Definitions:  Facility Safety Authorization Subject Area

Point of Contact:  KARL MORO

Issue Date:  09/11/2012
SCMS Revision:  4.0

TERM

DEFINITION

Accelerator

A device employing electrostatic or electromagnetic fields to impart kinetic energy to molecular, atomic, or subatomic particles and capable of creating a radiological area as defined by 10 CFR 835, Occupational Radiation Protection.

Accelerator Facility

The accelerator and associated plant and equipment utilizing or supporting the production of accelerated particle beams to which access is controlled to protect the safety and health of persons. It includes injectors, targets, beam dumps, detectors, experimental halls, experimental enclosures, and experimental apparatus utilizing the accelerator, regardless of where the apparatus may have been designed, fabricated, or constructed.

Accelerator Readiness Review (ARR)

A structured method for verifying that hardware, personnel, and procedures associated with commissioning and routine operation are ready to permit the activity to be undertaken safely.

Accelerator Safety Envelope (ASE)

A set of physical and administrative controls that define the bounding conditions for safe operations at an accelerator facility based on the safety analysis documented in the Safety Assessment Document. Any activity violating the ASE must be terminated immediately and the activity must not be restarted before the U.S. Department of Energy has been notified.

Approval Authority (Safety Basis)

The single point of contact between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the facility contractor for all areas of review and approval of Documented Safety Analyses and Technical Safety Requirements. In this capacity, the Approval Authority serves as the focal point through which DOE interfaces with the facility contractor and from which directions to the facility contractor originate. This is accomplished through the Review Team Leader and in conjunction with official contractor interfaces.

Authorization Agreement

The documented agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science (SC) and the contractor for highly hazardous facilities (Hazard Category 1 and 2 nuclear facilities and other facilities as designated by the SC Site Office Manager). This is one method to maintain Integrated Safety Management Continuing Core Expectations for Operations Authorization. The Authorization Agreement clarifies key Terms and Conditions (controls and commitments) under which the contractor is authorized to perform the work safely, securely and efficiently (such as Documented Safety Analyses, Technical Safety Requirements, environmental permits, etc.). Any changes to these Terms and Conditions require the approval from the SC Site Office.

Authorization Envelope

The set of limits necessary for the operation of all the facility activities. These limits are based on documented design limitations, controls, regulatory constraints, and assumptions or commitments that are required, as well as identified hazards and the environmental and security impacts associated with facility activities.

Authorize

To give a right to undertake an activity; as applied to contractor activities, authorization to commence or resume operations is reserved for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Contracting Officer.

Central Technical Authority (CTA)

The CTAs are designated by the Deputy Secretary of Energy (S-2) as identified in the July 11, 2012, Delegation of Authority:

  • Chief of Nuclear Safety for Environment,
  • The Under Secretary for National Nuclear Security Administration,
  • The Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, and
  • The Director of the Office of Science.

Commissioning

The process of testing an accelerator facility, or portion thereof, to establish the performance characteristics. It starts with the first introduction of a particle beam into the system.

Contract

The term “contract” refers to those prime contracts for U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities (including Management and Operating, Management and Integration, design, and construction) contracts that include DEAR Clause 970.5204-2, Laws, Regulations, and DOE Directives (as used in DEAR Clause 970.5204-2).

Documented Safety Analysis (DSA)

A documented analysis of the extent to which a Hazard Category 1, 2 or 3 nuclear facility can be operated safely with respect to the workers, the public, and the environment, including a description of the conditions, safe boundaries, and hazard controls that provide the basis for ensuring safety.

Exception

A treatment of an applicable provision from a Contractor Requirements Document (CRD) in a contract that would have required an Exemption if a DOE-approved tailoring process had not been followed (as used in DOE O 410.1, Central Technical Authority Responsibilities Regarding Nuclear Safety Requirements).

Exemption

For Federal Personnel, an exemption is formal and final relief from the need to comply with applicable requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) regulations and directives. For contractors, an exemption is a formal and final release from one or more requirements in a Regulation; or in a DOE Order, Notice, or Manual that is included in their contract (DOE O 251.1C, Departmental Directives Program, and 10 CFR 820, Procedural Rules for DOE Nuclear Activities.).

Extended Shutdown

The termination of program work in a facility that involves facility, Operation, or activity.

  • For Hazard Category 1 SC nuclear facilities, this period is greater than 12 months since the last time the reactor was in Operating mode 1, 2 or 3 as defined in the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs).
  • For Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities, this period is 12 months or greater.

Graded Approach

The process for ensuring that the level of analysis, documentation, and actions used to comply with a requirement are commensurate with (1) the relative importance to safety and safeguards and security, (2) the magnitude of any hazard(s) involved, (3) the life cycle stage of the facility, (4) the programmatic mission of the facility, (5) the particular characteristics of the facility, (6) the relative importance of the radiological and non‑radiological hazards, and (7) any other relevant factor. The graded approach may not be used in implementing the Unreviewed Safety Question process or Technical Safety Requirements.

Hazard Category

Evaluation of the consequences of unmitigated releases to classify nuclear facilities or operations into the following hazard categories:

  • Hazard Category 1: The hazard analysis shows the potential for significant off-site consequences.
  • Hazard Category 2: The hazard analysis shows the potential for significant on-site consequences.
  • Hazard Category 3: The hazard analysis shows the potential for only significant localized consequences.
NOTE: DOE-STD-1027-92, Change Notice 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, provides guidance and radiological threshold values for determining a facility's Hazard Category.

Implementation Plan (IP)

The procedural document by which the readiness review is conducted. This document implements the scope and direction approved in the readiness review plan-of-action and defines the depth of the review. Sections 8.2 and 9.3 of DOE-STD-3006-2010, Planning and Conducting Readiness Reviews, describe the contents, preparation, and use of the IP.

Internal Safety Review System

The contractor's one or more standing or ad hoc committees comprised of persons independent of the accelerator operation under review. This group functions primarily in an advisory capacity to a designated manager having the authority to direct actions based upon the review findings. The rigor with which the review system is implemented should be commensurate with the hazard potential of the facility. While the system is intended to be internal to the contractor organization, independent technical competence in all areas required for an appropriate review may not be readily available within the organization. Consultants from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) accelerator facilities may be used as a regular complement to internal staff to provide an additional degree of objectivity and independence as well as nurturing good communications within the DOE. Specific aspects of the accelerator facility that typically merit investigation by the internal safety review system include:

  • Safety and environmental aspects of the design of the accelerator;
  • Facility prior to the start of construction;
  • Development and modification of a Safety Assessment Document (SAD);
  • Proposed modifications to the accelerator facility, its operation, or any equipment that has potential safety implications;
  • Accelerator facility procedures related to safe and environmentally responsible operation;
  • Approved Accelerator Safety Envelope (ASE);
  • Determining whether proposed activities are within the ASE;
  • Identified causes of any violation of ASE;
  • Corrective actions proposed in response to a facility shutdown because of safety concerns; and
  • Content of safety training programs.

Justification for Continued Operations (JCO)

A mechanism by which a contractor may request that DOE review and approve a temporary change to the facility safety basis that would allow the facility to continue operating in view of a specific and unexpected situation, considering the safety significance of the situation and any compensatory measures being applied during this period. A JCO is associated only with situations where the PISA USQD is positive. The JCO should analyze the hazards and identify controls, appropriate for the hazards associated with the PISA and the length of time the conditions which resulted in the PISA are expected to exist.

Margin of Safety

The range between two conditions. The first is the most adverse condition estimated or calculated in safety analyses to occur from an operational upset or family of related upsets. The second condition is the worst case value known to be safe, from an engineering perspective (i.e., minimum acceptable limit for operation under normal and specific failure condition). This value would be expected to be related to the condition at which some accident prevention or mitigation action must be taken in response to the upset or accident, as required by a U.S. Department of Energy approved hazard control documents, not the actual predicted failure point of some component. Hazard control documents may be Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) or they may be in another form, as permitted by 10 CFR 830.205 for certain environmental restoration activities.

Nuclear Facility

Nuclear Facility means a reactor or a nonreactor nuclear facility where an activity is conducted for or on behalf of DOE and includes any related area, structure, facility, or activity to the extent necessary to ensure proper implementation of the requirements established by this 10 CFR 830. (10 CFR 830.3)

Operational Readiness Review (ORR)

An activity to confirm that management has brought the facility to a state of readiness to commence or resume equipment, activities or operations. There are two types of Operational Readiness Reviews [contractor and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)]:

  1. The contractor ORR provides the substantial basis for the acceptance of readiness. The contractor ORR precedes the DOE ORR.
  2. The DOE ORR:
    1. Determines the adequacy of the contractor ORR,
    2. Places significant emphasis on the effectiveness of the contractor's preparations through actual demonstrations or normal operations, abnormal events, emergency drills, etc.,
    3. Assesses the readiness of the responsible DOE line organization(s) to safely manage operations, and
    4. Assesses the effectiveness of coordination among organizations.
The intent of the ORR is to verify that the site infrastructure, including the Safety Management Programs, ensures that the status of readiness to safely conduct nuclear operations should be sustained through the operating cycle. The breadth of the ORR includes the minimum core requirements provided in DOE O 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities. The depth of evaluation of core requirements is determined according to situations associated with the shutdown and subsequent outage, magnitude of hazard, and level of complexity of the change through use of the graded approach.

Plan of Action (POA)

The document prepared by line management that describes the scope of the readiness review, the prerequisites which must be met to start the readiness review, and the proposed team leader for the readiness review. Both the contractor and the U.S. Department of Energy prepare plan of actions for their respective readiness reviews (in some instances as specified in the SNR, a DOE RA may not be required. Both contractor and DOE POAs when required are submitted to the Startup Authorization Authority (SAA) for approval. The designated readiness review team leader(s) develops their IP from the approved POA.

Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA)

An inadequacy exists in a Documented Safety Analysis that calls into question information relied upon for authorization of operations.

Radiological Facility

Facilities whose radionuclide inventory is below the threshold quantities of DOE-STD-1027-92, Change Notice 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

Readiness Activity

A review conducted to determine a facility’s readiness to startup or restart a nuclear facility, activity or operation (can include equipment). As defined in DOE O 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities, there are two types of readiness activities: Readiness Assessments and Operational Readiness Reviews.

Readiness Assessment (RA)

A review conducted to determine a facility’s readiness to startup or restart when an Operational Readiness Review (ORR) is not required.

Readiness Review Team Leader

The selected individual identified in the Plan of Action that leads the Readiness Review and directs the Review Team.

Readiness To Proceed (RTP) Memorandum

The formal document submitted by the contractor certifying the conclusion that the facility is: (1) prepared to start or resume nuclear operations or activities before the contractor Readiness Assessment (RA)/Operational Readiness Review (ORR) or (2) prepared to start or resume nuclear operations or activities before the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) RA/ORR. The contractor readiness review final report and finding closure packages or corrective action plans, along with the appropriate endorsements, are attached to the RTP.

Record

A completed document or other media that provides objective evidence of an item, service, or process.

Review Plan

A plan prepared by the Review Team Leader that is consistent with DOE-STD-1104-2009, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, as appropriate, that defines the membership, qualifications, time schedule, deliverables and focus of the Review Team. This plan is approved by the Approval Authority.

Review Team Leader (Safety Basis)

The individual selected by the Approval Authority to lead the review of the safety document and direct the Review Team.

Review Team Member (Safety Basis)

The individuals selected by the Team Leader to review the safety document and assist in preparation of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) or SER-based document.

Routine Operation (Applies Only To Accelerator Operations)

The point where U.S. Department of Energy authorization has been granted either (1) because the commissioning effort is sufficiently complete to provide confidence that the risks are both understood and acceptable and the operation has appropriate safety bounds, or (2) to permit the re-introduction of a particle beam after being directed to cease operation by the U.S. Department of Energy because of an environmental, safety, or health concern.

Safety Analysis

A documented processes which (1) provides a systematic identification of hazards within a given U.S. Department of Energy operation; (2) describes and analyzes the adequacy of measures taken to eliminate, control or mitigate identified hazards; and (3) analyzes and evaluates potential accidents and their associated risks.

Safety Assessment Document (SAD)

The document that identifies hazards; provides the results of the Safety Analyses including the associated onsite and offsite impacts to workers, the public, and the environment from the accelerator facility for both normal operations and credible accidents; and describes the accelerator facility and its function, location, operations, and management organization, engineered controls, and administrative measures in enough detail to understand the risk and the sufficiency of the selected controls.

Safety Basis (Hazard Category 1, 2 or 3 Nuclear Facilities)

The Documented Safety Analysis, hazard controls (e.g., Technical Safety Requirements), and other controls and commitments mandated by the Approval Authority that provide reasonable assurance that a U.S. Department of Energy nuclear facility can be operated safely in a manner that adequately protects workers, the public, and the environment.

Safety Basis (Radiological Facilities)

The document (e.g. Health and Safety Plan, Auditable Safety Assessment), hazard controls, and the U.S. Department of Energy approval documents mandated by the SC Site Office Manager that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated safely in a manner that adequately protects workers, the public, and the environment.

Safety Basis Information System (SBIS)

A database maintained by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters (HQ) Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) (HS-1) from input provided by the Program and Operations Offices to provide a means to search for a particular DOE nuclear facility or activity based on common attributes (e.g., facilities/activities at the same DOE site). It also provides the status of the safety basis documents and a point of contact for further information.

Safety Evaluation Report (SER)

The report that the U.S. Department of Energy prepares to document (1) the sufficiency of the safety basis document(s) Hazard Category 1, 2 or 3 nuclear facility, facilities downgraded to below Hazard Category 3 Threshold Quantities by analysis, or onsite transportation actives meeting Hazard Category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities criteria or contractor's procedure for its USQ process, (2) the extent to which a contractor has satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, and (3) the basis for DOE's approval of the facility's safety basis document(s), including any conditions for approval.

Safety Evaluation Report (SER)‑Like Document

The report that the SC Site Office prepares to document (1) the sufficiency of the safety document(s), (2) the extent to which a contractor has satisfied applicable requirements and (3) the basis for the U.S. Department of Energy's approval of the facility's safety document(s), including any conditions for approval.

Safety‑Class Structures, Systems, and Components (SC SSCs)

Structures, systems, or components including portions of process systems, whose preventive and mitigative function is necessary to limit radioactive hazardous material exposure to the public, as determined from the safety analyses.

Safety‑Significant Structures, Systems, and Components (SS SSCs)

Structures, systems, and components which are not designated as safety‑class SSCs but whose preventive or mitigative function is a major contributor to defense in depth and/or worker safety as determined from safety analyses.

Shall/Will/Must

A word used to denote a mandatory condition, stated in a directive, which must be met or complied with.

Shielding Policy (Applies Only To Accelerator Operations)

A document that defines the contractor's ionizing and non-ionizing radiation control guidelines for the facility (e.g., facility worker, non-facility worker, member of the public, groundwater activation); describes the policy and process for identifying engineering and/or administrative controls that will be utilized to assure radiation control guidelines are not exceeded; defines the initial and periodic assessments that will be conducted to demonstrate compliance with the shielding policy; and identifies a process for configuration control of facility shielding.

Should/May

A word used to denote a recommended practice or guideline that is not mandatory but is intended to comply with good practice or a standard.

Specific Administrative Control (SAC)

An administrative control is designated as a SAC if (1) it is identified in the Documented Safety Analysis as a control needed to prevent or mitigate an accident scenario, and (2) it has a safety function that would be safety significant or safety‑class if the function were provided by an SSC.

Startup Authorization Authority (SAA)

The line manager who is designated in accordance with DOE O 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start up or Restart Nuclear Facilities, Section 4.b, to authorize the start of nuclear operations when all requirements of the Order have been met. The SAA may range from a senior contractor line manager to the Secretary of Energy. For each startup or restart, the SAA is designated in the Startup Notification Report (SNR). See http://scms.sc.doe.gov/Reports/DelegationsList.cfm for a list of current SC delegations in conjunction with Table I in DOE-STD-3006-2010, Planning and Conducting Readiness Reviews.

Startup Notification Report (SNR)

A quarterly report (or at a periodicity as designated by the Program Secretarial Officer [PSO]) by each responsible contractor to identify nuclear facility new starts and restarts scheduled in the next year. The report identifies the facility, and based on the criteria in DOE O 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start up or Restart Nuclear Facilities, specifies whether an Operational Readiness Review (ORR) or Readiness Assessment (RA) is required. The SNR also identified the Start-up Authorization Authority (SAA) and updates previously provided information.

Startup or Restart

The initiation of existing or new equipment or controls (including safety management programs and limits) that are credited in the approved safety basis. The initial startup of a newly constructed nuclear facility (per Criterion 4.a.(2)(a) of DOE O 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start up or Restart Nuclear Facilities, or the initial startup after conversion of an existing facility to a new nuclear mission with a new DSA and associated TSRs (per Criterion 4.a.(2)(b) of DOE O 425.1D) would require an ORR. If the existing or new equipment of controls (including safety management program and limits) were originally not credited in the safety basis and then credited, that modification would need to be evaluated for an RA. Startups that utilize the same set of safety controls would not require an RA. Startups that utilize a similar set of controls would need to be evaluated for an RA based upon the safety significance and complexity of the differences. Restarts utilizing the same credited safety controls would need to be evaluated under Criterion 4.a.(3)(b) of DOE O 425.1D.

Startup or Restart Plan

The management plan developed by the responsible contractor that describes the process of deliberate, controlled operations the contractor intends to follow after authorization to start nuclear operations following a readiness review. Appendix 2 of DOE-STD-3006-2010, Planning and Conducting Readiness Reviews, contains additional information on the suggested content of a startup plan.

Substantial/Significant Facility Modifications

A major modification using the criteria in Table 8-1 of DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process. A substantial modification is a change that may meet one or more of the following criteria including:

  1. Adds a new building or facility with a material inventory greater than or equal to Hazard Category 3 limits or increase the HC of an existing facility.
  2. Changes the footprint of an existing HC 1, 2, or 3 facility with the potential to adversely affect any safety class (SC) or safety significant (SS) safety function or associated structure, system or component (SSC).
  3. Changes an existing process or adds a new process resulting in the need for a safety basis change requiring DOE approval.
  4. Utilizes new technology or government furnished equipment (GFE) not currently in use or not previously formally reviewed/approved by DOE for the affected facility.
  5. Creates the need for new or revised safety SSCs.
  6. Involves a hazard not previously evaluated in the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA).

Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs)

The limits, controls, and related actions that establish the specific parameters and requisite actions for the safe operation of a Hazard Category 1, 2 or 3 nuclear facility and include (as appropriate for the work and the hazards identified in the Documented Safety Analysis for the facility) the safety limits, operating limits, surveillance requirements, administrative and management controls, use and application provisions, and design features, as well as a bases appendix.

Terms and Conditions

The section of an Authorization Agreement that should specify contractor commitments for assuring the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that the authorized work will be performed safely. The process to be used to keep the Authorization Agreement current should be described. Key Terms and Conditions requiring DOE review and approval need to be clearly identified in this section. This may include specific implementation procedures or manuals of practice. Other Terms and Conditions may only require DOE notification and review if deemed appropriate.

Transportation Safety Document (TSD)

The U.S. Department of Energy approved document prepared in accordance with the requirements in DOE O 460.1C, Packaging and Transportation Safety, and associated guide, DOE G 460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, "Packaging and Transportation Safety", or DOE O 461.1B, Packaging and Transportation for Offsite Shipment of Materials of National Security Interest, as appropriate. The TSD addresses hazard identification, analysis, and controls and hazard communication necessary to conduct safe onsite transfers of Hazard Category 2 and 3 materials. The TSD may contain the required Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirement information in a single document, or as separate submittals.

Unreviewed Safety Issue (USI) (Applies Only to Accelerator Operations)

Exists if a proposed change, modification, or experiment or discovery of a previously unevaluated hazard will either:

  1. Significantly increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety from that evaluated previously by safety analysis; or
  2. Introduce an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously by safety analysis that could result in significant consequences.

Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ)

A situation where (1) the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or the malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) could be increased, (2) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the DSA could be created, (3) a margin of safety could be reduced, or (4) the DSA may not be bounding or may be otherwise inadequate.

Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Process

The mechanism for keeping a safety basis current by reviewing potential unreviewed safety questions, reporting unreviewed safety questions to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and obtaining approval from DOE prior to taking any action that involves an unreviewed safety question.


This is the online OFFICIAL SCMS COPY of this file. Before using a printed copy, verify that it is the most current version by checking the Last Major SCMS Revision date (at the bottom of each document) on the SCMS Web site.

Last Major SCMS Revision: September 11, 2012


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