Foreign Policy Bipartisanship is Not Dead UPDATED Posted by David Shorr

Bipartisanship in foreign policy hasn't vanished entirely, though in the recent political climate it probably qualifies as exotic. Today the Project for a United and Strong America is releasing a proposed national security strategy from a bipartisan group of experts (including yours truly). Having done a couple of these accross-party-lines exercises  back in 2006-07, it was interesting to see how it goes after the change of administrations. So I'll start with a congratulatory shout-out to Kurt Volker, Ash Jain, and Jim Goldgeier for successfully leading us to consensus. 

Despite the continued high temperature of foreign policy debates, relations between Republican and Democratic experts have stayed pretty amicable. For some, this is a vice not a virtue -- symptom of an insular groupthink-prone Washington establishment. For the rest of you, let me offer thoughts to inform your reading of this "Setting Priorities for American Leadership" strategy report.

What I find most interesting in a document like this are the ways it differs from what we hear in the political battles over foreign policy. With apologies to Sherlock Holmes, I suggest you listen for the partisan attack dog that didn't bark. Readers of this blog know all too well what issues and perspectives have split the opposing political camps; the "Setting Priorities for American Leadership" national security strategy marks out their common ground. It's not as if the experts in this group forgot what the political fights have been about; the report represents what all of us were comfortable saying (though not every participant agreed with every...) 

For the moment, I want to hold off from getting into the substance. I'd like to wait until after people have started to read and react to the report. That said though, another participant who blogs over at Shadow Government, Dan Twining, has already offered a comment that begs a response. Here's the lede to Dan's post:

The Obama administration's minimalist foreign policy, animated by domestic political expediency and a cramped view of America's responsibilities to uphold the liberal international order from which it has benefited so richly, can lead observers to forget what a more traditionally engaged foreign policy even looks like. The new national security strategy developed by a bipartisan group under the aegis of the Project for a United and Strong America fills that gap.

Like I say, I wanted to wait and see what others gleaned from the document, but I guess Dan went the other way. For the record then, I do not believe this report can be read as any kind of rebuke or repudiation of Obama foreign policy. At the most, it may be interesting window into a nascent intra-party debate outlined recently by Tom Wright (to which I've already reacted).

On the other hand, I guess the report can be taken as a slam against the figment Obama Republicans are always talking about. But then with enough imagination, anything can be taken that way.  

UPDATED to reflect the project's separateness from the McCain Institute.

Syria, Mali - Any Other Takers? Posted by Homa Hassan

It’s no wonder Secretary of State John Kerry has been walking on eggshells when discussing potential US support to the Syrian rebels.  As The Washington Post reported earlier in the week, a renewed discussion to supply the rebels with body armor, armed vehicles, and military training has arisen.  Until now, the support from the United States had been non-lethal aid along the lines of humanitarian assistance (such as medical supplies and packaged meals), funding for communications and logistical support, as well as an American invitation to the leader of the rebels to discuss the situation.  To date, any combat-related supplies the rebels have received has come from their own conquests of government bases or supposed help from nations like Qatar, Turkey, and, predictably, Saudi Arabia.

Not surprisingly, Syria is one of the last places the Obama administration would want its boots on the ground or its military munitions ending up in the wrong hands; however, as the situation continues to spiral downward, Kerry stated in Paris, “we need to help them to deliver basic services and to protect the legitimate institutions of the state,” indicating a concern of state failure lest the international community take another stab at aiding the rebels. 

However, recent scholarship suggests that U.S. hesitation to intervene in Syria or provide arms thus far may come from a somewhat consistent and historical aversion to military commitment, Afghanistan and Iraq notwithstanding.  According to a new study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released on U.S. Policy Responses to Potential Transitions, the U.S. has historically gone to great extents to avoid using its military during conflict driven political transitions.  The report goes on to show that over a 22 year span (1989-2010), the United States has most often defaulted to a non-response or issuing a statement, rather than imposing economic aid or sanctions, engaging in diplomatic efforts, offering military supplies, joining multilateral military action, or invoking unilateral military action. 

In effect, as the CSIS researchers point out, the question of intervention in Syria is not just figuring out the contemporary strategy, but anticipating the consequences in the decade to follow it.  The possibility of a failed state, marginalized groups facing increasingly dire livelihoods and further regional chaos loom ahead regardless of any action taken by the United States or others.  Ultimately, the Obama administration is looking to offer some form of support to the rebels before their following and credibility diminishes or Iranian influences pervade the porous Syrian border.

Syria is not the only former French-colonized country that has the leading superpowers hanging in the balance.  The dilemma in Mali has been pressing upon the world’s leaders to direct attention toward the nation without inflaming an incredibly sensitive and volatile region.  Largely credited to the spillover of armed mercenaries in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi, Mali had until now been seen by the U.S. as one of the more stable West African nations, despite a façade of democratic rule peppered with bribes, kickbacks, and corruption involving its leaders. 

But Kerry’s comments on Mali in Paris were sung to a different tune.  Kerry voiced that despite transportation, intelligence, and other U.S. support to the French-led offensive, “There has to be an African solution, ultimately. And our shared goal now should be that African and U.N. entities step up, so that France has the ability to step back.”  The different takes on Syria and Mali can be seen as informed by current strategic interests.  Though eager to stamp out strains of non-state actors like Al-Qaeda in the region, Kerry’s remarks indicate that the Obama administration is being incredibly tactful to not jeopardize its presence in regions where it is already working to curb Al-Qaeda’s influence (presumably Afghanistan). 

The question then becomes whether there is anyone more willing to take the lead when France eventually takes a step back.  Though ideally an “African solution to an African problem” would suit, the disparate interests of the neighboring African governments, the African Union, and the Western powers makes Kerry’s proposition more difficult.  Both Syria and Mali share the common roadblock that caused Somalia to turn into a debacle in the 1990s: the intelligence terrain is lacking without the eyes, ears, and interlocutors that eventually made Egypt easier to address by the West. 

Roadblocks not only come from internal politics and faulty governance in each of these nations, however.  Limited appetite for U.S. presence in international crises at the moment can be evidenced by the brutal debate over domestic issues like the impending sequestration debacle, economic instability, the inconclusive and unpredictable aftermath of aid or intervention, and the shadow of two prior military operations hanging over the heads of Americans. 

On the other hand, Russia and China are rattling the discussions further, as the former seeks to hold on to its role at the table and the latter to expand and assume a larger role in the global playing fields, particularly the mineral-rich African nations.  As such, the U.S. cannot simply ignore the impasses.  Refraining from intervention to the extent that the U.S. has done may be prudent, but should not transition their role into bystanders as the conflicts deepen.  As Marc Lynch of the Center for New American Security indicates, arming the rebels with American munitions does not mean the rebels will be able to simply defeat the Syrian army.  Instead, the Obama administration ought to be strengthening the legitimate authority of the rebels and more persistently encouraging a U.N. Resolution that emboldens them.

On the whole, the CSIS report indicates that the best U.S. policy that can and should continue to be pursued in either of these countries is the enforcement of a political solution, which will inevitably be needed whether fatigue or a stalemate batters the fighting down.  As in the civil war within Lebanon, there may be dozens of political solutions that fail, but eventually one will have to stick, even if no one is fully satisfied.  If, as has been suggested, no enforcement will hold without U.S. involvement, the Obama administration cannot simply hope a peacekeeping force will be able to ride out the tantrums wreaking havoc in the Middle East and Africa.

The strategy of having the U.S. take the lead may not be the key here, but working with its allies to push the direct stakeholders from behind in a way that avoids direct confrontation seems to be a discussion worth having.  Kerry’s cautious steps on behalf of the Obama administration regarding these fragile circumstances, therefore, are understandable.  However, both he and his boss know that if they want to make an omelet, no matter how careful, some eggs are likely to be broken.

--
Ms. Hassan is a Herbert Scoville, Jr. Peace Fellow at the National Security Network and has a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

Welcome to Homa Hassan Posted by The Editors

Please welcome the newest contributor to Democracy Arsenal: Homa Hassan. Homa is a Scoville Fellow at the National Security Network. Before coming to NSN, she co-hosted a nationally syndicated radio show on domestic and international politics, worked in Congress and for the International Broadcasting Bureau in Washington, DC. She has spent time working abroad with the United Nations Development Programme in Kosovo, the Red Crescent Society on the Somalia drought in Qatar, and Transparency International in Colombia and Liberia.  Ms. Hassan holds a Bachelor’s degree from Columbia College SC in Political Science, Public Affairs, and Communication, as well as a Master in International Affairs from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

The "New Foreign Policy Divide" Posted by David Shorr

Over at ForeignPolicy.com, Tom Wright welcomes us to "the Democratic Party's new foreign policy debate." Wright has noticed a fissure start to crack open, one he expects to pit progressive sister against brother. At issue is America's international role at a time of domestic challenges, and the emerging contrasts in approach could presage clashes over policy. 

Tom labels the two camps as "restrainers" and "shapers": 

Restrainers see a crumbling infrastructure, the budget deficit, a subpar education system, and a sluggish economy as much more threatening than events elsewhere in the world. Democrats of this stripe call for "nation-building at home," to use President Obama's phrase, and want to prioritize these tasks at the expense of international commitments, which they see as a drain or a distraction. 

The shapers have a starkly different view. They agree that domestic challenges are important -- and should be the subject of a strong domestic policy agenda -- but they don't believe international difficulties are on the wane. The U.S. economy is in a slump largely because of a crisis prone international economic order ... On security, the United States is a global power and detrimental developments in the Middle East, East Asia, or Europe will severely damage U.S. interests.

Since reading the piece, I've been test-driving Tom's idea. Are these two perspectives indeed prominent impulses within our major policy debates -- each of them with a clear enough orientation to offer answers to the big questions of our foreign policy? And has he avoided caricature? Actually, I think Tom's onto something. For one thing, he's given us a badly needed framework to talk about adjustments to American hegemony without the overblown specter of isolationism. 

We can start with the test of trying to place oneself in one of the two camps. Pretty easy in my case: confirmed shaper. Just take one line about the US global role from Nina Hachigian and my "Responsibility Doctrine" piece in Washington Quarterly: 

With a distinct ongoing role as a global leader, it will put great effort into bringing others along and offer its own cooperation for reasons of self-interest as well as broader peace and prosperity. 

Pretty shaper-ish sounding, I have to admit. Now I should also point out that the rest of the paragraph and article are about shifting some of the burden to other nations -- which sounds like restrainer talk -- but that's not a problem. Recall that Tom described shapers as sharing a sensitivity to our domestic challenges and constraints. 

Back during George W. Bush's presidency, we used to contrast the conservative and progressive approaches in terms that may be applicable here. Conservatives preferred to work unilaterally where they could, and multilaterally where they must; the progressive instinct is the reverse. Perhaps we can say that restrainers want the United States to involve itself only where it's imperative, while shapers also want to get involved where it can be constructive. Crucially, we shapers are still exercising prudence to ensure US involvement has good prospects for success. Shapers are picking our shots, whereas restrainers are pulling in their horns.

Naturally I recoil at Tom's forecast of progressives split into rival factions. There's also a best-case scenario in which the two perspectives provide a creative tension resulting in sound policies. Either way, though, I think Tom has identified a key fault line for us. 

UPDATE: Revised since published to add a sentence to the penultimate graf.

GRAPHIC: Cartoon by James Montgomery Flagg

How Can the G-20 Regain its Mojo? Posted by David Shorr

Recently I've traded posts back and forth with fellow G-20 watchers at the G20 Studies Centre of Australia's Lowy Institute. In a further bit of synchronicity, the Centre released a fuller analysis within days of an equivalent piece from me and a colleague. Looked at side-by-side, the two papers offer a lot of shared diagnosis of what ails the G-20, but also clarifies the lingering dispute over the scope of the group's agenda.

Both of these pieces give prescriptions to boost G-20 effectiveness in its next phase. The first four years of G-20 summits since the 2008 financial meltdown give us a good base of experience with its strengths and weaknesses as a multilateral body -- plenty of lessons to be gleaned and applied.

As the Lowy Institute's Mike Callaghan (a former Australian deputy finance minister) sees it, the process is due for a reset. His paper thus calls for Relaunching the G20 on the basis of nine essential precepts of summit-craft. My own paper on The G-20 as a Lever for Progress was written jointly with Barry Carin of the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). And while many of Barry and my ideas for a stronger G-20 are similar to Mike's, we didn't couch them as a major overhaul. That's because we see the G-20 as having gotten something of a bad rap, surrounded by cynics who make no effort to understand how the G-20 works or what it's trying to do. For all the debate over the G-20's proper focus and critique of its effectiveness, there's been scant attention to the practicalities of this comparatively new forum. 

In fact, the G-20 is dealing with an assortment of problems using various ways and means. One section of the Carin-Shorr paper takes inventory of the G-20 toolbox -- from collective declarations to national policy commitments, agenda-setting, resource-mobilization, or new multilateral mechanisms such as the Financial Stability Board and IMF Mutual Assessment Process. If you want to get the most out of this process, start with a full picture of its efforts thus far. And working from that sort of overview, Barry and I derived a cardinal rule of thumb for everything the G-20 does:

For any issue on its agenda, G-20 involvement is justified only when its attention to that issue translates into progress that could not otherwise be attained. Every proposed topic must be justified by such a theory of change, and every related report, statement, and communique must show what is being accomplished.

The G-20 can, and should, tackle a variety of international challenges, but always aimed at advancing the dialogue and moving toward solutions. As I highlighted in the last go-round with my Lowy Institute colleagues, this is a debate over which issues should be on the G-20 leaders' plates. (At some level it's also a culture clash between economic and foreign policy specialists, but that's another topic.) Mike Callaghan is arguing for erecting a wall around the G-20 agenda that keeps the leaders from dealing with anything but the main business of economic growth, financial stability, and governance reform for the Bretton Woods Institutions. 

Boiling it down, the Carin-Shorr argument is that there's a right way and a wrong way to be an agenda hawk. The G-20 can be clear about priorities, disciplined in its deliberations, and vigilant about wasted effort -- all without slamming the door on a few ancillary topics that offer the chance to make a positive difference. Some of our ideas are also echoed in a report from a study group of US and Chinese experts convened by the Stanley Foundation, Center for American Progress, and China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

As I mentioned, both sides of this debate agree on many things. All of us are concerned about G-20 reports and communique text that highlight issues without advancing them. We all agree on the importance of keeping world leaders focused on G-20 priorities that really need their attention, and Mike offers some great ideas for how the leaders' precious hours together at summits can be best spent and structured.

But here again, key questions in this debate are only loosely connected to practical realities. The plain fact is that the leaders do not engage or even familiarize themselves with all the issues on the G-20 agenda. That's not to deny that senior aides and lower-level officials certainly spin their wheels for some of the matters on the docket. Yet that's an argument for culling the agenda and enforcing greater discipline rather than a draconian purge. 

Best State of the Union Moments-Yep, in Advance Posted by Heather Hurlburt

In addition to the domestic policy you know about, there will be serious and important words on Afghanistan, nuclear weapons, cybersecurity, global poverty and climate change tonight. I'll write on that later, but here's what will keep you on the edge of your seat:

1. Who gets more tv cutaways, Ted Nugent or Michelle Obama?

2. Does Ted Cruz look even remotely abashed after his un-freshman-like outburst at the Armed Services Committee Hagel vote this afternoon? It's probably too much to hope that he's seen with McCain on national tv. If this happens, drain your alcoholic beverage and thank the tv gods.

3. Come to think of it, do the Teds meet? What does that look like?

4. In his response, does Marco Rubio repeat his summer Brookings approach of criticizing his own party more than the President? Of calling for diplomacy with Iran, and closer ties with allies?

5. Ditto Rand Paul, only never at Brookings. What can he say on national security that his own party agrees with? Stay sober enough to track this.

6. Drink every time a commentator who has never been to South Asia says "fighting season" while discussing Afghanistan.

7. If you want to be sure to sober up in time to drive home, only drink when GOP respondents say "Afghanistan."

 

 

Tanks But No Tanks Posted by The Editors

Check out NSN Senior Advisor Major General (ret) Paul Eaton on the Daily Show last night discussing the M1 Abrams tank: 

The Daily Show with Jon Stewart
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This Week In Threat-Mongering - The Ted Koppel Version Posted by Michael Cohen

When it comes to international relations and the nature of potential threats facing the United States there is generally a single default mode embraced by the pundit community – be afraid. To listen to both foreign policy professionals and those with just a glancing understanding of global affairs is to be presented with an image of the world that is one of great complexity and uncertainty as well as unceasing and ever-worsening threats, particularly to the United States.

Case in point: this week’s Meet The Press and in particular the embarrassing, misinformed stentorian pronouncements of former ABC Nightline anchor Ted Koppel. If you’ve been wondering what Koppel has been doing since he left late night television, ‘taking time to understand the world as it is today’ has clearly not been high on his agenda.

As the discussion on Meet The Press turned to foreign affairs (as discussed by five people who have little to no background in the issue) Koppel was asked to weigh in by host David Gregory – and the results were gruesome.

Here was Koppel’s opening salvo: “We’re entering one of the most dangerous periods this country has ever known.”

This is simply and unequivocally not true (and is completely head-scratching when you consider that Koppel was born in 1940 and thus lived through the entire Cold War). The US faces not a single plausible existential threat, no great-power rival, no near-term competitor for global hegemon and no legitimate military adversary that poses any security threat to the United States.

And as my colleague and friend Micah Zenko exhaustively pointed out last year – the world today is safer, freer, healthier and more economically prosperous than any point in human history.

Wars of all varieties are on the decline. Inter-state war is virtually non-existent. There hasn’t been a great power conflict in more than 60 years and there is little reason to believe there will be another one any time soon. In fact, in the first decade of the 21^st century there were fewer deaths from year than any previous ten-year period in the last century. 

Of course even if one recognizes that the world is safer it doesn’t mean it will stay that way, or so might argue the cynics. But again here there is more good news – all the key political, economic and social indicators point toward a future of less not more war.

There are today 117 electoral democracies around the world – a sizable increase over what the 70 or so that existed at the end of the Cold War. Moreover, economic interdependence and liberalization is the rule not the exception – and of course, increasing economic interdependence is a net positive because trade and foreign direct investment between countries generally correlates with long-term economic growth and a reduced likelihood of war.

So too does greater prosperity – which also defines our current global era. People are living longer and healthier lives with greater access to primary and secondary education. In fact, the number of people living in extreme poverty has dropped by more than half since the early 1980s. Thirty years ago, half the people living in the developing world survived on less than $1.25 a day; today, that figure is about one-sixth.

And while we know that these are not hard and fast rules, generally speaking, a world of more democracy, greater economic linkages and higher levels of prosperity and living standards is a world that is less prone to violence.

So from a global perspective:  the key democratic, economic and security-related metrics are all moving in one direction – toward greater security and a diminishing likelihood of conflict. All of this makes Koppel’s claims of a dangerous world highly dubious and deeply misleading.

Well rest assured Koppel has some “evidence” to back up his bold assertion:

“A. It’s not over in Afghanistan. B. To the degree that al Qaeda has moved over into Pakistan, that’s a country that has over 100 nuclear weapons. Syria, which is an ongoing problem. The suggestion constantly seems to be that we need to come in on the side of the rebels. There are at least 1000 Al Qaeda members in Syria today fighting on the side of the rebels. If the chemical weapons fall into their hands, big problem.

Iran . . . remember now . . . it might even have been on this program that Bibi Netanyahu suggested that come spring, come early summer if the Iranians still have not pulled back from building a nuclear weapons the Israelis may attack – the Iranians would respond against the United States and they have the capacity to do it with cyber war.”

So let’s unpack this. He’s right that things are not over in Afghanistan, although considering that the US is on a course to drawdown it troops there we can say that things are close to being over for the United States. Still, why would Afghanistan represent a future threat to the United States? The President has decided that US national security will be protected even if the US presence there declines – what makes Koppel think this is wrong?

But he is worried about Pakistan – so much so that he puts al Qaeda in the same sentence as “nuclear weapons.” Still what reason is there is to believe that al Qaeda, which is on the run, has been hammered by US drones and is down to a few key lieutenants would have any chance of gaining possession of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons – and then use them against the United States (or any other country for that matter)? Perhaps Koppel would be reassured by the fact that in January 2010, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates stated that he is “very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons” – a view that has been endorsed by successive senior officials.  Also, Koppel appears unaware that al Qaeda has been predominately in Pakistan since 2001 and yet amazingly no nuclear weapons have fallen into their hands.

Next while Koppel is correct that Syria remains an ongoing issue and there is pressure on the US to get involved it seems relevant to mention that Syria has been an issue for nearly 2 years; there has been pressure for the US to get involved and yet it hasn’t happened.  Moreover, while there is an al Qaeda franchise in Syria and the country has chemical weapons there is little reason to view that as a threat to the United States.  Koppel appears to believe that every group that has franchised with al Qaeda represents a danger to America and a defining feature of a less secure world.

Like in Koppel’s Pakistan example he has combined a few chilling words (al Qaeda and chemical weapons) to scare those listening into believing that US is facing a more dangerous period in global affairs. But even the most cursory analysis of his argument would suggest that this is not the case.

Finally, there is Koppel’s Iran example, which is fascinating in its complete disconnection from facts. First of all Iran is not building a nuclear weapon since according the IAEA and the US government, Teheran does not have an active nuclear program. Yes I’m aware that the country is enriching uranium, but the distinction between developing the capabilities for a nuke and actually building one is pretty important – Koppel elides it.  Second, the notion of a US strike on Iran has been dealt a rather serious blow in the wake of Israel’s recent elections (as well as the recent US elections) and few observers of the region believe that the likelihood of a unilateral Israeli strike are high. Moreover, Koppel’s conviction that such an unlikely attack would lead to an Iranian counter-attack against the United States is all well and good – but so what?

Iran is a diplomatically isolated, economically challenged country.  According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s “military forces have almost no modern armor, artillery, aircraft or major combat ships, and UN sanctions will likely obstruct the purchase of high-technology weapons for the foreseeable future.”  And their cyber capabilities are modest at best; certainly not at the level where they could threaten the United States in any serious way.  Iran is a bad actor and they can certainly make trouble when they want to – but a harbinger of a more dangerous world? Balderdash.

In of itself Koppel’s statements are fairly meaningless. It’s not as if he is a leading voice on foreign affairs or someone who today has a large media presence. But what is so troubling about these types of episodes is that after Koppel spread his misinformation he was followed by Bob Woodward, Andrea Mitchell, Jim Demint, Ben Jealous . . . all of whom bizarrely agreed with him and in the case of Woodward suggested that he was underplaying threats to the United States.

Woodward said that his next book should be on foreign policy – and be called “Meltdown” even that words comes nowhere close to describing the current global environment. Andrea Mitchell expressed concern that the US would “retreat” from the global stage even though not a single person in a position of political influence with the Obama Administration or Congress is advocating such a position. 

And Ben Jealous, president of the NAACP complained that voters want to know what their leaders will do to make them “safer” even though they are clearly at this point safer from foreign threats than at any point in decades. Rather than pointing out the uncontestable fact that the world today is safer than ever, Koppel’s panelists seemed to try and one-up his dystopian worldview.

The problem with all of this is that many Americans are simply unaware of the true nature of the global environment – and quite often take their cues on foreign policy from elites. And when you have elites like those who were on the Meet the Press this Sunday then Americans are receiving a simply wrong-headed notion about the kind of world they live in and the type of threats that confront the United States. This is more than just ill-informed analysis; it’s actually corrosive, unhelpful and makes Americans more susceptible to the type of fear-mongering that has long defined US foreign policy.  If Americans believe that the world is full of potential threats that could harm them or their families they are likely more inclined to support policies and politicians that seek to ameliorate those threats . . . or see: Iraq War, 2003.

The fact is, the world has never been safer and the United States has never been more secure. This is a fact. Indeed, it's the most salient fact of global affairs in the 21st century and it cannot be repeated enough. 

Foreign Policy "Requires Collective Action" Too Posted by David Shorr

But we have always understood that when times change, so must we; that fidelity to our founding principles requires new responses to new challenges; that preserving our individual freedoms ultimately requires collective action.  For the American people can no more meet the demands of today’s world by acting alone than American soldiers could have met the forces of fascism or communism with muskets and militias. No single person can train all the math and science teachers we’ll need to equip our children for the future, or build the roads and networks and research labs that will bring new jobs and businesses to our shores. Now, more than ever, we must do these things together, as one nation and one people.

Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama

January 21, 2013

The relatively scant discussion of the wider world in the president's second inaugural address has left some of us foreign policy types hungry for more, but I don't see a big problem. President Obama captured the main points concisely -- the folly of "perpetual war," the need to seek peaceful resolution of differences, support for the spread not only of freedom, but hope for the economically and socially marginalized. He also gave special emphasis to the challenge of climate change, and rightly so. 

Even with the speech's primary focus on our country's own polity and social contract, though, it isn't hard to connect the dots between President Obama's domestic and foreign policy approaches. I chose the key passage quoted above because of its relevance to the challenges America confronts both at home and abroad.

Picking up where last year's campaign left off, the president wanted to highlight the limits of self-reliance and individualism. To view America solely as a loose association of individuals is wilfully blind to practical realities. Only through combined efforts, commitments, resources -- and, yes, the structures of government -- do individuals have a context in which they can thrive and succeed.

The idea that a portion of society can thrive while the larger part struggles is a fantasy, and a dangerous one. We mustn't lose sight of the degree to which our fate is a shared one -- the reality that we rise or fall together. And as this truth holds for our country, it is equally true for our world. President Obama acknowledged as much in his address: "we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation."

Sometimes I label my worldview and approach to foreign policy as "interdependent-ist." The underlying perspective about our all being "in it together" is, I think, basically what President Obama talked about today. I also think it's been evident in his foreign policy. My friend Nina Hachigian and I recently published our theory of Obama foreign policy, which we call "The Responsibility Doctrine," in the latest issue of Washington Quarterly. To a greater degree than appreciated, President Obama's foreign policy has been a steady drive to get other nations to help tackle shared international challenges. If you're one of those who's looking for a little more foreign policy here on inauguration day (after all, you're reading a foreign policy blog), you might want to read the whole thing. 

Does the G-20 Have Too Much on Its Plate? Posted by David Shorr

Over at the interpreter blog of  Australia's Lowy Institute, Mike Callaghan and Mark Thirlwell kindly responded to a recent post I wrote on the G-20 (the major focus of my Stanley Foundation program). Their piece helps sustain an important debate regarding the proper role and scope of that high-level diplomatic process. Let's see if I can keep this exchange going. 

It can only help the G-20 to make an honest inventory of its strengths and shortcomings. With the benefit of four years' experience since it first convened world leaders in the middle of the financial meltdown, we can surely fine-tune the process for improved performance in its next phase. As with any multilateral forum, the G-20 is judged by whether its deliberations help address real-world problems. The value of the process lies in its ability take the issues on the agenda and prod them toward resolution. 

The debate between Callaghan, Thirlwell, and myself is about how many issues are on the G-20 agenda, and what kind. We're in agreement about the group's core mandates and top priorities: global economic growth, financial stability, and IMF governance reform. The dispute is about G-20 involvement in matters beyond those priorities. According to Mike and Mark, G-20 leaders have been distracted by too many peripheral matters for them to accomplish their main work. I think there are valid reasons for the G-20 to maintain a diversified portfolio. 

First off, if we're trying to explain why the G-20 has fallen short, distraction is a pretty weak alibi. The newer topics on the G-20 agenda are being scapegoated for the modest progress on the group's priorities.

It's plain to all of us G20-watchers what is needed on these issues, but we lay blame for the hold-up differently. Let's go through the major issues. While the G-20 performed heroically in warding off a global great depression three years ago, it has not given us a very strong recovery. The action plan from last June's summit offers a clear to-do list for the major economies to get in better balance and stronger performance; now those countries must take the prescribed macroeconomic steps. The Financial Stability Board has been plugging away at the problem of too-big-to-fail banks, but derivatives market regulation has been a struggle, and there are fears that Basel II and III capital requirements are too weak to prevent another crisis. As I've said, I don't think you can blame this state of affairs on the G-20's forays into development, climate, or anti-corruption.

There's an elephant in the room here, and it's the debate over austerity. I've seen this many times in discourse regarding multilateral bodies; in the rush to criticize the collective entity, the policy and political divisions among member governments get overlooked. So we can debate the wisdom of tight fiscal and monetary policy, but the G-20 has clearly given its leaders ample opportunity for, as they say, a full and frank exchange of views. The November 2011 Cannes summit, for example, was pretty much consumed by the Greek political crisis.

Disputing my claim that the G-20 has enough diplomatic bandwidth to tackle a variety of issues, Callaghan and Thirlwell respond:

But do leaders have the time? Meetings of G20 leaders, finance ministers and central bank governors are very crowded affairs. There is already little time to focus on the core responsibilities.

If we asked world leaders to delve into the details of every topic on the agenda, they certainly would not have the time. But then, that's not really how it works. For many issues on the docket, leaders simply give their blessing to the agreements and work that were hashed out by lower-level officials. (Callaghan probably knows this better than I do, having been deeply involved in the G-20 process as Australia's deputy finance minister.) Some items are handled mainly in expert-level working groups such as development or anti-corruption -- which hardly place strains on the prime ministers and presidents themselves. 

How do we know efforts at this level pose no major threat of distraction? Because despite a push by the current Russian G-20 presidency for a back-to-basics agenda at St. Petersburg, my understanding is that they intend to leave all working groups in place rather than shut any of them down. My point, though, is more general. All the warnings against distraction are painting with a pretty broad brushstroke, while the demands on officials' time and attention are, in fact, as different as the issues themselves. 

As Mike and Mark noted, we all agree on the need for greater discipline. The Development Working Group agenda, for instance, cries out for focus and prioritization. But I want to warn against being too narrow or rigid. There was another notable chink in Russia's back-to-basics approach as G-20 chair: sustainability and green growth. I suspect that many world leaders are worried they're not doing enough about the climate, and rightly so. The G-20 now has a working group on climate change financing, a key pillar of the Copenhagen accord. Perhaps they could also take a cue from the United States and focus on vehicle fuel economy standards.

The G-20 is the only major recent global governance innovation that brings together rising and established powers as peer equals. At a time when international cooperation is falling short of our major global challenges, we have to get as much out of the G-20 as we can. 

Use of American Power, An Unhealthy Obsession (According to Bill Kristol) Posted by David Shorr

One line from the recent coverage of the Hagel nomination jumped out at me. Check out this quote from William Kristol in Jim Rutenberg's piece in the Sunday New York Times:

I’d much prefer a secretary of defense who was a more mainstream internationalist — not a guy obsessed by how the United States uses its power and would always err on the side of not intervening.

Okay, let's do some parsing. Kristol is a hard-core interventionist, no news there. More noteworthy is the implication that American power is synonymous with military intervention. My apologies to Albert Camus, but Kristol seems to believe that there is but one serious foreign policy problem, and that is whom to blow up. A pretty narrow view of statecraft. 

Most interesting, though, is Kristol's use of the word obsessed. Apparently it's what separates mainstream internationalists from the surrender monkeys. So, how much reflection on America's actions overseas are we allowed before Kristol rules us out of the mainstream? 

In the category of have-we-learned-nothing-in-the-last-ten-years, it's bizarre to argue against diligence in the use of American power. God forbid that Americans should think about what we're doing internationally, that we have some self-awareness as the planet's most powerful nation. As someone who thinks about this stuff a lot, I don't consider myself obsessed or outside the mainstream. On the contrary, I consider prudence a virtue. 

Photo: Gage Skidmore

Republicans' Foreign Policy Problems - Part II Posted by David Shorr

All the recent attempts to draw the lessons of 2012 for Republican foreign policy are good grist for the blog (thank you Danielle Pletka). The other day, I wrote about the overall need to offer proposals that are plausibly workable, instead of counting on other international players to bow to Republican adamance. But moving beyond this general diagnosis to unpack the Republicans' problem, there's still so much more to say.

For example Pletka gives such emphasis to the spread human rights and democracy, with President Reagan as their patron saint, that they seem to overshadow the rest of US foreign policy. At the end of the first section, she places "willingness to promote American ideals globally" at the "heart of the GOP" serving as its "moral compass."

In the next section fidelity to those ideals is the basis for the best Republican leaders to style the United States as a revolutionary rather than status quo power -- and contrast themselves with faithless Democrats (that's with a capital 'D'). Pletka goes on to talk about the unfair caricature of Republicans as war-mongers, but also about how military strength caused the downfall of the Soviets, proxy wars vindicated democracy, and the Iraq War set the stage for the Arab Spring. Then comes a discussion of how America-come-home impulses give the world's undemocratic bad guys room to run rampant. The "world's policeman" section is sort of about international peace and the United States as global security guarantor; but then, it's about containing (communist) China and (again) our vindication in the Cold War. In the final two sections of her piece, Pletka focuses on the struggle for freedom in the Middle East and concludes that Republicans in Congress must sieze the initiative -- just as they did during the Clinton years -- and support Middle Eastern freedom fighters, bolster Asian allies against the Chinese threat, defend Russia's neighbors, and generally keep the rest of the world from despairing in American leadership. 

Apologies if that review seems a bit tedious, but I actually needed to check and make sure Pletka's article is as skewed as it seemed in my first couple readings. Set aside the issue of an overmilitarized foreign policy, when every problem looks like the illegitimacy of other governments, then all you have is a policy of resisting, replacing, reforming, or encircling other nations' leaders.

To put it bluntly, this only counts as the outline of a liberal internationalism v. realism debate if you consider it "realism" to be concerned about anything other than democracy and governance. More accurately, it's just obsession with regime character. 

And the other problems with Republican foreign policy orthodoxy -- including those problems identified by Pletka herself -- are fruit from the tree of this idea of a continuing Cold War-like ideological struggle. For instance she makes five references to China as a growing military threat and regional adversary before dropping the following gem toward the end of the piece:

The United States can provide its allies in Asia with the aid and military support they need to face challenges from China, while agreeing that everyone has a shared interest in Chinese prosperity.

Glad we've cleared that up. Here's some free advice: if you want your foreign policy to be taken seriously, don't treat the global economy as an afterthought. It has ceased being useful to say "America can't be strong without a strong economy," if it ever was. Belief in the imperative of restoring strong growth is not a policy -- and won't, you know, restore growth.  Not only do the United States and others have a "shared interest in Chinese prosperity," the fragile recovery from the Great Recession gives us a mutual interest in steps to strengthen the recovery such as Chinese fiscal stimulus, currency appreciation, and shifts from dependence on exports to domestic demand.

The point being that bold assertions about what the US "can provide its allies ... while agreeing..." won't get very far in obtaining what we want from key players like China and therefore doesn't really cut it as a credible foreign policy. Not to mention the challenge of making Iranian energy sanctions work when China, Japan, Korea, and India are all major customers. One more thing, Russia provides the NATO operation in Afghanistan with a major supply route -- aside from the one through Pakistan, that is. 

I'm afraid the Republicans' challenge to present a workable alternative is a bigger job than Danielle Pletka lets on. But don't take it from this progressive blogger, Dan Drezner's new Foreign Affairs piece on "Rebooting Republican Foreign Policy" gives the full bracing dousing of cold water. A sample:

The 2012 election was the nadir of the GOP's decadelong descent. By the time Romney was selected as the nominee, Republicans had come to talk about foreign policy almost entirely as an offshoot of domestic politics or ideology. What passed for discussion consisted of a series of tactical gestures designed to appease various constituencies in the party rather than responses to actual issues in U.S. relations with the world. The resulting excess of unchecked pablum and misinformation depressed not only outside observers but also many of the more seasoned members of the Republican foreign policy community who took the subject seriously.

And American Conservative's Daniel Larison points out that Pletka and her colleagues must look in the mirror if they want to know who's responsible for the sorry state of GOP foreign policy: 

The “painful” and “often incoherent” attempts to attack Obama on foreign policy and national security did not come out of nowhere. In most cases, Romney’s criticisms of Obama’s record were taken directly from common movement conservative arguments. On everything from his obsession with the 2009 decision on missile defense to his mindless Russophobia to his automatic support for Israeli policies to his complaints about Obama’s response to the Green movement, Romney was serving as little more than a conduit for prevailing Republican foreign policy arguments. There’s no denying that these arguments were often painfully bad and incoherent, but the poor quality of these arguments can’t be pinned solely on Romney or his campaign staffers. Many of the people who presume to speak for the party on matters of foreign policy crafted those arguments, and they are responsible for them.

But hey, good luck!

The Incipient Republican Foreign Policy Re-Think Posted by David Shorr

The Republican establishment is getting all introspective on foreign policy, particularly in response to two major pieces by Danielle Pletka and Dan Drezner. Along with the rest of the GOP, the party's foreign policy brain trust is wrestling with the question of what went wrong last November.

As a progressive counterpart and close observer of Republicans offering themselves as stewards of American power, I could just sit back and watch them grope for answers. But that wouldn't be any fun. 

Reading the panel of Rebpublican expert responses that ForeignPolicy.com assembled to react to Pletka's, a few lines from Will Inboden's contribution cuts to the heart of the matter:

An unappreciated but essential part of foreign policy is accurately reading the state of the world and the tides of history.

then further down:

[T]he question for the future of Republican foreign policy should begin not with where we think the Democrats may be wrong, but with what we think the state of the international system is today and how it can be shaped in ways favorable to U.S. interests and consonant with American values.

This is an even bigger blind spot than Inboden's critique acknowledges. Republicans have become too wrapped up in their notions of American omnipotence to notice how those ideas clash with international realities. By my own reading of the foreign policy debate in 2012, this myopia rendered the GOP unable to recognize President Obama's underlying strengths or present a viable alternative. As I highlighted frequently on this blog, the Republicans' case was remarkably thin and impractical. Based broadly on the assumption that greater shows of American strength and resolve would cause everyone else to snap into line, it basically boiled down to a new twist on TR: yell loudly and carry a magic wand.

Not to say Pletka ignores the problem altogether. For me, the most interesting passage of her piece straddles the fourth and fifth sections:

But it's up to the Republican Party -- and particularly its leadership -- to articulate how it would do better than Obama, how a robust American presence can make a difference in the Middle East, how victory should be the goal in Afghanistan, and how U.S. leadership in the Pacific can constrain Chinese predations. Republicans need to explain how much can be done consistent with America's dearest principles but without the use of force, without threats, without protectionism, and without breaking the bank. They need to work to bring along the many even within the party who doubt the imperative of success against al Qaeda, who doubt the value of friendly governments, and for whom each penny spent on a new fighter for the Air Force or aircraft carrier for the Navy is a penny wasted. You cannot hope to persuade the country if you cannot persuade your own party.

and

The other objection, of course, is that the last decade of war has drained not only Americans' emotional reserves but their country's treasury, giving America little choice but to retrench. Recognizing the "limits of our power" has been one of the resurgent themes of the post-Bush years. But where has it left the country? Leading from behind -- an absurd notion that itself must be left behind. After all, neither France, whose presidents have led on both Libya and Syria, nor the U.N. Security Council can solve the thorny problems we now face.

These grafs are interesting because they reflect both insight into the Republicans' difficulty as well as continued denial. Pletka is correct that the GOP's main failure in 2012 was that they presented no plausible case for how their approach would yield better results. Yet these very passages show why it's so hard for them to do so.

When Pletka talks about the "doubts" within her party, the beam in her own eye is magical thinking about the effectiveness of those approaches. It is the height of irony that Pletka's impulse to tag others with going weak on Al Qaeda, allies, and defense spending is exactly the thing that short-circuits constructive policy discourse of the kind she called for just a few lines above.

And it's her misreading of the "limits of power" that leads her astray. For Pletka, all the talk of limits is about the US pulling back from the world because of fiscal constraints. But that is a fundamental misreading of the issue -- and, consequently, of progressive thinking on foreign policy. In the spirit of Will Inboden's comment, progressive sensitivity to limits reflects our assessment of the current international system. Where magical thinking has deluded the Republicans about what can be achieved via chest-thumping and saber-rattling, we progressives make much less presumptuous -- we believe more realistic -- calculations about the practical leverage of a superpower's might. Which is precisely why Nina Hachigian and my "Responsibility Doctrine" article in the new Washington Quartelry highlights the push for international help and support as a major thrust of Obama foreign policy. 

Illustration: Boris Rasin 

What's The Matter With The G20? Posted by David Shorr

Experts are worried about the G20. After four years and seven summit meetings, many of my fellow G20-watchers are asking why the group doesn't have more to show for its efforts? But as conventional wisdom about the problem's source starts to take hold, I think my colleagues are getting it wrong. 

Setting the question aside for a moment, this is a good time to debate these issues as the chairmanship of the G20 passes from Mexico to Russia. In fact, many of us were in Moscow last week when Russia's government -- together with leading think tanks RANEPA and the Higher School of Economics -- hosted Think20 and Civil20 expert consultations to collect ideas. Planning for next September's St. Petersburg summit is just getting underway, and President Putin's G20 Sherpa Ksenia Yudaeva hosted her counterparts for the first time, also last week.

As Australia looks toward its turn as summit host in 2014, it has set up a research center on the G20 in the Lowy Institute. The introduction to that center's new report, "Challenges Facing the G20 in 2013," offers the following critique:

Many worry that the G20's agenda has been expanding too widely and covering too many issues. Given a weak, unbalanced, and vulnerable global economy, it is essential that the G20 give top priority to reinvigorating global growth. 

I have no qualms with how the authors characterize the agenda-creep that's taken place or the G20's prorper priority on the health of the global economy. My objection is to the way they -- and, admittedly, many others -- connect the two. If you're trying to lay blame for the G20's modest progress on the leaders supposedly being distracted by secondary matters, count me a skeptic. 

Let's take stock of the shortfalls on the G20's core agenda; judge for yourself whether the its sponsorship of a few working groups on anti-corruption, development, or climate change financing seems a likely culprit: fragile economic recovery; threat posed by sovereign debt on the Eurozone's periphery; structural adjustments to economies overly dependent on exports or leverage; governance reform of the IMF and World Bank; imposition of tougher capital requirements for banks; regulation of derivatives markets... Do we really think that expert-level discussions of financial inclusion, financing for infrastructure, or commodity price volatility kept the G20 from doing more in the priority areas? 

Obviously my underlying point is about the inherent degree-of-difficulty challenges associated with the G20's main tasks. But there's also an obvious explanation that tends to be glossed over: the deep divisions among key governments over stimulus and austerity. In other words, divergence on whether deficit spending is a solution or problem has meant G20 leaders don't agree on the basic issue of how to promote economic recovery. (This split became public before the 2010 Toronto summit when Pres. Obama cautioned against hastily ending stimulus in a letter to his counterparts.)

Among other things, this has left the G20 community with contradictory impulses -- simultaneously fretting over reducing the US deficit and the threat of the fiscal cliff, which is basically drastic deficit-reduction. Indeed, one of the Civil20 conference's most interesting moments was when a light bulb seemed to go off for a development aid advocate during the discussion of fiscal consolidation. Doing the 2+2 arithmetic on austerity and recovery, she pointed out that it would be bad for the global economy for the G20 governments to fulfil their commitments on consolidation.

But let me come back to the broader matter of the G20 and its problems. I think we need to turn the idea of agenda-creep on its head. There's no denying that the G20 agenda has become messy. Critics tend to misdiagnose the problem and overstate the consequences, as I've argued, but there actually is a problem. The really problematic agenda-creep has been happening within agenda items themselves -- internal to the issue areas in the G20 portfolio -- rather than between the different topics.

Strangely enough, the problem stems from the (well-intentioned) desire to take a comprehensive approach toward problems. As issues have been added to the agenda, the impulse to identify all dimensions of those issues is a hindrance rather than a help for the G20. To get a sense of this, just scan this 2011 report from the G20 Development Working Group, which reads more like a tour of horizon for global development work, rather than a focused checklist of advances that can be made on behalf of world leaders. It is probably unrealistic to hope the G20 can catalyze game-changing grand bargains. And yet, we need to adopt a new G20 agenda discipline whereby each issue comes with a theory-of-change showing how the blessing or impetus from world leaders will contribute to progress on the issue. For an example of an agenda item with clear focus, see the latest action plan for the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group. 

I believe leaders of the G20 have sufficient diplomatic and policy bandwidth to tackle issues beyond the group's core responsibilities for global economic growth and financial stability. In fact, I've heard senior officials argue the need for a range topics to complement the top-tier items on which progress will be unavoidably slow. But with that said, there is plenty of room for sharper focus across the G20 agenda. 

Photo: Russia G20

Recording of NSN's Media Call on Pentagon Reductions and Contractor Myths Posted by The Editors

NSN_Press_Call_12312

PARTICIPANTS: Ben Freeman, National Security Investigator, Project on Government Oversight; William Hartung, Director, Arms and Security Project, Center for International Policy; Christopher Preble, VP, Cato Institute

DATE: December 3, 2012

Obama Foreign Policy - Book Review Edition Posted by David Shorr

For everyone wondering what the foreign policy junkie in their lives wants for Christmas or Hanukkah, I've written a review of two recent books bound to be of interest.

Oh let's face it, the only people who read this blog are foreign policy junkies themselves. So maybe you could buy the David Sanger and/or James Mann book for yourself, or someone else. (Do wonks give their wonk loved ones wonkish gifts?)

Any way, my essay on these two first-drafts of the history of Obama foreign policy appears in the new issue of Policy Review. The authors are two of the most respected journalists on the beat and approach the subject from different angles. Sanger's account is the story of an administration working the levers of the US government's national security apparatus, whereas Mann situates the administration's overall worldview in the political debates that shaped it. Here's how I described the contrast:

The books’ subtitles hint at the authors’ shared questions of interest but also their divergent styles and methods. Sanger’s book is about Obama’s “surprising use of American power,” whereas Mann focuses on a struggle to “redefine American power.” Sanger, who is the New York Times chief Washington correspondent, takes readers more deeply into the workings of national security policy execution; he watches President Obama and his advisers preside over the machinery of statecraft. The revelations that have earned the book buzz as well as controversy — the cyberwarfare used to sabotage Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges — are the fruits of this method.

While Sanger delves into the Obama team’s exertion of American power to discern a policy style, James Mann is interested in their deliberate efforts to devise a foreign policy framework matching their view of 21st-century realities. He wants to know whether they could “bring about a new American relationship with the world, one that was less unilateral in approach and less reliant on American military power.” Applying the same approach as his earlier book about President George W. Bush’s foreign policy team (The Vulcans), Mann focuses on the perspectives and ideas that policymakers bring with them into government.

But as they say, read the whole thing. 

Embassy Security in the NDAA Posted by James Lamond

It’s that time of year again, when the amendments process for the National Defense Authorization Act is used as a vehicle to put forth new legislation. Yesterday and today have seen a flurry of amendments go to the floor. One amendment that passed through a voice vote caught my eye. It was proposed by John McCain and increases the number of Marines for security at American embassies and consulates. The amendment also asks DoD to reassess the rules of engagement for those Marines. The Hill reports:

The Senate passed an amendment to the defense bill by voice vote Wednesday that would place more Marines at U.S. consulates and embassies around the world… Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) introduced the amendment. He said the amendment was important to preventing more deaths overseas, referring to the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya on Sept. 11, 2012….

McCain said his amendment, 3051, would also ask the Department of Defense to reassess the rules of engagement for Marines stationed at embassies and consulates so they could engage in combat when attacked.

According to the Marine Corps Times, the amendment results in an overall 1,000 person increase of the Marine Corp. The MCT adds:

It’s not immediately clear how this would affect the Marine Corps’ ongoing personnel drawdown. Current plans call for shedding about 5,000 Marines from active duty each year through 2016 as the service works toward a new authorized end strength of 182,100.

The questions about effects on this amendment would have on personnel structure is only one issue. What caught my eye about this amendment is the overall question about the that Marines play in diplomatic security. In advocating for this bill Sen. McCain stated, the Benghazi attack was “a stark reminder that the security environment confronting American personnel serving in U.S. embassies and consulates abroad is as dangerous as any time that I can remember.”

However, the primary mission for Marines stationed in embassies and consulates abroad is not protection of personnel. The Marines Security Guard detachments are primarily assigned with protecting -- and destroying if necessary -- classified information that is vital to U.S. national security. Protection of the embassy/consulate and its personnel is a secondary mission of the Marines. That responsibility falls primarily to the little known, but highly trained, Bureau of Diplomacy Security at the State Department.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is “responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.” Its website adds, “[e]very diplomatic mission in the world operates under a security program designed and maintained by Diplomatic Security.” However, there was no mention of this office in McCain's amendment. In fact, there have been repeated efforts in Congress to decrease funding. “Since retaking control in 2010, House Republicans have aggressively cut spending at the State Department in general and embassy security in particular. [Reps.] Chaffetz and Issa and their colleagues voted to pay for far less security than the State Department requested in 2011 and again this year,” explains Dan Murphy of the Christian Science Monitor last month.

Just to be clear, this is not so say that the Marines do not play an important role in diplomatic security. Clearly they do both in terms of information protection and protection of dignitaries and personnel. However, it is strange that Sen. McCain would advocate so forcefully for increasing the Marines presence with no mention of the forces primarily tasked with the mission, especially since his colleagues have repeatedly decreased funding.

Speaking of Sen Marco Rubio... Posted by David Shorr

Now that Marco Rubio has kicked off his 2016 bid by discoursing with GQ about our planet's, er, genesis and getting better acquainted with Republicans in Iowa,^* this seems like a good time to look back at Sen. Rubio's big foreign policy speech at Brookings last April. I have to admit, it really is better than most of what the Republicans offered this cycle. But then, scoring a high grade on that curve is nothing to brag about; Republicans in 2012 were really low-achievers when it comes to foreign policy substance.

I was interested to see Rubio talk about President Obama's efforts to get other international players to help in addressing shared challenges. Together with Nina Hachigian, I've been highlighting this push as a significant driver of current policy. Nina and I sketched what we call the "Responsibility Doctrine" in the September issue of Foreign Service Journal (a fuller exposition will appear in the next Washington Quarterly). So Marco Rubio distinguished himself by refraining from the worst caricatures of Obama foreign policy and engaging with its real substance (sort of).

Actually, Rubio begins by setting aside his differences with Obama and drawing on Bob Kagan's World America Made for a bipartisan case for American international leadership and against turning inward. Back when Kagan's argument appeared in New Republic article form, I wrote a post here at DA saying that Bob was indeed offering the outline of a bipartisan consensus, but that more bridgebuilding was probably still needed from the Republican side. Rubio's speech showed the same blindspot: the need for America to obtain -- rather than presume or demand -- the support of other nations.

As a rhetorical device, Rubio runs through the arguments he's had repeatedly with those who think America should step back, for a change, and let others deal with the world's problems. After explaining that there isn't a candidate to take our place as a global leader, Rubio addresses the idea of greater sharing of responsibility, which is worth quoting at length:

Finally, I'll be asked, if we still have to lead, can’t we at least be equal partners with someone else? In fact, shouldn’t we rely on other nations to carry more of the burden? After all, we all know that they resent us telling them what to do, right?

In this new century, more than ever before, America should work with our capable allies in finding solutions to global problems. Not because America has gotten weaker, but because our partners have grown stronger.  It's worth pointing out, by the way that is not a new idea for us. Our greatest successes have always occurred in partnership with other like-minded nations. America has acted unilaterally in the past - and I believe it should continue to do so in the future -- when necessity requires.  But our preferred option since the U.S. became a global leader has been to work with others to achieve our goals.

So yes, global problems do require international coalitions. On that point this administration is correct. But effective international coalitions don't form themselves. They need to be instigated and led, and more often than not, they can only be instigated and led by us. And that is what this administration doesn't understand. Yes, there are more countries able and willing to join efforts to meet the global challenges of our time. But experience has proven that American leadership is almost always indispensable to its success.

By my reading, the speech is simply a more sophisticated version of the same lame critique Republicans have tried to make for the last four years. There is an entire genre of statements about "what this administration (or president) doesn't understand" that in fact describe the administration's exact approach. Heck, sometimes Obama's critics have cribbed fully detailed policy prescriptions from what he was already doing. This administration is well aware that most coalitions need to be instigated and/or led by the United States. One of President Obama's most impressive successes, as Nina and I argue, has been to spread responsibility for that leadership -- or at least contributions to the common effort -- more widely. 

So let me paraphrase. This is what Sen. Rubio doesn't understand. The real challenge for foreign policy is to somehow induce countries to join efforts when they are less than willing. It isn't only America's allies or the like-minded whose help we need. Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Iran would be impossible without the support of China and Russia (and oh by the way, American allies like Japan and Korea are too dependent on Iranian energy imports to halt them completely).

From what we hear, Republicans are busy these days taking stock of the rethinking they need in order to regain credibility. I offer the above thoughts for that agenda.

^*As a patriotic former Iowa caucus-goer, I would never suggest that it's too early for presidential apirants to start working retail in Iowa. In fact, there's no such thing as "too early."

Photo: Gage Skidmore

The Day after Tomorrow Posted by The Editors

This guest post is written by Erica Mandell.

Anyone who has ever written anything about Israel or Palestine will know that there is
no such thing as a single defining moment, at least not one that exists in the absolute.  Time stretches forward and backward and more so in times of crisis. The current situation in Israel and Gaza is no exception. 

For example, if asked what led to the current escalation, many would point to last
week’s targeted killing of Hamas military chief Ahmed Jabari.  Others would point to 2008’s Operation Cast Lead, or better yet the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, or perhaps the 2006 election of Hamas.  If we really want to get to the root of things, maybe we should go back farther.  The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948?  The Arab revolts of 1936?  The ill-fated Balfour Declaration of 1917?  Long and lamented story short, all of it is relevant, and all of it continues to play out today in clear, historical narratives.

This is no more apparent than on my Facebook newsfeed, where I watch my Jewish and
Arab friends exchange equally compelling arguments for why their side (be it Israel or Gaza) is more besieged.  Indeed, the situation involves so many considerations that leaving this page blank may be more effective than an attempt to hash out the causations and reactions to what we currently see unfolding.  Instead, let us consider options for where things could stand after, God willing, there is a resolution to this sickeningly tragic impasse.

Israel’s political right is emboldened

We all know what it is like to rally around the flag.  Depending on how the situation plays out, this phenomenon is likely to occur in Israel, just in time for the January 22 elections.  Should Israel manage to halt the rocket fire before any major loss of Israeli life, Netanyahu is likely to be strengthened. His was a gamble however, because should, God forbid, a rocket successfully hit a target in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, Netanyahu’s decision to go after Jabari (who was taken out in a targeted killing) would cause a significant fall from grace. A ground operation would also likely complicate matters, and would possibly delay the elections.

However, let us assume that Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu win the election and Netanyahu’s
position is assured once again. What happens when things calm down and the status quo prevails? Even before Operation Pillar of Defense began, all in the region felt the status quo was unsustainable. Sadly however, while Netanyahu and his government place priority in guaranteeing Israel’s daily security, they do little to help Israel in the long-term.  Settlements would likely expand and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority would continue to be marginalized. Adding to Israel’s concerns would be the rise of Mohamed Morsi of Egypt (though he seems willing to reason with Hamas on their behalf) and Iran’s progressing nuclear program.

 It would be business as usual, to the detriment of both sides.

Hamas is emboldened

Now let us assume that Hamas is further endeared to both its constituents and to
its Arab supporters.  It is likely then that Hamas would be encouraged in its quest to compete with Fatah as spokesparty for the Palestinians, thus drawing out any potential end to the conflict.  Indeed, we have already witnessed enthusiasm from the West Bank for Hamas’ efforts in Gaza.  Hamas might also feel confident enough to venture suicide attacks or continue to push Israel’s red lines. An emboldened Hamas would undoubtedly cause Israel to abandon any would-be long-term security efforts in favor of locking down moment-to-moment security. Israel’s security is bifurcated. They focus on current security (i.e. weather forecasts that include rocket fire) and basic security (the continued existence of the state) but rarely at the same time. Arguably, many threats overlap between the two categories, but if current security is threatened, long-term efforts go out the window.

No matter who is in power in Israel, this would effectively mean a step backwards
in security for both sides and a major step backward for Palestinian statehood
aspirations.

Moderate forces prevail

Luckily there is a Goldilocks option, however unlikely. Either Israelis elect a Kadima or Labor-led government or Netanyahu suddenly sees the West Bank and its leadership in a new light.  Just as crises cause Israel to revert to the agenda of the besieged, perhaps a reprieve in violence would inspire Israel to own its role in the conflict and start laying groundwork for final status agreements. Let us not deceive ourselves, a solution is a long way off, but concrete steps can be taken immediately to drastically improve the situation and foster hope. This would include fostering institutions that would serve as the building blocks for a future Palestinian state, start reducing Israeli presence and control in the West Bank, and focus on logistical progress over rhetoric-heavy final status agreements. 

Short-term quiet would give way to concrete progress. 

But lest we forget, this is a two-party conflict. While I continue to argue that Israel has the upper hand in taking effective action toward peace, Palestinians must also act with their long-term interests in mind. Unfortunately, the recent conflict has confirmed Palestinian support for Hamas and has only further alienated Mahmoud Abbas, whose commitment to the plight of Palestine was publicly questioned just weeks ago. For the Palestinians, the key to a moderate way forward is to unify behind moderate leadership. At this point, even if Netanyahu or any other coalition leader were to sit down at the negotiating table, they would be talking with someone who does not represent both territories and therefore cannot speak on behalf of a unified potential state. Rallies and cheers at the sound of rockets falling near Jerusalem may swell spirits in the short term, but they undermine realistic shots at a two-state solution.

As of now, rumors of an imminent ceasefire swell. If it is successful, this would be a good opportunity to analyze the role of Egypt in upcoming peace efforts, and push for American-backed but regionally led frameworks. If a ceasefire remains elusive, and Israel goes forward with a ground incursion, then things will get worse before they get better. Israeli presence in Gaza would no doubt be prolonged and moderation would fall by the wayside for both Palestinians and Israelis.

My preference for option #3 is no secret. While both sides have legitimate claims to fear, resolve, and bereavement, it is time for leaders to abandon the status quo and take
responsibility in acting in their own self-interest to establish peace. I am looking to both sides for this.

While pinpointing single moments in the conflict as stand-alone events is near
impossible, wasting opportunities to resolve long-term security issues seems to
be the rule.  Let us hope that what
happens next is the exception.

Lame Duck Opening Moves: GOP Leadership Agrees DoD is on the Table? Posted by Bill R. French

Speaker of the House John A. Boehner (R - OH) has just delivered the opening statement in what is sure to be a difficult lame duck debate within Congress over avoiding the fiscal cliff. If lawmakers fail to act, the combination of expiring tax cuts and arbitrary spending reductions will be automatically triggered in two months time. The consequences for the American economy could be disastrous, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

Of those reductions, those affecting the Pentagon have received disproportionate attention. What role the Pentagon budget should play in avoiding the fiscal cliff has been hotly debated,  with many – but by no means all – conservatives calling for a deal to exempt the DoD from cuts. Some, most notably Buck Mckeon (R-CA), have even called to reverse the cuts already in place, even though those "cuts" are from projected budgetary increases and the Pentagon budget is still on course to rise slightly over the next decade.

But Boehner may have just signaled a significant softening of the GOP position.  In his speech, he dedicated only one sentence to Pentagon spending to oppose “slashing” the DoD budget. Crucially, this is not objecting to reductions in Pentagon spending as such – a rhetorical fact which is likely indicative of GOP intentions when uttered in such a calibrated address. This interpretation would seem to be corroborated by House Majority Leader Eric Cantor's (R-VA) statements today when he similarly indicated merely opposing  “massive defense cuts.”

In looking forward to near-term the work required to avoid the fiscal cliff, it seems that the GOP leadership now tacitly agrees that Pentagon spending should remain on the table.

National Security Politics-Winners and Losers Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Losers
Islamophobes: Rep Bill Pascrell, who faced Islamophobic attacks in his primary, won in NJ. A sharia-fearing Senate candidate lost in FL. Romney adviers' efforts to subtly channel Islamophobia don't seem to have helped.

Pentagon spending scare-mongers:  The McCain-Graham-Lieberman-Ayotte sequester tours, and the misleading Romney rhetoric about the source and likelihood and severity of the Pentagon's share of sequestration don't seem to have hurt downticket candidates in Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine. Someone's leak today of a dialogue between the UAW and legislators in Ohio about M-1 tank production which the Army doesn't want didn't do the trick in Ohio.

Those tempted to play the Israel card: Obama's Jewish vote, it seems, stayed the same or declined about the same proportion the overall vote did. It didn't turn the tide in Pennsylvania (Florida still hangs in the balance as I write). Certainly the effort to use Iran-Israel as a surrogate for leadership to counter Obama's record on terrorism failed. The Perhaps one could argue that Romney's Israel-Iran rhetoric helped fire up the Christian Zionists and kept him close... but I haven't seen anyone arguing that yet. So, what will that next conversation between Obama and Netanyahu be like?

Winners

The national security establishment: Obama hugged the Pentagon, the homeland security community, the intelligence community, hard. They have hugged him back. They will get in return a President who is solicitous and centrist on their concerns.

Democrats: it's official -- Obama has now exploded the security gap that bedeviled Democratic politicians for 40 years. What are you going to do with that strength, Democrats?

Military families: they get an Administration that funds the VA and doesn't engage in adventurism. and doesn't tolerate prejudice against servicemembers who are immigrants, or gay... or others who are, for that matter

 

 

The Cedar Retribution: The Long Struggle for the Levant, from Hariri to Hassan Posted by The Editors

This post is by Anthony Elghossain, an attorney at a global law firm based in Washington, D.C. He blogs at Page Lebanon. 

On October 19, a bomb tore through Achrafieh, a predominantly Christian neighborhood and upscale gathering place in Beirut. Initially, many Lebanese believed the bomb was a scare tactic or a senseless consequence of a long-anticipated Syrian “spillover.” But investigators soon announced that Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan was among the dead. He’d been the target; Achrafieh was merely the price.

And then Lebanon exploded. Angry youths took to the streets. At Hassan’s funeral in downtown Beirut, ardent members of the March 14 coalition attempted a quixotic coup. Meanwhile, armed bands performed another of their almost ritual bloodlettings. Although the state has since quelled major fighting, Beirut and other flashpoints across the country remain tense.

The assassination wasn’t surprising. Hassan’s relationships, politics, communal affiliation, and security endeavors made him a prime target. A Sunni with close ties to the Hariri family, Hassan headed the Internal Security Forces’ (ISF) information branch. While transforming the information branch into an effective operation, Hassan cooperated with the U.S., France, and Arab states in Lebanon and beyond.

Of course, immediate causes are evident. Hassan had recently uncovered an alleged Syrian plot to destabilize Lebanon. Furthermore, in recent months, Hassan had reportedly joined international efforts—not all of them public—to bolster Syrian rebels.

But this killing means more.

At its heart, Hassan’s assassination was another salvo in the long struggle for the Levant. For more than a decade, rival factions—each aligning Lebanese and Syrian actors alongside foreign sponsors—have sought to control Beirut. Lebanon’s capital has long been an open arena; with the onset the Syrian conflict, these rivals are competing for Damascus too.

The scenes have included Beirut, foreign capitals, the media war, licit and illicit business, and Lebanon’s far-flung diaspora. The Assad regime and allies like Hezbollah have routinely used violence to silence opponents, eliminate liabilities, deplete pools of knowledge, and create political space. They probably killed Hassan because, in the complicated tapestry of the Levant, he tied many threads together:

The Closing Arguments of Foreign Policy 2012 Posted by David Shorr

The Des Moines Register has been kind enough, this election year, to publish a series of my op-eds on foreign policy issues in the campaign. Below is the final pre-election column (also reprinted in today's Iowa City Press-Citizen)...

It is now election crunch time; everything is over except for final swing voter decisions, turnout and tallying the results.

That makes it a good time to look back at the debates between President Obama and Gov. Romney and take stock of the hot foreign policy topics of 2012.

The bulk of attention has fallen on the Middle Eastern nations of Iran and Libya as well as China. It is questionable whether the election-year foreign policy debate has kept the issues and regions in the right proportion to America’s stakes.

For exmaple, there are still 68,000 American troops fighting in Afghanistan. Both presidential candidates support the same timeline to draw down this combat force, after Romney dropped his previous strong objections to setting a withdrawal date. Still, the candidates’ discussion of the three highest profile countries offers a good basis to compare their approaches.

Overall, Romney has shown a strong impulse for confrontation and general disregard for international sentiment. He has contrasted himself with the more measured approach of Obama, who has worked to build international support for U.S. positions and keep the world’s sole superpower from being viewed as heavy-handed.

The Obama administration, for instance, has used the World Trade Organization as a referee of our disputes with China and just in the last few days won a big case on steel production. There has been important progress on China’s artificially weak currency too. The administration has combined America’s voice with others and pressured China into letting its currency strengthen by 11 percent in four years — which helps lower the price of American exports. In the eight years of the Bush administration, the Chinese currency exchange rate didn’t budge.

Watching Romney and Obama’s recent debate on foreign policy, I was particularly struck by the discussion of the extensive sanctions Obama has imposed on Iran over its nuclear program. A diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue has been elusive for the last two administrations, but Obama has had notable success in building broad international support for pressure on Iran.

Romney tried to criticize the president by claiming to have favored tougher sanctions much earlier, but Obama exposed the flaw of this critique. Sanctions cannot work unless they are multilateral, and gaining international support is harder when the U.S. tries to hurry, instead of letting Iranian stubbornness become obvious to everyone. The tough challenge of reaching a solution remains, but Iranian leaders are under greater pressure to negotiate than ever before.

In Libya last year, the dictator Muammar Gaddafi threatened to massacre thousands of civilians rising up against him in Benghazi. It grew clear that leaders in the region and the wider world community favored intervening to prevent a bloodbath, and Obama worked with European and Arab counterparts to mount a successful air operation to support the resistance and removal of Gaddafi.

The first senior representative of the U.S. to work with rebels in Benghazi was the same Ambassador Christopher Stevens who, along with three other Americans, was killed in that city a few weeks ago.

It is safe to say that Stevens would have found the political hue and cry over his death very strange. For him, and many of his fellow U.S. diplomats, it was important not to become isolated within embassy fortresses. He was proud that the U.S. stood with the people of Libya against their oppressor.

What is strangest of all, though, is hearing Romney’s loud criticisms over the September Benghazi attack when last year he came out against forcibly removing Gaddafi.

But the real point of Libya is what happened after the death of the four Americans. There were much larger protests in appreciation of the U.S. than any of the anti-American demonstrations — ordinary Libyans wanted to express their gratitude for Obama’s intervention last year, to not let the murderous terrorists speak for them. This is just one example of how Obama has skillfully navigated the Arab Spring to preserve American influence.

Romney tries to argue that tumultuous events in the Mideast represent a foreign policy failure, as if players in the region would all fall into line for a Romney administration.

He is not only flattering himself but showing dangerous naivety about world affairs.

Photo: Voice of America

How Low Can You Go? Latino Voters Are Not Amused! Posted by The Editors

This post is by Johanna Mendelson Forman, a Scholar-in-Residence at the American University School of International Service.

With the election just days away the Romney campaign has tried again to make a last ditch effort to attract Latino voters.  In Florida, one of the biggest prizes in electoral votes, Latino voters could not be fooled by an offensive Spanish-language ad portraying President Obama as soft on dictators.  The ad, which started running yesterday on TV, tries to tar the President with connections to Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, and Cuba’s aging dictator, Fidel Castro

Fortunately, the immediate reaction from Florida’s Latino voters has been one of disbelief that Republicans would stoop this low to try to garner their support.  How could a candidate that has spoken out against immigration reform, who has supported self-deportation as the only solution for illegal aliens, and who has been against in-state tuition for the children of the undocumented be taken seriously?  Invoking smear tactics about foreign leaders cannot overcome a campaign that has been anti-immigrant from the get go and downright insensitive to the diversity of our Hispanic heritage.  Just because Romney tries to underscores his Mexican roots does not a Latino make! Ads alone cannot seal the deal in any election, and Latinos in Florida do not like what they see at the top of the Republican ticket

Obama was right when he talked about Romney’s most recent acquired ailment– “Romnesia.”  Does Romney not remember that in 2008 Obama received 67% of the Latino vote in the Sunshine State, compared with 31% for Sen. John McCain?   Did his advisors not read the most recent report of the Pew Hispanic Center that clearly showed that Latinos favored Democrats to Republicans, by a wide margin of 61 percent to 10 percent?   But can you blame a guy from trying?  Latinos represent 13.5 percent of the state’s registered voters it is highly unlikely that at this late date the Romney camp can win hearts and minds by running a Spanish TV ad that is both outrageous in its twisting of words, and offensive in bringing attention to the likes of an autocratic populist like Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chavez.

The dated concept of a president being soft on communists or coddling autocrats should be a warning sign that a vote for Romney is a throwback to an era of U.S. Latin American relations that does not reflect the growing partnership that President Obama has with our neighbors, equal partnership that has been a cornerstone of his foreign policy to the region since he first spoke of it at the April 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago:

“To move forward, we cannot let ourselves be prisoners of past disagreements... Too often, an opportunity to build a fresh partnership of the Americas has been undermined by stale debates. And we've heard all these arguments before, these debates that would have us make a false choice between rigid, state-run economies or unbridled and unregulated capitalism; between blame for right-wing paramilitaries or left-wing insurgents; between sticking to inflexible policies with regard to Cuba or denying the full human rights that are owed to the Cuban people. I didn't come here to debate the past -- I came here to deal with the future I believe, that we must learn from history, but we can't be trapped by it. As neighbors, we have a responsibility to each other and to our citizens. And by working together, we can take important steps forward to advance prosperity and security and liberty. That is the 21st century agenda that we come together to enact. That's the new direction that we can pursue.”

These are the words of President Obama who has been attacked by Chavez and by Castro. This is the leadership we need to work with our friends and our enemies in the Americas. Trying to make Obama look soft on those who challenge democracy and freedom had better think twice. Sunshine is the best disinfectant, and it sure looks like the Romney campaign could use a major cleaning job when it comes to its Spanish language advertising. This is what the Latino voters of Florida and the rest of our nation want to hear about the future, not some commie-baiting claptrap that panders to voter’s fears.

Romney Wrong on American Weakness Posted by Bill R. French

Tonight’s debate was right to include the rise of China as its own section for discussion. But taking the challenge posed by China seriously first requires an honest look at the Sino-U.S. relationship. Regrettably, here, Governor Romney instead decided to paint picture of fear and paranoia. In this effort, Governor Romney insinuated that China perceives the United States as economically and militarily weak due to the policies of the Obama Administration. "How strong are we going to be?" he asked, going on to to say:

“They look at the fact that we owe them a trillion dollars and owe other people 16 trillion (dollars) in total, including them. They -- they look at our -- our decision to -- to cut back on our military capabilities -- a trillion dollars. The secretary of defense called these trillion dollars of cuts to our military devastating…”

 First, it is disappointing that on the serious question of Chinese holdings of U.S. debt, honest conversation has been systematically avoided. Far from being a situation in which the United States is weakened or beholden to China because of Beijing’s holdings of U.S. debt, China actually depends upon buying American Treasury Bonds to favorably regulate the value of its currency. James Parker at The Diplomat explains:

There is an old banking saying which goes something like: “If you owe your bank a thousand pounds, you are at their mercy. If you owe a million pounds, then the position is reversed.” …  China is not a commercial bank; it did not decide to “lend” its foreign exchange reserves to the U.S. per se. Rather, China’s accumulation of reserves is a by-product of the government’s exchange rate policy. It used to buy large quantities of U.S. dollar assets because it had to maintain reserves of the currency to which the renminbi was pegged (although Beijing has allowed the renminbi to fluctuate around a basket of currencies since 2005)…

Present day, Parker continues, "the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) maintains a weakened renminbi by agreeing to purchase nearly all U.S. dollars accumulated by Chinese exporters and corporations." This scheme works because some of these dollars, in turn, are invested in U.S. Treasury Bonds. The return on investment on these bonds helps to finance the scheme by counteracting some of the inflation generated by replacing American dollars with renminibi. The remainder of his explanation is highly recommended, though slightly technical.

Similarly disappointing was Romney’s treatment of the American trade deficit with China.  After characterizing the trade deficit as a “trade war,” he went on to say:

“It’s a silent one and they’re winning. We have an enormous trade imbalance with China. And it’s worse this year than last year. And it was worse last year than the year before.”

To be sure, trade imbalance presents serious challenges. But characterizing those challenges as a “trade war” polarizes the issue far too severely, blurring the fact that US-Chinese bilateral trade benefits the United States, even while in deficit. For instance, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, “on average, of every dollar spent on an item labeled ‘Made in China,’ 55 cents go for services produced in the United States. In other words, the U.S. content of “Made in China” is about 55%.”

Second, in the context of China cited above, Romney implies that the future of the U.S. military – which, baring sequestration, will see its budget continue to rise slightly in real dollars – is somehow demonstrating weakness. While the modernization of the People’s Liberation Amy should be taken seriously, the balance of forces remains sharply in Washington’s favor. For example, the “budgetary basics” confirm this, as I have pointed out with former Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb: “The Department of Defense estimates that Chinese military expenditures were $105 billion in 2006, while the US spent $419 billion on defense, a gap of $314 billion. In 2010, US military spending increased to $533.8 billion while Chinese military spending increased to only $160billion, a gap of $373.8 billion -- nearly $60 billion greater than the gap in 2006.”

Yet, Obama was right to consistently point out tonight that it is military capabilities and not budgets that determine military power. Here, while it is certainly the case that the PLA has developed considerable capabilities, they pale in comparison to the ability of the United States to project power around the world. Awareness of this massive disparity in power projection capabilities has even generated discussion about the option for the United States to simply exersize "offshore control" of China's economy by closing maritime choke points in the unlikely and tragic event of conflict.

For instance, as the president pointed out tonight, “We have these things called aircraft carriers where planes land on them.” While the United States maintains 11 aircraft carriers, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) possess only one  – the Liaoning. As the PLAN’s sole carrier, The Liaoning will be limited to training operations for the foreseeable future as the Chinese navy figures out the basics of carrier aviation, as Naval War College professor Andrew Erickson has explained. Indeed, as he points out, the Chinese have even yet to successfully land an aircraft on her hull.

What was it that Governor Romney was saying about weakness, again?