery requirements and capabilities with state, local, and tribal governments; other Military Department(s); or HN partners using an all-hazards approach that balances risk management (i.e., threat, vulnerability, and consequence), resources, and need. Procedures must be consistent with the National Response Framework, the National Incident Management System, and the incident command system.

b. Unity of Command

(1) The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively, in part through interoperability. They must also synchronize, coordinate, and integrate the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. This includes joint force development, use of joint doctrine, the development and use of joint plans and orders, and the development and use of joint and/or interoperable communications and information systems. It also includes conducting joint training and exercises. It concludes with a materiel development and fielding process that provides materiel that is fully compatible with, and complementary to, systems of all Services and interorganizational partners. Planning processes that are joint from their inception enable interoperability.

(2) The joint and multinational EOD force structures normally include multiple levels. The number, composition, and task areas of EOD elements to support theater operations are determined by analysis of the following parameters:

- (a) Intention of the political and military leaders.
- (b) Threat assessment to determine the EOD structure and capability.
- (c) Expected restrictions of operational freedom.
- (d) Scope of the military mission.
- (e) Multinational operational structure.
- (f) National and Service EOD policies.
- (g) Size and characteristics of the operational area.
- (h) EOD capabilities provided by the individual nations.
- (i) Military agreements between the nations.
- (j) Other EOD elements (United Nations [UN], other international organizations, HN, and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]).

c. Unity of Effort

(1) Based on a threat assessment, component commanders and CCDRs should declare their intentions to the JFC for attaching DOD/national EOD forces to joint/multinational control and/or operations as early as possible. The JFC and the MNF commander and staff should know the EOD forces (and associated capabilities/limitations) and EOD staff available as early as possible to enable effective planning. The availability of these forces is likely to be situation dependent and vary with the phase of the operation.

(2) As with Service components, national force commanders may choose to employ their EOD forces to resolve explosive ordnance hazards without involving either the MNF or other military forces. Consequently, the JFC maintains direct C2 of assigned EOD forces or allocates them to support the broader MNF. The MNF must distinguish between EOD forces that are coordinated and tasked by a multinational explosives ordnance disposal control center (MNEODCC) and EOD forces that remain under national C2. EOD support to operations at sea or in a maritime environment is normally maritime operations under control of a naval command. However, the EOD portion of those operations should adhere to the principles of this publication. Adaptations may be required for tasking and reporting during MNF operations.

(3) Depending on the complexity of the threat, commanders may elect to form specific focused task forces to target aspects of the conflict. These task forces often include various representation and may include HN security services. For example, if the enemy has a dynamic IED capability, then a task force to target the network and IED system may be formed to mitigate the threat. Countering threat network operations may focus task forces on biometrics collection, IED, terrorism, narcotics, or corruption. The task force may be

**NOTIONAL THEATER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL JOINT FORCE
STAFF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS EXAMPLE**

1. Commander's Intent. Due to the specialized nature of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and the varying degrees of capability provided by each Service's EOD forces, I need a comprehensive and integrated level of involvement by joint EOD staff officers to ensure EOD capabilities are properly incorporated and accounted for throughout the military planning subsets: security cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. Use the capabilities-based planning construct. I want a dedicated knowledge base and clearinghouse during the development of operational plans and requests for forces that include joint and EOD. I also want the capability to acquire additional joint EOD staff personnel to assist with these requirements as well as other requirements based on the current and future weapons threat. Additional staff services would also include maintaining visibility into the overall readiness of EOD based on a joint mission-essential task list and to ensure EOD is effectively included in combined arms services prior to reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Staff would also integrate these efforts across all aspects of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. In order for EOD to better meet future operational requirements, individual Service EOD will be required to employ interoperable forces in a manner that best satisfies requirements across the range of military operations.

2. End State. The end state for the joint EOD staff is a fully integrated and synchronized EOD effort across the area of responsibility, resulting in the geographic combatant commander's visibility of all information and requirements related to the enemy's use of explosive ordnance, to include conventional, improvised, and weapons of mass destruction. Tactical-level EOD organizations will have a common set of capabilities that are based on joint warfighting requirements.

3. Objectives. This operation seeks to provide the most cost-effective use of EOD assets that serve as a force multiplier across the range of military operations. Provide visibility into overall availability and readiness of the joint EOD force; coordination of operational planning and follow-on request for forces; coordination and validation of interoperability requirements.

Various Sources

considered "all hazards" if it addresses more than one threat, especially regarding first response activities.

d. Command and Support Relationships. The JFC establishes the EOD command relationships and tasking of forces to accomplish mission objectives. The JFC will specify the command relationships between the functional components and Service components and has the authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. The JFC may delegate operational control (OPCON) or TACON, or establish support command relationships to subordinate commanders in order to ensure

effective C2 and to facilitate decentralized execution of EOD activities. The composition of the JFC's subordinate EOD command, as well as EOD staff, should reflect the composition of the joint EOD force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces know the capabilities and limitations of assigned or attached forces, to include EOD enablers. The senior EOD commander in the joint operations area (JOA) makes recommendations to the senior JFC on the employment of EOD and accomplishing missions. Subordinate EOD commanders are often dual-hatted as a special staff officer to the JFC at each echelon, serving as advisors and ensuring appropriate integration throughout the JOA.

e. **EOD Staff Functions and Responsibilities.** The joint EOD staff synchronizes EOD support to operations in the JOA to meet the needs of the JFC and maintain the tactical and operational integrity of EOD C2. The primary difference between planning for single-Service EOD employment and joint EOD operations is integrating the unique capabilities to mitigate the limitations of each force (to include MNF), and interagency elements, to achieve unity of effort. When organizing an operational HQ and staffs that encounter IEDs, EOD personnel and C-IED SMEs should be collocated to optimize coordination. One of the JFC's primary responsibilities is to designate an EOD controlling authority based on weapons threats in the JOA. Joint EOD staff responsibilities include:

(1) Plan EOD force deployment and redeployment in concert with operational planning.

(2) Advise on the proper employment of EOD forces made available for tasking, to include the impact of joint and multinational EOD support to operations as it pertains to applicable US, international, and HN laws and agreements.

(3) Plan and coordinate theater EOD support, identify required enablers to support EOD operations, coordinate the internal rotation of personnel based on Service deployment policy, identify materiel requirements, and establish/disestablish authorized demolition areas for EOD.

(4) Develop, integrate, maintain, and share an accurate representation of the EOD COP (objects and events), as an input to the COP. This includes the integration of the joint EOD single reporting format and system.

(5) Develop an EOD-specific portion of the OPLAN/operation order (OPORD) annex C (Operations).

(6) Participate on boards and working groups, as necessary.

(7) Conduct sustainment planning, to include coordination for contract management.

(8) Develop JFC's staff EOD terms of reference.

(9) Advise and provide policy guidance to subordinate EOD elements.

(10) Prepare EOD staff estimates.

- (11) Coordinate and supervise specific EOD activities as required.

f. **NATO Transfer of Authority Procedures.** EOD leaders have a requirement to understand NATO procedures. Under NATO procedures, nations will transfer some level of authority over their national force contributions to NATO at an agreed time. The command relationship of all EOD forces participating in an operation (e.g., NATO operational command, OPCON, TACON, NATO tactical command), including coordinating authorities and tasking authorities, must be clearly defined both in OPORDs and within national and international directives. The command relationships will normally be detailed in the order of battle transfer of authority message.

Note: US EOD personnel are NAVSCOLEOD graduates; MNF EOD SMEs are trained in accordance with STANAG 2143, AEODP-10, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Principles and Minimum Standards of Proficiency*; refer to STANAG 2282 to Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-72, *NATO Interservice Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations on Multinational Deployments*.

3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command and Control Considerations and Options

a. **Considerations.** EOD C2 considerations include flexibility, sustainability, and interoperability. All EOD teams/elements, to include multinational, should maintain unit integrity. EOD C2 structure must be flexible to accommodate the OE. An EOD estimate can help identify EOD C2 requirements. Planners should consider the size and terrain of the operational area, the nature of the threat, the EOD mission scope, response times, and the size and capability of the EOD force. In some circumstances, the EOD estimate may recommend several multinational or national EOD command cells. EOD operations in the multinational environment require command awareness of the capabilities and resources available and clearly defined C2 structure. Although each operation may require a different C2 structure, underlying guiding principles apply to each.

For additional information on EOD command or operational cells, refer to paragraph 6, “Explosive Ordnance Disposal Cells and Working Groups.” For additional considerations for interorganizational and multinational coordination, refer to paragraph 7, “Interorganizational and Multinational Coordination.”

b. **C2 options.** There are three C2 options to the JFC for structuring a joint EOD force to accomplish the mission. Each option and organizational example depicts the use of Service forces to accomplish the EOD mission. Based on the situation and anticipated duration of the operation, the JFC can modify, mix, or sequence any of the options.

- (1) Service component responsibility.
- (2) Lead Service or part of an existing functional component command.
- (3) EOD JTF.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

4. Utilization and Employment Considerations of Command and Control Options

a. Service Component Responsibility Option

(1) **Utilization.** The Service component responsibility option is used when each Service component provides for and controls its own EOD forces and requirements. In this option, a mutual support relationship may be established between components with direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) between the senior EOD commands of each component. This enables the EOD commanders to coordinate support actions directly with other component requirements-based established priorities (see Figure III-1). Prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, this was the most common method of employing EOD forces. This organizational option may be the default in the




Figure III-1. Service Component Responsibility Organization

initial stages of an operation as it represents the normal day-to-day operational construct in most theaters; however, for major operations and campaigns involving multiple Services' EOD forces, it may require different options to balance use of EOD assets across the entire AOR. If a supported/supporting command relationship is established between Service components, then no DIRLAUTH is required.

(2) **Employment Considerations.** When Service components directly control their own EOD forces, EOD responsibilities are relatively clear and easier to control. DIRLAUTH between the local EOD commanders facilitates EOD support to other Service component forces (consistent with the owning Service component commander's priorities and requirements). This option can also contribute to severe inequalities in EOD support to different forces in a JOA and can also limit rapid allocation of EOD forces to changing mission requirements.

b. Lead Service Component Option

(1) **Utilization.** The JFC may designate a lead Service or existing functional component (joint force land or maritime component command) to support limited duration missions or to provide more efficient EOD support. This option may be preferable for short notice, austere environment missions. In this option, the JFC attaches specific EOD personnel to a lead Service component commander or the functional component commander. Normally, the JFC designates the Service component with the preponderance of EOD forces to be tasked and the ability to command and control those forces. Typically, the functional component commander will exercise OPCON over its own EOD forces made available for tasking and TACON over other EOD forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish support relationships between functional component commanders and other subordinate commanders to facilitate operations. (See Figure III-2.) In this organizational option, the lead Service or functional component may form and control the joint explosives ordnance disposal operations center (JEODOC) (see paragraph 6, "*Explosive Ordnance Disposal Cells and Working Groups*"). Having the JEODOC under the lead Service or functional component expedites planning, coordination, and mission execution. This option should include a support relationship for administrative and logistical support.

(2) **Employment Considerations.** The lead Service or functional component option allows more efficient use of EOD assets. In this option, the lead component does not provide EOD support for specific Service-related missions (e.g., aircraft support, harbor clearances, and carrier strike group [CSG] support). Instead, each Service retains selected EOD forces for Service-specific missions. This option centralizes JEODOC functions, to include EOD tasking and tracking, with a single point of contact, normally the lead Service or functional component EOD unit operations officer. It also serves to coordinate and synchronize foreign materiel collection, exploitation, and dissemination, and aids Service EOD forces plan as operations transitions through different phases. While this option allows Services' EOD support to increase or decrease based on Service-specific operations requirements, it also may diminish the JFC's ability to meet EOD surge requirements.

c. EOD JTF Option




Figure III-2. Lead Service or Functional Component Option

(1) **Utilization.** In operations where the duration, scope of activity, or force requirements exceed single-Service EOD capacity, the JFC may elect to form a JTF or subordinate JTF for EOD. The JTF commander would exercise TACON or OPCON over attached forces as designated. Based on JFC guidance and other considerations, such as OPLANs and existing agreements, each Service component provides assets to fulfill common EOD support requirements. However, even when an EOD JTF is established, Service-unique EOD requirements and selected EOD units may remain under the control of the individual Service components. Task-organizing EOD forces under a JTF provides unity of command over EOD assets. This allows the JTF commander to focus EOD and associated assets where they are needed most. An EOD JTF can fuse intelligence from technical

exploitation and provide analysis across the joint force. It enables in-theater forensics exploitation and analysis of explosive hazards, explosive ordnance, and related components. An EOD JTF can produce and disseminate detailed informational and intelligence reports to develop targeting packages and support offensive operations. This option enables application of S&T developments, as well as synchronization of counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare (CREW). In this option, the JTF would provide the JEODOC, but can also exercise OPCON (as opposed to staff management) over any attached EOD units. Figure III-3 lists the EOD organizational naming conventions by Service.

(2) **Employment Considerations.** EOD JTFs are established to meet mission requirements. Operations in sectors of the operational area may exceed single-Service EOD capabilities. A JTF with assigned subordinate units can address multiple requirements with centralized resources. When EOD forces are organized as a JTF, the EOD commander is delegated authority to organize forces to accomplish the mission, based on the JFC’s concept of the operation. This can enhance unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. The JTF commander defines the scope of responsibility and command relationships of EOD forces and enablers within the operational area, to include EOD responsibilities. The EOD JTF also ensures external support requirements, to include life support, security, administrative, logistical, and medical support, are available and properly coordinated to sustain the EOD force. At the CCMD level, the JTF option consolidates the capabilities of each Service’s EOD force in a joint effort to mitigate AOR-wide explosive threats, expedites TECHINT and data acquisition and dissemination to end users, and provides a command structure to integrate and control multinational EOD forces. A potential limitation is that Service-specific capabilities to support ongoing contingency missions may be degraded in extended operations. More centralized control of EOD resources could cause gaps in Service and component EOD capabilities for enduring

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Naming Conventions			
Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine
Group (GRP)	Group (GRU)	See note.	See note.
Battalion (BN)	Mobile Unit (MU)	See note.	Company (Co)
Company (CO)	Company (CO)	Flight (FLT)	Platoon (Plt)
Platoon (PLT)	Platoon (PLT)	Element	Section
Team	Team	Team	Element

NOTE:
Not in current force structure. See Service appendix for details.

Figure III-3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Naming Conventions

missions. The extent of these challenges depends on the resources allocated to the JTF and must be actively managed by the Services and the JTF in a collaborative approach through risk management practices.

For additional information on joint C2, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations; JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations; JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations; and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. See Appendix B, “Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Assets;” Appendix C, “Marine Corps Explosive Ordnance Disposal Assets;” Appendix D, “Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Assets;” and Appendix E, “Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Assets,” for individual Service capabilities.

5. Organizing an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Joint Task Force

a. Introduction

(1) JTF HQ should be formed around an existing C2 structure. EOD groups/battalions/mobile unit HQ may be designated as the EOD JTF HQ (refer to Appendix B, “Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Assets,” and Appendix D, “Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Assets,” for Army and Navy force structure). Service EOD forces should provide EOD liaison officers (LNOs) to advise and assist the EOD JTF commander on Service capabilities and resolve administrative control (ADCON) and OPCON issues. The JFC may also augment the EOD JTF HQ staff in areas such as security, health services, administration, and logistics through the joint manning document.

(2) The EOD JTF staff should normally include standard manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) through the communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) sections, and may also include other functions such as partnership and training, as well as supplemental special staff members, as illustrated in Figure III-4.

(3) The JTF staff process involves leveraging the special skills of EOD operators to collect information from hazardous material at the tactical level that is used for intelligence purposes. The resulting intelligence is used to shape strategic and operational policies and objectives. The targeting cycle and intelligence process are examples of the staff processes that leverage EOD reporting at the tactical level.

b. Special Staff

(1) **SJA.** The SJA is well versed in the law of war, rules of engagement, and other applicable operational law. The SJA may be called upon to work with the EOD JTF J-2 to develop prosecution support packages. These packages are derived from weapons technical exploitation and may support EOD partnership training collection.

For additional information, refer to The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School’s Operational Law Handbook; CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces; and DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program.




Figure III-4. Notional Explosive Ordnance Disposal Joint Task Force Organization

(2) **Public Affairs.** The JTF EOD public affairs officer is principal spokesperson, primary adviser to the commander, coordinator for communication integration and alignment, and a member of the JFC’s personal staff. The public affairs office and public affairs staff perform public communication and activities directed toward both external and internal publics supported by planning, analysis, and assessment throughout the course of

operations. Explosive ordnance safety should be a primary JTF EOD message to both the joint force and the public.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

(3) **Medical**

(a) Medical assessment of injuries from blast exposure supports EOD reporting and TTP development. The EOD JTF medical officer's primary responsibility is to assess injuries caused by explosive ordnance events. The goal of EOD operations health services planning is twofold: first, integrate and augment health services into EOD support operations; second, identify challenges that will complicate the delivery of health services. The EOD medical planner translates EOD requirements into the conventional health services infrastructure best suited to support the mission. Collection of medical lessons learned data provides documentation to develop recommendations to shape plans and policy. Medical officers supporting EOD operations should be trained in CBRN effects and blast-related injuries.

(b) Working with the CCMD surgeon, the medical officer assesses joint EOD health services requirements and capabilities (both quantitatively and qualitatively) and provides recommendations to the JTF commander. The medical officer should receive broad guidance and a general concept of medical operations from the CCMD surgeon and advise the JTF commander concerning the following:

1. Tracking of individuals susceptible to traumatic brain injury due to blast exposure.
2. Updating medical records for blast exposure and injury and reporting injuries to the theater's trauma injury database.
3. The health of the joint EOD force such as disease and nonbattle injury, battle injury rates, and other health factors that could affect JTF operations to include medical threat identification and protective measures.
4. Health services and force health protection aspects of joint EOD operations.
5. Rest, rotation, and reconstitution policies and procedures.
6. Prevention and protection measures and procedures.
7. Health surveillance, including medical and occupational and environmental health surveillance.
8. Force health protection operations during the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) phase of the joint force deployment/redeployment process.

9. The treatment and evacuation of US and MNF personnel within the operational area.

10. The preservation of equipment and clothing after any blast incidents in order to support future design of equipment.

For additional information, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(4) **Chaplain.** The JTF EOD chaplain advises the command and staff on all matters of religion, ethical and moral issues, spiritual well-being, and morale, as affected by religion. Consistent with their noncombatant status, chaplains also advise the command and staff on matters pertaining to the ethical/moral implications of command plans, policies, operations, and strategies, to include advice on the impact of operations on religious and humanitarian dynamics in the operational area. The EOD JTF chaplain requests, coordinates, and provides religious support for the JTF. This includes coordinating employment of religious support teams with commanders. Chaplains can also assist commanders in counseling Service members who may be emotionally affected by the loss of comrades, dealing with exposure to casualties, or the stresses of a dangerous job.

For additional information, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, and JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

c. **EOD JTF Administration (J-1).** The J-1 oversees personnel management; manpower management; personnel augmentation; the joint personnel processing center; personnel accountability and strength reporting; rotation policy; pay and entitlements policy; postal operations; morale, welfare, and recreation; casualty reporting; personnel performance evaluations; awards and decorations; and civilian personnel. J-1 establishes and distributes personnel visibility policies and procedures based on higher command guidance.

For additional information on JTF manpower and personnel, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and DODD 2310.07E, Personnel Accounting-Losses Due to Hostile Acts.

d. **EOD JTF J-2.** The J-2 synchronizes intelligence efforts across the operational area vertically and horizontally, using all intelligence disciplines and agencies. These disciplines include TECHINT, CI, signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and open-source intelligence. The agencies include DOD, other USG intelligence agencies, and local law enforcement and intelligence entities. The J-2 coordinates with external agencies and assets to enhance their intelligence production capabilities. The J-2 of the EOD JTF has similar responsibilities but within the parameters of the JTF. The EOD JTF J-2 synchronizes the intelligence efforts supporting the JTF. Joint EOD identifies and acquires foreign ordnance to pack and ship to US locations for further exploitation and rapid development of TTP and EOD render safe procedures. Lethality, target damage, and tactical effects are recorded. When appropriate, all material should be collected, preserved, documented, and processed to allow for follow-on forensics analysis. The collection, exploitation, and analysis of collected materiel should be coordination and synchronized across multiple national-level agencies.

(1) **Functional Responsibilities.** Members of the EOD JTF J-2 plan, coordinate, direct, integrate, and control intelligence efforts focused on enemy interest. The J-2 acquires, produces, requests, and disseminates intelligence to support operations.

(2) **Support to Targeting.** The EOD JTF J-2 serves as the link between the EOD operators conducting level 1 (tactical level) exploitation on the scene and the broader IC. The J-2 directs level 2 (operational level) exploitation and analyzes the results, producing intelligence used to identify the weapons and explosive threat, link in networks, and build target support packages on key individuals. See Appendix H, “J-2 Technical Intelligence,” for description of the levels.

(3) **Support to Assigned/Attached Elements.** The J-2 supports FP efforts, the EOD JTF staff, and subordinate assigned/attached units by providing reliable intelligence and timely warning on the characteristics of UXO or IEDs on the battlefield, first-seen ordnance, and potential terrorist threats. Within the EOD JTF, the J-2 focuses on weapons and explosives and the networks involved in their proliferation throughout the JOA.

(4) **Support to the Operational Intelligence Estimate.** The EOD JTF J-2 develops, refines, and updates the EOD JTF intelligence estimate to provide a common understanding and view of the battlefield, and directs intelligence collection efforts and exploitation. The EOD JTF J-2 analyzes enemy TTP and provides feedback to the EOD JTF operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), subordinate EOD units, and senior JFC on specific weapons information, explosive threat trends, and possible countermeasures.

(5) **WTI.** The EOD JTF J-2 serves as the single point of contact within intelligence channels for the collection and dissemination of TECHINT/WTI products and provides intelligence input to OPORDs. The EOD JTF J-2 ensures that collection priorities address the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and that key WTI personnel are aware of persons of interest regarding bomb-making materiel. The J-2 improve the dissemination of WTI and BEI information and actionable intelligence directly into the division, brigade, and maneuver battalions. The J-2 coordinates with the biometric case managers to develop and disseminate WTI and BEI fused intelligence analysis products. It develops a communication and collection plan and disseminates captured materiel exploitation laboratory center reports and be-on-the-lookouts and prosecution support packages to military, contracted, and HN law enforcement. The J-2 collaborates and coordinates with supporting C-IED enablers, suggests biometric named areas of interest for collection operations, identifies and educates units on IED trends, and provides responses to requests for information within J-2 capability to support EOD battalion/mobile unit and EOD group HQ as directed (see Figure III-5).

(6) **Intelligence Enablers**

(a) **Theater Explosive Exploitation.** Operational-level expeditionary exploitation organizations (level 2) provide immediate feedback to the brigade, division, and corps, as well as theater commanders and staff. Expeditionary exploitation provides organizations forward deployed technical and forensic specialists with associated equipment to support operational commanders. Theater exploitation elements confirm reporting and




Figure III-5. Weapons Technical Intelligence-Dissemination and Analysis Process

provide the first technical assessment, as well as information pertinent to the immediate threat or the identification of individuals who construct and emplace explosive devices. Level 2 exploitation combines EOD and WTI reports with all-source analysis to enhance targeting, FP (through alerts, information, and training), sources, and prosecution. Operational-level exploitation efforts produce forensic and technical design information to support the commanders' intelligence requirements. Operational activities require more

sophisticated equipment and specialized skills than tactical-level activities, but are best conducted in theater to offset the time required to perform a thorough exploitation at the strategic level. The operational-level activities also identify and prepare materials for strategic-level exploitation and analysis.

(b) **Operations Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA).** The EOD JTF ORSA identifies and analyzes theater-wide explosive ordnance and other explosive hazard trends. The focused analysis cell examines data furnished by the level 2 laboratories, other intelligence products, and scene reporting to produce device profiles, named areas of interest, and network diagrams. The ORSA conducts analysis to try to identify trends and help determine areas where EOD efforts should be increased:

1. Geospatial and temporal analysis of IED trends, number and density of devices, device types, switches categories, net explosive weights, explosive types, device locations or hot-spots, and attack effectiveness.

2. Analyses of troop, vehicle, and equipment survivability and vulnerability.

3. Exploitation data analysis to detect minute trends among switch classes, explosive subtypes.

4. Analysis of biometric collection efforts, efficacy of certain material (evidence when entered into a court) collection, effectiveness of cache seizures, effectiveness of detainee operations, and effectiveness of certain aspects of the IED network.

5. Analysis of friendly force TTP as they relate to IED trends.

6. Analysis of casualty data to determine effects of IEDs and FP.

7. Mission analysis (threat/risk projects) in support of contingency planning.

For additional information on JTF intelligence, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

e. EOD JTF J-3

(1) The J-3 conducts current operations planning and coordinates and integrates EOD operations across the JOA. The J-3 provides oversight of current operations and plans for emerging missions; maintains a current operations estimate; prepares orders, reports, and records; determines predeployment technical training requirements for replacement EOD personnel; and recommends EOD priorities for operational support, task-organization, and JTF boundaries.

(2) The JEODOC, operating as part of the EOD JTF J-3 staff, oversees all EOD JTF operations in theater, tracks EOD assets, monitors and recommends changes in priorities, and resolves issues between Service components. Its primary purpose is to

manage theater-level EOD operations, planning, integrating, coordinating, and tasking functions (through the direction and authority of the commander).

f. **EOD JTF Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-4).** The J-4 oversees logistics for internal EOD JTF functions and monitors and manages readiness issues. EOD forces must deploy fully equipped for EOD tasks and ready to operate. The J-4 formulates logistics plans and coordinates supply, maintenance, transportation, field services, general engineering, health services, contingency operational contract support, HN support, and other logistics activities from the designated unit(s) providing logistic support to the EOD JTF. The EOD JTF J-4 directs the lateral transfer of separate items in support of subordinate elements. These lateral transfers redistribute excess equipment and equip subordinate elements with mission-essential equipment. The J-4 receives and distributes joint urgent operational needs statements-related equipment and other equipment procured outside of traditional Service channels. The J-4 oversees distribution of equipment to subordinate units.

g. **EOD JTF Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-5).** The J-5 provides oversight of the planning aspects of the EOD mission and ensures EOD is incorporated into the joint planning process (JPP).

For additional information on JTF logistics, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

h. **EOD JTF J-6.** The J-6 coordinates communications, electronics, and automated information systems support to the EOD JTF. This includes development and integration of communications architecture and plans that support the command's operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications systems to exercise C2 in the execution of the EOD JTF mission. The J-6's role is to provide, coordinate, and synchronize a multitude of communication services to all of the EOD JTF's units throughout the operational area. The J-6 provides signal and information systems support to software planning, integration, and information management. The J-6 ensures reliable, robust, and redundant voice, data, and video capabilities to support all EOD missions. For joint/multinational operations to be effective, the EOD structure must ensure effective communications and coordination at each command level.

For additional information on JTF communications, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

i. **EOD JTF CREW.** The CREW section includes electronic warfare (EW) officers. It provides theater-specific training; monitors the radio-controlled IED threat; resolves interoperability and compatibility issues between CREW and other systems; and assesses for new hardware, firmware, and software (including threat loads as well as spectrum deconfliction) prior to fielding with units in theater. The fielding branch works with CREW project managers to move equipment around the theater for warfighters. EW requirements of personnel in EOD billets differ significantly from the FP EW users. Hereafter, this publication, with regard to electromagnetic countermeasures (ECM), concentrates exclusively on EOD EW.

j. **EOD JTF Training and Partnership.** In any prolonged conflict, the EOD JTF may be tasked to provide training to MNFs on the recognition of, and proper TTP for, dealing with explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards. Normally, the JTF tasks the EOD JTF to provide training to all US forces during JRSOI. Likewise, the EOD JTF may be tasked with SFA and building partner capacity, as during operational phases from shaping through stability.

k. **EOD JTF S&T Element.** The S&T element identifies capability gaps and drafts requirements and communicates those requirements to the S&T and acquisitions communities. S&T and acquisition communities then develop solutions, deliver them to the warfighter, and collect feedback. An S&T staff helps develop sustainable solutions during prolonged conflict. The S&T staff expedites the fielding of new materiel solutions during combat operations by articulating demand to the acquisition community through joint urgent operational needs statements based on operational facts supported by intelligence.

For additional information on JTF operations and force planning, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

6. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Cells and Working Groups

a. The JFCs may form planning groups that include members of the CCDR's staff and EOD representatives of associated planning and advisory elements. Composition of the groups will depend on the activities being conducted and must include EOD SME participation. If the JFC elects to centralize execution of EOD tasks, previously formed EOD cells and working groups may be retained to support or provide continuity across the JOA. Communications are a determinative factor when electing to operate through ad hoc cells or working groups instead of dedicated task organization. During crisis action planning EOD cells and working groups may be established to provide an independent capability to review deliberate planning products from an enemy perspective to scrutinize courses of action (COAs) for branches and sequels, as well as C2 options.

b. A JFC may also establish a cell or working group to manage EOD-intensive activities and to ensure the effective use of resources to meet mission requirements. The JFC must distinguish between EOD forces that are tasked by control or operations cells and those that remain under full national/Service component C2. The cell is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a JFC's HQ. Examples are the JEODOC and the explosive hazards coordination cell (EHCC). Cells typically exist in both functional and traditional staff structures.

(1) **JEODOC.** The JEODOC, operating under the JFC's J-3 or lead Service, or as part of the EOD JTF, provides oversight over all JTF EOD operations in theater, tracks EOD assets, monitors and recommends changes in priorities, and resolves issues between Service components. It manages theater-level EOD operations, planning, integration, coordination, and tasking functions (through the direction and authority of the commander). When not part of an EOD JTF, the JEODOC synchronizes Service component EOD forces as the

operation transitions through phases. This enables the JFC to shift Service EOD support based upon priority of effort and operational tempo. Functions in the JEODOC are:

(a) **Operations Section.** This section monitors, synchronizes, and reports EOD operations to maximize efficiency throughout the JOA. It also aligns current theater-EOD operations with JFC intent.

(b) **Intelligence Section.** This section monitors and interprets the enemy and friendly situation for the commander and helps identify changes in operations, objectives, and priorities.

(c) **Logistics Section.** The logistics section determines administrative and logistical support requirements, coordinates airlift requests and special transportation requirements, and provides feedback (on request) for mission-essential repair and support items.

(d) **Communications-Electronics Section.** This section provides information systems planning, coordination, and support to the JEODOC and all joint, multinational, and external organizations.

(2) **EHCC.** The EHCC's mission is to predict, track, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theater that affect force application focused logistics, survivability, and awareness of the OE. The EHCC maintains an explosives hazard database, conducts pattern analysis, investigates mine and IED incidents, and tracks UXO hazard areas. The cell provides technical advice on the mitigation of explosive hazards, including the development of TTP, and provides training updates to field units.

For more information, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

c. JFCs may establish enduring or ad hoc EOD working groups consisting of a core functional group and EOD representatives who provide analysis on the specific functions. The basic working group model typically addresses current and future operations and supports multiple planning teams on multiple event horizons.

d. MNF commanders may establish cells in accordance with STANAG 2282, ATP-72, *Interservice EOD Operations on Multinational Deployments*. These include combined joint explosive ordnance disposal cells (CJEODCs) and MNEODCC:

(1) **Higher Staff Level.** The CJEODC oversees EOD for the MNF HQ. The nation which leads EOD should also provide the senior CJEODC staff officer. The CJEODC senior staff officer is not a commander; however, he should have EOD authority in the MNF HQ. He provides guidance to subordinate EOD staffs via the J-3 chain of command. While the CJEODC does not have authority to assign EOD tasks, it coordinates EOD with troop-contributing nations and other organizations (e.g., the UN).

(2) **Intermediate-Level HQ.** Based on mission analysis, the MNF commander can establish a MNEODCC at the multinational brigade, division, or component-level HQ. The MNEODCC is the coordinating authority for all EOD issues. While there may be multiple

MNEODCCs within a theater of operations, there will only be one MNEODCC in each chain of command. EOD staffs at higher HQ have functions modeled on the CJEODC.

For additional information on cells and joint working groups, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and ATP-72, Interservice Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations on Multinational Deployments, recorded in STANAG 2282.

7. Interorganizational and Multinational Coordination

a. The unique challenges of today's global security environment frequently demand more than just a military solution. In most cases, responses to these challenges require an integrated approach. Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, CCMDs, Services, and combat support agencies. Joint EOD forces have long served in a supporting role and have coordinated with USG departments and agencies including, but not limited to, the DOS, DOJ, Department of Transportation, United States Agency for International Development, and the IC, along with state adjutants general representatives for EOD units. Joint EOD has been, and will continue to be, a key enabler to solutions that require interagency coordination and has developed many strong and personal relationships with its counterparts within other agencies. Relationships are a key component to successful EOD support that is dependent upon coordination among the various agencies.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

b. **Chain of Command.** US joint forces in a multinational operation have two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. The MNF commander's command authority is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. This authority typically is limited to OPCON, TACON, designated support relationships, or coordinating authority. Important considerations to help determine the scope of the MNF commander's authority over joint forces include mission, size of the proposed US force, risks, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement. Regardless of the command relationships, the US commander coordinates joint operation planning with multinational planning in the interest of unified action.

For additional information on multinational command and coordination relationships, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

c. **Multinational and Intergovernmental EOD Capabilities.** EOD technical support elements are not all trained to the same level of proficiency, to include multinational partners. Support element capabilities must be considered when assigning EOD roles and responsibilities. In NATO operations, EOD capabilities will be identified based on a threat assessment and in accordance with STANAG 2377, *EOD Roles, Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Incident Procedures When Operating with Non-EOD Trained Agencies and Personnel*.

d. **Relationships and Coordination.** EOD forces counter explosive ordnance to protect personnel and material and maintain and restore friendly forces' freedom of maneuver. Relationships between EOD JTF or joint EOD forces and USG departments and

agencies, international organizations, and NGOs require close coordination to achieve unity of effort. Whether joint EOD forces are supported during military operations or are supporting civilian authority, close coordination between the military, other non-DOD agencies, and multinational EOD forces is key. Successful interagency, international organization, and NGO coordination enables the JTF to build support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals through unity of effort.

e. **Lessons Learned.** Experience has shown that the volume of explosive ordnance may require the cooperation of several nations operating in the combined JOA. Since individual national EOD elements provide different capabilities, these efforts must be coordinated and deconflicted. Additionally, all participating nations should share EOD lessons learned among all elements. At all levels of command, the effectiveness and clarity of the multinational EOD structure is of crucial importance. It is imperative to design a C2 structure that is simple and effective, particularly when the difficulties of different standard operating procedures and language are considered. It is also important to note, as with any multinational operation, multinational EOD forces are subject to national caveats.

f. **Team/Element Integrity.** To minimize confusion over differing national EOD TTP and operating procedures, multinational EOD structures in EOD PLTs or EOD teams/elements should be avoided. If integration of multinational EOD teams/elements is unavoidable, then responsibilities must be clearly specified, with detailed planning, concise orders, specified tasking, full safety control, and visible on-site leadership and supervision.

g. **Sustainability.** EOD forces should deploy fully equipped for EOD tasks and ready to operate. Contributing nations and agencies should plan to sustain their EOD capability throughout the operation.

For additional information regarding interorganizational and multinational coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation; JP 3-16, Multinational Operations; JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters; NATO STANAG 2377, EOD Roles, Responsibilities, Capabilities and Incident Procedures When Operating with Non-EOD Trained Agencies and Personnel; and ATP-72, Interservice Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations on Multinational Deployments.

CHAPTER IV

JOINT EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Securing the vast amounts of ammunition after the fall of Baghdad became one of the more daunting missions faced by coalition forces. "There is more ammunition in Iraq than anyplace I've ever been in my life, and it's not securable. I wish I could tell you that we had it all under control. We don't. There are certainly not enough forces anywhere to guard the ammunition in Iraq."

Army General John Abizaid, Commander, US Central Command, September 2003

1. Overview

The challenges of planning EOD support to operations in several diverse theaters are vast and varied. EOD staff should be involved in the planning operations from the initial stage of the process. EOD tasks affect operations in air, land, and maritime environments. Joint planners should form a comprehensive plan of EOD actions. The omission of EOD considerations in any phase of an operation can adversely impact the entire plan.

2. Strategic

a. Planning for EOD support to joint operations includes force planning, deployment planning, operation planning, campaign planning, and crisis action planning. Planning for EOD support to joint operations focuses on the means and capabilities to generate, mount, sustain, and recover EOD forces. EOD staff advises and assists commanders and planners on how to best integrate EOD forces into campaigns and operations.

b. EOD planners analyze the explosives and weapons threats and challenges that the joint force may face while conducting operations. Informed by this analysis, commanders and their staffs develop options to mitigate the threats and overcome the challenges. In many instances, the staff uses the operational variables within the OE to decide the depth and breadth of the threat of explosives and weapons.

c. To determine the depth and breadth of a country-specific or regional explosive threat, planners should consider both military ordnance and industrial capacity. Planners should consider the military capability in terms of government and nongovernmental forces, capital equipment, and manpower, and should also analyze the ancillary items such as munitions and bulk explosives, chemicals, WMD, and storage facilities. EOD staff support to assist in the analysis of these factors will help determine the level of EOD capability and capacity required within the deploying force.

d. Threat assessment should also include the capability of the country and neighboring states to produce conventional weapons and munitions. Planners should also identify the region's capacity to produce homemade explosive precursors in the chemical and the agricultural industries. In less stable environments, planners analyze non-state actors' capacity to obtain and employ chemical and agricultural resources as improvised weapons.

3. Operational

a. Based on strategic guidance, the commander and staff will apply operational art and design to create an operational approach and the commander's initial planning guidance. This informs the staff's execution of JPP to develop the COAs, then produce a plan or order based on the commander's COA decision. The CONOPS will outline the commander's guidance for the joint force, which will include available forces and the force structure and C2. Subordinate commanders will be allocated EOD forces to meet anticipated weapons and explosive threats. The commander and the staff should evaluate the size of the operational area and the range of threats to tailor the EOD resources necessary to support the joint force. Additionally, the staff considers the duration of the operation to inform the allocation of EOD resources.

b. The JFC should establish an EOD JTF if a single-Service EOD capacity will be exhausted by the scope of the operation. An EOD JTF allows the commander to allocate EOD assets based on changes in the OE.

c. An EOD command element provides unity of command, technical oversight, and the ability to effectively use EOD forces to support the commander's priorities in the operational area. EOD commanders apply forces and capabilities to support joint operation objectives and the military end state. The consolidation of EOD capabilities should provide support to the JFC's CONOPS.

4. Tactical

Intelligence collected at the tactical level, where friendly forces meet enemy forces, may have strategic or operational value. Operational planners should review this intelligence and other information coming from the tactical level and anticipate the EOD support required to mitigate and exploit the explosive threat in the OE. This analysis helps identify enemy weapons, networks, and their locations to enhance joint forces maneuver and targeting. Planners should develop systems and procedures to integrate EOD forces into tactical planning and operations as early as possible. EOD forces should deploy as far forward as required to meet the explosive threat.

5. Planning Process

a. Operational planners use JPP when planning for EOD support to joint operations. JPP is an orderly, analytical process, which consists of a set of logical steps (see Figure IV-1) to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. EOD planning activities are outlined in each phase of JPP. For additional information, see JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

b. **Step 1 (Planning Initiation).** During these activities, the joint EOD staff assembles resources (intelligence and maneuver force planners, multinational EOD planners, etc.) required to support COA development and begins the initial EOD staff estimate. The joint EOD staff also develops requests for information (ordnance order of battle, chemical manufacturing capabilities, agricultural information, etc.) required for mission analysis and prepares EOD personnel for a survey team to gather reception, staging, onward movement,




Figure IV-1. Joint Planning Process

and integration planning data. The joint EOD staff provides the JFC with information to support the understanding of the OE and the problem. They should provide options for the utilization of EOD forces in the initial stages of a campaign or operation, as well as plans for follow-on forces. Initial expectations for EOD support are also provided to allow the lead time necessary for focusing EOD assets and beginning the production of required weapons threat products and services to support the planning process.

c. **Step 2 (Mission Analysis).** The joint EOD staff enables the commander’s planning guidance by providing information related to the weapons threat and weapons manufacturing capabilities in the OE. This information contributes to a better understanding of the problem and the required forces to combat the threat. This information provides key outputs of the mission analysis, which includes revised staff estimates; a restated mission statement; and the development, preparation, and issuance of planning guidance to the staff and subordinate commands in correlation to the plan. Joint EOD force considerations during this step include:

- (1) Assignments of tasks for the EOD force to enable mission accomplishment based on strategic guidance.
- (2) Availability and suitability of joint, multinational, and HN EOD resources and capabilities.
- (3) Distribution and employment of the EOD force based on the known weapons threat.
- (4) Limitations on resource employment, which includes environmental, terrain, and weather analysis.

- (5) Determination of initial force requirements.
- (6) Follow-on force requirements.
- (7) Development of a joint EOD mission statement.
- (8) Contribution to the CCIRs.

d. **Step 3 (COA Development).** The joint force EOD staff assesses information derived from the mission analysis, which includes the commander's refined operational approach based on information received during mission analysis, to develop the initial COAs. The joint force EOD staff uses this combined assessment to identify the resources required to support each COA, to make recommendations based upon available time and resources, and to recommend force structure to best support the CDR's intent. This assessment lays a foundation to integrate EOD into operations. As part of the staff, EOD personnel conduct parallel planning and analysis and prepare the EOD staff estimates to align the EOD activities with the COA. During COA development, the joint EOD staff should consider:

- (1) Options for joint force operational movement and maneuver, FP, and the ramifications for EOD support to tactical operations.
- (2) Recommendations on munitions storage areas and avenues of approach.
- (3) Response times and resource allocation for major and alternative supply routes.
- (4) Staff estimates. As part of staff estimates, joint EOD personnel develop a detailed EOD assessment of each COA and its supportability. The EOD staff considers:
 - (a) Specific and implied EOD tasks necessary to support each COA.
 - (b) Identification and addressing of any EOD factors that may influence or affect force deployment.
 - (c) Availability of EOD assets.
 - (d) Logistics requirements to support each COA.
 - (e) FP.
 - (f) EOD actions and capabilities, plus the resources needed during transition from sustained combat operations to termination of joint operations.
 - (g) Identification and planning for EOD follow-on forces.

e. **Steps 4 and 5 (COA Analysis and Wargaming and COA Comparison).** The joint EOD staff participates in wargaming, analyzing, and comparing available COAs to produce a revised EOD staff estimate for each COA. EOD considerations for COA evaluation criteria should also be developed during this step. During COA analysis, the EOD staff provides

input to the development of potential decision points, potential branches and sequels, refined COAs, and refined staff estimates. The EOD staff then contributes to the evaluation of all COAs against established evaluation criteria, recommending the COA that best accomplishes the mission. The EOD staff supports COA comparison by providing a rationale for the recommended COA and by refining the EOD staff estimates and EOD-related CCIRs based on what was learned during the COA comparison. At a minimum, the EOD staff evaluates the following:

- (1) Criteria for risk assessment (includes environmental risk).
- (2) Resource requirements.
- (3) Resources available.

f. **Step 6 (COA Approval).** The joint EOD staff participates in the COA-approval briefing, answers the JFC's EOD-related questions, and assists the J-3 with any JFC-directed COA modifications.

g. **Step 7 (Plan or Order Development).** The joint EOD staff supports the JFC's development of planning guidance by providing EOD input to the following planning activities: force planning, support planning, deployment and redeployment planning, shortfall identification, feasibility analysis, and supporting plan development (if required). EOD subject matter expertise is essential for EOD force planning. The EOD staff should determine EOD requirements by operation phase, mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and operating area. Additionally, the EOD staff supports the development of several annexes and appendices within an OPLAN or OPORD. At a minimum, EOD considerations should be addressed in the following annexes:

(1) **Annex A (Task Organization).** The joint EOD staff identifies EOD capability to meet requirements. Additionally, planners recommend EOD force and materials on the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) list.

(2) **Annex B (Intelligence).** The joint EOD staff provides EOD support to operations and integrates EOD intelligence requirements. This includes products that support intelligence preparation of the battlefield, such as the ordnance order of battle for both friendly and enemy forces, CBRN capabilities, and support to targeting.

(3) **Annex C (Operations).** The joint EOD staff helps write and review annex C (Operations). The majority of EOD information in the OPORD is contained in annex C. Input focuses on the detection and clearance of explosive ordnance. Considerations for annex C include the integration of EOD forces in support of specific types of operations (e.g., dismounted, mounted, airborne, rapid response, special operations). Annex C, appendix 13, is designated for EOD support.

(4) **Annex D (Logistics).** The joint EOD staff input includes support to mortuary affairs operations, health services, main and alternate supply route support, and ammunition management and control.

(5) **Annex E (Personnel)**. The joint EOD staff input includes the handling of enemy combatants associated with bomb-making and emplacement activities, as well as EOD support to NEOs.

(6) **Annex J (Command Relationships)**. The joint EOD staff provides input to clarify command relationships of all available EOD forces, to include multinational and HN.

(7) **Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services)**. The joint EOD staff input may include the mapping of known explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards, identification of choke points, and historical IED emplacement sites.

(8) **Annex P (HN Support)**. The joint EOD staff input may include the development of HN EOD training and mentorship programs.

(9) **Annex V (Interagency Coordination)**. The joint EOD staff input may include theater-level support and reachback capabilities requirements to support operations.

6. Development of Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

EOD personnel help in develop of the TPFDD to help ensure the correct flow of EOD capabilities into the operational area. TPFDDs are time-consuming and intensely managed. EOD TPFDD input matches capabilities to ongoing and future requirements by phase. Theater support requirements will dictate the level of EOD organization to C2 EOD assets, and possibly other assets to facilitate a C-IED or CWMD JTF, as well as the development and management of intelligence information related to explosive ordnance.

For additional information on EOD force planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

7. General Planning Considerations

a. In tailoring EOD support to operations, the joint EOD staff should address a number of general considerations to determine the most efficient and effective use of the allocated EOD force. Considerations include the weapons threat, planning and dissemination of resources, EOD mission planning, unique EOD characteristics, and coordination of support.

b. EOD forces are manned and equipped to counter the weapons threat. Enemy weapons threat capabilities are always evolving, which requires EOD forces to continually coordinate with intelligence assets, to include reachback interagency support, to stay ahead of the threat in the operational area and to ensure that reports and collected material from weapons are adequate to support intelligence development.

c. The high demand on EOD force support requires deliberate planning and careful dissemination of resources. Planners should consider:

(1) Force composition, equipment, and structure tailored to size, type, and mission of the supported force.

(2) Time-phased force and deployment list and phasing of forces.

- (3) Initial administrative and logistical requirements.
 - (4) Training, equipping, and organizing EOD forces within each component in order to maximize interoperability among Services operating in the OE.
 - (5) Sourcing key EOD-qualified officers to the CCDR and or subordinate joint force special staff.
 - (6) Performing an intelligence estimate of information necessary to address hazards that present a threat to operations, installations, personnel, or materiel.
 - (a) Ordnance order of battle.
 - (b) Enemy capabilities and TTP.
 - (c) Critical target listing (enemy) and munitions US forces plan to use.
 - (d) Critical vulnerabilities (friendly).
 - (7) Sourcing joint or Service-specific EOD capabilities to support CCDR requirements. Sources of EOD support:
 - (a) US military EOD forces.
 - (b) Multinational and HN EOD forces.
 - (c) Contracted recovered munitions and UXO disposal organizations.
 - (8) Transportation to and from the incident site and use at the incident site of classified documents and materials, specifically arms, ammunition, and explosives, which require special planning emphasis.
- d. Joint EOD administrative, logistical, and operational support is coordinated with theater support command or Service components, to include:
- (1) Identifying required enablers to support EOD operations.
 - (2) Identifying material requirements.
 - (3) Establishing a joint EOD operations cell (if required).
 - (4) Establishing standardized EOD incident reporting procedures and requirements.
 - (5) Ensuring that a methodology is in place for the collection, exploitation, analysis and dissemination of material, information, and intelligence (collection plan).
 - (6) Establishing requirements for authorized demolition areas for explosive ordnance in accordance with applicable HN and US policy and regulations.

e. EOD command relationships are coordinated prior to operations and may change based on the phase of the operation. In a supported and supporting relationship, the supported EOD commander articulates the requirements of the support relationship. The EOD commander assigned in a supporting role articulates Service-specific limitations. Each relationship has advantages and disadvantages, as listed below.

(1) DS is a mission requiring a force to support another specified force, and requiring it to answer directly to the supported force's RFA. DS lasts only for the duration of a planned mission. Units should use OPORDs to clearly limit the supported mission. The tasking authority for the EOD team/element is the EOD team's/element's higher HQ. The EOD higher HQ will re-task an EOD team/element after the EOD team/element completes a mission. The supported unit assumes some basic life support responsibilities for an EOD team in a DS role.

(2) GS is support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. Because EOD is a high-demand military specialty, EOD forces may be placed in GS in large theater operations. Maneuver units do not task the EOD supporting unit, but rather request support as needed.

f. EOD forces are significantly more effective and efficient with reachback capability for WTI, contractor and intelligence asset support, and access to maintenance and power generation. Prior to deployment, EOD forces and supported maneuver units should clearly articulate support requirements.

g. EOD groups and battalions/mobile units maintain the capability to provide WTI and targeting support to the CCMDs. In order to provide this support, the EOD groups and their subordinate units require a robust reachback capability to national-level organizations that are able to further exploit information sent from various theaters. Marine Corps EOD units do not typically operate under the authority of the Army or Navy EOD group but may provide information and material to support WTI and targeting through various intelligence agencies. This topic is discussed in detail in Appendix H, "J-2 Technical Intelligence."

h. At the tactical level, intelligence support can facilitate the EOD unit's interaction with the IC and enhance understanding of enemy tactics. One method of achieving this goal is to assign an intelligence analyst to the EOD company, flight, or PLT. This allows the intelligence analyst to identify the trends and networks relevant to the EOD unit's assigned operational area. By passing this information vertically and laterally, all EOD teams/elements can create a common understanding of enemy TTP. Additionally, this analyst can communicate this information to supported units, relieving EOD teams/elements of a substantial burden.

i. Maintenance is one of the more complicated areas of support for EOD. This is due to special equipment employed on the battlefield by EOD forces. Additionally, EOD teams/elements may operate in a decentralized manner away from their dedicated maintenance support for an extended period. If this is the case, the EOD team/element may require assistance from the supported unit for vehicle/equipment maintenance.

j. Power generation is another consideration that units must take into account. The EOD team/element may be assigned to a base camp in order to provide GS to a range of units. The EOD unit will require electricity and power generation support from the unit that provides command for that area.

k. EOD units retain organic communications capabilities in a joint environment, but may also require additional communications system support from the Service component, other Service components, or the joint force. Specific requirements will depend on the C2 arrangement of the EOD forces within the joint force, mission tasking, and geographic location. Communications between US and MNFs, as well as communication between the Services, should be planned for prior to executing EOD support. EOD tactical and operational forces will require:

- (1) Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network.
- (2) SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network.
- (3) Joint Worldwide Information Communications System (group/battalion/mobile unit).

l. Sustaining EOD support requires planning for and executing administrative, logistical, and operational support in coordination with the theater support command or Service components. Considerations include:

- (1) Internal rotation of personnel, to include combat replacements.
- (2) EOD-specific tools, equipment, and demolitions.
- (3) Redeployment planning.
- (4) Ammunition retrograde and demolition range closing requirements.
- (5) Reconstitution of forces.

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CHAPTER V

JOINT EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL EXECUTION AND ASSESSMENT

1. Overview

a. Execution begins when the President decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis. Only the President or SecDef can authorize the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue an execute order (EXORD). Depending upon time constraints, an EXORD may be the only order a JFC receives. The EXORD defines the time to initiate operations and conveys guidance not provided earlier. Assessment during execution is continuous and provides the JFC feedback to adapt to uncertain and changing environments and to anticipate and mitigate crises.

b. Assessments conducted by EOD personnel rely on results obtained from both internal and external sources. One assessment may provide an overview of the employment of EOD and enabling forces. Another type of EOD assessment may provide information about the current state of the weapons threat in the OE, the progress of EOD support to operations to mitigate the threat, and recommendations to the JFC on changes to operational tactics to adjust to discrepancies between the actual and predicted progress.

For more information on assessment, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and Joint Doctrine Note 1-15, Operation Assessment.

2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Reporting

a. Prompt EOD reporting allows commanders to assess EOD activities throughout the OE and provide intelligence that informs current and future operations. EOD planners provide input during CONOPS development to identify the weapons threat in the OE. Reporting will help determine EOD force requirements, feed intelligence, and support operational planning.

b. EOD reports and their supporting exploitation reports are disseminated to operational formations and fusion centers to support operations through the intelligence process. The following EOD-based reports and assessments provide:

(1) **Level 1 EOD Reporting (Site/Tactical).** The dissemination of EOD level 1 and 2 reports provide tactical and technical information related to the explosive threat in an operational area. Level 1 reports address tactical operations at the brigade, battalion, or company. They influence immediate action as well as future operations. Because these reports have not been fused with other information, they should not influence targeting of individuals or groups.

(2) **Level 2 Reporting (Expeditionary/Operational).** Level 2 reports, disseminated at the theater level, are fused with other information to produce more detailed analysis of threats. These reports provide a higher fidelity of technical and tactical data from the level 1 report and accompanying material. Targeting and prosecution support packages

may be developed based on information contained in these reports. Level 2 reports will also accompany material that is sent for further exploitation at level 3 facilities.

(3) **Level 3 Reporting (Tertiary/Strategic).** Level 3 processing facilities provide numerous reports, bulletins, and assessments, which provide a strategic view of the explosive threat based on information gained through a variety of resources. EOD teams/elements collecting information, to include photographs, at the tactical level provide data to develop:

- (a) Intelligence information reports.
- (b) Intelligence bulletins.
- (c) Technical bulletins.
- (d) Intelligence assessments.
- (e) Forensic intelligence analysis reports.
- (f) Responses to requests for information.
- (g) Investigative leads.

3. Execution of Support

a. EOD forces support and conduct strategic, operational, and tactical activities. The level of EOD support is largely determined by the weapons threat, as outlined in Chapter I, “Explosive Ordnance Disposal Within the Department of Defense,” the type of force, and the mission.

b. EOD activities at the operational level are generally executed by EOD battalion/mobile units or groups. These organizations provide C2 of the majority of EOD forces. They may also provide C2 for other forces that support EOD activities.

c. EOD activities at the tactical level can be executed during any military operation. Tactical-level EOD support during phase 0/1 operations may be conducted in small units with EOD SMEs and little to no EOD C2 above the company/PLT/flight level.

4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operational Assessment

a. The EOD operational assessment helps organize and analyze data to develop recommendations for commanders. EOD assessments contribute to larger assessments of operations and campaigns. EOD reporting facilitates current and future operations. EOD assessments in Iraq and Afghanistan focused on identity activities, support to intelligence, resource allocation, partnering, enemy weaponry logistical support, weapons exploitation, enemy weapons networks, training requirements (joint force, multinational, HN), survivability and mobility, EOD task assessment, damage assessment, friendly vulnerability, and threat assessment.

b. Assessment addresses data collection and the data collection plan. Information gathered and analyzed through EOD assessments should be shared with multinational and USG partners. Data collection for EOD assessment focuses on weapons-related information, technology, acquisition, sources, design, capabilities, and potential destructive effects. Initial data collection may be obtained from sources outside of EOD (e.g., maneuver unit locating a weapons cache within their operational area). EOD reassesses the initial information to synchronize efforts and answer priority information requirements. The framework for EOD assessment establishes individual supporting elements at the tactical and operational level that feed the overall hierarchical strategic framework. This data is synchronized with intelligence to support the operation or campaign assessment and strategic framework. Data collection to build the operational assessment framework for joint EOD includes:

- (1) Periodic trend reports (IEDs attacks by switch type, location, and casualty).
- (2) Monthly explosive composition study (using exploitation data).
- (3) Comparison of data consistency across the Combined Information Data Network Exchange and level 1 and level 2 exploitation (monthly) reports.
- (4) Unclassified casualty numbers for public affairs and interagency partners.
- (5) Specialized “deep dive” IED reports that focus on specific provinces or operational areas.
- (6) Risk assessments for operations.
- (7) Special studies examining effects of certain multinational unit activities on IED attacks.
- (8) Special studies examining effects of PN force operations.
- (9) Special studies of the effectiveness of named operations.
- (10) All EOD tasks come with an associated level of risk. Assessment of the task is used to determine the risk versus reward for the EOD technician performing the task. A route risk assessment can be used to determine the likely threat by distance from the origin and the time of day for a given route. The route risk assessment is used by EOD leaders to determine standard operating procedures during the conduct of support. Assessments can also aid in R&D of emerging technologies.
- (11) Analysis of resource allocation decisions and COAs.
- (12) Point of origination of enemy TTP determined by migration.
- (13) Enemy weapon supply chain disruption.
- (14) Friendly TTP success.

(15) Effectiveness of EOD equipment/procedures/training.

5. Activity Assessment

LOOs for a specific mission should have assessments to determine successes or failures (see Figure V-1). The following activities support one or more LOOs for a C-IED task force as indicated in the examples provided in Figures V-2 and V-3.

a. **Identity Activities.** Identity activities collect biometric, biographic, and behavioral attributes, as well as other information related to individuals which can be used to further identify them. Information and intelligence obtained via such as activities as BEI, FEI, and DOMEX can be used to help identify people and groups who develop, sell, or transport weapons for hostile actors in the OE.




Figure V-1. Notional Mission and Lines of Operation

b. **Support to Intelligence.** The value of information collected by EOD forces during operations fused with information related to individuals to other persons, places, events, or materials can be assessed by the disruption of IED events following the identification and targeting of IED makers (Figure V-2). This information is collected by EOD forces conducting site exploitation, sensitive site exploitation, and weapons TECHINT activities. Refer to Appendix H, “J-2 Technical Intelligence,” for detailed exploitation information.

c. **Resource Allocation.** Assessment provides information for the JFC to allocate resources to effectively combat weapons threats.

d. **Partnering.** Assessments should evaluate HN capabilities to counter weapons threats. In coordination with interagency partners, the JFC can use this data to design training for HN EOD forces and allocate resources.




Figure V-2. Targeting Assessment

e. Information concerning enemy weaponry logistical support enables the JFC to employ resources to degrade enemy logistical lines.

f. **Weapons Exploitation.** Weapons exploitation is used to develop EOD-related publications and procedures; perform support training of EOD personnel; conduct research, development, testing, and evaluation efforts; prevent technological surprise; and support attribution efforts.

g. **Enemy Weapons Networks.** Information related to weapons networks improves the JFC's COP.

h. **Training Requirements** (joint force, multinational, HN). Specific data enables training requirements.

i. **Survivability and Mobility.** Information related to enemy weapon employment enables the JFC to select a COA with superior FP and freedom of movement.

j. **EOD Task Assessment.** All EOD tasks are assessed to evaluate risk to EOD technicians versus reward to the supported unit. EOD leaders use this risk assessment to develop standard operating procedures. Assessments will also help evaluate and develop emerging technologies (see Figure V-3).

k. **Damage Assessment.** Damage assessments determine the effectiveness of enemy weapons systems against personnel, equipment, and infrastructure, as well as intended or unintended effects on civilians. The assessment enables the development and modification of TTP, training, and materiel.

l. **Vulnerability and Threat Assessment.** Vulnerability and threat assessment contributes to infrastructure-related risk management programs by providing information on entry control points, port operations, and forcible entry operations. Information related to vulnerabilities, and lessons learned through data collection, assists the national critical infrastructure protection program and the DOD critical infrastructure protection program.

6. Flexibility

As the OE changes, criteria to assess it are modified to help determine information gaps. The iterative nature of assessments and testing assumptions before acting enable JFCs to respond to enemy adaptations.




Figure V-3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robotic Platform Effectiveness

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APPENDIX A MULTI-SERVICE CAPABILITY MATRIX

1. Introduction

Figure A-1 identifies Service capabilities for EOD support to joint operations. Refer to Figure III-3 for naming conventions.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capability Matrix (Part 1 of 2)

Capability	Army					Navy					Air Force	Marine Corps					
	PLT	CO	CO (CONUS Support)	CO (Airborne)	CO (SOF Support)	Mobile PLT (CSG/ESG/CES)	MCM PLT	NAVSO/SOF PLT	VSW PLT	Shore Detachment(s)	CEXC PLT	Flight	CO	PLT	Section (MWSS/MEU)	Base/Station	MARSOC
Conventional Munitions																	
Locate, Identify	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Render Safe Procedures	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Dispose	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Near-Surface Buried Munitions Detection	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sub-Surface Buried Munitions Detection						X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Buried Ordnance Recovery	X	X	X			X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Large Area Munitions Clearance	X	X	X			X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Airfield Recovery	X	X	X			X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Sub-Munitions Clearance	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Surface Munitions Disruption	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Munitions Storage Area Cleanup	X	X	X			X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Aircraft Explosive Hazard	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Naval Sea Mines (1)																	
Locate, Identify						X	X		X	X(3)	X						
Render Safe Procedures						X	X			X(3)							
Dispose						X	X		X	X(3)	X						
Recover						X	X			X(3)							
Low-Influence Diving						X	X		X	X(3)							
Limpet Mines (1)																	
Locate, Identify						X	X			X(3)	X						
Render Safe Procedures						X	X			X(3)							
Dispose						X	X			X(3)	X						
Underwater Ordnance (1)																	
Locate, Identify						X	X		X	X(3)	X						
Render Safe Procedures						X	X			X(3)							
Dispose						X	X		X	X(3)	X						
Improvised Weapons																	
Improvised Explosive Device	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vehicle-Borne Improvised	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Explosive Device	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Post Blast	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Homemade Explosives	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

NOTES:

1. In water only; otherwise treat as conventional ordnance.
2. Refer to established operational plans for further guidance.
3. Selected detachments only.
4. To fully understand these mission capabilities, contact theater special operations commander.

Legend

CES	coast earth station	MCM	mine countermeasures
CEXC	combined explosives exploitation cell	MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
CO	company	MWSS	Marine wing support squadron
CONUS	continental United States	NAVSO	Navy special operations forces
CSG	carrier strike group	PLT	platoon
ESG	expeditionary strike group	SOF	special operations forces
MARSOC	United States Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command	VSW	very shallow water

Figure A-1. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capability Matrix (Part 1 of 2)

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capability Matrix (Part 2 of 2)

Capability	Army					Navy					Air Force	Marine Corps					
	PLT	CO	CO (CONUS Support)	CO (Airborne)	CO (SOF Support)	Mobile PLT (CSG/ESG/CES)	MCM PLT	NAVSOFF/SOF PLT	VSW PLT	Shore Det	CEXC PLT	Flight	CO	PLT	Section (MWSS/MEU)	Base/Station	MARSOC
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear																	
Detection	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X(4)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Limited Decontamination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X(4)		X(3)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Agent Identification	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X(4)		X(3)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Leak Seal/Package	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X(4)		X(3)		X	X	X	X	X	X
Render Safe Procedures	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X(4)		X(3)		X	X	X	X	X	X
Emergency Disposal	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X(4)		X(3)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Nuclear Munitions																	
Initial Response Force		X(3)				X	X	X(4)				X	X	X	X	X	X
Response Task Force		X(3)				X	X	X(4)				X	X	X	X	X	X
Foreign Nuclear Initial Response Force		X(3)				X	X	X(4)				X	X	X	X	X	X
Render Safe and Continuation Procedures						X	X	X(4)				X	X	X	X	X	X
Additional Capabilities																	
Weapons Technical Intelligence	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X(4)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sensitive Site Exploitation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X(4)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Inerting													X	X	X	X	X
Advanced Explosive Techniques	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X(4)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure						X	X	X(4)		X			X	X	X		X
Noncombatant Evacuation Operation	X(3)					X	X	X(4)		X(3)			X	X	X		X
Very Important Persons Protection Support Activity	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X(3)		X	X	X	X	X	X
Aircraft Crash Recovery	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X(3)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Methods of Entry						X		X					X	X	X	X	X
Mobility																	
Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction				X	X	X	X	X	X	X(3)			X	X	X	X	X
Fast Rope	X(3)			X	X	X	X	X	X	X(3)		X(3)	X	X	X	X	X
Rappel	X(3)			X	X	X	X	X	X	X(3)		X(3)	X	X	X	X	X
Combat Rubber Raiding Craft				X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X		X
Casting						X	X	X	X	X(3)			X	X	X		X
Airborne				X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X		X

- NOTES:
1. In water only; otherwise treat as conventional ordnance.
 2. Refer to established operational plans for further guidance.
 3. Selected detachments only.
 4. To fully understand these mission capabilities, contact theater special operations commander.

Legend

- | | | | |
|--------|---|---------|--------------------------------|
| CES | coast earth station | MCM | mine countermeasures |
| CEXC | combined explosives exploitation cell | MEU | Marine expeditionary unit |
| CO | company | MWSS | Marine wing support squadron |
| CONUS | continental United States | NAVSOFF | Navy special operations forces |
| CSG | carrier strike group | PLT | platoon |
| ESG | expeditionary strike group | SOF | special operations forces |
| MARSOC | United States Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command | VSW | very shallow water |

Figure A-1. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capability Matrix (Part 2 of 2)

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APPENDIX B

ARMY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL ASSETS

1. Mission

Provide EOD support to land operations by detecting, identifying, conducting on-site evaluation; rendering safe, exploiting, and achieving final disposition of all explosive ordnance, including IED and WMD; and providing support to joint, interorganizational, and multinational operations as required.





2. Service Responsibilities

Joint AR 75–14/Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 8027.2/Marine Corps Order (MCO) 8027.1E/Air Force Joint Instruction (AFJI) 32-3002-8, *Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)*, and other policy and directives outline the Army's responsibilities and capabilities. Army EOD units are composed of equipment and trained personnel who are tasked to perform procedures to provide EOD support on Army installations, in assigned operational areas, or for explosive ordnance in the physical possession of the Army (see Figure B-1).

3. Overview

EOD units provide operational support by performing final disposition of all explosive ordnance. This includes IED, UXO, and WMD. Typical missions and tasks include the following:

- a. Locate, excavate, recover, identify, perform render safe procedures, transport, dispose, and exploit explosive ordnance, which include captured enemy ammunition, UXO, IED, and CBRN munitions. EOD forces conduct these procedures in support of land operations, contingency operations, HD, DSCA, and law enforcement.
- b. Exercise mission command of Army subordinate EOD forces and specialized MNFs.
- c. Provide maneuver and other supported commanders the special staff functional expertise and leadership concerning exploitation capabilities that inform the operations and intelligence fusion processes, explosive ordnance threat picture development, ammunition and explosive safety issues, and the effective employment of EOD and other specialized forces.
- d. Provide EOD support to joint and Army SOF.
- e. Provide support to CWMD operations.
- f. Provide EOD support to the USSS for the protection of the President and Vice President, as well as the Secretary of State and foreign dignitaries, as requested. EOD personnel are responsible to search for and isolate explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Force Structure Allocation			
Organization	Basis of Allocation	Supported Organization	Relationship
	1 per Theater Army 1 per Corps 1 per Joint Task Force 1 per Combined Joint Task Force 1 per Homeland Defense 1 per 2-7 EOD Battalion	Theater Army Corps Joint Task Force Combined Joint Task Force	Attached or OPCON Attached or OPCON OPCON OPCON
	1 per Division 1 per Joint Task Force 1 per Combined Joint Task Force 2 per Homeland Defense 1 per 3-7 Army EOD Companies 1 per 3-7 Sister Service EOD units	EOD Group Division Joint Task Force Combined Joint Task Force	OPCON DS or GS DS or GS DS or GS
	1 per BCT 1 per SFG(A) 1 per Ranger Regiment 9 per Homeland Defense 1 per 1-5 EOD Platoons	EOD Battalion BCT MEB SFG(A) Ranger Regiment	OPCON DS or GS DS or GS OPCON or TACON OPCON or TACON
	1 per Maneuver Battalion 1 per Special Forces Battalion 1 per Ranger Battalion 24 per Homeland Defense 1 per 3 EOD teams	EOD Company Maneuver Battalion Special Forces Battalion Ranger Battalion	Assigned DS or GS DS or GS DS or GS

Legend

BCT	brigade combat team	MEB	maneuver enhancement brigade
DS	direct support	OPCON	operational control
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal	SFG(A)	special forces group (airborne)
GS	general support	TACON	tactical control

Figure B-1. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Force Structure Allocation

g. Provide EOD support to federal, state, and local civil and law enforcement authorities, in the form of training, training support, render safe, and/or disposal of explosive ordnance to include IED, military munitions, and WMD, when requested and within DOD and Army authorities.

h. Identify requirements and develop new EOD procedures, tools, vehicles, and equipment to accomplish enduring and emerging missions.

- i. Provide institutional programs for initial, leader, and advanced functional training.

4. Organization

a. **EOD Group.** The EOD group is a functional mission command HQ for EOD operations (see Figure B-2). The group conducts mission command of designated EOD assets in a theater and provides EOD staff liaison to the Army Service component commands. The EOD group is capable of conducting EOD mission command for two to seven EOD battalions. The EOD group is attached, normally OPCON, to coordinate C-IED and exploitation and analysis operations, to a theater army, corps, or JTF in support of a specific operation, OPORD, OPLAN, or concept plan (CONPLAN). The group may also form the core of a specialized combined JTF with the mission of providing various protection and exploitation enablers such as C-IED, exploitation, or CWMD task forces. The group can also provide enabling support, analysis, and support to targeting efforts, theater exploitation, and CWMD in order to provide maneuver support and FP in all OEs.

b. **EOD Battalion.** The EOD battalion is a functional mission command HQ for EOD operations (see Figure B-3). The EOD battalion conducts staff planning and staff control of all C-IED assets within a division area of operations. The EOD battalion is capable of conducting EOD mission command and supervision of EOD operations for three to seven EOD companies. The EOD battalion may be attached or OPCON to a theater army, corps, division, or JTF in support of a specific operation, OPORD, OPLAN, or CONPLAN.

c. **EOD Company.** The EOD company (see Figure B-4) provides mission command of one to five EOD PLTs and provides administrative company-level planning and support based on the level of employment, to include augmenting the brigade combat team commanders with a special staff element. The EOD company provides EOD support throughout the operational area and DS to designated brigade combat team/maneuver enhancement brigade, special forces group (airborne), and Ranger Regiment.

d. **EOD WMD Company.** The EOD WMD company (see Figure B-5) provides highly technical EOD operations and containment procedures for WMD in support of joint or interagency operations. It has the ability to respond anywhere in the world with two fully capable eight-person PLTs as part of the joint technical operations team. The unit has the capability to provide four WMD PLTs to support the Army or other USG department or agency in support of missions to defeat or mitigate WMD directed against the US or national interest. The nuclear support team provides internal training and operational management of the response PLTs.

e. **EOD Company (CONUS Support).** The EOD company (CONUS support) (see Figure B-6) provides EOD service in the reduction and elimination of explosive ordnance to federal, state, and local agencies on an area basis. The EOD company (CONUS support) is allocated based on the concept of support requirements and dependent on the EOD battalion for administrative, religious, legal, personnel, field feeding, and supply services and support.

f. **EOD Company (Airborne).** The EOD company (airborne) provides support to conventional forces and SOF to perform direct action operations by means of ground assault,




Figure B-2. Notional Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group

parachute insertion, fast-rope, and special patrol insertion/extraction in order to identify, render safe, and exploit all explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards to include CBRN. The EOD company enables a direct action capability that is skilled in hostage rescue, kill/capture operations against designated targets, and other specialized tasks. For company composition, refer to Figure B-4.




Figure B-3. Notional Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion

g. **EOD Company (SOF Support).** The EOD company (SOF support) provides support to SOF in the conduct of special warfare operations. The EOD company enables freedom of movement for forces conducting sabotage, subversion, and insurgent activities




Figure B-4. Notional Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company


for extended periods in denied areas and advising, assisting, and training PN forces in COIN and special operations. For company composition, refer to Figure B-4.

h. **EOD PLT.** The EOD PLT (see Figure B-7) is normally employed at the battalion level and provides leadership, supervision, and technical guidance for three to four EOD teams, typically consisting of three personnel. The EOD PLT provides the capability to eliminate and reduce explosive, CBRN hazards, including IEDs and conventional US and foreign UXO. The PLT provides support to the USSS and DOS in protection of the President, Vice President, and other dignitaries as directed.

i. **National Guard.** Army National Guard EOD assets are located within several states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Administered by the National Guard Bureau (a joint activity of DOD), the Army National Guard has both a federal (Title 10, USC) and a state mission (Title 32, USC or state active duty).

5. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support (Brigade Through Corps)

a. **Corps and Division Operational Planning.** The EOD staff officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) are a key link between the corps or division commanders and EOD forces integrated into tactical level operations. The officer and NCO must understand joint and Army EOD doctrine and articulate capabilities, constraints, and limitations of EOD units.



**Figure B-5. Notional Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Weapons of Mass Destruction Company**

(1) The EOD officer provides information about resourcing, integration, and reallocation of EOD capability into the corps or division operational area.

(2) The EOD NCO has a technical focus, offering guidance on the render safe procedure and exploitation expertise EOD Soldiers possess.

b. Supported Brigade Operational Planning. Supported brigades do not maintain an organizational EOD planning staff capability; rather, they rely upon the supporting EOD company for plans and operations support specific to EOD missions. The EOD company may provide an operations officer and/or NCO to the supported brigade in order to provide appropriate EOD planning and to perform LNO duties, to include:

(1) Facilitating cooperation and understanding between the supported brigade commanders and staffs and the EOD battalion and company commanders.

(2) Coordinating tactical matters to achieve mutual purpose, support, and action.




Figure B-6. Notional Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company (Continental United States Support)




Figure B-7. Notional Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon

APPENDIX C

MARINE CORPS EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL ASSETS

1. Mission

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) EOD mission is to support to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), supporting establishment, HD, SOF, and other USG departments and agencies. USMC EOD detects, locates, accesses, diagnoses, renders safe, neutralizes, recovers, exploits, and disposes of hazards from foreign and domestic UXO, IEDs, CBRN, and WMD that present a threat to operations, installations, personnel, or materiel.

Note: All USMC EOD units are trained and equipped to conduct exploitation operations.

2. Service Responsibilities

Joint AR 75-14/OPNAVINST 8027.2/MCO 8027.1E/AFJI 32-3002, *Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)*, defines the USMC responsibilities as: “Marine Corps EOD provides EOD support on Marine Corps installations, in assigned operational areas, or for explosive ordnance in the physical possession of the Marine Corps.” For further details, reference Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-17.2, *MAGTF Explosive Ordnance Disposal*.

3. Overview

a. **Operational Concept.** USMC EOD forces provide uniquely trained personnel to support the MAGTF operational concept by eliminating and mitigating all explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards encountered in any military operation. Augmentation of or substitution for EOD skill sets must not be attempted. Typical missions and tasks include the following:

(1) Providing EOD services in accordance with MCO 3571.2, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Program*, and supporting Marine Corps regulations.

(2) Providing organic EOD support throughout the MAGTF at the Marine expeditionary force (MEF); Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB); Marine expeditionary unit (MEU); and special purpose MAGTF levels, to include task-organized support throughout the major subordinate commands and DS to reconnaissance, assault, raid, and crisis response forces.

(3) Providing EOD support to Marine Corps installations, in assigned operational areas, or the disposal of explosive ordnance in the physical possession of the Marine Corps.

(4) Providing organic EOD support to United States Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC).

(5) Providing EOD support to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), joint special operations command, and special operations task force.

(6) Providing EOD services in support of GCC and amphibious ready group (ARG) commanders.

(7) Providing EOD staff to Marine forces, USG departments and agencies, training commands, and supporting establishments.

(8) Providing EOD support to local law enforcement during DSCA and defense support of civil law enforcement agencies activities.

(9) Providing EOD support to partnered nations.

(10) Providing EOD services to HN, in compliance with the GCC and DOS.

(11) Providing EOD support to DOS, USSS, VIPPSA, NSSEs, and special events (e.g., UN General Assembly, political party national conventions, presidential inauguration).

b. **C2.** Centralized EOD C2 functions include EOD operation tasking and data tracking with a single point of contact, usually the MAGTF EOD officer. Effective C2:

(1) Provides increased mission success and EOD operator survivability.

(2) Allows for more efficient use of EOD forces.

(3) Provides improved TECHINT acquisition and dissemination to all EOD personnel.

(4) Benefits the MAGTF and staff by placing the EOD structure under the MAGTF EOD officer to assist in managing the EOD mission.

(5) Provides a mechanism that plans for fluctuations of EOD responsibilities as the operation transitions through different phases.

(6) Allows EOD support to increase or decrease based on operating tempo or the theater EOD mission.

c. **Operational Planning.** For planning, MARSOC, Marine Corps Forces Pacific, MEFs, MEBs, MEUs, special purpose MAGTFs, and Marine logistics groups (MLGs) have USMC EOD officer(s) and/or EOD chiefs/planners within their HQ component operations staff (brigade or higher staff) section. The MEF EOD officers are responsible to the commander for providing the appendix 13 (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) to annex C (Operations) to ensure full USMC EOD support in all phases of the operation. These officers also serve as special staff officers for all matters pertaining to USMC EOD and C-IED actions. The EOD staff officer provides the supported unit's Marine Corps component operations staff officer (brigade or higher staff)/battalion or regiment operations staff officer (S-3) with the EOD staff estimate, risk assessment, and operational limitations. The EOD staff officer further assists in developing the method of employment for EOD forces throughout the Marine Corps planning process and rapid response planning process. More specifically, the EOD staff officer can:

(1) Contribute to intelligence preparation of the battlefield and provide an intelligence estimate of information necessary to address foreign and domestic explosive ordnance.

(2) Provide ordnance order of battle.

(3) Identify enemy threats, capabilities, and TTP.

(4) Generate a critical vulnerability assessment (friendly).

(5) Develop mission statements and CONOPS.

(6) Identify initial administrative and logistical requirements.

(7) Coordinate administrative, logistical, and operational support with GCC or Service components, such as:

(a) Identifying required enablers to support EOD operations (e.g., security, medical).

(b) Identifying materiel requirements (e.g., communications, transportation, all classes of supply).

(c) Establishing standardized EOD incident reporting procedures and requirements.

(d) Ensuring that a methodology is in place for the collection, exploitation, analysis and dissemination of material, information, and intelligence.

(e) Establishing authorized demolition areas for explosive ordnance in accordance with applicable HN and US regulations.

(f) Coordinating the internal rotation of personnel, including combat replacements.

(8) Conduct sustainment planning for:

(a) All classes of supply.

(b) Repair and replacement of vehicles, tools, and robotics.

(c) Communications.

(d) CREW.

(e) Equipment calibration and electronic publications updates.

(f) Technical support and reachback.

(g) Redeployment planning for closing demolition areas, establishing requirements and procedures for EOD relief in place, determining redeployment flow of EOD forces, conducting post-mission analyses, and reconstituting forces.

4. Organization

USMC EOD is organized and billeted with operating and supporting forces as follows:

a. MEF

(1) **Command Element.** The EOD officer and EOD planner assigned to the MEF HQ located within the Marine Corps component operations section of the MEF command element. Serves as a special staff officer to the MEF commanding general for all EOD related matters and serves as a member of the MEF level C-IED cell.

(2) **MLG.** The EOD planner is assigned to the MLG HQ located within the Marine Corps component operations section of the MLG command element. Each engineer support battalion has an organic EOD company. The company is divided into PLTs and a HQ element. See Figure C-1.

b. Company

(1) USMC EOD companies are organized to plan, coordinate, manage, supervise, and conduct EOD support to MEF and major subordinate commands. They are structured to facilitate task organization in support of all MAGTF operations during military operations, including emergent worldwide support to the CCMDs and/or SOF.

(2) Each company is capable of supporting a division or group-sized element not conducting distributed operations with full spectrum EOD support. During the conduct of distributed operations, additional EOD assets may be required depending on the size of the OE. Marine aircraft wing (MAW) EOD units can be consolidated within the company. The company is divided into PLTs and a HQ element.

c. **PLT.** Each EOD PLT consists of 27 Marines (two officers and 25 enlisted personnel) which consist of four EOD managers, nine EOD supervisors, and 12 EOD technicians. The PLT can break down into three sections. The PLT is capable of supporting a regimental-sized element not conducting distributed operations. During the conduct of distributed operations, additional EOD assets may be required depending on the size of the regimental battlespace.

d. **EOD Section.** An EOD section consists of an EOD manager, EOD supervisors, and EOD technicians. Each EOD section is capable of supporting a battalion-sized element not conducting distributed operations. During the conduct of distributed operations, additional EOD assets may be required depending on the size of the regimental battalion operational area.




Figure C-1. Marine Expeditionary Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Organization

e. **EOD Response Element.** Based on the scope of mission requirements, all EOD sections can be task-organized into response elements to support specific missions. An EOD response element normally consists of three Marines (one EOD supervisor and two EOD

technicians), capable of supporting a company-sized element not conducting distributed operations. The EOD response element should not consist of less than two EOD technicians. However, missions in support of SOF, raid forces, assault elements, and reconnaissance units can task-organize down to the individual depending on mission specifics, time, and acceptance of risk.

f. **MEU.** Each MEU has an EOD section that consists of 13 Marines (one officer and 12 enlisted), which also consists of one EOD manager, four EOD supervisors, and seven EOD technicians. The EOD section provides DS to force reconnaissance, maritime raid force, and battalion landing team. The EOD section is also prepared to provide support to the GCC, ARG commander, and SOF (USSOCOM, joint special operations command) upon tasking. Each MEU possesses an exploitation analysis center, which the EOD personnel serve as SMEs. When a MEU is expecting to conduct contingency operations, additional USMC EOD assets may be required in order to reinforce the organic section.

g. **Special Purpose MAGTF.** When a special purpose MAGTF is formed, an EOD officer located in the S-3 is tasked to serve as a staff officer to the special purpose MAGTF commander for all EOD-related matters. This officer provides input for planning and task organization for EOD support to accomplish the commander's requirements. One EOD manager is assigned to assist the EOD officer. Not all special purpose MAGTFs have the same composition. Mission tasks, locations, and MAGTF size are factors in determining EOD support. Each special purpose MAGTF possesses an exploitation analysis center in which EOD personnel serve as SMEs.

h. **C-IED Cell.** In the event a C-IED cell is formed within the MAGTF HQ, an EOD officer is assigned to serve as the SME and advisor on all IED-related matters.

i. **MAW.** Each MAW contains a Marine wing support squadron, which has an EOD section within the airfield operations company. The section consists of one EOD officer and eight enlisted EOD technicians. Although their primary mission is to provide aviation ground support, they are manned, trained, and equipped to support all MAGTF EOD support operations and are frequently employed to do so.

j. **MARSOC.** The Marine Corps component to USSOCOM is MARSOC. MARSOC is charged with recruiting seasoned Marines in order to organize, train, equip, and deploy them in task-organized, scalable, and responsive Marine Corps special operations forces (MARSOF) worldwide to accomplish special operations missions assigned by Commander, USSOCOM, and/or GCCs employing SOF. USMC EOD officers and technicians assigned to MARSOC receive additional advanced training and certification through a specialized MARSOF training pipeline. Upon completion of the MARSOF EOD training pipeline, an enlisted EOD Marine assigned to MARSOC will receive the additional Military Occupational Specialty 8071, Special Operations Capabilities Specialist—Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

(1) MARSOC has an organic EOD capability within the Marine Raider Regiment. Each Marine raider battalion has an EOD section task-organized to support the full range of special operations assigned to MARSOC in support of Commander, USSOCOM and/or the

GCCs. MARSOC EOD technicians are integrated at the Marine special operations company level and integral to the Marine special operations team in order to support SOF core activities and operations assigned to MARSOC. See Figure C-2.

(2) MARSOF conducts operations with strategic effects and implications. MARSOF EOD is assigned to conduct the following SOF core activities and operations: direct action, special reconnaissance, CT, SFA, foreign internal defense, COIN, unconventional warfare, and support to CWMD. For more information, see JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.

k. **Marine Corps Bases and Air Stations.** Most Marine Corps bases and air stations have an organic EOD section. Installation EOD sections are a FP asset and are first responders along with other applicable emergency services, on and off the installation, in support of the HD mission. Additionally, these sections assist range operations through routine EOD response for explosive ordnance related issues. These sections are manned, trained, and equipped to support the full range of EOD operations.

5. Training

All USMC EOD personnel possess a common tactical knowledge and skill set from Service entry level training required of all Marines. All USMC EOD personnel, regardless of unit, attend numerous skill enhancement training directly related to the EOD military occupational specialty.

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command Organizational Chart




Figure C-2. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command Organizational Chart

APPENDIX D

NAVY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL ASSETS

1. Mission

The primary mission of US Navy EOD is to provide direct combat support to joint forces, enable access to areas denied by explosive ordnance, and facilitate operational mobility and battlespace maneuver.

2. Service Responsibilities

DODD 5160.62, *Single Manager Responsibility for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T)*, designates the Secretary of the Navy as the single manager for EODT&T. Therefore, an EOD program board is headed by a Navy flag officer who serves as the executive manager for EODT&T and includes one flag or general officer from each of the Services. OPNAVINST 8027.1, *Naval Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program and Mission Support*, outlines the Navy responsibilities for EOD.

3. Overview

a. Navy EOD forces maintain a maximum state of readiness to carry out the required operational capabilities within projected OEs per reference OPNAVINST F3501.97, *Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environments for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group Forces*, and OPNAVINST 3501.374, *Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environment for Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division Expeditioner Exploitation Unit One*. General categories of Navy EOD support include:

(1) Combat service operations in support of joint force operational mobility and special operations to enable blue water, coastal, littoral, and battlefield maneuver.

(2) Underwater mine countermeasure operations to include the search, classifying, mapping, reacquiring, identification, neutralization, exploitation, and disposal of sea mines and waterborne IEDs.

(3) General EOD operations ashore or afloat in support of joint, fleet, and shore establishments.

(4) Assistance in the clearance of UXO remaining in former combat zones, training areas, and target ranges. The activity on the ranges includes support for warfare centers and their test and evaluation activities.

(5) Support to nuclear weapons incidents, as required.

(6) Assistance in the development of allied nation EOD programs consistent with existing agreements.

(7) Diving, underwater object location, recovery, and demolition services required to support salvage, limited ships husbandry, oceanographic, and other Navy requirements.

(8) Support to ships and stations in planning and conducting training in areas of firefighting and damage control involving explosives, explosives safety, disaster control, CBR monitoring, technical decontamination, and emergency destruction procedures.

(9) Near real-time weapons technical exploitation operations on captured and recovered enemy weapons, and ordnance in all weather conditions and CBR environments on land and underwater in support of the joint force.

(10) In-theater and national post blast investigation (levels 1 and 2) encompassing tactical evaluation of the incident site, identification, collection, and neutralization of all remaining explosive hazards, electronic analysis of post-blast components producing detailed intelligence reports used for rapid development of C-IED TTP, counter-bomber target development, and EOD render safe procedures.

(11) OCONUS identification and acquisition of unknown foreign ordnance and packaging for shipment to CONUS locations for further exploitation and rapid development of TTP and EOD render safe procedures.

(12) DSCA.

b. The following conditions constitute requirements for Navy EOD support:

(1) Joint operations where access to the battlespace is denied and/or operational mobility and maneuver are impeded by the presence or suspected presence of explosive ordnance. This includes mine countermeasures (MCM) operations and exercises where Navy EOD technicians are needed for mine recovery, weapons technical exploitation, and neutralization operations.

(2) Incidents involving UXO.

(3) Incidents involving explosive items that have become or are suspected to be hazardous or unserviceable by damage or deterioration, and when the disposal of such items is beyond the capabilities of personnel normally assigned the responsibility for routine disposition.

(4) Handling of fuzed ordnance in conjunction with aircraft carrier (nuclear) and amphibious assault ship (general purpose) flight deck operations.

(5) Handling and/or storage of concentrations of chemical, nuclear, or unusually hazardous bulk explosives or explosive ordnance.

(6) Operations intended to obtain enemy ordnance and associated components for analysis and weapons technical exploitation.

(7) Operations to defeat unconventional ordnance such as booby traps and IED and collect associated material to support weapons technical exploitation operations.

(8) Operations to counter WMD such as nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, radiological dispersal devices, and other devices incorporating chemical or biological warfare agents.

(9) EOD support to VIPPSA.

(10) Operations required to render safe and remove military ordnance from civilian areas as coordinated with the appropriate federal, state, or local authorities.

(11) Operations required to conduct underwater emergency repair and salvage missions to recover ships, aircraft, or other objects of value.

(12) Operations required to conduct harbor clearance services in order to remove explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards, vessels, and objects obstructing ports and piers, and provide access to waterways and facilities.

(13) Operations that require specialized mobility skills to include static line and freefall parachute insertion, helicopter rope suspension techniques, helicopter cast and recovery, and specialized personnel insertion/extraction techniques.

4. Organization

a. The Navy organizes EOD forces to support the CCDRs. EOD officers within each numbered fleet, CCMD, and theater special operations command (TSOC) provide staff planning support for operational EOD activities (see Figure D-1). EOD warfare-qualified officers are the SMEs for maritime MCM and are capable of directing MCM operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.

b. **Explosive Ordnance Disposal Groups (EODGRUs).** Navy EOD operating forces are organized under two deployable echelon 4 EODGRUs (see Figure D-2). The EODGRUs are O-6-led brigade/regimental equivalent HQ that provide centralized planning, coordination, and integration of subordinate EOD forces relating to movement, control (when exercising OPCON), readiness and training, administration, and logistics. They are organized to deploy, when required, as a commander, task force (CTF) controlling Navy EOD and expeditionary salvage (ES) forces or as the core of a joint EOD task force. Group staff EOD-qualified personnel may also be selectively mobilized individually as LNOs to support local, regional, littoral, or wartime EOD tasks. The EODGRU exercises Service authority over assigned EOD forces to provide EOD services to the operational commanders through explosive ordnance disposal mobile units (EODMUs), mobile diving and salvage units (MDSUs), explosive ordnance disposal expeditionary support units (EODESUs), and explosive ordnance disposal training and evaluation units (EODTEUs).

c. **O-5 Battalion Level Equivalent Command HQ**




Figure D-1. Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Force Structure

(1) **EODMU.** The mobile units are echelon 5 operational commands that provide deployable task organizations to exercise OPCON and ADCON of assigned and attached EOD forces. The mobile units command EOD forces to eliminate explosive threats from aviation, surface, ground, and improvised ordnance, and provide diving and demolition services to eliminate hazards from subsurface ordnance. The mobile units provide EOD forces in support of CSGs and ARG, MCM task forces and groups, naval special warfare (NSW), SOF, unified theater commanders, CONUS naval region commanders, and humanitarian demining and contingency operations (e.g., aircraft recovery, range or waterway clearance, USSS support, Chief of Naval Operations [CNO] projects).

(2) **MDSUs.** The MDSUs are echelon 5 operational commands that provide deployable organizations task-organized to exercise OPCON and ADCON of assigned and attached mobile diving and salvage (MDS) and EOD forces. The mission of an MDSU is to direct highly mobile, fully trained and equipped companies to perform combat harbor clearance and search, and expeditionary operations, including diving, salvage, repair, underwater ship's husbandry, rescue and assistance, and demolition in ports or harbors and at sea aboard US and foreign military ships and craft and commercial vessels of opportunity in wartime or peacetime.




Figure D-2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group Structure

(3) **EODTEU.** An echelon 5 command subordinate to the EODGRU which provides fleet EOD personnel with advanced PLT-level training in rendering safe and disposal techniques, diving and parachuting (other than basic), intelligence gathering and

reporting procedures, and expeditionary field skills. An EODTEU conducts field evaluations of EOD tools and TTP.

(4) **EODESU.** The EODESUs are echelon 5 operational commands that provide optimized logistics support to EOD forces both deployed and in garrison. They provide services and personnel in support of EOD task force and EOD task group operations, major combat operations, MCM task forces and groups, unified theater commanders, CONUS Navy region commanders, and contingency operations (aircraft recovery, range and waterway clearance, USSS support, CNO projects, etc.). EODESUs provide expeditionary support elements, mobile communications (MC) PLTs, and flyaway recompression chamber (FARC) PLTs. The expeditionary support element is an inherent capability of the EODESU to provide tailored deployable elements that possess the requisite skill sets to provide logistics support for specific PLT and battalion level mission tasking. They are scalable and capable of fully integrating into assigned operational units as directed by higher authority. Although the size of an expeditionary support element may vary widely with mission and tasking, normal manning would typically consist of any combination of the following types of Sailors: yeoman, personnel, legal, engineman, boatswain's mate, corpsman, gunner's mate, intelligence, seabees, information systems, and electronics technicians.

(5) **EXU1.** The EXU1 is an echelon 5 EOD operational command subordinate to NSWC IHEODTD, which is task-organized into combined explosives exploitation cell (CEXC) PLTs and an FMA PLT. CEXC and FMA PLTs collect, process, exploit, and analyze enemy improvised and conventional weapons and components for the purpose of providing near real-time TECHINT to the tactical commanders and EOD forces. A secondary mission is to provide tailored deployable TECHINT and FMA support to Service, DOD, and national-level intelligence activities as directed by higher authority.

d. Navy EOD PLTs and MDS companies are subordinate units of EODMUs, MDSUs, EXUs1, and EODESUs. The types of EOD PLTs are the mobile, Navy special operations forces (NAVSOFF), SOF, and MCM PLT and shore-based detachments. Other subordinate units include the very shallow water (VSW) dive PLT, marine mammal system (MMS) PLTs, UMS PLTs, VSW combatant craft PLT, MC PLT, area search PLT, MDS companies, and FARC PLT.

e. **Primary Units of Action**

(1) **EOD Mobile PLTs.** Mobile PLTs may embark, deploy with, and support CSGs and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs). Outside of this construct, EOD mobile PLTs are tasked through the global force management (GFM) process for worldwide EOD missions. CSGs and ESGs assume Service authority of EOD mobile PLTs during deployment. The PLTs may also support mine warfare missions while embarked in vessels of opportunity, afloat forward staging bases or deployed to a land base in support of mine warfare operations. Additionally, mobile PLTs may deploy to support land forces, shore detachments, riverine operations, CNO project support, and contingency or special operational support, as tasked. The PLTs are trained and equipped to conduct their EOD mission as stated above. Additionally, they are trained and equipped to conduct limited mine warfare missions to locate, identify, and dispose of underwater ordnance that impedes

dominant maneuver. They can provide diving and demolition support, level 1 weapon technical exploitation support, aircraft and ordnance recovery, land range and underwater clearance, and EOD support or augmentation. For conventional incidents not requiring diving or the operation of field decontamination, mobile PLTs are capable of splitting into four or two-man elements to respond to multiple, simultaneous incidents.

(2) **EOD NAVSOF PLT.** The NAVSOF PLTs support NSW squadron and are tasked through the GFM process for worldwide EOD NAVSOF missions, providing EOD support to those deployed units and their operational areas. ADCON and Service authority are retained by the respective PLT's EODMU until ready for deployment, upon which the Service authority will transfer, along with NSW squadron, to appropriate GCC and the SOF or naval component commander. The PLTs also provide limited support to GCC SOF requirements and specialized IW EOD CONPLAN support requirements. The PLTs are functionally organized to locate, identify, and dispose of ordnance that impedes dominant maneuver. The PLTs also provide diving and demolition support, intelligence collection, aircraft and ordnance recovery, range clearance and underwater clearance, shore detachment augmentation, riverine operations, CNO project support, and contingency and special operational support as tasked. The PLTs are capable of task-organizing into seven two-man elements with a two-man command team.

(3) **EOD SOF PLT.** The SOF PLTs are assigned to the GCCs or may be tasked through the GFM process for worldwide EOD SOF missions for SOF contingencies. The SOF PLTs support GCC and TSOC requirements, humanitarian demining and IW EOD support requirements providing specialized EOD skill sets in support of deployed units and their operational area. ADCON is retained by the respective PLTs EODMU. The EODMU commanding officer delegates OPCON of assigned EOD SOF PLT to a SOF commander during training periods and deployment. USSOCOM requests command authority of attached EOD forces throughout integrated training and deployment with OPCON further delegated as operations dictate. The EOD SOF PLTs are functionally organized to locate, identify, and dispose of ordnance that impedes dominant maneuver and provide expanded CWMD capability to the supported TSOC. The SOF PLTs also provide demolition support, intelligence collection, aircraft and ordnance recovery, range clearance, shore detachment augmentation, riverine operations, CNO project support, and contingency and special operational support as tasked.

(4) **EOD MCM PLT.** The MCM PLTs are tasked through the GFM process for worldwide MCM missions or provide support to fleet commanders for MCM contingencies. The PLTs may embark on a vessel of opportunity such as a mobile landing platform, or any afloat forward staging base. Additionally, EOD MCM PLTs may operate from the shore when security and operations permit. The PLTs are specifically prepared to locate, identify, neutralize, recover, exploit, and dispose of underwater ordnance in support of underwater MCM, and are equipped with special low influence signature gear to operate in close proximity to influence initiated maritime ordnance. The PLTs are normally employed as an integrated part of the combined MCM team or integrated with UMS PLT and a post mission analysis cell as part of an expeditionary MCM company. Other components may include surface MCM platforms, airborne MCM platforms, and other underwater MCM units such as the VSW task force.

(5) **EOD Shore-Based Detachments.** The EOD shore-based detachments are geographically located to support selected Navy regional commanders. These detachments maintain tailored EOD equipment allowances to enable support in their respective areas of responsibilities. The shore detachments eliminate hazards from aviation, surface, ground, and improvised ordnance, and provide diving and demolition services to eliminate hazards from subsurface and mine ordnance. These detachments also provide EOD specific support during ammunition handling, ordnance testing, live fire training, and operations requiring diving. The shore detachments may be required to respond to requests for EOD support from civilian authorities in the local area and provide other EOD support when directed by the assigned regional commander.

(6) **MDS Companies.** The MDS companies are afloat operational EOD units that provide rapid deployment as specialized teams to conduct underwater emergency or battle damage repair; salvage missions to recover ships, aircraft, or other objects of value; harbor clearance services for the removal of vessels and objects obstructing ports and piers, and access to waterways and facilities; underwater search and survey; FP; and surface-supplied air, mixed-gas, and self-contained underwater breathing apparatus diving operations. The MDS companies are capable of operating ashore or at sea aboard Military Sealift Command ships or other vessels of opportunity.

f. **Highly Specialized Units**

(1) **VSW Dive PLT.** The EOD VSW dive PLTs are tasked through the GFM process for worldwide MCM missions or to provide support to fleet commanders for MCM contingencies. The PLTs conduct underwater MCM operations in the VSW zone to reacquire, identify, and neutralize mines in support of pre-assault amphibious operations.

(2) **EOD MMS PLT.** The MMS PLTs are tasked through the GFM process for worldwide MCM and FP missions or to provide support to fleet commanders for MCM contingencies. These PLTs can be supported from a well deck equipped amphibious ship or from expeditionary shore facilities within small boat range of the area of operations. The PLTs provide an enhanced capability for underwater MCM in the shallow water (40 to 300 feet) and VSW (10 to 40 feet) zones of the littoral battlespace. The PLTs provide an enhanced capability to detect, identify, mark, render safe, recover, and neutralize objects within the water column. The MK [Mark] 7 MMS PLT conducts mine hunting and neutralization operations against bottom, moored, and buried mines in the shallow water and VSW zones.

(3) **UMS PLT.** The UMS PLTs are tasked through the GFM process for worldwide MCM and FP missions or to provide support to fleet commanders for MCM contingencies. The PLTs are functionally organized to locate and identify underwater ordnance that impedes dominant maneuver and underwater hazard mapping in support of FHA. The PLT operates from small boats and employs UMS for mine exploration, reconnaissance, and hunting operations.

(4) **VSW Combatant Craft PLT.** The VSW combatant craft PLTs are tasked through the GFM process for worldwide MCM missions or provide support to fleet

commanders for MCM contingencies. The PLTs conduct over the horizon insertion; FP; and a C2 platform for UMS, MMS, and dive PLT operations in support of pre-assault amphibious operations.

(5) **MC PLT.** The MC PLT is task-organized to provide an independently deployable field communications center for integrated command post tactical and long haul communications in support of EOD and MDSU forces. It provides all necessary communications systems and circuits for the EOD CTF or task group in support of maritime operations or as the core of a joint explosives ordnance disposal task force (JEODTF). Capabilities include secure radio/telephone, satellite communications, digital photo imagery, secure communications, and cellular communications. The MC PLT is capable of supporting battalion and PLT-level communications requirements as a component of an EOD task unit/element and may report to OPCON in the same manner as the supported unit. Manning for the MC PLT may range from 12 to 15 enlisted sailors.

(6) **Area Search PLT.** The area search PLTs are deployable teams that operate side-scan sonar and precise navigation equipment to detect, locate, mark, and reacquire underwater objects that are proud (unburied) of the bottom. The PLTs frequently support salvage and search operations, with a limited mine detection capability. The PLTs detect and reacquire underwater objects and known noninfluence ordnance sitting proud of the bottom using side-scan sonar and remotely operated vehicles. The PLTs also deploy in hydrographic and Q-route survey operations, but are not used as a mine hunting asset. Normal manning for an area search PLT is one officer and seven enlisted.

(7) **FARC PLT.** The FARC PLTs are tasked through the GFM process for worldwide missions or to provide support to fleet commanders for MCM contingencies. This capability is critical to divers in support of EOD operations. Normal manning for the FARC PLT is five military personnel. The PLTs provide on-site recompression chamber support to diving operations in remote or austere locations.

(8) **CEXC PLT.** The CEXC PLTs conduct weapons technical exploitation operations against captured and recovered IEDs and ordnance. All EOD EXU1 forces are trained and equipped to conduct level 1 and level 2 exploitation operations to provide near real-time actionable intelligence. The PLTs normally operate in combat and high threat environments where use of IEDs is prevalent. As IEDs are and will remain a rapidly evolving threat on the battlefield, near real-time intelligence on IED construction, employment and functioning is critical to the conduct of joint operations. The TECHINT produced by CEXC supports decision making at all levels of warfare, primarily tactical commanders who must rapidly adapt blue force TTP and countermeasures. These efforts also support service research, development and acquisition of technologies to counter or mitigate IED threats.

(9) **FMA PLT.** These PLTs are manned by both active duty EOD and civilian SMEs with WTI experience. They conduct weapons technical exploitation operations against conventional military munitions worldwide. Supporting noncombat operations, these PLTs collect identified foreign munitions for which safety, arming, and firing conditions are unknown, and returning them to facilities within CONUS for strategic exploitation by the

TECHINT community and service S&T labs (to include NSWC IHEODTD). Collection may only require the packaging, certification, and shipment of hazardous explosive items except in cases where the ordnance is in an unsafe condition.

5. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Commander, Task Force

The EODGRUs are deployable staffs capable of standing up and operating a JEODTF in support of maritime operations or serve as the core of a JEODTF conducting mission analysis, crisis action, and deliberate planning. The EOD CTFs direct assigned CTFs or commander, task groups to conduct EOD and ES operations in support of CDRs in order to eliminate threats from UXO and to perform ES operations. When augmented, the EOD task force functions as a JEODTF to coordinate multi-Service/multinational EOD operations in an assigned operational area.

6. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Task Group Commander

The primary mission of the EOD task group is to employ EOD/ES assets to support operations in maintaining the uninterrupted flow of material, supplies, and personnel through designated seaports of debarkation and sea lines of communications. Additional EOD/ES operations in support of other joint security area operations and maneuver forces include:

a. EOD operations to prevent the restriction of friendly forces' combat and logistics capabilities by eliminating hazards from ordnance and other explosive items afloat, ashore, and underwater up to the high water mark of the sea coasts, inlets, bays, harbors, rivers, and enclosed bodies of water. Operations conducted to enhance ship survivability preserve fleet warfighting capabilities and enable naval, expeditionary, and joint forces to achieve and maintain freedom of action through the reduction or elimination of any hazardous UXO threat as a result of conventional or unconventional means.

b. ES operations clear underwater obstructions from sea coasts, inlets, bays, harbors, rivers, and enclosed bodies of water that impede combat and logistics operations. Additionally, ES assets conduct rapid underwater emergency repairs or salvage to restore port operations, object recovery, underwater survey, and assist joint ES operations.

c. **EOD Commander, Task Unit (CTU).** The EOD CTU is a staff element assigned to coordinate EOD operations and provide EOD and MCM liaison within a deployed CSG or ESG. Manning for the EOD CTU is one officer and one enlisted sailor.

APPENDIX E

AIR FORCE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL ASSETS

1. Mission

The Air Force EOD primary mission is to enable the Air Force to provide compelling air, space, and cyberspace capabilities for use by the CCDRs. The Air Force will organize, train, and equip EOD forces capable of delivering distinctive EOD expertise to protect personnel, missions, resources, and environments to achieve an assured capability in airfield operations, nuclear deterrent operations, special operations, HD operations, and DSCA. EOD forces provide Air Force and JFCs the capability to mitigate or defeat the hazards presented by enemy or friendly employment of explosive ordnance, to include IEDs, conventional explosives, CBRN, and incendiary material. Air Force EOD is a high demand capability that can be employed alone or as part of an Air Force, joint, interagency, or MNF to support installation or CCDR objectives during in garrison and worldwide contingencies to include major combat operations and IW operations.

Note: EOD-qualified military members are the only designated and authorized personnel within the Air Force who are organized, trained, and equipped to analyze, mitigate, and defeat threats from all explosive ordnance and IEDs.

2. Service Responsibilities

Joint AR 75-14/OPNAVINST 8027.2/MCO 8027.1E/AFJI 32-3002, *Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal*, and other policy and directives outline the Air Force responsibilities and capabilities. Air Force EOD provide support on Air Force installations, in forward operating locations, and assigned operational areas, and for explosive ordnance in the physical possession of the Air Force.

3. Overview

a. **Operational Concept.** Air Force EOD forces are primarily postured to support air base operations for the air component commander and the commander, Air Force forces. In deployed environments, Air Force EOD flights are primarily postured at every main operating base supporting combat or significant airlift missions—with primary missions to support sortie generation and FP by eliminating explosive threats to airfield operations. In this way, the expertise of Air Force EOD flights is used to greatest effect in an OE, while maximizing support available from collocated Air Force units. Priority of Air Force EOD employment is in support of base security zones (BSZs) and EOD missions outside of the BSZ in support of air operations in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. As a secondary mission, Air Force EOD is a key enabler that can be employed independent of traditional air operations for securing other operational level objectives and support to commanders during military operations.

b. **Operational Planning.** The air expeditionary force is the Air Force methodology for presentation of rapidly responsive air and space forces to meet the defense strategy requirements. Through the air expeditionary force, the Air Force supports defense strategy

requirements using a combination of both permanently assigned and rotational forces. The Air Force task-organizes air expeditionary task forces using both US-based and forward stationed units. The Air Force provides basic unit type code packages for planners to develop capabilities at deployed locations. Unit type codes form capabilities to respond to various threat levels. This capability-based building-block approach allows maximum flexibility in EOD force employment:

(1) **4FPXB, Engineer EOD Senior NCO Management (One E-9).** Provide EOD management force and EOD-qualified leadership support to major combat, contingency, and homeland operations where EOD personnel and equipment already exist or are scheduled for deployment. Independently provide forward command functional management.

(2) **4FPXC, Engineer EOD Element Leader (One E-7).** Provide EOD element leadership as well as support to major combat, contingency, and homeland operations.

(3) **4FPXD, Engineer EOD Core Response Team (Three Personnel).** Provide EOD core response team and support to major combat, contingency, and homeland operations.

(4) **4FPXE, Engineer EOD Element Support (Two Personnel).** Augment EOD core response team to support to major combat, contingency, and homeland operations.

(5) **4FPXF, Engineer EOD Management Superintendent (One E-8).** Provide EOD management force to support major combat, contingency, and homeland operations where EOD personnel and equipment already exist or are scheduled for deployment. Independently provide forward command functional senior NCO management.

(6) **4FPXG, Engineer EOD Officer Management (One Officer).** Provide EOD-qualified management officer leadership to manage EOD forces during major combat operations as well as provide support to major combat, contingency, and homeland operations where EOD personnel and equipment already exist or are scheduled for deployment. Independently provide forward command functional management.

(7) **4FPXH, Engineer EOD C2 Team (One Officer, One E-9, and Two E-7s).** Provide G-series command of Air Force EOD units supporting airfield/garrison or JOA missions.

(8) **4FPJB, Engineer SOF EOD Team (Two Personnel).** Serve as combat enablers to Air Force SOF in the execution of various IW missions to include SFA, COIN, stability activities, and building partnership capacity.

c. EOD personnel supporting the air expeditionary force and the en route structure ensure 24-hour coverage on base, in the BSZ, and throughout the operational area. There are two levels of Air Force EOD support to consider for each type of operating location:

(1) Operations under normal contingency conditions (high, medium, or low threat from ballistic missiles or projected munitions).

(2) Asymmetric operations in locations with either openly hostile enemy/insurgent activities (e.g., a C-IED mission) or a recovery of airbases denied by ordnance mission, or both. Asymmetric EOD support requires a supplemental EOD capability.

4. Organization

a. EOD flight (in garrison). The EOD team is the basic building block of an EOD flight. Flights organize functionally and posture manning to suit their mission. However, each EOD flight is required to maintain a minimum of 10 personnel or 30 personnel for larger US Air Force-designated bases.

b. The Air Force task-organizes EOD flights under the civil engineer organization within an Air Force wing/group/squadron as shown in Figure E-1. Flights are responsible for supporting major command missions and posturing deployable force packages. EOD flights fall into the following categories:

- (1) Large-range flights (54 EOD operators).
- (2) Large force-projection flights (25 EOD operators).
- (3) Small force-projection flights (17 EOD operators).
- (4) In-garrison flights (12 EOD operators).

c. EOD flights provide support to the following garrison requirements: aerospace systems and vehicles, C-IED, CWMD, nuclear weapon response, UXO recovery operations, operational range clearance, mortuary services, DSCA, and IW and VIPPSA support.

d. **EOD Low, Medium, and High Threat Expeditionary Flights.** These EOD flights organize functionally and posture manning to suit their mission. Flights depend on supported units or separately sourced Air Force specialties for all logistical, maintenance, communications, and administrative support (see Figure E-2).

e. **Team Structure.** The standard Air Force EOD team is typically composed of three EOD-qualified operators. The EOD team may adjust to a minimum of two EOD-qualified personnel, one of which is an EOD team leader. The teams adjust when manning constraints and the mission warrant. Minimum team manning should be included in EOD-coordinated instructions and accompanied by the commander's operational risk management determination. All EOD teams receive special training, publications, and specialized equipment to perform EOD related tasks.




Figure E-1. Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Organization

United States Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Expeditionary Flight Structure

Type of Base	Threat	Total USAF EOD for Standard AEF Operations	Total USAF EOD for Irregular Warfare Operations or RADBO (Open Hostilities)	Notes
MOB, COB, BB, AB, FOL, Enroute, Hub, Spoke, TTF	High	16 (4 EOD Teams/C2)	28 (6 EOD Teams/C2)	Note 1
MOB, COB, BB, AB, FOL, Enroute, Hub, Spoke, TTF	Medium	12 (3 EOD Teams/C2)	22 (4 EOD Teams/C2)	Note 1
MOB, COB, BB, AB, FOL, Enroute, Hub, Spoke, TTF	Low	8 (2 EOD Teams/C2)	12 (3 EOD Teams/C2)	Note 1
Command/Control (Without in-place EOD Support)		4	4	

NOTE 1:
 If eight Air Force EOD personnel or more are already sourced into or in-place at a base, this satisfies hub, TTF, and air mobility low-threat requirements; no additional personnel are required.

Legend

- AB air base
- AEF aerospace expeditionary forces
- BB bare base
- C2 command and control
- COB collocated operating base
- EOD explosive ordnance disposal
- FOL forward operating location
- MOB main operating base
- RADBO recovery of air bases denied by ordnance
- TTF tanker task force
- USAF United States Air Force

Figure E-2. United States Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Expeditionary Flight Structure

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APPENDIX F EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL REPORTS AND REPORTING

1. Introduction

a. Prompt and accurate explosive event assessment (tactical and technical), material exploitation, and reporting are critical to developing intelligence that supports operations. EOD contributions to information gathering during operations, regardless of Service component, are critical to developing the COP and the safe conduct of operations within an operational area. These reports provide near real-time situational awareness to the commander. They are a record of tactical and technical facts that directly support the intelligence process, while also providing a detailed record of the incident. Additionally, these reports are analyzed for data relevant to the development of valid, timely, and accurate EOD procedures and publications for all EOD technicians.

Note: Joint EOD uses the EOD Information Management System as the standard reporting system to allow EOD commands to track EOD incidents, operations, and other information.

b. Level 1 and 2 EOD reports are analyzed at all levels of government, to include HN, multinational, and US. Because these reports provide information during all facets of an operation that may involve participation from several levels of civil and federal government, it is essential to have common terminology to support universal understanding. Standard EOD terminology is contained in TM 60A-1-1-15, *Glossary of EOD Terminology, Abbreviations, and Designations*. Additionally, US EOD forces may use the WTI handbook for common technical usage.

c. Standardized EOD technical reporting of EOD operations and dissemination provide the commander, and joint EOD forces, with an improved capacity to understand and counter explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards found in the OE. The EOD reports are tailored to meet the level of intelligence they are supporting.

d. Timely and accurate reporting is essential to the efficient movement and exploitation of facts and material (see Figure F-1). TECHINT uses material analysis to help the staffs develop support to targeting packages in support of decisive action, as well as a greater understanding of enemy capabilities and lines of effort.

2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support to the Combatant Commander

a. Prompt EOD reporting provides the CCDR with relevant intelligence. To counter the global explosive threat, the CCDR must build partnerships with intelligence, interagency, and international partners to promote intelligence and information sharing, build capacity, and develop complementary capabilities.

b. EOD forces are the sole source of technical information necessary to perform any comprehensive technical and tactical explosive event analysis. The technical and forensic exploitation of an explosive device, whether rendered safe, collected from an explosion (post-blast), hoax device, turn-in, or components from a weapons cache/find are important.




Figure F-1. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Report Flow of Information

But so too is the information provided by the EOD team/element about the scene. Level 1 exploitation and analysis starts the formation of pattern analysis. Reports developed by the EOD team/element may also be supported by reports from site exploitation representatives who are trained in enhanced nonexplosive collection. This will ensure all necessary data is captured and reported in a means that supports later analytic work. One document that consolidates some of this data is the ordnance order of battle. It consists of friendly and enemy explosive ordnance, weapons systems, and capabilities that can be expected to be encountered, in what amounts, and what delivery systems are present. See Figure F-2 for a visual representation of EOD support to the CCDR.

3. Support to Intelligence

a. Level 1 and 2 EOD reports provide technical and tactical information related to explosives. These reports support the development of intelligence at all levels, to include

Material collected, exploited, and processed from explosive incidents during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM supported force protection; research; development; test and evaluation efforts; training of deploying explosive ordnance disposal personnel; sourcing; and interdiction of materials, targeting of networks, and prosecution in host nation courts of law.

theater, national, and international agencies. Figure F-3 provides a sample visual representation of intelligence fusion. The EOD reports will include the tactical characterization, which includes the tactical design and intended outcome, and the technical categorization of an explosive incident/item. The information in these reports also enables forces to conduct operations, based on facts, against the enemy.

b. Additional reports may be developed and distributed throughout a theater, or worldwide if necessary, regarding specific types of explosive threats (e.g., detonators, IED




Figure F-2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support to the Combatant Commander




Figure F-3. Levels of Intelligence

triggers). These reports are developed by the level 2 exploitation facility, or forwarded from a level 3 facility, and contain information that informs forces of a particular threat.

c. For first-seen military explosive ordnance, or ordnance items of interest, EOD technicians follow procedures contained in TM/TO/Navy EODB 60A-1-1-7, *Field Evaluation and Intelligence*, for TECHINT reporting requirements. Reports, and the explosive ordnance, are forwarded through the chain of command to the Naval Technology Division for further exploitation and render safe/disposal procedure development.

4. Support to Operations

a. EOD reporting provides weapons threat information and intelligence to affect a wide spectrum of military operations. By tracking the enemies continually changing TTP, reporting provides the commander the ability to make rapid tactical decisions (see Figure F-4).

b. At all levels, EOD reports enable the CCDR and staff when developing OPLANs, OPORDs, and policies. EOD reports and products at the operational and strategic level enable:

(1) **FP.** The EOD reports may include information on site surveys conducted to identify and remedy weak points for buildings and bases. Level 1 and 2 reports provide timely identification of new enemy TTP and IED designs that defeat friendly countermeasures, including electronic jamming devices and armor. Information contained in EOD reports support the development of load sets for CREW.

(2) **Targeting.** Technical profiles are used in pattern analysis to link incidents and spread of capability. Forensic science used in the exploitation of recovered information and material from an IED-related incident or weapons cache can be used to recover fingerprints




Figure F-4. Level 1-3 Support to Operations

and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) which may be matched and used to identify participants in the incident. Level 2 and 3 reports contain forensic and biometric information.

(3) **Sourcing.** The exploitation of improvised weapons and IED components to identify patterns in material usage and device assembler patterns can provide clues to the supporting logistic network and local supply sources, or to identify state or non-state sponsor collaboration on the basis of similarity in system type. Level 1 and 2 reports contain trend information which can be fused with other intelligence products.

(4) **Signature (indicator = observable + signature).** Tactical characterization of an improvised weapon or IED incident, to include fabrication and emplacement methods, aid in the allocation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. Level 1 through 3 exploitation reports will provide tactical characterization of an IED from different standpoints. The signature of the weapon or IED incident may support prosecution of technically trained (experienced bomb makers) detainees by linking the characteristics of the device to the individual or associated groups. This information may also provide indicators to the level of training and experience of the bomb maker, which will aid in the questioning and interrogation of the individual prior to prosecution.

(5) **Prosecution Support.** The IED and explosive ordnance-related materials handled in a forensically sound manner with a chain of custody that tracks materials' progress through the exploitation process may be used to support the detention and prosecution of captured terrorists/insurgents. Level 1 through 3 reports provide for the tracking of IED and explosive ordnance-related material that may be used in an HN court of law. Information in the reports that support prosecution may also be used to link individuals that provide the raw materials to the groups that provide the funding for the operation and then to those that construct, design, and emplace the devices.

5. Explosive Ordnance Disposal 9-Line Report

a. An EOD 9-line report is a detailed, two-way reporting system used to request EOD support that makes clear the location of suspected explosive ordnance and the priority for clearance and identifies the unit affected by the explosive ordnance. The report helps the commander set priorities based on the tactical situation. The EOD 9-line is the first echelon report sent when a unit or observer detects suspected explosive ordnance and is transmitted by the fastest means available.

b. The EOD 9-line is routed through the chain of command. Commanders may change the priority to reflect the current tactical situation or future plans. Each commander in the chain is responsible for forwarding the EOD 9-line and for setting proper priority for each report. Commanders must be aware of the status of each incident site in their operational area.

c. The commander's guidance defines priorities. During combat operations it is common to receive multiple requests for EOD support at the same time. The EOD commander, with input from the EOD team/element, will advise the unit commander of the priority for support. Priority of support, while ultimately the unit commander's decision,

should be based on several factors such as available assets, response time, risk to personnel or assets, type of explosive ordnance reported, and mission requirements.

d. Once on site, the EOD team/element will set the response category. Response categories determine the actions the team/element will take to mitigate the explosive device. Only the EOD team/element leader may upgrade or downgrade the category. An example of an EOD 9-line report, with explanation of priority and category, is provided in Figure F-5.

6. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident Report

a. The EOD team/element responding to an incident submits an EOD incident report, preferably in electronic format, through the EOD command chain. The senior EOD commander, or the EOD team/element leader, submits reports of all EOD incidents into a single EOD reporting system. This facilitates the rapid dissemination of emerging or changing TTP, new or first seen explosive ordnance, and interagency regulatory compliance.

b. The first level of reporting of an explosive incident or device is the level 1 report. It supports follow-on reporting and exploitation and when fused with other intelligence data, can affect operations.

c. Each Service maintains Service-specific EOD reports and formats. It is useful when operating as a joint force to have a single reporting format and system. Those EOD assets under OPCON or TACON of the lead Service or EOD JTF prepare the reports as directed by the JTF commander. Regardless of the format of the report, the technical content of the report must be accurate.

d. Within the joint EOD community, the Joint Digital Information Gathering System is the joint EOD data repository for EOD reports. The main EOD feeder of this system is the Joint EOD Information Management System, which is the system of record for EOD unclassified and classified reporting. Information can also be fed by other various global C2 systems that support intelligence and command information system architectures. Figure F-6 provides the minimum amount of information that should be included in the level 1 report. Additional information may be required. Note: This sample does not supersede Service-specific reporting requirements.

e. Figure F-7 provides the type of information that may be included in the level 2 report. The group or JTF level EOD commands provide and manage these reports. Additional information may be required.

7. Other Reporting

Each Service has its own method of investigating explosive incidents. Service directives govern these reports. These reports are used to provide lessons learned to identify and correct training and equipment deficiencies or munitions malfunctions. In addition, EOD reports are used by the Service's explosives safety center and the DOD Explosives Safety Board to aid in the investigation of explosive mishaps or accidents.

Sample Explosive Ordnance Disposal 9-Line Report

Line	Description	Example
1	<u>Date-Time Group (DTG)</u> : DTG item was discovered.	131200ZAUG10
2	<u>Reporting Activity</u> : Unit identification code and location (8-digit grid of explosive threat).	2/505 IR, A CO, 2 PLT BS13221433
3	<u>Contact Information</u> : Radio frequency, call sign, POC, and telephone number, email/chat.	F400, Shockwave3, 1 Lieutenant Turner
4	<u>Type of Explosive Threat</u> : 1. Method of emplacement: Dropped, projected, placed, possible IED, unknown, or thrown. If possible, provide total number of items. 2. Description: Without touching, disturbing, or approaching the item, include details about size, shape, color, and condition (intact or leaking).	Possible 155MM wrapped in wires and tape, 1 visual confirmed, multiple suspected
5	<u>CBRN Contamination</u> : Be as specific as possible (visible and physiological effects).	No
6	<u>Resources Threatened</u> : Report any units, equipment, facilities, or other assets that are threatened.	Items located 1 meter off MSR Sleepy
7	<u>Impact on Mission</u> : Provide a short description of your current tactical situation and how the presence of the explosive threat affects your status.	Vehicle traffic restricted/stopped
8	<u>Protective Measures</u> : Describe any measures take to protect personnel and equipment.	Perimeter established, traffic halted
9	<u>Recommended Priority</u> : Recommend a priority for response by EOD.	Immediate

Incident Priority	Description
Immediate	Incidents that constitute a grave and immediate threat. Stops the unit's maneuver and mission capability or threatens vital assets. These incidents will be given priority over all other incidents. EOD procedures are to be started immediately.
Indirect	Incidents that constitute an indirect threat. Slows the unit's maneuver and mission capability or threatens important assets. Before beginning EOD procedures, a safe waiting period will normally be observed to reduce the hazard to EOD personnel.
Minor	Incidents that constitute a minor threat. Reduces the unit's maneuver and mission capability or threatens noncritical assets of value. EOD personnel will normally deal with these incidents after immediate and indirect incidents, as the situation permits, and with minimum threat to personnel.
No Threat	Incidents that constitute no threat at present. Has little or no effect on the unit's capabilities or assets.

Legend

CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear	MSR	main supply route
CO	company	PLT	platoon
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal	POC	point of contact
IED	improvised explosive device		

Figure F-5. Sample Explosive Ordnance Disposal 9-Line Report

Sample Level 1 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident Report

1. Responding explosive ordnance disposal unit, date-time group, type of event.
2. Responding personnel, responding vehicles, and any special equipment responding to incident.
3. Site point of contact or on-scene commander, security unit, or supported unit.
4. Geographic location (latitude, longitude, and global positioning system) and location with respect to buildings or valuable installations. Include grid, latitude, longitude of incident control point and actual incident site.
5. Tactical situation and identification of target (taken from 9-line plus explosive ordnance disposal assessment).
6. Sequence of events: detailed timeline (notification, departure, arrival scene, departure scene, return to base) of operations, including safety precautions taken.
7. Tactical characterization: detailed description and available photographs/drawings of the scene; and anti-stripping devices or anti-handling devices, secondary and tertiary devices, and environmental conditions.
8. Technical categorization: detailed description and available photographs and sketches of items and components of the hazard; positive identification; external markings/condition of case or body; worn or damaged parts; corrosion, extent and kind of sea growth; condition of explosives; fusing/firing mechanisms; batteries; important components or fittings.
9. List of materials collected (Biometric Automated Toolset System, biometrics, field questionnaire and interviews, explosive identification [test results]).
10. Technical assessment of the hazardous threat. (Reason object functioned or failed to function as designed.) Post blast analysis.
11. Difficulties or unusual circumstances related to the incident. (Tactics, techniques, and procedures deficiencies, equipment deficiencies, and security deficiencies.)
12. Explosive ordnance disposal action/procedures or render safe procedure used.
13. Final disposition of items (level 2 recommendation).
14. List expenditure of demolition materials.
15. Additional pertinent information.
16. Overall and specific technical assessment.

Figure F-6. Sample Level 1 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident Report

Sample Level 2 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident Report

1. Level 1 Report Information
2. Triage Report
3. Chemical Report
4. Biometrics Report
5. DNA Report
6. Firearms and Tool Mark Reports
7. Electronics Report
8. Device Information (cosmetics, power supply)
9. Other Lab Report (Level 3 information)
10. Overall and Specific Technical Assessment

Legend

DNA deoxyribonucleic acid

Figure F-7. Sample Level 2 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident Report

APPENDIX G

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

1. Introduction

Joint AR 75-14/OPNAVINST 8027.2/MCO 8027.1E/AFJI 32-3002, *Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)*, and OPNAVINST 8027.1, *Naval Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program and Mission Support*, provide Service-specific responsibilities to support the entire homeland. DOD EOD forces should maintain relationships with local, state, and other federal bomb disposal and law enforcement agency assets within their geographic locations. These relationships, which include conferences and training exercises, are designed to increase the interoperability and integration with local EOD agencies, improve the response capabilities to civilian authorities, when requested, and enhance the consolidated response capabilities. EOD personnel may also conduct explosive ordnance awareness and education programs that promote public safety and inform the public of the hazards associated with military munitions and explosive items.

2. Published Guidance

a. Numerous policy, directives, issuances, and doctrinal publications provide direction for the employment of EOD forces in support of law enforcement agencies. Non-DOD actors, including local civil authorities and first responders, are frequently unfamiliar with US military terms, definitions, and doctrine. When working with non-DOD actors/partners, especially in an emergency situation, clear, effective, and mutually understandable communication is essential. DOD elements will be able to work much more seamlessly, efficiently, and productively by employing operational concepts and terms that other USG departments, agencies, and authorities already understand.

b. For operations conducted in the homeland to counter terrorist threats or acts, the FBI is the lead federal agency. Close coordination with the FBI ensures roles and responsibilities are well understood prior to actual employment.

c. Military forces providing support to law enforcement agencies must observe the authorities and restrictions imposed by law, to include Titles 10 and 32, USC, and Title 18, USC, Section 1385, The Posse Comitatus Act. Commanders must ensure their forces are aware of and properly trained to act in accordance with the provisions of those statutes.

(1) Title 10, USC, federal military forces will typically not be first responders. The federal military's role in DSCA operations is well defined and is limited by federal law and regulation in scope and duration.

(2) Title 32, USC, National Guard personnel are federally funded, but remain under the control of the state. Because National Guard members serving under Title 32, USC, fall under state control, they do not fall under Posse Comitatus Act restrictions and may, therefore, perform law enforcement duties authorized by state law. However, some states

may have Posse Comitatus Act-like legal restrictions limiting the use of National Guard personnel in Title 32, USC, duty status.

(3) Title 18, USC, Section 1385, Posse Comitatus Act. Except as expressly authorized by the US Constitution or by another act of Congress, the Act prohibits the use of Title 10, USC, Army and Air Force personnel, as enforcement officials to execute state or federal law, or to perform direct law enforcement functions. The Navy and Marine Corps are included in this prohibition as a result of DOD policy articulated in DODD 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*. The Services are required to report off-installation explosive incident support within 72 hours in accordance with DODD 3025.21.

For more information, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

d. Understanding the types of missions that DOD EOD forces participate in while in the homeland is vital to understanding support to law enforcement. Homeland security (HS), HD, and DSCA are distinct actions and not interchangeable terms.

(1) HS is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. HS is an integral element of a broader US national security and domestic policy. Protecting the US from terrorism is the cornerstone of HS.

(2) HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats, as directed by the President. DOD is responsible for HD; therefore, this is not considered support to law enforcement.

(3) DSCA is support provided by federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC, status or when federalized) in response to RFAs from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities or from qualifying entities for special events.

e. DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DSCA, which is the majority of support provided to law enforcement agencies by EOD forces and the authorizing document for immediate response authority. DSCA includes participating in conferences and training exercises, conducting explosive ordnance awareness programs, responding off-post to assist law enforcement dealing with explosive ordnance or suspect IEDs, and supporting special events. Support is initiated by a request for EOD assistance from civil authorities or qualifying entities or authorization from the President or SecDef.

f. DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides DOD support to federal, state, tribal, and local civilian law enforcement agencies. Enclosure 5 provides specific guidance for the employment and reporting of EOD activities in the homeland.

g. Title 40, CFR, Parts 266.200-266.206, *Military Munitions*, outlines when conventional and chemical military munitions become a hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and establishes standards applicable to emergency responses.

h. In accordance with DODD 3025.13, *Employment of DOD Capabilities in Support of the US Secret Service (USSS)*, *Department of Homeland Security (DHS)*, and DODI 3025.19, *Procedures for Sharing Information with and Providing Support to the US Secret Service (USSS)*, *Department of Homeland Security (DHS)*, provides policy for DOD EOD forces to support USSS in providing protection to the President, Vice President, their families, and all foreign dignitaries as directed. Support provided includes surveying areas before and during the dignitaries' visit to locate possible explosive threats and taking appropriate actions in accordance with standard operating procedures. This routine mission is executed by all DOD EOD forces.

i. DODD 2060.02, *Department of Defense (DOD) Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy*, provides guidance which guides the DOD effort to counter WMD. All EOD forces are trained to provide initial response to a WMD incident. Certain elements within the EOD force are able to provide specific capabilities to render safe.

j. CJCSI 3125.01, *Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland*, provides guidance for EOD forces acting in a CBRN response. A CBRN response in the homeland will normally be provided under the auspices of DSCA.

k. National policy general provides national strategic direction that informs GCCs when military action is authorized by the President and SecDef to counter WMD. These strategic directives define presidential WMD authorities for domestic and overseas WMD incidents. These authorities include specific guidance in regards to the employment of forces that have the authority to perform specific actions, such as render safe procedures, on WMD.

l. National Guard weapons of mass destruction-civil support teams (WMD-CSTs) are designed to support the IC and local emergency responders, but are not intended to replace those functions normally performed by the emergency first responder community. WMD-CSTs support crisis management activities by identifying CBRN hazards or threats, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for additional support. WMD-CSTs are not trained to conduct EOD operations, but are prepared to support WMD consequence management. Each of the 57 WMD-CSTs has a mobile analytical laboratory system that can conduct sampling of precursors or remnant products of suspected explosives within applicable safety standards and regulations. Crisis management activities are those that occur prior to an incident, primarily focused on incident prevention and law enforcement.

For additional information, see JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

3. Response Authorities

EOD forces responding to requests from authorities respond under two separate authorities, immediate response and RFA.

a. Immediate Response Authority

(1) In accordance with DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, while executing a DSCA mission normally requires DOD approval, upon civilian authority request, when time does not permit approval from higher authority, and under “imminently serious conditions,” DOD officials may exercise immediate response authority “to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.” EOD forces providing support under immediate response authority will comply with applicable local, state, and federal laws and regulations, including environmental laws and regulations. The authority of state officials is recognized to direct a state immediate response using National Guard personnel under state C2 (including personnel in a Title 32, USC, status) in accordance with state law, but National Guard personnel will not be placed in or extended in Title 32, USC, status to conduct state immediate response activities.

(2) Requests from state or local authorities will be routed through installation authorities according to Service-assigned procedures and then forwarded to the closest EOD unit. When requested, several factors must be applied to determine the appropriate response, if any. The factors applied are cost, appropriateness, readiness, risk, legality, and lethality. In addition to those factors, immediate response authority must also meet the following criteria:

(a) Civilian authority request.

(b) Time does not permit approval from higher authority.

(c) Imminently serious conditions.

(d) Action is needed to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage.

(3) When responding under immediate response authority, immediate notification to the National Joint Operations Intelligence Center, through the chain of command, is required. The center will notify the GCC. For Army units, this notification must be done “within two hours” per a 5 July 2005 Department of the Army message. For Navy units, this notification must be done within two hours, per OPNAVINST 3440.16, *Navy Defense Support of Civil Authorities Program*. Marine Corps commanders must report the decision immediately via chain of command to Headquarters Marine Corps per MCO 3440.7, *Domestic Support Operations*. For all other DOD units, this must be done within “a few hours,” per memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense dated 25 April 2005, *Reporting ‘Immediate Response’ Requests from Civil Authorities*.

(4) If DOD EOD capability is already on scene and assisting civil authorities under immediate response, and appropriate authorities determine additional EOD capability is

required or current EOD capability needs to be retained for a longer time frame, a transition from immediate response should be considered as the event evolves or becomes larger in size and scope. EOD teams/elements that respond under immediate response authority are usually self-sufficient for short periods of time as they do not expect to be away from home station for extended periods. Longer durations may entail increased support and logistics.

b. **RFA.** Civil authorities may also request EOD support under the existing RFA processes. Requests from civil authorities for nonimmediate EOD support are subject to approval by SecDef. Examples of nonimmediate EOD support include, but are not limited to, post-blast analysis, use of DOD material and equipment, and support of preplanned events. Exceptions include those activities in support of the USSS that do not require SecDef approval and those activities undertaken in response to requests for technical assistance or assessment of military munitions that are performed solely for safety purposes. This is usually the case for NSSEs, lesser special security events, or other preplanned operations.

c. FBI approval is required for EOD personnel to employ electronic countermeasures in the US while conducting EOD support as part of a DSCA mission. Per DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, the FBI is the primary federal agency for domestic use of electronic countermeasures. When FBI requests DOD EOD support, the use of ECM equipment or devices must be addressed. All use of electronic countermeasures equipment or devices while conducting EOD operations supporting civilian authorities is coordinated with the FBI's Strategic Information Operations Center and reported to the National Joint Operations Intelligence Center.

4. Considerations

a. Planning/assessment/deployment considerations for EOD:

(1) EOD operations have unique characteristics that must be taken into consideration. Routine EOD operations involve explosives, explosives tools and unique ammunition items, secure communications equipment, and classified documents and materials. EOD operations also require secure workspaces as well as vehicle and equipment storage. Supporting EOD elements may provide further information regarding specific requirements. EOD operates under existing DOD policy and guidance for explosives safety, physical security of arms, ammunition and explosives, and classified materials and communications equipment. DOD EOD must also comply with environmental laws as required.

(2) The transportation to and from the incident, and use at the incident site of classified documents and materials, specifically arms, ammunition and explosives, requires special planning emphasis.

(3) In addition to the above considerations, US Navy EOD has very unique and specific requirements when conducting underwater EOD operations. Navy EOD is the only Service EOD that is manned, trained, and equipped to perform underwater render safe procedures and conduct EOD dive operations. Navy EOD dive operations have unique

logistics, personnel, and mobility support requirements, in addition to any potential hazardous material requirements associated with diving equipment and/or gases. If US Navy EOD is to be involved or requested for support, it is important to establish contact as soon as possible with Navy EOD in order to ascertain their specific requirements.

b. EOD response/support of civil authorities considerations:

- (1) Immediacy and promptness of EOD emergency response.
- (2) Impacts for federal, state, and local law enforcement and first responders already waiting on-scene and holding a secure safe evacuation perimeter.
- (3) Impacts on local populace, communities, and governments. Resolving the incident as quickly as possible, allowing incident command to return the affected area back to normalcy.
- (4) Environmental and explosive safety concerns (including potential CBRN hazards).
- (5) Avoiding adverse impacts on overall disaster response operations. Other first responders and displaced/affected civilian populace should avoid major roads, supply routes, staging areas, aid distribution points, or other critical areas cordoned off awaiting EOD response.
- (6) Mobility considerations (land, air, or water).
- (7) Security considerations for arms, ammunition, explosive, and classified materials.
- (8) EOD may also be required to support FP functions for DOD purposes in addition to supporting civil authorities.

5. Support of Special Events

a. A NSSE is a designation given to certain special events that, by virtue of their political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity. The Secretary of Homeland Security designates NSSEs.

b. Special events may occur with little notice (e.g., a state funeral), but are normally scheduled events allowing proper planning and coordination. The highest levels of events are designated as NSSEs and will normally require short-duration military support. Events include presidential inaugurations; major sporting events; presidential debates; State of the Union Addresses; national political conventions; and international gatherings, such as the G-8 summit. Non-NSSE events, known as special security events, may still generate a request for military support.

APPENDIX H J-2 TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Introduction

a. TECHINT is an intelligence discipline that includes the components of S&TI, the foreign material program, and WTI. The process begins with the acquisition of a foreign piece of equipment or foreign scientific/technological information, followed by exploitation of the item and assessment of the threat. EOD forces contribute to TECHINT for foreign explosive ordnance. It serves as the basis of all EOD tasks because it gives the EOD technician an understanding of the fuzing, functioning, and firing of the ordnance item.

b. EOD forces are the primary collectors in four of the seven categories that support TECHINT. This spans the entire spectrum of the weapons threat (conventional, improvised, and WMD).

(1) **Weapons.** Includes foreign weapons and weapon systems, including IEDs, associated components, improvised weapons, and conventional weapons (e.g., rockets, tube artillery, mortars, small arms, guided missiles, and associated fire control).

(2) **Munitions.** Includes foreign missiles; nuclear, biological, and chemical munitions; direct and indirect fire weapons ammunition; explosives; and mines.

(3) **CBRN Threats and Hazards.** Includes CBRN material including toxic industrial materials. This information is used in determining the threat capability and vulnerability assessments during possible CBRN response operations.

(4) **Flame and Obscurants.** Includes flame materials and obscurants providing the military application of protection, marking, and deception.

c. To address the weapons threat, EOD forces must apply lessons learned. This includes integrating intelligence capabilities into the EOD force to ensure recognition, collection/processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information enabling immediate and deliberate actions against those that employ weapons in the future. As weapons systems become more advanced, the categories of the weapons threat will become blurred to the point where they are unrecognizable until in direct contact with them. A force that is able to adapt to that future environment is essential to all operations. EOD forces need to be familiar with the range of conventional and improvised weapons systems across the globe and maintain their capabilities to counter these weapons threats.

2. Weapons Technical Intelligence Levels

a. The CONOPS for DOD WTI describes the WTI process as agile and adaptable based on information priorities, tactical situation, type of mission, and/or required outputs. To achieve this, WTI activities that collect, exploit, analyze, and disseminate information and material are aligned into five distinct WTI levels that support critical needs in the tactical, operational, and strategic environments.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL LESSONS FROM THE VIETNAM WAR

In-country analysis of improvised weapons systems dates to the Vietnam War. The use of mines and boobytraps against US forces was producing a large number of casualties. In response, US Army Vietnam established the Mine Warfare Center, which conducted operational field research to study the problem at the unit level. Working with the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, studies were produced on enemy TTPs [tacticss, techniques, and procedures] based on enemy prisoner of war interrogations and the exploitation of captured improvised weapons.

While in-country analysis of improvised weapons was ongoing, efforts were under way in the US as well. The US Army Material and Combat Development Command was developing countermeasures, such as kits to increase vehicle body armor and expendable mine rollers, to protect against boobytraps. Although improvised weapons never went away, the lessons learned from the Vietnam conflict quickly disappeared until IEDs [improvised explosive devices] began causing casualties in Iraq in 2003.

A Study of Factors Affecting Mine and Boobytrap Detection: Subject Variables and Operational Conditions, Jeffery L. Maxey

b. Level 1 (tactical) technical collection and exploitation outcomes involve the processing and immediate dissemination of assessed materiel characteristics and purpose close to the point of capture. Basic analysis and presumptive testing may take place at this level as determined by time and resource availability. This is the first level utilizing specialists trained to a higher proficiency. This level is generally noninvasive while details are recorded and materiel is collected, thus preserving the potential recovery of additional information and forensic analysis during secondary collection at higher-level facilities. However, this must be balanced with the need to support more immediate tactical needs where the invasive recovery of information outweighs the need for subsequent technical processing. The decision to conduct procedures to preserve the explosive device and scene will be made by the EOD team/element leader based on safety and mission requirements.

c. Level 2 (operational) technical production is the secondary collection, exploitation, and scientific analysis and dissemination of information and data to support intelligence production while still functioning within the planning and operations cycle of the supported unit. Within technical production, methods include a structured series of actions conducted by functional experts with specialized training and scientific equipment which, although set out sequentially, may also take place concurrently.

d. Level 3 (strategic) technical production is conducted at the national level by experts located at highly specialized scientific and technical facilities with the capacity to conduct full-scale scientific and technical examination and analysis. This would include techniques, applications, and capacity that are unavailable at level 2 facilities. For this reason, level 3 experts will occasionally provide assistance to level 2 facilities, typically when theater capacity is exhausted. Capabilities at this level may include reverse engineering, scientific testing, and detailed component analysis to include the production of surrogate devices for

weapons and countermeasure effects assessments. Level 3 technical production can be arranged on a bilateral basis with those nations that possess a like capability. It is critical that information gained through level 3 technical production be shared with theater personnel and PNs whenever possible.

e. Levels 4 (national) and 5 (strategic oversight and special activities) facilities are CONUS-based elements that support production for the theater objectives. The following CONUS-based elements support production for the theater's objectives.

(1) **National-Level Agencies.** In accordance with DODD 5205.15E, *DOD Forensic Enterprise (DFE)*, the Director, DIA, is tasked with establishing the standards, processes, and procedures required for the application of forensics to WTI collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation processes. The Director, DIA, should coordinate with the Director of DTRA for Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) when these standards, processes, and procedures pertain to the exploitation of IEDs and their components in accordance with DOD policy.

(2) **DOD S&TI.** Organizations within the DOD S&TI process and exploit captured material in support of tactical and operational commanders and strategic objectives. The primary point of contact with these organizations is the JFC. The JFC's J-2 has staff responsibility in managing captured materiel exploitation activities in the JOA. This requires the following actions by the J-2:

(a) Coordinate with the DIA to identify national-level TECHINT requirements that will be tasked to the JFC.

(b) Identify support requirements that organizations within the DOD S&TI community will be tasked to fulfill.

3. Overview

a. The products derived from the collection, exploitation, and analysis of TECHINT materials allow US forces and MNFs to develop weapons, TTP, and various other countermeasures that support tactical through strategic level operations (see Figure H-1). EOD forces provide the information, materials, and reports essential to data fusion and product development. The end-result permits the identification of tactical and technical characteristics and enables an attack against networks in order to defeat devices and minimize their effectiveness.

b. Exploitation begins at the incident site with the EOD team/element performing render safe procedures or techniques, or conducting a post-blast analysis (see Figure H-2). This allows for the preservation and immediate collection of material related to the weapon system and enables continued tactical site exploitation of the scene. Once the weapon is declared safe to transfer, products are collected in a forensically sound manner and then transported to the nearest processing facility for further analysis. The EOD team/element may provide information to the finding unit that warrants immediate FP actions that can be taken to mitigate the effects of the weapons threat.




Figure H-1. Sample In-Theater Analysis Capability

c. The weapon or weapon components that require further analysis are packaged and sent to an in-country level 2 exploitation facility along with the level 1 report. After comprehensive exploitation, a level 2 report is produced and is the basis of technical data processing and data basing. Single-source analysis is performed and then undertaken, and this analysis is sent forward for fusion by all-source analysts who incorporate key weapons-related analysis in intelligence products which support the commander's operational process and JPP within the OE. Once the information has been fused, deliberate actions may be taken against the weapons threat at all levels of operation. For more information on reporting, see Appendix F, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal Reports and Reporting."

d. If the weapon or weapon components are believed to have strategic value they may be forwarded to a level 3 facility, such as the FBI's TEDAC, which is a CONUS-based level 3 exploitation facility. Currently, TEDAC forwards items to national labs and universities which undertake level 4 exploitation.




Figure H-2. Level 1-4 Exploitation

e. Further exploitation at a level 4 facility will combine exploitation and analysis with national policy guidelines and link laboratories worldwide to exploit items using varied scientific disciplines.

4. Weapons Technical Intelligence—Conventional Weapons

a. The NSWC IHEODTD provides a 24/7 technical reachback capability to the joint EOD force. The technical division provides EOD technicians worldwide with real-time information essential to countering rapidly evolving, sophisticated explosive threats. It also provides direct access for all DOD and USG and allied government entities, to include law enforcement, to technical information and SMEs in EOD.

b. The Secretaries of the Military Departments have established management controls to ensure all joint EOD programs for acquisition of explosive ordnance and applicable weapon

delivery systems provide for development of EOD technical source data in accordance with single manager for EOD technology and training specifications, availability of hardware for joint EOD validation and verification testing, and recommendation of tools necessary for EOD render safe and disposal operations.

c. Prior to fielding any US weapons system, the NSWC IHEODTD ensures all weapons technical data relating to the design, functioning, and safety for development of EOD tools, equipment, and procedures is tested and validated. Validated information and procedures are entered into AEODPS which is distributed to the joint EOD community.

d. AEODPS is a database containing technical data for all known foreign and US explosive ordnance. The database is maintained by the NSWC IHEODTD, who is responsible for creating joint EOD publications. The NSWC IHEODTD employs mechanical and electrical engineers, information technology specialists, intelligence analysts, physicists, chemists, and SMEs from a variety of unique disciplines. This multidisciplinary team is tasked with developing tools, equipment, and procedures that are used to render safe and dispose of all explosive ordnance. This effort also supports the foreign ordnance material database established for the DIA and related activities through FMA.

e. Acquisition of foreign ordnance for exploitation is vital to provide technical data for tactical-level EOD technicians. EOD teams/elements will encounter a variety of foreign ordnance and weapons in a variety of conditions. Markings may not be distinguishable to easily identify the type of weapon or ordnance. Technical data, such as length, diameter, or stamps, may provide enough detail for the EOD technician to locate the item in the database. Ordnance found in the OE can be traced back to the country of origin during the exploitation process.

f. An understanding of enemy weapons capabilities is essential prior to and during any operation. EOD forces at the operational level assist with the development of the enemy ordnance order of battle for the Ccdr.

5. Weapons Technical Intelligence—Improvised Weapons

a. WTI information gained from technical and forensic exploitation of improvised weapons supports the identification, capture, and removal of global enemy networks. It allows the commander to stay informed and ahead of the enemy's decision cycle by providing theater technical support to exploit these weapons. To support each contingency, a unique, flexible, modular/scalable WTI capability is required. Explosive ordnance forces provide this capability at the tactical through strategic level to understand the tactical design associated with an event so EOD may gain insight into the answers for three key questions; why here, why now, why this way?

b. Improvised weapons are a subcategory of the weapons threat that includes modified munitions and weapons, IEDs, and improvised CBRN devices. Exploitation of improvised weapons may be the greatest contribution EOD forces made to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

c. At the tactical level, EOD teams/elements may be able to make the immediate determination of tactical design and technical categorization of an improvised weapon during level 1 exploitation. This information can be used by supported forces to conduct immediate actions against opposing forces employing the weapon. Using the WTI lexicon, EOD teams/elements develop reports that are forwarded through the EOD chain of command and sent directly to the supported unit to aid in targeting and provide early warning of attacks and opposition capabilities.

d. Tactical design of an improvised weapon includes the method of identification, employment, emplacement, and attachment, as well as sensor defeat and the role of the IED, as outlined in Figure H-3. This information allows the commander to properly plan for particular types of improvised weapons that may be employed in an operational area.

e. The determination of the technical categorization of an improvised weapon is made by examining its key components, as outlined in Figure H-4. These components make up the device fuzing, firing, functioning, power, and main charge and provide materials directly associated with the weapon. EOD teams/elements collect these components after the rendering safe of a weapon or the collection of components during a post-blast investigation or tactical site exploitation. Physical material, along with a level 1 report is forwarded to in-theater level 2 facilities.

f. At the operational level, the exploitation of the improvised weapon is vital in providing information and data to support intelligence production, FP, targeting, material sourcing, and signature characterization.

g. Level 2 exploitation facilities may have the capability to exploit both the explosive and nonexplosive components of improvised weapons. The exploitation of the explosive material from an improvised weapon to determine chemical composition may resolve whether the explosive content is military grade, produced in a laboratory, or homemade. This information aids in identifying whether the device has tactical, operational, or strategic impact.

h. The exploitation of the nonexplosive components of an improvised weapon links individuals and attribute groups, and state and non-state sponsors to the weapon system. Fingerprints, DNA, tactical design, level of sophistication, component origination and material, and component/device assembler patterns all provide essential links to individuals or groups who have the ability to employ specific weapons. From this information, along with the explosive information, a determination can be made if the improvised weapon should be forwarded for further technical exploitation and analysis based on the significance of the material, documents, and media.

i. Certain weapons will require automatic or immediate forwarding to a level 3 facility based on construction techniques, level of sophistication, origin, or other specific criteria. Level 3 facilities are able to provide global support and play an important role in the exploitation of improvised weapons, especially in theaters where there is little to no level 2 exploitation capabilities. Products from level 3 facilities are fused with theater and national intelligence sources to support BEI, FEI, targeting support packages, comprehensive




Figure H-3. Improvised Weapon Tactical Design

technical assessments on electronic items, explosive chemical analysis, and DNA comparison and analysis. Facilities have the capability to warehouse significant items and return items to support HN prosecution efforts.




Figure H-4. Technical Categorization

6. Weapons of Mass Destruction Technical Intelligence

When dealing with WMD it is important to understand the rules and regulations that govern which capabilities may be applied to the threat. EOD forces should work within the guidelines set forth in policy when conducting WTI activities on WMD.

7. Technical Reachback

a. Technical reachback is the capability to contact technical SMEs when an issue either exceeds the capabilities at the tactical or operational level, or the weapon is determined to be of global or strategic value. Reachback should be conducted using established unit and theater protocols. While some organizations are solely focused on the Service EOD forces, others have a primary mission that is not specifically resourced for reachback.

b. **NSWC IHEODTD.** The NSWC IHEODTD exploits technology and intelligence to develop and deliver joint EOD information, tools, equipment, and their life-cycle support to meet the needs of the EOD operating forces and other customers. Core functions include:

- (1) Developing EOD procedures to counter munitions threats.
- (2) Developing tools and equipment to meet EOD operational needs.
- (3) Performing in-service engineering for EOD tools and equipment for joint use.
- (4) Performing depot-level management and repair for EOD tools and equipment.

c. **TEDAC.** TEDAC has several core functions:

(1) Manages critical program(s) and/or long-term projects relating to the forensic analysis of bombing matters.

(2) Maintains the Explosives Reference File and the Explosives Reference Tool database.

(3) Conducts training in bombing crime scene investigations and terrorist bombing matters.

(4) Performs chemical analyses to determine the type of explosives used in an improvised explosive or incendiary device.

(5) Assists investigators in determining if debris from a fire of suspicious origin has an accelerant present.

(6) Accepts, conducts safety inspection, and prepares for transport explosive material and IED components when arriving in CONUS.

(7) Prepares device accounting, cataloging, and storage.

d. **NGIC.** The NGIC conducts TECHINT-related identity analysis, biometric analysis, and devices or component analysis to support the targeting of key individuals in enemy IED networks. The NGIC leverages biometric and forensic exploitation results from laboratory submissions to rapidly match individuals to specific IED incidents by matching and assessing latent prints, fibers, and other data. The NGIC TECHINT analysts support targeting by conducting personality and device based network analysis. Related tasks include:

- (1) Targeting and developing intelligence on IED networks.
- (2) Identifying insurgent capabilities, vulnerabilities, and likely COAs.

(3) Preparing all-source intelligence assessments and analysis.

(4) Preparing periodic and special IED intelligence reports, plans, and briefs.

e. **MCIA.** MCIA conducts TECHINT-related identity and biometric analysis in support of targeting of key individuals in enemy threat networks and the exploitation of expeditionary foreign weapons systems and components, including foreign commercial items with potential military application and related technologies. The MCIA Identity Intelligence Analysis Cell supports operating forces with all-source identity intelligence analysis, global exploitation data management, training support, and custom-tailored watch list solutions. The MCIA Identity Intelligence Analysis Cell leverages biometric and forensic exploitation results from laboratory submissions to rapidly match individuals to specific IED incidents by matching and assessing latent prints, fibers, and other data. Related tasks include:

(1) Identify foreign threat capabilities, limitation, and vulnerabilities of VSW mines, police forces of the world, emerging and disruptive technologies, coastal defense systems, foreign amphibious capabilities, and foreign antiaccess/area denial capabilities.

(2) Conduct analysis of littoral defenses, coastal characteristics, expeditionary points of entry, and physical environment for peace operations, humanitarian assistance missions, and forced entry operations.

(3) Exploit expeditionary equipment captured during military operations.

(4) Coordinate and oversee extraction of appropriate equipment to the US in conjunction with DIA.

(5) Prepare all-source intelligence assessments and threat analysis.

(6) Prepare periodic and special intelligence reports, plans, and briefs.

f. **Combat Incident Analysis Division.** The Combat Incident Analysis Division, also located at NGIC, analyzes the results of insurgent attacks on armored vehicles worldwide. Analysis is provided to operational commanders down to battalion level, materiel and R&D program managers, and DOD leaders. The Combat Incident Analysis Division maintains the Anti-Armor Incident Database to record, compare, and analyze strikes against armored vehicles. This organization uses WTI-derived intelligence to identify trends in the enemy's development, manufacture, and procurement of anti-armor weapons. It makes recommendations to mitigate the effects of anti-armor weapons (for example, explosively formed penetrators). A primary focus of the division is providing intelligence to support elements of the protection warfighting function and materiel development based on using the outcome of certain types of IEDs and improvised weapons and the damage and casualties they inflict.

g. **JIDO.** JIDO leads DOD actions in support of the CCDRs and their respective JTF efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. JIDO develops FP requirements and streamlines S&TI, along with prioritizing R&D.

h. **Intelligence and Information Warfare Directorate.** The Intelligence and Information Warfare Directorate is a part of the US Army Communications Electronics Research and Engineering Center. Its stated mission is to identify, develop, evaluate, tailor, and insert emerging information technologies into operational systems. The directorate supports EOD operations through EW and radio frequency detection.

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- f. PPD-23, *Security Sector Assistance*.
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- l. Title 10, USC, *Section 407*.
- m. Title 42, USC, *Section 6901*.
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- v. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation.*
- w. JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater.*
- x. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.*

- y. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.
- z. JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*.
- aa. JP 3-15.1, *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations*.
- bb. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- cc. JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*.
- dd. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.
- ee. JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*.
- ff. JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*.
- gg. JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- hh. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- ii. JP 3-30, *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations*.
- jj. JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*.
- kk. JP 3-32, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*.
- ll. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
- mm. JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.
- nn. JP 3-40, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*.
- oo. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response*.
- pp. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- qq. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
- rr. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- ss. JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*.
- tt. JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs*.

4. Multi-Service Publications

- a. TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-11.36/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.83, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency Management*.

b. Army Techniques Publication 4-32.16/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal*.

c. Army Techniques Publication 4-32.2 [Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 4-32.2]/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance*.

d. Joint AR 75–14/OPNAVINST 8027.2/MCO 8027.1E/AFJI 32-3002, *Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)*.

e. AR 12-15/SECNAVINST 4950.4B/AFI 16-105, *Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training*.

5. Other Publications

a. 2012-2017, *Defense Intelligence Agency Strategy*.

b. *Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2012-2016*.

c. DOJ, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States Implementation Plan*.

d. *Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, 2013 Review*, cttso.gov.

e. Defense Logistics Manual 4000.25, *Federal Condition Codes*.

f. *Defense Security Cooperation Agency Vision 2020*.

g. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)*, samm.dsca.mil, accessed 5 October 2014.

h. DOS website: *Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security*, <http://www.state.gov/t/>; *Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement*, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/>; and *Conventional Weapons Destruction*, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c3670.htm>.

i. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization's Lessons-Learned: *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations*.

j. NATO STANAG 2143, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Principles and Minimum Standards of Proficiency–AEODP–10*.

k. NATO STANAG 2282, *Interservice EOD Operations on Multinational Deployments–ATP-72(A)*.

l. NATO STANAG 2377, *EOD Roles, Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Incident Procedures When Operating with Non-EOD Trained Agencies and Personnel*.

- m. *Technical Support Working Group website, tswg.gov.*
- n. *Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (WMD CST) Doctrine Handbook, No. 1-2000, hsd1.org.*
- o. *OPNAVINST 3440.16D, Navy Defense Support of Civil Authorities Program.*
- p. *OPNAVINST F3501.97, Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environments for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group Forces.*
- q. *OPNAVINST 3501.374A, Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environment for Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division Expeditioner Exploitation Unit One.*
- r. *OPNAVINST 8027.1H, Naval Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program and Mission Support.*
- s. *MCO 3440.7B, Domestic Support Operations.*

APPENDIX K ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine (DD JED), Attn: Joint Doctrine Division, 7000 Joint Staff (J-7), Washington, DC, 20318-7000 or email:js.pentagon.j7.list.dd-je-d-jdd-all@mail.mil.

- b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JED.

- c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

4. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DODM 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*; and DODM 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint

Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at <https://www.jllis.mil> or <http://www.jllis.smil.mil>.

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7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (NIPRNET) and <http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADCON	administrative control
AEODP	allied explosive ordnance disposal publication
AEODPS	Automated Explosive Ordnance Disposal Publication System
AFI	Air Force instruction
AFJI	Air Force joint instruction
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AOR	area of responsibility
AR	Army regulation
ARDEC	United States Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center
ARG	amphibious ready group
AT	antiterrorism
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (DOJ)
ATP	allied tactical publication
BEI	biometrics-enabled intelligence
BSZ	base security zone
C2	command and control
CBR	chemical, biological, and radiological
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CCMD	combatant command
CEXC	combined explosives exploitation cell
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CI	counterintelligence
C-IED	counter-improvised explosive device
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJEODC	combined joint explosive ordnance disposal cell
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COA	course of action
COIN	counterinsurgency
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
CREW	counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device
	electronic warfare
CSG	carrier strike group

CT	counterterrorism
CTF	commander, task force
CTU	commander, task unit
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
DERP	Defense Environmental Restoration Program
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DNA	deoxyribonucleic acid
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DODM	Department of Defense manual
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOMEX	document and media exploitation
DOS	Department of State
DS	direct support
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
DTIRP	Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECM	electromagnetic countermeasures
EHCC	explosive hazards coordination cell
EO	executive order
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EODB	explosive ordnance disposal bulletin
EODESU	explosive ordnance disposal expeditionary support unit
EODGRU	explosive ordnance disposal group (Navy)
EODMU	explosive ordnance disposal mobile unit
EODT&T	explosive ordnance disposal technology and training
EODTEU	explosive ordnance disposal training and evaluation unit
EODTIC	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Information Centre (NATO)
ES	expeditionary salvage
ESG	expeditionary strike group
EW	electronic warfare
EXORD	execute order
EXU1	Expeditionary Exploitation Unit One
FARC	flyaway recompression chamber
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)
FEI	forensic-enabled intelligence
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FMA	foreign materiel acquisition
FP	force protection

GCC	geographic combatant commander
GFM	global force management
GS	general support
HD	homeland defense
HMA	humanitarian mine action
HN	host nation
HQ	headquarters
HS	homeland security
IC	intelligence community
IED	improvised explosive device
IMET	international military education and training
IW	irregular warfare
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff
JCMEC	joint captured materiel exploitation center
JEODOC	joint explosives ordnance disposal operations center
JEODTF	joint explosives ordnance disposal task force
JFC	joint force commander
JFHQ-NCR	Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region
JIDO	Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (DTRA)
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JPP	joint planning process
JRSOI	joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JTF	joint task force
LNO	liaison officer
LOO	line of operation
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MARSOC	United States Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command
MARSOFF	Marine Corps special operations forces
MAW	Marine aircraft wing
MC	mobile communications
MCIA	Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MCM	mine countermeasures
MCO	Marine Corps order

MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MDS	mobile diving and salvage
MDSU	mobile diving and salvage unit
MEB	Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MLG	Marine logistics group
MMS	marine mammal system
MNEODCC	multinational explosives ordnance disposal control center
MNF	multinational force
MTAB	Military Technical Acceptance Board
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSCOLEOD	Naval School Explosive Ordnance Disposal
NAVSO	Navy special operations forces
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSSE	national special security event
NSW	naval special warfare
NSWC IHEODTD	Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OE	operational environment
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPNAVINST	Chief of Naval Operations instruction
OPORD	operation order
ORSA	operations research and systems analysis
OTERA	organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise
PfP	Partnership for Peace (NATO)
PLT	platoon
PN	partner nation
PPD	Presidential policy directive
R&D	research and development
RFA	request for assistance
S&T	science and technology
S&TI	scientific and technical intelligence

S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army; Marine Corps battalion or regiment)
SA	security assistance
SAP	special access program
SC	security cooperation
SCC-WMD	United States Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SECNAVINST	Secretary of the Navy instruction
SFA	security force assistance
SJA	staff judge advocate
SME	subject matter expert
SOF	special operations forces
STANAG	standardization agreement (NATO)
STO	special technical operations
TACON	tactical control
TECHINT	technical intelligence
TEDAC	Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (FBI)
TM	technical manual
TO	technical order
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TSOC	theater special operations command
TTAB	Technical Training Acceptance Board
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UMS	unmanned system
UN	United Nations
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSS	United States Secret Service (TREAS)
UXO	unexploded explosive ordnance
VIPPSA	very important personnel protection support activity
VSW	very shallow water
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMD-CST	weapons of mass destruction-civil support team
WTI	weapons technical intelligence

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

explosive hazard. 1. Any material posing a potential threat that contains an explosive component such as unexploded explosive ordnance, booby traps, improvised explosive devices, captured enemy ammunition, and bulk explosives. (JP 3-15) 2. In explosive ordnance disposal, a condition where danger exists because explosives are present that may react in a mishap with potential unacceptable effects to people, property, operational capability, or the environment. Also called **EH**. (JP 3-42) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

explosive ordnance. All munitions and improvised or clandestine explosive devices, containing explosives, propellants, nuclear fission or fusion materials, and biological and chemical agents. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

explosive ordnance disposal. 1. The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, exploitation, recovery, and final disposal of explosive ordnance. 2. The organizations engaged in such activities. Also called **EOD**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

explosive ordnance disposal incident. The suspected or detected presence of unexploded or damaged explosive ordnance that constitutes a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and requires explosive ordnance disposal procedures. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

explosive ordnance disposal procedures. Any particular course or mode of action taken by qualified explosive ordnance disposal personnel to detect and/or locate, access, identify, triage, diagnose, stabilize, render safe or neutralize, recover, exploit, and dispose of ordnance, explosives, or any hazardous material associated with an explosive ordnance disposal incident. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

explosive ordnance disposal unit. Personnel with special training and equipment who render explosive ordnance safe, make intelligence reports on such ordnance, and supervise the safe removal thereof. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-42 as the source JP.)

improvised nuclear device. A device incorporating fissile materials designed or constructed outside of an official government agency that has, appears to have, or is claimed to be a nuclear weapon that is no longer in the control of a competent authority or custodian or has been modified from its designated firing sequence. Also call **IND**. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

munition. A complete device charged with explosives; propellants; pyrotechnics; initiating composition; or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material for use in operations including demolitions. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)


render safe procedures. The portion of the explosive ordnance disposal procedures involving the application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of

unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-42 as the source JP.)

unexploded explosive ordnance. Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. Also called **UXO**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-42** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

