

Inspector General

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Development of Individual Equipment Requirements
for the Afghan National Army Needs Improvement

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Acronyms

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ASFF	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
CECOM	U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HF	High Frequency
LCMC	Life Cycle Management Command
NTM-A/CSTC-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
OCIE	Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment
SCIP	Security Cooperation Information Portal
TACOM	U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command
VHF	Very High Frequency



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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May 25, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, NATO TRAINING MISSION-
AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION
COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN


SUBJECT: Development of Individual Equipment Requirements for the Afghan National Army
Needs Improvement (Report No. DODIG-2012-092)

We are providing this report for review and comment. We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) did not develop adequate sustainment requirements for the 15 types of ANA individual equipment items that we reviewed. Specifically, NTM-A/CSTC-A did not develop supportable equipment recapitalization and maintenance requirements. Not developing supportable sustainment requirements could adversely affect the availability of serviceable equipment, impact the ability of the Afghan National Army to sustain operations, and hinder the effective transition of security responsibilities to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan by 2014.

DoD Directive 7560.3 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. The NTM-A/CSTC-A Deputy Commander-Army's comments to Recommendation 1.b were partially responsive. Therefore, we request that the NTM-A/CSTC-A Deputy Commander-Army provide additional comments by June 25, 2012.

If possible, send a portable document format (.pdf) file containing your comments to audclev@dodig.mil. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-9077.


Jacqueline L. Wicecarver
Assistant Inspector General
Acquisition and Contract Management



Results in Brief: Development of Individual Equipment Requirements for the Afghan National Army Needs Improvement

What We Did

We determined whether the process for developing the individual equipment requirements for sustainment of the Afghan National Army (ANA) was adequate. Specifically, we reviewed the planning and processes for determining sustainment requirements for 15 types of ANA individual equipment items in 3 commodity areas with a total cost of approximately \$667.6 million.

What We Found

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) officials did not develop adequate sustainment requirements for the 15 types of ANA individual equipment items. Specifically, officials did not develop supportable recapitalization and maintenance requirements.

This occurred because NTM-A/CSTC-A:

- relied on anecdotal evidence, experience, and professional judgment to develop the recapitalization rates;
- could not determine the items identified for recapitalization or the process used to develop the requirements in FY 2007 through FY 2011;
- did not request all necessary maintenance data from contractors; and
- did not request subject-matter expertise from the Life Cycle Management Commands in developing sustainment requirements.

As a result, NTM-A/CSTC-A:

- had no assurance that 2,613 individual equipment items, costing \$5.6 million, planned for recapitalization in FY 2012

were sufficient to replace irreparably damaged or lost items;

- had no assurance that items would be available to replace a potential 29,569 irreparably damaged or lost ANA individual equipment items, valued at approximately \$49 million, acquired before FY 2012; and
- did not have information to make informed decisions on ANA individual equipment sustainment requirements.

What We Recommend

The Commanding General, NTM-A/CSTC-A should develop and implement a plan to:

- identify and obtain data necessary to support ANA individual equipment recapitalization and maintenance requirements;
- determine the condition of individual equipment items acquired before FY 2012 and identify recapitalization requirements; and
- obtain information from subject-matter experts to assist with the development of sustainment requirements.

Management Comments and Our Response

The NTM-A/CSTC-A Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander-Army, responded for the Commanding General, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and agreed with the recommendations. The comments were responsive for Recommendations 1.a, 2, and 3. The comments for Recommendation 1.b were partially responsive. We request NTM-A/CSTC-A provide additional comments by June 25, 2012. Please see the recommendations table on the back of this page.

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan	1.b	1.a, 2, and 3

Please provide comments by June 25, 2012.

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Introduction

Audit Objective

Our objective was to determine whether the development process for Afghan National Army (ANA) individual equipment requirements for sustainment was adequate. See the Appendix for a discussion of the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the objective.

Background on Sustainment of Individual Equipment for Afghan National Army

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in FY 2005 as an emergency supplemental appropriation for equipment and services to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Congress appropriated approximately \$39.7 billion to this fund from FY 2005 through FY 2011. ASFF, as appropriated by Congress, provides funds to the Secretary of Defense to allow the Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) to assist the security forces of Afghanistan. This includes the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facilities, and infrastructure. Since its creation, ASFF has funded activities to allow the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to begin its transition to assuming the lead for its own security operations by 2014.

Definition of Terms

Sustainment

Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operation,” August 11, 2011, defines sustainment as the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Further, it states that the sustainment function encompasses a number of tasks, including coordinating the supply of food, fuel, arms, munitions, and equipment and providing for maintenance of equipment. NTM-A/CSTC-A uses recapitalization and maintenance as two primary tools for sustaining ANA individual equipment.

Recapitalization. NTM-A/CSTC-A defines recapitalization as the acquisition of equipment for replacement and battle damage losses necessary to maintain a combat-ready ANSF force. Recapitalization rates provide the percent and time necessary to recapitalize 100 percent of the assets acquired. For example, the weapons recapitalization rate is 5 percent, or 20 years. Therefore, if you replaced 5 percent of the weapons per year for 20 years, you would have replaced 100 percent of the weapons by the end of the 20 years.

Maintenance. Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” November 8, 2010, defines maintenance as all actions taken to retain materiel in a serviceable condition or to restore it to serviceability. Maintenance activities include inspection, testing, servicing, classification of serviceability, repair, rebuilding, and reclamation.

Individual Equipment

For the purpose of this audit, individual equipment is any item worn or carried by the individual ANA soldier. NTM-A/CSTC-A categorizes equipment into specific commodity areas. We identified 15 individual equipment items from three commodity areas: weapons, communication, and other ANA equipment. Individual equipment items in the weapons commodity area include the M16A2 rifle, 9MM pistol, M4 rifle, M249 machine gun, M240B machine gun, M24 sniper rifle, M203 grenade launcher, and RPG-7 grenade launcher. Items in the communication commodity area include tactical telephone with field wire, very high frequency (VHF) manportable radio, high frequency (HF) manportable radio, VHF handheld radio, and night-vision goggles. Items in the other commodity area include helmets and individual body armor. According to the ANA Tashkil,¹ these 15 items account for 659,144 individual equipment items with a total cost of approximately \$667.6 million.

NTM-A/CSTC-A Sustainment and Recapitalization Budget Requests for FY 2009 through FY 2012

NTM-A/CSTC-A requested 519 weapons, valued at \$34 million, for recapitalization in the FY 2009 ASFF budget justification. Additionally, NTM-A/CSTC-A requested 14,791 weapons, valued at \$62 million, and 7,200 communication assets, valued at \$73 million, for equipment to replace unserviceable weapons and provide sustainment spares for radios lost in battle in the FY 2010 ASFF budget justification. The NTM-A/CSTC-A FY 2011 ASFF budget justification also included a request for 31,698 weapons, valued at \$64 million, to replace unserviceable weapons.²

NTM-A/CSTC-A requested \$3.3 billion for sustainment of ANA in the FY 2012 budget, including \$400.6 million for organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), \$40 million for weapons maintenance, and \$6.6 million for radio maintenance. In addition to sustainment, NTM-A/CSTC-A requested recapitalization assets within the \$1.6 billion budget request for equipment and transportation. Recapitalization assets requested in the FY 2012 budget were based on recapitalization rates for weapons of 5 percent (20 years); communications equipment of 10 percent (10 years); and for all other ANA equipment of 5 percent (20 years).

¹ The Tashkil is a document that prescribes the standard equipment of the ANA unit for combat or service under normal operating conditions.

² The number of weapons and communication assets identified for FY 2009 through FY 2011 include all items presented in the budget justification, and are not limited to the 15 individual equipment items reviewed.

Life Cycle Management Commands

A Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) unites mission areas by creating single commands with responsibility for the life cycle management areas of technology, acquisition, and sustainment for all systems assigned to the LCMC. Two LCMCs are responsible for the sustainment of individual equipment for U.S. Forces: U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) and U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command (TACOM).

According to CECOM, its mission is to develop, acquire, provide, and sustain communications and electronics equipment for the joint warfighter. Specific responsibilities include command, control, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance systems, and battle command capabilities. CECOM conducts training missions; provides field support; and provides logistical expertise for the ontime delivery of equipment, services, and capabilities to the warfighter.

According to TACOM, it is one of the U.S. Army's largest weapon systems research, development, and sustainment organizations. It provides the warfighter with assets for lethality, survivability, mobility, and sustainment in the battlefield. Additionally, it develops, acquires, fields, and sustains soldier and ground systems for the warfighter through the integration of effective and timely acquisition, logistics, and cutting-edge technology.

Control Weaknesses in Developing Individual Equipment Requirements for Sustainment

DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program (MICP) Procedures," July 29, 2010, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified internal control weaknesses in the NTM-A/CSTC-A process for developing ANA individual equipment requirements for sustainment. Specifically, NTM-A/CSTC-A relied on anecdotal evidence, experience, and professional judgment to develop the recapitalization rates; could not determine the portion of items identified for recapitalization or the process used to develop the requirements for the budget; did not request all necessary maintenance data from the contractors' maintenance systems; and did not request subject-matter expertise from the LCMCs in developing sustainment requirements for individual equipment used by the ANA. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in NTM-A/CSTC-A.

Finding. NTM-A/CSTC-A Process for Developing Sustainment Requirements for ANA Individual Equipment Was Inadequate

NTM-A/CSTC-A did not develop adequate sustainment requirements for the 15 types of ANA individual equipment items that we reviewed. Specifically, NTM-A/CSTC-A did not develop supportable equipment recapitalization and maintenance requirements.

This occurred because NTM-A/CSTC-A:

- relied on anecdotal evidence, experience, and professional judgment to develop the recapitalization rates. As a result, NTM-A/CSTC-A had no assurance that 2,613 individual equipment items, costing \$5.6 million, planned for recapitalization in FY 2012 were sufficient to replace irreparably damaged or lost items.
- could not determine the individual equipment items identified for recapitalization or the process used to develop the requirements for the FY 2007 through FY 2011 budgets. Therefore, NTM-A/CSTC-A had no assurance that items would be available to replace an estimated 29,569 irreparably damaged or lost ANA individual equipment items, valued at approximately \$49 million, acquired before FY 2012.
- did not request all necessary maintenance data from the contractors' maintenance systems and, as a result, did not have information needed to make informed decisions on sustainment for individual equipment items for the ANA.
- did not request subject-matter expertise from the LCMCs in developing sustainment requirements for individual equipment used by the ANA, which resulted in NTM-A/CSTC-A's not having the information needed to make informed decisions on sustainment for individual equipment items for the ANA.

All of the above could adversely affect the availability of serviceable equipment, impact the ability of the ANA to sustain operations, and hinder the effective transition of security responsibilities to the GIRoA by 2014.

Availability of Recapitalization Rate Data

NTM-A/CSTC-A did not develop supportable equipment recapitalization requirements because officials relied on anecdotal evidence, experience, and professional judgment to

NTM-A/CSTC-A...officials relied on anecdotal evidence, experience, and professional judgment to develop equipment recapitalization rates.

develop equipment recapitalization rates. According to the previous Deputy Commander-Programs at NTM-A/CSTC-A, officials based recapitalization requirements identified within the FY 2012 budget on

assumptions because data were not available to determine actual attrition rates for

individual equipment items. Additionally, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials stated that they had no formula or data to use to determine percentages for recapitalization rates and, therefore, relied on anecdotal evidence obtained from observations made during site visits to locations throughout Afghanistan. For example, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials stated that they discussed equipment recapitalization rates for different commodity groups. The discussion resulted in assumptions that vehicles lasted longer than weapons and, therefore, have a lower attrition rate than weapons. Similarly, radios had a higher attrition rate than weapons because of the increased use and handling of the items.

Accordingly, NTM-A/CSTC-A assigned the following FY 2012 recapitalization rates to different commodity groups based on these assumptions: 5 percent for weapons; 10 percent for communications equipment; and 5 percent for all other ANA equipment. Furthermore, the recapitalization rates only applied to equipping assets planned for procurement in FY 2012 and did not take into consideration individual equipment replacements or battle damage losses for previously acquired assets. Table 1 identifies the total number and cost in the FY 2012 budget justification allocated for recapitalization for the 15 types of individual equipment items reviewed.

Table 1. FY 2012 ANA Individual Equipment Rates, Quantity, and Costs

Individual Commodity Group and Rate	Total Quantity Planned for Procurement*	Recapitalization Quantity	Recapitalization Cost
Weapons (5 percent)	31,670	1,508	\$2,366,190
Communications (10 percent)	12,153	1,105	3,210,181
OCIE** (5 percent)	Undetermined	Undetermined	Undetermined
Total	43,823	2,613	\$5,576,371

* Includes recapitalization quantity.

** Specific amounts for helmets and individual body armor could not be determined because amounts for these items were included in the overall OCIE budget justification.

As a result of using anecdotal evidence, NTM-A/CSTC-A had no assurance that the 2,613 individual equipment items, costing \$5.6 million, planned for recapitalization in FY 2012 were sufficient to replace irreparably damaged or lost items. NTM-A/CSTC-A did not establish and use supportable recapitalization rates, which may impact the ability of the ANA to perform its mission. NTM-A/CSTC-A should develop and implement a plan to identify and obtain the specific data necessary to adequately support individual equipment recapitalization requirements.

Use of Recapitalization Items

NTM-A/CSTC-A officials could not determine the items identified for recapitalization or the process used to develop the requirements for the FY 2007 through FY 2011 budgets. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials stated that the FY 2012 budget justification included amounts for recapitalization of individual equipment. We also identified recapitalization for individual equipment items in the FY 2009 through FY 2011 budget justifications.

However, officials used the recapitalization items to equip newly fielded ANA units. The new units resulted from increases in the overall ANA force level from 70,000 to 192,000 since FY 2007. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, they designated as a priority the use of individual equipment items for initial equipping until they could equip all new and previously fielded units at 100 percent. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials anticipated that the ANA would be fully equipped by 2012, and it was their intent to redirect assets from equipping to sustainment starting in FY 2013. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials did not adjust the recapitalization requirements when officials did not use FY 2007 through FY 2011 individual equipment items as budgeted. Using NTM-A/CSTC-A's FY 2012 recapitalization rates, Table 2 shows an estimate of at least 29,569 items, valued at approximately \$49 million, would be required to recapitalize 286,216 items procured or donated for the 15 types of individual equipment items reviewed.

Table 2. FY 2007 Through FY 2012 Individual Equipment Recapitalization Requirements Estimate*

Individual Equipment Items	Quantity Procured or Donated**	Recapitalization Quantity	Total Cost for Recapitalization
M16A2 Rifle	58,712	4,764	\$5,716,545
9MM Pistol	12,838	1,720	911,709
M4 Rifle	15,663	1,838	2,802,599
M249 Machine Gun	7,323	851	3,743,265
M240B Machine Gun	5,713	648	5,123,057
M24 Sniper Rifle	3,929	478	3,587,440
M203 Grenade Launcher	7,441	1,012	1,214,533
RPG-7 Grenade Launcher	227	42	166,323
Tactical Telephone w/ Field Wire	7,228	2,112	1,028,375
VHF Manportable Radio	1,098	245	1,035,332
HF Manportable Radio	3,386	852	13,257,836
VHF Handheld Radio	2,000	937	1,380,375
Night-Vision Goggles	4,747	1,084	4,508,397
Helmets	95,584	6,211	925,247
Individual Body Armor	60,327	6,775	3,103,834
Total	286,216	29,569	\$48,504,867

* The table includes an estimated amount of items procured or donated from FY 2007 through FY 2011 and estimated amounts of recapitalization requirements for those items through FY 2012. The table does not include recapitalization requirements for equipment procured in FY 2012.

** The Defense Security Cooperation Agency provided data on the number and value of equipment acquired for FY 2007 through FY 2011; however, not all of the data provided were complete, as some case detail reports did not contain shipping dates.

NTM-A/CSTC-A had no assurance that individual equipment items for recapitalization would be available for individual equipment acquired through FY 2011. In this regard, NTM-A/CSTC-A did not identify recapitalization requirements for individual equipment items purchased or donated in previous years, which had an immediate impact on the ANA's ability to perform its mission and could ultimately hinder the effective transition of security responsibilities to the GIRoA by 2014. NTM-A/CSTC-A should determine the condition of individual equipment items acquired before FY 2012 and develop a plan to identify recapitalization requirements for these items.

Use of Contractor Maintenance Data

NTM-A/CSTC-A did not develop supportable maintenance requirements because officials had not requested all necessary maintenance data from the contractors' maintenance systems. Current maintenance contracts require the contractors to maintain an equipment database that provides the status and tracking of equipment repairs and to assist NTM-A/CSTC-A in predicting necessary stock levels. The contracts required contractors to periodically provide NTM-A/CSTC-A electronic reports prepared from their equipment databases.

NTM-A/CSTC-A officials received from the contractor's monthly weapon reports that contained information on closed and open work orders, weapons awaiting parts and maintenance, estimated delivery date of the parts required to complete the job, and a parts list required to complete repairs. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials also received weekly communications status reports, which contained information on the number and type of communication items repaired by each training group.

Although maintenance contractors consistently provided NTM-A/CSTC-A officials with periodic reports prepared from their databases, the reports did not contain data needed to establish accurate maintenance requirements. The contractors' reports did not consistently include information on the total number of equipment items repaired, the types of repairs, the number of nonrepairable items, or the number of items lost.

Even though the necessary information may be available within the contractors' databases, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials did not request that contractors provide the data. As a result of not requesting the data, NTM-A/CSTC-A did not have all available information to make informed decisions on maintenance requirements for proper individual equipment sustainment planning, which could ultimately affect the availability of serviceable equipment to sustain ANA operations. NTM-A/CSTC-A should develop and implement a plan to identify the specific data needed to adequately determine individual equipment maintenance requirements by obtaining and using relevant data available from contractors.

Use of Life Cycle Management Command Expertise

NTM-A/CSTC-A did not obtain subject-matter expertise or assistance from the LCMCs to support sustainment requirements. NTM-A/CSTC-A did not always have subject-matter experts available in Afghanistan to assist with the development of sustainment

NTM-A/CSTC-A did not always have subject-matter experts available in Afghanistan to assist with the development of sustainment requirements.

requirements, due in part to the frequent personnel rotations. However, U.S. Army Commands located stateside use the LCMCs to develop sustainment requirements for individual equipment items used by U.S. Forces. Use of LCMCs to develop ANA individual equipment items sustainment requirements could have provided continuity of subject-matter expertise to lessen the impact of frequent changes in NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel.

Although NTM-A/CSTC-A used CECOM in a limited capacity for oversight of communication asset maintenance contracts, NTM-A/CSTC-A did not request CECOM's assistance in developing sustainment requirements for the communication equipment used by the ANA. Similarly, NTM-A/CSTC-A did not use the expertise available at TACOM to develop sustainment requirements for weapons or OCIE, even though useful data were available.

TACOM also has maintenance data for weapons provided to countries that purchase equipment from the U.S. Government through Foreign Military Sales.³ Available maintenance data included contractor-developed spare parts listings for each standard weapon in use by U.S. Forces. The spare parts list for the M-9 pistol identified 52 separate spare parts, and the required number of each spare part, based on 1- and 2-year maintenance cycles for U.S. Forces during peacetime operations. The spare part listing would form the basis for establishing maintenance requirements for similar weapons used in Afghanistan in the absence of available historical data.

By not using subject-matter expertise within DoD for establishing maintenance requirements, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials were not in a position to make informed decisions on sustainment of ANA individual equipment items. To improve ANA equipment sustainment decisions, NTM-A/CSTC-A should obtain information available from LCMC subject-matter experts to assist with the development of sustainment requirements for ANA individual equipment items.

³ Foreign Military Sales represent a government-to-government method for selling U.S. defense equipment, services, and training.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

We recommend the Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

1. Develop and implement a plan to identify all data necessary to support Afghan National Army individual equipment item:

a. Recapitalization requirements by obtaining and using relevant data available throughout NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and other DoD organizations.

NTM-A/CSTC-A Comments

The NTM-A/CSTC-A Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander-Army, responded on behalf of the Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. He agreed with the recommendation, stating that the recapitalization process was no longer used to replace nonserviceable or nonmission-capable ANA equipment. Rather, the Chief of Staff stated that NTM-A/CSTC-A guidance called for a one-time purchase of “float” equipment to be procured at between 1 percent to 10 percent of Tashkil authorizations for vehicles, weapons, and communications. The equipment items were to be held at the National or Regional Depot level, to be issued out as required to replace nonmission-capable ANA equipment. Once repaired, the particular piece of equipment would be added to the “float” equipment pool. He stated that this information was included in the FY 2013 budget justification and presented at the February 2012 Equipping Requirements Program Objective Memorandum Review by Deputy Commander-Army to senior leadership within the command.

Our Response

The Chief of Staff’s comments were responsive. The actions taken by NTM-A/CSTC-A to discontinue the recapitalization process were responsive to the recommendation and conformed to requirements. No additional comments were required. Any future procurement of individual equipment to replace nonserviceable or nonmission-capable ANA equipment should be supported with relevant data available throughout NTM-A/CSTC-A.

b. Maintenance requirements by requiring contractors responsible for maintaining Afghan National Army weapons and communication equipment to provide the necessary data.

NTM-A/CSTC-A Comments

The Chief of Staff agreed, stating that the command was reorganized to meet the changing requirements. Specifically, the Chief of Staff stated that the Deputy Commander-Support Operations became responsible for theaterwide logistics, including

maintenance. Deputy Commander-Support Operations has an ongoing bridge contract, which is scheduled to expire in August 2012, and which would be followed by a new 6-month contract with an option for an additional 6 months. The contract provides organizational- and general-level maintenance, as well as, unit armorer training. To date, on-the-job training and train-the-trainer programs have been incorporated into the contract. Additionally, he stated that the Deputy Commander-Support Operations Primary Contracting Officer's Representative was receiving monthly maintenance reports from the contractor that identified weapons that had been serviced or repaired, were awaiting parts, or were not repairable. The reports captured all weapon systems on the Tashkil.

Our Response

The Chief of Staff's comments were partially responsive. He stated that the command was reorganized with the Deputy Commander-Support Operations being assigned responsibility for theaterwide logistics, including maintenance. In addition, the Chief of Staff stated that the Deputy Commander-Support Operations Primary Contracting Officer's Representative was receiving monthly maintenance reports from the contractor that identified weapons that had been serviced or repaired, were awaiting parts, or were not repairable. The Chief of Staff's comments also included a snapshot of the contractor's maintenance management system, which we reviewed during our audit.

However, the Chief of Staff's comments did not address contractor-provided data for communications equipment. As stated in the audit report, the contractor maintenance reports did not consistently include information on the total number of equipment items repaired, the types of repairs, the number of nonrepairable items, or the number of items lost. This information is needed to establish accurate maintenance requirements for both weapons and communication equipment. We request that the Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan provide additional comments on the final report.

2. Determine the condition of individual equipment items acquired before FY 2012 and develop and implement a plan to identify recapitalization requirements for these items.

NTM-A/CSTC-A Comments

The Chief of Staff agreed, stating that the command was reorganized to meet the changing requirements. Specifically, he stated that the Deputy Commander-Support Operations is now responsible for theaterwide logistics, including maintenance and sustainment of the ANA. The Chief of Staff stated that the Deputy Commander-Support Operations had representation throughout the theater at Regional Support Commands, which were directly aligned to the Regional Commands. The Regional Support Commands were the initiators of the NTM-A/CSTC-A feedback loop with regard to the status of the condition of equipment. They monitor equipment conditions through WEBMANAGE, manufacturer's technical data, and historical data for in-country wear and tear. In addition, the Chief of Staff restated that recapitalization was no longer the practice for acquiring and replacing materiel within the ANA.

Our Response

The Chief of Staff's comments were responsive. The actions taken by NTM-A/CSTC-A to reorganize the command, monitor the condition of individual equipment items, and discontinue the recapitalization process met the intent of the recommendation and conformed to requirements. No additional comments were required.

3. Obtain information available with subject-matter experts at the Life Cycle Management Commands to assist with the development of sustainment requirements for the Afghan National Army individual equipment items.

NTM-A/CSTC-A Comments

The Chief of Staff agreed, stating that the Security Assistance Office had begun assisting ANA in the development of a sustainment plan that would encompass the purchase of spare components at a rate consistent with individual equipment wear through usage. He stated that continued close coordination with the LCMCs was integral to achieving this. Additionally, the Chief of Staff stated that appropriate technical manuals, translated into Dari, were to be procured to allow the Afghans to gradually take the lead in sustaining their equipment.

Our Response

The Chief of Staff's comments were responsive. The actions taken by NTM-A/CSTC-A to coordinate with LCMCs in the development of a sustainment plan for the ANA met the intent of the recommendation and conformed to requirements. No additional comments were required.

Appendix. Scope and Methodology

The audit was announced in April 2011 and reannounced in July 2011 to focus the objective on sustainment requirements. We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 through March 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

To perform the audit, we reviewed the sustainment planning and processes for determining the number of equipment items required for ANA individual equipment sustainment through recapitalization. We also defined individual equipment to be anything worn or carried by the soldier, including small arms, communication equipment, and OCIE.

We identified a sample from the Solar Year 1390 ANA Tashkil of 189 individual equipment items from a universe of 1,140,684 equipment items required. Based on the quantity of equipment items identified in the Tashkil, we selected to review sustainment planning for 15 mission-critical individual equipment items with the highest required quantities. This sample included the M16A2 rifle, 9MM pistol, M4 rifle, M249 machine gun, M240B machine gun, M24 sniper rifle, M203 grenade launcher, RPG-7 grenade launcher, tactical telephone with field wire, VHF manportable radio, HF manportable radio, VHF handheld radio, night-vision goggles, helmets, and individual body armor. Based on the ANA Tashkil, these 15 types of items in 3 commodity areas accounted for 659,144 individual equipment items, with a total cost of approximately \$667.6 million.

To accomplish the audit objective, we met with the following offices and reviewed the following data:

- We contacted officials from the following offices to understand their roles in developing ANA individual equipment sustainment requirements plans and processes and to obtain data to support the plans and processes in place:
 - NTM-A/CSTC-A, Deputy Commander-Programs. In November 2011, NTM-A/CSTC-A redesignated Deputy Commander-Programs as the Deputy Commanding General, NTM-A/CSTC-A, Deputy Commanding General-Support. Additionally, Deputy Commander-Programs oversight for CJ-4 Logistics and CJ-6 Communications transferred to the NTM-A/CSTC-A Chief of Staff.
 - NTM-A/CSTC-A, Security Assistance Office-Afghanistan
 - NTM-A/CSTC-A, CJ-4 Logistics
 - NTM-A/CSTC-A, CJ-6 Communications

- NTM-A/CSTC-A, CJ-7 Force Integration and Training. In November 2011, CJ-7 dissolved, and its responsibilities transferred within NTM-A/CSTC-A.
 - NTM-A/CSTC-A, CJ-8 Comptroller
 - Defense Security Cooperation Agency
 - CECOM
 - TACOM
 - Program Executive Office-Soldier
 - Project Manager Soldier Weapons.
- We analyzed the FY 2007 through FY 2012 ASFF Annual Budget submissions and justifications to identify recapitalization and sustainment requirements in each of the fiscal years.
 - We reviewed current maintenance contracts for weapons and communications to identify contractor reporting requirements and data available to support sustainment requirements.
 - We reviewed NTM-A/CSTC-A's Common Operating Picture slides to identify the pseudo-Foreign Military Sales case numbers for our 15 individual equipment items. After obtaining the case numbers, we requested case detail reports from the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). We then applied NTM-A/CSTC-A's annual recapitalization rates from FY 2012 to all shipments from FY 2007 through FY 2011 to estimate the attrition of these individual equipment items. We started this attrition calculation the year after the individual equipment items were shipped to Afghanistan. We totaled the estimated quantity and cost of recapitalization for equipment purchased or donated from FY 2007 through FY 2011 that had not been purchased for recapitalization before 2012.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We relied on computer-processed data from the SCIP system. The SCIP system allows customers to obtain or view information related to their Foreign Military Sales cases. We used SCIP to obtain case detail reports to determine individual equipment procurements and donations issued in FY 2007 through FY 2011.

We compared the SCIP case detail reports to NTM-A/CSTC-A's Common Operating Picture slides to determine the quantities and timeframes for individual equipment item procurements or donations from FY 2007 through FY 2011. As a result of our analysis, we considered the data within the SCIP system sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our review.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) have issued three reports discussing topics related to ANA sustainment costs and requirements. Unrestricted GAO reports

can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>.

GAO

GAO Report No. GAO-11-66, “Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-Term Costs Not Determined,” January 27, 2011

GAO Report No. GAO-08-661, “Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces,” June 18, 2008

DoD IG

DoD IG Report No. D-2010-059, “Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform,” May 14, 2010

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Comments



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A/DCOM-A

23 APR 2012

MEMORANDUM THRU

United States Forces - Afghanistan (CJIG), APO AE 09356
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621

FOR Office of the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22304

SUBJECT: NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to the Draft Report "Development of Individual Equipment Requirements for the Afghan National Army Needs Improvement" (DoD IG Audit D2011-D000AT-0222.000)

1. Reference: Draft Report, dated 2 April 2012, Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), subject as above.
2. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide formal comments to DoD IG's draft report provided to this office on 2 April 2012.
3. Point of contact for this action is at [REDACTED]

2 Encls

1. General Comments on the Report
2. DoD IG Audit: Weapons Presentation


ELMER SPEIGHTS
COL, US Army
Chief of Staff, DCOM-A

DRAFT REPORT
**“Development of Individual Equipment Requirements for the Afghan National Army
Needs Improvement” (DoD IG Audit D2011-D000AT-0222.000)**

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

Page 9, Section “Recommendations” the Report states:

We recommend the Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

1. Develop and implement a plan to identify all data necessary to support Afghan National Army individual equipment item:
 - a. Recapitalization requirements by obtaining and using relevant data available throughout NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and other DoD organizations.
 - i. **NTM-A/CSTC-A Response:** NTM-A/ CSTC-A concurs.
 - ii. NTM-A/ CSTC-A at present is not utilizing the recapitalization process to replace non-serviceable or non-mission capable Afghan National Army equipment. Current NTM-A guidance calls for a one time purchase of “float” equipment to be procured at between 1-10 percent of Tashkil authorizations for vehicles, weapons and communications to be held at the National or Regional Depot level to be issued out as required to replace non-mission capable Afghan National Army equipment. Once repaired the particular piece of equipment will be added to the “float” equipment pool. This information was included in the FY13 JBook Input and presented at the February 2012 at the Equipping Requirements POM Review by DCOM-A to senior leadership within the command.
 - b. Maintenance requirements by requiring contractors responsible for maintaining Afghan National Army weapons and communication equipment to provide the necessary data.
 - i. **NTM-A/CSTC-A Response:** NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs.
 - ii. NTMA-CSTC-A reorganized to meet the changing requirements. DCOM-Support Operations (SPO) is now responsible for theater-wide logistics, including maintenance. They currently have an ongoing bridge contract scheduled to expire AUG 2012, which will be followed by a new six month contract that has an option for another six more months.. The contract provides organizational and general level maintenance, as well as unit armorer training. To date, OJT and a train the trainer program has been incorporated into the contract, all towards the sustainment of the ANA weapons.
 - iii. The DCOM-SPO Primary Contracting Officer’s Representative (PCOR) receives monthly maintenance reports from the Contractor, that identifies weapons that have been serviced, repaired, awaiting parts, deadlines and non-reparable. The reports captures all weapon system on the ANA Tashkil e.g. the weapons in question: M4, M9, M16, M24, M203, M240,

DRAFT REPORT
**“Development of Individual Equipment Requirements for the Afghan National Army
Needs Improvement” (DoD IG Audit D2011-D000AT-0222.000)**

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE REPORT
M249 & RPG-7. Examples of these reports and a snap shot of the Contractor’s maintenance management system were given to the DOD IG Representatives in NOV11 (See Enclosure 2).

2. Determine the condition of individual equipment items acquired before FY2012 and develop and implement a plan to identify recapitalization requirements for these items.
 - a. **NTM-A/CSTC-A Response:** NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs.
 - b. As previously stated, NTMA-CSTC-A reorganized to meet the changing requirements. DCOM-Support Operations (SPO) is now responsible for theater-wide logistics, including maintenance and sustainment of the Afghan National Army. DCOM- SPO has representation throughout the theater as Regional Support Commands (RSC), which are directly aligned to the Regional Commands. They are the initiators of the NTM-A/CSTC-A feedback loop with regards to equipment condition status. They monitor equipment conditions through the utilization of WEBMANAGE, Manufacturer’s technical data, and historical data for in-country wear & tear.
 - c. The concept of recapitalization is no longer the practice for acquiring/replacing materiel within the Afghan National Army.
3. Obtain information available with subject-matter experts at the Life Cycle Management Command to assist with the development of sustainment requirements for the Afghan National Army individual equipment items.
 - a. **NTM-A/CSTC-A Response:** NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs.
 - b. The NTM-A/ CSTC-A Security Assistance Office (SAO) has initiated a process of assisting ANA in the development of a sustainment plan that encompasses the purchase of spare components at a rate consistent with individual equipment wear through usage. Continued close coordination with the LCMCs has been integral to achieving this. Additionally, appropriate technical manuals (translated into Dari) will be procured to allow the Afghans to gradually take the lead in sustaining their equipment.

APPROVED BY:

██████████
Acting G4, DCOM-A

PREPARED BY:

██████████
NTM-A/CSTC-A
G4 Advisor, DCOM-A
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Inspector General Department of Defense

