King v. Burwell

King v. Burwell, Halbig v. Burwell, Pruitt v. Burwell, and Indiana v. IRS are a set of related lawsuits challenging U.S. Treasury regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(a)(1), issued under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The challengers argue that the text of the ACA only allows for subsidies on state-run exchanges, and that the regulation as implemented by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), providing for subsidies on state-run exchanges as well as federal exchanges, exceeded the authority Congress granted to it. All of the "v. Burwell" cases were originally titled "v. Sebelius" until Kathleen Sebelius was replaced by Sylvia Mathews Burwell as United States Secretary of Health and Human Services.

Only 14 states have set up their own exchanges. If the mandates and subsidies are struck down in the other 36 states, many think that the economic foundation of the ACA would be undermined, putting the entirety of the legislation at risk. If the challenge is successful, approximately 5 million Americans who obtained coverage through federal exchanges would lose their tax credits and, in all likelihood, their health insurance coverage. The Individual mandate, employer mandate, and tax credits for employers to provide health-insurance coverage would also likely be overturned in states with federal exchanges. However, insurers would still be required to cover all applicants regardless of pre-existing conditions, which would destabilize the insurance market in states with federal exchanges and lead to rapid rises in premiums and the possible collapse of the insurance market in those states.

Ruling on the same day, The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in King and the D.C. Court of Appeals in Halbig came to opposite conclusions, creating a circuit split. When the D.C. appeals court decided to rehear the case en banc, however, the court vacated its initial ruling, removing the split. On November 7, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the King case, with oral arguments expected to be held in March 2015 and a decision issued by late June or early July 2015.

Text of the law and regulation

The ACA legislation includes the language "enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under 1311" where the IRS regulation implements a more broad definition encompassing both the state exchanges and the federal exchanges set up under section 1321. The legislation includes the phrase "established by the State under 1311" in nine different locations.

Internal Revenue Code section 36B, enacted as part of the ACA, includes the following provision:

In the case of an applicable taxpayer, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this subtitle for any taxable year an amount equal to the premium assistance credit amount of the taxpayer for the taxable year.

(2) (a) the monthly premiums for such month for 1 or more qualified health plans offered in the individual market within a State which cover the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or any dependent (as defined in section 152) of the taxpayer and which were enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under 1311 [1] of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, [...]

The IRS regulation reads as follows:

(a) In general. An applicable taxpayer (within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section) is allowed a premium assistance amount only for any month that one or more members of the applicable taxpayer's family (the applicable taxpayer or the applicable taxpayer's spouse or dependent)—

(1) Is enrolled in one or more qualified health plans through an Exchange [ . . . ]

The IRS defined the term "Exchange" as:

[ . . . ] a governmental agency or non-profit entity that meets the applicable standards of this part [part 155 of title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations] and makes QHPs [qualified health plans] available to qualified individuals and/or qualified employers. Unless otherwise identified, this term includes an Exchange serving the individual market for qualified individuals and a SHOP [Small Business Health Options Program] serving the small group market for qualified employers, regardless of whether the Exchange is established and operated by a State (including a regional Exchange or subsidiary Exchange) or by HHS [the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services].

Chevron test

In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. the Supreme Court ruled that congress may delegate regulatory authority to an agency, and that the agency's regulations carry the weight of the law, if the regulations pass the two part "Chevron test".

(1) "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."

"If the Court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute . . . Rather,

(2) [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question, the issue for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984).

Arguments

Legislative intent

Plaintiffs argue that Congress intentionally restricted payment of subsidies to state exchanges to induce states into setting up exchanges so their citizens could receive subsidies.

The government argues that the law intends for federal exchanges to be treated identically to state exchanges (and therefore qualifying individuals are entitled to subsidies whether or not their state has set up an exchange), or, in the alternative, if the law were ambiguous, that the regulation at issue was a permissible interpretation of the law.

Lyle Denniston wrote that the parties' positions offer differing views on how to interpret legislation: while the plaintiffs argue that only the words of a statute can govern its interpretation, the government argues that courts can look outside the text of a statute to consider policy objectives Congress intended to achieve.

In a 2009 paper, Timothy Jost published an article in the Georgetown Law Journal that argued that one way to avoid a commandeering issue with the ACA would be "by offering tax subsidies for insurance only in states that complied with federal requirements." Jost later published an oped in the Washington Post arguing that allowing subsidies for Federal exchanges is "the only way of reading the statute that makes sense." In an article on Forbes, Jost pointed out that his original law journal article proposed "several alternatives through which Congress could encourage the states to establish exchanges, one of which was to limit the availability of tax credits to states that operate exchanges. The first alternative [proposed] was that Congress ask the states to establish exchanges, but create a federal fallback exchange in the event they failed to do so."

Others have argued that the issue is due to a drafting error during the legislative process. Yale Law School Professor Abbe Gluck said that the unusual maneuver of having the ACA become law through reconciliation required a preliminary version of the bill to become law without the "usual legislative clean-up process".

On January 18, 2012, Jonathan Gruber, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist who was a consultant on the ACA, said, "What’s important to remember politically about this is if you’re a state and you don’t set up an exchange, that means your citizens don’t get their tax credits." On January 10, 2012, Gruber said, "... if your governor doesn’t set up an exchange, you’re losing hundreds of millions of dollars of tax credits to be delivered to your citizens." Gruber has characterized his earlier statements as "a mistake". Gruber's statements have been widely quoted by proponents of the plaintiff's position, and were used in Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt's case (Pruitt v. Burwell). The quotes were also cited by the plaintiff's attorney for King v. Burwell in his appeal to the Supreme Court.

King v. Burwell

Fourth Circuit decision

King v. Burwell
Court	United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Argued	May 14, 2014
Decided	July 22, 2014
Case opinions
The plaintiffs contend that the IRS’s interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute, which, they assert, authorizes tax credits only for individuals who purchase insurance on state-run Exchanges. For reasons explained below, we find that the applicable statutory language is ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations. Applying deference to the IRS’s determination, however, we uphold the rule as a permissible exercise of the agency’s discretion.
Court membership
Judge(s) sitting	Stephanie Thacker, Roger Gregory, Andre M. Davis
Keywords
Internal Revenue Service, Affordable Care Act

The Fourth Circuit court unanimously upheld the regulation, saying that the wording in the statute was ambiguous, and that the IRS wording was a reasonable interpretation of the statute:

The plaintiffs-appellants bring this suit challenging the validity of an Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) final rule implementing the premium tax credit provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA” or “Act”). The final rule interprets the ACA as authorizing the IRS to grant tax credits to individuals who purchase health insurance on both state-run insurance “Exchanges” and federally-facilitated “Exchanges” created and operated by the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). The plaintiffs contend that the IRS’s interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute, which, they assert, authorizes tax credits only for individuals who purchase insurance on state-run Exchanges. For reasons explained below, we find that the applicable statutory language is ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations. Applying deference to the IRS’s determination, however, we uphold the rule as a permissible exercise of the agency’s discretion. [....]Rejecting all of the plaintiffs' arguments as to why Chevron deference is inappropriate in this case, for the reasons explained above we are satisfied that the IRS Rule is a permissible construction of the statutory language. We must therefore apply Chevron deference and uphold the IRS Rule....

Although the court ruled unanimously for the government, the opinion stated that it "cannot ignore the common-sense appeal of the plaintiffs’ argument; a literal reading of the statute undoubtedly accords more closely with [the plaintiffs’] position," and "the [government has] the stronger position, although only slightly."

Supreme Court

On November 7, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the plaintiff's appeal of the 4th Circuit ruling. A ruling is expected by June 2015.

The decision to grant certiorari was unusual. It was believed that the Supreme Court would not grant certiorari given the lack of a circuit split, instead awaiting further decisions from lower courts before reviewing the issue. University of Michigan Law School Assistant Professor Nicholas Bagley described the decision to grant certiorari as indicating that "four justices apparently think—or at least are inclined to think—that King was wrongly decided".

Halbig v. Burwell

Halbig v. Burwell
No. 14-5018
Court	United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Argued	March 25, 2014
Decided	July 22, 2014
Case history
Prior action(s)	Summary judgment for government defendants, 2014 WL 129023 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014)
Subsequent action(s)	Rehearing en banc ordered (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
Case opinions
The IRS does not have the statutory power to grant subsidies to Federally-established insurance marketplaces known as exchanges established under the Affordable Care Act, as the enabling legislation defines exchanges as being established by states themselves. Reversed and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to the appellants and to vacate the IRS rule, 2–1. Opinion by Judge Griffith, concurrence by Judge Randolph. Judge Edwards dissents.
Court membership
Judge(s) sitting	Thomas B. Griffith, A. Raymond Randolph, Harry T. Edwards
Keywords
Internal Revenue Service, Affordable Care Act

DC Court of Appeals decision

On July 22, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled 2–1 in favor of the plaintiff, Jacqueline Halbig.

The Court of Appeals stated:

Because we conclude that the ACA [the Affordable Care Act] unambiguously restricts the [Internal Revenue Code] section 36B subsidy to insurance purchased on Exchanges "established by the State", we reverse the district court and vacate the IRS's regulation [26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(a)(1)].

Court of Appeals rehearing

On September 4, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the U.S. Secretary of Health's petition for rehearing the case en banc. The D.C. Circuit's order set a briefing schedule starting on October 3 and ending on November 17. It sets oral argument for December 17, 2014, at the Prettyman Courthouse in Washington, D.C. The order also vacates the previous July 22 judgment.

Commentators said that the likelihood of a ruling in favor of the government by the en banc court was increased by the confirmation of three nominees to the D.C. Circuit following an invocation of the nuclear option in November 2013.

Pruitt v. Burwell and Indiana v. IRS

On September 9, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma ruled against the IRS saying

The court holds that the IRS Rule is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A), in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(C), or otherwise is an invalid implementation of the ACA, and is hereby vacated.

In Indiana v. IRS the state of Indiana and multiple Indiana school districts are suing the IRS claiming that the employer mandate should not apply to schools or local governments. The IRS argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue, but that argument was rejected and Judge William T. Lawrence in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana ruled that the case could proceed. Oral arguments occured in October 2014 but a ruling has not been issued.

See also

• Federalism in the United States