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Cover photo: Lord Robertson (left), Italian President Ciampi and Ambassador de Franchis (right) at NATO, 5 May.

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## Building stability in the Balkans

*Our challenge in the Balkans, as an international community, is simple: to build a new southeastern Europe, where each and every country shares peace and democracy, and plays a part in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Given recent history, that may seem a daunting challenge indeed, but since I took up my position as Secretary General almost a year ago, I have seen major progress. The transformation which has taken place this year in Croatia, the steady progress of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the stabilisation of Kosovo, and the renewed international commitment to the region give cause for optimism.*



*To fulfil this promise, we must continue to promote integration. The clearest lesson of the past half-century in Europe is that integration breeds trust, stability and prosperity. As a result, all of southeastern Europe must be given the opportunity to join Euro-Atlantic structures and become part of the European mainstream. Put differently, integration is the ultimate way to prevent further conflict and build stability. Together with the countries of the region, therefore, we have to work towards comprehensive solutions to the problems of southeastern Europe.*

*Serving together in the NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Kosovo are soldiers from countries, which during the Cold War – just ten years ago – prepared for war against each other. Today, these former antagonists are working together towards common goals. Croatia's entry into the Partnership for Peace is only further evidence of change. This new spirit of cooperation demonstrates that progress is possible, that former enemies can be reconciled, and that the benefits of freedom and democracy can be shared.*

*The European Union's Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and NATO's own South East Europe Initiative together aim to create the conditions for economic growth, democratic government and security throughout the Balkans. The logic which underpins these programmes is similar to that which inspired both the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the 1940s, which together helped Western Europe get back on its feet and become an area of stability and prosperity.*

*No one should harbour any illusions that reconciliation between ethnic groups or economic prosperity can be achieved overnight in the Balkans. But we must remember that both the Marshall Plan and NATO were long-term projects whose success only became apparent with the years. The key is that we stay the course, that we devote the time and resources to southeastern Europe that the region merits, and that we provide the security framework so that the various peace processes become self-sustaining and democracy is able to take root. It will then be up to a new generation of local leaders to take their countries forward with confidence into the 21st century.*

*Georgiosorosin*

Lord Robertson



**NAC's Balkan tour**

The North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's senior decision-making body comprised of the 19 NATO ambassadors, Secretary General Lord Robertson and Admiral Guido Venturoni, the chairman of NATO's Military Committee, made a fact-finding tour of the Balkans between 17 and 19 July to review the state of the peace processes in Kosovo and Bosnia.

Croatian President Stipe Mesic visited NATO on 17 July and discussed with Lord Robertson political changes in his country since he came to power.

Lord Robertson visited Central Asia between 3 and 7 July and met Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Uzbekistan's Prime Minister Utkur Sultanov, and President Askar Akaev of the Kyrgyz Republic. President Nazarbayev visited NATO on 27 June.

Lord Robertson visited Germany on 29 June to meet with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping to discuss the European Security and Defence Identity in the light of Germany's military reforms.

**New Spanish ambassador**



Ambassador Juan Prat y Coll succeeded Ambassador Javier Conde de Saro as permanent representative of Spain to the North Atlantic Council on 10 July. A career diplomat from Barcelona, Ambassador Prat, 58, was formerly Spain's ambassador to Italy, Albania, Malta and San Marino between 1996 and 2000. Before that he was director general at the European Commission, for external relations (1995-96) and for North-South relations, Mediterranean policy and relations with Latin America and Asia (1990-95).

**War crimes suspect snatched**

War crimes suspect, Dusko Sikirica, was snatched in Bosnia by SFOR peacekeepers on 25 June and transferred to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Sikirica, a former commander of the Keraterm prison camp, is accused of genocide, violation of the laws and customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

EU leaders identified principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and ways to develop EU-NATO relations at their two-day summit in Feira, Portugal, on 19 and 20 June.

Five NATO and nine Partner countries rehearsed peace support operations in Tirana between 21 June and 1 July in an exercise called Cooperative Dragon 2000.

Lord Robertson visited the United States between 21 and 23 June for talks with Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, several senators and congressional leaders and to attend the annual seminar of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

KFOR peacekeepers in Kosovo discovered an illegal arms dump on 16 June and seized the contents, including heavy machine-guns, mortars, detonators, anti-tank missiles, boxes of ammunition and large quantities of TNT.

Ten NATO and six Partner countries took part in Cooperative Partner 2000, a military exercise designed to help multinational forces work together in peace support operations, between 19 June and 1 July around Odessa in the Black Sea in Ukraine.



This year's Manfred Wörner Fellowship, worth 800,000 Belgian francs, went to Alexander Yuschenko of Kharkov State Polytechnic University in Ukraine for his project entitled *Intellectual Modelling of Information Management of Political Mentality Dynamics of Social Ukrainian Strata Towards NATO*.

Some 400 sea rescue specialists from 16 NATO and Partner countries took part in Cooperative Safeguard 2000, a Partnership for Peace exercise, in Iceland between 7 and 12 June focusing on maritime humanitarian operations.

**Defence ministers' acknowledgement**

NATO defence ministers meeting in Brussels, Belgium, on 8 June acknowledged the need to do more to improve defence capabilities in order to meet goals laid down at last year's Washington Summit and be ready for a future Kosovo-type crisis.

16 NATO and Partner countries took part in Cooperative Banners 2000, a military exercise aiming to train naval, land and air forces in out-of-area peace support operations, between 29 May and 10 June in Denmark and southern Norway.

Between 5 and 9 and 13 and 16 June in northern France 13 NATO countries took part in Clean Hunter 2000, an air force exercise aiming to train participants in tactical air operations, and help evaluate and practise joint regulations and procedures.

Lord Robertson visited Kosovo on 31 May for a third time since taking office in October last year, for talks with UN administrator Bernard Kouchner, military commanders and local officials. He travelled to Kosovo after addressing the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Hungary and meeting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 30 May.

The Standing Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly said it was willing to resume dialogue with the Russian Duma at a meeting in Budapest, Hungary, on 29 May. Relations were interrupted as a result of NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia.

Between 20 May and 10 June, Italy, Greece and Turkey hosted Dynamic Mix 2000, an exercise involving some 15,000 troops, 65 ships and 290 aircraft from 14 NATO countries. Participants rehearsed humanitarian intervention, deployment, re-deployment and combined land, sea and air operations.

**Florence détente**

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov attended the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council meeting in Florence, Italy, on 24 May for the first time since NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia.

Croatia became the 46th member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council after joining the Partnership for Peace on 25 May.

A Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre opened at NATO on 22 May to improve coordination of WMD-related activities, to strengthen consultations on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, and to improve the Alliance's ability to respond to the threat of WMD.

Lord Robertson visited Helsinki, Tallinn and Vilnius on 17, 18 and 19 May, meeting with the heads of state and government and the foreign and defence ministers of Finland, Estonia and Lithuania.

**Vilnius declaration**

Foreign ministers of the nine countries aspiring to join NATO – Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>1</sup> – made a joint pledge on 19 March in Vilnius to prepare and apply for membership together.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko visited NATO on 22 May and Admiral Guido Venturoni, chairman of NATO's Military Committee, visited Ukraine between 17 and 19 May.

**Membership invitations at 2002 NATO summit**

During a visit to Slovakia and Slovenia on 10 and 11 May, Lord Robertson said that decisions on the next invitations for NATO membership would be taken at the Alliance's next summit in 2002.

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.





France's first Partnership for Peace exercise, **Cooperative Lantern 2000**, took place between 14 and 27 May and involved some 600 military personnel from 22 countries practising working together in two multinational brigades in Fréjus in southern France.

**Russian participation resumes**

Russia resumed participation in NATO's highest military authority, the **Military Committee's chiefs-of-staff meeting**, on 9 and 10 May for the first time since NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia last year.

Croatian Prime Minister **Ivica Racan** visited NATO on 9 May to discuss his country's relations with Bosnia, support for the Dayton Peace Accords, refugee return, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague and domestic political reform.

**Italy in the Balkans**

Italian President **Carlo Azeglio Ciampi** visited NATO on 5 May and **Lord Robertson** visited Italy on 8 May to discuss current security issues and Italy's contribution to peace-building in the Balkans.



More than 2000 troops from 11 NATO countries took part in **Ardent Ground**, an annual rapid reaction exercise in Hungary, between 29 April and 13 May organised for the **Ace Mobile Force (Land)**. AMF (L) is a rapid reaction force trained to deploy within 72 hours.

**Linked Seas 2000**, a joint peace-keeping exercise involving participants from 17 countries, took

place between 2 and 15 May in an area stretching from the Gulf of Gascony to the Island of Madeira. The exercise simulated response to a border conflict between two non-NATO countries.

**SHAPE change**

General **Wesley Clark** handed over command of the **Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe** to General **Joseph Ralston** on 3 May. General Ralston, a combat pilot with more than 2,500 flying hours including missions over Laos and North Vietnam, is also the commander-in-chief, **United States European Command**, and was previously vice chairman of the **Joint Chiefs of Staff**, the second highest-ranking officer in the United States.



**SFOR** peacekeepers arrested war crimes suspect **Dragan Nikolic** on 21 April and transferred him to the **International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague**. Nikolic was commander of the **Susica** detention camp and is accused of crimes against humanity, violations of laws and customs of war and grave breaches of the **Geneva Conventions**.

NATO's **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre** helped coordinate international aid for victims of flooding in **Hungary** and **Romania** in April, assisting **Budapest** and **Bucharest** rapidly obtain sandbags and fuel.

**Euro KFOR command**

The five-nation European military force, or **Eurocorps**, headed by the Spaniard, **Lieutenant-General Juan Ortuño**, took command for six months of the **Kosovo Force** on 18 April. Eurocorps replaces

**LANDCENT**, which was headed by German General **Klaus Reinhardt**.



**Lord Robertson** visited the **International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague** on 13 April where he reiterated NATO's determination to arrest war crime suspects still at large. He also met with Dutch Prime Minister **Wim Kok**, Foreign Minister **Jozias van Aartsen** and Defence Minister **Frank de Grave**.

**Lord Robertson** visited the United States between 3 and 7 April to meet with Vice President **Al Gore**, Secretary of State **Madeleine Albright** and key senators, and to give a series of speeches at think tanks and universities across the country.

**SFOR** peacekeepers arrested **Momcilo Krajisnik**, the highest-ranking war crimes suspect arrested to date, on 3 April in Bosnia. A confidant of Bosnian Serb wartime leader and indicted war criminal **Radovan Karadzic**, **Krajisnik** has been charged by the **International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague** with genocide and many other war crimes including murder, wilful killing, extermination, deportation and inhumane acts.

**Lord Robertson** visited **Latvia** and **Sweden** between 29 and 31 March.

**Lord Robertson** visited **Kosovo** on 24 March to mark the first anniversary of NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia, meeting with the then **KFOR** commander, General **Klaus Reinhardt**, the UN administrator, **Bernard Kouchner**, and three Albanian members of the province's **Interim Administrative Council**.

**Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar** visited NATO on 22 March to meet **Lord Robertson** and discuss Estonia's involvement in NATO's **Membership Action Plan**.

Ten NATO countries took part in **Ample Train 2000**, an air logistics exercise testing the degree of compatibility between participants' rapid reaction forces, in France between 27 and 31 March.

**Kosovo One Year On**

A year after NATO launched **Operation Allied Force** against Yugoslavia, **Lord Robertson** published his thoughts on the achievements and challenges in Kosovo in a report called **Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and Challenge**. He explained that the international community remained committed to peace and stability in the province, but stressed that locals had a fundamental role to play in the peaceful cohabitation of different ethnic groups.



**Lord Robertson** visited **Croatia** and **Hungary** on 16 and 17 March, meeting with the leaders of these two countries and then attending a two-day working session with southeastern European prime ministers.

**Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta** visited NATO on 20 March and discussed the situation in **Montenegro**, the **Stability Pact** for South Eastern Europe and defence reform in Albania with **Lord Robertson**.

**Strategic Reserve Forces** took part in exercise **Dynamic Response 2000** between 19 March and 10 April in Kosovo to test their ability to deploy rapidly, their interoperability and operational readiness, and demonstrate NATO's capacity to reinforce **KFOR**.

# Italy in the Balkans

*To mark the visit of Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi to NATO, Ambassador Amedeo de Franchis examines Italy's policy towards the Balkans.*

Italy is one of the founding members of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. In the decisive – difficult, but exciting – years between 1950 and 1955, there was an intense debate in Italy at all levels, from parliament to grass roots society, on the country's international future. This debate resulted in Italy's membership of the two entities, which have so profoundly shaped and transformed the events of the subsequent decades and the face of the Old Continent: the Atlantic Alliance and what at that time was called the European Community. These two organisations became and have remained the signposts of Italy's foreign policy: its Atlantic commitment and its European vocation.

It is in this spirit and with the strong support of Italian public opinion and Italian political forces, that Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi came to address the North Atlantic Council on 5 May. Seeing the Atlantic Alliance of the year 2000 as a bridge between past and future, he paid tribute to it for having preserved for 50 years the fundamental, values of freedom and democracy, and expressed Italy's appreciation for the effective way in which the Atlantic Alliance "has adapted and transformed itself, consolidating the cohesion among its members".

The "new NATO" – as it is often called today – that emerged following the Washington Summit, is able and ready to assume a central role in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, in addition to its longstanding and still valid functions of collective defence. The Balkans provide clear testimony to NATO's vocation of maintaining security on the continent, of developing a vision that is increasingly dynamic and of broadening and maintaining peace, in the Balkan region. NATO, which had never before deployed a single soldier there, has intervened militarily first in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and then in Kosovo, and now has more than 60,000 troops deployed in the region. The Balkans are therefore central to the Atlantic Alliance and to its vision for the future. And Italy, in

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*Ambassador Amedeo de Franchis is Italy's permanent representative to NATO.*

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turn, plays a central role in the Balkans and in the strategy being developed by NATO for that region, which demonstrates more each day the extent to which the area of potential threat and geographic instability has shifted from the East to southeastern Europe. This central role on the part of Italy is derived from both her geographic position – for Italy, the Balkans are not a remote entity, but a reality that lies just a few dozen kilometres from the Adriatic coast – and from her history. Thus, Italy's geography, history and political vocation combine to give her a special responsibility,



State visit: Lord Robertson (left), Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and Ambassador Amedeo de Franchis (right) at NATO.

which Italy has not shirked, playing a leading role, at times even acting as the Alliance's conscience, emphasising the need to act quickly, in the conviction that the Balkan theatre is not and should not be seen as a "zero-sum game", but one in which the dividends reaped can expand the sphere of Euro-Atlantic security.

Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini stated at the Florence NATO Ministerial meeting on 24 May: "We have learned from the Balkans that the security and stabilisation of the whole of southeastern Europe must be pursued on a regional and integrated basis. Italy has always adopted this regional interdependence approach." For this reason, Italy did not hesitate to organise and lead Operation Alba during the spring and summer of 1997. This operation also involved, among others, forces from Denmark, France, Greece, Romania, Spain and Turkey (a total of 7,000 troops, including more than 3,000 Italians). Responding to the OSCE and the United Nations, Operation Alba's specific mission was to permit the distribution of humanitarian aid,

but it was also conceived and conducted in order to prevent a civil war and make it possible for the Albanians to find a solution to their political crisis. And it is important to recall that, as Operation Alba was taking place, Italy continued to deploy thousands of troops in Bosnia, in the context of the IFOR and SFOR missions.

The genesis and subsequent evolution of the Kosovo crisis are still present in the minds of us all and I need not recall the various phases. Suffice it to say that also in those circumstances – in a situation of flagrant violations of the most fundamental human rights and values, provoked by a policy of ethnic cleansing – Italy clearly understood and foresaw the dimensions of the challenge. It not only provided, by making available airports and naval ports, the entire strategic and logistic base necessary for the success of the military operations, but also participated with its own means. Moreover, Italy has been present from the very outset in KFOR, providing one of the largest contingents. In response to the Mitrovica emergency, Italy sent additional forces, which made it, for a considerable period of time, the largest military contributor in Kosovo. At present, it has a total of 7,500 troops deployed in the framework of the KFOR mission, also including the contingent in Albania, where Italy ensures virtually single-handedly the NATO presence. Furthermore, the Italian contingent ensures the functioning of the Djadovica airport, as well as railway links between Pristina and Skopje. These efforts are complemented by numerous activities conducted by Italian NGOs.

Italy's military contingent in the western sector of Kosovo around Pec, which is under its command, is particularly significant and is highly valued by the local population and by the minority groups, both for its assistance in ensuring the functions of daily life and in making possible the observance of religious practices for the various creeds and protecting historical monuments. It is important to point out that this contribution is not only of a military nature, but also concerns the civilian sector. As Foreign Minister Dini said in Florence: "In Kosovo... the top priority is to create an area of security for all individuals, to foster the development of civil society and urge the leaders to gradually adopt the values of freedom and democracy."

Also in Kosovo, Italy's action is inspired by the two guiding stars of its foreign policy: NATO and the European Union. Indeed, Italy believes that in the Balkans it is necessary to develop both the security dimension – ensured by NATO – and the economic, financial and civil reconstruction, where the European Union is in the forefront. This reinforces the so-called "interlocking institutions" system and lays the foundations for further work on what is to become the European Security and Defence Dimension. One of the lessons learned from the Kosovo crisis is that Europe must take up the security challenges. In this regard,

while we still have a way to go in order to attain our goal of having a European military crisis management capability to conduct missions, eventually using NATO assets and capabilities, the itinerary to be followed has already been laid down, most recently at the European Council of Feira.

Italy is not only one of the main force contributors in Kosovo, it is also (in third place) among the countries which, at global level, participate in peace operations under UN auspices. Moreover, Italy is in fifth place among UN member countries in terms of financial contributions. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, commenting on Italy's involvement in the Balkans and in East Timor, said: "Italy is the ideal United Nations member state." In the national military parade, which took place in Rome last June, there were units from the various UN peace missions involving Italy. Just to name a few: Albatross in Mozambique, Pellicano in Albania, Interfet in East Timor, the various missions of the Carabinieri in El Salvador, Cambodia, Somalia, Hebron, Bosnia, Albania and Guatemala, as well as representatives of the Italian forces deployed in the Balkans under NATO auspices.

In conclusion, Italy does not believe that the Balkans have an ineluctable destiny. We are faced there with both risks and opportunities and even that tormented region is acquiring a dynamic vision of history, realising that it also has a right to a future, not only a past, and that it can shake off its identity as the tinderbox of the continent to become a showcase in Europe. In this sense, we are encouraged by the indications of change and openness appearing in Zagreb and by the improvement in the situation in Sarajevo. We hope that such developments may contribute to democratic change also in Serbia in order that it may, as Italy fervently hopes, assume its rightful position in the Euro-Atlantic context. However, the entire region, including Serbia, must first abjure its pessimistic vision, which led Edmund Stillman to say that: "The Balkans are exactly the opposite of easy optimism. They teach us that everything ends, everything breaks and everything disintegrates."

Italy and NATO consider civil and economic reconstruction of the Balkans and the consolidation of democratic values and tolerance in that region to be a commitment to civilisation. As President Ciampi stated on 5 May to the North Atlantic Council, if NATO is the only great military alliance to have survived the end of the circumstances leading to its creation, there is a "profound reason which touches the very essence of the Western World's values". The common strategic interests, values and intentions that inspire European and American culture and which together form a common Euro-American civilisation, enable us to embark with confidence on the missions that await NATO at this dawn of the 21st century. ■



# Making up for lost time

*Ivica Racan describes the revolution that has taken place in Croatian policy this year and his aspirations for the future.*

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**T**he transition from authoritarian rule to democracy is fraught with danger in any country. It can be made easier, however, with international help. This is why membership of the Partnership for Peace is so important to Croatia and why my country aspires to join both NATO and the European Union.

Since coming to power in January of this year, my government has charted a very different course from that of its predecessor. Having embarked on a wide-ranging reform programme, the years ahead will likely be difficult. In many ways, Croatia is now on a similar course to that charted some 25 years ago by Spain and Portugal. Today, both of these countries are prosperous democracies, active members of both NATO and the European Union, and an inspiration. We aim to emulate their achievements, to participate actively in the Partnership for Peace and to contribute to finding durable solutions in southeastern Europe and beyond.

Under the former regime of the late President Franjo Tudjman, Croatia was at loggerheads both with its neighbours and the wider international community. The principal points of conflict were policies towards Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), relations with the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague (the Tribunal), and attitudes towards the return of Serb refugees to Croatia. These are no longer issues.

© NATO



*Ivica Racan is prime minister of Croatia.*

Whereas certain individuals in the former ruling party and Tudjman himself clearly coveted parts of Bosnia, my government respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our neighbour. Indeed, my colleagues and I were outspoken critics of Tudjman's policies towards Bosnia both during and after the Bosnian war, believing that a functioning and successful Bosnian state was and is in Croatia's national interest. We are therefore committed to the Dayton peace process and intend to contribute to the reconstruction of a Bosnia that can be a home to all its peoples.

Since coming into office, we have stopped transferring soldiers directly between the Croatian Armed Forces and the Croat Defence Council, the Bosnian Croat component of the Bosnian Federation's Armed Forces. We have also severed direct communications and control links between the two militaries. Moreover, since signing a Financial Assistance Agreement with the Bosnian Federation in May, financial transfers between Croatia and the Federation's defence ministry have become transparent.

Croatia is not, however, abandoning the Bosnian Croats. It is simply looking to find durable, long-term solutions that balance their legitimate interests with those of a viable Bosnian state and of the country's Serb and Bosniac communities. Croatia will continue to pay military pensions and disability allowances to Bosnian Croats, but these payments will in future either be made via the appropriate federal institutions or paid directly to beneficiaries in as open a manner as possible. They will no longer be channelled through shady, parallel structures.

The change of regime in Zagreb and the reversal of Tudjman's policies towards Bosnia has already borne some fruit in the recent Bosnian municipal elections with gains for multi-ethnic parties. Although nationalists remain powerful, their support base is crumbling. Hopefully, an irreversible trend has been set so that, in time, Bosnians of all ethnic groups will follow the Croatian example and reject the bankrupt nationalism, which has blighted all their lives for the past decade.

Bosnian society cannot, however, be rebuilt without reconciliation. Here, the Tribunal has a vital role to play. For guilt is individual, not collective. Only when those individuals responsible for the excesses of the wars of Yugoslav dissolution are forced to account for their actions, can the healing process properly begin.

Crimes were committed on all sides, including by Croats. In order to help the Tribunal, my government has again reversed the policy of the former regime and intends to hand over indictees, make available all relevant documents and support investigations on Croatian territory. In March, Bosnian Croat indictee, Mladan "Tuta" Naletilic, was extradited to The Hague. In April, the lower house of the Croatian parliament endorsed a declaration on cooperation with the Tribunal. Since then, Croatia has been assisting the investigations of a forensic team from The Hague.

One reason Croatia is so eager to assist the Tribunal is to ensure that when an individual is tried, all evidence is available, both to the prosecution and to the defence, so that the accused receives a fair trial. Only in this way, will justice be done and be seen to be done. Since Croatia's former regime refused to cooperate fully with the Tribunal and failed to hand over documents, there is a possibility that in some cases, in particular the 45-year prison term given to Bosnian Croat General Tihomir Blaskic, the Tribunal did not have the information necessary to make the right decision.

While the Tribunal has helped build a framework for reconciliation, it remains remote from its beneficiaries, the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Ultimately, reconciliation is up to us and the healing process has to take place within the region. For this reason, we hope that in the future war crimes trials can be held in Croatia, as well as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

Reconciliation will not take place unless and until those who have been forced from their homes in the war are able to return. My government has therefore made the return of refugees and displaced persons a priority. We have already adopted a joint declaration on refugee return with Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb dominated part of Bosnia, hoping to kick-start the return process throughout the region. At the same time, together with the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), we have developed a project for the return of 16,500 displaced persons to Croatia. With funding pledged at the Stability Pact's regional finance conference in March, we can commit ourselves to its implementation.

My government will never insist on reciprocity – that is an identical number of Croat returnees as returnees of other ethnicities – nor will it knowingly discriminate against returning Serbs. A Croatian citizen is a Croatian citizen, irrespective of his or her ethnic origins, and entitled to the full protection of equitable law. To this end, we have initiated a process of amending all discriminatory legislation on the principles of the inviolability of private property and the equality of all citizens before the law.

The Croatian war is recent and holds bitter memories. At the same time, our economy is depressed, unemployment is high and there are severe constraints on government spending. As a result, some in Croatia may resent aid being paid to returning Serbs. That will not, however, alter our policies. Already in June, we adopted laws granting Serbs equal access to reconstruction funds and our courts have punished individuals who have desecrated Serb monuments.

Assisting Serb returns to Croatia will hopefully help improve relations with our neighbours, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Genuine normalisation of relations will, however, not be possible as long as Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic remains in power and the attitudes and mindset that he has helped inculcate continue to prevail. Serbia's problems go well beyond Milosevic. Until Serbian society comes to terms with its recent past, it will remain an international pariah and lasting peace and stability in both Kosovo and south-eastern Europe will likely prove elusive.

Talk of rebuilding some sort of new Yugoslavia and bringing Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia back together is naïve. That said, the various countries of the region could work together. Indeed, we intend to demonstrate this in the framework of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which we also view as the path towards membership of the European Union.

In addition to joining the Partnership for Peace, Croatia has this year become an associate member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and signed 16 bilateral military cooperation agreements, eight of which are with NATO countries. These new links should enable us to work together with partners to find solutions and help us reform and restructure our own armed forces.

Establishing democratic control over the armed forces and defence reforms are mutually reinforcing efforts and therefore need to be tackled together. New legislation is being prepared to expand parliament's oversight of the military, a corps of civilian defence experts is being created, and defence standards and procedures designed to increase transparency are being introduced.

The drive to reform Croatian society is part of the drive to integrate Croatia into Western Europe. As a result of war and later mismanagement, Croatia slipped down the league table of countries aspiring to join both NATO and the European Union. But now, we are making up for lost time and hope to follow the trail blazed by countries like Spain and Portugal. What is good for Croatia, is good for all Croatian citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins, is good for southeastern Europe and for the Euro-Atlantic community beyond. ■

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### The drive to reform Croatian society is part of the drive to integrate Croatia into Western Europe.

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# Cultivating Croatia's military

*Kristan J. Wheaton describes how NATO countries helped prepare the Croatian military for the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.*



Students of democracy: Croatia's military has demonstrated its democratic credentials by staying out of politics.

When Croatian voters rejected the political party that had led Croatia to independence and had been in power for the past decade, the Croatian military did a remarkable thing. Nothing. Despite calls from some right-wing extremists for a coup, Croatia's Armed Forces refused to meddle in politics, contributing to a smooth hand-over of power.

While such behaviour is expected in Western democracies, it is not the norm in countries transitioning from authoritarian rule. In fact, the exact opposite is commonly true. Generally speaking, an accommodation with the military is one of the essential pre-conditions for a successful transition, making the Croatian military's respect for the political process even more remarkable. This significant achievement, however, was not accidental. NATO Allies and the Croatians themselves have devoted substantial resources to pro-

fessionalising the Croatian military during the past five years.

In 1995, the Croatian military clearly and overwhelmingly supported the late Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and his authoritarian party, the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* or HDZ). From the average soldier's point of view, there were good reasons for this support. Through its near total control of the media, the HDZ had managed to convince most of the military, indeed much of Croatia's population, that the HDZ, and only the HDZ, could efficiently govern the country and effectively represent its interests abroad. At that time, it was nearly unthinkable that, in the event of a crisis, the HDZ would not be able to count on the support of the Croatian military.

By late 1999, the situation had changed dramatically. Falling living standards and a series of economic scandals implicating senior figures in the ruling party bred increasing disillusionment with the HDZ's stale diet of nationalism and international isolation. In the wake of Tudjman's death in December 1999, support for the HDZ disintegrated. Its parliamentary representation crashed from 59 per cent of seats to just 29 per cent in January and February 2000 elections.

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*Kristan J. Wheaton is a foreign area officer for the US Army currently stationed at the US Embassy in Zagreb.*

*The opinions expressed in this article, however, are his and do not reflect the official position of any department or agency of the US government.*

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Moreover, the military accepted the election results and began to work with the new, democratically elected president, Stipe Mesic, and the government of new prime minister, Ivica Racan.

The United States was, in late 1995, the first NATO country to organise military cooperation programmes for Croatian soldiers and remains the largest single funder of what the US military refers to as “engagement” activities. These are programmes designed to promote regional stability and democratisation and, in relation to the former Yugoslavia, to “support US efforts to ensure self-sustaining progress from the Dayton process” and “develop military institutions adapted to democratic civilian control”. In 1998, the US Ambassador to Croatia, William Montgomery, drew up a “Road Map to Partnership for Peace”, which helped focus US programmes in Croatia itself. Furthermore, he made the US defence attaché responsible for synchronising the US effort. This step both protected the programmes, through a successful working relationship with Croatian leaders, and multiplied their impact, through careful coordination.

Direct US military training assistance to Croatia grew from \$65,000 in 1995 to \$500,000 in 2000. This money was provided to Croatia through the congressionally authorised International Military Education and Training (IMET) fund. During this period, the United States trained nearly 200 Croatian military and civilian personnel in the United States and several hundred more at one- and two-week seminars held in Croatia. IMET money also paid for the establishment of three language laboratories, so that the Croatian Military School of Foreign Languages is now capable of producing nearly 150 fluent English speakers annually. The total cost of the IMET programme in Croatia since 1995 has been about \$2 million. The Defence Security Cooperation Agency, in collaboration with the US European Command, has also funded two full-time personnel to assist the Croatian military with scheduling and executing IMET-funded training since 1997.

In addition to IMET-funded activities, the US European Command sponsored a four-person military liaison team in Croatia under the Joint Contact Team Programme (JCTP). The team began operations in 1996 and has to date conducted nearly 300 events designed to present the US Armed Forces as a role model of a capable military under effective civilian control. JCTP events differ from IMET-funded train-

ing. JCTP is prohibited from conducting training and must restrict its activities to familiarisation and orientation-type events. Participants are not required to be fluent in English and the events normally last less than a week (as opposed to IMET-funded courses, which normally last several months). That said, JCTP-funded events played an important role in exposing a large number of Croatian military personnel to democratic norms and expectations.

The United States, along with Germany, also supported the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. The Center is designed to support higher security and defence learning for foreign and security policy officials. Croatia has sent more than 40 members of its defence ministry and general staff to the Marshall Center for training since 1995. This effort cost the United States nearly \$350,000 in 1999 and 2000 alone.

In addition to the Marshall Center, Germany began offering Croatian officers training in its military schools in 1999. Since then 23 officers have been educated in German military schools and 30 have completed familiarisation or orientation events. The focus of these courses is normally on professional military education including battalion- and company-level courses, as well as slots in the German Command and General Staff College and training for Croatian medical personnel. Germany also provided language training to Croatian officers attending its schools. Staff talks occurred annually at all levels between Croatian and German officers and Germany also conducted some exercises with Croatia in the field of arms control. Total aid, paid out of the defence budget of Germany to Croatia, is approximately \$2 million.

The United Kingdom has also supported the Croatian military. Since 1997, when the United Kingdom began working with the Croatian military on arms control (in particular in relation to the Dayton Accords), some 45 Croatian students have been sent to the United Kingdom for English language instruction. In addition, the United Kingdom has sponsored seminars on a broad variety of topics, including the arms-control provisions of Dayton, military law, and the military and the media.

France also provided significant training. Beginning in 1998 with the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement, the French established a programme which saw 31 officers graduate from schools such as the French War School, 14 in 1998 and 17 in 1999. According to the French Embassy in Zagreb, as

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As a critical mass of trained officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, began to return from training abroad, NATO officers began to find common ground with an increasing number of their Croatian counterparts.

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many as 20 additional training events are planned for 2000. The French military also provided language training.

In line with previous agreements between Turkey and Croatia, 12 Croatian officers have attended Turkish schools since 1999. According to the Turkish Embassy in Zagreb, all students attended a one-year course in Turkish before attending professional military education training, such as the Armed Forces Military Academy or courses designed for officers who are about to take command of companies and battalions. In addition to training opportunities in Turkey, Croatia sent observers to three exercises in 1999.

Italy also had an active programme of engagement with Croatia prior to the 2000 elections. According to the Italian Embassy in Zagreb, the Italian government secured a series of memorandums of understanding with Croatia designed to improve both the safety of navigation and the response to emergency situations in the Adriatic. Italy has limited its education opportunities to one person at the Italian Naval Academy and to an exchange of observers during national exercises. It is currently the lead nation for implementing the Partnership for Peace with Croatia and expects to increase its activities in 2000.

Other NATO Allies, such as Hungary, Norway, Poland and Spain, have also provided exposure to Western military practice to the Croatian military through direct training and other activities. More importantly, all the NATO countries informally coordinated these activities during the critical 1995-2000 period through regularly scheduled meetings of the NATO attaché corps in Zagreb.

Interestingly, between 1995 and 2000, Croatia itself dedicated significant resources to professionalising and modernising its military. For example, Croatia has a policy of funding the travel and living allowances of all students sent abroad. In the case of the United States, this has the effect of tripling the money available for training in the United States. According to the Croatian defence ministry, Croatia will spend more than \$2 million in 2000 of its own money supporting training activities abroad, more than 90 per cent of which will be spent in NATO countries.

Since one of the aims of the various foreign training programmes was to emphasise the apolitical role of the armed forces in a democratic country, Croatia's expenditure on these programmes effectively undermined the HDZ's desire to maintain absolute control over the military. But in late 1995, when the first, modest US programme began, Croatia had a political need to confirm its relationship with the West and a military need to train the largest number of officers possible. According to the Croatian defence ministry, the military budget at that time was nearly \$1.4 billion and the investment of

approximately \$130,000 was likely viewed as politically prudent.

By the late 1990s, however, the policy of paying for training abroad was clearly working against the HDZ. The Tudjman regime was at odds with the international community on virtually every point, except military-to-military cooperation. Reducing the level of support at that time would have sent an extremely negative political signal. At the same time, the rapid growth of the programmes, coupled with a strict adherence to entrance standards, effectively de-politicised the process of selection of candidates for training.

As a critical mass of trained officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, began to return from training abroad, NATO officers began to find common ground with an increasing number of their Croatian counterparts. By the end of 1999, every major command, every sector of the general staff, every directorate in the defence ministry had someone who had attended training abroad.

Beginning in 1997, the United States was already able to evaluate the impact of its programmes. Areas were clearly identified where the United States believed it had provided adequate resources for Croatia to move in the direction that it had said it wanted to go. More importantly, Croatia was then held accountable for using those resources efficiently. Not only were officers trained abroad expected to be used in positions commensurate with their new skills, but also systems in transition were expected to move towards Western norms – a goal the Croatian defence ministry stated publicly and consistently, but which had been often ignored in practice.

An example of where detailed accountability made a clear difference occurred in late 1998. At that time, the United States was able to tell the defence ministry that it had trained more than 100 Croatians in modern defence resource management techniques. It was clear to both Croatian and US officers that this was more than enough for the defence ministry to produce a more efficient and transparent budget – a goal that it had publicly espoused, but which had met with considerable resistance from within. Faced with this accounting – as well as significant diplomatic pressure –, the hardliners were forced to acquiesce. Soon after the defence ministry issued its most transparent and detailed budget to date.

With bilateral assistance from NATO Allies and others, the Croatian military was well on its way to changing its mindset into that of a modern, civilian controlled, democratically oriented military by the time of the elections in early 2000. By seeking no role and having no impact on the Croatian elections, the Croatian military has passed its most important test to date. ■



# A European vision for the Balkans

*Chris Patten examines the challenges facing the European Union in southeastern Europe and analyses current policies to meet them.*



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Building Europe: The European Union has spent more than €4.5 billion in the Balkans since 1991.

In the 20th century, southeastern Europe influenced European affairs in a manner disproportionate to its size or economic might. The last century began and ended with major European powers militarily engaged in the region. These repeated military commitments are testimony to the region's enduring significance. Our determination to avoid further conflict in the 21st century is one reason why the major European institutions, including the European Union, are now investing significant political and economic capital in building stability in this strategic region.

The challenges are clearly enormous: shattered infrastructure, a ruined industrial base, thousands of refugees and displaced persons and a legacy of ethnic suspicion. Nevertheless, our experience in Europe after 1945 shows that change is possible. Reconstruction of a new Europe was made possible after the Second World War by the will to put conflicts behind us, the desire to achieve better lives for our children, the determination to rebuild and the willingness of friends to help. With others, the European Union is providing help to the countries of southeastern Europe. The area

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*Chris Patten is European commissioner for external relations.*

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will test the mechanisms at our disposal, both our traditional assistance and trade policies and the new structures of the Common European Security and Defence Policy that we are currently putting in place. Using them, we are determined to “win the peace”. Assuming the countries of the region accept help and make wise choices, there is no reason why they too cannot become stable democracies with successful market economies – an outcome which will benefit both them and us.

The Stability Pact, originally an EU initiative launched in June of last year, is a major step along the path of recovery. The Pact's three “tables” – which cover democracy and human rights, economic reconstruction, and security – aim to promote reform, reconstruction and regional cooperation. To maintain momentum, the European Union and its partners have stressed the need to demonstrate results quickly on the ground. For this reason, the most recent funding conference in March 2000 discussed a comprehensive quick-start package of regional projects and initiatives that will begin during the next twelve months. At the conference donors pledged over €2.4 billion, thereby more than financing the proposed package. The conference stressed, however, that stabilisation efforts are a two-way street. The aim is to help the countries of southeastern Europe to help themselves. In order to

replicate Western Europe's renaissance after the Second World War, they must improve governance, create the conditions for genuine private enterprise, fight corruption, strengthen social cohesion and cooperate with each other to mutual advantage.

Many countries of the region have already recognised that their best future lies not in xenophobia and isolation but in participating in the process of European integration. In response, as a special contribution to the Stability Pact, the European Union has opened the prospect of full integration into EU structures. The European Union is now offering Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>1</sup> tailor-made Stabilisation and Association Agreements. This new form of contractual relationship holds out the carrot of integration into EU structures, trade liberalisation, financial assistance, help with democratisation and civil society, humanitarian aid for refugees, cooperation in justice and home affairs, and the development of a political dialogue in return for political and economic reform and regional cooperation. In effect, the European Union is offering to share its political and economic future with the countries of the western Balkans.

The Stabilisation and Association Agreements emphasise and require regional cooperation, this being a core element of any lasting solution to south-eastern Europe's problems. Developing trade and infrastructure links, managing mutual borders and promoting cross-cultural interaction require cooperation across both internal and external dividing lines. Also, such activity is a useful preparation for future integration into European structures, which are themselves based on inter-regional and international cooperation. Progress on reform has allowed the opening of negotiations on Stability and Association Agreements with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and more recently with Croatia, while for Albania a feasibility report has been submitted. A feasibility study on such an agreement with Bosnia has yet to begin.

At the same time, EU aid to the region continues. The European Union is by far the single biggest assistance donor to the western Balkans as a whole. Since 1991, through its various aid programmes the European Union has provided more than €4.5 billion. For the year 2000 over €520 million is available in the context of the aid programmes PHARE and OBNOVA alone. The European Union also leads on the ground.

In Kosovo some 36,000 troops and 800 civilian police from EU member states serve alongside the European Commission, which in turn works with other international partners. The European Union heads the European Reconstruction Agency, the department of the UN Mission to Kosovo responsible for economic reconstruction and it is the single largest donor to the rebuilding process. Further to the east, Romania and Bulgaria, now both candidates for EU membership, together receive approximately €900 million per year in pre-accession aid.

Unfortunately, Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic has chosen to stand aside from positive engagement with the European Union and the wider international community. While Serbia cannot prevent its neighbours forging stronger links with Western Europe, it lies at the heart of the region and retains the capacity to export conflict. Regional stability will be endangered until Yugoslavia takes its rightful place as part of a new, peaceful and democratic order in the Balkans. Milosevic and his government – not the Serbian people – are the biggest obstacle to such development.

Since the Milosevic regime is the stumbling block, the European Union has exercised pressure on the Serbian government through isolation and the maintenance of sanctions. At the same time, aware that isolation could itself become an obstacle to change in Serbia, the European Union has tried to target sanctions by focusing on individuals

close to the regime. Meanwhile, the European Union is attempting to help the Serbian population through imaginative forms of humanitarian aid such as "Energy for Democracy", a programme to supply oil to opposition-ruled municipalities, and support to independent media. Significantly, the flight ban has been lifted and contacts have been developed with reformist local administrations and the still largely unfocused political opposition. The example of growth and increasing prosperity in other parts of the former Yugoslavia will, in time, hopefully induce a greater push for reform within Serbia itself.

The European Union continues to support democratic and economic reform in Montenegro, Serbia's junior partner in Yugoslavia, while discouraging moves towards independence. However, the European Union believes Belgrade's destabilisation efforts in Montenegro have not been sufficiently compensated by international assistance and that efforts in the areas of budgetary, humanitarian and technical aid need to be

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**Southeastern Europe will test the mechanisms at our disposal, both our traditional assistance and trade policies and the new structures of the Common European Security and Defence Policy.**

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<sup>(1)</sup> Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

reinforced. Montenegro's lack of statehood should not be an obstacle to such aid.

In Kosovo, short-term measures designed to shore up peace remain important. Here our aim is to prevent new crises, particularly in the Presevo valley and in Mitrovica. In conformity with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, we must continue to ensure sufficient security for the roots of political compromise and economic regeneration to take hold. The participation of Kosovo's Serbs in the Joint Administration structures may suggest that current policy is beginning to bear fruit.

The prospect of European integration has been a powerful force for change in the western Balkans. In Bosnia and in Croatia change has been supported by the institution of so-called "Consultative Task Forces" in which the European Union and the corresponding national authorities discuss the priorities and practicalities of change, reform and integration. The Consultative Task Forces are forums for regular consultations, enabling us to drive the process forward together. The European Union hopes that similar institutions will eventually be introduced in other south-eastern European countries.

Undoubtedly, more can and should be done. Aid is useful; trade is decisive. Already the European Union has a liberal trade regime towards southeastern Europe, allowing more than 80 per cent of regional exports to enter the European Union duty free. However, the European Union proposes to go further. Free trade agreements are foreseen as part of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements, and we are already pushing the countries of the region to negotiate free trade agreements with each other to optimise their comparative advantages. Immediate free trade with the European Union would, however, be a shock to regional economies, depriving them, for example, of the customs revenue that for many governments is a key source of income. The European Union therefore intends to bring forward further proposals soon on measures aiming at further opening of the EU market prior to the negotiation of Stability and Association Agreements.

All analyses identify the centrality and subversive potential of crime and corruption in the region. The European Union could use its experience with the 1998 "Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime between the Member States of the European Union and the Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus" to good effect, ensuring that it is closely coordinated with the Stability Pact's third, security table.

The European Union's provision of development, technical and humanitarian assistance and our insistence on tying this assistance to progress in building democracy, respecting human rights and good governance mean that our policies vis-à-vis the Balkans have

a large in-built conflict-prevention component. Our aim is eventually to create in southeastern Europe a situation in which military conflict becomes unthinkable. As the situation in Kosovo demonstrates, we are, however, still some way from that goal. For this reason, the European Union's decision to create by 2003 a rapid reaction force of up to 60,000 troops, capable of mobilising within 60 days and executing humanitarian, crisis management, peacekeeping and peace-making operations is important. Moreover, the decision to develop non-military crisis response tools in areas such as humanitarian aid, civilian police deployment and training, border controls, mine clearance and search and rescue has an all too evident relevance for some parts of the Balkans. To facilitate this, a Rapid Reaction Facility is foreseen, which should allow us to mobilise financial and other resources within hours or days rather than weeks or months.

Both Javier Solana, the European Union's first high representative for foreign policy, and I see the creation of stability in southeastern Europe as a priority. The evidence of this is our frequent visits to the region. We see this as a way to develop a comprehensive dialogue, to create momentum and to drive the agenda forward. In this we shall continue to work closely both with our partners in the international community and all those working for progress in the region itself. This engagement is costly in terms of time, manpower and money, but infinitely preferable to the military commitments and conflict that so often characterised the past one hundred years. The creation of a new region of stability and security is a goal worthy of a new century. ■

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# Commanding KFOR

*General Klaus Reinhardt reflects on KFOR's contribution to the Kosovo peace process and highlights difficulties that lie ahead.*



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Helping hand: KFOR soldiers are helping rebuild Kosovo's shattered society, as well as keeping the peace.

When NATO-led peacekeepers entered Kosovo in June 1999, tens of thousands of Albanians were feared dead and over a million people had been forcibly evicted or had fled in fear of their lives. The capital, Pristina, was a ghost town with no shops open and few cars on the streets. There were no controls at Kosovo's borders and boundaries, no civil structures, no functioning economy, no administrative services and no law and order.

Today, most Kosovars have returned to their homes. The streets of Pristina are filled with buses and cars, and crowded with people who feel safe to go out. Bars, restaurants and shops have reopened. There is a thriving market and street stalls abound. People are well clothed and nobody looks hungry. Newspaper

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*General Klaus Reinhardt was KFOR's second commander between October 1999 and April 2000.*

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stands carry uncensored local newspapers, as well as international publications. Radio stations are free to broadcast what people want to hear. Many Kosovars are enjoying freedoms denied them for years.

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been instrumental in much of the progress made in many areas of the province's daily life. Mandated by the United Nations with prime responsibility for preventing renewed hostilities, securing the province and ensuring public safety, KFOR was also tasked to support the lead civilian agencies in the areas of humanitarian relief and reconstruction, as well as the work to rebuild Kosovo's civil society.

A Military Technical Agreement (MTA) was negotiated in early June with the Yugoslav military authorities to ensure the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, and KFOR supervised its implementation. As of today, the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the police of the Yugoslav interior ministry (MUP) pose no immediate threat to

Kosovo. KFOR's troops, which have included contingents from 20 non-NATO countries, including Russia, are more than capable of preventing them from re-entering Kosovo by force. Frequent exercises help maintain the troops' readiness for a wide range of contingencies.

KFOR has successfully implemented "The Undertaking" to demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and to transform it into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian emergency organisation under the control of the UN interim administration. Its 5,000 members have sworn to abide by the instructions of legal authorities, to respect human rights and to perform all duties without any ethnic, religious or racial bias. It is intended to be a multi-ethnic organisation and Bosniacs, Roma and Turks have joined, but no Serbs as yet.

This is the first time a guerrilla army has been disbanded and its weapons decommissioned in this way. But KFOR remains vigilant to the risk of renewed hostilities, keeping a particularly watchful eye on the dangerous situation building up due to rebel Albanian insurgency by the "Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja" in southern Serbia.

KFOR's other key responsibility is to create a safe environment in which all the communities of Kosovo – the Serb, Bosniac, Roma and Turkish minorities, as well as the Albanians – can rebuild their lives. One priority has been to clear mines, which are a danger to men, women and children whatever their ethnic origins.

Explosive experts have cleared mines and other devices from 1,700 kilometres of roads, over 1,200 schools and 16,000 houses or public buildings.

But the main challenge has been keeping a lid on ethnic tensions and tackling crime. On any given day, two out of every three KFOR soldiers are out conducting between 500 and 750 patrols, guarding over 550 key sites and operating over 200 vehicle checkpoints. During the past year, the number of serious crimes, such as looting, kidnapping and arson, has decreased dramatically and the murder rate is down from some 50 revenge killings a week to an average of five – lower than in many Western capitals.

In Mitrovica, a flash point for ethnic tensions, KFOR has up to 11 companies working to ensure the security of the different communities. "Confidence areas" have been set up on both sides of the river Ibar to reduce tensions and encourage displaced families to return to their homes. The challenge in Mitrovica, as in

the whole of Kosovo, is to convince the population that there will be no partition and that it is possible for the two main communities to co-exist peacefully.

Civilian policing remains an area of concern, however. Common criminals and organised crime are flourishing in the partial power vacuum that will not be filled until municipal elections are held later this year. There is an urgent need both for more UN police and for more local Kosovo police, as well as the infrastructure to support them. Until the international community provides the resources needed, KFOR soldiers are having to step in to fill the gap, carrying out duties for which they are not trained.

KFOR has also played an important supporting role in helping the international community's humanitarian and reconstruction effort. From the start, a close working relationship was built up between KFOR – particularly its civil-military cooperation staff – and the UN team. A massive programme was immediately launched to provide food aid, shelter kits and temporary emergency accommodation centres in preparation for winter. Thanks to this effort, nobody died from hunger or cold in Kosovo despite the harshness of last

winter and the World Food Programme, which started out feeding 900,000 people, has been able to scale down its operations, as more people start meeting basic needs themselves.

As part of the reconstruction effort, KFOR soldiers have built or repaired 200 kilometres of roads, six bridges and several bypasses, helping relieve congestion and assist the flow

of humanitarian aid. Military engineers have restored the railway network, repairing 200 kilometres of track and rebuilding two bridges. Damage to Pristina airport has been repaired and the airport reopened to commercial flights.

In one sector alone, KFOR worked with the local population to build 1,600 houses; provided shelter for 17,000 people; supported the restoration of the basic necessities of life such as electric power, water, heating and communication systems; and helped provide essential medical care, including a daily average of more than 1,000 consultations, as well as emergency hospitalisations, immunisation programmes, ambulance and aerial medical evacuation services.

Close cooperation between KFOR and the UN administration has been key to regenerating many aspects of everyday life in Kosovo and setting up civil structures. An early, key step was the decision to fill the governmental and administrative vacuum left by the

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Until the international community provides the resources needed, KFOR soldiers are having to step in to fill the gap, carrying out duties for which they are not trained.

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Yugoslav withdrawal by establishing joint interim administrative structures open to all ethnic communities. The problem, as with so many initiatives in Kosovo, has been that the Serb leaders were initially reluctant to participate. But some hope is offered by the courageous decision taken by the Serb National Council in April to participate as observers in the Interim Administrative Council and the Kosovo Transitional Council.

The university in Pristina has reopened and most primary and secondary pupils are back at school. KFOR helped rebuild buildings and escorts teachers

flourish and small businesses are springing up everywhere. Cafés and restaurants, in particular, are doing a roaring trade under the patronage of international personnel. Still, unemployment remains a major challenge. Official figures put male unemployment at between 80 and 90 per cent. Resources could be better targeted at providing modest start-up investment loans to small businesses, rather than ploughing huge sums into a few, large projects which tend to benefit international contractors. Priority should also be given to helping Kosovo's many small farmers get back to working the province's rich soil. Many farms were



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Health check: KFOR is providing essential medical care, including more than 1,000 consultations a day.

and schoolchildren through areas where ethnic tensions remain high. Local media and telecommunications projects have been assisted through the airlift of material, the erection of antennae and the reconstruction of major transmission and relay sites. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is responsible for media democratisation, is being helped to establish a database of authorised transmitters and organise the management of frequencies.

After a slow and faltering start, the judicial system now has the judges and prosecutors required to operate the courts. They have proved able to administer justice when there is no strong ethnic element to the crime. But international judges and prosecutors are still needed to handle the more difficult cases, and a lot of work lies ahead in the area of law reform.

Kosovo's increased stability and security have allowed the local population's entrepreneurial flair to

destroyed during the conflict, forcing farm workers into the cities to look for jobs.

One large project of note is the initiative to resurrect the sprawling Trepca mining and metallurgy complex, which has suffered from years of neglect and under-investment. International support has been enlisted to revitalise it, which could generate many jobs and much-needed revenue for Kosovo. KFOR has been heavily involved in the assessment and strategic planning stages of the project and provides the day-to-day security for individual sites, many of which straddle the ethnic divide.

KFOR has also provided guards, helicopter transport and armoured vehicle escorts to help distribute over 80 million German marks (\$40 million), as part of an emergency financial assistance programme launched last December to kick-start the economy, which had no functioning banks. Now, the basics of a financial sector are slowly starting to emerge.



The international community has made much progress over the last year. But much remains to be done and several thorny issues lie ahead. My successors will be kept busy trying to provide the safe and secure environment that is vital for democracy and tolerance to take root in Kosovo, and for all its people to live peacefully and prosperously.

The question of Kosovo's final status needs to be clarified. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, it will be a province enjoying substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But what exactly is meant by this? The vast majority of the Albanian community view any return to Serb rule as unacceptable. Even Ibrahim Rugova, who is considered the most moderate Albanian leader, has made it clear that: "Independence is unavoidable and I hope to be elected as the first President of an independent Kosovo." They will need to be convinced that they can, nevertheless, co-exist peacefully with Serbs and all other minority groups in an autonomous province.

Another challenge will be to make sure that the municipal elections planned for this autumn are free and fair and to encourage all communities to take part – so far, the Serbs seem intent on boycotting them. The OSCE is organising the registration of voters and KFOR will help the UN police secure polling stations and ballot boxes. Unfortunately, voter intimidation appears to have started already, with people being "asked" to join a particular political party or risk losing their job.

Finally, there is the issue of how to organise "a phased, slow, humane return" of refugees under safe and secure conditions, as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, recommends. Many Western host countries are calling for speedy repatriation. But Albanians are likely to feel more safe returning than Serbs are. A large influx of returning refugees this year would also put further pressure on scarce resources in the province, while swelling the ranks of the unemployed and presenting KFOR with considerable security challenges.

The international community's resolve to push ahead with this agenda and to provide the resources needed will largely depend on the Kosovars themselves. As NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson has made clear: "You all have a responsibility to work for the future. NATO does not risk the lives of its soldiers to see their efforts washed down the Ibar river. The killing and ethnic cleansing must stop or donor money will stop.... We are not in the business of creating just another mono-ethnic country in southeastern Europe."

## ALL CHANGE

After six months as KFOR commander, General Klaus Reinhardt handed over to Lieutenant-General Juan Ortuño in April in a move which illustrates the strengthening of the European role in security matters. Lieutenant-General Ortuño, a Spaniard, is commander of the five-nation European military force, Eurocorps.

Originally a Franco-German initiative, Eurocorps is today made up of soldiers from Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, as well as France and Germany. Eurocorps headquarters will form the core of the KFOR headquarters until October, augmented by personnel from other KFOR-contributing nations.

Relations between Eurocorps and NATO are based on a 1993 agreement between the French and German chiefs of defence and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). This specifies that the Eurocorps will adapt itself to NATO structures and procedures, which will allow a rapid integration into NATO in the case of engagement.

Under the system of six-monthly command rotations, KFOR first deployed under the command of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). This was headed by British Lieutenant-General, Sir Mike Jackson, who handed over in October 1999 to General Reinhardt of the Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT).

Lieutenant-General Carlo Cabigiosu, an Italian from Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), has been designated to take command of KFOR in October 2000. KFOR commanders all come under SACEUR, who, since May, has been US General, Joseph Ralston.



Hand-over: General Klaus Reinhardt (left) shakes hands with Lieutenant-General Juan Ortuño (right), in the presence of then SACEUR, General Wesley Clark.

## Balkan breakthrough?

*Christopher Bennett assesses the prospects for democratic change and self-sustaining peace and stability in the former Yugoslavia.*

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There has been little cause for optimism in the course of the past decade in the Balkans, but signs of positive change are finally becoming apparent. Refugee returns in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) have been accelerating this year. Croatia, long shunned by the international community, has been transforming itself since the death of the former president, Franjo Tudjman, last December. The international community is, via the Stability Pact, pursuing a regional approach to tackle the problems of southeastern Europe as a whole. Nevertheless, the scale of the task ahead remains daunting and many years of international engagement are in prospect.

Groundbreaking electoral victories for centre-left reformers in Croatia at the beginning of the year have, understandably, fuelled optimistic speculation about a chain reaction of democratic change extending elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, into Bosnia and even into Serbia. Despite some gains for moderates in Bosnia's spring municipal elections, however, nationalist parties continue to dominate that country's politics. Despite predictions that he was about to fall from power in the wake of his fourth military defeat in Kosovo last year, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has been stubbornly rebuilding and reinforcing his authority in Serbia. Even in Croatia itself, the challenges facing the new government are enormous as it struggles to overcome the Tudjman legacy.

The new authorities in Zagreb charted a radically different course from that of their predecessors literally from the moment they came into office. Just minutes after the former ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* or HDZ), held its final government session in February, the tourism minister was handcuffed and taken to prison, indicted for transferring government funds to his wife's construction firm's bank account. Since then, with the Croatian press revealing details of scandals and implicating key figures in the ancien régime on virtually a daily basis, another 20 or so individuals have to date been arrested for a range of economic misdemeanours.

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*The views expressed are purely personal and do not represent the views of NATO or of any of its member nations.*

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If the task facing the new Croatian government was limited to holding members of the former ruling party accountable for abuses of power committed during the past decade, it would already be difficult. But it goes much deeper. The covert operations, corruption and nepotism which characterised Tudjman's Croatia are the legacy of almost half a century of communist rule, the best part of a decade of war or media-generated war hysteria, and several years of largely self-imposed international isolation.

The new Croatian government is having to make the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and to switch from a largely state- or party-controlled economy to the free market, at a time of high unemployment and declining living standards. The task is further complicated by war-related economic turmoil and the need to balance the interests of the country's Croat majority and Serb minority, a principle that Zagreb has committed itself to in both word and deed. Structural reform is the order of the day. Gradually, the new Croatian government will have to restructure the country's key institutions, including the military, media and secret services, as well as the way the economy is run, taking on deep vested interests every step of the way.



*Adieu à l'ancien régime: President Tudjman's death has generated hope for democratic*



Although the years ahead are likely to be tough in Croatia, the signs are, nevertheless, good. Tudjman's death removed the principal obstacle to reform. Civil society – that is, a vibrant, independent press and dynamic non-governmental sector – emerged as a powerful force during the 1990s despite official contempt, and the transition to date has been remarkably smooth. Policy reversals concerning Bosnia, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague and a thoughtful, diplomatic offensive have generated international good will, providing prospects of much-needed economic and expert assistance to ease the transition. Critically, Croatia's destiny is very much in Croatian hands, a situation which is not necessarily the case in the former Yugoslav republics immediately to the south.

As in Croatia, Bosnia has to come to terms with the transition from authoritarian to democratic government, and the move from the command economy to the free market. But in Bosnia, this already daunting undertaking is complicated by the legacy of almost four years of continuous war, the existence of rival armed forces and a delicate, three-way ethnic balance. Almost five years since its war came to an end, Bosnia remains on an international life-support machine, dependent on foreign aid and internally divided. The task of rebuilding a functioning society has proved so complex that Bosnians have handed much responsibility to the international community.

Sustained conflict turns society on its head and allows misfits to prosper. In Bosnia, many individuals, who are unlikely to have got far in peacetime, seized

the opportunities offered by war and rose to positions of power for which they were singularly ill-qualified. Individuals, who could have helped rebuild their shattered society, either emigrated or found themselves marginalised. Many able and well-educated Bosnians who remained in their own country are today working as interpreters and drivers for the international community. Meanwhile, by manipulating the "nomenklatura" system inherited from the communist era (the system by which the Party controls appointments), whipping up nationalist fears and hatred at critical moments to maintain a high state of tension and in the absence of any mechanism for bringing them to book, hard-line nationalist politicians were able to slow down the peace process during the first 18 months or so.

Reconstruction began in earnest in Bosnia when, a year and a half into the peace process, the international community stepped up its efforts to stand up to the domestic authorities, arrest indicted war criminals, dismiss local officials and take over and then restructure the local media. However, building the conditions for a self-sustaining peace process that locals can identify with is proving extremely slow and painstaking.

Whereas Croatian reformers know exactly what they are up against in attempting to restructure their own society, international envoys in Bosnia have, during the past five years, been on the steepest of learning curves to adapt to local circumstances to bring in the kind of reforms, which might put the country back on an even keel. As international expertise has grown, the scale of the undertaking has begun to become apparent. It is far greater than anybody could have realised in 1995 at the time of the Dayton peace talks, ending the Bosnian war. Almost every issue the international community has to tackle – from banking reform to providing security for returning ethnic minorities and building democratic structures in a multi-ethnic state – is uncharted territory where improvisation, experimentation and empirical analysis offer the best way forward.

A recent evaluation of international efforts in Bosnia by the Berlin-based think tank the European Stability Initiative (ESI) highlights several areas in which, despite massive vested interests, the international community has been successful in introducing reforms and building functioning local institutions. These include the creation of a single Bosnian Central Bank, currency board and new Bosnian currency; media reform and the creation of a domestic regulator in the form of the Independent Media Commission; and tax and customs reform as a result of the work of the European Union's Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office to Bosnia and Herzegovina (CAFAO). But even policies that fail to achieve their goals can be turned into success, as long as the reasons for failure are learned and taken on board.



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change throughout the former Yugoslavia.



As the peace process has evolved, international officials have been obliged to take on an ever more intrusive role in Bosnian life. Illegal structures are being dismantled, including the sprawling secret services. Mechanisms to build transparency and accountability and to fight corruption are being introduced. At the May 2000 meeting of the Peace Implementation Council – the body of states and international organisations overseeing the Bosnian peace process – international officials decided to establish new institutions to build a level economic playing field, particularly in the telecommunications and energy sectors. These lucrative markets are currently divided into three ethnically based monopolies. By reforming them, international officials hope to starve the nationalist parties, which have systematically worked against the peace process, of the cash to fund their covert operations.

A key lesson of the peace process to date, illustrated in the ESI research, has been that money alone does not resolve problems. Some international aid, especially in the immediate aftermath of the war, has inadvertently added to the difficulty of reconstruction by reinforcing power structures fundamentally hostile to the peace process. Local elites have, for example, on occasions been able to turn reconstruction projects into their own lines of patronage. Rebuilding shattered infrastructure may generate spectacular and rapid physical results, but it does not address the underlying problems of Bosnian society. Indeed, roads and bridges that were rebuilt with international money in 1996 have since fallen into disrepair because the society remains too dysfunctional to maintain them.

In the wake of what Kosovo's senior UN administrator, Bernard Kouchner, described as "forty years of communism, ten years of apartheid, and a year of ethnic cleansing", the issues in Kosovo are as new and as complex as those in Bosnia. The peace process is barely a year old, so, despite being able to draw on some lessons of the Bosnian experience, international officials there are still at the beginning of the learning curve. The question of Kosovo's final status and the nature of its future relationship with Serbia and other Albanian communities in the Balkans is inevitably the subject of much speculation. In the meantime, officials on the ground are exploring which policies generate results, which do not, and how best to build functioning local institutions to balance the interests of majority and minority populations. As in Bosnia, there are no easy solutions and the process is inevitably proving slow and painstaking.

The cloud hanging over both the Bosnian and Kosovo peace processes and the entire Balkans is, of course, Milosevic's Serbia. Indeed, as long as the largest successor state of the former Yugoslavia remains an international pariah, it is difficult to see how self-sustaining settlements can be reached any-

where or how regional initiatives such as the Stability Pact can yield comprehensive solutions. Worse still, Milosevic, now an indicted war criminal, shows no desire to leave office.

Some analysts have portrayed Milosevic as a genius, forever able to outmanoeuvre the international community. He is actually a career *apparatchik* who, like other unscrupulous dictators, has managed to hide behind and abuse the legal concepts of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of independent states to justify all manner of repression within Yugoslavia's borders. In the past, he has also relied on divisions within the international community to avoid paying the price for his actions. The result has been the appearance of short-term successes and the prospect of long-term disaster.

Since staging a bloodless coup in 1987 at the eighth plenum of the Serbian League of Communists, at which he ousted the post-Titoist government for being soft on Kosovo, he has never looked back. He placed the republic's media on a war footing and set out to extend his authority across the rest of the former Yugoslavia. As Serbia fought and lost successive wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, Serbian society progressively lost touch with reality. Eight years of economic sanctions, more than a decade of media distortion and successive purges have all taken their toll.

During 13 years in power, Milosevic has transformed a country with proud traditions and some democratic credentials into a surreal and warped caricature of a state. The problems of Serbian society, therefore, are likely to be deeper rooted. Indeed, some of the most respected Serbian analysts, such as Sonja Biserko of the Serbian Helsinki Committee, believe that Serbia today requires a deep and comprehensive restructuring, which goes far beyond anything seen to date in the other successor states to the former Yugoslavia.

Policy-makers attempting to devise strategies to help promote democratic change in Serbia are, however, to a large extent operating in a vacuum. As a result of international sanctions, the Kosovo war and Milosevic's indictment for war crimes, only a handful of Westerners remain in Serbia. Understanding of how Serbian society really functions is at an all-time low. One day, possibly soon, Milosevic must fall from power and, whether or not comprehensive restructuring is required, fundamental reforms will be critical to recreating a stable and functioning society. Large amounts of international aid have already been earmarked in Western capitals for the reconstruction of Serbia, but the task itself will inevitably take a very long time. ■

# Romanian reflections

*Radu Bogdan considers Romania's aspirations to join the European Union and NATO and the reform programme currently underway in his country.*

Romania's drive to join European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, which dates back to the 1989 revolution, has begun to bear fruit. Having been admitted to the Council of Europe in 1993, Romania will succeed Austria as Chairman-in-Office of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2001. But membership of the European Union and NATO, the key promoters and guarantors of development and prosperity in Europe, remain the ultimate goals. Moreover, preparing for possible membership is considered a useful way to modernise Romania itself.

An Association Agreement with the European Union was signed in February 1993 and a membership application submitted in 1995. Last December at their summit in Helsinki, EU leaders invited Romania – together with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia – to start accession negotiations in 2000. But the economic challenges facing the country necessitate painful reforms and make it unlikely that the country will be in a position to catch up sufficiently to be admitted in the near future.

Historical poverty combined with communist mismanagement before 1989 and more recent industrial unrest and resistance to reform have left Romania in an economic mess. Gross domestic product has fallen sharply for several years with reductions in both industrial and agricultural output. While there are signs that things are beginning to pick up again, the economy shrank by 4.6 per cent last year and is only expected to

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Lining up for NATO: Romania was first to join the Partnership for Peace.

recover slightly in 2000. Inflation, though falling, is still more than 40 per cent and official unemployment has doubled since 1996 to 12 per cent. A number of large loss-making industries need privatising or restructuring. Urgent reforms are needed in the financial and banking sector, especially if foreign investment is to be attracted.

Yet, despite fears, Romania has managed to service its international debt and in June of this year the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the extension of the deadline on a \$535 million loan and the release of a tranche of \$116 million. Other multilateral funding depended on the release of this money. The economy should eventually be strengthened by the fiscal discipline imposed by the IMF and by the medium-term economic development strategy that Romania has adopted in the context of its EU accession negotiations. This should also help generate the resources that will be needed to implement the defence reform objectives Romania has set itself as part of its preparations for possible NATO membership.

Romania was the first country to join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme in January 1994. It has always been one of the most active participants in Partnership for Peace exercises and activities, as well as in the political consultation and cooperative initiatives of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Participation in both is seen as a means to pave the way for NATO membership, as well as to address regional security challenges by extending NATO patterns of cooperation.

Generally, there is broad parliamentary and public support for the country's NATO membership aspirations. But the full implications of the reforms needed to

prepare for possible membership may not yet have sunk in and could eventually meet some resistance. The bipartisan consensus in favour of NATO and its actions suffered from the economic consequences of the Kosovo crisis and, in particular, the blocking of the river Danube. Moreover, some sections of the population opposed the Allied air campaign.

In spite of the political risk, the Romanian government remained firm in its support for the Allies. As Foreign Minister Petre Roman points out: "Romania proved its solidarity with NATO by taking risks together with the Allies. It granted NATO unrestricted access to its air space, established new communication channels with the Alliance and allowed NATO troops to transit and NATO air space management equipment to be installed on its territory."

One lesson from the Kosovo crisis is that European security is indivisible and that the new challenges to stability can only be removed or at least contained through common endeavour. The crisis and its aftermath, including the deployment of the NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR, have also shown the value of regional security cooperation under the umbrella of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, and the need to develop its potential. The successful resolution of the crisis would have been more difficult, if not impossible, without the contribution of the countries in the region.

Kosovo-type conflicts would be less likely to arise in a region where Euro-Atlantic patterns of predictable domestic and international behaviour were more firmly entrenched. The question of further NATO enlargement should therefore be addressed as a part of a broader policy to promote stability and democracy in central and southeastern Europe, and beyond. Already, the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration has helped promote greater democracy and speed up economic reforms in countries aspiring to membership, including Romania. It has also fostered internal and international patterns of cooperation and dialogue in a region too often burdened by long-standing grievances.


Thanks to NATO's Membership Action Plan, launched at the Washington summit in April 1999, Romania and other countries hoping to join the Alliance now have a road map to help guide them through the preparations for the rights and responsibilities that NATO membership would bring.

The nine participating countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>(1)</sup> – have each submitted an annual national programme on their preparations for possible membership covering political and economic, defence/military, resource, security and legal issues. Each country sets its own objectives, targets and work schedules.

NATO follows the progress made, providing political and technical advice.

While participation is not a guarantee of eventual membership, the action plan gives substance to NATO's open door policy and commits the Allies to help aspiring members along the road to that door.

Romania has taken up the challenge with determination. The annual programme of membership preparations is helping to streamline efforts and to set priorities in the allocation of scarce resources. The country's programme of activities under the Partnership for Peace has also been adapted to feed into this process.



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Risk-sharing: Petre Roman believes Romania has proved NATO solidarity by taking risks with the Allies.

A national security strategy reflecting the main provisions of the NATO Washington summit documents has been presented to parliament. The implementation of the multi-annual core plan for defence reform was approved by parliament in 1999. This two-stage plan calls for restructuring of the armed forces by 2003 and for modernising equipment by 2007. The number of troops is to be reduced from 168,000 to 112,000 by 2003 and the proportion of career soldiers is to rise to 71 per cent from the current 55 per cent. Forces are to be not only significantly smaller, but also more professional and mobile with a high degree of interoperability with NATO forces. High priority is being given to developing rapid reaction forces and capabilities, in particular strategic sea and airlift, and to intensifying cooperation with NATO in air defence.

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.



A critical point has been reached, however, where important but difficult political decisions need to be made concerning the new structure of the defence ministry and the plans to downsize the armed forces. Due care will need to be taken to help mitigate the effects of this restructuring, especially through retraining redundant officers. Consideration is also being given to improving the national crisis management system and to reforming resource management and financial planning in the defence sector.

The first meeting with the North Atlantic Council to assess Romania's progress took place on 6 April. Foreign Minister Roman appreciated the feedback provided by the Allies, which pointed to the need to identify key priorities for greater correlation between available resources and targets, and for better overall coordination between different ministries. Romania may also need to be ready to revise defence spending forecasts downwards, depending on how the economy performs over the coming years. More important, given the difficult and often unpopular choices that lie ahead, is the urgent need for these essential reforms to be perceived as such by all those responsible at the national level.

On the political front, Romania has come a long way since 1989. Significant progress has been made in the practical implementation of democratic principles and in improving the rule of law, respect for human rights and the treatment of ethnic minorities, mainly of Hungarian or Roma origin. Indeed, ethnic Hungarians entered the Romanian government in 1996. But more remains to be done, including stepping up the fight against organised crime and corruption.

The country has worked hard to establish good relations with its neighbours. Strategic partnerships have been formed with Hungary and Poland. Trilateral arrangements – with Bulgaria and Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece, Ukraine and Moldova – have been set up to deal with new challenges and non-conventional threats to security, such as organised crime, international terrorism, illegal immigration and trafficking in arms and drugs.

Active in a host of regional projects and cooperation schemes, as well as the EU-initiated Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and NATO's South East Europe Initiative, Romania's commitment to peace and stability in the region is further demonstrated by its contribution to the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. An engineering battalion of 200 men and

a Multinational Specialised Unit platoon have been deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of SFOR, and an infantry battalion forms part of the strategic reserve. In November 1999, parliament voted to send 20 policemen and 20 military officers to Kosovo, as well as medical personnel, though the military personnel have yet to be deployed.

NATO has committed itself to reviewing the enlargement process in 2002. In the meantime, there will of course be much debate. Could the Alliance remain functional if it were much further enlarged? How many new members should be invited to join, in what order and how fast?

Then there is the age-old question of how to balance the wish to integrate those countries willing and able to join NATO with that of building a constructive relationship with Russia. Welcoming the recent resumption of the Russia-NATO dialogue in the Permanent Joint Council, Foreign Minister Roman expressed his confidence that: "This framework will facilitate Russia's understanding of the fact that the enlargement of NATO is directed towards strengthening security and cooperation in Europe and not against a particular country." He also stressed Romania's determination to do whatever it can to help bring this message home to Russia.

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One lesson from the Kosovo crisis is that European security is indivisible and that the new challenges to stability can only be removed or at least contained through common endeavour.

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Legitimate concerns about the enlargement process will need to be addressed. Recent events, however, demonstrate quite convincingly that, at the beginning of the 21st century, the Alliance needs to do more than simply maintain a stable, secure environment on its own territory. In order to be able to do this, it also needs to project stability outwards into the wider Euro-Atlantic area. Further

extending the security umbrella by inviting new members to join NATO – provided they meet accession requirements – would be an appropriate way to address this need, in keeping with NATO's role as the flagship of a community of nations founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

It is precisely this message that the foreign ministers of the nine applicant countries wished to convey when they met and adopted the Vilnius Declaration on 19 May. By inviting those countries to join – based of course on the individual merits of each – NATO will become, in the words of Foreign Minister Roman, "the long-term investor in European stability" and thus decisively contribute to "the creation of a free, prosperous and undivided Europe". ■

# Helping Albania manage munitions

*Richard Williams describes how a NATO-led team is helping Albania deal with unexploded munitions and explosives, which have killed scores of people.*



Time bombs: An area the size of 360 football pitches was contaminated with unexploded ordnance when a NATO-led team arrived in Albania.

In the wake of the anarchy which engulfed Albania in March 1997, looters seized several hundred thousand weapons and some 20,000 tonnes of ammunition and caused explosions in many storage depots across the country. Since 1998, many of the weapons have been recovered but the sudden appearance of so much unexploded ammunition exacerbated what was already a serious problem of out-of-date ordnance dating back to Albania's years of international isolation. In the absence of both the means and the technical expertise to deal with this crisis, Albania turned to NATO and its Partnership for Peace programme for help.

While the scale and nature of the problem confronting Albania in 1997 was extremely serious, munitions storage and disposal problems are common to many former Eastern-bloc countries. As a result, the eventual solution, which involved training Albanian

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officers and the establishment of an Albanian agency to dispose of explosive ordnance, could serve as a model for other nations with large stockpiles of ageing ammunition left over from the Cold War.

A NATO-led team with ammunition specialists from both NATO and Partner countries arrived in Albania in late 1997 to assess the scale of the problem. At the time, more than 180 hectares of land, an area the size of about 360 football pitches, was contaminated with unexploded ordnance throughout the country. Moreover, initial Albanian attempts to clear the worst so-called "hot spots" had led to more than 50 casualties. Following an initial survey, the team decided to focus on training Albanians in ammunition management and explosive ordnance disposal procedures consistent with those used by NATO member states.

Between October and December 1998, a team of trainers from both NATO and Partner nations ran intensive, hands-on courses for selected Albanian junior officers. The courses, which included the use of live



explosives, aimed to provide students with the technical skills and fundamental training capability to train others to help clear the contaminated areas and properly account for and secure stored ammunition. At the same time, as part of a wider restructuring of the Albanian Armed Forces, obsolete, age-deteriorated, damaged and excess ammunition was to be identified for a disposal programme, so that the ammunition stockpile could be reduced and consolidated from some 140 storage depots to 60.

After the first generation of Albanian officers completed their training in ammunition management and explosive ordnance disposal, an Albanian Explosive Ordnance Disposal Organisation was created, headed by the top graduate of the NATO-run programme. The newly qualified ammunition experts began clearing unexploded ordnance at the first site, at Palikesht, some 100 kilometres south of the capital, Tirana. As a result of the Kosovo conflict, however, the fledgling organisation was obliged to take on emergency work. It cleared unexploded ordnance from a site selected for a refugee camp at Shkodra, dealt with large numbers of unexploded bomblets from Serb-fired rockets in the north of the country, and surveyed and marked Serb-planted minefields along the border between Kosovo and Albania. The Albanian defence ministry also launched an extensive awareness-raising campaign among refugees and Albanians living in the north of the country as to the dangers of landmines and unexploded munitions.

With NATO assistance, an Albanian Mines Action Committee and Albanian Mines Action Executive have been formed to carry forward the preliminary surveying, marking and minefield recording efforts. Their principal objectives, however, are to ensure that Albania has institutions able to provide donors initial information about contaminated areas and help coordinate demining in the longer term.

Meanwhile, the Palikesht site was cleared of unexploded ordnance in October 1999 and to date some 260 tonnes of ammunition have been disposed of without casualty, freeing up 45 hectares of land for productive use. Work has also been completed at the nearby site of Mbreshtan, where the teams were faced with the added technical challenge of gaining access to unstable rocket-propelled grenade warheads under the rubble of collapsed storage buildings.

Albania recently ratified the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction, which came into force in February 1999. This obliges

the country to dispose of its entire stockpile of an estimated 1.6 million anti-personnel mines within four years. A pilot "reverse engineering" project is being drawn up with the help of the NATO team of experts, which would aim at dismantling landmines to separate and destroy the dangerous components and recover the rest as recyclable scrap. But given the quantities involved, Albania will need more international assistance and funds to complete the disposal of its stockpile.

Another problem that emerged during the initial survey was that of deteriorating propellants, which cause instability and create the potential for spontaneous explosions in Albanian ammunition storage facilities. Out of approximately 125,000 tonnes of ammunition, 90 per cent are more than 30 years old. Over 30,000 tonnes of damaged, obsolete, and excess ammunition, including 2,230 tonnes of anti-personnel mines have been identified for high priority disposal.

The imminent danger presented by such huge quantities of potentially unstable ammunition prompted NATO to propose a study to look into the feasibility of constructing a purpose-built ammunition demilitarisation facility in Albania. This project, which is still pending and would require international financial assistance, could potentially bring benefits for other nations in southeastern Europe facing similar problems.

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Given the quantities of landmines involved, Albania will need more international assistance and funds to complete the disposal of its stockpile.

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The Albanian Armed Forces urgently need to improve management of their ammunition stockpile to overcome serious problems with safety, security and accountability. In the wake of the 1997 anarchy, many of the Armed Forces' accounting documents were destroyed. The NATO team has therefore worked closely with Albanian ammunition-storage specialists to conduct a munitions census, which was completed in mid-2000. This information will allow plans to be finalised for the large-scale reduction of ammunition stocks and consolidation of their storage sites, some of which lie dangerously close to civilian-inhabited areas.

Many challenges lie ahead for Albania as it seeks to get to grips with these munitions management and disposal issues through its demilitarisation programme. The scale of the task means that it would take the Albanian Armed Forces more than 30 years to complete, in the total absence of foreign aid. As a result, international financial assistance will be needed. Thanks to the Partnership for Peace programme and the unique and positive collaboration that was built up between the NATO team and the Albanian specialists, Albania is moving towards self-sufficiency in munitions management. ■



# Shaping soldiers for the 21st century

*Chris Donnelly examines the difficulties all European militaries face to meet the challenge of the 21st century, focusing on the armies of central and eastern Europe, where the need for reform is most urgent.*



Troubled times: Today's soldiers must train for a wide range of stressful situations.

Most European countries face a similar security dilemma. The forces they have – and which they maintain at considerable cost – are not suitable to meet many of the threats that Europe faces today and is likely to face for the foreseeable future. This is a dilemma for both NATO members and Partner countries, which therefore have an interest in resolving it together.

Kosovo has brought the issue to a head. Although Europe has more than two million soldiers and fewer than two per cent of them are deployed in the Balkans, the peacekeeping operations have placed an enormous strain on national military systems. Despite high defence spending, Europe lacks certain basic military capabilities and cannot effectively deploy forces out of area without US support. Something is clearly wrong.

Media analysis of Europe's security deficiencies has focused almost exclusively on the need to buy high-tech equipment to match US capabilities, or on

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*The views expressed are purely personal and do not represent the views of NATO or of any of its member nations.*

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the need for European intelligence gathering, a corps headquarters, improved command, control and communications, and large transport aircraft. But the situation is more complex. To understand the military requirements of the 21st century, it is important to examine the nature of the threat in Europe, and ways in which that threat can be met.

Though the possibility of a regional war remains, as in the Balkans, mass invasion and total war have ceased to be a threat to East or West. Instead, most threats to national security in Europe today are non-military. They may evolve out of economic problems, ethnic hostility, or insecure and inefficient borders, which allow illegal migration and smuggling. Or they may be related to organised crime and corruption, both of which have an international dimension and undermine the healthy development of democracy and the market economy. Moreover, the proliferation of military or dual technology, including weapons of mass destruction – chemical and biological as well as nuclear – and their means of delivery, and the revolution in information technology present special challenges.

Whereas ten years ago, national security was chiefly measured in military might, today that is only one of several units of measurement and, for most countries, one of the least immediate. Most of the

above threats call not for a traditional military response but require investment in interior ministries, border and customs forces, and crisis management facilities. But as investment in internal security increases, the pressure on defence budgets becomes even greater. It can in some cases, therefore, be counter-productive to urge countries to spend more on soldiers, if what they really need is police, both for their own security and to contribute to international security operations.

Experience demonstrates that when soldiers are called on to meet a security challenge nowadays they have to be able to do more than merely fight. The peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have shown that, in addition to the ability to fight, soldiers require a range of skills to fulfil a wide spectrum of stressful and demanding roles, from diplomat through policeman and arbitrator to first-aid worker, hospital manager and city administrator.

Two more points can be added. The first is that today's soldiers are likely to have to operate outside their home countries. The second is that new challenges are likely to arise which are today unforeseen. Tomorrow's armies will therefore require a much broader range of competence than their predecessors. Soldiers will have to be more flexible, better trained and better educated, and forces will have to be capable of rapid, decisive, and sustained deployment abroad. This requires changes in security thinking and it implies changes in overall security investment.

Changes in thinking are already underway. The realisation of the need to deploy European forces beyond the borders that they are committed to defend, without excessive dependence on US support, has spurred the development of the European Security and Defence Identity. This programme, which seeks to improve European military capabilities, is not just an issue of new equipment, new command, control and communication structures or logistics mechanisms. It is also a question of the skills and abilities of the soldiers, sailors and airmen themselves.

Examination of the state of Europe's armed and security forces reveals a mismatch. At the end of the Cold War, most European countries had relatively large conscription-based armed forces designed to defend national territory. Neutral countries, such as Finland and Switzerland, had to maintain large force structures capable of independent operation to make their defence credible. NATO members, secure under the US nuclear umbrella, could afford to spend less and maintain smaller armies, and still have credible defence. Nevertheless, despite a growing tendency towards military and industrial integration and multinational military structures, each NATO member has largely maintained its own national chains of command, national procurement systems and balanced forces organised on national lines. This has meant that there has never been

the economy of scale possible in a large national system, such as the United States, or in a system with a fully integrated and standardised structure, such as that which the Soviet Union enforced upon the Warsaw Pact.

In the past decade, most European countries have reduced their budgets and force structures considerably. But many have yet to change fundamentally their structure. Instead of large conscript armies for national defence, they now have smaller conscript armies. Moreover, for a combination of political and financial reasons, these armies have reduced capabilities. Conscription periods have been shortened. Equipment has not been upgraded. Munitions' stocks have been allowed to fall. Training has been cut back. The armed forces of NATO's European members have become dependent on US "force-multiplier" technology.

Since the probability of conflict was deemed low, and deterrence depended on a visible political and military stance, it was more important for NATO's European members to maintain a show of military power, than to develop real combat performance. This resulted in procurement policies that emphasised force structure rather than capability. For example, it was more important to buy an aircraft than the systems that would make it effective. Rapid technological developments plus institutional pressures reinforced the logic of this process.

Three issues have, in particular, affected the countries of central and eastern Europe since 1990. Firstly, they have retained an excessively large administrative, command and military education structure, eating up a disproportionately large share of the defence budget. Secondly, these countries have lacked an effective, modern and transparent personnel system, retaining instead a version of what they had in Warsaw Pact times. This constitutes probably the single greatest institutional obstacle to reform as, without such a system, there is no mechanism for evaluating, rewarding, promoting or posting to key jobs those qualified to drive change and implement new plans.

Thirdly, these countries suffer from a lack of national governmental capacity for defence policy formulation, defence planning, and crisis management. This is because, as members of the Warsaw Pact or constituent elements of the Soviet Union, they were unable to develop national control over their armed forces. Such expertise takes many years to develop. Most countries in central and eastern Europe therefore need a fundamental change in their military cultures, if they are to build forces suitable for fulfilling the kind of tasks which, as Kosovo demonstrates, European security is likely to require in the next decade.

Many of the new military functions do not require classical soldiering skills, but could be better done by

police. In some circumstances, therefore, a gendarmerie might be more appropriate than an army. Certainly, in Kosovo today the shortage is of this kind of police. When more soldiers are needed, it is communications and engineering troops or psychological operations officers, rather than infantry or artillery. Soldiers will always be needed, but not all those needed in such operations will be soldiers. It is clearly best to avoid overloading soldiers with civilian functions. Yet it is also clear that these functions and structures have to be ready for almost simultaneous deployment with the military in peacekeeping operations.

Many analysts, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States, believe that a professional army is the solution to the security demands of the 21st century. This may be true for large, rich countries, particularly if they are separated from any possible enemy by water. But for small countries, and particularly for poorer countries, this poses serious problems of cost. This in turn means that countries capable of fielding large conscript armies might only be able to afford very small, well-equipped regular forces. Three factors contribute to the very high cost of regular forces, namely personnel, equipment and sustainability.

**Personnel:** Conscript soldiers are relatively cheap. They endure a low standard of living and need little by way of support, being unaccompanied by a wife or children. Moreover, they are always available for service, since they get little leave. Regular soldiers, by contrast, must be paid at competitive rates, provided with adequate housing and associated infrastructure for their families, lest they leave the army for better conditions elsewhere. Regular soldiers require reasonable leave periods and will be detached for training courses and the like during service, which will reduce availability.

The experience of the United States and the United Kingdom, which both have professional armies, shows a high turnover of regular soldiers. Moreover, most regular professional militaries employ individual rotation and replacement, that is, deploying soldiers on an individual basis. This is disruptive since personnel turnover is continuous and often exceeds 50 per cent per year. It also reduces small-unit cohesion and therefore compromises readiness. It is difficult to form units for an extended operation from personnel all of whom must have over nine months left before reassignment. By comparison many conscription-based militaries use unit rotation and replacement. This generates interchangeable cohesive teams, platoons and companies. And it increases small-unit cohesion, resulting in relatively high readiness, once units are formed and trained.

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Peacekeeping operations have shown that soldiers require a range of skills to fulfil a wide spectrum of stressful and demanding roles.

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Conscripts can therefore be good soldiers, if well trained and instructed. But while it is relatively easy to drill specific skills into conscripts, it is more difficult to train them to deal with a variety of situations, requiring a wide range of skills with the result that they are rarely versatile. Reservists, on the other hand, can bring support skills from civilian life. Their biggest shortcoming is maintaining combat skills. A further problem arises if force structures are reduced but remain conscript-based. Either the conscription term must be reduced or conscription must become selective. The former reduces effectiveness; the latter is socially divisive. The time is ripe to seek an alternative form of service, blending the advantages of both.

**Equipment:** For the past 30 years, as weapons and equipment have improved, their cost has risen much faster than inflation. Consequently, as forces modernise, if they retain the same size of force structure, the cost of equipment procurement as a percentage of the overall budget will double in real terms approximately every 18 years. If the percentage of GDP allocated to defence is constant, and if GDP does not grow annually in real terms by a considerable amount, then the costs of procurement will lead inevitably to a reduction in the size of the force structure. It is this, more than anything, which drives countries to conduct defence reviews. The politician who promises that “leaner will be meaner” and “smaller equals better” is in fact making virtue out of necessity.

**Sustainability:** To sustain modern armies on operations, experience shows that land forces require at least three times the manpower of the actual battalions making up the force structure deployed. Deploying 60,000 troops will, therefore, require a total operational force of some 200,000. In addition, an equal number is needed to staff the infrastructure to support the whole. Creating a modern regular army, therefore, requires at least five or six people for every one deployed in the field.

As forces need to become more flexible, versatile, and capable of being sustained abroad, their cost will increase and the size of force that can be afforded will decline. Indeed, the cost of maintaining such forces, which are likely to have to be used either for peacekeeping or regional wars, may prove greater than the cost of maintaining conscript forces during the Cold War.

It is possible to save money by careful defence spending. Countries often incur extra cost for political reasons, building their own aircraft instead of buying a cheaper foreign one, for example. However, the scope for such saving is limited. In the end, modern armies are expensive, and regular armies are much more



expensive than conscript ones. All this presents the smaller countries of Europe with a particularly acute problem. If cost forces their armies to be reduced, they will rapidly reach a point when they cannot maintain high-tech forces because of the disproportionate cost on a small scale. They will likewise not be able to maintain balanced armies capable of all the functions required of a national defence force. The smaller the national force, the greater the proportion of the budget taken by the defence ministry and headquarter infrastructure.

Unwittingly, the desire of some countries to join NATO is adding to this problem. The demands of providing competent forces to NATO-led operations such as Kosovo push a nation towards developing small competent forces. However, these forces are so expensive that, to afford them, the country may have to switch scarce resources away from a force structure geared for national defence. The preparations for joining NATO may therefore reduce a country's independent defence capability. In the absence of any guarantee of eventual membership, such a policy inevitably represents a gamble.

Some analysts argue that the armies of central and eastern Europe need a strong, reliable and competent cadre of non-commissioned officers (NCOs). In practice, however, this is not easy to create. Armies reflect the social structure of their societies. France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, have a strong tradition of middle management – the factory foreman, the independent farmer, the shop manager, the small businessman. In civilian life these people have the independence, initiative and education to accept responsibility, which is carried into military service. Since this section of society is weak in central and eastern Europe because of the communist heritage, the material for the Western-style NCO is not necessarily available.

Over time, it should, nevertheless, be possible to develop this section of command. After all, both the British and German armies today base their NCO structure on training and education within the armed forces themselves. But this will have to be accompanied by a cultural evolution, so that the command structure is prepared to delegate authority down to the NCO level. A good example to study here would be the *Bundeswehr* "redefinition" of East German Army officers' posts as senior NCO posts.

The way in which governments assess the forces they need to meet the risks they face is problematic in central and eastern Europe since, in the communist system, such assessments were beyond their remit. Key decisions were usually taken in Moscow and relayed by the Party with the result that governmental expertise in this area was minimal. Moreover, even in the Soviet Union, civilians had so little knowledge of military

matters that in effect the military decided everything. There was no real civilian governmental control of defence policy, and no civilian governmental capability in defence planning.

The consequences can be seen today in Russia's new National Security Concept. This is a list of all possible threats prepared by each ministry or agency linked with security issues. It is a collegiate review of facts, but there is no prioritisation and no analysis of risk versus probability, with the result that it is of little use as a policy-planning document. Producing the kind of analysis necessary to make informed decisions requires an information system, which can draw on the widest possible range of sources, both open and secret. Western intelligence services do this well. But in many central and eastern European countries, the intelligence services still reflect the heritage of closed societies. Open information, a system to evaluate it, and politicians and civil servants educated to understand it, are essential today to enable intelligence to be used properly. It is not clear how long it will take many of the new democracies to develop this particular attribute of modern society.

The problems of defence reform for all European countries today are both great and urgent. For the countries of central and eastern Europe, with a Warsaw Pact or Soviet heritage, they are extreme, and the smaller the country, the more difficult they are to resolve. Indeed, so acute is the problem that the need to address more attention to it must be recognised at once.

Although there are no ready answers, the way forward will likely require increased transparency in defence planning and a joint approach. For most countries, difficult decisions will have to be made and issues which have to date been taboo, such as role specialisation for smaller countries – that is dividing military tasks between countries – will have to be considered. A partial solution might be regionalisation, with several countries pooling their militaries and each specialising in particular areas. The Benelux example could serve as a precedent. Whatever the strategies, the idea of security through alliance is the only sensible approach and all international institutions with a stake in these issues, NATO, the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have an interest in collaboration.


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A longer, electronic version of this article in English will be posted on the NATO web site.

# Harnessing technology for coalition warfare

*Joseph J. Eash III explains how the rapid integration of advanced technologies into war-fighting systems helped the Allies during the Kosovo campaign.*



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The Predator: During the Kosovo campaign, Predators carried out surveillance in areas too dangerous for manned aircraft.

Operation Allied Force in Kosovo last year demonstrated the value of coalition operations. It also showed that technology is key to their success. Many of the innovations that were first used during the campaign were some of the fruits of a US Department of Defense programme that seeks to integrate new technology rapidly into war-fighting. To date, Allied participation has helped in the process. Expanding this cooperation could enable the improved capabilities that NATO is seeking in future multinational operations.

The value of coalition operations was seen in Kosovo. NATO's solidarity was central in compelling the Belgrade regime to accept its demands. It signalled a political resolve and moral force that was greater than any unilateral action could have mustered. Moreover, Operation Allied Force could not have been conducted without the efforts of the entire Alliance and depended on such Allied contributions as forces, bases, infrastructure and transit access.

Operation Allied Force was also militarily significant. It was NATO's largest combat operation to date,

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demonstrating significant prowess and featuring the most precise air campaign conducted in history, with a minimum of collateral damage.

Technology played a critical role in this military performance. New systems and capabilities were fielded for the first time in this campaign and integrated into new processes. The result was a multinational force that operated with speed and precision, able to find and hit opposing forces rapidly, while minimising friendly casualties.

Some of the innovations introduced in Kosovo were the result of a US Department of Defense initiative called the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program. During the past five years, this programme has been harnessing technology to meet war-fighting needs. It brings together scientists and soldiers, who insert technology into an operational concept to see quickly what works and what does not. The programme is contributing to a revolution in military affairs and reducing time, risk and cost in acquisition.

Since its inception, the programme has initiated 68 projects, of which, more than a third have benefited from Allied involvement. Some have resulted in a technological innovation for a particular theatre comman-

der. Others have enabled a faster acquisition of systems than in the past. And, in other instances, they have revealed systems that do not work, helping avoid further expenditure.

These projects also focused on coalition warfare prior to Kosovo. One launched in 1998 is enabling the US Army's command and control systems to operate with those of Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. It is developing and refining methods of exchanging information, using NATO standard messages, directly between national databases. Another project is helping ground, air and naval coalition forces in Korea synchronise deep strikes.

The Kosovo campaign created a great demand for many of the technologies developed in this programme. Approximately 20 per cent of its products were deployed, or prepared for deployment in support of Operation Allied Force. How some of these products were used provides a glimpse of future joint operations and attests to the programme's effectiveness.

In Kosovo, speed was essential. To put an end to the campaign of terror that was being waged by the Yugoslav Army, Serbian police and paramilitaries, the Alliance had to find and attack the Belgrade regime's ability to wage military operations faster than its forces could act.

Several products of the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program were used to find enemy forces. One in particular was the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle. Remotely piloted by personnel hundreds of kilometres away, this aircraft carries video cameras and other sensing devices and can fly for as long as 40 hours. In Kosovo, Predators often flew over areas too dangerous for manned aircraft. They kept almost constant surveillance on enemy forces operating in open country and were also used to observe refugees and assess battle damage.

The Predator unmanned aerial vehicle – a project that involved several nations – was fielded after only 30 months of development. In this way, two years of testing were eliminated at a saving estimated to be greater than \$10 million, without any loss of credibility in the Predator's performance.

NATO's extensive surveillance during the Kosovo campaign increasingly drove Serbian forces into hiding, forcing them to rely extensively on camouflage and concealment. Though this made it more difficult

for Alliance planes to find them, it also prevented their offensive employment. Moreover, such tactics are likely to be used increasingly by other potential enemies as sensors continue to improve.

The United States deployed technologies from a project called the "Common Spectral Measurement and Signals Intelligence Exploitation Capability". This project has been working on technologies that can detect camouflage and threat vehicles, but its systems may also be used for such purposes as search and rescue, characterising terrain and detecting chemical and biological weapons. This capability is being achieved by a computer workstation that processes information from several spectral sensors.

Alliance forces used another product of the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program to find and identify opposing forces. Called "Precision Targeting Identification", this product was used to detect targets at greater ranges than previous detection and monitoring systems. Its infrared sensors find targets and a laser radar identifies them. The system was initiated to detect targets in congested areas such as in coastal regions and was previously used in counter-drug operations to detect boats smuggling cocaine.

Once targets were located, the information had to be rapidly passed to Alliance strike forces. One of the most useful means of doing this was a wide-band dissemination system developed by the Advance Concept Technology Demonstration Program. Throughout the Kosovo campaign, this system transmitted high-priority imagery of emerging targets. This communications system significantly shortened the time between finding the target and hitting it. Several countries also participated in its development.

Speed alone was not enough, since NATO had to minimise casualties among civilians. This meant using not only a considerable number of precision-guided munitions, but also accurately anticipating and assessing their effects. Alliance forces analysed each target, determined the desired damage and selected the weapon or weapons that would achieve it. This was done using an automated planning tool that assesses the effects of more than one type of munitions on a given target. This product was the result of a counter-proliferation project conducted by the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program. This weaponising and hazard production capability has been installed in NATO's ten regional centres.



Technological take-off: The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program cuts the time, risk and cost of new war-fighting technology.



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As Alliance strikes became more effective, Yugoslav military hardware was often hidden in caves, tunnels and hardened facilities. Attacking them under these conditions required penetrating munitions. In anticipation of those possibilities, the theatre requested the “Advanced Unitary Penetrator”, which was also developed by the programme’s counter-proliferation project. It has twice the penetration capability of previous hard-target munitions and is capable of counting layers and voids in structures, calculating distances travelled and detonating at a predetermined depth.

Operation Allied Force offered other insights into the future of warfare by indicating the technology initiatives that must be undertaken for future coalition operations. During the campaign, attacks on mobile targets were more problematic than attacks on fixed targets. Several NATO countries have fielded, and continue to field, ground and air-based surveillance systems. However, they must work together to find and attack mobile targets more effectively.

Since the Kosovo campaign, the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program has initiated a project called “Coalition Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance”, which benefits from the participation of countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. This project seeks to develop interoperability between Allied surveillance systems and will ultimately help coalition forces find mobile targets faster, and enhance their strike capabilities.

Alliance forces also encountered difficulty in attacking enemy air defence systems. These systems often turned off their radar, preventing NATO radar-seeking missiles from fixing on them. While Alliance forces suppressed enemy air defences, they could not destroy them and their continued existence caused justifiable concerns. An initial assessment from pilot reports and other sources counted almost 700 missile shots from a variety of enemy air defence systems.

To address this problem, the Advance Concept Technology Demonstration Program has initiated a project called “Quick Bolt”. This project will integrate several other guidance technologies into radar-seeking missiles, which will enable these missiles to remain targeted on air defence systems, even after they have turned off their radar.

The Kosovo campaign made it apparent that increased emphasis must be given to concepts of operation. Although technology is important, it is not the only path to success. In many cases, these concepts are more difficult to develop than the technology. In the United States, this increased emphasis is reflected in Joint Vision 2020 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that builds on the concepts for future operations established in Joint Vision 2010 and incorporates multinational operations into their design.

The Kosovo campaign provides an important message, namely that we all need to embrace the revolution in military affairs. Forces built for the Cold War are quickly becoming obsolete. Moreover, we are likely to face threats more challenging than that in Kosovo. Potential adversaries can buy such modern technologies as satellite services for communications, navigation and surveillance, low-cost biological and chemical weapons, and cruise as well as ballistic missiles.

NATO is now pursuing the Defence Capabilities Initiative, a programme seeking improved capabilities in mobility, sustainability, effective engagement, command, control and communications, and survivability. As US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen has pointed out, many improvements in these capabilities can be achieved through international cooperation in defence research and development and procurement.

The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program offers such an opportunity. Increased Allied participation in this programme could significantly contribute to future coalition operations and the Defence Capabilities Initiative. It would enable the United States to share the cost of

technology initiatives and help Allies to see quickly what works in coalition operations, allowing them to incorporate their requirements early in the process, rather than making more costly changes later. Ultimately, it can contribute to common capabilities and that means interoperability.

Operation Allied Force was a success because the Alliance was politically united. It was also instructive, teaching us a lot about coalition warfare and its future needs. Perhaps the most important lesson is that the Alliance must pursue improved military capabilities for coalition warfare and the best way to do that is by working together. Collectively, we can achieve the unified military action that will be critical to the success of future coalition operations. ■

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Many of the innovations first used during the Kosovo campaign were some of the fruits of a US Department of Defense programme that seeks to integrate new technology rapidly into war-fighting.

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
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