The End of the Cold War, 1981-1992

The Fall of the Berlin Wall Ronald Reagan inherited a country demoralized and on the defensive in the face of Soviet expansionism. By the end of the period, the Berlin Wall had fallen, the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe were free, and the Soviet Union itself disbanded. But the United States and its diplomats struggled to cope with new threats to global stability—and take advantage of new opportunities.

The World in 1981

President Reagan entered office in January 1981, determined to contain, if not “roll back,” Soviet expansionism in global trouble spots such as Afghanistan and Angola. The United States and its European allies found themselves in frequent disagreement over the western response to Soviet moves against the burgeoning Solidarity movement in Poland and European participation in the Soviet natural gas pipeline from Western Europe to Siberia. The Reagan Administration adopted a two-pronged approach to authoritarian governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Central Intelligence Agency provided military assistance for “freedom fighters” to combat left-wing regimes, while the Department of State provided diplomatic incentives for right-wing regimes to allow free elections.

The President and Secretary Haig

The new President acknowledged his own lack of experience in international affairs, and nominated a recognized authority in the field, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., as Secretary of State. Although Haig was a military man, he was politically adept and played a key role in domestic as well as foreign policy under President Nixon. A former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. European Command, Haig was also well versed in current military strategy on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

During the transition, Reagan assured Haig that his administration would speak with one voice on foreign policy—but the reality was sometimes different. Haig described his role as the “vicar” for the “formulation, conduct, and articulation of foreign policy.” But because Haig had no prior personal relationship with the President and White House advisers strictly controlled access to the Oval Office, there was little policy coordination and the government spoke with several voices on foreign policy. Both sides were suspicious of the other and refused to send Reagan a draft directive defining National Security Council responsibilities. As a result, during its first year the Administration lacked the traditional foreign affairs machinery necessary to coordinate long-term planning. Foreign policy decision-making was chaotic.

Secretary Haig and the Department

As Secretary, Haig did exercise control over the decision-making process within the Department of State. Deputy Secretary of State William P. Clark, although lacking deep experience in foreign affairs, was a personal friend of the President whom Haig expected to act as an “interpreter” between the Department of State and the White House. Haig selected Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the highest post in the Department reserved by tradition for career Foreign Service officers. Within a year, Clark moved to the White House as National Security Adviser and Stoessel was promoted, becoming the first Foreign Service officer to serve as Deputy Secretary of State.

Four of the five Assistant Secretaries for the geographic bureaus were also career appointees, including Stoessel’s eventual replacement, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. But only one of Haig’s five appointees, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, remained on the job for eight years.

In addition to Robert C. McFarlane, who became Counselor of the Department, Haig tapped several outside experts in national security affairs, including Paul D. Wolfowitz for Director of the Policy Planning Staff and Richard R. Burt for Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. Wolfowitz, Burt, and McFarlane functioned as the Secretary’s “brain trust” to generate ideas outside the normal Foreign Service and Civil Service channels.

Reagan’s Foreign Policy

The Reagan Administration also came to Washington determined to combat communism—especially in Latin America. Reagan and his advisers focused in particular on El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Haig decided to make El Salvador a "test case" of his foreign policy. Conflicts between the White House and the State Department and with the Congress, however, frustrated the Administration’s bold plans. While Haig sought a significant increase in military assistance to El Salvador, Congress made certification of progress on human rights a quid pro quo. The two branches of government clashed regularly over assistance and certification.

Administration officials also disagreed on China policy. For over a decade, the White House had managed most high-level contacts between Washington and Beijing. Under Haig, the Department of State assumed primary responsibility for the formulation and implementation of the Administration's China policy. Haig wanted to transform the informal alliance with China into a “strategic association” to block Soviet “hegemony” in Asia, but the President insisted on loyalty to Taiwan. The Administration debate on Taiwan, especially over the sale of military aircraft, resulted in a crisis in relations with China, which was only alleviated in August 1982, when, after months of arduous negotiations, the United States and China issued a joint communiqué on Taiwan in which the United States agreed to limit arms sales and China agreed to seek a “peaceful solution.”

In the critical Middle East region, the White House, preoccupied with its domestic agenda, largely deferred to the Department of State and its Foreign Service experts. The Department continued negotiations to implement the Camp David Peace Accords, a task complicated by the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in October 1981, and the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Philip C. Habib, the President’s special envoy, conducted Kissinger-like shuttle diplomacy to reach a ceasefire agreement.

Secretary Shultz Takes Charge

After Secretary Haig resigned in late June 1982, citing a recent shift from the "careful course" of the Administration’s foreign policy, Reagan turned to George P. Shultz, who would serve as Secretary of State for 6-1/2 years—the longest tenure since Dean Rusk in the 1960s. An economist by training, Shultz had held three cabinet-level posts during the Nixon Administration and brought to the job of Secretary of State long experience in government and economic diplomacy. Despite his frequent clashes with Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger over major issues of foreign policy, Shultz forged an effective partnership with President Reagan by the end of the President's first term. Shultz deferred to Reagan on major foreign policy decisions, while Reagan delegated to Shultz the details of diplomacy.

Secretary of State George Shultz

Shultz relied primarily on the Foreign Service to formulate and implement the Reagan’s foreign policy. However, he believed that the Deputy Secretary of State should be a political appointee, as familiar with senior officials in the White House as with those in the Department. He first selected Kenneth W. Dam, a law professor, to serve as his alter ego; in June 1985, Shultz recruited John C. Whitehead, an investment banker, to fill the post. Many of the principal officers appointed by Haig remained to serve under the new Secretary. Eagleburger, for example, stayed as Under Secretary for Political Affairs until May 1984, when another career appointee, Michael H. Armacost, replaced him. By the summer of 1985, Shultz had personally selected most of the senior officials in the Department, emphasizing professional over political credentials in the process.

In his farewell address to the Department, Shultz commented that the decision to surround himself with Foreign Service officers had been “one of the smartest things I’ve done.” The Foreign Service responded in kind by giving Shultz its “complete support,” making him one of the most popular Secretaries since Dean Acheson.

From 1982 to 1989, Shultz was the driving force behind the Administration’s effort to promote peace between Israel and its neighbors. In response to the escalating violence in the region, Reagan sent a Marine contingent to protect the Palestinian refugee camps and support the Lebanese Government. After a year of sustained diplomatic effort, the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut killed 241 U.S. servicemen, the most serious foreign policy reversal of Reagan’s first term.

Reagan’s decision to give the National Security Council staff operational responsibility in the Middle East led to the most serious setback of his second term, the Iran-Contra affair, when Administration officials devised a complicated covert plan to raise money for the anti-government “contra” forces in Nicaragua through the sale of missiles to Iran. The resulting controversy allowed the Department of State to resume control of Middle East policy. By December 1987, Shultz had assembled a strong team of professionals when the Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, challenged Israeli authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. After six months of shuttle diplomacy, Shultz had established a diplomatic dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization in December 1988, laying the groundwork for further negotiations during the next administration.

The United States in Europe

Shultz believed that the Department’s most important task was the conduct of its Soviet and European diplomacy. By the summer of 1982, relations were strained not only between Washington and Moscow but also between Washington and key capitals in Western Europe. In response to the imposition of martial law in Poland the previous December, the Reagan administration had prohibited U.S. companies as well as their European subsidiaries or licensees from involvement in the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to West Germany. European leaders vigorously protested sanctions that damaged their interests in the pipeline but not U.S. interests in grain sales to the Soviet Union. Shultz finally resolved this “poisonous problem” in December 1982. The Americans agreed to abandon sanctions against the pipeline, and the Europeans agreed to adopt stricter controls on strategic trade with the Soviets.

A more controversial issue was the NATO Ministers’ 1979 “dual track” decision: if the Soviets refused to remove their SS-20 medium range ballistic missiles within four years, then the Allies would deploy a countervailing force of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. When negotiations on these intermediate nuclear forces (INF) stalled, 1983 became a year of the protest. Shultz and other Western leaders worked hard to maintain allied unity amidst popular anti-nuclear demonstrations in Europe and United States. In spite of Western protests and Soviet propaganda, the allies began deployment of the missiles as scheduled in November 1983.

As the missiles were installed, Shultz thought the time was right “to resume a dialogue with the Soviets if we could.” But Secretary Shultz was out of sync with the President and his hard-line advisers. In March 1983, the President announced the Strategic Defense Initiative and called the Soviet Union an “evil empire”—without consulting the Secretary of State beforehand.

Gorbachev and Perestroika

The policy struggle in Washington further intensified when a new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, emerged in March 1985. In order to restructure the Soviet economy and reform domestic society, Gorbachev needed to reduce military spending at home and political tensions abroad. His goal was a fundamental change in the relationship between the superpowers and his method was arms control agreements. Shultz encouraged Reagan to develop a personal relationship with Gorbachev. Reagan and Gorbachev held four summit meetings between November 1985 and May 1988 in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow.

President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Russia.

Their personal relationship produced its most practical result in December 1987, when the two leaders signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The treaty, which eliminated an entire class of missiles in Europe, was a milestone in the history of the Cold War. Although Gorbachev took the initiative, Reagan was well prepared to adopt a policy of negotiations. Shultz and the Department of State played a key role in this diplomatic approach.

Management Fails the Department

The Department of State has at times been more adept at the formulation of policy than the management of its resources. The Reagan Administration was no exception. The Under Secretary for Management was described at the time as responsible for “keeping the Foggy Bottom bureaucracy in paper clips and the embassies stocked with gin and hors-d'oeuvres.” This attitude was further reflected in the fact that Richard T. Kennedy, who held the position during Haig’s tenure, also served as the U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The American Foreign Service Association complained that Kennedy was therefore unable to devote enough attention to the Department’s budget and personnel. Secretary Shultz assigned a higher priority to management and chose Ronald I. Spiers, the first and only career appointee to serve as Under Secretary for Management. Spiers held the job for five years—longer than anyone else before him.

Secretary of State George Pratt Shultz

The Department of State faced additional challenges in managing its budget and personnel. “Reaganomics”—the effort to cut government expenditures and revenues despite a dramatic increase in defense spending—left little money to improve the state of the nation's diplomatic machinery. During the Reagan Administration, the Department of Commerce was the only cabinet-level agency to receive a smaller portion of the budget than the State Department. From 1981 to 1988, spending for State Department operations and programs decreased as a percentage not only of the federal budget but also of the gross domestic product. The financial situation deteriorated in particular when Congress passed the so-called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in 1985, which mandated spending cuts to reduce the federal budget deficit. Under Gramm-Rudman, the Department endured what one high-level official called “its worst budget crisis in modern times.” Shultz pleaded for budgetary relief every year and some cuts were restored, but the Department’s infrastructure and employee morale were damaged by the forced economies.

Department Appointments Politicized

The process of appointment of principal officers in the Department of State and ambassadors became increasingly politicized during the Reagan Administration, with some appointments causing controversy. Reagan was forced to withdraw the nomination of Ernest Lefever as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs when a majority on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that he was not an advocate for human rights and rejected his nomination.

The Foreign Service Act of 1980 stipulated that the President should “normally” appoint Foreign Service officers, not political supporters, as ambassadors. Nonetheless, during his first term Reagan proposed nearly as many political as Foreign Service ambassadors. The American Foreign Service Association charged in 1981 that this record made “a mockery of the careful selection and long and varied experience which professional career officers bring to senior assignments within the service.” Although Shultz reversed the trend, the number of non-career ambassadors was higher under Reagan than under any President since Herbert Hoover. Although Reagan made some distinguished appointments from outside the Foreign Service—such as Arthur Burns in Bonn—his critics pointed to ambassadors of lesser distinction. Spiers publicly complained in 1987 that such appointments demonstrated “a lack of respect” that would “have a corrosive effect on the career service.”

More Change for the Foreign Service

The Department also began the implementation of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. Although the creation of a Senior Foreign Service was designed to advance some officers to the highest ranks, the “up-or-out” promotion system forced many—including those with valuable language and area expertise—into early retirement. The Department offered “limited career extensions” for those retirees whose experience merited retention but not promotion. The “up-or-out” system, however, left too many officers down and out, resulting in a serious threat to morale. In 1988, Congress temporarily suspended the system pending a thorough review of its impact on the service.

Throughout the decade, the Foreign Service also faced the public perception that it had become the last refuge of an elitist group of white men. In accordance with the 1980 act, the Department tried to make the service more “representative of the American people” by recruiting, hiring, and promoting women and minorities. From 1980 to 1990, the percentage of women in the Foreign Service doubled to nearly 25 percent, although the percentage of minorities rose by only one-quarter to 12.5 percent. In spite of “substantial progress,” Spiers conceded in 1985 that the lack of equal opportunity was still a serious problem, as reflected by the low number of women and minorities serving in the Senior Foreign Service. Despite the new emphasis on diversity, allegations of discrimination persisted. The Department continued to fight two lawsuits--one filed by women in 1976 and the other by African-Americans in 1986--that claimed a systematic denial of promotion and career opportunity.

Embassies Subject to Violence, Spying

During the 1980s, the Department of State spent more time and money than ever before on the security of its posts and personnel. From 1980 to 1989, more U.S. civilians died overseas in the line of duty than during the entire 19th century. The Department did not address security matters fully until after two devastating terrorist attacks on U.S. installations: In April 1983, a truck loaded with explosives blew up outside the embassy in Beirut, killing 63 employees, including 17 U.S. diplomatic and military personnel; and in September 1985, another explosion at the Embassy killed an additional 12 Foreign Service nationals. After a thorough study of the terrorist threat against U.S. diplomatic installations, the Department, with Congressional approval, began a $1-billion program for more than 60 construction projects worldwide.

U.S. installations abroad also remained a primary target for espionage, particularly by the Soviet Union. Twice in one year, the Department learned that the Soviet intelligence agency had seriously compromised security at the embassy in Moscow. In January 1985, the U.S. Marine Corps announced that one of its security guards at the Embassy had passed classified information to a Russian woman. In August of the same year, the Department ceased construction on the new embassy building, when an inspection revealed that Soviet intelligence agents had embedded countless listening devices in the concrete. After a comprehensive review of the project and years of debate in Congress, the Clinton Administration finally adopted many of the recommendations of the inspection report. By then, the unfinished embassy had become the most expensive construction project in U.S. diplomatic history.

President Bush and Secretary Baker

During most of the Cold War, the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser competed for influence over the President’s foreign policy. Presidential candidate George H.W. Bush pledged to end the centralization of foreign policy decision-making in the White House, which had reached extremes during the “Iran-Contra affair.” Bush wanted ambassadors to have a larger advisory role, while a reduced NSC staff would be less intrusive. Choosing his cabinet from among people he already knew, Bush selected one of his closest friends, James A. Baker III, as Secretary of State. Baker had served as White House Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Treasury under Reagan. Bush characterized Baker as a “gimmie,” and announced his appointment less than 24 hours after his election. The foreign policy of the Bush presidency benefited greatly from the personal rapport between the two men.

Secretary of State James Baker

Bush brought his own considerable foreign policy experience to the presidency. In addition to his eight years as Vice President, he had served as Ambassador to the United Nations, U.S. envoy to the People’s Republic of China, and as Director of the CIA. Bush was at the helm of a smooth-functioning national security team comprised of Secretary Baker, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin L. Powell. Although intense policy differences occurred, a collegial approach to foreign policy-making was the norm, especially in the “breakfast group” of Baker, Cheney, and Scowcroft, which met weekly to iron out problems that could not be resolved through the bureaucratic channels of interdepartmental meetings or the deputies committee system.

Bush’s Foreign Policy

With the end of the Cold War, the Bush foreign policy team faced such radical and rapid global changes that the Department of State seemed capable only of reacting to events. The collapse of first the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union itself, the reunification of Germany, the end of apartheid in South Africa, pro-democracy demonstrations in China’s Tiananmen Square, the international coalition formed to combat Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in the Middle East stretched the ability of the U.S. foreign policy establishment—from the President to the Department of State—to stay in front of events and formulate policy.

Despite Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost, the fate of Soviet reforms remained unknown. During his first summit meeting, when Bush asked what the Soviet Union would look like in several years, Gorbachev quipped, “Even Jesus Christ couldn’t answer that question!” Lacking both clairvoyance and an internal Soviet monitoring system, the Department of State struggled to keep abreast of the rapid changes within the disintegrating Soviet empire. Initially, the Department lagged behind the NSC in pushing the President to move U.S.-Soviet relations beyond confrontation to a period of engagement. Secretary of State Baker argued that until the division of Europe ended, the Administration had to be cautious about prematurely declaring an end to the Cold War.

Secretary Baker relied heavily on a trio of close advisers. He named Dennis Ross, a specialist on Soviet and Middle Eastern affairs, as Director of the Policy Planning staff. Ross operated as virtually a one-man command staff, proposing positions on critical issues that Baker often adopted wholesale. Equally influential was Robert Zoellick, dubbed the Secretary’s “second brain” by journalists. Appointed Counselor of the Department, Zoellick served as Baker’s “gatekeeper” for policy papers and personnel access. He also became the chief sub cabinet official on German reunification. To ensure that the Department’s views were presented to the public as Baker wanted, he appointed former Treasury staff aide Margaret deB. Tutwiler as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Department Spokesman. Baker’s key aides built a valuable working partnership with their counterparts at the NSC, forging an alliance that oversaw German reunification and provided critical support for democratic change in the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe.

Bush’s own active involvement and direct communications with foreign leaders surprised many career officers at the Department, and not everyone was comfortable with informal lines of communication. Vernon Walters, the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, reportedly resigned in part due to frustration after continuously hearing second-hand reports from the West German Foreign Ministry of agreements reached independently by Bush and Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

The Berlin Wall Falls and USSR Dissolves

Initially, Department of State officials and Bush’s foreign policy team were reluctant to speak publicly about German “reunification” due to fear that hard-liners in both the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union would stymie reform. Although changes in the GDR leadership and encouraging speeches by Gorbachev about nonintervention in Eastern Europe boded well for reunification, the world was taken by surprise when, during the night of November 9, 1989, crowds of Germans began dismantling the Berlin Wall—a barrier that for almost 30 years had symbolized the Cold War division of Europe. By October 1990, Germany was reunified, triggering the swift collapse of the other East European regimes.

People celebrating the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Thirteen months later, on December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the Union of Soviet Union Republics dissolved. President Bush and his chief foreign policy advisers were more pro-active toward Russia and the former Soviet republics after the collapse of the Communist monolith than while it was teetering. In a series of summits during the next year with the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Bush pledged $4.5-billion to support economic reform in Russia, as well as additional credit guarantees and technical assistance.

The two former Cold War adversaries lifted restrictions on the numbers and movement of diplomatic, consular, and official personnel. They also agreed to continue the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty negotiations (START), begun before the collapse of the Soviet Union, which set a goal of reducing their strategic nuclear arsenals from approximately 12,000 warheads to 3,000-3,500 warheads by 2003. In January 1993, three weeks before leaving office, Bush traveled to Moscow to sign the START II Treaty that codified those nuclear reductions.

New Global Problems Emerge

Rapid change in Europe was mirrored by equally complex problems in China, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula. In the People’s Republic of China, tanks and troops attacked pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, effectively suppressing the movement. Media coverage of the suppression made a powerful impression, as nations around the world realized that China was not prepared to follow the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and allow its people more freedom. The United States joined the protest of many other nations by imposing economic sanctions and condemning the suppression and killing of the pro-democracy demonstrators.

"The Goddess of Democracy" erected in Tiananmen Square during the protest.

In an effort to improve U.S. relations with China, Bush sent Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft on a secret trip to China in July 1989. When word of their visit became public several months later, the President was criticized for pursuing “constructive engagement” with the Chinese Communist government so soon after the Tiananmen Square killings and his announcement of a U.S. ban on all high-level talks between the two countries.

Unlike the serious human rights abuses in China, the changes taking place in South Africa signaled a peaceful end to the practice of apartheid. Secretary Baker described U.S. policy as a “classic carrot-and-stick strategy,” in which the Department of State issued threats of continued sanctions as well as invitations to the United States to both black and white South African leaders as incentives to end apartheid. The Department’s African Bureau took the lead. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen met privately with South African President F.W. de Klerk to inquire whether he was prepared to end apartheid.

South African President, F.W. de Klerk

By late 1989, de Klerk had desegregated many public places, released numerous African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid political prisoners, and discussed black-white power sharing. A few months later, de Klerk released Nelson Mandela from prison after 27 years of incarceration. Mandela proved to be a potent symbol of national healing, respected by most blacks and whites in South Africa. Recognizing that the government was on a course toward a nonracial, multiparty democracy, the ANC soon ended its policy of armed struggle against the South African Government.

The Department of State’s African Bureau also played a critical role in bringing about the end of the proxy war in Angola between the pro-Soviet and pro-U.S. factions. In the spring of 1991, Cohen conducted negotiations with the Soviets that ended more than 20 years of support for guerrilla warfare between contending groups, although peace remained elusive in that war-ravaged country.

The First Gulf War

Of all the policy successes during this era, the Department of State and President Bush are most clearly associated with the successful effort to roll back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

President G. W. H. Bush visiting the Troups during the First Gulf War

When Saddam Hussein invaded its small, oil-rich neighbor in the summer of 1990, the Department faced its first full-scale post-Cold War international crisis. Bush’s foreign policy team forged an unprecedented international coalition consisting of the NATO allies and the Middle Eastern countries of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt to oppose Iraqi aggression. Although Russia did not commit troops, it joined the United States in condemning Iraq, its long-time client state. The Department of State orchestrated the diplomacy for this grand coalition’s effective air campaign in January 1991, which was followed by “Operation Desert Storm,” a 100-hour land war, which expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

During the Gulf crisis, Secretary of State Baker relied heavily on two men—John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, who played a significant role in coordinating relations with the United Nations, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, who was Baker’s day-to-day crisis manager. One innovation that greatly facilitated decision-making during the Gulf War was the use of teleconferences, which saved many hours of travel time. Instead, Baker and others could communicate and display charts through cameras and television screens.

Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, John Bolton

After the success in Kuwait, President Bush paid special tribute to the Foreign Service officers who labor in relative obscurity until they are caught up in a dangerous conflict or become the victims of international terrorism. President Bush made a special visit to the Department of State to honor 33 employees for their service at our embassies in Baghdad and Kuwait, which included finding food and supplies for trapped Americans in those countries and helping children to safe havens after fighting erupted. Acknowledging the peril most Americans never see, Bush said, “I know that often your jobs are not comfortable or safe.”

Iraq was not the only trouble spot in the Middle East during Bush’s four years in office. The perennial tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors continued to test the expertise of the many U.S. ambassadors and area experts. Baker’s personal involvement, reflected in numerous trips to the region, helped bring about the first face-to-face talks between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors in Madrid, beginning in October 1991. Secretary Baker’s “shuttle diplomacy” rivaled Henry Kissinger’s in 1974. From the beginning of Baker’s tenure until August 23, 1992, when he resigned to become White House Chief of Staff, he made 217 trips abroad.

Lawrence Eagleburger, who succeeded Baker, became the first Foreign Service officer to serve as Secretary of State. During a 27-year government career, Eagleburger had been a staffer for Kissinger’s National Security Council, and held numerous senior positions at the Department of State, including Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Deputy Under Secretary for Management, and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Eagleburger's appointment reflected Bush’s deep respect for the Foreign Service. Bush compiled an impressive record of nominating career officers to ambassadorships (72 percent), one of the best records for all Presidents in the post-1945 era.

Conclusion

As the 1990s began, the Cold War was finally over and the United States was the sole remaining superpower. But hopes for a safer, more peaceful world would be dashed as regional conflicts and global problems challenged the American foreign policy establishment to chart a new course for the United States.