Smart Defence:
The analyst's view
How can Smart Defence
work in practice?
Well, I think there are at least two
key ways in which this could work.
The first one is to focus
on urgent operational requirements.
To basically focus on those things
that we see we lack in operations.
And, I think, the other way
of thinking about this,
would be to start with
what countries are willing to do
because there are
sovereignty concerns related
to specialisation, prioritisation,
because once you collaborate more,
you accept mutual dependencies,
you make yourself
dependent on each other
and that is a difficult trade-off
to find for NATO member states.
What real difference
could Smart Defence make?
I think the ambition behind Smart
Defence is rather large actually.
If Smart Defence succeeds,
it will change the way that NATO
member states develop, provide,
operate, maintain,
but also discard military capabilities.
That is very encompassing in itself
and it would create a new way
of doing defence policy
within the NATO context.
What funding changes
could Smart Defence bring?
Well, the interesting question is:
What can NATO do to give incentives
to member states to engage in this?
And we can already see
that NATO is starting discussions
on seed funding for projects,
on more common funding to help
member states make the case
that this is something
that is in their interest to do,
not just a priority
that comes out of headquarters,
but something that they can explain
as being beneficial and useful.
How do NATO partners fit in?
I think for partners
the key question is:
What is their role
in NATO operations?
That is what is driving
partnership for a lot of countries
who do not necessarily
aspire to NATO membership.
So, the question for both
NATO and partners becomes:
How do you structure
that relationship?
Which capability goals can be defined
where partners can plug in
a capability that does not already
exist in abundance within NATO,
but that fills a visible and
important gap in NATO's inventory?
Is Smart Defence
a bottom-up or top-down project?
Well, I think it needs to be a mix.
Clearly,
Smart Defence cannot succeed
without the buy-in from
member states and from capitals.
This is for them to decide.
At the same time,
NATO as an organisation,
needs to think about
how it can most efficiently structure
its role as a facilitator,
as an advisor, but perhaps,
and this is slightly provocative,
as an enforcer of these decisions.
And one way to do this would be
to design a defence planning process
that is slightly more intrusive.
And this can be done by two ways:
by making it on the one hand
more future oriented
and by increasing
the multinational goals that it covers
so that it becomes less of
a bilateral NATO to one member state
kind of arrangement
and a more encompassing tool.
Will Smart Defence work this time?
Well, I think the chances are
that today we have
a very different context.
We have a triangular
challenge of austerity,
of operational challenges, which we
can see when our forces do deploy,
and of the uncertainty
in the strategic environment.
So, therefore the pressure
to change the way we do business
is much greater. However,
one has to of course acknowledge
that member states, governments
will within that general context
pursue different priorities,
will have different preferences.
There is no unifying threat and
that needs to be taken into account
as NATO develops the Smart
Defence agenda at Chicago,
but also following up on Chicago
to make sure that it is actually
not a headline grabbing moment
that fizzles out after the Summit.