



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

J-6
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CJCSI 3320.02E
15 October 2010

JOINT SPECTRUM INTERFERENCE RESOLUTION (JSIR)

References: See Enclosure B.

1. Purpose. To provide policy, reporting guidance, and program description; identify the roles and responsibilities of DOD agencies; and provide security classification guidance for the JSIR program.
2. Cancellation. CJCSI 3320.02D, 9 January 2009, is canceled.
3. Applicability. This instruction is applicable to the DOD combatant commands, Services, and agencies (C/S/As), to include joint task forces, U.S. elements of combined commands and DOD elements of the intelligence community. C/S/As will develop procedures for implementing this manual.
4. Policy. Applicable organizations and commands described above are to follow procedures established in references a through g.
 - a. The C/S/A will attempt to resolve electromagnetic interference (EMI) problems at the lowest possible level in the operational chain of command. Interference incidents shall be entered into the JSIR collaboration portal as soon as practicable while resolution using local organic assets or host-nation assistance is pursued.
 - b. C/S/As will follow specific guidance and detailed procedures established in CJCSM 3320.02.
5. Definitions. Definitions of terms in this instruction can be found in reference d.
6. Responsibilities. See Enclosure A.

7. Summary of Changes. This instruction has been modified to reflect current reporting procedures and contains updated references and contact information. It is the intent of this instruction to mandate reference d as the appropriate guidance for detailed procedures concerning the JSIR program.

8. Releasability. This instruction is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. C/S/As (to include the combatant commands), other federal agencies, and the public may obtain copies of this instruction through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Home Page--
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives. Local reproduction is authorized.

9. Effective Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt.



For
B. E. GROOMS
RADM, USN
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:

- A -- Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) Program
- B -- References

ENCLOSURE A

JOINT SPECTRUM INTERFERENCE RESOLUTION (JSIR) PROGRAM

1. Program Description. The Department of Defense established the JSIR program in October 1992 to address persistent and recurring interference problems in joint operations, including those between civil and DOD systems and those involving space systems. The JSIR program was designed as a replacement for the electromagnetic interference (EMI) portion of the former DOD Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference program, disestablished 30 June 1992, which was administered by the Joint Electronic Warfare Center.

a. The C/S/A will attempt to resolve EMI problems at the lowest possible level in the operational chain of command. Interference incidents shall be entered into the JSIR collaboration portal while resolution using local organic assets or host nation assistance is pursued.

b. If the interference incident cannot be resolved by the affected C/S/A using organic service resources, it is referred up the operational chain of command for resolution in accordance with the applicable C/S/A spectrum interference resolution program instructions and reported on the JSIR collaboration portal in accordance with reference d.

c. This document provides supplementary information regarding the reporting and resolution of suspected hostile electronic attacks (EAs) against DOD systems. Interference incidents that are suspected to be caused by hostile EAs shall be immediately reported on the JSIR collaboration portal, indicating the hostility of the incident, while attempting resolution. For more information, see CJCSI 3320.02C-1, "Classified Supplement to Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) (S)". If assistance is requested for EA incidents, the Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) will coordinate analysis, collection, and field support activities with the National Military Command Center (NMCC), Joint Staff and the affected C/S/A. The JSIR program addresses the following categories of EA:

(1) Meaconing. The intentional transmission of signals designed to deceive users of navigational aids (tactical air navigation, GPS, nondirectional beacon, instrument landing system, etc.). Example: Attempting to draw aircraft across an international border by transmitting false VHF omnidirectional radio range signals.

(2) EM Intrusion. The intentional insertion of EM energy into transmission paths in any manner, with the objective of deceiving operators or causing confusion.

15 October 2010

(3) EM Jamming. The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of EM energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy's effective use of the EM spectrum and with the intent of degrading or neutralizing the enemy's combat capability.

2. Responsibilities. Identified below are responsibilities for specific C/S/As. In addition, all C/S/As will provide internal directions and procedures to implement the other responsibilities of the directive.

a. DOD JSC will:

(1) Manage the DOD JSIR program and the JSIR collaboration portal in accordance with guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration) and the Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (J-6), Joint Staff.

(2) Assist in the resolution of persistent, recurring interference problems that cannot be resolved by the C/S/As. The JSC will assist the C/S/As in resolving interference incidents after the incidents have been coordinated and resolution has been attempted up the operational chain of command to the Service, major command, or joint task force level. The JSC will analyze and recommend corrective action for reported interference problems by first using the JSC and JSIR databases and other analytical tools, and then, if needed, by providing personnel and equipment to perform onsite direction finding and equipment testing within the limits of available funding. The organization requesting JSIR services will be provided a report of the JSIR analysis results and appropriate information will be incorporated in the JSIR database.

(3) Assist USSTRATCOM's Global Satellite Support Center (GSSC), the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) and the GPS Operations Center (GPSOC) in resolving interference problems affecting DOD satellite communications (SATCOM) and GPS systems to include spacecraft, ground control sites, and associated user terminals in accordance with procedures outlined in reference e.

(4) Develop and maintain the JSIR database, interference resolution tools (e.g., SPECTRUM XXI), and direction finding and spectrum monitoring equipment. The JSIR database shall be a Web-based, net-centric database on the Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET) that captures and maintains interference incidents, resolutions, and lessons learned from the historical interference reports. This database will provide status tracking, support trend analysis, and facilitate interference analysis and will be accessible to C/S/As.

(5) Coordinate analysis of interference incidents involving suspected hostile EA with the NMCC, affected combatant commands, IO, and the Intelligence Community.

(6) Keep the C/S/A interference resolution program offices of primary responsibility informed of interference incidents affecting systems under their purview.

b. C/S/As will:

(1) Report interference events involving DOD systems to the JSIR collaboration portal in accordance with reference d. Attempt to resolve persistent, recurring interference problems affecting systems under their purview at the lowest echelon possible within their operational chain of command. Interference problems that cannot be resolved will be forwarded through the operational chain of command for resolution assistance, by updating the report on the portal to indicate the type of assistance required.

(2) Immediately report suspected or confirmed EA on the JSIR collaboration portal in accordance with reference d. Attempt to resolve suspected hostile EA affecting systems under their purview at the lowest level possible within their operational chains of command.

(3) Develop policy and procedures for implementing this instruction and provide a copy of all implementing policy documents to the JSC for reference.

(4) Post and update, on the JSIR collaboration portal, an interference point of contact at the geographic combatant command level for the dissemination and coordination of interference incidents and policy.

(5) Identify, document, and leverage intelligence and communications system capabilities to assist in geolocating sources of interference.

(6) Develop and maintain an organic EMI resolution capability.

(7) Data collection on laser events is necessary to understand the nature of the threat and to develop countermeasures. Report laser events against air, ground, naval assets, and personnel through a reporting process using the following SIPR link. C/S/As may call the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) Avionics and Directed Energy Branch with questions.

(a) Laser Event Reporting,

<http://www.naic.wrightpatterson.af.smil/DEW/LE/index.html>

(b) National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) Avionics and Directed Energy Branch.

Commercial: 937-522-4820/4818/4885/4817;

DSN: 312-672-4820/4818/4885/4817

c. USSTRATCOM will:

(1) Act as focal point for all incidents of interference and EA affecting DOD SATCOM, in accordance with reference e, and GPS systems, including spacecraft and ground control sites.

(2) When necessary, request assistance from the JSC in the resolution of interference or EA in accordance with reference d.

(3) When necessary, the GSSC will coordinate the request for geolocation with the appropriate agencies to identify and/or resolve interference to SATCOM systems.

(4) The Purposeful Interference Response Team (PIRT) acts as the USG's coordination body for cases of suspected purposeful interference with space systems of USG interest. The PIRT process is managed by the Department of Defense through USSTRATCOM and includes representatives from the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Federal Communications Commission, and other offices as appropriate.

(5) When necessary the JSpOC, will coordinate the request for geolocation with the appropriate agencies to identify and/or resolve interference to GPS.

d. NASIC will collect and maintain data on laser events against air, ground, and naval assets and personnel.

APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE A

JSIR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

Security classification of interference incidents and/or reports is determined principally by nationality and location of the implied or stated source of the interference and the security sensitivity of the affected military system. Stations located in combat areas or having a sensitive military mission additionally must classify all interference reports in accordance with guidance from the combatant command for the supported operation, mission, or the location of the implied or stated source of the interference and the security sensitivity of the affected military system. The classification reasons are further described in Executive Order 13292, reference f. The following are guidelines for classifying interference incidents and reports:

a. The specific identification of an unfriendly platform or location by country or coordinates as the source of interference or EA will be classified as SECRET. Reason: 1.4(g). Declassify on: Based on the sensitivity of the information, a date between 10 years and up to 25 years from the date of the decision should be used.

b. Specific susceptibility or vulnerability of U.S. electronic equipment and/or systems will be classified at a minimum level of SECRET. Reason: 1.4(g). Declassify on: Based on the sensitivity of the information, a date between 10 years and up to 25 years from the date of the decision should be used. The classification guide for the affected system should be consulted for specific guidance.

c. Parametric data of classified U.S. electronic equipment and/or systems will be classified in accordance with the classification guide for the equipment affected. Classify correspondence at a level equal to the security category assigned to the affected system.

d. Suspected interference from unidentified sources while operating in or near hostile countries will be classified SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR. Reason: 1.4(g). Declassify on: 10 years from date of incident.

e. Interference to U.S. EM equipment and/or systems caused by EA exercises in foreign nations will be classified as CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR. Reason: 1.4(g). Declassify on: Based on the sensitivity of the information, use a date between 10 years and up to 25 years from the date of the decision.

f. Suspected interference from friendly sources will be treated as unclassified unless it reveals a specific system vulnerability, in which case it will be classified at a minimum level of SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR. Reason: 1.4(g). Declassify on: Based on the sensitivity of the information, use a date between 10 years and up to 25 years from the date of the decision.

g. Suspected interference from unknown sources will be classified at a minimum level of CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR. The classification guide for the affected system should be consulted for specific guidance.

ENCLOSURE B

REFERENCES

- a. DODD 3222.3, 8 September 2004, "Department of Defense Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Program,"
- b. DODI 4650.01, 9 January 2009, "Policy and Procedures for Management and Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum"
- c. DOD 5200.1-R, 14 January 1997, "Information Security Program Regulation"
- d. CJCSM 3320.02 series, "Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) Procedures"
- e. SI 714-5, 14 April 2009, "Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Resolution Procedures"
- f. EO 13292, 28 March 2003, "Further Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as Amended, Classified National Security Information"

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