

Presentation to the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee

U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Debt Management May 3, 2011



Agenda

- Fiscal Developments
 - Tax Update
 - MBS Portfolio
 - Non-Marketable Treasury Security Update
 - Deficit Forecasts
 - Debt Limit
- Auction Demand & Market Trends
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 - Nominal Coupons and Bills
 - Treasury Supplementary Financing Program
 - TIPS
 - Average Maturity
 - Percentage of Debt Maturing in Upcoming Years
- Long-term Challenges
 - Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Forecasts
 - Deficit Reduction Plans



FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS





Growth in Individual Tax Receipts Continued in Q2 FY 2011

Quarterly Tax Receipts Year-over-Year Percentage Change



Note: Adjusted for 9/11/01 Corporate Tax Receipts disruption Source: Monthly Treasury Statement

Withheld Taxes

Note: Data plotted is year-over-year changes in guarterly receipts





5-Year Average Receipt Composition FY2006-2010

Receipt Category	Avg. % of Annual Receipts
Withheld	69%
Corporate	14%
Nonwithheld	17%

A Closer Look at April 2011

Receipt Category	Composition	Y/Y % Change	Y/Y Change \$Billions
Withheld	42%	1%	\$2
Corporate	9%	-6%	-\$2
Nonwithheld	49%	29%	\$37



Treasury Sales of MBS Will Reduce Borrowing Needs



FNMA Current Coupon 30yr TSY OAS





Treasury's Current MBS Holdings

Treasury Holdings of FNMA & FRE 30-Year As a % of Outstanding Float (ex-CMO)



Note: Data through 4/29/2011 MBS Outstanding Float Source: JP Morgan



Non-Marketable Redemptions Continued in Q2 FY 2011

Net Non-marketable Issuance In Billions \$



Source: Monthly Treasury Statement



Primary Dealer and Government Deficit Estimates

FY 2011-2013 Deficit and Borrowing Estimates		
Primary Dealers*	СВО	OMB
1,431	1,480	1,645
1,149	1,100	1,101
920	704	768
1,300-1,682		
1,025-1,300		
700-1,100		
1,124-1,550		
1,000-1,350		
Apr 2011	Jan 2011	Feb 2011
	stimates Primary Dealers* 1,431 1,149 920 1,300-1,682 1,025-1,300 700-1,100 1,124-1,550 1,000-1,350 Apr 2011	stimates Primary Dealers* CBO 1,431 1,480 1,149 1,100 920 704 1,300-1,682 700-1,300 1,025-1,300 700-1,100 1,124-1,550 1,000-1,350 Apr 2011 Jan 2011

*Based on Primary Dealer feedback on April 29, 2011. Deficit estimates are averages.





Total Public Debt Outstanding Subject to the Statutory Debt Limit



Note: Data through 4/28/2011



Extraordinary Actions Used in the Past Do Not Provide as Much Flexibility

Fiscal Year 1996

# of Days of Debt Limit Impasse	136
Tools	G-Fund, CSRDF, ESF, FFB, SLGS

Fiscal Year 2002

# of Days of Debt Limit Impasse	85
Tools	G-Fund, CSRDF, SLGS

Fiscal Year 2003

# of Days of Debt Limit Impasse	93
Tools	G-Fund, CSRDF, ESF, FFB, SLGS

Fiscal Year 2005

# of Days of Debt Limit Impasse	3
Tools	G-Fund, CSRDF, ESF, FFB, SLGS

Fiscal Year 2006

# of Days of Debt Limit Impasse	29
Tools	G-Fund, CSRDF, ESF, FFB, SLGS

Fiscal Year 2011

# of Days of Debt Limit Impasse	???
Tools	G-Fund, CSRDF, ESF, SLGS

There have been 6 occasions over the past 15 years where Treasury has been forced to use extraordinary actions to continue to fund government operations.

Some combination of the following actions have been used during these episodes:

• Suspension of issuance of new State and Local Government Securities (SLGS)

 Suspension of investments in:

 the Government Securities Investment Fund (G-Fund)
 the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF)
 the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF)*

• Federal Financing Bank (FFB) swap transactions

These periods lasted between 29 and 136 days. In each of these cases, the extraordinary actions undertaken by Treasury were sufficient to continue funding the government.

However, given financing needs, these tools will not sustain borrowing beyond early August.

*Also includes the redemption of existing investments



AUCTION DEMAND & MARKET TRENDS



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Weighted Average Coverage Ratio on Nominal Notes and Bonds In Billions \$, Coverage Ratio



Source: Treasury Auction Data; Through 4/25/2011



Smaller Dealers Have Increased Nominal Coupon Auction Participation



FY2011 YTD: Average Investor Class Allotments Five-Year Average of Investor Class Allotments*

*FY2006 through FY2010

Source: Treasury Investor Class Data; Data through 4/15/2011



FY2011 YTD: Average Investor Class Allotments

Five-Year Average of Investor Class Allotments*



*FY2006 through FY2010

Source: Treasury Investor Class Data; Data through 4/15/2011



PORTFOLIO METRICS





Nominal Coupons and Bills as a Percentage of the Portfolio







\$800 \$700 \$600 Max: \$560B \$500 \$400 \$300 3/31/11: \$200B Min: \$5B \$5B 12/30/09 \$200 \$100 \$0 Aug-09 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10 Jun-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 May-09 Jun-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Apr-09 90-InC Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11

Treasury Supplementary Financing Program Cash Balance In Billions \$



TIPS Calendar Year Issuance in Billions \$, Percentage of Portfolio



Note: Data through 4/21/2011



Average Maturity of the Debt Continues to Lengthen

Average Maturity of Marketable Debt In Months



Note: Data through 3/31/2011



Percentage of Debt Maturing in the Near-Term Remains at Historic Lows



Percentage of Debt Maturing in Next 12 to 36 Months

Note: Data through 3/31/2011



LONG-TERM CHALLENGES





OMB FY 2012 Budget Projections

Budget Surplus/Deficit In Billions \$, Percentage of GDP





OMB Long-Term Debt Metrics



Fiscal Year Outstanding Debt





Note: Interest costs based on net interest on Treasury debt minus interest on trust funds and other income.



Deficit Reduction Plans



Deficit Reduction

Relative to Current Policy Baseline, \$ billion

	Administration Framework (2012-23)	Simpson- Bowles (2012-21)	Ryan Budget Resolution (2012-21)
Total Deficit Reduction	-4,000	-4,394	-4,685
Spending	-2,010	-2,694	-5,325
Security Discretionary	-400	-930	-100
Non-Security Discretionary	-770	-600	-1,740
Repeal ACA	0	0	-1,410
Medicare/ Medicaid	-480	-460	-1,100
Other Mandatory	-360	-224	-975
Social Security + Superlative CPI	0	-480	0
Tax Reform	-1,000	-1,000	1,420
Interest	-990	-700	-780





What adjustments to debt issuance, if any, should Treasury make in consideration of its financing needs in the short-, medium-, and long-term?



The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee May 3, 2011

The Charge

We would like the Committee to comment on the current state of public and private pension funds in the U.S. How do public and private pensions differ in their approach to asset-liability management? Please discuss how these approaches affect their investment decisions in fixed income markets. Is there anything Treasury should consider when thinking about the overall composition of the Treasury debt portfolio and/or other Treasury products?

Part I: Characteristics of Public and Private Pension Funds

Historical Growth of U.S. Retirement Assets by Category

- Retirement assets totaled approximately \$17.5 trillion as of the end of 2010
- State and local government plans are almost exclusively defined benefit (DB) plans
- In the private sector, defined contribution (DC) plans are larger than defined benefit plans



Historical Growth of Defined Benefit Plans

- Total assets of state and local government DB plans first exceeded corporate DB plan assets in 1997
- Since then, state and local government DB plans have grown 66% (4% annually), while corporate DB plans have grown by 25% (1.7% annually)
- In 2010, state and local DB plans comprised 57% of the total DB market (\$3 trillion of \$5.2 trillion)



Comparison of Private and Public DB Plans

- Private and public DB plans have different characteristics
- In general, public plans offer higher benefit payments but require larger contributions from both the employer and employee
- Importantly, freezing a public DB plan is generally more difficult (due to collective bargaining agreements, legal protections, etc.), thus reducing the degrees of freedom for public plan sponsors

Characteristic	Private Plans	State and Local Plans	
Benefit Formula	The most common plan structure sets retirement benefits based on the number of years of service, salary at/near retirement, and a constant accrual rate		
Median Accrual Rate ¹	1.5%	1.9%, if covered by Social Security 2.2%, if not covered by Social Security	
Cost of Living Adjustments	Very rare	Majority of plans have automatic COLAs	
Median Employee Contribution Rates ²	Very rare	5%, if covered by Social Security 8%, if not covered by Social Security	
Median Employer Contribution Rates ³	8%	8%, if covered by Social Security 10.7%, if not covered by Social Security	
Can Employer Freeze Plan?	Generally, yes	Generally, not unilaterally	

1. As of 2005

2. As of 2005. From 2002 – 2009, public employee contribution rates were stable.

3. As of 2005. In 2009, public fund figures were 9.4% and 12.7% respectively

Source: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (CRR), Public Fund Survey

Complexity and Volatility are Causing Private Firms to Freeze DB Plans

- Regulatory, legislative, and accounting changes over the past several decades have made private DB plans increasingly complex and have contributed to cash flow and earnings volatility
- As a result, firms have increasingly frozen DB plans
 - 59% of Fortune 1,000 companies sponsor a DB plan (vs. 64% in 2004)
 - 21% of Fortune 1,000 companies have frozen at least one of their DB plans (vs. 5% in 2004)





Status of DB Plans at Fortune 1,000 Companies

Sources: National Institute on Retirement Security, PBGC, Towers Watson

DB Coverage is Declining, while DC Coverage is Rising

- DB plan freezes and turnover of the labor force have contributed to a dramatic shift in the coverage of DB plans
 - The percentage of workers covered by DB plans has declined by over 40 percentage points since 1983
 - Less than half of the participants in private DB plans (and 55% in public DB plans) are still working for the sponsoring employer



Sources: CRR, PBGC

Historical Growth of Public Defined Contribution Plans

- State & Local Defined Contribution plans represent a small portion of the DC market
 - Only two states (MI and AK) have implemented mandatory defined contribution programs
 - Most of the asset growth has been in voluntary contribution plans (similar to 401(k) plans)



Sources: ICI, CRR

Part II: Survey of Assets Held by Public and Private Funds

Asset Allocation Diverging Between Private and Public DB Plans - Historical

- Since the Pension Protection Act was enacted in 2006, corporations have increasingly focused on liabilitydriven investment strategies
- As a result, corporate DB plans have shifted from equities into fixed income and also increased the duration of their fixed income assets to better match the duration of their liabilities (typically 12+ years)
- Over the past decade, the fixed income allocation of corporate DB plans has expanded from 26% to 39%, while the allocation in public DB plans has declined from 29% to 27%
- Both have increased allocations to alternative strategies (such as real estate, private equity, and hedge funds)



Asset Allocation for Public DB Plans



Source: Pensions & Investments (P&I)

Comparison of Funding and Accounting Rules

- Differences in accounting and funding requirements impact asset allocation
- Under proposed accounting standards for private plans, the expected return on pension assets will no longer flow through the income statement. This may cause private plans to increase their allocations to fixed income.

	Private DB	Public DB
Accounting Rules		
Source	Primarily FAS 87 and 158	Primarily GASB 25 and 27
Funded Status on Balance Sheet?	Yes. Net asset for all overfunded plans + net liability for all underfunded plans	No. Incur a liability if annual contribution is below the annual required contribution (ARC) ¹
Pension Asset Valuation	Generally at fair value	Typically 3-5 year smoothing
Liability Discount Rate	Based on high-quality corporate bond yields. Discount rate unaffected by asset allocation.	Based on expected rate of return. Assumes sponsor will not default.
Income Statement Impact of Asset Allocation	More aggressive portfolio → Higher expected return → Lower pension expense	More aggressive portfolio → Higher expected return → Lower ARC → Lower pension expense
Funding Rules		
Source	Primarily ERISA and PPA	No uniform requirement
Annual Required Contribution	Normal Cost + Underfunding amortized over seven years ²	GASB recommends Normal Cost + Underfunding amortized over ~30 years

1. Funded status (using actuarial value of assets and a discount rate equal to the expected return) is reported on a separate schedule.

2. Unlike the funded status reflected on balance sheet (which compares assets to the projected benefit obligation), funding requirements are calculated with respect to the accumulated benefit obligation (which excludes future salary growth). Congress enacted pension funding relief in 2010 that allows sponsors to temporarily extend the amortization period.

Asset Allocation Diverging Between Private and Public DB Plans - Prospective

- Surveys indicate that asset allocation trends between corporate and public DB plans are likely to continue over the next few years
- 41% of corporate DB plan sponsors intend to increase their allocation to long corporate bonds over the next one to two years (35% planning to increase allocation to long government bonds)
- Both corporate and public plans intend to reduce exposure to U.S. equities



Private DB More Concerned About Volatility, Public DB About Returns

- Surveys of plan sponsors indicate that corporate DB plan sponsors are primarily concerned with volatility, while public DB plan sponsors are more concerned with improving their funded status
 - When asked to define volatility, corporate DB plan sponsors were more concerned with funded status volatility, while public DB plan sponsors were more concerned with asset volatility
- This difference in focus is likely the result of differences in regulatory and accounting standards, as well as the lower funded status of public plans



Top Concerns of Corporate and Public DB Sponsors over the Next Decade

Source: Pyramis

DC Plan Asset Allocation

- Participants in corporate DC plans have been gradually de-risking
 - Cash, stable value, and fixed income in aggregate have risen from 24% to 33% over the past 5 years
 - Total equity allocation has declined 4 percentage points, driven by a decrease in sponsoring company stock
 - However, corporate DC plans still appear to have riskier asset allocations than public DC plans
- Changes in the risk profile of public DC plans, meanwhile, appear more muted
 - Equity allocation has declined slightly, offset by an increase in alternative investments / other
 - Fixed income assets have been re-allocated to stable value



Corporate DC vs Public DC Asset Allocation as of 2010



Source: P&I

Change in Asset Allocation: 2010 vs 2006 (in percentage points)

Part III: Public and Private Pension Fund Liabilities

What Drives the Growth of Pension Liabilities?



Measuring Pension Funding Gaps

- Pension funding gaps fluctuate with pension assets and liabilities
- Main drivers of pension assets
 - 1. Investment Return (most volatile component)
 - 2. Benefit Payments
 - 3. Contributions (generally, but not necessarily, increase in response to reductions in funded status)
- Main drivers of pension liabilities
 - 1. Service cost + Interest cost
 - 2. Benefit Payments
 - 3. Changes in actuarial assumptions, especially the discount rate
- Due to differing accounting standards, funding gaps for public and private funds are not directly comparable
- The choice of discount rate is particularly important in calculating the funded status of a plan
 - Corporate DB plans are discounted using high-quality corporate bond yields
 - Reflects credit risk of strong corporations
 - In 2010, yields in the 5.5% 6% range were generally used
 - State & Local DB plans are discounted using an assumed long-term rate of return on plan assets
 - These return assumptions rarely change, and are not necessarily tied to actual plan returns
 - Currently, the average public plan discount rate is about 8%
 - Discounting public plans using high-quality municipal bond yields may be a better choice
 - In contrast, discounting each entity's pension obligation using the sponsor's bond yields may be a poor choice because it would reduce the pension obligation as the sponsor's creditworthiness deteriorates

Funded Status of Public Pensions

- Public pension liabilities are valued using a discount rate that is linked to the expected return on plan assets, which does not fluctuate based on movements in interest rates or credit spreads
- Assets are measured using either a mark-to-market valuation or a smoothed actuarial value, ۲ resulting in different levels of estimated funded status
- Strong market returns are improving the funded status on a market value basis. Actuarial returns are continuing to decline as they still do not fully incorporate the financial crisis.



Estimated Funded Status of 125 State DB Plans as of 2010

How Large is the State and Local Government Pension Gap?

- Public plans report their liability using a discount rate that is equal to the expected return on plan assets
- Based on "as reported" figures (adjusted for recent market movements), plans are ~78% funded. If a lower discount rate were to be used, plan funding would be significantly worse (shown below).
- To calculate the increase in taxes necessary to fund accrued benefits, we assume that 22-year amortizing pension obligation bonds are issued to fully fund the pension and then solve for the upfront tax increase that is necessary to pay off the debt. If yet-to-be-accrued benefits for current employees are taken into account, the figures are even larger (see subsequent slides).



Note: For the tax increase analysis, the yield on the pension obligation bonds equals the discount rate. If future asset returns are lower than the discount rate, then taxes would need to be increased more than indicated above. "% of PI" indicates the tax increase as a % of personal income. "% of taxes" indicates the tax increase as a % of the existing state and local tax burden. Source: JP Morgan

Tax increase

Projected Benefit Payments for Current State and Local Employees

- Already earned vested benefits (dark blue area) will peak at ~\$380 billion per year in 2026
- If employees' future service and salary increases are also included (all shaded areas), annual benefit payments will peak at ~\$660 billion in 2041
- This analysis does not take into account that new employees will be hired to replace retiring employees (and that many of those new employees will retire during the illustrated timeframe)



Required State Adjustments To Fund Benefits for Current State Employees

- When including the full costs of future service and salary increases (PVB on the prior slide), the total state and local gap increases to \$3.9 trillion (of which the state portion is \$2.5 trillion)
- The fiscal adjustment required to satisfy these liabilities varies significantly from state to state



Note: Pensions discounted at a yield curve of taxable muni discount rates. Revenue is FY2011 total governmental funds excluding federal grants and aid. Source of revenue data: FY2009 and FY2010 CAFRs and NCSL survey of legislative analyst projections for FY2011. Unfunded pension liabilities also include full estimate of future service and salary increases and eliminate asset smoothing. Cost of servicing unfunded pensions assumes 22-year fully amortizing bonds are issued (at the same taxable muni rate) to pay for the entire unfunded liability. Source of personal income in each state: Tax Foundation.

Source: JP Morgan

Alternatives to Raising Taxes

- Aside from raising taxes, states have other levers at their disposal
- The chart below illustrates one possible solution that relies equally on cutting state spending, increasing employee contributions, reducing COLAs, and increasing retirement ages



As with the chart on the right side of the previous page, all numbers show the adjustment as a percentage of personal income in the state

Employee contributions assume that each percentage point increase raises \$250 per member per year. Present value of COLA reduction and retirement age increases based on "Policy Options for State Pensions Systems and Their Impact on Plan Liabilities" presented by Joshua Rauh and Robert Novy-Marx at Jackson Hole in August of 2010.

Source: JP Morgan

Limited Legal Precedents to Changing Benefits

Decreasing cost of living adjustment for retirees

- **Colorado's** 2010 legislation, amongst other reforms, reduced the COLA to the lesser of 2% or inflation
- Minnesota's 2010 legislation reduced COLAs until the plan is 90% funded (COLAs from 2.5% to 2% for SERS, from 2.5% to 1.5% for state police, from 2.5% to 1% for PERS, from 2% to 0% for teachers)
- South Dakota's 2010 legislation ties COLAs to a formula based on funded level (3.1% COLA if 100%+ funded, 2.1-2.8% if 90-100%, 2.1-2.4% if 80-90%, 2.1% if less than 80%)

Retirees in all three states have filed lawsuits alleging that the reduction in benefits represents a breach of contract Increasing early and full retirement ages

- Rhode Island's 2009 legislation was carefully crafted to generate as much savings as possible (e.g., impacting current workers too) while also respecting the vested rights of current workers:
 - Increasing the retirement age from 60 to 62, but only for employees who are NOT yet eligible to retire
 - The closer an employee is to age 60, the less it impacts him or her (proportionally with caps)

No lawsuits have been filed to our knowledge

Note: Legal protections vary by state

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures

S&P 500 DB Funded Status is Improving and Likely Manageable

- After declining to ~77% in 2008, the funded status for S&P 500 companies has improved to ~85% as of 12/31/2010 (~\$192 billion)
 - A 50bp increase in the discount rate would improve the status to 90% (~\$120bn), assuming an 11 year duration
 - Employer contributions are sizeable: ~\$66 billion in 2009, up from \$39 billion in 2008
- In aggregate, \$192 billion of pension underfunding (\$125 billion after-tax) seems manageable
 - In 2010, S&P 500 companies spent \$299bn on share repurchase and \$206bn on dividends
 - Circumstances vary by sector and company



Sources: Morgan Stanley, Wilshire, Standard & Poor's, Citigroup

Potential Fixed Income Inflows from Pension Asset Allocation Changes

- Given expected asset allocation trends, flows into fixed income may increase in the coming years
 - \$2.2 trillion of assets in corporate DB plans, \$3 trillion in state and local government DB plans
- A 10 percentage point increase in the fixed income allocation for corporate DB plans equates to \$224bn
 - For comparison, the Barclays Capital Long Corporate and Long Treasury indices have market caps of \$744 billion and \$661 billion, respectively, as of 3/31/2011
 - Currently, corporate DB plans have a fixed income allocation of 39%
- However, changes in asset allocation are likely to be gradual. According to the Pyramis survey of corporate DB plans cited earlier (pg. 12):
 - 39% (net) of plans intend to increase their allocation to long corporate bonds over the next 1 -2 years
 - 34% (net) of plans intend to increase their allocation to long govt. bonds over the next 1 -2 years
 - If we assume that increasing the allocation to an asset class means changing the allocation by 5 percentage points, this would imply purchases of \$44 billion of long corporate bonds and \$38 billion of long government bonds *
- Given the lack of near-term catalysts, it appears unlikely that state and local government DB plans will increase their fixed income allocation in the near future

* \$2.24 trillion corporate DB assets * 39% increasing allocation to long corporate bonds * 5% increase in allocation = \$44 billion For reference, \$88 billion of long (>15 years) investment grade US corporate debt was issued in 2010 (\$105bn in 2009)

Implications for Treasury / New Product Ideas

- The Treasury may be able to issue new types of securities to assist DB plans in hedging risks that are currently difficult to hedge
 - Ultra-long Treasuries
 - Pension liabilities are long duration and have meaningful convexity
 - Wage inflation-linked Treasuries
 - Retirement benefits are often linked to the retiree's wage at retirement
 - TIPS are linked to CPI and may not provide an adequate hedge against wage inflation
 - The federal government already calculates wage inflation to index Social Security benefits
- OPEB liabilities are generally unfunded but could be funded with bonds in the future
 - Health inflation-linked treasuries
 - Public plans face an estimated unfunded OPEB liability of ~\$1 trillion, while S&P 500 corporations are underfunded by approximately \$260 billion
 - The growth rate of healthcare costs is an important factor in measuring OPEB liabilities
- While in theory the above products may generate new demand, it is important to also analyze the practical implications of issuing a new type of security. For example, dealers have balance sheet constraints that limit their ability to warehouse new issues (particularly for new types of securities). This may lead to storage costs / higher yields for the Treasury.
 - Average participation in 30-year bond auctions by various investor types (Aug '06 present):
 - Pension and retirement funds: 0.14% (essentially zero direct participation)
 - Dealers: 54%
 - Investment Funds: 25%

Sources: Pew Center on the States, Standard & Poor's, US Treasury

UK and Netherlands Offer Alternative Models for Pension Regulation

	United Kingdom	Netherlands
Assets	\$1.6 trillion	\$1.1 trillion
	(10% public / 90% private)	(roughly evenly split public/private)
Liability Discount Rate	Gilts + margin	Euro swap curve
	(typically in 0.5-1.5% range)	
Minimum Funding	Less formula-driven than in the U.S.	Three tests need to be met
Requirements	or Netherlands. Nevertheless, the	
	UK is viewed as one of the most	1) Minimum Test: Assets must exceed 105% of
	stringent frameworks.	liabilities. 3 year recovery period if below 105%
	C C	, , , , ,
	Funding plan must be submitted to	2) Solvency Buffer Test: Sufficient buffer to withstand
	the regulator. Deficits generally need	a 1-in-40 year market move. Typically implies assets
	to be rectified over the average	exceed 120-130% of liabilities 15 year recovery period
	duration of scheme (~15 years)	if below this level
	duration of scheme (15 years)	II below this level
		3) Continuity Test. Dreaf that asherent plan in place
		5) Continuity Test: Proof that conferent plan in place
		LAS 10 (1 1 1 1 1 41 + 650/ (1 1
Accounting Regime	IAS 19	IAS 19 (corporate schemes only. About 05% of market
	00.000/	is industry-wide schemes)
Average Funding Position	80-90% range	107% as of December 2010
Asset Allocation	31% bonds & hills 41% equities	47% bonds & hills 32% equities
ressee renocation	4% cash $26%$ other	4% cash 18% other
Commonts	Clear trend toward I DI	Duration mismatch vorsus liabilities is a major concern
Comments	Clear tiend toward LDI	bacques it grantes column an lovel velocitity or 1
		because it creates solvency level volatility and
		increases required buffer

Sources: Presenting Member's Firm, OECD

Considerations Regarding Public Pension Reform

- State and local government retirement plans should be structured to satisfy the needs of retirees, employees, and taxpayers
- Clear <u>disclosure</u> is needed so that plan beneficiaries, plan sponsors, and investors in state and local government debt can make informed decisions
 - While some flexibility in accounting standards is necessary, sponsors should use standardized assumptions/methodologies to the greatest extent possible and standardize reporting dates for comparability
- Pension funds should take <u>concrete actions</u> before it is too late. Potential actions include:
 - 1. Adjust benefits for current employees (COLAs, length of service, retirement age, etc) or increase employee contributions
 - Most direct approach. May face legal challenges if attempted unilaterally once granted, may be deemed "contractual obligations"
 - 2. Contribute actuarially required contribution, funded by raising taxes and/or cutting expenditures
 - Difficult given current state of economy. May be used as a bargaining chip when negotiating benefit cuts
 - 3. Create a new tier of benefits or switch to a DC plan for new employees
 - Fewer legal hurdles but does not address the potentially large benefits promised to current employees
 - 4. Risk sharing Implement a hybrid "cash balance" plan (low guaranteed return + DC component) or full DC plan
 - Employees may demand higher current salaries or increased employer match if they view the new benefit package as inferior to DB
 - 5. Improve governance / oversight to ensure that plans are managed effectively by increasing training, setting higher standards for trustees, or hiring outside professionals
 - 6. Issue pension obligation bonds and use proceeds to improve funded status
 - If future returns are lower than the bond yield then the sponsor is worse off