The Challenge of Global Conflict, 1913-1945

President Woodrow Wilson announcing the U.S. Declaration of War against Germany before Congress The First World War was one of the great turning points in modern history. The 1914-1918 conflict triggered a period of international disequilibrium that would characterize most of the 20th century, generating political turbulence and organized violence on a hitherto unimaginable scale. The Department of State would struggle to meet the new challenges.

The World in 1914

The First World War greatly affected the international position of the United States because it shattered the general global stability that had cocooned the nation for almost 100 years. Political isolation, however appropriate during the 19th century, no longer served the national interest, and the country was pulled into foreign entanglements unthinkable just a few years earlier.

Soldier during World War One

When war broke out in 1914 between the Allied Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, and later Italy) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey), the United States announced a policy of strict neutrality in keeping with tradition. This position was untenable when American shipping came under repeated attack from German U-boats.

During the period of American neutrality (1914-1917), attitudes toward international affairs born in the wake of the Spanish-American War blossomed. As its global interests expanded, United States found itself in conflict with another rising power—Germany. Ironically, American interests were frequently aligned with those of an old enemy, Great Britain. The war exacerbated the trend, and a tense diplomatic conflict with Germany over the legality of unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral shipping simply accelerated a political process that had begun some years earlier.

America Enters the War; Wilson's Plan for Peace

The entry of the United States into the First World War in April 1917 as an “associate”—not ally—of the Allies, was more than just a response to submarine warfare; it also reflected the vision of President Woodrow Wilson. President Woodrow Wilson By 1917, the war had grown into a quasi-global conflict, verging on total war and completely unlike any conflict before it. Wilson thought that the United States alone could shape an effective peace settlement because he believed that the combatants were politically and morally bankrupt. Wilson felt that American intervention in 1917 would ensure that the United States would play a decisive role and dominate the postwar peace conference.

The President's plan for the future, outlined in the “Fourteen Points” (January 1918) and augmented by later pronouncements, envisioned restoration of a stable, equitable, and enduring international balance through a new collective security organization, the League of Nations, based on a consensus of the great powers. Due in large part to Wilson's vision, the United States had changed course from isolation toward engagement.

New Challenges for the Department

The fundamental shift in foreign policy that accompanied World War I posed great challenges for the Department of State as it assumed duties never anticipated in earlier years. Both the Diplomatic and Consular Services expanded their reporting functions to provide much needed information and augmented their diplomatic and consular efforts. During the years of neutrality, American missions located in belligerent countries often acted as caretakers for the interests of countries on the other side of the conflict. The U.S. Embassy in Berlin, for example, represented British, Japanese, and Italian interests in Germany until the United States abandoned neutrality.

The burgeoning responsibilities of the foreign services led to an increase in personnel and expenditures. Many temporary employees were assigned to duties at home and overseas, and resignations and retirements were minimized in an attempt to retain experienced officers. Congress authorized a significant number of new permanent positions, including 27 in the Diplomatic Service, for a total of 97. The domestic complement grew from 234 employees in 1910 to 708 one decade later. Expenditures jumped from $4.9 million in 1910 to $13.6 million in 1920.

For the first time since the very earliest years of the nation, the American people were interested in foreign affairs. As a result, the Department attracted considerable attention and even praise, a welcome change from the general apathy or distrust that characterized the heyday of isolation. The rise of the “new diplomacy,” a term used to describe statecraft responsive to the desires of popular majorities, brought international politics and its practitioners fully into the consciousness of people who had never before been concerned with foreign relations.

Other Foreign Policy Advisors

Despite its expanded operational responsibilities and its increased respectability, the Department of State lost much of its influence on the formulation of major foreign policy decisions. Almost all the significant decisions of the conflict—to pursue strict neutrality in 1914, to intervene on behalf of the Allies in 1917, to champion the League of Nations in 1918, and to negotiate a peace treaty on American terms in 1919—emanated from the White House without decisive contributions from the Secretary of State and his subordinates.

Several factors contributed to the displacement of the Department of State as the principal source of advice about the most crucial questions of war and peace. One key factor was that none of President Wilson’s Secretaries of State had a close and confidential relationship with him. Wilson relied primarily on others for advice, notably an intimate friend, Edward M. House of Texas. A less obvious but equally significant factor was that the Department was poorly organized to meet the requirements of wartime. t tended to act slowly, and it lacked expertise in dealing with military issues. Moreover, the exigencies of the national emergency dictated the participation of many agencies in decisions about foreign relations, notably the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Treasury, as well as temporary organizations such as the War Industries Board. The Department of State was not prepared to take a leading role in coordinating these activities. Finally, modern communications rendered the President less dependent on the Department for accurate information than past presidents had been.

Modernization of the Department

The experience of modern warfare demonstrated that the Department of State would have to undergo major changes. As early as 1915, in response to the wartime pressures on the Diplomatic and Consular Services, Congress passed the Stone-Flood Act, which permitted the appointment of certain diplomatic and consular officers to functional positions rather than to specific posts in the field. Prior to this, consular officers who wanted to transfer to the Diplomatic Service had to take the examinations, and oral examiners who might want to keep diplomacy the preserve of men from the “right schools” or “right families” could reject the candidates, despite their experience. In addition to assignment after examination or presidential appointment, the 1915 law permitted reassignment by administrative transfer.

But even after the war, the public believed that the modernization of American diplomatic practice was still far from complete. In January 1920, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, writing to a sympathetic Congressman, John Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts, described the problem: “The machinery of government provided for dealing with our foreign relations is in need of complete repair and reorganization. As adequate as it may have been when the old order prevailed and the affairs of the world were free from the present perplexities it has ceased to be responsive to present needs.” Three categories of reform were required to enable the Department to function effectively under the changed conditions of the postwar period:

• (I) The foreign services had to be fully professionalized and democratized;
• (II) The structure of the Department had to be modernized to deal effectively with a whole range of new policy initiatives; and
• (III) Relations between the Department and other participants in the foreign policy process had to be clarified and conducted in a new institutional context.

The Rogers Act

After the war ended, Congress completed the pre-war movement toward a fully professional and democratic Foreign Service. Representative Rogers, who led the congressional campaign, stated his objective in 1923: “Let us strive for a foreign service which will be flexible and democratic; which will attract and retain the best men we have; which will offer reasonable pay, reasonable prospects for promotion, [and] reasonable provision against want when old age comes to a faithful servant.” Hugh Gibson, a respected diplomat interested in reform, supported Rogers, arguing that improvements in the Diplomatic and Consular Services would attract the most qualified candidates so that “we can choose our men by the only good method—that is, by keen competition.” He hoped for creation of “a real diplomatic career, which is open to any American citizen who has the necessary qualifications.”

In 1924, the Rogers Act fundamentally reformed the foreign services by establishing a career organization based on competitive examination and merit promotion. The Diplomatic and Consular Services were unified into one organization performing both functions. Members of the new “Foreign Service of the United States of America” would be commissioned in a given class at a set salary rather than commissioned for service at a specific overseas mission or post. Salaries would range from $3,000 for the lowest level (Class 9) to $9,000 for Class 1 officers. Officers would be placed in positions for three years with the presumption of regular rotation to other assignments. The Rogers Act granted regular home leave and set up a retirement system. It also allowed for representational expenses, although these allowances were not authorized until 1931. A special reinstatement provision permitted career officers who became chiefs of mission to remain in the Foreign Service after completing their tours of duty. Earlier they had been required to resign without assurance of a future presidential appointment to other responsible duties, which led at times to the discarding of the most experienced and competent officers at the height of their abilities.

Several other measures also furthered reform. In 1925, the Foreign Service School was founded to provide specialized training in languages and other necessary skills. The following year, Congress passed the Foreign Service Buildings Act; among other things, it established a fund of $2-million per year—gradually increasing in later years—for the construction, purchase, and maintenance of missions and consulates overseas. The U.S. Government also took responsibility for the purchase or rental of office space and living quarters, further reducing a need for private wealth as a prerequisite to a diplomatic career.

Despite these improvements, certain flaws in the Rogers Act became apparent, especially inequities in the promotion of those serving in consular assignments. Congress moved to correct the problems in the Moses-Linthicum Act (1931), which reorganized the Board of Foreign Service Personnel to ensure impartial promotion practices. Other sections of the law improved salaries, authorized representation and post allowances and paid annual leave and sick leave, set up an improved retirement system, and conferred career status on clerks in the Foreign Service. Reflecting on these reforms, Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr noted that “the Foreign Service had finally attained the goal for which Presidents, Secretaries of State, and businessmen of the country had striven for years, namely, a reasonable, adequate provision in the way of pay and allowances for the men who served the United States in a diplomatic or consular capacity in foreign countries.”

Unfortunately many of these gains proved temporary. During the Great Depression, economies in government led to the suspension of promotions, a 15 per cent reduction in salaries, abolition of representational and living allowances, elimination of paid home leaves, and suspension of recruiting for four years. The result was a 10 percent reduction in the size of the Foreign Service between July 1932 and December 1934.

Incremental Reorganization

In 1924, the Secretary of State—who had final responsibility for policy and administration—had relatively few senior officials to help him. The Under Secretary provided support on policies of special importance. Three Assistant Secretaries handled economic and financial questions, international law, and general administration. The Chief Clerk supervised both the Department's clerks and its physical property, while the Director of the Consular Service also served as budget officer. The Solicitor handled legal business, and the Economic Adviser made recommendations concerning international trade and finance. Various other bureaucratic entities, such as the Division of Passport Control and the Bureau of Accounts, provided additional support. Five geographic bureaus maintained communications between Washington and missions abroad.

When problems grew acute or new responsibilities arose, limited modifications were made to the 1909 bureaucratic structure. For example, a Division of Publications was established in 1921 to centralize work on informational projects such as the documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States. In 1929, a Division of International Conferences and Protocol was formed to cope with the very substantial increase in multilateral negotiations. Two new divisions were created in 1938—a Division of International Communications and a Division of Cultural Relations.

But in real terms, growth in the Department of State stagnated. Between 1920 and 1930, the domestic work force increased by only six to 714, the Foreign Service grew from 514 to 633, and annual expenditures rose from $13.6 million to $14 million.

A Return to Isolationism

But the changes weren’t enough. The failure to fully modernize the Department of State reflected the country’s lack of commitment to an energetic foreign policy after the Senate repudiated the Treaty of Versailles. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes Woodrow Wilson was the first American president to envision the United States as a global leader, but the nation was not yet ready to accept responsibilities commensurate with its power.

During the 1920s, the United States strongly resisted binding international commitments and focused instead on preventing the outbreak of war. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes played a key role in the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference (1921-22), and Secretary of State Frank Kellogg was instrumental in the creation of the Paris Peace Pact (1928), a multilateral agreement outlawing offensive warfare. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg Although clear dangers emerged during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the massive economic shocks reinforced the country's isolationist inclinations during the rise of totalitarianism.

As a result, the Department of State returned to the passivity of the 19th century, and accepted a secondary role from 1919-1939. One historian has described the generally backward state of the organization when Secretary Cordell Hull assumed control. He wrote: “In 1933 the Department was small, placid, comfortably adjusted to the lethargic diplomacy of the preceding decade, and suffused with habits of thought that reached back to a still earlier day.” Overseas missions were in a comparable state, he noted. “The Foreign Service—genteel, slow-moving, and complacent—also cherished its ties with the past.”

“Interventionist” Neutrality

But the neglectful attitude toward foreign relations characteristic of the interwar years, changed rapidly after the start of the Second World War. The undeniable menace of the Axis—Nazi Germany and its partners Italy and Japan—forced the United States to pursue an interventionist policy. Despite an official stance of neutrality, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the sale of destroyers to Great Britain in return for leases on some Western Atlantic bases and eventually provided wholesale economic assistance to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union through the Lend-Lease Act of 1941.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signing the Lend-Lease Act of 1941

As the Nazis began the systematic persecution of Jews first in Germany and then later in occupied Europe, the United States faced a major crisis in refugee policy. Even though the nation admitted more refugees from Nazi tyranny than any other country, the United States had the capacity to admit many more. But the American public was still isolationist and anti-Semitic—and preoccupied with domestic economic problems. Since Americans were apathetic toward the plight of the refugees, there was little chance of persuading Congress to increase the existing national origins quotas. Although President Roosevelt was sympathetic, he did not use his office to implement changes in U.S. refugee policy.

The Department of State, mirroring the public mood, also failed to lead on the issue, and anti-Semitism influenced policy at a key level. An historian of the refugee crisis has concluded, “The Department of State compiled a dismal record. It discouraged or actively opposed virtually all efforts for a more generous American policy . . . It obstructed the emergency visa program for political refugees. And it tolerated consuls whose anti-alien, anti-Semitic, and politically conservative attitudes influenced their decisions in visa cases.”

Wartime Diplomacy

Secretary of State Cordell Hull The United States entered the war when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The Department faced immediate new burdens and responsibilities from evacuating Americans from combat zones, representing the interests of belligerents in enemy countries, and assisting prisoner-of-war exchanges, to maintaining liaison with the International Red Cross and dealing with refugees. During the war, Department officials also helped coordinate the activities of various agencies created to mobilize the nation for total war and to assist in the reconstruction of liberated territories. The Department of State also created a complex system of efficient international communication.

The Department’s staff grew at an unprecedented rate. In 1940, the Department had 1,128 domestic employees, with total expenditures of $24 million. By 1945, the staff had more than tripled (3,767 employees) with a budget of about $50 million. Recruiting for the career Foreign Service was suspended during the war, but a Foreign Service Auxiliary was created to provide additional manpower. By January 1946, the Auxiliary included 976 people.

Vice President Henry A. Wallace However, like Wilson during WWI, President Roosevelt relied on other advisers—such as Harry Hopkins, Vice President Henry A. Wallace, General George C. Marshall, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.—and largely ignored the advice of the Secretary of State.

Although Secretary Cordell Hull was usually informed of important decisions, he rarely participated in the major wartime conferences at which the leaders of the alliance forged the victory of 1945. His inability to gain the President's full confidence kept the Department from a paramount role in many major decisions. It is not surprising that Secretary Hull commented bitterly toward the end of his service: “When I accepted this office, I knew that I would be misrepresented, lied about, let down, and that there would be humiliations that no man in private life could accept and keep his self-respect. But I made up my mind in advance that I would accept all these things and just do my job.”

Secretary Hull proved influential only in one area—preparation of plans for a postwar international organization. In 1942, Hull established an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy to avoid the partisan fighting that characterized the period after World War I. In 1944, representatives of 44 nations met at Bretton Woods to agree on plans for post-war economic policy, to stabilize currency, and to establish a World Bank. Later that year at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, world leaders hammered out a draft charter for a new international organization—the United Nations.

Embarrassment Brings Change

In 1943, Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. immediately began a major reorganization of the Department of State because of the embarrassments that stemmed directly from wartime experience. As one journalist summarized the situation: “Notwithstanding the personal prestige of the Secretary of State Hull, the organization he heads has only to be mentioned in almost any circle, American or foreign, to arouse either doubt, despair, or derision.” Stettinius’ reorganization marked the birth of the modern Department of State. His reforms ensured that the Department would participate effectively in shaping the nation’s foreign relations in the postwar period.

Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

Stettinius concentrated on key deficiencies of the Department, particularly the poor division of responsibility for important functions, inadequate means of obtaining and disseminating information, and ineffective long-range planning. In December 1944, shortly after Stettinius succeeded Hull as Secretary of State, he issued Department Order 1301, which concentrated similar functions in the same office and related offices under a senior official, either the Under Secretary or one of six Assistant Secretaries.

To coordinate the work of the Department, ensure follow-through, and conduct long-range planning, Order 1301 created several new entities. A Staff Committee including the Secretary and his principal subordinates became the chief managerial group in the Department. A Coordinating Committee was formed to investigate policy options and control inter-office projects. A Joint Secretariat monitored Department activity to ensure that decisions were handled efficiently. Finally a Policy Committee and a Committee on Postwar Problems were created to focus on long-range planning.

Secretary Stettinius also streamlined functions overlapping the jurisdictions of the traditional geographic bureaus. New bureaus were set up to deal with trade relations, cultural diplomacy, and public information. Another important functional organization came into being in September 1945—the Interim Research and Intelligence Service, which is the forerunner of the present-day Bureau of Intelligence and Research. These innovations minimized fragmentation of jurisdiction that so frequently immobilized the Department in a crisis when quick decisions were required.

Conclusion

The Department of State that emerged from World War II better prepared to play a leading role in the foreign policy process and to participate fully in the difficult tasks ahead. In July 1945, Secretary James F. Byrnes recognized the extent of the postwar challenge. “The supreme task of statesmanship in the world over is to help them understand that they can have peace and freedom only if they tolerate and respect the rights of others to opinions, feelings, and way of life which they do not and cannot share.”