



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

PREVENTION

PREVENTION NEWSLETTER

JULY 2012

MISSION

The USIP's Center for Conflict Management (CCM) designs and manages the Institute's efforts to *prevent* the initial outbreak of violent conflict, *resolve* ongoing conflicts, and *stabilize* areas emerging from conflict. The Center also conducts research, identifies best practices, and develops new tools for conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

CALENDAR

Ongoing: Pakistan-India Secretary level bilateral talks

July 7: Legislative Elections in Libya

July 8: Anniversary of Kim Il-sung's death in 1994.

July 27: Anniversary of the signing of the Korean War Armistice by North Korea (representing the North Korea-China Delegation) and the U.S. (representing the UN Command Delegation) in 1953.

July/August: Interactive Dialogue at UN General Assembly on the Responsibility to Protect.

PUBLICATIONS

- "Assessing the Role of Security Assurances in Dealing with North Korea" Chapter in Stanford University Press Volume *Strategies of Assurance* by John Park, Summer/Fall 2012.
- "Violence in Karachi" *USIP Peace Works* by Huma Yusuf, July 2012.
- "Pakistan's Energy Crisis" *USIP Peace Works* by Elizabeth Mills, June 2012.
- "Atrocity Prevention through Persuasion and Deterrence" *USIP Peace Brief* by Jonas Claes, June 2012.
- "Egypt's Elections" *USIP On the Issues* by Daniel Brumberg, June 2012.
- "Trashing Social Divides in Pakistan" *USIP Peace Brief* by Nadia Naviwala, May 2012.

United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • Fax. 202.429.6063

Dear Colleagues,

On April 23, 2012, President Obama announced a number of steps to help the United States prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities. In his speech at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the President outlined an unprecedented effort to institutionalize normative commitments to atrocity prevention by creating a high-level interagency Atrocities Prevention Board (APB). The Chair of the APB is the National Security Council's Senior Director of Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, Samantha Power. The Board will meet on a monthly basis, with rotating attendance by senior representatives across the relevant Departments at the Assistant Secretary level or higher. Apart from identifying threats, the Board will oversee the development and implementation of atrocity prevention and response policy. Over the long-term, the APB may enable the U.S. Government to move away from its traditional ad hoc approach to imminent or ongoing atrocities.

The APB was one of the main recommendations of the 2008 Genocide Prevention Task Force (http://www.usip.org/genocide_taskforce) co-chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Following their inaugural session at the White House, the APB members emphasized the role of early warning mechanisms and multilateral approaches, and announced the development of new doctrine and planning efforts by the Departments of State and Defense and within the intelligence community, steps and themes that echo the GPTF recommendations.

As a follow-up to the work of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, the U.S. Institute of Peace continues its efforts to enhance the U.S. capacity to respond to emerging threats of mass atrocities through its Working Group on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), co-chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Ambassador Richard Williamson. The Working Group is a joint effort by the United States Institute of Peace, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the Brookings Institution.

Abiodun Williams

Senior Vice President

Center for Conflict Management

U.S. Institute of Peace



SPOTLIGHT

Morsi's Victory Brings Challenges New and Old



A voter shows proof she took part in Egypt's May 2012 presidential elections.

Source: VOA

On June 24, Egypt's transition came to a turning point: Had the Presidential Election Commission ruled former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq president, Egypt's transition would have been stifled. After all, Shafiq was a close ally of the previous regime, and a stalwart defender of the military. But if it ruled Muslim Brethren leader Mohamed Morsi the winner, there would be some hope for democratization. The good news is that Morsi is now the first democratically elected president in the history of Egypt. Now the hard part begins.

The key challenge that Egypt's January 2011 Revolution has faced was to balance two competing goals. On the one hand, the rules of the transition had to promote a process sufficiently open or *uncertain* such that all key groups would have a reasonable expectation that periodic elections would eventually give them a seat at the table of political participation. On the other hand, the rules also had to promote sufficient certainty or "credible guarantees" such that no group had reason to fear that the victory of their rivals would lead to their political isolation at the hands of an elected majority. This delicate balance was never struck. On the contrary, divisions between Islamists and non-Islamists blocked agreement on the procedures, laws and reforms needed to insure that all key sectors of society would view them as a win-win proposition. While Egypt's new political leaders broke the "wall of fear" between the regime and society, they did not break the multiple walls of suspicions that endure in the opposition itself.

The debilitating consequences of opposition fragmentation were amply demonstrated during the first round of presidential elections on May 23 and 24. With splits within and between the non-Islamist and Islamist camps proliferating, voters threw their support behind the five leading candidates. This demonstration of ideological pluralism may have been commendable. But in the context of a shaky transition it precluded the emergence of a single consensus candidate who could take on the still powerful forces of the *ancien regime*. The result? The two top vote getters were the Muslim Brethren's Mohammed Morsi, and former prime minister Ahmed Shafiq, a regime holdover. If many new generation activists were shocked, their dismay did not elicit efforts to overcome their divisions. Indeed, the parliament's agonizing efforts to elect a 100-member constituent Assembly nearly collapsed when non-Islamist parliamentarians threatened to boycott the entire procedure unless the seats were equally divided between Islamists and non-Islamists. Pressed by the military, an agreement was finally reached to share the seats 50/50. But the agreement fell apart, as non-Islamists raised a host of issues that led to a boycotting of its proceedings.

All of these events unfolded in or around the second round of presidential elections. Buoyed by the endorsement of Abdol Monem Fatouh—a former Muslim Brethren leader who took 18% of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections—and by the backing of the Salafi-based Nour Party, Morsi showed little inclination to reach out to non-Islamists. His reticence not only intensified the worries of non-Islamists, it inadvertently invited further meddling from allies of the old regime. The June 14 decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court to invalidate the electoral law left the very future of the parliament up for grabs.



This was followed by the June 17 decision of the military to issue a series of constitutional amendments that reserved special powers for the military, while greatly diminishing those of the president.

Morsi's election offers a second chance for Egypt's political opposition to unite and forge a common vision. His great challenge is not only to lead this unity, but also to leverage this unity to renegotiate the terms of the transitions with the military. It will not be easy, but Egypt's prospects do not look so dim now as they did just a few weeks ago.

OVER THE HORIZON— HIGHLIGHTS

Israel–Palestine Peace Process Remains Stalled

Negotiations remain stalled, and prospects for renewal seemed to face further setbacks in June as Hamas and Israel engaged in cross-border violence that saw over 100 rockets fired into Israel and Israeli airstrikes into Gaza. A terrorist attack across the border from Egypt that killed an Israeli civilian has also increased concerns over the prospect of escalating violence from the Sinai. Meanwhile, in May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ruling Likud party formed a unity government with Shaul Mofaz, head of Likud's rival party, Kadima. While a domestically-driven move, Netanyahu now heads one of the broadest coalitions in Israel's history and has political room to take a more centrist stance on the peace process if he chooses. During a June visit to Washington, Shaul Mofaz, now Israel's Vice Prime Minister, met with President Obama and other Administration officials and emphasized his own view that the new coalition government offers an opportunity to restart negotiations. The Obama Administration has been working to step up contacts between Israeli and Palestinian officials, hoping to push the sides back to direct talks.

U.S.–Pakistan Relations at a Low

After indications of progress over more than six weeks of bilateral talks between U.S. and Pakistani officials on re-opening the NATO supply routes through Pakistan into Afghanistan, observers of the U.S.–Pakistan relationship were faced with a return to what has become the new normal in the troubled relationship when talks stalled on June 11 with the withdrawal of a U.S. negotiation team. In mid-May, the relationship looked to be warming with NATO's last minute invitation of President Zardari to the Chicago Summit, ostensibly an overture to induce Pakistan to re-open the supply lines. In Chicago, however, President Obama declined to meet President Zardari. Two days later, Pakistan convicted Shakil Afridi, the Pakistani doctor who assisted U.S. agencies in their hunt for Osama Bin Laden. In response, Senate appropriators suggested cuts of \$33 million in aid to Pakistan, \$1 million for each year of Afridi's sentence. The conviction proved a sticking point in the supply routes negotiations given U.S. perception of Afridi as a hero, and Pakistani perception of him as a traitor. It is fair to say that the bilateral relationship has hit an all time low. There is now a real danger that key elements of the relationship heading into the 2014 transition in Afghanistan will reach a point beyond repair, placing both sides in a precarious position in post-2014 regional realignments. Adding to the complication is the election dynamic on both sides and Pakistan's fresh political turmoil that has seen the Supreme Court dismiss the sitting Prime Minister

“Morsi's election offers a second chance for Egypt's political opposition to unite and forge a common vision.”

“The Obama Administration has been working to step up contacts between Israeli and Palestinian officials, hoping to push the sides back to direct talks.”



U.S. Secretary of State Clinton Meets with Pakistani President Zardari in Chicago.

Source: Flickr



and the President appointing a rather controversial successor, who has also already been put under the scanner by the Supreme Court

USIP Discussions with Libyan Dignitaries

As Libya approaches its elections for a constitutional assembly, an uptick in violence has cast a shadow over the country's transition. On June 11, a convoy carrying the British Ambassador to Libya, Sir Dominic Asquith, came under attack, though the Ambassador escaped uninjured. This follows an attack on the Benghazi headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross on May 22, and a bombing at the gates of the U.S. diplomatic mission to Benghazi on June 5. All three attacks were claimed by an Islamist militant group called the Omar Abdul Rahman Brigade. A number of clashes along ethnic and tribal divides have occurred in various regions throughout the country, including Kufra, the Nafusa Mountains, and Ghadames. The airport in Tripoli was temporarily shut down due to a takeover by a militia demanding the release of one of its members. Despite security concerns the elections are scheduled to take place on July 7.

In addition to programming on-the-ground in Libya, USIP has hosted discussions with a number of Libyan dignitaries during their visits to DC. On June 5, Libyan Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Mustapha Abushagur participated in a closed round-table discussion with a number of civil society representatives, joined by the State Department's Deputy Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions, Mark Ward. Also on June 5, USIP's Academy hosted a round-table discussion with Libyan Minister for Higher Education and Scientific Research, Dr. Naeem Abrurahaman Gheriany, focusing on higher education reform and training initiatives in Libya. On May 9, Libyan Deputy Minister of Oil and Gas, Dr. Omar Shakmak, visited USIP for a discussion of the political and economic climate in Libya during his visit to DC.

North Korea and Sanctions

Following North Korea's April missile test, the UN Security Council designated additional North Korean entities as part of an expanded sanctions effort. Although this action was intended to send a clear message to the new leadership in Pyongyang, it raised questions about the efficacy of increasing sanctions on the world's most sanctioned country. Keen to prevent the collapse of a fragile regime on its northeastern border, China's policy actions appear to be undermining existing sanctions measures. North Korea's overall trade volume in 2011 was \$6.3 billion of which \$5.6 billion (over 88%) was with China. In 2004, approximately 48% of North Korea's trade was with China.

An unintended consequence of sanctions is North Korea's greater dependence on China as an important coping mechanism. Key findings from USIP's Track 1.5 activities indicate that growing divergences among countries in terms of their priority policy goal in dealing with North Korea are fostering a situation where the elites in Pyongyang are deepening their commercial ties with Chinese partners and accumulating more wealth. If current trend lines continue, a nuclear North Korea will become a firmly embedded part of the security landscape in Northeast Asia.

Timely and Decisive International Response to Mass Atrocities

Since the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, was unanimously adopted at the 2005 World Summit by Heads of State and Government, atrocity prevention mechanisms have been gradually

“An unintended consequence of sanctions is North Korea's greater dependence on China as an important coping mechanism.”

- “The PTI and Pakistan’s Changing Political Landscape” *USIP Peace Brief* by Stephanie Flamenbaum, May 2012.
- “Moving Forward with the Legal Empowerment of Women in Pakistan,” *USIP Special Report* by Anita Weiss, May 2012

institutionalized at the local, regional, and international level. Unfortunately, R2P is still unable to guide the international community towards effective and consistent policy responses to imminent or ongoing atrocities, as illustrated by recent events in South Sudan and Syria. In the past few years, the UN General Assembly has served as a forum for efforts to advance R2P, leading to interactive dialogues on early warning and assessment mechanisms, and the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in implementing the principle. In a move to address some of R2P’s most controversial components, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recommended the General Assembly to dedicate this summer’s dialogue to R2P’s third pillar. This pillar includes pacific and coercive tools for collective action in the face of atrocities, including the use of military force, after local efforts or international capacity-building failed to prevent a crisis situation. It remains to be seen whether the exceptionally robust intervention in Libya will continue to compromise conversations about the future of atrocity prevention, or whether small steps can be taken to improve our collective ability to address some of the world’s most heinous crimes.

WORKING GROUPS

- In early May, the **Korea Working Group (KWG)** conducted briefings for Rep. Phil Roe, a Senate Armed Services Committee staffer, a House Ways and Means Committee staffer, and a Pentagon official on key findings from USIP’s Track 1.5 activities related to leadership transitions in Northeast Asia and their implications for regional stability.
- On June 7th, the **Lebanon Working Group (LWG)** hosted a discussion with Rob Malley of the International Crisis Group, and Alistair Harris, a Beirut-based security consultant. The meeting focused on the impact on Lebanon of spillover sectarian violence from, and the implications for U.S. policy.
- On May 22nd, DLA Piper LLP hosted the **Working Group on the Responsibility to Protect** for a sub-group session on the role of international justice and accountability mechanisms in preventing and responding to mass atrocities. The publication of the Working Group Report is scheduled for December 2012.
- On June 8th, the **Yemen Working Group** met with a Yemeni delegation from the south of the country to discuss the country’s ongoing political, economic, and security challenges. The group was in the U.S. as part of the State Department International Visitors Leadership program, exploring federalism and the role of local governance in the U.S. context.



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

2301 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20037
202.457.1700

www.usip.org

USIP provides the analysis, training and tools that prevent and end conflicts, promotes stability and professionalizes the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office of Public Affairs and Communications, 202.429.4725