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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT PROCEEDINGS
INFORMATION FLOWS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS TO
CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES OF THE COLLECTION
AND USE OF CONSUMER INFORMATION
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

June 18, 2003

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The above-entitled conference was held on
Wednesday, June 18, 2003, commencing at 8:32 a.m., at the
Federal Trade Commission, First Floor Conference Room, 601
New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20001.

Reported and transcribed by Deborah Turner, CVR

P R O C E E D I N G S

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3 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Good morning and welcome to the
4 Federal Trade Commission's workshop on Information Flows.
5 I'm Maureen Ohlhausen, the Assistant Director for Policy
6 Planning at the FTC. I just have a few administrative
7 details to go over before we get started.

8 First, I'd just ask if everyone would please be
9 sure that the ringers on your cell phones are turned off.
10 Also, in the unlikely event of an emergency security staff
11 will give us directions.

12 Just so you know, we're having this workshop
13 transcribed and the transcript will eventually appear on
14 our website, www.ftc.gov, where there will be a link to the
15 workshop's home page.

16 Also, we will accept written comments for 30 days
17 following the workshop, and the instructions for submitting
18 those comments are on the workshop's home page. Also, I
19 would like to acknowledge that our refreshments were very
20 kindly provided by Experian and Teradata. So thank you all
21 for coming and I'd now like to introduce the Chairman of
22 the FTC, Tim Muris.

23 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Good morning. On behalf of
24 my fellow commissioners, welcome to the Federal Trade
25 Commission's Information Flows Workshop. We will examine

1 the benefits and costs to consumers and businesses of the
2 collection and use of consumer information.

3 Our economy generates an enormous amount of data.
4 Most users of this data are honest businesses who have
5 incentives to collect and use information responsibly to
6 serve their customers better. The information revolution
7 greatly benefits all of us. The average American today
8 enjoys access to credit, financial services and shopping
9 choices that earlier Americans could never have imagined.
10 Today we can pay bills, make travel arrangements and go
11 shopping when and where it is convenient for us.

12 Ordinary consumers can receive the type of
13 personalized service that used to be available only to an
14 elite few. What I personally find most astonishing is what
15 occurs all over America at auto dealers everyday. If
16 consumers have good credit, they can borrow \$10,000 or more
17 from a complete stranger and actually drive away in a new
18 car in an hour or less. I call this the miracle of instant
19 credit. I have been assured that it requires a higher
20 authority than a credit manager to bestow a miracle but I
21 still think it's an astonishing thing.

22 Despite the benefits of information sharing,
23 concerns about privacy are real and legitimate. Surveys
24 tell us that consumers are troubled by the extent to which
25 their information is collected. At the same time,

1 consumers willingly part with personal information every
2 day to facilitate transactions.

3 For example, few consumers seem worried about the
4 many companies that have to share their information to
5 clear checks or to process ATM transactions. They
6 understand that the information must be collected and
7 shared to complete the transaction. Consumers also provide
8 information to increase their convenience or expand their
9 choices.

10 What consumers are most concerned about is that
11 their information, once collected, may be misused to harm
12 them or disrupt their daily lives. These kinds of adverse
13 consequences drive consumer concerns about privacy.

14 The FTC's privacy agenda focuses on stopping the
15 kinds of practices that can harm consumers. For example,
16 many consumers are concerned about physical consequences,
17 especially for their children. The misuse of information
18 can cause economic consequences ranging from the improper
19 denial of credit to loss of a job. In extreme cases misuse
20 of information can lead to identity theft.

21 The Commission's focus on stopping misuse of
22 information highlights another issue, the explicit
23 recognition of the trade-offs involved in regulation.
24 Privacy is not, nor ever can be, an absolute right. We are
25 willing to make practical compromises between privacy and

1 other desirable goals like having our briefcase or backpack
2 inspected at the airport or before entering a building or a
3 sports arena.

4 There are trade-offs in the commercial arena as
5 well where information sharing poses risks but also offers
6 enormous benefits. The advantages of instant credit
7 approval, the lower cost of processing transactions and the
8 convenience of personalized services are all benefits that
9 consumers want and expect.

10 We must ensure that our approach both protects
11 privacy and preserves the important benefits of our
12 information economy. To spur a rigorous and balanced
13 discussion of these important issues, we have invited to
14 the workshop knowledgeable participants with a range of
15 perspectives. More research needs to be done to provide
16 the information that we as policymakers need to understand
17 fully the role of information practices in our economy.

18 This workshop will help lay the groundwork for
19 future research in privacy and information practices. The
20 workshop will begin with a roundtable of distinguished
21 executives from a variety of businesses that use consumer
22 information extensively. The participants will discuss how
23 their particular businesses collect and use information,
24 the benefits of this information, how their businesses
25 incorporate information practices, and how they measure the

1 value of consumer trust.

2 This roundtable will be followed by remarks from
3 my colleague, Commissioner Orson Swindle, and I greatly
4 appreciate his help on this issue and in setting up this
5 workshop. We will then have the first of two panels
6 presenting case studies about the collection and use of
7 consumer information for particular purposes. Panelists
8 will be experts from universities, think tanks, consumer
9 groups and industry.

10 The first panel will examine the relationship
11 between consumer information flows and the extension of
12 consumer credit. Panelists will discuss the costs and
13 benefits of the availability of consumer data in
14 formulating and offering consumer credit products.
15 Panelists will also examine how problems such as fraud are
16 prevented or facilitated through the use of consumer
17 information.

18 The afternoon session will open with remarks by
19 Commissioner Mozelle Thompson. The second case study panel
20 will follow examining the role of consumer information
21 flows based on information gained from businesses' past
22 dealings with customers and from other sources.

23 Panelists will discuss how consumer information
24 helps tailor offerings to customers and manage internal
25 activities such as inventory control and planning. They

1 will also discuss business use of transaction data and
2 other consumer information to identify and target
3 consumers' preferences for marketing and the costs and
4 benefits to consumers of such practices.

5 After the second case study panel, Commissioner
6 Thomas Leary will address the workshop. We will then have
7 a methodology panel comprised of academics and researchers
8 who will discuss how to evaluate the benefits and costs of
9 collecting and using consumer information. Panelists will
10 present a range of perspectives on the appropriate
11 methodology for evaluating information practices including
12 the appropriate use of benefit-cost analysis.

13 The workshop will conclude with remarks on the
14 use of information to fight identity theft by Wayne
15 Abernathy, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions,
16 Department of the Treasury.

17 Let me move back over here and we will start our
18 roundtable. Let me introduce our panelists who will each
19 make some brief remarks and then we'll have a discussion.

20 Charles Morgan is the company leader of Acxiom
21 Corporation. Acxiom provides databases and information
22 management for many of the largest companies in the world.
23 Charles, as we were discussing just a few minutes ago, also
24 was the 2001 Chairman of the Direct Marketing Association
25 and he assured me that he does not share all of DMA's

1 current views about the Federal Trade Commission.

2 MR. MORGAN: No, that was private, and it's true.

3 COMMISSIONER MURIS: John Thompson is Chairman of
4 the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of
5 Symantec Corporation. Symantec is a leading provider of
6 Internet security technology including the Norton brand of
7 consumer security products. Last year, President Bush
8 appointed John to the National Infrastructure Advisory
9 Committee.

10 Pete Kight is the Chairman and Chief Executive
11 Officer of CheckFree Corporation, which he founded in 1981.
12 Today, CheckFree is a major player in the electronic
13 billing and payment industry, and he also, like me, was
14 born in Ohio and went to school in Southern California.
15 Actually, he went to Bakersfield which is in between
16 Southern and Northern California.

17 MR. KIGHT: Very in between.

18 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Very in between. There are
19 more people from Oklahoma in Bakersfield than in Oklahoma,
20 but that's another story.

21 Ken Seiff is the cofounder and Chief Executive
22 Officer of Bluefly Incorporated which sells designer
23 apparel and other products through its Internet retail
24 site, bluefly.com. Prior to Bluefly, Ken was the founder
25 and CEO of Pivot Rules, a leader in golf apparel.

1 Tom Seddon is Senior Vice President, America's
2 Brand Performance for InterContinental Hotels Group, a
3 global hospitality company that includes brands such as
4 Holiday Inn, Crowne Plaza and the Willard here in D.C. Tom
5 is responsible for brand strategy across all
6 InterContinental properties. So let's begin with Charles.

7 MR. MORGAN: Chairman Muris and members of the
8 Commission, I want to thank you all very much for the
9 opportunity to participate in this workshop. My goal today
10 is to bring some more clarity to this debate that Chairman
11 Muris set forth in his opening comments.

12 I want to talk about the benefits from the
13 collection and use of consumer information from the
14 perspective both of the consumer as well as from the
15 perspective of those of us in business.

16 I have served as CEO for the Acxiom Corporation
17 now for about 30 years, and our company has consistently
18 supported a balanced approach to the use of personal
19 information.

20 The efficient flow of consumer information has
21 significantly contributed to our nation's economic growth
22 and it has given the United States a real competitive
23 advantage in the global marketplace.

24 Appropriate use, and I emphasize appropriate, use
25 and access to consumer information has ensured that

1 businesses can offer targeted compatibly-priced offers on
2 relevant products and services and access to information
3 has accelerated the accuracy and accelerated the speed at
4 which transactions can be completed.

5 Chairman Muris talked about getting an auto loan.
6 I would also say that the insurance underwriting process,
7 which literally used to take weeks, is now done in hours.
8 And not only can the underwriting process be done in hours,
9 you can shop for insurance online and do it in a matter of
10 hours.

11 So the flow of consumer information for
12 appropriate uses, such as the ones that Chairman Muris and
13 I have described, clearly benefit the consumers and clearly
14 benefit businesses.

15 But I want to be very clear on one point. The
16 inappropriate use of information to defraud and
17 discriminate against consumers should be, and in many cases
18 already is, illegal. And those laws should be strictly
19 enforced.

20 Acxiom is involved in several distinct uses of
21 consumer information, and each provides a different value
22 to consumers and to the businesses that use that
23 information. And, in my opinion, each requires different
24 policy approaches.

25 They are first, information that helps businesses

1 manage and keep accurate the information that they have on
2 their customers. The second area is information that helps
3 businesses find and keep customers and also grow those
4 customer relationships over time, and thirdly, information
5 that helps businesses manage the various risks that they
6 face in delivering their products and services like the
7 underwriting process that I just described.

8 In my comments today I'm going to focus on the
9 first issue, data accuracy. Accurate information is the
10 absolute foundation on which mutually beneficial business
11 consumer relationships are based.

12 Data errors compromise every aspect of these
13 relationships with varying consequences. For example, an
14 inaccurate address can keep a consumer from receiving an
15 item ordered from a catalog. It may be no big deal, except
16 to that consumer. However, being mistaken for a different
17 consumer with a similar name can result in being denied
18 credit in that auto transaction that Chairman Muris
19 described earlier.

20 Our experience in working with some of the
21 world's largest, most sophisticated companies show that
22 they typically have between 8 and 13 percent error rate in
23 identifying information that they have on their own
24 customers.

25 Sometimes the data is captured wrong, the

1 consumer provided incorrect information, or the consumer
2 might have moved and a business didn't accurately record
3 the new address information. You can add to those
4 scenarios some of the statistics, like the fact that 4.7
5 million marriages each year result in name changes and we
6 have 1.9 million divorces every year that, of course, often
7 result in more name changes. And we have 43 million
8 residential moves, and we have 6 million consumers that
9 actually have two homes which results in address confusion.

10 Well, as part of the proof of the widespread
11 problem, I would point out that the United States Postal
12 Service reports that 23 percent of the mail that they
13 process has some kind of error in it, the address is
14 incomplete or the person doesn't live at that address any
15 longer.

16 Since there is no single repository of
17 information to confirm that data is accurate, businesses
18 like Acxiom aggregate information from a number of
19 carefully selected sources into repositories against which
20 a business can compare its data, confirm its accuracy and,
21 in many cases, correct the errors.

22 The estimated cost of these data inaccuracies is
23 huge. Simply for direct marketers, the people that we
24 mostly work with, costs approach \$5 billion annually. The
25 practical benefits of the name and address correction that

1 Acxiom provides is demonstrated by one simple customer
2 example. We did a mailing of three and a half million
3 records. We reduced the return mail by tenfold and the
4 annual result of that was a million dollar savings to that
5 one customer.

6 So the economic cost of inaccurate consumer data
7 to the U.S. economy, I think, goes well beyond advertising.
8 It results in delayed bills, late payment fees, lost
9 payments, undelivered product recalls. And, of course, the
10 cost to straighten out all these messes has not even ever
11 been calculated as far as I know.

12 Access to third-party data can help clean up
13 consumer records in other ways as well. It can remove
14 records based on a consumer's preference not to be
15 contacted.

16 For example, Acxiom provides a suppression
17 service that helps businesses ensure that they don't
18 contact marketers who are on the do-not-call or do-not-mail
19 list. And this task of identifying people on those lists
20 is a lot more complicated than one might imagine,
21 particularly on mail suppression.

22 For example, if you've got J. Brown at 135 Oak
23 Street on a targeted mail solicitation list that could be
24 John Brown at 135 Oak Street, apartment 4 or Jane Brown at
25 135 Oak Street, apartment 42. If we had other information

1 about the person at that address, such as age, it could be
2 used as a tiebreaker so that the correct person is sent
3 mail or not sent mail.

4 If the person on the solicitation list is 34, and
5 we know that John is 75 and Jane is 34, then we know that
6 the J. Brown on the solicitation list refers to Jane. And
7 since it is Jane on the promotion list to mail, it is her
8 name that should be checked against the do-not-mail list.

9 Acxiom analyzes our customers' data and one
10 analysis going across 400 million customer records and
11 prospect records that represent a cross-section of our
12 clients' data demonstrated a tremendous opportunity to
13 improve the quality and consistency of that customer data.

14 We identified 21 million of the 400 million
15 records had undeliverable addresses when we first received
16 the supposedly clean customer data. We also identified 9
17 million of those records had erroneous names. But once
18 again, by leveraging some of the third-party information,
19 we were able to correct about 36 percent of these errors.
20 So the collective use, the appropriate use of data ensures
21 consumers receive access to a wide variety of goods and
22 services, and I believe this helps keep prices competitive.

23 With all that said, you can understand why it is
24 not surprising that accuracy is one of the globally
25 embraced privacy principles. From a policy perspective,

1 verification and correction services must be allowed to
2 continue to help businesses manage their data accuracy
3 issue because I believe everybody wins.

4 Restrictions on data should be focused on how
5 accurate information is used, not on inhibiting businesses'
6 ability to get the data right in the first place.

7 But I think a disturbing trend in recent years is
8 legislation and regulations that unnecessarily curtail the
9 flow of information available to businesses and information
10 that is exchanged between businesses.

11 I believe in most all cases the motives have been
12 understandable and even laudable. They want to protect the
13 consumer. But in many cases these laws and regulations
14 were created without a full understanding of the facts.
15 They therefore have had unintended negative consequences by
16 restricting or eliminating flows of information that are
17 beneficial to all.

18 So when drafting effective privacy legislation
19 regulations, though it is not easy, I think a careful study
20 of all the uses of information should be undertaken before
21 restrictions are imposed to ensure that the desired result
22 will be achieved and also, of course, to avoid these
23 unintended negative consequences.

24 But anyhow, Chairman Muris, we really appreciate
25 the opportunity to be here and participate in this, and we

1 hope that we have been able to make a contribution. We
2 have, in addition to my comments here, a written submission
3 in which I have given more examples and more information
4 about use of data and data errors.

5 I want to thank you very much for holding this
6 workshop. I think it's a valuable thing to do to inform
7 this debate on the benefits to both businesses and
8 consumers. So I appreciate very much the opportunity to be
9 here. Thank you.

10 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Thank you very much, Charles.
11 Next, we have John Thompson.

12 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you very much. And I, too,
13 appreciate the opportunity to talk about a very important
14 topic, not only to our company but, I think, to consumers
15 around the world.

16 When I think about the issue at hand, the first
17 word that comes to mind is trust because it is, in fact,
18 imperative that we establish a trust relationship between
19 our consumers and our company. As the leading provider of
20 Internet security technologies for consumers around the
21 world, we have more than 120 million users who depend on us
22 to deliver trusted information to them about the security
23 of their environments.

24 Hence, our goal is to create a sense of
25 confidence in those consumers not only in our company, but

1 in their ability to work and play in a very connected and
2 wired world. So to that end we take this issue very
3 seriously and we approach it with four fundamental tenets
4 of how we want to manage our relationships in this
5 marketplace.

6 First, policy; second, process; third,
7 technology; and fourth, organization. And we think in each
8 and every case we have to apply rigor in those four
9 processes to ensure that we protect the information that is
10 provided to us and we use it in a way that is appropriate
11 for our company and our customers.

12 Let me walk through an example of how we go about
13 implementing each of those processes. First, policy. We
14 do not buy or sell consumer information. It is very, very
15 important that we use the information that is provided to
16 us by our customers but not use lists to go outbound with
17 marketing activities.

18 Second, from a process point of view, we allow
19 every customer to opt in and once they have opted in, we
20 then give them an opportunity to opt out if they conclude
21 that this is not the interaction that they want to have
22 with our company.

23 Third, technology is critically important to
24 protecting the information that we have, in fact,
25 collected. Therefore, firewalls, intrusion detection

1 solutions and vulnerability assessments are critically
2 important to how we manage the technology around the
3 information that we have collected.

4 And finally, organization. The information that
5 we collect is owned by the marketing organization of our
6 company, and they must guard that with all due care because
7 it can undermine the confidence and trust that our
8 customers have in us and, hence, all activity and requests
9 about information in our database must be coordinated
10 through that one organization.

11 Now, let me give you a couple of practical
12 examples of why those four tenets are important. First, we
13 are one of the most abused companies in the wired world.
14 Our products are very important to consumers yet some
15 people who have dubious intent have chosen our brand as the
16 target for fraudulent spam campaigns.

17 As a matter of fact, in 70 percent of the
18 campaigns that we have tracked back there has been some
19 fraud motive, either credit card theft, counterfeit
20 software product or, in fact, identity theft of the
21 individual who is engaged on the other end.

22 So we work hard to protect the brand and have, in
23 fact, made significant investments in enforcement around
24 this idea of protecting the information that we have so
25 consumers don't assume that we are the source of this

1 egregious fraudulent activity.

2 We have a spam watch. We try to educate
3 consumers on the idea of how we use the information that
4 they provide to us and furthermore how they can take simple
5 safeguards to protect their environment.

6 I think it's also important to talk about why
7 consumers are reliant on us and therefore why we must, in
8 fact, deliver a trusted relationship with them. Every day
9 in some part of the world some person with perhaps
10 unintended consequences is looking to penetrate a system in
11 this wired world in which we live.

12 The 120 million consumers who bang on our systems
13 every day are looking for relevant, timely information
14 about the threats that exist in the Internet. So it's
15 important to them that we know who they are so we can
16 deliver that information to them when the threat occurs.

17 So if we were to ever, in fact, misuse that
18 trusted relationship not only would it undermine our
19 business but we believe it would undermine the environment
20 of the wired world in which we live.

21 Furthermore, we ask customers to allow us to
22 assess the security of their systems, an important element
23 of them building a protection plan for their individual
24 devices. We, however, need to use the information that we
25 collect as we try to build new products and as we try to

1 deliver better services to those customers.

2 So it is important that they know that we are
3 collecting information that is a result of the test that
4 has been run on their machines that they have allowed us to
5 do and, hence, we must protect those results and use them
6 in a way that they consider to be very appropriate for our
7 individual or firm use.

8 So I can't stress enough the importance of
9 building a trusted relationship, and I can't stress enough
10 the requirement to build policies, process, technology and
11 organizational controls around this issue. If that is done
12 I believe we can, in fact, continue to derive real benefits
13 from the use of technology and, candidly, the advances that
14 have occurred in the wired world. Thank you very much.

15 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Thank you very much, John.
16 Pete?

17 MR. KIGHT: Well, I can tell you it's always very
18 good in a panel situation when you are able to say I'm
19 going to agree exactly with the person who just spoke ahead
20 of me. It beats the heck out of the alternative. I'm
21 really going to second almost exactly what John talked
22 about but from a very different technology company
23 perspective.

24 Now, let me tell you just one minute about what
25 CheckFree does since you probably don't know our name but

1 I'll guess that we provide service to a majority of the
2 people in this room.

3 We provide the infrastructure behind most of the
4 United States banking system's Internet banking, electronic
5 billing and payment services. We provide electronic
6 banking and bill paying services to more than 10 million
7 consumers today. We also provide Internet banking services
8 through just about anyplace else that you might find them,
9 including MSN, Yahoo, AOL and even the United States Postal
10 Service.

11 We also provide a very high percentage of the
12 investment community's infrastructure for portfolio
13 management and accounting, allowing the investment industry
14 to keep track of individual investment portfolios on our
15 system. Those portfolios represent about \$500 billion in
16 investment today. Of course, last year it was about \$800
17 billion and now it's down to \$500 billion, but we are all
18 working to get that back.

19 So obviously, you can tell, as an infrastructure
20 company behind all of these financial services that
21 CheckFree cares a lot about the privacy issue. But very
22 much like John just talked about, while we should care, and
23 we do care, we are driven to care by our customers, the
24 financial institutions, and ultimately by their customers
25 who we ultimately serve, which are the consumers.

1 It is estimated right now that the 10 million
2 people that we have online and our competitors have about
3 another million only represent the very beginning. As we
4 speak, over the last 18 months Internet banking and
5 specifically receiving bills electronically and paying them
6 electronically, online, is the fastest-growing service on
7 the Internet.

8 More consumers and more households in the United
9 States are going online to activate the ability to see and
10 pay bills than for any other reason that they're going
11 online. And that's important to understand when you think
12 about this issue of privacy and what we're doing about
13 ensuring it.

14 It is estimated that by 2006, more than half of
15 the United States banking households will be banking almost
16 exclusively online. So we're talking about a mainstream
17 issue here when you talk about privacy and the fact that
18 people's financial information is going to be online.

19 We are much more concerned about privacy and
20 security, which we link directly together, because they are
21 interrelated in our part of the business because that is
22 exactly what our customers demand.

23 We believe that we are in a business that is zero
24 defect tolerant in terms of errors and zero defect tolerant
25 in terms of privacy and security. We don't have any leeway

1 in that business whatsoever.

2 I will tell you that the
3 financial services industry is extremely aware of exactly
4 those facts. They're very aware that their consumers want
5 privacy, want security, want accuracy absolutely assured.
6 They're aware of it and because they're aware of it they
7 demand it from us as their service infrastructure provider.

8 The issue that is really complex is the fact that
9 while consumers demand almost perfect accuracy, security
10 and privacy, at the same time their challenge back to us is
11 I want all of that, I want it perfect, I want it complete.
12 I'll tell anybody who calls me and asks me about it that
13 that's what I want. I want it in total and I want it
14 complete.

15 And then they'll tell us, the service providers,
16 but by the way, I only want to use one password and I only
17 want to use it once. And don't do anything that gets in my
18 way from getting all of these services automatically and,
19 in fact, why aren't you doing more for me. And don't give
20 me more things to do online; give the online services
21 you're doing the ability to do more things for me.

22 It is a very real issue, and the issue, I think,
23 that is the most concerning to us when anything like this
24 hits the radar screens here in Washington and you have
25 people that are not in business and are not dealing with

1 these consumers in a real-life business application, is
2 that it is very easy to oversimplify the issue and decide
3 that what you want to do is pass laws to try to provide
4 perfect security just based on the reply that a consumer
5 gives to a simple question.

6 In reality it's a very complex issue and that is
7 consumers want privacy and security but they want no extra
8 work and they do not want what you do to get in the way of
9 the services that they demand that we provide.

10 What you have in our industry, the financial
11 services industry, is a very strong, probably the strongest
12 implementation of what John was just talking about and that
13 is the banking industry in the United States believes, and
14 in my personal opinion they are accurate in this belief,
15 that they exist today based on one constant and that is
16 they have consumer trust.

17 Over a hundred years -- while all of us love to
18 complain about our bank because it's part of the national
19 pastime -- when push comes to shove and you need some place
20 to secure your money you go to a bank.

21 The fact is today in this digital world you can
22 manage your finances almost anywhere with almost anyone and
23 as we go more online and as more gets digitized you're
24 going to be able to have even greater freedom.

25 But the fact is the banks are still by far, and

1 by banks I'm using a broad definition that includes
2 investment firms because that line obviously is clearly no
3 longer a line, what we trust, those trusted names, the
4 financial institutions, and we trust them because, quite
5 frankly, while they haven't provided the greatest kind of
6 service we want when we go in and stand in a teller line
7 and try to get the loan approved quickly and that sort of
8 thing, they have been very good at securing our trust.
9 They don't lose our money and they don't share information.
10 They don't allow data to get out easily. They are very,
11 very focused on this issue.

12 As a service provider I can tell you that in the
13 thousands of contracts we have with the thousands of
14 financial institutions that we serve, every single
15 agreement that we have has built into it the absolute
16 requirement that we secure the privacy, security and
17 accuracy of the consumer's financial information.

18 We very much need to be able to keep that kind of
19 trust. We very much need to be able to figure out how to
20 continue to improve that process, but at the same time what
21 we cannot have is impairment in our ability to be able to
22 provide that kind of improved security and privacy which
23 means we need access to information.

24 One of the critical things that we have to do
25 when someone goes online and signs on to a new online

1 financial service is we very much need to have the best
2 possible way we can to authenticate that that person who
3 wants to go online and access this information is indeed
4 that person.

5 If we're the front line in why people care so
6 much about identity theft, the only way that we do things
7 is accurately, and I can tell you we do it very well today.
8 We've improved tremendously almost on a twelve-month basis.

9 Each new release of the systems that we have put
10 out always has significant improvements in our ability to
11 authenticate and our ability to ensure privacy and our
12 ability to secure the accuracy of the system.

13 But that authentication capability is absolutely
14 dependent upon the kinds of information that we have to
15 access in order to be able to assure that identity theft
16 isn't taking place.

17 And I can assure you consumers want us to do that
18 and they want us to continue to improve that process. But
19 at the same time if we ask them in a simple form do you
20 want pure privacy they would say yes. They don't actually
21 know what is going on behind the scenes but they absolutely
22 will tell you that what they want is the most secure, most
23 private capability they can get.

24 Our experience is that the financial services
25 industry in the United States is operating, again, exactly

1 as John's talking about his industry and the people that he
2 serves are acting, and that is we have to defend the trust
3 that is in this system.

4 I can tell you that the financial services
5 industry is absolutely, acutely aware that if they lose
6 that trust they lose the main reason why consumers are
7 trusting them with their money and their lives will change.
8 The industry will change.

9 The industry is as focused on this issue as
10 anything I have ever seen them focused on in securing this
11 information. The industry is extremely aware, however, at
12 the same time that this is a complex issue, that we need to
13 continue to be able to access information so that we can
14 indeed provide the kind of privacy consumers want and
15 that's what makes it complex. To provide the absolute
16 privacy at levels that consumers want we need access to
17 information in order to be able to do that.

18 We, as a single infrastructure company in the
19 United States, have a budget for this specific area,
20 increasing the efficiency and the effectiveness of our
21 privacy and security systems. Our budget this year exceeds
22 \$10 million. In the scope of a \$500 million company that
23 is a significant investment but that is the kind of focus
24 that this industry has.

25 We deal with information that is about as

1 critical and as personal as you can get and the industry is
2 absolutely focused on making sure that we continue to earn
3 the trust that the industry has earned over the last
4 hundred years.

5 So in conclusion, our experience is that this is
6 a very complex issue. It's extremely important. It's very
7 important to consumers and they want it, but it's a complex
8 issue.

9 The idea of individual states making snap
10 decisions and fragmented decisions on these kinds of issues
11 so that we can't provide the same level of service across
12 the United States and the idea that questions are being
13 oversimplified so that the solutions become oversimplified
14 and end up getting in our way of being able to provide the
15 kind of privacy consumers want are the kinds of things that
16 concern us.

17 We believe very much that meetings like this are
18 very important because at the end this is a complex issue
19 that needs to be well understood. The full perspective of
20 what consumers in the United States really want, the full
21 understanding of what they really want is important and
22 ultimately we need all of that understanding to be able to
23 make wise, informed decisions.

24 MR. SEIFF: I apologize. If you want to interrupt
25 any time just go right ahead. First, let me start by

1 saying I absolutely agree with everything Pete said. My
2 conversation today will be a little bit different.

3 Number one, I want to tell a little story about
4 last summer. I love and am a slave to convenience.

5 My book reading habits have changed since Amazon
6 came into the world; it has just made it so much easier and
7 so much more convenient to shop for books that I have
8 become a slave to one-click shopping and have probably
9 doubled my consumption of books in the last two or three
10 years.

11 Last summer I went on to buy a book and I was in
12 my shopping cart and there were 34 Disney books in my
13 shopping cart. And so I picked up the phone and I'm just
14 buying my little book and I call my wife and I said, do we
15 really need all these Disney books, what was going on. And
16 she said I have no idea what you're talking about.

17 So I put two and two together. I went home. I
18 sat down with my four-year-old son. And he doesn't know
19 how to read or write. And I said, Reed, do you know --
20 that's his name, Reed -- do you know how to get to Amazon?
21 And he said, yes, Dad. Let me show you.

22 I had set up for him, because I'm teaching him
23 the Internet, I had set up for him a link to go to the
24 Disney site which he loved. He found on the Disney site
25 the Bear in the Big Blue House. He clicked on the books

1 link. It took him to an affiliate program at Amazon and he
2 learned how, by playing around, to put books in the
3 shopping cart.

4 For some freak reason my one-click shopping had
5 been turned off at home. If not, I would have found out by
6 having 34 books delivered to my door. So I have left it
7 disabled at home and continue to have it enabled in the
8 office. And so while trust and security and accuracy and
9 privacy are the pillars for sound business decisions they
10 are not enough. We need to give consumers choice.

11 What I want to talk about today is what choice
12 means and how it impacts companies like Bluefly. And just
13 to give you a little bit of background, Bluefly was started
14 five years ago. We sell men's and women's fashion. We did
15 about \$30 million last year selling brands like Prada,
16 Polo, Armani, Gucci and Diesel.

17 Our average retail prices are about 60 percent
18 off of store prices. We buy the stock six or eight weeks
19 or sometimes the end of the season and my guess is most of
20 you have never heard of us. So the ability to reach out to
21 you is fundamental to our success as a company over the
22 long term. And we have invested over \$60 million in
23 building a secure and accurate system and also reaching out
24 to consumers over the last five years.

25 What Bluefly -- and I apologize for taking some

1 on this but I think it's helpful in understanding how we
2 want to use information to fill this concept. What Bluefly
3 is trying to do is be the best of all retail worlds. It is
4 trying to be the first place where you can get the
5 selection of Bloomingdale's and Neiman's, the savings of a
6 Lohmann's or a T.J. Maxx, the service of a Nordstrom or a
7 Land's End and the convenience of a J. Crew.

8 Basically, what we would like to do is take the
9 traditional off-price store experience where you dig
10 through racks and bins and make it much simpler, much
11 nicer. Sit on your couch, have a cup of cappuccino and
12 we'll find you what you want to see.

13 This is what the women's department looks like
14 today. We're in a little more promotional mode than normal
15 but we put stuff together, outfits for summer fun. We have
16 Diesel starting at \$19.95. We have Fendi and Michael Korr
17 and Prada and Polo on the site. And without turning this
18 into an advertisement I just wanted to give you a little
19 bit of the picture of what we do.

20 Consumers don't need more stores. This country
21 is already overstored. The service levels are, at best,
22 acceptable and at worst inconsistent and unacceptable. And
23 when you want to save money, which I certainly do and I
24 assume there are several of you here who would like to,
25 it's not always the easiest thing to do.

1 It's inconvenient either because the average trip
2 to the mall is over two hours round trip or because when
3 you go to an off-price store to shop for savings you have
4 to dig through racks and bins. So the convenience level is
5 not comparable to going to The Gap, for example.

6 Our ability to compete as a start-up
7 fundamentally hinges on, among other things, the creative
8 use of information because by using that information we can
9 create a better experience and a better option for
10 consumers. And not surprisingly it includes our chance to
11 succeed as a company.

12 If we win, in my humble opinion, consumers get a
13 new hybrid form of retail. Our brands may not appeal to
14 everyone. Our savings may not appeal to everyone. Our
15 service may not appeal to everyone but we are creating a
16 very strong and small following amongst our customer base
17 and we'd like to expand that.

18 Our suppliers win also because we pay more for
19 product because we're presenting and selling it in a
20 different format. As a consequence their business
21 economics can and should change because they recover more
22 money from their excess inventory and our economy, in
23 theory, with thousands and millions of businesses like ours
24 would improve as well.

25 We, this year, employed 80 people. This business

1 didn't exist five years ago. In the last five years we've
2 invested over \$60 million in people, infrastructure and
3 marketing.

4 Here are some examples of companies that I like
5 that use information to my advantage. Number one, I talked
6 about Amazon. I do love one-click shopping. But even more
7 than that, I love knowing when an author that I like
8 releases a new book before it's released so I can pre-order
9 it and not have to check in the bookstores when the next
10 Nelson DeMille book is coming out.

11 I like going into a hotel. Last night I did not
12 have to give any information other than my credit card. I
13 got my king size bed and no smoking room and they didn't
14 need to ask for anything at the check in.

15 And I like having caller ID. There is nothing
16 more annoying than having a call while I'm having dinner
17 and I've gotten them on my cell phone at home on Saturdays.
18 And I am so protective of my information.

19 So I appreciate the two sides to this issue but
20 responsible businesses don't do that. And they shouldn't
21 be allowed to do that. So I am, I hope, have a balanced
22 perspective on this, both as a business owner and as a
23 consumer.

24 I'll give you an example of how we intend to use
25 information. If you go to look at women's pants at Bluefly

1 we have over one thousand different styles of pants and
2 that's probably too many, and why we're running the
3 business like that is something we're going to change. But
4 I would like to offer hundreds of pairs of pants, probably
5 not a thousand in the future.

6 What I would like to be able to do for each
7 customer over the next 12 months is identify, based on the
8 brands they've clicked on in their previous site visits or
9 even during that session which brands they are most likely
10 to be interested in, which price points they're most likely
11 to favor and then present the thousand pairs of pants to
12 them in the sequence that is most likely to interest them.

13 So sure, the company benefits, but the consumer
14 benefits too for not having to fill out forms, for not
15 having to dig through all of the thousand pairs of pants.

16 This is how we present it. Here there's only 63
17 products. There's seven pages of nine products but you can
18 see that with a thousand pairs of pants it's a 100 pages of
19 information that can be dug through by brand, by category,
20 by price, sorted by what is new.

21 Off-price retailers can't buy everything in every
22 size because by definition we buy end-of-season stock.
23 Bluefly can remember the size you wear provided we continue
24 to be allowed to so that we, if you choose to let us, will
25 only show you product that is available in your size.

1 That significantly reduces the level of
2 frustration and we measure this. We actually take customer
3 satisfaction surveys and we get a chance to see how this
4 sizing information impacts the customer.

5 The benefit to us, of course, is it allows us to
6 be more successful economically and therefore continue to
7 build more services and more features for the consumer.

8 Faster check-out. We've all been through this
9 online. It remembers everything for you. You don't need
10 to fill it out. And in our case we speed check-out to two
11 screens, a preview screen and then a final place-your-order
12 screen. My son still hasn't figured out how to break that
13 one.

14 This is one of my last two points. Just the
15 simple fact of knowing your ZIP code will allow us to
16 provide services. When it's raining, how about an umbrella
17 and a raincoat on the home page for you.

18 If there's a heat wave and you're in Maine in
19 November and you need some short-sleeved shirts and it's 80
20 degrees, and I have been in Maine at 80 degrees in
21 November, we could provide that level of service.

22 If you live in Chile customers can provide a
23 service for us. We have winter coats in April, how about
24 taking some of them off our hands at a great price. And
25 perhaps even sequencing product based on what other people

1 in your ZIP code like, in effect, aggregating information
2 to provide that.

3 The last point I'll make is even traditional
4 concepts help new companies. The ability to buy names, to
5 prospect, improves the economics of our business. It
6 allows customers who have never heard of us to find out
7 about us which we think is a service. It helps us acquire
8 profitable customers.

9 We can even buy keywords on the Internet so when
10 someone types in Prada a Bluefly ad can appear. That kind
11 of use of information can fundamentally alter the economics
12 of our business over the next five years.

13 I'll just hit the highlights of this. Four
14 percent of our customers generate 49 percent of our
15 profits. Understanding who those customers are allows us
16 to pick the products we sell to them. It allows us to
17 target market more effectively. It allows us to understand
18 what level of service we can provide for our customers as a
19 whole and has, in fact, allowed us to identify many new
20 strategic opportunities for our business. Thank you.

21 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Thank you very much, Ken.
22 And finally, Tom.

23 MR. SEDDON: Thank you. Well, I guess moving from
24 from a business that is all clicks I'm very happy to be
25 here in a business that is really all about bricks. As

1 opposed to many of the other panelists, we really, in the
2 hotels business, are the end-users for a lot of the types
3 of things you have heard about, particularly from the first
4 two gentlemen.

5 Our company, InterContinental Hotels Group is the
6 world's most global hotel company. We operate
7 InterContinental, Crowne Plaza, Holiday Inn, Holiday Inn
8 Express and Staybridge Suites Hotels. We have about 3300
9 hotels in just about a hundred countries around the world.
10 And every night we accommodate about half a million people
11 which means during a typical year we have got about 150
12 million guests choosing to stay with us. And that really
13 adds up to an awful lot of information. When I say we're a
14 bricks business one of the interesting things though, I
15 think, is just how dependent on the free flow of
16 information our industry is.

17 Like I said, we are a very global business and
18 while the actual act of being in the hotel and staying and
19 sleeping in the night is something that is very
20 straightforward and has been around for thousands of years
21 a lot of things to do with the process of making that
22 reservation and making that reservation easy for you and
23 making sure that when you show up at our hotel we know what
24 you like, as Ken was talking about, are absolutely
25 dependent on information.

1 One of the critical things for us as a business
2 is to be able to flow information not only between
3 countries and within countries but also between businesses.
4 The hotel industry is extremely, or the travel industry in
5 general is extremely effective in terms of exploiting a
6 network of interdependent partners.

7 So, for example, if you choose to make a booking
8 on Expedia for a Holiday Inn Hotel, that booking goes
9 through Expedia's system and you're providing them some
10 information. They need to get that information to us.
11 What we will do is put that into a centralized database
12 that we will then push out to the individual hotel so that
13 information is transferring between businesses.

14 And one of the things that isn't immediately
15 apparent to people is the extent to which even inside what
16 you might consider just our business we actually have a
17 number of partners. About 80 percent of our hotels are
18 actually franchised.

19 So we don't own and operate the majority of our
20 hotels. The majority of our hotels are actually owned and
21 operated by entrepreneurs, third-party businesses that, for
22 all legal purposes, are separate entities to us.

23 Yet, from the customer's point of view they see
24 it as part of the overall brand. And it's also very
25 important to us that each of those properties does appear

1 to the customer as part of the overall brand.

2 But I need to transfer all of the customer's
3 information between my business and that hotel there which
4 actually may be owned and operated by a completely separate
5 company within our standards and operating to our rules
6 which do include things like standards on privacy and
7 security.

8 So when you choose to make a booking and you
9 maybe phone up our reservation number, you're sitting in
10 Germany, and you may be talking to a reservation center
11 that's based in Amsterdam. That reservation center in
12 Amsterdam is transferring information to a data center in
13 Georgia.

14 That data center in Georgia is pulling
15 information from both what the customer is telling them and
16 from our center database, pulling information from the
17 local hotel about availability so that we can tell that
18 person who's calling in Germany right there and then
19 whether the hotel that they're looking for in Washington
20 has a room available or not.

21 And if it does, we take the customer's
22 information and we transfer it all the way down to the
23 hotel. We, to the extent the customer wants to, we
24 transfer that customer's preferences and information about
25 that customer that allows them to show up at 10:00 or 11:00

1 at night and check in immediately, which is one of the
2 biggest bugbears in the hotel business.

3 When you show up at a hotel, like I did, at
4 midnight last night you do not want to be standing around
5 for five minutes telling them again what your home address
6 is and what type of room you like and especially when you
7 say, well, I've been here ten times in the last three
8 months, perhaps you might know that. I've been to your
9 hotel brand 50 times in the last six months and perhaps you
10 really should kind of start to get to know me. So we
11 really do need to be able to facilitate that information
12 flow and it really has a huge value to customers.

13 About one-third of our business comes from
14 customers that choose to belong to our frequency program.
15 We have about 15 million people in our frequent traveler
16 program, Priority Club Awards. And those people have
17 actively chosen to join our program. We sign none of those
18 people up except through them actively choosing. We
19 obviously make the offer at the front desk particularly or
20 on the phone when the reservation is being made but we
21 don't enroll anybody in that without their choice.

22 So about a third of our customers have chosen to
23 join that and that program obviously gives them benefits in
24 terms of points and free hotel stays but also very
25 critically in terms of the information held about them.

1 And that's a great way for us to hold the
2 information about preference and credit card on file so
3 that if you're a frequency program member you can show up
4 at virtually any of our hotels in the world having made
5 your booking, they will have a key packet pre-made up for
6 you.

7 So you walk up to the front desk, say I'm Tom
8 Seddon, here's my identification and they'll give you the
9 key packet and then you walk to your room which is about as
10 good a reservation and check-in experience as you can
11 possibly get. And that's really where we are trying to go.

12 So people really do value the benefits they get
13 from the smooth reservation process, from our ability to
14 make that available everywhere that they want to be,
15 whether it's online, whether it's through a travel agent
16 system, whether it's through an 800 number, whether it's
17 calling the hotel direct, they need to be able to have a
18 very seamless process there.

19 And we have invested very large amounts of money
20 in facilitating that process and making sure that process
21 is secure and is something that people feel they can trust,
22 because our brands are really all about trust. If you
23 think about our business, Holiday Inn has been around for
24 over 50 years. InterContinental brand has been around for
25 over 50 years.

1 who is not. And that allows us to dramatically reduce the
2 amount of outbound mailing, for example, because I don't
3 want to waste my time and I don't want to waste my money
4 communicating with customers who have demonstrated they're
5 kind of not interested in the communication I'm sending to
6 them.

7 On the other hand, there's a great segment of
8 customers who really like the offers that we send them and
9 we are increasingly able to customize the offers. So, for
10 example, based on your past behavior, based on what I know,
11 for example, about the ZIP code perhaps that you live in, I
12 might send you an offer that's more family targeted or I
13 might send you an offer that's more targeted to a couples
14 breakaway or I might send you an offer that's more targeted
15 for just a business trip.

16 And again, increasing my ability to target means
17 that I'm less likely to send something that you just look
18 at and think, I have no idea why they sent me this and
19 throw it in the bin. So we have a very strong interest
20 even on the marketing side of things to make sure that our
21 information is used really well and to a large extent it's
22 all about reducing unwanted contacts with customers,
23 unnecessary contacts with customers.

24

25 So overall, I think the big thing from our

1 company's point of view particularly is ensuring that we do
2 get free global flow of information. That is something
3 where we have been on the front end of experiencing, for
4 example, the European Union's(EU) approaches and
5 particularly some of the fragmentation there and the lack
6 of clarity which makes it very difficult then to make sure
7 that you are complying with what is being required.

8 And to a large extent we generally feel that just
9 good common sense is what drives it anyway because we are
10 in the business of keeping customers happy. We're in the
11 business of keeping customers. That's what it's all about.

12 The hotel business is an extraordinarily
13 competitive business and so we really, really have to be
14 very focused on the information that we use and generally
15 feel like the ability to transmit that information
16 absolutely is in the customer's interest. And the fact
17 that so many customers so willingly give us so much
18 information kind of demonstrates that.

19 And we feel that we need to make sure that in the
20 interest of maintaining a healthy business going forward
21 that there is nothing that impedes that flow, either
22 directly or inadvertently.

23 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Thank you very much, Tom.
24 There have been several very interesting points here and I
25 want to start a general discussion about some issues. And

1 let me start with the issue of the incentives that you all
2 have to make sure the information is accurate and kept
3 private.

4

5 I guess one way to put this is what is the return
6 on investment for companies to use their information in a
7 way that consumers would consider responsible? Let me
8 start with Pete.

9 MR. KIGHT: I've got the easiest answer to that, I
10 think. The incentive for us in taking care of consumer
11 privacy and managing that information is our continued
12 existence. We, a long time before this became the big
13 issue, had to decide early on, because as you can imagine
14 in our systems, with more than 10 million consumer
15 households managing their finances through our systems we
16 have a lot of information.

17 And we had to make a decision early on whether we
18 thought that information was ours and which you would need
19 to decide if you thought you could resell it or do
20 something with it. And we came up with the novel concept
21 of asking the consumers who actually put in the
22 information, who do you think owns this information.

23 And it was not a shock to us to hear them say
24 well, we do and you don't. So our return on managing this
25 is pretty absolute and that is the consumer has said quite

1 clearly that is not your information. It's mine.

2 So our issue has always been and has been for
3 more than a decade we not only don't own that information
4 the consumer has told us it's ours and I'm paying you to
5 protect it. That is a big part of the service.

6 So that's why we, I mean, in this budget year
7 more than \$10 million is dedicated to that part of the
8 service. So we literally believe it is an integral part of
9 the basic service that they are buying from their financial
10 institution is that protection.

11 Again, at the same time, they are also saying we
12 want you to do all these other services and so we want you
13 to use information to get done what it is we want you to do
14 but we want absolute security and privacy in terms of our
15 financial information.

16 COMMISSIONER MURIS: John, did you want to chime
17 in here?

18 MR. THOMPSON: I think the thing that is most
19 important to us is to try to create a loyal relationship
20 with our customers. Obviously, the second transaction that
21 you do with a customer is far less expensive than the first
22 one.

23 Hence, if you violate the trust along the way,
24 the ability to create a loyal relationship and the ability
25 to drive down your cost to serve is substantially impaired

1 by that lack of trust.

2 So in our world we think creating a loyal, long-
3 lasting relationship bears itself out in lower cost to
4 serve and more revenue on the back end. So it's awfully,
5 awfully important that we manage the information that we
6 have that hopefully over time engenders the kind of loyalty
7 we want out of our customers.

8 MR. SEIFF: Can I add one thing to that?

9 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Sure.

10 MR. SEIFF: This is a binary issue. Trust is the
11 foundation for a successful business. And I would hate to
12 be an auto dealer. Can you imagine what goes on, having
13 nothing to do with privacy issues, but if you imagine what
14 goes on when a customer walks into an auto dealership they
15 are so skeptical of what they are going to be told and what
16 they are going to be sold that the hurdle that needs to be
17 overcome is insurmountable.

18 Running a retail store I want my customer coming
19 in and saying this place has credibility to me. I trust
20 that when they're pushing product they are not pushing
21 their weak product but they're pushing their best product
22 and, in fact, that is a business decision we have made, to
23 engender more trust.

24 And I trust that when I give them something they
25 are undertaking a fiduciary relationship with that

1 information. We operate that way. That is not even a
2 topic of conversation or debate in my organization and I
3 have never met a good company in this country in all the
4 conversations we have where this is not a binary issue.

5 You protect that information with the integrity
6 and perhaps even higher than you would your own. I give my
7 credit card out to my assistant all the time. I would
8 never think of doing something like with someone else's
9 credit card, even if it was my wife's because we protect
10 other people's information with a higher fiduciary
11 standard.

12 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Charles, did you want to --

13 MR. MORGAN: I was going to say something sort of
14 repetitive like being successful in businesses is all about
15 trust. And we recognized years ago as we were managing
16 information for a lot of large enterprises, and
17 particularly financial services companies, that this idea
18 of managing their customer data and their prospect
19 information with great care and high security was extremely
20 important to our customers.

21 We recognized a key business risk early on that
22 trust that we had with our customers, if we allowed
23 anything to happen with their information and that customer
24 data was not properly protected, then our customers would
25 very likely find a new provider of service.

1 Early on, you know, Jennifer Barrett was named
2 chief privacy officer in 1990, and I think one of the first
3 in the country, because we wanted to really understand this
4 concept of privacy and data use and keep it as one of the
5 core concepts and principles that guided our business's
6 development.

7 It was so important to us that we made it one of
8 the core functions in our business and it remains that
9 today. And for the last five years Jennifer and a staff
10 does nothing else but deal with this issue, privacy and
11 data use and maintaining these trusted relationships.

12 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Thank you. Tom, did you
13 want to add anything?

14 MR. SEDDON: Again I would absolutely echo what
15 everybody has said about the importance of trust. Our
16 company depends on the value of its brands and the brands
17 are only as good as what customers think about them. So we
18 are always extremely concerned to make sure we do nothing
19 to damage the value of those brands in people's minds.

20 If you think about our hotels do about \$10
21 billion of revenue a year, the real estate backing them up
22 is worth about \$30 billion. So there is so much money tied
23 up in the brands. There's so much money tied up in what
24 the brands mean in terms of the real estate that the
25 protection of that customer franchise has enormous economic

1 value to us.

2 It is something that we place a huge amount of
3 importance on, not only in terms of some of the high-tech
4 stuff but even down to something as simple as one of our
5 simple, most basic, global standards. In every hotel we
6 have, everywhere in the world, when you walk up to the
7 front desk and the front desk person hands you your key
8 they should never, ever say your room number aloud. Very
9 simple, absolute bedrock standard for us.

10 So they should write it on the thing, give it to
11 you, because even the act of saying your room number aloud
12 at the front desk where someone else might hear it we
13 consider a completely outrageous violation of privacy.

14 So it's everything from the most complicated
15 network protection consideration down to something as
16 simple as front desk training and making sure that you
17 never ever say a guest's room number aloud, because we have
18 so much money tied up in making sure that we never break
19 that trust.

20 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Let me ask a question and I
21 think I'd probably like to start with Charles about
22 accuracy versus predictability and maybe versus is the
23 entirely wrong word but I suspect there are some trade-offs
24 there somewhere. Is predictive really what you're getting
25 at? Is there some difference?

1 MR. MORGAN: Yes, there is quite a bit of
2 difference. I would say that accurate data is by far more
3 predictive however, so that those two concepts are related,
4 very much so. If you have a lot of inaccurate data you're
5 going to get inaccurate predictions or at least less
6 precise predictions. Even inaccurate data has some
7 predictive value but it's not nearly as good as accurate
8 data.

9 But also inaccurate data costs us when we're
10 trying to link data -- we're talking about hotel data --
11 what if we misconnect customers, and we're talking about
12 just in the hotel example, inaccurate data and you start
13 giving somebody who is a nonsmoker a smoking preference and
14 all of a sudden they say what do you mean? I've been a
15 customer.

16 Well, inaccurate data can create customer
17 relationship problems. You target people with very
18 inappropriate kinds of things or you target people that
19 have asked to be opted out -- they may be a good customer
20 of yours but you start mailing to them because your
21 suppression process isn't good.

22 Inaccurate data can kill you in so many ways.
23 You can be trying to create a better customer experience,
24 as at Bluefly, and if you mistarget you can actually create
25 a bad customer experience. So inaccurate data can hurt you

1 in a lot of ways, not the least of which is if you mail to
2 somebody at an address they don't currently occupy it is a
3 totally wasted communication. But those two concepts are
4 connected.

5 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Ken.

6 MR. SEIFF: There are economic reasons. I prefer
7 accurate data and good predictive data and the example that
8 comes to mind is last summer we tested e-mailing people who
9 had bought a brand of product, saying here are new arrivals
10 in that brand.

11 We had a 784 or 584 percent increase in
12 conversion. So we're now building out the technology to
13 automate that and do that on a regular basis because what
14 it does is it shifts us in our e-mail campaign from a semi-
15 service, semi-marketing role to a pure service role. If
16 you like Prada and we get Prada you don't need to come to
17 us we'll come to you and let you know, if you opt in for
18 that service.

19 This is a very powerful economic driver and I am
20 reminded of a friend of mine who called me last week and he
21 said, Ken, got your e-mail on the Vera Wang dresses. Which
22 one do you suggest I buy? He wasn't going to fit into any
23 of them. We not only didn't get the sale but we probably
24 did ourselves a disservice by sending a wasted
25 communication. If you do that enough people start to

1 ignore your communications.

2 The economic impact of this is so profound that
3 even if we weren't all up here saying we want to be good
4 citizens, we all want to run good businesses. And so the
5 powerful economic driver here is build the trust, keep the
6 information accurate and the company will be rewarded
7 through higher levels of trust and better performance with
8 whatever communication or whatever marketing tools you use.

9 COMMISSIONER MURIS: The four percent that you
10 mentioned, do you do something special to get more data
11 from them other than that they make more purchases?

12 MR. SEIFF: We haven't treated them differently on
13 the data capture side yet. We're still an evolving
14 business. We put every customer into quadrants in terms of
15 profitability and just as an aggregate number in terms of
16 profitability and revenue generation.

17 What we discovered is when you match that
18 quadrant against the brands that our least profitable
19 customers buy and our most profitable customers don't buy
20 we could eliminate millions of dollars of inventory
21 investment that we didn't need.

22 So that kind of information so far has been used
23 for merchandising and marketing more than it has been in
24 terms of approaching it from a segmentation of data
25 capture.

1 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Tom?

2 MR. SEDDON: I would say that what we found is
3 that for both accuracy and predictiveness the best data is
4 the information that customers want to give us. It's a lot
5 easier to keep data accurate that customers have a real
6 interest in us having accurate data on.

7 For our frequent traveler program, for our
8 priority club members, they like to tell us when they
9 change their address because if you've got 50,000 points
10 built up and you move, you're keen to not lose those
11 points. Or to the point about the smoking/nonsmoking we
12 probably wouldn't usually have that preference wrong more
13 than one trip because you would come and say this isn't
14 right, fix your system.

15 I would rather ask customers if they're
16 interested in sharing information like, for example, on our
17 website, online is huge for us right now. We probably do
18 about \$3 million a day, so close to a billion dollars a
19 year right now. So it's a huge distribution channel.

20 We were looking at a lot of stuff in terms of
21 trying to figure out where people want to go and looking at
22 their purchase patterns and what can you do with that. And
23 then we said, wouldn't it be a whole lot easier to just
24 have a little button that says, would you like to tell us
25 your favorite hotels? Because typically, if you travel a

1 lot, you tend to go back to a lot of the same places all
2 the time.

3 So rather than going through the brain damage of
4 trying to figure out from your behavior what your favorite,
5 where you might like to go, we just kind of said would you
6 like to tell us. And surprise, surprise, we have probably,
7 I think, well over a million customers now who have already
8 put their list of their four or five hotels.

9 So they go to the website. Instead of drilling
10 through I want to go to Atlanta and now look at the 30
11 hotels and find the one I want and the room, it's just like
12 click again, repopulate basically exactly what you booked
13 last time and you say that's what I want again. Thank you.

14 It's a whole lot easier we find to keep
15 information accurate and it's a whole lot more predictive
16 when you're working with stuff that customers actually care
17 about. So that's generally our big approach.

18 MR. MORGAN: Can I jump in here? I know you like
19 data so let me give you some data from 18 different travel
20 and entertainment customers of Acxiom that was submitted
21 from their customer prospect files.

22 Interestingly enough, we found about 6 percent
23 duplicates on those files but slightly more disturbing were
24 1.44 percent deceased. I think the point here is there's a
25 lot of change and it's not simple to keep that data

1 accurate even if you try as hard as you can.

2 MR. SEDDON: Absolutely not. And we don't want to
3 keep data that is not useful and is not accurate because
4 it's just you have a huge amount of overhead then
5 associated with hanging onto that. So we try to be pretty
6 mindful about not picking stuff up that isn't useful.

7 COMMISSIONER MURIS: John?

8 MR. THOMPSON: Well, our system depends upon
9 customer participation in ensuring the accuracy of the data
10 because we run an alerting service about Internet threats.
11 It's important that customers tell us how they want to be
12 contacted, when they want to be contacted, and what kind of
13 information they want us to contact them about.

14 Hence, if a new threat emerges on the Internet
15 and if you want to be paged by e-mail about it, any time
16 your pager number changes, if you don't tell us what that
17 is, you are not likely to be alerted in the manner in which
18 you expect it. If your e-mail address changes you're not
19 likely to get an e-mail alert from us.

20 So it's awfully, awfully important that our
21 customers participate in the process of keeping the
22 information fresh. And hence, we do an awful lot to make
23 sure that that is the case because in many instances an
24 alert in advance of an outbreak by a matter of days, if not
25 hours, can prevent a disastrous network effect for one of

1 our customers and hence the alerting process and the
2 accuracy of the information that underpins that is
3 critically important.

4 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Pete?

5 MR. KIGHT: The only thing I think new that I
6 would add to that, is your question further clarifies the
7 issue of why this is more complex than some of the
8 oversimplistic approaches that you read about. Our
9 customers demand near-perfect accuracy and near-perfect
10 predictability and they simply won't accept anything else.

11 This is much more complex than solving this with
12 an opt in, opt out type of approach. In essence, an opt
13 in, opt out type of approach like some of the
14 oversimplistic ones I've seen would leave us in a position
15 of saying to that customer when they log in and we need to
16 authenticate them, would you like to be authenticated well
17 or would you not like to have the authentication go very
18 well and we'll take a guess because I need your Social
19 Security number if I want to do 3.06 Sigma level
20 authorization. It doesn't work like that. You can't opt
21 in, opt out. It's just much more complex than that.

22 One other thing I would add because being as a
23 business person, especially if you have the title CEO,
24 these days you sort of sit up here and listen to all these
25 CEOs and you realize nobody is going to trust us right now

1 when we talk about how you should trust us.

2 We talk about all this trust. Now, all
3 of us have pointed out that we have to understand that
4 people need to trust us if we want to stay in business.
5 We're not asking you to trust us because we're good people;
6 because we have CEO titles you assume we're not. We're
7 saying you need to trust us because we understand that that
8 is what customers absolutely require if we want to stay in
9 business.

10 One of the issues that's vastly overlooked in
11 this whole discussion is the digitization of information
12 that has brought up this whole privacy issue. At the same
13 time what's coming along is business is becoming more and
14 more digitized and the information flow more free; the
15 velocity of choice that is going to consumers is
16 accelerating dramatically.

17 By velocity of choice I mean in today's world and
18 even greater in tomorrow's world if you don't like the way
19 we've acted you can change us with a press of a button. In
20 my business, in financial services, what's going to happen
21 within the next five years is you're going to be able to
22 change financial service providers with the press of a
23 button.

24 So that's why I say at the same time that this
25 digitization is making this privacy issue a complex issue

1 it's also giving the consumer immensely more control over
2 their own destiny. If you don't earn their trust they can
3 change you with the press of a button. And, in fact, even
4 in Tom's case, as he's pointed out, he's now doing so much
5 business online that they can change him with the press of
6 a button and just pick a new favorite hotel if he doesn't
7 earn their trust.

8 So consumers are actually gaining a lot of power
9 out of this whole process but what you're reading about is
10 just one side of the issue.

11 COMMISSIONER MURIS: We've got time for another
12 question and let me start with Tom. What would it mean if
13 exchanges of consumer information were prohibited. I mean,
14 would public data like census data be useful and what would
15 the impact be on consumers?

16 MR. SEDDON: Well, for us, if we were not able to
17 exchange data, let's take an extreme example and say we
18 couldn't exchange data with any other kind of company, any
19 other separate legal entity. That would basically mean
20 that no hotel company in the world, no travel company in
21 the world would be able to take your booking. You would
22 basically have to. Contact the individual endpoint.

23 The hotel business would go back to before 1958,
24 I think, when we came out with the first centralized
25 reservation system, Holidex, and the concept of an 800

1 number you could call for any hotel.

2 So you would go back to if I want to go to
3 Washington I've got to get the phone number of the specific
4 hotel in Washington that I want to book and I have to call
5 them up and that hotel has got to keep a little list right
6 there with their own little database that they can't share
7 with anybody.

8 If you went to one Holiday Inn, and had a
9 preference for a nonsmoking room and then went to another
10 Holiday Inn they would not be able to know that you liked a
11 nonsmoking room. You would have to keep giving people your
12 same information again and again and again.

13 I think it would really basically eliminate a lot
14 of the convenience that has developed and a lot of the
15 things we totally take for granted in terms of the ease
16 with which, particularly in the travel business, you can
17 book and conduct travel. If you think back to the way
18 hotels were in the 1920s, that's really where we'd be back
19 to.

20 COMMISSIONER MURIS: If it was an opt-in world and
21 people had to every time or at least initially take the
22 time to give you the permission to use their information in
23 the future would that work or is that what you do now?

24 MR. SEDDON: It's kind of what we do now. To a
25 very large extent most of the things we do now are opt in,

1 and again, there's a different technical definition to opt
2 in. So, for example, in Europe, we are required to go to
3 some pretty extreme lengths on a reservation.

4 When you make a reservation there's a little
5 issue because the legal situation is very gray, which is
6 extremely unhelpful to business. When you make a
7 reservation we have to tell you that your information is
8 going to be transferred overseas and back again and ask if you
9 care about that.

10 And nobody really cares about it when we ask do
11 you care I'm going to transfer your information, your
12 booking from France to Germany. Do you care I'm going to
13 transfer your information via a computer in Atlanta? No, I
14 don't. And why are you even bothering to tell me? And the
15 fact you're telling me starts to make me wonder what the
16 heck is going on.

17 So that has a big cost to us because we've got to
18 spend talk time then on the phone and if you look
19 worldwide, a second of talk time is something like a
20 quarter of a million dollars. Perhaps it's only like five
21 or ten seconds to say that. Well, yes, but that can be two
22 and a half million dollars for us.

23 Simple terms like opt in and opt out really often
24 are very fraught with danger because people think they're
25 very straightforward and simple and then when you actually

1 get down to the practical implementation it's much more
2 gray than it's made to appear.

3 COMMISSIONER MURIS: John?

4 MR. THOMPSON: If you were to think about global
5 business it is, candidly, made up of more small and medium
6 businesses than super large enterprises around the world.
7 Therefore, if I was not able to share information about my
8 customers and their preferences with my business partners
9 who help me reach many of the small to medium-size
10 businesses around the world that would be devastating not
11 just to our company but to the global economy in general.
12 The notion of a partner network to serve the needs of a
13 far-flung set of small to medium-size users is critically,
14 critically important to the business community at large.

15 Therefore if in some manner information exchange
16 or information flows between business partners was
17 interrupted I think it would have a devastating effect on
18 the economy around the world.

19 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Charles?

20 MR. MORGAN: I would just add to that if we had
21 purely an opt in system it would be great for the large
22 companies but it would be terrible for the new
23 entrepreneurial companies, Bluefly and Symantec and many
24 others that are trying to grow and spread their market from
25 a smaller base.

1 It would be a tremendous barrier to
2 entrepreneurial startup businesses and the formation and
3 growth of the business. You know, the jobs in this country
4 come from small business. We would definitely slow that
5 process down significantly.

6 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Pete?

7 MR. KIGHT: In terms of financial services, I
8 guess the one point I would make is ironically the more you
9 impair the basic ability to double check financial
10 information with authorization what you do is significantly
11 reduce our ability to secure privacy and security.

12 So, in fact, again back to the issue of it's very
13 complex. If you put the wrong rules in place so that we
14 can't exchange the right kind of information, I can't
15 provide you with the privacy that secures your information.

16 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Ken?

17 MR. SEIFF: If I could presume to speak on behalf
18 of startups and small companies, when you start a business
19 there is only thing you need and that's customers. It's
20 hard enough already to start a small business. We've spent
21 \$60 million, as I said before, starting a small company.

22 I hope it works and it becomes a big company but
23 impede that any more and we would not have been a survivor
24 of the Internet bust. And I think it's only getting
25 tougher now.

1 I'll be interested to see what happens with the
2 spam regulations. I have a feeling they're going to hurt
3 good companies and not do anything to the bad companies no
4 matter how well crafted the legislation is.

5 This opt in, opt out is a huge issue and I don't
6 want to presume to even set a standard for what opt in
7 means or what opt out means but we have found the shift
8 from going to opt in to opt out is dramatic and, in effect,
9 as long as the customer still retains control of what
10 they're doing and what we can do with that information I
11 don't think there's a great difference to the consumer but
12 there is a huge economic impact to businesses.

13 I would say on behalf of small businesses, please
14 don't shut us down from acquiring new customers entirely.
15 We're happy to operate responsibly and follow any
16 guidelines that come from the government on this front. I
17 think we would be very supportive of guidelines as long as
18 they allow us to continue to stay in business.

19 COMMISSIONER MURIS: Our time is up. I wanted to
20 thank everyone and I'm just sitting here thinking of the
21 opportunity cost of all of your time to be here. Unlike
22 when we have lawyers in front of us whose opportunity costs
23 are a lot less than yours, at least in terms of real impact
24 on the economy, I very much appreciate your time and I
25 would appreciate all joining in giving you a round of

1 applause.

2 (Appause.)

3 COMMISSIONER MURIS: We'll reconvene at 10:15 for
4 Commissioner Swindle.

5 (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

6 COMMISSIONER SWINDLE: That was a great first
7 session. I was impressed with it and I hope you
8 appreciated it as well. I hope the rest of the day will be
9 the same.

10 The first thing I'd like to do is thank Maureen
11 Ohlhausen for her coordination of this event and all the
12 staff that worked on it. I believe that probably one of
13 the best things we do at the Federal Trade Commission comes
14 in the form of these workshops where we put the facts as
15 best we know them, and we will never know them perfectly,
16 but we put them on the table for all people who are
17 involved in industry, in the Congress, in the state
18 legislatures, the law firms and the regulators, and the
19 consumers and the customers and the businesses to
20 understand better what we are dealing with here.

21 I'd like to thank Chairman Muris and our
22 distinguished guests for the incredibly insightful opening
23 panel. Obviously, these gentlemen that were here have vast
24 and very challenging responsibilities and to take time out
25 to come here and be with us is really quite an opportunity

1 for us. We really appreciate John Thompson of Symantec,
2 Pete Kight of CheckFree, Tom Seddon of InterContinental,
3 Ken Seiff of Bluefly and Charles Morgan of Acxiom for being
4 with us.

5 We're taking an incredibly important first step,
6 I think, in trying to bring forward the concept of cost and
7 benefits in information flow and the importance that that
8 information flow plays in our economy in a macro sense, and
9 certainly as Ken was pointing out in a micro sense for up
10 and coming businesses. If we do the wrong thing with
11 legislation and policy we can really cause some problems.

12 I particularly appreciated Pete Kight's reference
13 to the often, too often used concept of oversimplicity. I
14 could not help but agree as he was talking about the
15 problems that we face when we sometimes take very complex
16 problems and try to oversimplify them and then legislate
17 based on that.

18 So much of what happens in this country is
19 driven, at least in the legislative process, by an
20 emotional reaction to something we perceive as good or bad
21 and that we have to do something about. And oftentimes for
22 expediency purposes we do tend to oversimplify in the
23 legislature, both state and federal; we say okay, let's
24 pass something. We've done our job. Problem solved, let's
25 go to the next problem.

1 Oftentimes we have actually just laid down a much
2 worse problem. I couldn't help but think of the
3 conversation I had with Jeff Bezos a couple of years ago
4 out at a conference out at Aspen.

5 He told the story about when they first got
6 Amazon going they had no idea that this thing would really
7 take off and they were operating, if I recall correctly,
8 out of his mother's home, actually her garage, and they
9 were getting the books shipped in to them and they were
10 filling a few orders.

11 And all of a sudden it started to pick up and
12 they were wrapping the books in something like Saran Wrap
13 on the floor of the garage and, you know, eventually they
14 were going seven days a week, 24 hours a day. They're down
15 on their knees wrapping these books.

16 And Jeff says, you know, it was getting painful.
17 Our knees were getting bloody and he said finally, it just
18 occurred to me like a flash of light coming: I stood up
19 and said, guys, you know what we need? We need some knee
20 pads. And one of his guys -- all these guys were engineers
21 said no, no Jeff. We need a table.

22 He tried to oversimplify and solve a problem and
23 he was immediately getting himself in hot water because he
24 didn't have any talent in that respect. This is a
25 brilliant guy and he's a funny speaker. If you've never

1 heard him take the opportunity. He's a great speaker.

2 But that's part of the problem, oversimplifying
3 things, looking for solutions; typically, we come up with
4 the wrong one.

5 Our goal today is to elevate the debate beyond
6 the anecdote and the seven-second sound bite to get some
7 actual data to give us a clearer understanding of the costs
8 and the benefits of the free flow of information. I love
9 it when OECD(Organization for Economic Cooperation and
10 Development) and the EU tell InterContinental that if you
11 want to do this you have got to assure us that the people
12 agree with you.

13 As was illustrated by every speaker you have to
14 prove it to yourself because these businesses are trying to
15 make happy customers. They're trying to keep those
16 customers. They have every incentive to do it the right
17 way.

18 I don't think assuring some government
19 organization is necessarily going to improve that because
20 that falls far short of what their motivation is. Their
21 motivation is the right motivation. It's profit. It's
22 shareholder value. It's happy consumers who come back and
23 come back and come back.

24 The use of data benefits consumers in many, many
25 ways: the quick access to credit, the personalization of

1 goods and services, and as was mentioned, the instant
2 increase in choices.

3 I was marveling at Pete's comment also that in
4 the near future you'll be able to change your credit
5 services by the mere punch of a button. You know, have any
6 of you changed your long distance service provider
7 recently?

8 I hope when we get to that point that the punch
9 of a button works better than that process because that's
10 not a one button punch. That's sometimes days and weeks of
11 getting it straightened out.

12 Consumer concerns about the privacy of personal
13 data as reflected by every one of these very senior
14 officials, most CEOs, is that it's also very important to
15 those business.

16 All of the consumers' concerns have to be
17 respected by businesses. And we've got to work together to
18 ensure that our approach both protects privacy and
19 preserves the important benefits of this information flow
20 for our society, our economy and consumers and literally to
21 the world economy because that is where we're going.

22 Today's workshop is about finding the best policy
23 solutions based on facts and data, so I say to our
24 panelists today, and we've got another distinguished group
25 here, check your anecdotes at the door. To rephrase a

1 memorable line from the movie Jerry Maguire, show me your
2 data.

3 The Commission testified last month that the
4 FCRA, the Financial Credit Reporting Act, helps make
5 possible the vitality of the modern consumer market
6 providing a carefully balanced framework giving us the
7 benefits that result from the free, fair and accurate flow
8 of consumer data.

9 To my friends who support the reauthorization of
10 that legislation, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, show us
11 the data. To my friends who oppose reauthorizing the Fair
12 Credit Reporting Act, show us the data. Your data, and
13 particularly if you oppose it, is especially important
14 since you have the burden of showing why we need a change
15 in the way it already exists.

16 Putting facts on the table informs policy makers.
17 It informs those of us in the regulation business. It
18 informs consumers. It informs businesses. It is the way
19 to do things, and to do things right by dealing with facts
20 and less emotion.

21 Our panel moderator is Peggy Twohig. She is the
22 Assistant Director of Financial Practices. We have a busy
23 day ahead of us and I think this panel will be just as
24 entertaining as the last one. Thank you very much for
25 being here.

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(Applause.)

MS. TWOHIG: Good morning everyone. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to moderate this discussion by such distinguished panelists. The purpose of the panel is to discuss more specifically the costs and benefits of information flows used in credit transactions.

We have a lot of ground to cover, so I want to get started right away. Our panel represents an impressive amount of experience dealing with credit information issues from all kinds of perspectives. They will each present brief remarks with the hope that we can get to questions and a discussion at the end of some more specific issues. Our first speaker is Fred Cate, distinguished professor of Law from Indiana University.

Next, we'll hear from Pete McCorkell who is senior counsel at Wells Fargo. Then we'll hear from Bill Gossett who is president of Islands Community Bank in South Carolina. Then we have Andrea Fike, Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of Fair Isaac.

Then we have Laura Desoto who is senior Vice President at Experian. And then we'll hear from Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director at Consumer Federation of America and finally from Evan Hendricks who is Editor and Publisher of Privacy Times. And without further ado we'd

1 like to get started with Fred Cate.

2 MR. CATE: Thank you very much. I very much
3 appreciate the chance to be here. I appreciate the fact
4 that the Commission is hosting this. It's difficult to
5 imagine a more important topic and the opportunity for a
6 more thoughtful discussion of it than in the sort of
7 political highlight of Capitol Hill hearings. It's
8 something we are all particularly grateful for.

9 I have been asked to try to set the groundwork
10 for all of the panelists by talking briefly about credit
11 reporting generally before turning to more of the topic of
12 the impact of credit reporting.

13 Credit reporting, as certainly the vast majority
14 of you know, is a tremendous volume business. 200 million
15 individual credit files are maintained by the three
16 national credit reporting agencies.

17 One and a half billion separate credit accounts
18 are reflected in those files, and in many ways it's much
19 more accurate to think of files in terms of accounts
20 because all a file is is linking together disparate account
21 data. Credit accounts include updates of 2 billion items
22 of trade line information a month, 2 million public record
23 items a month, and 2 million credit reports a day.

24 Now, the content of credit reports is actually
25 quite simple and often widely misunderstood. They include

1 identification information, information on open trade
2 lines, basic information on outstanding balance, credit
3 limits, date account opened, payment history and so forth.

4 Additionally included are public record data,
5 information on bankruptcies or legal collection and other
6 collections information, and then finally inquiries on the
7 credit file, including the date and identity of the
8 inquirer for the past two years.

9 Information not found in credit reports would
10 include employment information, income, race, other
11 lifestyle indicators. Credit scores, for example, is
12 something that credit bureaus are often being asked to
13 change or disclose, but they don't have them.

14 Other than if there's a credit account with a
15 health care provider, no specific health information would
16 be included. And probably most important, no discrete
17 purchase information. In other words, not what you buy or
18 what you write checks for. That would not be found in a
19 credit report.

20 Credit report content again comes from many, many
21 places, but they fortunately divide easily into three
22 categories: public records, creditors, which is the source
23 of the vast majority of information, and collection
24 agencies.

25 It's probably most important to note here all

1 sources of credit report information are voluntary. No one
2 is required to supply information to a credit bureau. In
3 fact, one of the major issues involving credit reporting
4 and the granting of credit over the past decade has been
5 the question of financial institutions not being willing to
6 report information on best customers in an effort to
7 protect them from competition.

8 This is a very long slide for a very simple
9 point. It's just to give you sort of a practical look at
10 credit reports. This is a survey of about a quarter of a
11 million credit reports done in June of 1999. What you see
12 87 percent had information on credit accounts and those
13 break down largely in banks and financial companies,
14 somewhat less with retailers.

15 Public record data at 12 percent, collection
16 agency data at 30 percent. Inquiries had been made on the
17 credit file within the past two years in just over half of
18 the cases and interestingly, and I'll come back to this,
19 there was no current derogatory information in 85 percent
20 of the files looked at in 1999.

21 Now, what are credit reports used for? Well, as
22 you all know, the FCRA provides a list of permissible
23 purposes. These include fairly obvious things like if the
24 customer provides written instruction saying I want you to
25 provide a credit report, or if a court issues a court

1 order.

2 I want to just touch on one other in some greater
3 detail. One of the permitted purposes is for prescreening.
4 And this, of course, is very much at the center of the
5 current legislative debate over FCRA. Prescreening of
6 credit information for the purpose of marketing firm offers
7 of credit or insurance conditioned, of course, on having an
8 opt out system.

9 As you know, as of 2001, we saw just over 5
10 billion prescreened credit card mailings. So this is a
11 major use of credit reports, and it is the primary way in
12 which new credit accounts are opened in this country. And
13 it is, by all accounts, increasing.

14 Another use of credit reports is that credit
15 information may be shared among affiliated companies or
16 entities, among persons related by common ownership or
17 affiliated by corporate control.

18 Again, this is conditioned on there being an opt
19 out opportunity and clear and conspicuous notice to the
20 consumer that the sharing will take place prior to the
21 sharing actually taking place.

22 Now, let me turn, to conclude, to some of the
23 issues regarding the impact of credit report data. The
24 other panelists are going to address each of these in far
25 greater detail, so I'm going to take advantage of that fact

1 to speed through them very quickly. We see three broad
2 overarching benefits.

3 One is that credit reporting gives a
4 comprehensive, reliable picture of demonstrated consumer
5 behavior. It's not a guess. It's not a prediction. It's
6 data about what has happened in the past. It therefore
7 substitutes data for prejudice or guesswork. It allows a
8 creditor to make a decision based on actual reported,
9 recorded data. And it makes this data available
10 nationwide.

11 Because of the efficiency of centralizing that
12 information in comparatively few locations, it makes them
13 available at much lower cost than would otherwise be the
14 case if each creditor had to collect its own data.

15 Now, let me just quickly sort of break these down
16 into slightly smaller, discrete points. One is that, of
17 course, it facilitates nationwide competition and has been
18 tremendous benefit to consumers in mortgages and credit
19 cards because it means now that you are no longer held
20 captive. If you live in Bloomington, Indiana, as I do, you
21 would know what that means. You are no longer held captive
22 to your local bank or your local credit offers.

23 It certainly results in lower cost and prices
24 from many reasons. These are just various indicators of
25 those lower costs or prices but we see this reflected

1 significantly in interest rates.

2 And it's not just an overall economic effect on
3 the interest rate. If you look at the last example there
4 we see revolving credit actually offering a lower interest
5 rate, dropping even when compared with, say, T-bill rates.
6 So that we see this significant impact of the data
7 aggregation here far beyond just the general trend in the
8 economy.

9 Perhaps most importantly it means more people
10 have access to more credit, and this is incredibly
11 significant. Let me give you an example of why that is,
12 because what it means is that people who would otherwise
13 not receive credit get access to credit, in many instances
14 for the first time.

15 So, for example, this slide shows the change in
16 the proportion of U.S. households using nonmortgage credit
17 from 1970 when the FCRA was adopted to 2001; what you see
18 is in the lowest quintile by income it's almost 70 percent,
19 68 percent increase over this 30-year period. Again, a
20 very significant increase in the next to lowest. Among the
21 people with the largest income or economic resources, if
22 you take the top two quintiles, for example, it averages
23 less than 5 percent increase.

24 So the dramatic benefit of this expansion of this
25 information being available is felt by people who have the

1 greatest need for it, who have been the least served prior
2 to this system. It leads to more accurate credit decisions
3 which therefore means fewer delinquencies.

4 There are many examples of this; I've already
5 mentioned the 85.3 percent of credit files with no
6 derogatory information. Really all of the indicators would
7 suggest that people are carrying more credit but are still
8 carrying it responsibly.

9 It gives families and the economy as a whole a
10 cushion against bad times, something we have all been
11 living through. I have here the quote from Walter
12 Kitchenman that almost universal reporting of personal
13 information is not only the foundation of consumer credit
14 but a secret ingredient of the U.S. economy's resilience
15 and that certainly has been more important than ever over
16 the past few years.

17 It makes relocation by individuals easier. It
18 also makes travel by individuals easier. Greater speed,
19 choice and convenience for consumers. You've already heard
20 the Chairman's remarks this morning and, in fact, probably
21 the best example really is the one that he gave which is
22 the ability to get approval, for example, of a mortgage
23 often in a couple of minutes, of a car loan, a very quick
24 service and a very convenient service.

25 Fraud prevention will be talked about later.

1 Identity verification now required under the USA Patriot
2 Act. Again, likely to become an important use. And making
3 the financial services sector in general more transparent,
4 resilient and subject to legal oversight.

5 In closing, the quote with which I think you're
6 familiar from the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
7 Alan Greenspan, about the U.S. financial services sector
8 being more transparent and stronger in general as a result
9 of access to this information. So let me stop there.
10 Thank you for your patience.

11 MS. TWOHIG: Thank you, Fred. Pete.

12 MR. MCCORKELL: Wells Fargo has sort of the
13 interesting history of having started in the days when
14 being a financial institution meant that you kept money and
15 gold and things like that in safe boxes and vaults and you
16 moved it around by stagecoach. We don't do that anymore.
17 The amount of financial transactions that take place using
18 hard currency or folding money is really pretty trivial
19 compared to the overall economy.

20 Financial services now is an information
21 business. Basically, this person has a credit of this
22 much, and this person has a debit of this much. It's
23 keeping that information straight is what financial
24 services is all about today.

25 A number of the speakers on the first panel

1 mentioned the trade-off between security and convenience.
2 That is a tremendous issue for us in the financial services
3 community, and striking that balance right is a continuing
4 challenge.

5 If you think about credit in particular, I would
6 say you can break down the cost into four basic categories.
7 First, what we call acquisition cost or what probably most
8 of you would think of as marketing cost. And that may be
9 marketing to new customers or acquiring new customers or
10 getting existing customers to use additional products or
11 make more use of the products they already have.

12 The other three categories are the cost of
13 capital, credit and fraud losses, and finally, operating
14 costs. Again, on the plane I realized that if I had
15 thought a little bit harder before I submitted these slides
16 I would have put an asterisk after operating cost as well,
17 because access to information in electronic form, the
18 ability to have automated decision processes in data
19 processing, really reduces operating costs tremendously.
20 So really all four of those categories are very highly
21 dependent on access to information to improve efficiencies
22 in cost structure.

23 Information has tremendously transformed the
24 credit industry over the last quarter of a century. Better
25 risk assessment, more competition, as Fred mentioned, the

1 lower cost of capital and greater amounts of capital being
2 available have all contributed to that increase in
3 competition, in national competition, and greater
4 availability of credit to the people who need it most.

5 Now, if I can go backwards, I get to represent
6 sort of the big financial institution on today's panel and
7 to just try to explain a little bit, first of all, I get to
8 sound like speakers from the FTC by giving my disclaimer.

9 The next three slides are A, meant to be generic
10 and not representative specifically of Wells Fargo and B,
11 they are pretty highly simplified. So please don't come up
12 and tell me well, is that the exact Wells Fargo work chart?
13 The answer is no.

14 Not all integrated financial services companies
15 have all of the pieces that I have shown on this slide and
16 indeed Wells Fargo does not have any insurance underwriting
17 capability in-house but because we feel that providing
18 insurance is an important part of providing an overall
19 financial services package to our customers, dealings with
20 insurance underwriters, traditional insurance companies
21 accounts for the lion's share of our information sharing
22 for marketing purposes with third parties.

23 There is nothing particularly new or shocking or
24 groundbreaking about that. The traditional insurance
25 market has been characterized by insurance agents and

1 brokers representing separate underwriters. Certainly
2 there are some direct underwriters of insurance, GEICO
3 being a prime example of that.

4 But most insurance business is done through
5 agents or brokers dealing with nonaffiliated insurance
6 companies. And we sort of follow that pattern at Wells
7 Fargo, although a number of other financial institutions,
8 Citicorp obviously being the most prominent example of
9 that, do have insurance underwriting in the same corporate
10 family.

11 Wells Fargo, in particular, has a strong focus on
12 cross-selling products to additional customers. We have as
13 a goal to have every customer have eight Wells Fargo
14 products. I will tell you that is a distant goal. We're
15 not quite halfway there yet.

16 In my case, they're getting close. I've got, by
17 my count, seven different Wells Fargo products and that
18 involves relationships with five different legal entity
19 Wells Fargo affiliates to provide those seven products to
20 me. I don't have anything under the insurance part.

21 Why do we want to do that? Well, first of all,
22 because we have regular contact with existing customers it
23 is a lot less expensive to get the message out to them
24 about other products and services. We can do that not only
25 when a banking customer comes on the website but also when

1 we send them monthly statements. When they call in to
2 inquire about one product, we can tell them about other
3 products that might be of interest.

4 Because we know what they have at least with
5 Wells Fargo, we can do a better job of saying what is or is
6 not appropriate for this customer. If somebody already has
7 a Wells Fargo credit card we're not going to try to sell
8 them another one and if somebody has a pretty large deposit
9 in a Wells Fargo CD we're not going to try to sell them
10 more deposit products.

11 We might, indeed, if they come in and say well, I
12 want to put some more money in my CD, we might say, well,
13 gee, you know, you're earning a whopping 1.2 percent on
14 that right now. Maybe you want to think about a different
15 way of investing that money.

16 Because we know these people we can do a better
17 job of risk assessment. We can offer them credit at lower
18 rates. Because they already have one product predictably
19 they're going to be more loyal. If they have more than one
20 product, they're likely to stick with both of those
21 relationships for a longer time than somebody who only has
22 one product.

23 Somebody on the earlier panel mentioned the fact
24 that it's a lot more expensive to have that first
25 transaction with a customer. The same thing is true for

1 us. It's a lot more expensive to establish that first
2 relationship with a customer than the second or third or
3 fourth or eighth relationship with a customer.

4 Just trying to describe in a very short period of
5 time the relationships, the inputs to the credit decision
6 process.

7 MR. MCCORKELL: On the inputs to the credit
8 decision process we're getting information both from
9 external sources and, if somebody is already a customer,
10 from internal sources. One thing I wanted to mention
11 particularly on both of these slides is that the customer
12 information system is sort of the central repository of
13 information organized by customer.

14 We include a certain amount of information about
15 all the relationships we have with that customer whereas
16 the system of record for a particular product is where the
17 detailed transaction information is being kept whether it's
18 a credit card or a checking account.

19 What shows up in the customer information system
20 typically is summary information, not the detailed
21 transaction information of every check you write or every
22 credit card purchase you may make.

23 Certainly, not all of these elements are going to
24 be used in every decision process. For example, in
25 marketing there may not be any application data. The

1 property data is only going to be used in connection with
2 secure products, auto loans, home loans being the primary
3 examples.

4 The fraud data would include things like the
5 government databases for the Office of Foreign Assets
6 Controls, the Patriot Act compliance, as well as
7 commercially available data on fraud.

8 The demographic data both in the input and the
9 output is really aggregated information rather than
10 individualized, personalized information. The rest of this
11 information tends to be personally identifiable.

12 The output from the decision process is a little
13 bit more complicated, because information is going to go
14 into the system of record for whatever account we're
15 talking about. It is also going to go into the customer
16 information system from that process to basically saying
17 Pete McCorkell just opened a new account with us of this
18 type, et cetera, and summary information to be put in that
19 overall customer relationship.

20 The output from the system of record includes
21 reporting to credit bureaus if this is a credit product, to
22 our own internal hot files or fraud files, and if the need
23 arises, to our collection system. Then those internal hot
24 files, in turn, provide the information that goes back out
25 to external fraud file databases.

1 Customer information system and again the system
2 of record also feeds into the customer information system
3 as that relationship evolves. Typically between the
4 customer information system and the outside world there is
5 a filter of some kind of marketing database because again,
6 as other speakers mentioned, we don't want to provide any
7 more information to somebody outside of Wells Fargo about
8 our customers than we have to to carry out a particular
9 function.

10 Also, we have a fiduciary obligation to keep that
11 information private, to only use it for permissible,
12 legitimate purposes; our biggest asset is information about
13 our customers. Again, the demographic databases is
14 aggregate information not personally identifiable.

15 MS. TWOHIG: Thank you, Pete. That's very helpful
16 and important information and hopefully as we proceed with
17 the discussion you'll have time to expand on some of those
18 points. Bill?

19 MR. GOSSETT: Good morning. I'm Bill Gossett.
20 It's my pleasure to be here. I started in the business of
21 extending credit back in the 1960s. At that time I managed
22 a statewide credit department for a very large bank in
23 Florida.

24 So in addition to some gray hair I have first-
25 hand knowledge in the use of credit information before

1 things were quite so efficient as they are today, and I
2 also managed the first compliance with the Fair Credit
3 Reporting Act.

4 Quickly, at that time, we didn't really have
5 computers as we know them today. We didn't have
6 calculators. We didn't have fax machines, if you can
7 remember back then. We did have telephones so our
8 gathering of credit information in our network included
9 upstream banks and downstream banks. If someone needed
10 information from us they would call us. If our customer
11 needed information we would call one of our correspondents
12 and gather that information. That was our method of
13 getting credit data primarily.

14 The information wasn't consistent. Whatever the
15 person on the other end deemed was important was what you
16 got. I remember calling the bank in Lakeland, Florida one
17 time and was told that the customer had a seven-figure
18 balance on an account. Well, little did I know that they
19 were counting the two digits to the right of the decimal
20 point.

21 There was no reasonable method to refute the
22 information if there was an error, on the part of the
23 consumer, the customer. The credit bureaus did exist but
24 remember there were no faxes so if you got a credit bureau
25 to get it in writing, you had to wait for the mail to

1 deliver it or someone took it on a yellow pad and the
2 employee would usually use shorthand and they would
3 abbreviate this that and the other so accuracy and
4 completeness was an issue.

5 Today we take a lot for granted. In my small
6 bank someone opens an account and before they leave we ask
7 would you like a credit line or an equity line associated
8 with the account in one setting.

9 My bank has \$30 million, the other end of Wells
10 Fargo. We've been open just under two years. We're
11 focused on services and we're an active small business
12 administration(SBA) lender.

13 My background prior to that included a very large
14 SBA lending bank in the state of Florida. Therefore, my
15 remarks will concentrate on the use of consumer information
16 in the small business context.

17 SBA tells us that small businesses with less than
18 500 employees are nearly 98 percent of all employers. They
19 employ half of the private sector and they generate by some
20 estimates up to 80 percent of the new job creation.

21 So how does Islands Community Bank collect and
22 use consumer information in their small business lending
23 operations? I'll tell you my world involving credit is
24 rather basic and simple.

25 The credit report is one major tool we use to

1 assess the character of the borrower which is critical to
2 small business lending. The character to us means the
3 payment history and how they have handled their finances;
4 in other words, what does their handshake really mean.

5 For purposes of credit worthiness, 90 percent of
6 small businesses are almost indistinguishable from their
7 consumer side from the credit, from the people that own
8 them. In most cases the owners are going to guarantee the
9 loan.

10 Character and how the borrower handles his
11 financial affairs is at least equal to any other credit
12 consideration that we look at. The other components are
13 education, experience, cash flow. Cash flow is king to us.
14 Without that nothing works, with collateral, competition
15 and a lot of other lesser factors are considered in
16 granting a loan.

17 I will add that we're probably less credit
18 scoring-oriented as a community bank probably than larger
19 flows. I know we are. Sometimes we'll get into a lot of
20 loan officer discretion in extending credit. I can recall
21 one recently where we had a professional person moving into
22 the city. He had had a bankruptcy due to a terrible
23 accident prior to his arrival, and we used a credit bureau
24 to identify parties that had dealt with him in the past in
25 order to go in. We telephoned those folks and verified

1 information and through the telephone got very detailed
2 info and were able to make the credit as a result. Again,
3 it's just a different use of credit information.

4 We do not share credit report information with
5 anyone nor any other information for that fact that the
6 borrower may provide. We have no affiliates, no third
7 parties and, of course, as our bank matures that is subject
8 to change.

9 We may use the information as far as financial
10 statements to assess the borrowers other financial needs
11 and across other bank products and services that may be of
12 benefit to the borrower. This would involve any basic
13 banking service, lines of credit, charge card services,
14 mortgages or whatever. Our goal, too, is to always create
15 as full a banking relationship with the small business
16 customer as we can.

17 So what are the benefits to the bank and the
18 borrowers using the information? First, it allows us to
19 provide credit more cheaply and quickly and to make credit
20 more readily available. Accurate, reliable information
21 about borrowers is essential to our ability to make
22 informed, safe and sound lending decisions.

23 Credit information speeds up the decision-making
24 and decreases cost of providing credit. In the days before
25 we had a robust credit reporting system it would take bank

1 staff about three days to perhaps a week to gather the
2 information, obtain verification about payment history and
3 other credit relationships provided by the borrower.

4 This process was not only costly and time-
5 consuming but accuracy is lost when doing a self-
6 investigation. Today we can access good information from
7 the credit bureau in two minutes or less. Credit
8 information, I think, makes credit more available. It
9 helps me to price loans based on the risk or otherwise
10 structure the credit for the risk involved.

11 Examples would be lowering or increasing the loan
12 to value, requiring additional collateral. I might require
13 an SBA guarantee on the loan if I deemed it necessary in
14 order to make it, or any other number of terms could be
15 altered based on my assessment of the credit risk.

16 Thus borrowers with lower risk get lower-priced
17 credit and/or more favorable terms, and those with higher
18 risk still get credit albeit at a higher price. Without
19 the ability to adjust price for terms or risk in the face
20 of uncertainty regarding the information I have about the
21 borrower, my choice might be not to make the loan in the
22 first place.

23 Credit information gives my small bank the
24 ability to compete with large lenders, and I think the more
25 competitors there are and the more quickly lenders can

1 fairly and rapidly access credit worthiness, the greater
2 access borrowers have to competitively priced credit to
3 start or grow a business and achieve economic success.

4 I think all said, we're very small. We're the
5 other end of the spectrum from Wells Fargo but credit
6 information is equally as important to us for our survival
7 on our ability to compete and also the benefit we provide
8 to our customers. I thank you for the opportunity and look
9 forward to comments or questions.

10 MS. TWOHIG: Thank you, Bill. Just one question
11 before we proceed. You said that you use the information
12 to assess your customers other financial needs, and I
13 assume that's for your own marketing. Do you also do joint
14 marketing with financial partners?

15 MR. GOSSETT: Not at this point.

16 MS. TWOHIG: Thanks. And moving along, Andrea.

17 MS. FIKE: Good morning. Commissioner Swindle,
18 Ms. Twohig, thank you for the opportunity to participate in
19 this important workshop.

20 Fair Isaac is the preeminent provider of creative
21 analytics that provide value to people, businesses and
22 industries. Fair Isaac invented statistically-based credit
23 evaluation systems commonly called credit scoring systems
24 and is the world's leading developer of those systems.

25 Thousands of credit grantors commonly use scores

1 known as FICO scores generated by Fair-Isaac developed
2 scoring systems implemented at the three national credit
3 bureaus.

4 A FICO score is a three digit number that tells
5 lenders how likely a borrower is to repay as agreed. FICO
6 scores use information from consumer credit reports to
7 provide a snapshot of credit risk at a particular point in
8 time. Your credit score is a number based on the
9 information in your credit file that shows how likely you
10 are to pay back a loan on time. The higher your score, the
11 less risk you represent.

12 FICO scores are calculated from a lot of
13 different data in your credit report. This data can be
14 grouped into five categories. The percentages in the chart
15 generally reflect how important each of the categories is
16 in determining your score.

17 The first category, approximately representing 35
18 percent of any given FICO score is payment history. The
19 kinds of information included here are account payment
20 information, for example, whether or not you have paid on
21 time every time. If you have not, the amount that has been
22 past due and for how long and how long it has been since
23 you missed a payment.

24 Also included in this category is information
25 such as the existence or absence of adverse public record

1 information such as bankruptcies, judgments, or liens and
2 the number of accounts on which you have paid as agreed.

3 The next largest category, representing about 30
4 percent of any given FICO score is the amounts owed and
5 includes information such as the number of accounts with
6 balances and the proportion being used on credit accounts.

7 Representing approximately 15 percent of a FICO
8 score is length of credit history. This includes
9 information such as how long it has been since an account
10 was opened and how long it's been since that account was
11 used.

12 Representing 10 percent of the FICO score is new
13 credit or really the answer to the question is this
14 consumer looking for more credit. This looks at factors
15 such as the number of recently opened accounts and how long
16 it has been since those accounts were opened. It also
17 looks at the number of recent inquiries on a consumer's
18 credit record.

19 Please note, however, that this does not include
20 inquiries made by the consumer to check his or her own
21 credit report. It also does not include prescreening
22 inquiries or inquiries for employment purposes.

23 The final category, again representing 10 percent
24 of a given FICO score, is the types of credit that are in
25 use and that looks at the balance of a number of various

1 types of accounts such as credit cards, retail accounts,
2 installment loans, mortgages, consumer finance accounts and
3 others.

4 Although there are many types of information that
5 go into a credit score it is important to remember that no
6 one piece of information alone will determine your credit
7 score. What is important is the mix of this total package
8 of information which, of course, varies from person to
9 person and varies for the same person over time.

10 FICO scores do not contain factors that are
11 illegal to use in the lending process. FICO scores
12 consider a wide range of information in your credit report
13 but do not consider race, color, religion, national origin,
14 sex or marital status.

15 And as pointed out by Mr. Cate earlier most of
16 this information is not even included in credit reports
17 which are the source of data from which credit scores are
18 derived.

19 U.S. law would prohibit credit scoring from
20 considering these facts as well as receipt of public
21 assistance or the exercise of consumer rights under
22 consumer protection statutes. Age is not considered in
23 FICO scoring models. Salary, occupation, and other
24 information relating to occupation is not considered in
25 these models.

1 Where you live is not considered, how much
2 interest you are charged on existing credit accounts is not
3 considered in your FICO score, nor are items that are
4 reported as child and family support obligations or rental
5 agreements.

6 With credit scoring more people get credit. They
7 get it faster and it is more affordable. People can get
8 loans faster today than ever and that, in part, is due to
9 the availability and use of credit scoring. Instant credit
10 at a retailer, auto dealer over the phone or the Internet
11 would not be possible without credit scoring. As pointed
12 out by an earlier speaker a survey of auto dealers in 2001
13 revealed that 84 percent of auto loan applicants received a
14 decision within an hour and 23 percent received a decision
15 within 10 minutes.

16 In the mortgage arena mortgage loans that used to
17 take weeks can now be done in minutes. Credit decisions
18 are fairer. Fair Isaac credit scores transform the
19 economics and efficiencies of credit decisions and allow
20 all relevant information to be brought to bear so that no
21 information that is favorable to an individual is omitted
22 from the decision process.

23 Credit scoring scientifically and fairly balances
24 and weighs positive information along with any negative
25 information in credit reports. In essence, full credit

1 reporting as you see under the existing version of the Fair
2 Credit Reporting Act and scoring have democratized credit
3 granting. Scoring has transformed credit granting so that
4 it is no longer simply based on who you know.

5 Among households in the lowest income quintile,
6 the percent with a credit card has increased between 1970
7 and 2001 from 2 percent to 38 percent. The percentage for
8 minority families has gone from 26 percent in 1983 to 54
9 percent in 2001.

10 Even the least advantaged persons in our country
11 have better access to credit today largely in part to the
12 existence and use of credit scoring by credit grantors.

13 Credit mistakes or bad information in your credit
14 file, information that reflects negatively on you as a
15 result of your past behaviors, counts for less in a credit
16 scoring system than in a judgmental system. Since scoring
17 considers many factors including positive factors, positive
18 factors may outweigh problems in your report.

19 Judgmental systems in many cases rely on a rules-
20 based system such that a problem in one factor area
21 considered in the lending decision may require that the
22 applicant be rejected. The scoring of multiple positive
23 indicators in your file can outweigh negative information
24 in that file and permits the generation of a high enough
25 credit score to permit the applicant to be extended credit

1 where a judgmental system may not.

2 More credit is available, more people can get
3 credit regardless of their credit history because credit
4 scores allow lenders to safely assess and account for the
5 risk of consumers who have no existing relationship with
6 that lender, who may not have been in that lender's
7 branches before or may have been turned away by other
8 lenders in the past.

9 Lenders who have switched from judgmental systems
10 to scoring have commonly seen that they are able to
11 increase the amount of credit that they can grant from 20
12 to 30 percent in the number of applicant subjects with no
13 increase in their loss rates.

14 In addition, overall credit rates are lower.
15 Scores make credit more affordable by reducing the cost of
16 evaluating applications, reducing loan losses, reducing the
17 cost of managing credit portfolios and making more capital
18 available through securitization.

19 The cost of credit cards has declined 35 percent
20 from 1984 to 1996 while the quality and quantity of offers
21 available to consumers have increased.

22 Spreads in mortgage lending are about one basis
23 point lower than in the early 1980s in which total
24 mortgages of 5.4 trillion in 2001 translates to annual
25 savings of \$54 billion. Overall, credit scoring benefits

1 consumers and businesses and the free flow of information
2 permitting such scoring is hugely important to us all.

3 MS. TWOHIG: Thank you, Andrea. Credit scoring
4 obviously is a critical use in credit transactions and it
5 is, I know, quite challenging to try to explain it all in
6 the time allotted but we appreciate your presentation.
7 Laura?

8 MS. DESOTO: I'm Laura Desoto with Experian and
9 I'd like to start with a little background on Experian to
10 give you some foundation for my remarks.

11 Experian is a global leader in the information
12 services industry. In North America Experian is comprised
13 of several business units. You probably know Experian as
14 one of the national credit reporting agencies and you might
15 be familiar also with our direct marketing operations.

16 We also have a business unit dedicated to helping
17 organizations detect and prevent fraud and identity theft.
18 I'm here today to talk with you specifically about
19 Experian's efforts in those regards.

20 According to sources cited in testimony that I
21 have submitted for the record, economic crime in the year
22 2000 cost U.S. businesses more than one trillion dollars.
23 A Meridian study found institutions absorbed approximately
24 \$18,000 per identity theft victim, including loss of goods,
25 revenue, and costs associated with customer service and

1 victim assistance.

2 Fraud is a serious crime. Experian's goal is to
3 help businesses stop fraud before it starts. Experian was
4 a pioneer in fraud prevention providing tools to lenders
5 more than a decade ago to help them identify increased
6 fraud risk.

7 Early fraud tools like our facts plus system
8 notified lenders of reported variations in addresses,
9 Social Security numbers or other basic identification data
10 in a credit report that indicated increased risk. Later
11 improvements searched for other high risk indicators such
12 as business addresses on a personal credit history and
13 incorporated analysis of less obvious credit report
14 anomalies that suggested need for greater caution.

15 Today Experian's sophisticated fraud detection
16 and prevention services are not reliant entirely on a
17 credit report. The most effective fraud prevention tools
18 also include data from many other sources and utilize
19 complex analyses.

20 The tools help businesses verify customer
21 identities. They alert businesses when they are
22 considering an application with information tied to verify
23 fraud activity. They warn businesses of application
24 information that could be fraudulent and fraud tools help
25 businesses assist customers who are fraud victims. The

1 concurrent and continued flow of information and access to
2 a broad range of sources is the foundation on which all
3 fraud prevention tools are built.

4 Experian's national fraud database is at the
5 forefront of the fight against fraud. It is the first
6 cooperative database of verified fraud information.
7 Members from across industry contribute and have access to
8 information about known fraud activity. A national fraud
9 database report alerts the user when information provided
10 during the application process matches verified fraud
11 records.

12 When a match is made the business can stop the
13 transaction and take appropriate action. The national
14 fraud database also incorporates complex analysis systems
15 that can identify the level of risk based on the degree to
16 which fraudulent application information matches verified
17 fraud data and differentiates whether the applicant is a
18 perpetrator or a victim. The business then knows to treat
19 the applicant with greater caution or sensitivity.

20 Detect, our most recently introduced fraud
21 detection tool, adds another layer of defense. The new
22 tool compares application information shared by
23 participants and searches for discrepancies that indicate
24 fraud. Similar to our national fraud database, Detect is a
25 cooperative database to which members share application

1 information rather than information about verified fraud
2 activity.

3 Information supplied by a consumer in a new
4 application can then be compared to his or her previous
5 application data in the cooperative database. Comparison
6 of application information for subtle and not so subtle
7 differences can reveal attempted fraud otherwise that would
8 have gone undetected.

9 Coupling insight from the application information
10 of Detect with the verified fraud data of our national
11 fraud database creates one of the most powerful fraud
12 prevention tools available today. The online environment
13 poses its own unique set of challenges to fraud prevention.
14 The most difficult issue is authenticating the identity of
15 a consumer whom a business will never meet face to face.

16 Experian's authentication services suite of
17 products verifies the identity of consumers before an
18 online transaction is completed by requiring them to pass
19 an identity quiz.

20 Questions about basic identifiers such as name
21 and date of birth establish an identity baseline. Such
22 information is known as in-wallet data because it is often
23 found in a lost or stolen wallet. Our authentication
24 services are very successful because they are able to go
25 beyond this in-wallet information by incorporating data

1 from a broad range of sources, credit reports and property
2 records among them.

3 This information is commonly referred to as out-
4 of-wallet because it is not readily available to identity
5 thieves. Out-of-wallet information is critical for
6 verifying the identity of customers in an online
7 environment. Identity thieves will know a consumer's full
8 name, address and date of birth. They are much less likely
9 to know which lender holds the consumer's mortgage or what
10 bank has their car loan.

11 While each of Experian's fraud tools are
12 effective alone these tools are more powerful when used in
13 conjunction with each other. Together, these tools protect
14 businesses and consumers from fraud across industries and
15 in all types of lending transactions both online and
16 offline.

17 Globally, businesses using Experian's fraud
18 prevention tools regularly report 50 percent decreases in
19 fraud losses within the first year of implementation. A
20 national credit card issuer reviewing more than 10,000
21 accounts a day sought a cost effective way to reduce losses
22 associated with application fraud.

23 By implementing only one of Experian's most basic
24 identity authentication tools, this company realized a 13
25 percent decrease in application fraud losses and

1 experienced an annual savings of \$18 million.

2 One major U.S. telecommunications company
3 utilizing the combined power of multiple fraud protection
4 tools experienced a 55 percent decrease in losses per
5 handset and decreased the time it took to confirm fraud
6 records by two-thirds.

7 Clearly, businesses that use our fraud tools will
8 experience significant savings and increased customer
9 satisfaction because the tools help financial institutions
10 stop fraud before it starts.

11 Similarly, our fraud prevention tools benefit
12 customers with greatly increased risk of financial fraud or
13 identity theft by offering a possible solution to the crime
14 and much faster recovery when a person is victimized.

15 The key to Experian's fraud services and all
16 fraud prevention tools for that matter, is responsible
17 information use. The most effective fraud tools rely on
18 many data sources to ensure accurate identification.

19 As identity thieves become more creative in their
20 attempts to commit fraud, the ability of organizations
21 fighting fraud to access and utilize information from a
22 range of sources becomes increasingly important, yet
23 regulators and legislators target that information access
24 in their efforts to attack fraud and identity theft.

25 That attack is inadvertently aimed at the wrong

1 target and is resulting in friendly fire casualties. We
2 are allies in the fight against fraud. Our enemy is the
3 same.

4 Unfortunately, regulation and legislation that
5 target access to vital information can critically wound or
6 even kill our efforts to fight fraud. While well intended
7 restrictions on data use and sharing actually exacerbate
8 the problem of identity theft by making it more difficult,
9 if not impossible, for businesses to detect and prevent
10 fraud.

11 It is essential that in the future we preserve
12 access to a broad spectrum of information sources for use
13 in fraud detection and prevention services if we are to be
14 successful in our fight against fraud and identity theft.
15 Thank you.

16 MS. TWOHIG: Thank you, Laura and thank you in
17 particular for some of the numbers you provided. The fraud
18 losses, were those all creditors in those examples?

19 MS. DESOTO: Yes. We're primarily talking about
20 application fraud in the numbers I quoted although at the
21 very beginning I talked about the \$1 trillion loss for all
22 of economic crime in the U.S.

23 MS. TWOHIG: Thank you. Moving along, Travis,
24 could we hear from you next?

25 MR. PLUNKETT: Good morning everyone. My name is

1 Travis Plunkett. I'm the Legislative Director of the
2 Consumer Federation of America. It's good to be here with
3 you. I'm going to focus my remarks on the trend that you
4 heard about towards increasing automation in the evaluation
5 of credit histories and the credit score.

6 As of 1999, approximately 60 to 70 percent of all
7 mortgages were underwritten using a credit score or
8 automated evaluation of credit. More recent estimates by
9 Fair Isaac indicate that 75 percent of mortgage lenders and
10 over 90 percent of credit card lenders use this score in
11 making credit decisions.

12 Now, you've heard about the good news. There has
13 been increased speed in the granting of credit. There have
14 been lower costs. And there certainly has been broader
15 access by more Americans who 15 years ago couldn't have
16 gotten access to this credit.

17 Now, as I'm a consumer advocate, let me tell you
18 about some of the negative information. Then I'm going to
19 provide you with data from our most recent report on credit
20 scoring accuracy.

21 Of course, technology and information in
22 automation are neutral. So the bad news is that this
23 information has been used positively but also negatively.
24 Some lenders have extended credit to sub-prime borrowers in
25 an abusive and predatory manner, abusing their new

1 technological capabilities to develop usurptiously high
2 interest rates and fees carefully targeted at unwitting and
3 vulnerable consumers through a number of strategies which I
4 won't talk about in detail here but we can talk about
5 later. Upselling is one.

6 These lending practices contributed to an
7 unprecedented growth in bad credit card and mortgage debt,
8 home foreclosures which are at near record highs, and let
9 me also mention the personal bankruptcy rate, which is at a
10 record high.

11 Now, of course, automation isn't the major factor
12 in all of those problems but it certainly is a contributing
13 factor. And, finally, accuracy. Accurate information is
14 the foundation of this entire system of automation. I
15 can't explain what is at stake better than Howard Beale,
16 the director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection here at
17 the FTC, has done it so I'm just going to quote him, quote,
18 because even small differences in a consumer's credit score
19 can influence the cost or other terms of the credit offer
20 or even make the difference between getting approved or
21 denied, accuracy of information underlying the score
22 calculation is paramount.

23 Now, the Consumer Federation of America and the
24 National Credit Reporting Association looked at accuracy,
25 completeness and differences in the score between the three

1 major reporting agencies in December. As far as I know,
2 this is the most exhaustive study of credit score accuracy
3 and completeness that has ever been done. We looked at
4 over 500,000 credit files. Every state and territory in
5 the nation was represented.

6 Findings: nearly one out of three files, that's
7 about 29 percent, had a score discrepancy between the three
8 major reporting agencies of 50 points or more. Now, as you
9 may know, credit scores range from on the low end around
10 400, around 400 to on the high end around 800.

11 Four percent of the files we looked at had a
12 discrepancy of more than a hundred points. Now, one of the
13 issues about this finding that has been raised on Capital
14 Hill is well, come on, that's like the difference between
15 say, Coke and Pepsi or the ACLU's take on one particular
16 legislator versus the National Taxpayer Union's score or
17 rating. That just isn't so. And you've heard why.

18 These scores purport to be predictive of consumer
19 credit behavior. They purport to be objective. We
20 shouldn't be seeing variations between the three agencies
21 even though the type of information they collect can vary.
22 They have different strengths and weaknesses in the type of
23 information they collect, we shouldn't be seeing
24 differences of this magnitude.

25 We looked at this information in three layers. I

1 told you about the largest sample. In the next largest
2 sample we looked at the impact in particular on mortgage
3 borrowers on the bubble between lower cost prime credit and
4 higher cost sub-prime credit. We found about 20 million
5 vulnerable consumers around the 620 credit score level who,
6 if their credit score was a little higher or a little
7 lower, could be paying more or less.

8 Roughly 8 million, one in five of those who are
9 at risk, are likely to be misclassified, according to what
10 we found, as sub-prime upon applying for a mortgage based
11 on our review of credit errors and inconsistencies.

12 A similar number, this is important, are likely
13 to benefit from errors in the reports. However, I don't
14 think anybody in this room is going to endorse the notion
15 that the credit score should be kind of a lottery system.
16 Consumers don't benefit from systemwide averages. So we
17 need to talk about specifically how to eliminate those
18 variances and make the situation better so that more
19 consumers are getting a more accurate score.

20 Finally, in our smallest sample we looked at why
21 these errors were occurring. Were they errors of omission
22 such as nonreporting of information or errors of
23 commission, incorrect or inconsistent data included in the
24 report? One of the big findings here is that there are
25 significant problems with the reporting of positive

1 information.

2 This is information, for instance, complete
3 information on a consumer's positive credit history, their
4 payment of their mortgage loan on time, the ratio of their
5 balance on their credit card to the overall amount of
6 credit that they have been offered. Huge problem there.

7 What we found was nearly eight in ten files were
8 missing a revolving account in good standing. One of three
9 files were missing a mortgage account that had never been
10 late. Reporting on credit limits and balances, which
11 anyone who has studied credit scoring will tell you is a
12 significant factor in that score, that is how much do you
13 have out versus how much have you been offered, reporting
14 on that was almost universally inconsistent.

15 Let me mention that that particular finding is
16 consistent with the findings of a Federal Reserve report
17 out this February. In fact, one of their major findings
18 was that reporting on limits and balances was not accurate.

19 What we have here is an automation problem. The
20 default setting, so to speak, when they report your balance
21 is your balance. So in many cases furnishers and
22 creditors, aren't supplying the information on what your
23 credit limit is. They're simply supplying the information
24 on what your balance is and then the system defaults, in
25 terms of your limit, to what that balance is. So if you

1 have a balance of \$500 and the system shows that your
2 overall limit is \$500. It shows you maxed out. And that
3 is a ding on your credit report, on your credit score.

4 That's a summary of our report and the concerns.
5 We can debate policy resolutions to these concerns. Just
6 in closing let me mention that if the accuracy of credit
7 score information is in question and the accuracy and
8 completeness of the underlying information that is used for
9 credit scoring is in question in significant cases for one
10 price point, in this case we're talking about that 620
11 credit score, then as the credit industry moves more and
12 more towards risk-based pricing it's going to be a concern
13 for more price points.

14 For example, we learned recently that one insurer
15 in Florida now has 50 -- that's right, 50 price points for
16 their insurance product based on the credit score. So if
17 we found problems around the 620 point, imagine 50 of
18 those. I mean, at this point, given the research that
19 we've done we're most concerned about that prime/sub-prime
20 borderline.

21 For folks on the high end who have a 730 credit
22 score or a 760 credit score, that variation doesn't matter
23 as much. But as we go more and more to a risk-based
24 pricing situation where you have a whole range of prices
25 that are offered then those kinds of variations matter

1 more. I will close with that point and then we can talk
2 more about some of the other implications of this problem
3 and other problems of misuse of credit scoring later on.
4 Thank you.

5 MS. TWOHIG: Thank you, Travis. Evan?

6 MR. HENDRICKS: Thank you, Peggy. Thank you, FTC.
7 I'm here to talk about the benefits to identity thieves of
8 certain information flows and the costs and the damages to
9 some consumers.

10 Thieves steal identities so they can take out
11 credit in people's names. They're able to do that because
12 when they apply for credit the credit bureau discloses the
13 credit report of the innocent victim to the credit granter
14 taking the application from the identity thief.

15 Now, why does this happen? It happens because
16 the credit bureaus generally accept partial matches of
17 identifying information so the Social Security number
18 doesn't have to be exact. Sometimes it can be a one or two
19 digit difference. The last name doesn't have to be the
20 exact same thing.

21 This has been well exploited by identify thieves
22 and when they do use the exact same Social Security number,
23 which is what identity thieves usually do, then that can
24 override all the other identifying data. The identity
25 thief can be putting forward a different last name or be in

1 a different state but if they have the same Social Security
2 number, it will still spur the disclosure of the innocent
3 victim's credit report.

4
5 Now, this partial match was also the cause of
6 mixed files which was the leading cause of complaints to
7 the FTC in the early 1990s. Now, identity theft, which is
8 really a subset of mixed files, is the leading cause of
9 complaints because in identity theft the thief's generated
10 data is polluting your credit report.

11 When inaccuracies arise, the consumer dispute
12 resolution process doesn't always work. Let's say you
13 discover that your credit report shows you're nine days
14 late on a credit card from the XYZ credit card company
15 either because of identity theft or a mixed file.

16 You tell by writing or calling the credit bureau
17 that you've never done business with the XYZ corporation
18 but the process, they use an automated process where the
19 credit bureau will send an automated message to the credit
20 grantor saying, reducing your dispute to a two-digit code,
21 usually meaning not mine. The consumer says not mine.

22 The credit grantor receives this code and then it
23 looks to see if what you're disputing is what it reported
24 before. And then it often says no or yes we did report
25 them 90 days late before. So we confirm that. The credit

1 bureau comes back and says we have verified the
2 information.

3 In other words, this is an electronic version of
4 did you say this and they said, yes, I said that. This
5 does not really constitute a true investigation. Why do
6 they do this? Well, because of the volume. The credit
7 bureau disputes can run from 5- to 25,000 disputes per day,
8 usually in the range of 7- to 10,000. A year and a half
9 ago Capital One said it was getting a thousand disputes per
10 day about credit reports. A year ago it was 2000, and now
11 in the spring, it's getting 4000 disputes per day.

12 Clearly, the need to hold down personnel costs is
13 driving the need to use an automated process, but the
14 contradiction is it doesn't allow for true investigation.

15 The next point also relates to another handout, a
16 news story in Privacy Times, page two, Criminal gangs of
17 varying size and sophistication around the country are
18 making identity theft their crime of choice and mail theft
19 their primary method of operation.

20 The criminals are on the prowl for preapproved
21 credit card offers, convenience checks, bank and insurance
22 statements. Some thieves are able to convert stolen
23 preapproved apps or checks into cash or credit. Other sell
24 or barter the personal data to ID theft fences.

25 Some gangs are made up of drug addicts

1 particularly the Meth-Amphetamine users, or Tweakers as
2 they are called. Others consist of foreign nationals,
3 including Nigerians, Lithuanians, Russians, Asians, and
4 Middle Easterners.

5 Others are made up of gay cross dressers with
6 names like House of Con and House of Ebony. In the past
7 seven months, postal inspectors have made 2264 identity
8 theft related arrests from mail theft.

9 Thus the flow of financial marketing information
10 containing consumers' personally identifiable information
11 is facilitating identity theft.

12 Now, also, we have not really developed a formula
13 for measuring or gauging these damages to consumers and so
14 I would like to quickly run through this in about one
15 minute.

16 These are some of the typical damages from being
17 a victim of either identity theft or an inaccurate credit
18 report. You can be inaccurately described as a dead beat
19 and you are improperly denied credit. You expend time and
20 energy to correct errors not of your making.

21 You wrongfully receive debt collection calls.
22 You're chilled from applying for credit. You have physical
23 symptoms. Your sense of helplessness, loss of control of
24 your personal information and the emotional distress
25 stemming from all of the above.

1 I clearly believe these are damages and costs to
2 consumers and if someone doesn't I would be curious to hear
3 why. So we need a formula and maybe Fair Isaac can donate
4 pro bono some of its skill as statistician to assign
5 weights to each category so you can look at each category
6 and the extent of the harm.

7 So let's say you're mischaracterized is one of
8 the categories, and it says that you've got bankruptcies
9 and charge offs and none of it's true. So you assign a lot
10 of weight to that and then you start multiplying factor one
11 then factor two and how much time and energy you have to
12 solve the immediate problem.

13 Then if you solve it you have an expectation that
14 it was solved and then it's reinserted that would be
15 another multiplier. Then the number of times that happens
16 over and over, which is what I see in the cases that I work
17 on, is another multiplier and then the period of time over
18 which the problem persists.

19 In essence, the formula we need to assign weights
20 to each factor and then multiply each factor by the number
21 of times. And then we can apply this to macro in different
22 context we have the last report from the FTC showing
23 161,000 complaints about identity theft to the FTC alone.

24 The GAO's estimate of 2002 that there was
25 500,000. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Wayne

1 Abernathy, who will be here later today, used the term one
2 million. We don't really know exactly how many victims of
3 identity theft. We do know that the number is doubling
4 every year.

5 Now, also, Travis already touched on this the
6 industry is saying they're worried that privacy will
7 restrict the free flow of information. In fact, credit
8 grantors trying to game the system, trying to hold onto
9 their own best customers by not reporting their credit
10 limits is really the main obstacle to the free flow of
11 information and they're doing this voluntarily.

12 The June 12th American Banker reported Capital
13 One purposely does not report consumers' credit limits for
14 competitive reasons. Then they make people look like
15 they're maxed out, lowering their credit scores. I don't
16 know how many customers Capital One has. I know it runs in
17 the millions.

18 In closing, I would like to show a very quick
19 video because ultimately the argument is being made that
20 privacy protection is bad for the economy. Can we run this
21 video now so we can see a quick rendition of how this
22 argument can play out?

23 MR. HENDRICKS: By Citizens for North Dakota's
24 Future which ran in advance of the referendum on the opt in
25 financial privacy law.

1 (Whereupon, a videotape was played.)

2 MR. HENDRICKS: The argument was made that it was
3 bad for the economy. The argument was rejected by 72
4 percent of the voters. I think they saw through it as
5 shallow. Since the referendum, by the way, one bank has
6 expanded its call center and created more jobs and another
7 bank has opened a new call center in North Dakota. I think
8 that you should look at the statements of Joel Reidenberg
9 and Julie Brill before the House that the states with the
10 best privacy protections, Vermont and Massachusetts, have
11 the lowest bankruptcy rates and the best interest rates.

12 California, which also has good privacy laws,
13 also is better than the median when it comes to
14 bankruptcies and has a good mortgage interest rate.

15 I think that the argument that privacy law is bad
16 for the economy is suspect and any studies purporting to
17 say that should be looked at closely. Thank you very much.

18 MS. TWOHIG: Thank you, Evan. Well, I think we
19 have a considerable challenge ahead of us because as you
20 can see there is all kinds of different information that is
21 used in making credit transactions, and one of the
22 challenges in just discussing this issue in the remaining
23 time we have is that there is various stages to the credit
24 transaction.

25 You heard some of the issues mentioned with

1 respect to each. There is the basic marketing stage,
2 getting the consumer in the door or online or on the phone.
3 Then there's the decision stage which involves making sure
4 the financial institution knows they're dealing with who
5 they say they are dealing with, that the person is who they
6 say they are as well as deciding whether they're going to
7 do business with a person in terms of underwriting and on
8 what terms.

9 And then, of course, it even goes from there in
10 terms of account review and management and further
11 marketing cross-selling. Given that challenge I think what
12 I'd like to do to try to home in a little bit on the costs
13 and benefits and specific data and specific examples is to
14 break it down and let's talk first a little bit about
15 marketing in particular.

16 Something I would like maybe Pete to start
17 addressing is how important is it that the marketing that
18 is done and what are the benefits to business of using
19 personally identifiable information? By that I mean the
20 marketing that is done perhaps using the prescreened
21 database from the credit bureaus or other personally
22 identifiable information as compared to more aggregate data
23 which presumably has less privacy concerns.

24 MR. MCCORKELL: Well, personally identifiable
25 information is important because it helps us understand

1 whether this person is a good prospect. Somebody that
2 already has a half a dozen credit cards is probably not a
3 very good prospect for us, and you can't get that at the
4 ZIP code level.

5 It understands who's a good risk. It's much more
6 effective to be able to go out with an offer of credit than
7 with a solicitation, well, please send us an application
8 and we'll consider it.

9 Maybe the best indicator of the effect that
10 credit bureau prescreening has had on the economy is to
11 compare interest rates on credit cards today to what they
12 were, say, 25 years ago before there was prescreening.
13 Twenty-five years ago, regardless of what the prime rate
14 was doing, 18-percent was a spectacularly good interest
15 rate on a credit card and a lot of them were 21, 23
16 percent.

17 There was very little national competition. If
18 you wanted a credit card you went to your bank and hoped
19 that they issued it. If they issued it, maybe you went to
20 another bank and maybe you got one and maybe you didn't.

21 Today the market for credit cards is essentially
22 nationwide as is the market for mortgages. That
23 competition factor, again, makes us act more efficiently in
24 terms of who we market to, at the same time it makes the
25 cost of credit much more affordable and much more available

1 to a larger segment of the population.

2 MS. TWOHIG: Evan or Travis, do you want to
3 comment on the cost to consumers on the flip side of the
4 personally identifiable marketing and in particular the
5 prescreening process?

6 MR. PLUNKETT: I wouldn't deny that prescreening
7 allows better targeting. I think most experts though would
8 dispute the notion that the main reason for the drop in
9 credit card interest rates is this trend. The main reason
10 for the drop in credit card interest rates since the late
11 '70s and early '80s is the drop in the cost of capital.

12 I mean, just in the last three years the
13 benchmark rate has dropped significantly and when the Fed
14 puts out its report at just about this time every June that
15 is the main reason that they cite for a drop in interest
16 rates.

17 MS. TWOHIG: Evan?

18 MR. HENDRICKS: I also agree that for many years
19 prescreening played an important role in expanding credit
20 and it was beneficial to consumers in many ways. But time
21 evolves and circumstances evolve and I think that given the
22 fact that credit is so plentiful and there are so many ways
23 to get credit and the fact that now we know that identity
24 thieves are looking for financial instruments, we have to
25 rethink how much strengthening consumers need in their

1 right to be able to not receive those sort of offers.

2 MS. TWOHIG: It also seems to me that one of the
3 costs of allowing creditors to access the credit database
4 to do marketing has also been there have been reported
5 problems in creditors then pulling back. I think that's
6 been alluded to and not reporting complete information in
7 order to protect their best customers. Does anyone want to
8 comment on that situation as a cost of prescreening or what
9 the data shows there?

10 MS. DESOTO: Sure, I'll take that one. First of
11 all, I think it's absolutely foundational to a national
12 credit reporting system the concepts of quality and
13 accuracy and completeness. So from the perspective of a
14 credit reporting agency we actually look at quality in five
15 different dimensions. So we definitely look at
16 completeness or content, depth, accuracy, currency and
17 consistency. So that's foundational to the system.

18 As was mentioned earlier this morning, we do have
19 a voluntary system of reporting, and certainly Experian,
20 and I think I speak on behalf of the entire industry, is a
21 strong supporter of full file data reporting by all
22 lenders.

23 Certainly we want to go on the record for saying
24 that, and we take many proactive measures to go out and
25 seek lenders who are not currently reporting to the system.

1 I think in that sense we are absolutely in agreement with
2 the comments made earlier today that the whole system is
3 strengthened by full file data reporting and completeness
4 of the data.

5 MR. HENDRICKS: And that's a widespread problem,
6 Laura, in creditors not reporting?

7 MS. DESOTO: I wouldn't say it's a widespread
8 problem. As I mentioned, we do have efforts on an ongoing
9 basis to reach out to credit grantors and many times they
10 are smaller organizations who need prodding or some
11 expertise in understanding how do I even report to a credit
12 reporting agency. Give me some support. Give me some
13 advice on how to do that, and those are active efforts.

14 MR. PLUNKETT: On that point I'd like to quote the
15 Controller of the Currency as to his assessment of the
16 cost. Sub-prime loans can become a vehicle for upward
17 mobility of creditors in the broader credit market, lack
18 access to consumer credit history, yet a growing number of
19 sub-prime lenders have adopted a policy of refusing to
20 report credit line and loan payment information to credit
21 bureaus without letting borrowers know about it. Some make
22 no bones about their motives. Good customers that pay sub-
23 prime rates are too valuable to lose to their competitors.
24 Now, the cost there to the consumer is obvious. They're
25 stuck in a higher rate, higher cost loan.

1 Another issue that doesn't involve prescreening
2 but relates to marketing has been raised in a lawsuit by
3 the organization Acorn against Household Finance, filed in
4 2002. Household Finance obtained a list of clients from
5 affiliate retailers including Best Buy, K-Mart, Costco and
6 a few others.

7 Homeowners with high rate credit card and other
8 consumer debts were identified from these lists and
9 contacted by account executives at nearby branches.
10 Potential customers were promised that their debt
11 consolidation loans would save them money.

12 Acorn contends that the purpose of these
13 consolidation loans was to upsell them in amounts so high
14 that it would be nearly impossible for the consumer to sell
15 or refinance the loan. So certainly not an issue of
16 prescreening here but an issue of marketing and how once
17 again this information can be used for negative purposes as
18 well as positive.

19 MS. TWOHIG: Any other comments on that?

20 MR. CATE: If I could just comment, I always feel
21 a little like I'm missing something in discussions about
22 privacy and fair credit reporting issues. I'm feeling that
23 way again because it seems like in many ways the types of
24 issues that are identified really have to do with too
25 little information.

1 In other words, full file reporting; there's not
2 enough information in the file or consumers don't have
3 enough information or not identifying the person accurately
4 which you can only do with more information to identify
5 them.

6 It seems like in many ways the issues or the
7 problems identified with credit reporting really would
8 argue for legislation requiring more information flows.
9 Instead of looking at ways to restrict information flows,
10 the way to make a credit file more accurate is to ensure
11 that there's greater access to information and that access
12 is guaranteed by law, that there are ways to verify that
13 information and that it is the absence of sufficient
14 information flow that's really at the heart of many of the
15 problems, many of which are well documented. I'm not in
16 any way disputing the existence of the problems. I'm
17 wondering how if you can possibly solve those problems
18 without greater --

19 MS. TWOHIG: If I could just ask Fred one
20 question. How do you see the ability to use the credit
21 bureau database for marketing purposes as relating to the
22 current situation of incompleteness of data?

23 MR. CATE: Well, in other words, it's a valuable
24 source of data. It is, to go back to your original
25 question, always better to make a credit decision based on

1 an individual's actual information rather than accurate or
2 predictive or guessing if you will.

3 Therefore, to the extent that you either make
4 that data less available as a matter of law to use or you
5 make it more expensive to use or you create incentives for
6 providers of that data, particularly creditors, not to
7 provide it, whether those incentives are cost or regulatory
8 or whatever, you inevitably come back to make either less
9 information available or you run into the accuracy problem.

10 MR. PLUNKETT: I'm going to agree with him here on
11 this point. We've crossed the line between marketing here
12 and underwriting, and from the consumer point of view we
13 make a real significant distinction. On marketing we think
14 consumers should control the secondary uses of information
15 for marketing purposes but to go to the question of
16 underwriting, absolutely, what we proposed is that if a
17 furnisher, a creditor, for example, uses the credit
18 reporting system they should report completely.

19 We would agree that more information in the
20 situation of underwriting is a good thing. Now, that's not
21 a mandate. That's if you use the system, use it right.

22 MR. HENDRICKS: It's a standard. It's still going
23 to be voluntary but if you report the standard is you have
24 to report completely.

25 MS. TWOHIG: And Travis, since we are moving to

1 the underwriting issues where accuracy is critical, if I
2 could just ask you on some of what your report talks about.
3 It seems to me there is a difference between accuracy and
4 completeness and one, perhaps, cost of our voluntary system
5 is that in some sense you're never going to have exactly
6 identical data in every credit bureau as opposed to,
7 perhaps, if you had a system that it was required and it
8 was all lock step, exactly the same you would probably
9 still have some accuracy issues just from volume of data.
10 Could you say a little bit about that?

11 MR. PLUNKETT: Sure. It's a good question. Well,
12 we don't have a command and control system. We don't have
13 one databank. We don't have a Soviet-style credit
14 reporting system so we are going to see variances. But
15 we're talking about the increased use of the credit score
16 in automation where you take that underlying data and you
17 come up with a predictive factor. If the end product isn't
18 effective then I guess my response would be there are going
19 to be some variances between the three agencies but that
20 end product, that score, we shouldn't be seeing the
21 variances that we're seeing because that is what's used by
22 lenders, for example, to grant credit or to not grant
23 credit or to grant credit at a particular rate or under
24 certain terms.

25 So whatever the underlying data we shouldn't be

1 seeing variances like we're seeing with the credit score
2 given that so many lenders now just look at the score.

3 MS. TWOHIG: Anyone want to respond to that?

4 MS. FIKE: If I could comment briefly on that. I
5 think I hear Travis questioning whether using a statistical
6 based system to help assist in the credit underwriting
7 process is legitimate or not. Fundamentally the question
8 that any creditor has to answer is whether or not to extend
9 this credit to this consumer. Is that going to keep me, A,
10 competitive in the marketplace and if I give this credit on
11 these terms and if I do will it be accepted. And B, if I
12 give credit on these terms, will I have losses that are
13 going to cause me to end up out of business.

14 You can make those decisions on a spectrum from
15 pure judgmental systems like we used to have before
16 scoring assisted or with a combination or using automated
17 systems.

18 Fundamentally, you're pointing to differences
19 that you have identified in the results of the scoring
20 system which are driven in many cases by simple differences
21 in data, not necessarily inaccuracies in data but in some
22 cases pure timing differences and therefore suggesting that
23 the system is somewhat flawed. I guess I take issue with
24 that.

25 I, however, believe your study is important in

1 that it helps educate consumers about the fact that there
2 can be differences. We believe that consumers should
3 understand how credit scoring works and we want them to
4 understand that. We want them to see how lenders see them.
5 We encourage consumers to check their scores at all three
6 bureaus and we encourage them to check their score before
7 they undertake a major purchase like a mortgage or car
8 financing.

9 So while the point is valid that people should
10 understand how these systems work, I'm not sure that the
11 fact that there are temporal differences implicates the
12 validity of the system.

13 MR. PLUNKETT: I just would respond on one point.
14 Temporal differences don't account for what we found. We
15 looked at, for instance. The issue of loading data at
16 different times by the three credit reporting agencies.
17 It's in our report, those differences do not account for
18 the variances that we found.

19 The other issue I'll raise is that if we did have
20 more complete reporting then hopefully we wouldn't see the
21 kind of variances. And, you know, whether there's an error
22 or a lack of complete information it's kind of a
23 distinction without a difference to the consumer if their
24 credit score is 610 and it should be 670. Either way,
25 they're going to face higher costs and maybe not get

1 credit.

2 MS. TWOHIG: Evan?

3 MR. HENDRICKS: Well, I'm glad Fair Isaac does
4 want people to see their credit scores now because it
5 didn't always used to be that way. So it is better now
6 that people are able to see it. I remember Chris Larson at
7 e-loan almost got suspended from access to credit reports
8 because he insisted on giving people their credit scores.

9 But public pressure plays a very important role
10 in this which is why I wanted to ask Andrea, let's say
11 you've got a consumer who's satisfied with his credit,
12 likes the number of credit cards he has, and basically,
13 wants to opt out from prescreening. And he opts out from
14 prescreening.

15 Don't you think that should make the credit score
16 go up? If you say I don't need any more credit card
17 offers. I'm very comfortable with where I am and I'm not
18 going to be tempted by offers and hey, I'm where I want to
19 be, doesn't that show a responsible consumer? Shouldn't
20 that make their credit score go up?

21 MS. FIKE: Since I'm not one of our scientists I'm
22 not sure I could really answer that question. I guess we
23 have to look at a statistically significant sample size and
24 see whether or not that has a legitimate correlation.

25 MR. HENDRICKS: I would be concerned, though, that

1 your industry doesn't want people to opt out from
2 prescreening so I'm afraid you might be conflicted from
3 making an objective judgment on that. Again, this is a
4 role for public policy.

5 MR. MCCORKELL: I don't know what industry you're
6 talking about there because as a credit grantor, I'm happy
7 that people opt out of solicitation mailing if they don't
8 want it.

9 As most of you know up here and a lot of people
10 in the room know I used to be in Andrea's position and I
11 said the same thing then, that consumers that take the
12 trouble to opt out are doing us in the industry a favor
13 because they're poor response candidates anyway.

14 MR. HENDRICKS: So you agree that credit scores
15 should go up if they opt out?

16 MR. MCCORKELL: I didn't say I agreed the credit
17 scores should go up. Somebody can look at the data and see
18 if those folks, in fact, are better risks and if they are
19 then I don't have a problem with that.

20 I'm saying that I don't think that the industry
21 has a conflict of interest in saying we want nobody to opt
22 out of prescreening. The people that would have opted out
23 but couldn't if you didn't have that system are lousy
24 response candidates. We don't want to waste money mailing
25 to them.

1 MS. TWOHIG: Fred?

2 MR. CATE: One thing we probably should note and
3 this has nothing to do with the point Travis made but just
4 as a separate point is that many of the benefits that we
5 have seen from sort of the flow of credit information
6 relate to the fact of credit scores.

7 In other words, it's not simply that there's more
8 information and it's more available; it's that it's
9 available in a format that using these algorithms can make
10 the instantaneous decisions about credit available. So
11 even if the information were available but scoring were not
12 available or were significantly retarded it could certainly
13 compromise many of those online credit approval, many of
14 the instant credit opportunities.

15 Many of the cost savings that have driven down
16 prices relating to credit are made possible because of the
17 efficiencies credit scoring itself makes possible.

18 MS. TWOHIG: Bill, I was wondering if you want to
19 comment from your perspective because you said that you
20 believe you're a little less dependent on credit scoring
21 than some of the larger institutions. And also you talked
22 about the importance of small-business lending to your
23 bank.

24 MR. GOSSETT: Okay. Scoring we probably use in
25 our mortgages and we are aware of it but it's not a be-all,

1 end-all. It's sort of hard to apply that to someone
2 wanting to start a new business with his mother-in-law
3 guaranteeing the credit, for instance.

4 Really the issues that are being raised are
5 somewhat news to me. I live in a sheltered world down in a
6 small bank but efforts to regulate or legislate the
7 underwriting side, which is a judgmental process, I have a
8 lot of indigestion with that.

9 MS. TWOHIG: Thanks. We're just about out of time
10 but I do want to talk briefly though, if we can, about
11 another aspect of the credit information sharing debate
12 that I think is very important and that has to do with
13 affiliate sharing.

14 Pete, I know we gave you such a limited time you
15 couldn't adequately really describe this but if you could
16 describe again, I'm particularly interested in the
17 information you can provide on whether the data you have on
18 all consumers is kind of just pushed into one big database
19 that all the affiliates can access.

20 You said you had different databases and some
21 were more specific than others. I think one of the reasons
22 affiliate sharing as such can be so controversial is, of
23 course, because of the fears that there is so much data
24 that is being aggregated that could be accessed by
25 different kinds of businesses. Could you say a little bit

1 more about that?

2 MR. MCCORKELL: Yes. As I pointed out there's a
3 very real difference between the information that's in the
4 system of record about any particular credit product with
5 detailed transaction data, the fact that you spent \$50 at
6 Amazon and \$40 at the pharmacy and that very detailed data
7 that I think is the source of a lot of the fears on this
8 versus the customer information system that tends to be
9 much more summary data.

10 It may have the fact that I have a credit card.
11 It may have the fact that my limit is X and I've had the
12 card since such and such a date, that my current balance is
13 Y, that I've never been delinquent. But it's not going to
14 have that detailed transaction data.

15 As a practical matter, regardless of the legal
16 situation, constructing a customer information system that
17 had all of that detailed transaction data is a gargantuan
18 and maybe close to impossible feat to pull off correctly.

19 One of the things that I've seen really over the
20 last 10 or 12 years were financial institutions that tried
21 to construct customer information systems to bring all
22 those information relationships together.

23 A lot of the early attempts failed because people
24 didn't put any limits on what they put into that
25 centralized database. They had too much, it became a

1 storage problem and it became an access problem. The more
2 data you have to sift through to find what you're looking
3 for the more expensive it is.

4 And if we achieve that eight-product goal with
5 each of our customers and you take it down to the
6 transaction level we may have thousands or even potentially
7 tens of thousands of fields of data about that customer
8 that's got those eight different relationships with us at
9 the transaction level.

10 We can't construct a database for 35 million
11 customers with 10,000 fields available for each customer.
12 It just isn't going to work. So we have got to summarize
13 that data and bring it up to the level of what is really
14 useful in making the next prediction.

15 From our standpoint the fact that you spent money
16 at Amazon or the pharmacy or wherever else typically isn't
17 going to be useful in making the next prediction. It might
18 be useful as heck to Amazon or to Borders to know that you
19 spent X number of dollars per month on books but we are not
20 doing that.

21 I think there was a case maybe five or six years
22 ago where American Express, I think, I hope I'm not
23 slandering them. I think it was American Express tried to
24 provide transaction data to third parties. They got
25 slapped pretty hard by the New York State Attorney General

1 and I don't think most financial institutions are trying to
2 do that any more because of the customer reaction and
3 because of the technical infeasibility of doing it.

4 MS. TWOHIG: But to the extent you can you are
5 using it for cross-selling and also at the decision stage?

6 MR. MCCORKEILL: Well, again, we're not using that
7 individual transaction data very much at the cross-selling
8 or decision stage. We're using the account level of data
9 in the customer information field. To the extent we are
10 dealing with third parties, even that is probably getting
11 filtered once again through a marketing database so that we
12 provide really the minimal information we need for third
13 party use. In our case probably close to 90 percent of
14 that is involved in insurance sales for very, very accurate
15 organization.

16 MS. TWOHIG: Evan or Travis, did you want to say
17 anything about affiliate sharing and the potential cost to
18 consumers on that issue?

19 MR. HENDRICKS: The main issue with affiliate
20 sharing is that affiliates often represent different
21 purposes and the consumer doesn't expect information
22 collected for a checking account to be used to sell them
23 securities.

24 The other issue coming up is that a study, we
25 keep waiting for it to come out from Michigan State, saying

1 somewhere that 57 percent of identity theft is caused by
2 insiders, people inside organizations. So it's important
3 for consumers to know, be able to know, where information
4 about themselves is within a large organization. That's
5 why I think the issue of access to your information is
6 almost as important as the right to opt out.

7 MR. PLUNKETT: If I can add just one point. As
8 some of you may have heard, in some cases affiliate sharing
9 has resulted in more than an annoyance in terms of
10 marketing. It has resulted in actual financial loss and
11 harm to consumers.

12 The case study here is the NationsBank,
13 NationsSecurities case of a few years ago where the
14 securities entity and the bank entity shared information
15 about certificate of deposit holders, mostly elderly. When
16 their certificates of deposit were expiring they were
17 targeted, offered a risky, uninsured derivative product
18 called a term trust. Many of them lost portions of their
19 life savings.

20 NationsBank/Securities was eventually fined about
21 \$7 million by federal regulators. So when we talk about
22 putting the consumer in control of that information, we're
23 also talking about giving them the opportunity to know
24 about this so that they can avoid financial loss as well.

25 MS. TWOHIG: Unfortunately, we are over time even

1 though I think we could go on talking about these issues
2 all day. I want to thank the panelists for their excellent
3 presentations and also an interesting discussion.

4 (Whereupon, a lunch recess was taken.)

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1 AFTERNOON SESSION

2 1:12 P.M.

3 COMMISSIONER THOMPSON: Good afternoon and thank
4 you for being here today. In thinking about this
5 afternoon's panel I began to reflect on, actually, a very
6 large meeting I attended in January between the
7 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD)
8 and APEC, which is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
9 group, to talk about the future of the digital economy.

10 At that time I said that because of the current
11 economic climate throughout the world and technological
12 innovation, we have become a more demand-driven marketplace
13 where what consumers think and how they act have become
14 more important. In fact, even a very minor change in
15 consumer confidence can have a substantial impact on world
16 economies.

17 That means the strategies for how we all look at
18 consumer confidence and how we value consumers have become
19 very important. I think in looking at especially the
20 online world we can visualize consumer confidence as sort
21 of a basket, a basket containing tools that consumers use
22 to determine whether they are being treated well and fairly
23 and whether they entice consumers to participate.

24 Now, among those tools are some of the areas that
25 we work on here at the Commission. Protection of harm

1 against fraud deception, security for their data, and
2 privacy.

3 We recognize that there are lots of people
4 involved in giving consumers those tools including
5 government and businesses and even consumers themselves.
6 Now, this afternoon, and for that matter for this whole
7 day, we have talked a lot about how we measure the costs
8 and benefits of the collection and use of consumer
9 information.

10 But what I would also say is that we need to be
11 sure that we capture the true costs and benefits to
12 consumers. That means being able to measure some things
13 that might not be so obvious including how much is the loss
14 of consumer confidence worth? How much is a failure to
15 address consumer needs or to take appropriate action or
16 engage in best business practices going to harm consumer
17 confidence?

18 We need to think about these issues not only for
19 the short term but also for the long term, because an
20 immediate benefit is illusory if over time the collection
21 and use of a particular category of information erodes
22 consumer confidence.

23 The panelists we will hear from in this next
24 session will be discussing consumer relationship
25 management. We'll hear a little bit of the interface

1 between marketing and consumer confidence and we'll hear a
2 little bit about what industry and others are doing to
3 measure the consumer experience and how business develops
4 their face to the world.

5 I also think it's an opportunity for the
6 panelists to tell us how they include consumers in their
7 own values proposition. So it's an interesting panel and I
8 look forward to hearing your presentations. Thank you very
9 much for being here today.

10 (Applause.)

11 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Commissioner
12 Thompson. Welcome to the panel on customer relationship
13 management, which is also called CRM for short, and
14 targeted marketing. I'm Maureen Ohlhausen. I'm the
15 Assistant Director for Policy Planning here at the Federal
16 Trade Commission.

17 We will first start off with remarks by each of
18 our panelists and then we'll have a discussion so I'd like
19 to first introduce our panelists.

20 We have Marty Abrams Executive Director for the
21 Center for information Policy Leadership; Dave Schrader,
22 Lead Strategist and Marketing Director for Teradata; Nelle
23 Schantz, Program Director for CRM Solutions at SAS
24 Institute; Sandy Hughes, Global Privacy Executive, Proctor
25 & Gamble Company; Rick Savard, Senior Vice President,

1 Marketing Services for FACS Group.

2 Then we've had a slight change in the order.

3 Next we have Beth Givens, Director of the Privacy Rights
4 Clearinghouse and batting cleanup we have Larry Ponemon,
5 Chairman of the Ponemon Institute. We'll start with Marty.

6 MR. ABRAMS: My job, as described by Maureen, is
7 to set the table for everybody else who is on the program.
8 So hopefully, all of the themes I just touch on and don't
9 explore will be explored by others and there will be no
10 empty thoughts.

11 But what I'd like to leave you with is this
12 concept that technology is important, having a 360 degree
13 view of the consumer is important, and understanding the
14 concept of balance is incredibly important in beginning to
15 understand how CRM is going to bring increased value into
16 the marketplace.

17 As we think about CRM it's really a simple
18 concept. It's a concept that the merchants in West
19 Philadelphia, when I used to go visit my grandmother in
20 West Philadelphia, it was a concept that they understood
21 very, very well. It's know your customer, have a 360
22 degree view of your customer so you understand them very
23 well, and make sure that you offer the right product at the
24 right time with the right attributes. If you do that you
25 will create value for your customer. Your customer will

1 have satisfaction and your profitability will be much
2 greater.

3 When I used to visit my grandmother in West
4 Philadelphia we used to visit Mrs. Goldblatt's dress store
5 and I always noticed that while my grandmother was a large
6 person, all the dresses in that dress shop were size 8.
7 And they all fit my grandmother. That's because my
8 grandmother liked to think of herself as a size 8.

9 Mrs. Goldblatt knew everything about the women
10 who lived in that West Philadelphia neighborhood. For
11 example, when my mother became engaged, and I'm just
12 guessing this because I, of course, was not around when she
13 got engaged, I'm sure that the first thing Mrs. Goldblatt
14 did was thought about what type of dress should Leah wear
15 to that wedding and make sure that that dress was in the
16 shop with a size 8.

17 So this is really not a new concept but the
18 nature of the marketplace has changed significantly and we
19 use technology to get at that 360 degree view.

20 CRM is about applying new technologies to
21 traditional applications. These new technologies, I don't
22 have to go down the list, include data storage, data
23 organization, data collection, analytics and
24 communications.

25 The applications are traditional applications for

1 the marketplace. They're things like fulfillment, customer
2 service, risk management, product development, which is to
3 me the most important, sales and marketing.

4 So what we're doing is applying the technologies
5 of CRM to all of those traditional applications. What is
6 different about CRM and is really the concept of
7 centralized information management. It's either that you
8 have a data warehouse or you have good ways of linking data
9 that are distributed together to come up with a 360 degree
10 view of the consumer.

11 All the data is accessible for all of the
12 applications so that you understand the best way to service
13 that consumer. So what has really changed is this concept
14 of bringing all the data together. In the old days when I
15 first started at TRW systems, the company did one thing and
16 one thing well. So you had all the data in one system
17 together. Today, we have a common place for the data and
18 we have multiple processes running off of that common data
19 system.

20 Let me give you some practical examples from the
21 marketplace. I still think we're very new into the CRM
22 marketplace. I think probably where CRM has been best
23 applied is in financial services. But let me give you some
24 concrete examples of how you change the market when you
25 begin to have a 360 degree view of the consumer.

1 One organization I knew had 400 data platforms
2 because they were built through many, many acquisitions.
3 They knew that they had 80 million distinct customers in
4 those 400 data platforms. They knew it was not possible
5 that they actually had 80 million customers, but they
6 didn't know how many customers they actually had until the
7 consolidated down to one data system or one data platform.

8 At that point they could begin to deal with those
9 customers and do things like preference management that
10 they could not do before they had consolidated down to one
11 data system.

12 Another organization, a direct marketer for a
13 catalog, had different systems for sales, for catalog sales
14 and for returns. So they for years thought that their best
15 customers were the customers they could measure based on
16 the number of products purchased and the amount of money
17 paid for those products.

18 When they began to consolidate those two systems
19 together what they found was a lot of their customers who
20 were buying \$4- and \$5000 worth of goods or services a year
21 were returning about \$3800 worth of those goods and
22 services. Rather than being a seller of goods and services
23 they were actually a renter of dresses and other things for
24 parties.

25 They changed their strategy around those

1 customers, sent them a lot fewer catalogs, became a lot
2 less of a costumer for people's parties. So they began to
3 understand better who their most profitable customers were.

4 We already had the mention of Amazon this morning
5 that analyzes your purchasing behavior so that they can
6 begin to model what type of products you might want to buy
7 tomorrow, what type of books might be available. They are
8 an example of an organization that has used information to
9 model behavior.

10 Lastly, we have an airline that began to match
11 their complaint data with their data on frequent fliers.
12 They stopped sending their frequent fliers who missed big
13 meetings and sent complaint letters with congratulatory
14 messages about how wonderful a job they were doing online
15 arrivals, cut down the angst level of those particular
16 travelers. Simple concept that happened when you begin to
17 integrate data together.

18 When we think about these questions all of these
19 applications have trade-offs for consumers. If I'm the
20 consumer who has been renting for free these clothes from
21 this particular cataloger, I lose the ability to be able to
22 game the system.

23 I game a particular airline. They think that I
24 start all of my trips in Washington on a Friday, go back to
25 Dallas, spend the weekend in Dallas and come back to

1 Washington. So all of my trips have a weekend stay,
2 because I'm gaming the system. I have concerns that as we
3 work through the CRM process that airline will begin to
4 figure out how I'm gaming the system and I will lose the
5 opportunity to have those advantages.

6 But on the other hand, the technologies that
7 empower that airline to discover I'm gaming the system also
8 empower me to shop for better prices, know what other
9 people are paying, and know what the best opportunities
10 are.

11 The point is that technology is not good or bad;
12 it's neutral. The market will continue to change; the
13 rules around the market will change, which then brings us
14 to the last point. Actually, two points.

15
16 The first is that the real future for CRM and the
17 future that really begins the great lift is when we begin
18 to use our 360 degree view of consumers to get ahead of the
19 market. Not only do we want to have the right product
20 today for the consumer but we also want to anticipate how
21 our customers are changing so we can efficiently create the
22 right products tomorrow for that consumer and get all of
23 the efficiencies into the system that come from building
24 the right products for the right consumer at the right
25 time.

1 My last point is the balancing point. And it has
2 to do with good privacy policies are an absolute necessity
3 for CRM. First is that it's all about trust. And at the
4 Center for Information Policy Leadership almost everything
5 revolves around the equation $T=VSP$ which means trust equals
6 value times security times the appropriate application of
7 information.

8 Without value you don't have trust and without
9 trust every organization will lose its customers over time.
10 Thank you.

11 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Marty. Next
12 we have Dave Schrader.

13 MR. SCHRADER: Good afternoon. I'd like to begin
14 by thanking you on behalf of Teradata for this important
15 opportunity to describe the information collection and
16 usage practices of some of the Fortune 1000 companies who
17 buy and use the Teradata data warehouse product.

18 In particular, I'd like to focus today on the
19 difference between bad and good marketing practices based
20 both on customer and industry facts as well as case studies
21 that I have gathered. As you'll see shortly, the main
22 difference between good and bad is the usage of analytics
23 technologies.

24 Part of the motivation for this hearing stems
25 from the bad practices, so let's start there. These

1 include unsolicited commercial e-mails, often called spam,
2 irrelevant banner ads and even unsolicited paper mail or
3 junk mail.

4 Bad marketing people use and abuse these channels
5 by sending out too many marketing messages to too many
6 consumers. Recent statistics show that a typical American
7 this year will receive more than 2600 unsolicited e-mails,
8 will see roughly 8900 banner ads and will receive more than
9 34 pounds of third-class mail.

10 As a result, consumers are becoming annoyed and
11 even clamoring to outlaw unwanted communications. But it
12 is important to understand that most responsible companies
13 want to behave responsibly so that they can create and
14 build enduring customer relationships.

15 Good companies realize that every consumer
16 creates numerous clues about what he or she wants and these
17 come in the form of purchases, browsing behaviors on the
18 web, interactions with call center agents and even e-mails.
19 It's a balancing act to collect this information without
20 intruding on privacy.

21 But, when it is allowed by consumers, good
22 marketing companies capture these clues in data warehouses
23 and use analytical techniques like propensity modeling to
24 determine what products might actually be a good match for
25 each customer. They realize that not all products are

1 relevant to all customers at all times so they create small
2 customer segments and try to provide individualized offers
3 and personalized customer service.

4 For consumers this is exactly like going back to
5 the pre-computer days when the merchant might greet you by
6 name when you come in the store, remember what you bought
7 at a last visit and highlight newly arrived merchandise
8 that you might like. That's the primary use of consumer
9 information, to delight each customer with a great
10 experience.

11 Now, the way one can distinguish between good and
12 bad marketing is to take a look at two measures.
13 Conversion rates, defined as the percentage of people who
14 respond to an offer, and customer satisfaction rates,
15 either measured on a one to ten point scale or by metrics
16 like return shopping behavior.

17 Bad marketing people who spam get very, very low
18 rates. One recent example cited only 36 responses to 10
19 million e-mails for an herbal supplement which translates
20 into a 0.00036 percent response which is very, very poor.
21 Only 36 people out of 10 million.

22 By contrast, I'd like to show you an example of
23 great marketing by one of our customers. It's a large
24 international bank. Every day their Teradata data
25 warehouse system looks through all the banking activity by

1 their customers for significant individual events such as
2 an out-of-bounds or large deposit or withdrawal, gaps
3 between the original loan rate they got and the current
4 rates which may have dropped, and events like CDs coming
5 due.

6 Every night 370 analytical programs called event
7 detectives look for these clues. The system generates
8 42,000 leads per week which are then evaluated and handed
9 to personal bankers who do follow-ups via phone or e-mail
10 at a time chosen by the consumer.

11 This high touch, relevant approach to banking has
12 paid dramatic dividends. By basing the marketing
13 activities on consumer behavior the bank has seen responses
14 to its campaigns of up to 60 percent. Average customer
15 conversion rates are five times as high as before doing
16 this kind of event-based marketing.

17 Customers like the approach so much that they
18 deposited an additional \$2 billion with the bank within the
19 first six months of the program.

20 Finally, because event-based marketing works so
21 well, the bank decided to stop doing most mass mailings.
22 As a consequence they were able to chop 75 percent from
23 their advertising budget and they have saved \$20 million in
24 postage costs.

25 This bank is not unique. Numerous customers of

1 Teradata are reporting similar numbers when they adopt
2 event-based marketing programs. The three steps include
3 one, detecting key events at the individual customer level;
4 two, responding with an appropriate offer personalized to
5 that customer; and three, measuring the results to know
6 what offers work and which don't thereby continuously
7 improving the ability of the bank to please its customers.

8 Good marketing pays off with conversion rates in
9 the 25 to 60 percent ranges as well as much higher customer
10 satisfaction numbers.

11 Across the industry we're beginning to see
12 numerous statistics that show the profound difference
13 between marketing people who collect the clues and analyze
14 them and those who don't. This chart shows that good
15 marketing practices can be 11 to 63 times more effective
16 than bad ones.

17 For example, only one in 300 people, 0.3 percent,
18 will click through on a banner ad if it's not targeted
19 correctly while one in five people, or 21 percent, will
20 respond if it is well matched to their needs. Similarly,
21 companies who do a good job of targeting their physical
22 mail offers can see a 36 times difference in their
23 effectiveness by using analytics. The final line of the
24 chart shows the difference in customer satisfaction, a
25 factor of 30 when it comes to repeat buying rates.

1 In summary, using analytics technologies like the
2 ones Teradata offers can make a huge difference between bad
3 and good marketing. It is a win-win situation because the
4 company usually spends less money on marketing for a higher
5 return. The consumer benefits, too, because she will
6 receive fewer but more relevant messages which cause higher
7 conversion rates and higher customer satisfaction. Thank
8 you.

9 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Dave. Now we
10 have Nelle Schantz from SAS Institute.

11 MS. SCHANTZ: Thanks, Maureen. Let me begin by
12 saying thank you and thank you to the Federal Trade
13 Commission for sponsoring a workshop where we can sit here
14 and discuss data and discuss facts about how to use
15 customer information.

16 I appreciate the opportunity to add insight into
17 the discussion on this panel today. Let me begin by
18 pointing out that I work for a company, SAS Institute, that
19 provides software to companies to gain or acquire better
20 insight about their customers and to improve their customer
21 relationship management strategies that Marty went through
22 very well.

23 We maintain the position that leveraging customer
24 information, if used responsibly, is beneficial not only to
25 the company but also to consumers. So what I'm going to do

1 over the next few minutes is leverage what Dave just talked
2 about from the perspective of why we should do this and why
3 it's smart from the marketing point to drill into a little
4 bit more detail on exactly how companies acquire this
5 information and use this information.

6 I'll get into a little bit more of the details of
7 exactly how companies gather data and use data. Then I
8 want to share with you some examples from a consumer
9 perspective about how using customer data benefits the
10 consumer.

11 I have oversimplified a pretty complicated
12 process to get my point across to share with you four steps
13 on how companies use customer data.

14 It begins with the first step of accessing data.
15 Along Marty's point of creating a 360 degree view of the
16 customers, companies look to access data and use technology
17 to access data from as many relevant sources as they can
18 get.

19 What we're talking about there is accessing data
20 from all front office channels, whether it's storefront
21 information, branch information, ATM information if you're
22 a financial services company, call center information, all
23 the front office's information, pulling in information from
24 all the product areas, pulling in information from third-
25 party data, pulling in attitudinal data, survey data,

1 satisfaction data, pulling in information like that to get
2 as complete a view of your customer as you possibly can.

3 The second step is as you're pulling that
4 information in is cleansing it, making it more accurate.
5 You want to be able to as we heard from Acxiom this morning
6 do things like make sure that Jane Brown's data is combined
7 with Jane M. Brown's data.

8 What we found is that these first two steps are
9 the foundation for creating good relevant insight. SAS
10 just conducted a survey in Europe. We surveyed and
11 interviewed 500 marketing directors in financial services
12 institutions and telecom institutions.

13 Sixty-seven percent of those companies said that
14 inaccurate data and incomplete data was having a negative
15 impact on their profitability of the company. And
16 consequently, it was also having a negative impact on the
17 customer satisfaction and the customer loyalty.

18 So getting this more complete view of a customer,
19 getting this more accurate view of a customer is a
20 foundation that you've got to have in order to start using
21 the analytics that I'll get into now to create that
22 customer insight.

23 The third step here is the analytics piece, using
24 analytic technology to analyze your data. What companies
25 are doing with that is they can start off as basic as doing

1 reporting and looking at historical data and trends to
2 getting more sophisticated, using what we call data mining
3 or predictive modeling.

4 That is technology that gives companies the
5 ability to get their arms around huge amounts of data and
6 to gain insight from that data using statistical models and
7 predictive models.

8
9 It's that type of process that helps companies
10 answer questions like who is in danger of leaving my
11 company or what is the next best product that this customer
12 is going to be interested in that I should talk to them
13 about. Or, maybe on the flip side, who is a potential
14 money launderer in this company?

15 So it's the predictive modeling and the data
16 mining that is going to give you insight like that. Once
17 obtained, you want to take that insight and have technology
18 that helps you deliver it or deploy it into the front
19 office channels and into the hands of the employees that
20 need to use that data to have more effective interactions
21 with their customers.

22 Just a summary, the four steps are accessing
23 data, cleansing the data, performing analytics to create
24 your customer insight and then delivering that insight out
25 to the people that need to use it or the system that needs

1 to use it.

2 Let me switch gears and give you a couple of
3 examples about why using this type of technology and these
4 practices, again, when used responsibly, can benefit the
5 customer. We've got a lot of examples, from the companies
6 that we work with of how companies will identify profitable
7 or potentially profitable customers and try and grow and
8 maintain those relationships.

9 Taking a little bit different slant, let me share
10 with you about a situation where a national bank here in
11 the United States decided that, as a commitment to their
12 community, they were going to commit to making several
13 hundred billion dollars of loans, mortgage loans, over a
14 ten-year span of time to low income and minority families.

15 They used analytics to identify customers,
16 families, that qualified for these mortgages. By using
17 analytics and getting the information out to these
18 customers they were able to in the first year alone surpass
19 their goals by 4.6 billion dollars. So from the consumer's
20 perspective what that meant was not only getting much-
21 needed money in their hands but getting it faster and more
22 effectively.

23 One more example about the importance of having
24 customer information on why it's relevant on the flip side,
25 I also worked with a bank that the credit card company used

1 analytics to identify customers that were unprofitable.

2 They sent a note to those customers which said,
3 thanks for being a customer. We are going to start
4 charging you're a \$25 annual user's fee because they wanted
5 to make it more profitable.

6 Well, consequently, a lot of customers ended up
7 closing out their credit card account and at first they
8 thought that was fine because it was improving the
9 profitability of their credit card portfolio. But what the
10 bank came to find out was because they did not have a
11 complete view of their customers and weren't looking at a
12 well rounded view what they ultimately found out and
13 determined was that the least profitable credit card
14 customer was the most profitable banking customer.

15 So they also lost mortgages, savings accounts,
16 deposit accounts, and investments. That's a great example
17 as I'm wrapping up here to share with you maybe a best
18 practice learning from that and that is that companies in
19 implementing CRM solutions or implementing CRM strategies
20 are not focused just on technology.

21 They are driving at this from a best practices
22 perspective. They are driving at this with a focus of
23 delighting customers and retaining customers. Companies
24 that are successful in this not only align their technology
25 with that strategy but they are aligning their employee

1 training, they're aligning their center plans, they are
2 aligning their whole culture to focus on delighting the
3 customer. Thank you.

4 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Nelle. Marty
5 gave us the overview and Dave and Nelle both gave us sort
6 of the general view of how these processes work. Now, I'd
7 like to turn to some specifics and Sandy and then Rick will
8 discuss how their companies in particular use this data and
9 these kind of processes in their own operations. So,
10 Sandy?

11 MS. HUGHES: Thank you, Maureen. I'm Sandy
12 Hughes, Global Privacy Executive at the Procter & Gamble
13 Company. As the saying goes, a picture is worth a thousand
14 words. So I have produced a video to give you some
15 examples of some of the technology you've heard about and
16 the balance that we have in relationship marketing and
17 we'll also see what our business leaders and some real
18 consumers feel about relationship marketing.

19 Now, I have to tell you that in general P&G does
20 not sell products online but we do offer information and
21 services to improve the lives of our consumers. So, let's
22 take a look at a couple of examples of these services.

23 (Whereupon, a videotape was played.)

24 MS. HUGHES: As you can see, at P&G our
25 relationships with consumers are built on a basis of

1 transparency and trust. We offer individuals who provide
2 us their information on choices, on how they'd like to get
3 further communication. We ask whether or not they'd like
4 to get additional information or services and we also seek
5 to find the most convenient means where they can tell us
6 whether or not they'd like us to contact them again.

7 This video highlights real consumers who are
8 talking about real benefits in providing their personal
9 information. This value is converted to trust which we
10 measure in terms of increased subscription rates, low opt-
11 out rates, improved products and services, which, of
12 course, lead to increased loyalty and sales. Even though
13 this video is showing the online world, these principles
14 also apply to offline.

15 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Sandy, I just have one question.
16 How do you get consumers to visit these websites for the
17 first time?

18 MS. HUGHES: Well, we use typical advertising that
19 you would for any other type of medium. So on various
20 sites, in the case of Pampers, it would be on
21 Babycenter.com or iVillage and things like that.

22 In the case of Home Made Simple it would be they
23 may start through a site called Start Sampling where they
24 put in their profile and they'll go to our website to find
25 out more about information and then they could get a link

1 to the sites that way. It's also in our typical print ads
2 and things we'll also put websites on there.

3 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much. Rick?

4 MR. SAVARD: Well, I, too, will take advantage as
5 Marty did to say thank you to the FTC. Thank you, Maureen,
6 for the opportunity to participate in this important forum.

7 For those of you who may not know F A C S or FACS
8 stands for Financial and Credit Services. We are the
9 credit card division of Federated Department Stores. And
10 Federated Department Stores encompasses Bloomingdale's,
11 Macy's, The Bon Marche in the Northwest, Burdine's in
12 Florida, Lazarus, Rich's Macy's, Goldsmiths, and Macys.com.

13 I'm going to try to cover four topics today.
14 They are the importance of customer data, collecting and
15 protecting data, the concept of relationship equity, which
16 we have talked a lot about today.

17 Secondly, how does data sharing benefit the
18 customer. We'll look at two concrete examples. The value
19 of sharing data to the customer and the retailer, and some
20 observations on where we go in the near future. The near
21 future is now. It's six months away.

22 MR. SAVARD: Relationship equity is defined as the
23 trust that a customer has in the relationship that they
24 have with the retailer. We talked a lot about trust today.
25 This is something we try to be very, very conscious of at

1 Federated.

2 Let me give you two examples of how you can maybe
3 gauge relationship equity. The first one is if when you
4 conduct a customer survey you experience a response rate of
5 20 percent or above then chances are you probably have
6 pretty strong relationship equity.

7 If you have a large percentage of your customer
8 base that has been transacting and doing business with you
9 over a long period of time, so these are tenured customers,
10 let's say ten or 15 years, and they have transacted with
11 you each and every year chances are you have a high degree
12 of relationship equity.

13 Customer data. First, regarding the control of
14 data. I think we all agree that customer data is a very
15 valuable asset. Consequently, you need internal system
16 support to manage the data as well as record and execute
17 customer requests relative to the use of their data.

18 Second, regarding the use of the data, if you are
19 going to collect customer data then it is essential that
20 you have a place to store the data, to aggregate it in an
21 appropriate fashion, and then applications that allow you
22 to access the data in a real and relevant time frame.

23 Let's look at two examples, two concrete examples
24 of how data sharing can benefit the customer. First, a
25 very popular topic today, the creation of loyalty programs.

1 Developing a customer loyalty program based on consumer
2 behaviors versus spending levels. Historically, loyalty
3 programs were designed based on the simple requirement of
4 what you spent.

5 It was assumed that all customers who spent a
6 predetermined amount of money with you, let's say \$500,
7 looked alike. Today, with the benefit of data sharing, our
8 perspective on this topic is much more evolved.

9 Listed behind me on the chart is just a sample of
10 the data elements that we would consider today when
11 attempting to develop a customer loyalty program. What
12 customers buy, the specific merchandise, the frequency of
13 their visits, as well as when they visit, lifestyle data.

14 Do they use your store card or do they use
15 another payment method, full versus sale price, the number
16 of relationships that you have with that particular
17 customer, do they revolve when they use your card, use of
18 promotions, demographic data, do they take advantage of
19 deferred payments, brands purchased and families of
20 business that they shop. This is but a fraction of the
21 data elements that we factor into decisions on how to
22 tailor products and offerings to customers.

23 Well, the implications are pretty obvious. All
24 customers that spend \$500 with you are not alike. Unique
25 customer behaviors are what drive enhanced customer

1 satisfaction and profitability.

2 Lastly, this higher degree of success, in turn,
3 allows companies to develop and deliver more relevant,
4 compelling offers that, in turn, nurture stronger customer
5 relationships.

6 Example number two, this is a little more of a
7 challenging example in that what we are looking at here is
8 the management of the entire customer life cycle. For many
9 of us as retailers the motivation in our business goes far
10 beyond the transaction. It really talks to the entire life
11 cycle.

12 For some of us, for example, in the department
13 store business, that life cycle truly is a lifetime. The
14 richer the data we have as a customer progresses through
15 the phases of their life cycle the better we can manage and
16 respond to a customer's needs.

17 The value of sharing data. Benefits to the
18 customer. Let's look at why the value of sharing data is a
19 win-win proposition. Better products that address their
20 individual and evolving needs. Again, Marty talked a
21 little bit earlier about how in the old days back in.

22 MR. SAVARD: West Philadelphia. That retailer was
23 able to cater to the individual needs of the customer. The
24 landscape today is about millions of customers. In the
25 case of Federated it's about tens of millions of customers

1 that transact with us every year.

2 We see it just as relevant our ability to cater
3 to their individual needs on a one-to-one basis as it was
4 in yesteryear. But at the end of the day, it comes down to
5 the data.

6 The second advantage is a greater value at lower
7 cost. What I mean is the ability to understand the
8 customer on a one-to-one level means less waste. If we
9 give something to a customer we want it to be relevant and
10 appreciated so that we can grow together.

11 If I overdeliver or deliver elements to a
12 customer, especially in a loyalty program, that aren't
13 targeted, aren't relevant, then I have an issue on my hand.
14 That lost cost then hinders me in developing new products
15 and services later on.

16 Customer protection. Today's technology allows
17 us to protect the customer as never before. The more data
18 we have, the better we can do this. The interesting thing
19 about protecting the customer is that the customer expects
20 that from you. It's part of the whole relationship equity
21 idea so that when a customer shops in our store and there
22 is something that we see as aberrant in the technology that
23 we put in place and we ask to speak to that customer, that
24 customer is not upset. That customer appreciates the fact
25 that we have their best interests in mind.

1 Now, let's look at the benefits to the companies.
2 Enhanced profitability. Profitable retailers take their
3 earnings and develop new formats. They introduce new
4 products, they launch new services. This keeps them
5 relevant and in the marketplace.

6 More entrenched customer relationships. No
7 customer has more value than the current customer that you
8 have. While new customers are essential it's success with
9 our core customers that allows us to continue to be
10 successful and propels us forward.

11 The richness of customer data combined with the
12 profitable successful retailer gives us the ability to
13 develop relevant goods and services in an accelerated
14 fashion. That's essential today, especially when all
15 retailers are striving to remain relevant to their customer
16 bases.

17 I will go through these quickly in the interest
18 of time. Where do we from here in the future? More
19 sophisticated techniques to collect data. I think we have
20 covered this, however, let me say one thing. To the degree
21 to which we collect more data and to the degree to which we
22 want to enhance relationship equity it is essential that
23 the customer understand why we're collecting the data and
24 how we expect to use the data.

25 Real time access and mobilization of data. Five

1 years ago our data was 60 days old. It was hard to get at
2 and it was incomplete. Today our data is days old. We can
3 access it in a minute and I can mobilize it the very next
4 day.

5 More sophisticated safeguards and control of
6 data. I won't expand on that. Clearer communication with
7 your customer, prospective customer of how the data will be
8 used. I think we've touched on that.

9 And lastly, greater appreciation for the concept
10 of relationship equity. For individual retailers their
11 respective definition of relationship equity will become
12 essential for them to understand in the future. Thank you.

13 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Rick.
14 Turning back now to some more general issues that I also
15 think Sandy and Rick both touched on but I think that we'll
16 get into more, we have Beth Givens.

17 MS. GIVENS: Thank you very much. I appreciate
18 the opportunity of participating on this panel. The title
19 of my presentation is "What's Missing From This Picture?"

20 We've heard several presentations from industry
21 representatives today touting the benefits of the
22 collection and use of customer information. These include
23 the benefits of convenience and also of saving money.

24 I want to focus, in contrast, on two themes.
25 First, there are significant costs to individuals and to

1 society of not protecting privacy, and second, not all
2 costs can be expressed in monetary terms.

3 And I think Commissioner Thompson expressed this
4 well in his opening comments. I would recommend to the
5 Federal Trade Commission that an important area of research
6 for the FTC would be to come up with ways to determine the
7 costs of not protecting privacy and also some of these
8 intangible and nonmonetary costs to society as a whole.

9 MS. GIVENS: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is a
10 nonprofit consumer advocacy and research and education
11 program. We're based in San Diego, California. We have
12 been in existence since 1992.

13 For the past 11 years my staff and I have invited
14 consumers' complaints and questions about a wide variety of
15 information on privacy issues. From the very first calls
16 that we started receiving in 1992 we observed that control
17 is a critical issue for individuals, and it is the lack of
18 control over what is done with their personal information
19 that literally drives them crazy.

20 In the early days the majority of our calls were
21 about unsolicited mail and telemarketing. By the mid-'90s
22 that subject was replaced resoundingly by identity theft as
23 the number one topic. And today we have a mix of issues,
24 telemarketing, identity theft, credit and financial issues,
25 Internet privacy and employment background checks.

1 People who have contacted us explain how their
2 personal information, and it might be in the hands of
3 another person, it may be a company, it may be a government
4 agency, has in one way or another caused them harm,
5 aggravation or fear.

6 I submit that a great deal of these strong
7 feelings about privacy stem from the fact that deception
8 and a lack of transparency undergird the collection and use
9 of a significant amount of consumer information.

10 Let me use just one example, that being the so-
11 called product registration forms also called warranty
12 cards. These are often packaged with consumer electronics
13 products and I'm sure you've seen them. In addition to
14 asking for information about that purchase they also gather
15 demographic information such as income, age, education,
16 hobbies, home ownership and the like.

17 But actually one's receipt is all that is needed
18 to activate the warranty and demographic data certainly has
19 nothing to do with registering the product. Indeed, the
20 deception goes further. The address that the post card is
21 mailed to is not to the manufacturer of the product but
22 rather to a post office box of an aggregation company that
23 compiles and sells this personally identified data to
24 marketers.

25 Yes, most if not all of these forms have opt-out

1 statements but they are at the end, very tiny, written in
2 vague language and I have yet to meet an individual who's
3 actually noticed that opt-out statement.

4 So what is result of the collection of consumer
5 data such as this in a way that I consider to be deceptive?
6 Well, it's unsolicited mail and phone solicitations and I'm
7 often asked by industry representatives what's so bad about
8 that? It's just a little junk mail.

9 My answer is that many of the strategies used to
10 market to consumers are based on deception and are
11 invisible to individuals. It leads to the perception which
12 is borne out I think in a lot of surveys that individuals
13 have little control over what is done with their personal
14 information.

15 I also think it contributes to the lack of trust
16 that is reflected in numerous public opinion polls. Now,
17 I'm not going to recite poll findings today in the interest
18 of time but suffice it to say, and I think we all know
19 this, support for privacy protection is in the high 80s,
20 low 90s when these surveys are done.

21 We have heard the phrase the free flow of
22 information several times today. What are some of the
23 consequences of so-called free flow of information? How
24 have financial institutions, to use one example, shared
25 their customer data?

1 Many financial companies sell or share name,
2 address, phone numbers, account balance, account types and
3 account numbers with telemarketing companies.

4 Telemarketers in turn pitch products of dubious
5 value, in my opinion, to those bank and credit card
6 customers such as travel, entertainment and shopping clubs,
7 also insurance policies.

8 Several major U.S. financial companies have been
9 sued by state attorneys general in the past four or five
10 years for their unfair and deceptive marketing practices
11 involving the sharing and the selling of customer data.
12 These include U.S. Bancorp, Citigroup, Chase, Fleet
13 Mortgage, First USA and NationsBank.

14 What are some of these fraudulent and unethical
15 practices regarding customers' financial data and the
16 sharing of that data? One practice is called preacquired
17 account telemarketing fraud where products and services are
18 charged against the individuals' accounts without their
19 consent. This is achievable because the financial company
20 shares that account number with the telemarketer.

21 U.S. Bancorp, Minnesota Attorney General is one
22 of those cases. Now under Gramm-Leach-Bliley you cannot
23 sell the account number but it is encrypted and actually
24 the end result is still the same, that account can be
25 debited.

1 In a 2001 case the Federal Trade Commission v.
2 Citigroup a former Citi financial employee explained in a
3 sworn declaration that branch managers targeted deceptive
4 loans to individuals who they identified as vulnerable
5 because of being, quote, uneducated, inarticulate, a
6 minority or particularly old or young, end of quote.

7 Travis Plunkett this morning talked to you about
8 the NationsBank, NationsSecurities case where affiliate
9 sharing resulted in a lot of people moving into riskier
10 investments and losing a considerable portion of their life
11 savings.

12 Now, I mentioned at the outset that I would talk
13 about the cost to individuals and society of not protecting
14 privacy. Certainly these fraudulent and unethical
15 practices that I have just described have very real and
16 significant costs to many individuals.

17 This coming summer we're going to see the launch
18 of the Federal Trade Commission's national do-not-call
19 registry. It's been a long time in coming, and I, of
20 course, speak as a privacy and consumer advocate when I say
21 that, and I think it's fair to say that the strong
22 political support for this registry is the result of this
23 industry's abusive use of personal information.

24 Not everyone in the industry but certainly enough
25 to make the problem evident to the tune of over 100 million

1 telemarketing calls every day. And this is even during a
2 time when targeting has presumably been improving.

3 What are some of the costs to consumers? Well,
4 the expense of phone services such as unlisted numbers,
5 caller ID, anonymous call rejection, privacy manager,
6 answering machines, voice mail services and devices like
7 Telezapper, the Phone Butler and EZ Hangup.

8 I want to say just a few words about identity
9 theft. Certainly this crime is testament to the negative
10 consequences of the free flow of information but what I
11 want to focus on is the tremendous cost to society as a
12 whole.

13 We read of the estimates of losses to the
14 industry and losses to the victims but I think one of the
15 largest costs is to the Internet economy. The fact that
16 the major reason people are not shopping online is their
17 fear of fraud and identity theft.

18 I would be remiss if I didn't mention the role of
19 untrammelled information trafficking in the crimes of
20 stalking and domestic violence. The National Network to
21 End Domestic Violence is located here in Washington is
22 doing excellent work on these matters.

23 You become instantly sensitized, as I have, to
24 the challenges of protecting information privacy when
25 attempting to assist individuals in keeping their residence

1 addresses out of the hands of their batterers and stalkers.

2 You don't often think of one's address as being
3 highly sensitive but it certainly is to a victim of one of
4 these crimes. The same holds true for people in certain
5 occupations like law enforcement, court officials,
6 teachers, doctors, social workers, celebrities, political
7 leaders.

8 I encourage those of you who are designing CRM
9 and target marketing systems to keep the needs of these
10 individuals in mind as you design your systems because I
11 think if you can serve them and still give them the
12 benefits that you profess that you also will be helping
13 others as well.

14 I attempted to get a supermarket shopper's card
15 as an anonymous person, my name was Ralph Shopper. I went
16 to one and they said, no, absolutely not. We have to have
17 your name and you cannot have a card unless you give us
18 your name and your information. I went to another. I
19 shopped around actually, and found one that it wasn't an
20 issue at and I know am a proud user of a loyalty card and
21 my name is Ralph Shopper.

22 In closing, I want to talk about recommendations,
23 solutions and I do think the adoption of robust care for
24 information principles is key. I'd like to give you three
25 references that cover in more detail what I've been

1 covering.

2 One is a very good report by Robert Gellman
3 called "Privacy, Consumers and Costs," and it does get into
4 a lot of these costs that are not thought of when you don't
5 protect privacy.

6 Secondly, is the EPIC's comments the Electronic
7 Privacy Information Center that are out on the table out
8 there and they offer a method for evaluating the cost of
9 information flows.

10 Third is something that I wrote two years ago
11 called "The Information Marketplace" presented as comments
12 to a Federal Trade Commission workshop on that subject.
13 And I get into a lot more discussion of some of the
14 deceptive practices of collecting consumer data.

15 So again, I want to thank you and by the way, in
16 answer to Commissioner Swindle's earlier exhortation to
17 show him the data, all of these papers have very good
18 footnotes and a lot of well cited data and legal
19 references. Thank you very much.

20 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Beth. We now
21 have Larry Ponemon.

22 MR. PONEMON: Thank you for allowing me to be the
23 cleanup person. It's kind of a deja vu experience. I feel
24 like I was just here. I was. What I'm going to do is
25 maybe spend about eight minutes to go through some data

1 that I'm going to report upon. This was research that was
2 recently conducted. I'm just going to give you a high
3 level cut. If you want more detail please contact me.
4 Many of you have and I appreciate the phone calls that are
5 coming in.

6 This analysis was done in conjunction with
7 Peppers and Rogers. I'm their privacy adviser and partner
8 with PRG and so I just want to make sure that I'm giving
9 due credit to PRG.

10 A little bit about why we are talking about
11 privacy and CRM and the merger of the two. If you think
12 about privacy management, privacy management is done for a
13 reason. I'm going to now advance a few key assertions or
14 reasons why we want to do this and how it may link to the
15 CRM universe, because I think all of these comments were
16 just terrific.

17 First, the privacy management process consists of
18 five key elements. There is a procedural management
19 element which is giving organizations a structure for
20 making sure that they do what they say they do in the form
21 of policy which may seem easy but it's really not that
22 easy.

23 It's about monitoring. It's about
24 communications. It's about education and awareness. It's
25 about redress and enforcement. It's about doing real

1 stuff. Keep in mind that if you're an organization and you
2 are not walking the walk that is probably just going to
3 just devastate your CRM efforts even if you have a good
4 policy and even if you really have great interaction with
5 your end customer.

6 So what are some of the key assertions about the
7 privacy management process? Well, we all believe that a
8 good process helps to reduce cost. We tend to measure cost
9 like a compliance thing that if we do it right we're not
10 going to get sued as much.

11 Well, it is also about making policies real and
12 educating employees and other stakeholders. It's also a
13 tool, a process and a tool, that helps provide feedback
14 because we make mistakes. Most privacy abuses are ones we
15 never read about because they're just not that interesting;
16 they are about people making mistakes like sharing data and
17 not really understanding that it's a violation of the law.

18 Now, the big assertion that is still untested is
19 the idea that if you align the perceptions and beliefs of
20 customers and targets, consumers, you will increase the
21 confidence, their confidence in your organization and that
22 will translate into new revenue. We all see that, that
23 connection is clear to us but it may not be something that
24 we can test or test very easily.

25 Now what are companies doing today? I'm not

1 going to go through this. If you're interested we just
2 completed a benchmark study. But in drawing upon the 150
3 or so items of the study I just pulled out a few
4 interesting items to show you what leading companies, 55
5 leading companies, are doing today to build more of that
6 value proposition on the trust side.

7 Number one, only 15 percent of the companies are
8 actually linking privacy to their ROI framework, which I
9 will discuss hopefully a little bit later, is a mistake.
10 It needs to be linked.

11 Fifty-three percent of companies are actually
12 attempting to capture consumer privacy preferences in their
13 systems. Thirty-four percent are actually doing a double
14 check to make sure that the choice that a consumer or
15 customer makes is being honored. That can be dangerous.
16 Fifty-eight percent actually attempt to align the policy
17 with the expectation of the stakeholder.

18 Eighty-three percent have a process for
19 communicating the policy. Forty percent have an outreach
20 program to new customers. Forty-eight percent believe that
21 they have sufficient resources to execute on that program,
22 and 36 percent, in other words, 64 percent do not, 36
23 percent believe that privacy is important to the brand or
24 market image.

25 It's in that last category, that's where it's all

1 at. If you believe that it's about improving your clients,
2 your customers, your consumer, your policyholder then
3 you're walking the walk. It's about baking it into your
4 market image and brand.

5 Now let me do a deeper dive in that question.
6 The question in the benchmarking study is whether privacy
7 is an important part of the company brand or marketplace
8 image. Those that responded yes are different than the
9 companies that responded no or unsure.

10 For example, the yes group seemed to have a
11 higher likelihood of a formal outreach to new customers and
12 business partners. For some of you in the room, if you're
13 a chief privacy officer here's some good news. If you
14 answered yes, you probably had more resources allocated to
15 privacy as a way to generate money.

16 MR. PONEMON: If you answered yes you had closer
17 involvement from your senior executive team like the CEO
18 and the board. This is especially true when the program
19 was linked to measurable goals or ROI.

20 If you answered yes, interestingly enough, you
21 were less focused on control, especially over customer-
22 centric information. I'm not sure if that's a good thing
23 or a bad thing. If you answered yes you had more
24 restrictions on data sharing, especially with third
25 parties, and the notice as well as the policy was written

1 more clearly.

2 Now, this is the one picture is worth a thousand
3 words. This is probably its own conference and clearly you
4 can't read it but I just want to tell you what this is
5 about. This is something that if you really want to get a
6 big yawn tonight, if you want to sleep well, read this.

7 It actually takes a lot of data from three very
8 large scale studies that our Institute just completed, one
9 for retail banking, one for the grocery store industry and
10 one for retail pharmaceutical companies. And what we're
11 able to do from about 22,000 observations, remember three
12 different studies using a meta-analysis, we can compare and
13 contrast those companies that are viewed as trusted
14 organizations against companies that are viewed as not
15 being particularly trusted. This is by industry. So, for
16 example, this would include banks, grocery stores and
17 pharmaceuticals. But it was remarkably consistent.

18 Now, let me just take two of the items of the
19 five items, like notice, security, choice and consent,
20 access, and redress. The companies that were most trusted
21 did a Procter & Gamble. In other words, they baked privacy
22 into the brand. If you have a brand like Pampers that's
23 going to have more meaning if you're shopping for Pampers
24 than if, in fact, you see the Procter & Gamble name. So
25 brand focus privacy was considered a good fact.

1 A bad fact under notice was just differing online
2 and offline privacy policies.

3 On choice and consent or permission marketing
4 related issues, the confirmation that the customer's choice
5 is being honored was considered something that increased
6 trust. No data sharing, by the way, I know you're going to
7 throw things at me but that was actually the number one
8 factor on trust but I know it's not necessarily realistic.
9 No data sharing with third parties was considered a trust-
10 enhancing factor.

11 Clearly defined opt in on all personal contact
12 including research was especially true in the
13 pharmaceutical industry. It may not be true in banking and
14 the grocery store industry.

15 But here's an interesting finding. Choice that
16 is delivered as a categorical variable, in other words, not
17 a simple binomial yes and no was considered a good thing.
18 Give the customer more choices in terms of how that
19 information is being used.

20 So having categories of use rather than a yes or
21 no is considered a good fact.

22 Then there's access and redress. Keep in mind
23 that we found differences between those organizations by a
24 given industry that are viewed as trustworthy or trusted
25 and those that are not.

1 We also have a broad category called neutral.
2 Things that we think enhance trust like the existence of
3 privacy seal programs don't seem to make a difference. So
4 if you're interested, start looking at this good stuff.

5 The whole model that we have all talked about,
6 and this is preaching to the choir, is that it's not about
7 just being altruistic and respecting privacy, it's about
8 getting better data and it's using that data in ways that
9 lead to greater efficiency in the organization.

10 The best model, and I've talked to lots of folks
11 who are on the CRM side of the universe, is about self-
12 service. It's about a customer someday actually choosing
13 what kind of laptop or what kind of printer they want to
14 buy. That exists today.

15 In order to do that right you have to understand
16 how that customer thinks, believes, behaves and will buy.
17 In order to do that you need good data. In order to get
18 good data you have to be trustworthy with that data. You
19 can't slip, not even once.

20 So the whole model is moving from availability to
21 ultimately your system and your CRM process generating
22 advice and that leads to greater loyalty, greater
23 convenience and a bottom line result for the organization.

24 The next step is we have to measure what we are
25 talking about here. We have to convene groups to develop

1 real ROI models that we can demonstrate to the CEOs of our
2 organizations to show that it's not just about compliance.
3 It's about generating a healthier bottom line.

4 If we do it right, we're going to get better
5 business. Well-defined models are important. Empirical
6 testing of that model to prove the value proposition, and
7 then having workshops like this workshop to educate and to
8 make organizations feel like there's another way to prove
9 the value proposition for privacy. And with that being
10 said, thank you for allowing me to talk a little bit
11 longer.

12
13 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Larry. At
14 this point I'd like to prompt the audience. I'll start off
15 with a few questions that I have.

16 One of my questions is that for some of the
17 benefits that have been discussed it seems to me that they
18 can be obtained with using data in the aggregate.

19 For example, if you figure out the people who buy
20 diapers often buy, for example, headache medicine you can
21 generate a coupon at checkout or something. As a mother of
22 four children I link those two together very easily, and so
23 I was trying to figure out sort of when you decide when
24 it's better to store information in identifiable,
25 individualized form and when it works better in the

1 aggregate.

2 MS. SCHANTZ: The old diapers and beer example.
3 I'll take a stab at that. You can certainly gather
4 information and use information effectively at the
5 aggregate level. That's what we talk about from the
6 segmentation perspective.

7 Larry talked about working with Peppers and
8 Rogers a lot and they have coined the phrase, one to one.
9 So you hear from a lot of customers that they want to be
10 interactive with from a perspective of what is important to
11 me.

12 I'll give you a statistic that the Gardener Group
13 has recently produced a report that talks about how
14 solicitations or interactions, I should say, with customers
15 when you do campaign mailing, which is done on the
16 aggregate typically, the success rate of that is typically
17 around three percent.

18 When you do event-based or event-triggered
19 marketing or interactions with customer where something
20 happens in the individual's behavior and that triggers an
21 event, say, wait a second. Something's going on with this
22 customer. We need to initiate an interaction. Those types
23 of interactions are 20 percent, are successful 20 percent
24 of the time.

25 Then we have information that is used when the

1 customer actually contacts the company and you can follow
2 up with a discussion using data that is relevant to that
3 individual who has contacted you. The success of those
4 interactions are a whopping 40 percent.

5 Studies like that are showing that while you do
6 have success with information at an aggregate level that
7 trying to drill it down and, again, I preface this with
8 doing it responsibly, but drilling down to an individual
9 level you're going to have more success. When I'm talking
10 about success, of course, it's from a company perspective
11 but likewise the success on the other side of the fence
12 shows that it's more relevant to the customer and they're
13 more interested in what you have to say. And you don't
14 have the headache of all the unwanted solicitations.

15 MR. SCHRADER: I'd like to add an echo to a
16 couple of the points. If you deal with averages and
17 aggregates then you can probably expect average results.
18 People who drill down and get to the consumer behavior in
19 context are likely to do very, very well.

20 I'll give you an example. I was browsing on the
21 Internet on a website that is one of our customers, and I
22 was looking for information on going to visit a friend in
23 the Peace Corps in Africa.

24 Up came, as part of the banner ad, information
25 from a pharmaceutical company about malaria. I had not

1 thought about malaria but because the timing was right the
2 next day I went and got all the shots before I went on the
3 trip.

4 So if the advertising is done in context when a
5 consumer is likely to be very amenable the percentages, the
6 numbers show the results. There are a lot of other ones
7 that are coming out and I put some on the information that
8 I gave out. It's showing that the payoff numbers are there
9 when you get down to the individual level.

10 MR. ABRAMS: There's a Welt Anschauung issue here
11 that goes back to basically how you think information
12 systems should be regulated. All systems should be secure.
13 There's no question if you're collecting personal
14 information, you're matching personal information you
15 should have secure systems. So let's put that piece of the
16 equation aside.

17 There's no question that when you have real data
18 and we've heard that from the first session this morning,
19 when you have real data that you match together in an
20 accurate fashion and you use that information to build your
21 analytics you end up with much more accurate results.

22 If you apply that information in a responsible
23 way that builds trust and you are accountable for applying
24 it in a fashion that builds trust you will get better
25 results.

1 The concept that we can deal with regarding
2 median data or we can deal with data that is aggregated
3 together -- we don't know and therefore we can't get the
4 history behind some of the events -- leads to less results
5 but it does have a much more controlled environment. The
6 less data that's matched to individuals, the less fear that
7 that data will be misused.

8 The question is in an information age are we
9 going to regulate the collection of information? Are we
10 going to regulate the application of information? Are we
11 going to focus on accountability for using information
12 responsibly and protecting information responsibly or are
13 we going to go with a system that thinks in the ways the
14 technology was built 30 years ago, single systems that can
15 do a single thing.

16 I think that in an information age we really have
17 to think about accountability for the misuse of information
18 and accountability for having secure systems rather than
19 trying to go back to the concepts that made a lot of sense
20 30 years ago.

21 MS. GIVENS: I'd like to add onto my Ralph Shopper
22 story to give my perspective on the excellent question of
23 aggregate data versus specific, personally identifiable
24 data.

25 I think this is a good place where you can build

1 choice into your customer relationship marketing model.
2 I'm able to shop with a discount card and I don't have to
3 identify myself. I think there are a lot of people who
4 would just as soon do that.

5 But this is a case where if I wanted to and, of
6 course, I had to be a little assertive to do that mind you.
7 One manager didn't want me to be an anonymous shopper but I
8 think that when you have the opportunity to give a choice
9 you should and still let people have benefits of certain
10 programs. They can choose to be an anonymous user and feed
11 in their data in aggregate or they can choose to receive
12 marketing solicitations as an identified person.

13 I will add, however, that I think it was a Wall
14 Street Journal article earlier in the year found that
15 people aren't actually saving all that much money, if any,
16 with the supermarket loyalty programs when compared against
17 those companies that do not use them.

18 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Anyone else want to weigh in?

19 MR. SAVARD: Yes, I'd like to add something on
20 this, Maureen. Aggregated data, while it certainly has
21 applications with regards to analytics and probably some
22 broad swath type programs that can be executed the issue
23 becomes the organic nature of data. So let me give you two
24 concrete examples and then let me talk about why it's
25 organic.

1 Retailers today try to market to customers that
2 are hundreds in size and in segment. To do that
3 effectively you need to be able to have individual level
4 data that's aggregated in some sort of way that makes sense
5 and is accessible.

6 Some retailers have clienteling programs. We
7 have one at Bloomingdale's where we have a one-to-one,
8 truly one-to-one relationship that involves all methods of
9 communication with that customer, and the customer welcomes
10 that tactic.

11 The organic reference to data is the fact that
12 while I may have somebody where their level of activity
13 with us is appropriate to be aggregated, that customer
14 evolves and all of a sudden, for example, gets married,
15 registers with us, has all kinds of spending during that
16 period, has all kinds of spending post the wedding, and now
17 I need to have a much more refined level of data for that
18 customer. So I think there are some applications, but I
19 think they are narrow.

20 MS. OHLHAUSEN: I have some audience questions.
21 One of them is that the panelists today are from reputable
22 companies and the real problem, according to many
23 consumers, is the marketing by less reputable companies
24 such as money launderers and pornographic websites.

25 What steps do you panelists think we should take

1 to further protect consumers' privacy against these
2 illegitimate and unethical marketers? I mean, part of it I
3 think, goes back to what Beth is saying, it's the deception
4 is the problem and not necessarily a privacy violation but
5 when they involve privacy violations what steps do you
6 think might be available to us?

7 MR. ABRAMS: I'll start. I mean, one of the
8 things that I think we really have to come to grips with
9 and it's something that Commissioner Thompson and I were
10 chatting about just before the session started is that we
11 have to have a better sense of what we agree is unfair
12 practices.

13 The Federal Trade Commission has done a great job
14 of defining what deceptive practices are. We understand
15 deceptive practices, but when it comes to things like
16 pornographic sites, pornographic e-mailers, body
17 enhancement e-mailers, not honoring my opt out but rather
18 using my opt out as a sense that there's a real live person
19 at that site, I mean, we have to have the ability to come
20 quickly to a decision on what are unfair practices in a
21 very complicated market and where there is growing
22 consensus on harm and then be willing to deal with the
23 court process around that.

24 I think that that is one of the things that we
25 need to do because we can pass 16 additional laws that

1 outlaw bad people from doing bad things but if we can't
2 catch those bad people those bad people continue to pollute
3 the market.

4 MR. PONEMON: May I respond too? Really there are
5 two issues and they're separate but related. You have the
6 issue of the bad person doing bad things and the way around
7 that is to create transparency. Some mechanism or
8 mechanisms to show, to prove, that you are doing what you
9 say you will do.

10 The policy is just a start. Policy doesn't
11 really have a whole lot of meaning if you're a
12 pornographer, money launderer, whatever. I mean, if you're
13 trying to commit evil you're going to do it with probably a
14 very nice policy maybe even a seal on your website. Who
15 knows. But the end result is it's about transparency.
16 That's the key variable.

17 Now, by the way, I'm not sure exactly what that
18 means. It may be great access to everything or maybe there
19 are different types of seal programs that can be created
20 but at the end of the day it's transparency for the bad
21 guy.

22 The good guy still will slip up and make mistakes
23 and big organizations make a lot of mistakes because
24 they're big. It's about having an ongoing process to
25 measure your success. It's about trying to make those

1 mistakes smaller and less frequent.

2 So these are two separate issues. And frankly
3 when a big company makes a mistake I think it's more
4 damaging to the privacy clause than when this smaller fly-
5 by-night companies make mistakes. When you're dealing with
6 a major brand it's much more costly than a fly-by-night.

7 In a way it's the buyer beware issue. If you're
8 buying a product and you don't know who you're buying from
9 even if the site looks cool at the end of the day it's your
10 choice. If you want to give them your credit card I
11 suppose that's a choice you make as an individual. But
12 when you're dealing with a major bank or a major consumer
13 products company I think there are certain expectations
14 that we have.

15 MS. HUGHES: I'll put another spin on that, too.
16 I mean, these are ways that you can really get at that
17 issue but I think education is another thing. I mean,
18 education for the public, the end consumers.

19 The FTC is trying to do some of those things.
20 We've got other organizations like BBO where we're trying
21 some education stuff through the Ponemon Institute and
22 things like that.

23 Also, I think, the media can play a role here
24 because you have these examples of the bad guys are the
25 ones who do things wrong. It would be really great to see

1 well, here's things you consumers need to know or things
2 you could do differently to offset these things.

3 So take the bad that's always in the press but
4 then add some education with it and I think through that
5 then, through all these different channels that we should
6 be able to do that.

7 Also, it's like being a role model so the ones
8 who are the good companies being out there visible and
9 being able to show the right way that things are being done
10 and how it's a positive and how you can get good bottom-
11 line results by doing the right thing.

12 MR. ABRAMS: Back in the 1980s the expenditures on
13 consumer education in terms of a percentage of the size of
14 the economy, I think, was much greater than it is today. I
15 think a lot of the consumer education emphasis that we had
16 back in the 1980s has disappeared in the 1990s.

17 I think that with the marketplace much more
18 complicated I think we need to figure out a way to create
19 incentives to go back to a higher level of consumer
20 education. I agree with you absolutely, Sandy, on that.

21 MS. GIVENS: I don't know if I agree, Marty.

22 We find that people learn a great deal,
23 oftentimes it's a very hard lesson, when they are a victim
24 of identity theft or when something happens to them that
25 harms them or makes them feel uncomfortable or anxious or

1 fearful.

2 Then they oftentimes these days if they have
3 Internet access are going on the Web and they are finding
4 very specific consumer education resources to help answer
5 their questions.

6 The Federal Trade Commission's website is a very
7 good example. Also, it's a good example because it has
8 some information in Spanish. I will say that the web is
9 unfortunately not good for those who don't have computer
10 access and are not comfortable with computers. But I do
11 think that consumer education in some respects is better
12 these days.

13 I would like to add, in answer to your question,
14 Maureen, I think most of the people in this room will not
15 agree with what I have to say. But as a consumer advocate,
16 I think more FTC enforcement, making examples of some of
17 the bad players, and also making it easier for consumers,
18 those who have been truly harmed to sue, to go after the
19 bad guys would be good.

20 I think that the Telephone Consumer Protection
21 Act, which gives us the ability to go to small claims court
22 and sue telemarketers, junk faxers, et cetera, has had some
23 good effect. I think that that is one way to answer your
24 question.

25 MR. SCHRADER: I'd like to add one other point.

1 The one argument that I hear that seems to be the most
2 obvious but I don't hear it at all so I want to bring it up
3 is hit them in their pocketbook.

4 The reason why we have so much spam is that the
5 cost is very low. I saw an ad two weeks ago you could send
6 28 million e-mails from \$149. Now, if you're a marketing
7 person what a wonderful opportunity, right? What person
8 wouldn't want to go for that?

9 But if we could get to the point where the cost
10 of sending an e-mail commercially was approximately in the
11 same ballpark as the third-party mail or any of the other
12 traditional marketing vehicles I think the problem goes
13 away by itself because that \$28 million for ten cents or a
14 nickel would be \$2.8 million or \$1.4 million for that
15 spammer and the spammers and rogue marketers don't have
16 that kind of money.

17 So the free market solution of getting a price on
18 the cost but not to mention the consumer side cost of
19 having not to clog up the mailboxes. I think that alone
20 would take care of the problem.

21 MS. OHLHAUSEN: I wanted to fit in another
22 audience question. I'll throw this out to the panel in
23 general. Where today is there a working model in industry
24 that correctly balances sharing information and privacy?

25 MR. ABRAMS: You mean which companies?

1 MS. OHLHAUSEN: You could say a type of industry
2 or if you have a specific company. They didn't specify.

3 MR. ABRAMS: I would say I work with a lot of
4 companies who have looked at privacy from a strategic
5 perspective rather than a tactical perspective. I think
6 the companies that look at privacy from a strategic
7 perspective, and I think it's backed up by the data that
8 Larry has put on the table, are always looking for where
9 the balancing point is between the appropriate application
10 of information to create value and how their customers are
11 going to see that application of information. They use
12 that to build the processes in place for balancing the use
13 of information and privacy.

14 I'll go back to the simple equation which is the
15 beginning point that trust is the component and trust is
16 first based on the value you create for the consumer based
17 on your use of information, making sure that it's always
18 secure and applying the information in an appropriate
19 fashion or manner.

20 Smart organizations have similar metrics that
21 they build into their organization, similar guide points
22 that put them into that constant balancing position.
23 Organizations that are not looking at privacy strategically
24 but rather looking at it tactically, what are the two or
25 three laws I need to abide by and how do I abide by it, are

1 having a more difficult time finding those balancing
2 points.

3 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Are there some industries then who
4 are sort of generally ahead of the curve in that and some
5 that lag?

6 MR. SCHRADER: Definitely. When I was pulling
7 together information on case studies, many of which are on
8 our website, it struck me that a lot of the international
9 banks, even those dealing with European regulations, are
10 doing an appreciably better job than, I think, banks in the
11 United States.

12 Examples would be Union Bank of Norway, National
13 Australia Bank, Royal Bank of Canada. There's a Harvard
14 business review case study that was published on how they
15 use it.

16 My main point in answering the question would be
17 the two ways of balancing it would be what are the
18 conversion rates, so that's a measure of how accurate and
19 precise the marketing people were and then what are the
20 customer satisfaction rates?

21 If a company can get their conversion rates up
22 and the customer satisfaction rates up, which those three
23 companies have done, then I think it's a win-win on both
24 sides of the equation.

25 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Anyone else? Larry?

1 MR. PONEMON: There are two models that I think
2 are appropriate for measuring the value of privacy. One as
3 I mentioned in my presentation is to do the conventional
4 ROI model and CEOs love it. They'll ask the question what
5 is the ROI and how can I measure the impact? If I spend a
6 dollar on privacy will I get ten dollars back or three
7 dollars back? So that's the conventional way of doing it.

8 The problem is a lot of the measurable issues are
9 difficult because they're longer term. Another approach,
10 one that is not as common, is like a quality or a total
11 quality management(TQM) approach where you can measure
12 impacts, both positive and negative impacts.

13 Both models are actually being tested in a number
14 of different organization and a number of different
15 industries. Organizations that have the greatest brand,
16 that have the greatest market image at stake are probably
17 in a position to demonstrate value through ROI and TQM.

18 Organizations that are not as brand-centric,
19 consumer focused, will have a more difficult time. But it
20 is not an easy exercise. That's why in my last slide I
21 think there needs to be a pool of companies working
22 together to put together that type of framework to justify
23 that value proposition.

24 MR. ABRAMS: If you go back to the basic research
25 done by Alan Westin decades ago, he isolated the fact that

1 there is a relationship between the amount of information
2 the public will accept you using and the value you create
3 for them with that use of information.

4 That concept is not new and it's a concept that
5 we have understood in the privacy profession for 30 years.
6 How you constantly put that into the process and put it in
7 play is the strategic concepts behind good privacy
8 management. People don't go to a brand because they do
9 privacy well. They go to a brand because they are trusted,
10 because they create incredible value. The other pieces
11 enhance that.

12 It really begins with a focus on using the
13 information to create value for the consumer which creates
14 higher levels of satisfaction and increases profitability.

15 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Well, I hate to say we need to
16 wrap things up here to keep on the big schedule but please
17 join me in thanking all of our panelists for a very
18 interesting session.

19 (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

20 MR. ZYWICKI: For our final panel today we're
21 going to have sort of a multimedia presentation. First,
22 we're going to have some remarks from Commissioner Leary,
23 then we're going to move into the panel and that will be
24 followed by some closing remarks by Wayne Abernathy,
25 Assistant Secretary of Financial Institutions.

1 We're very pleased to have Commissioner Thomas
2 Leary here from the Federal Trade Commission and he's going
3 to kick off our final session of the day just by saying a
4 few words. Commissioner Leary.

5 COMMISSIONER LEARY: I'm very happy to be here and
6 I want to welcome you all. I guess I'm sort of the last
7 person on the Commission that you've heard from on the
8 topic of cost benefits and information flows, consumer
9 commercial transactions.

10 When I first saw that I became aware of the fact
11 that at least some people in the world get very nervous
12 whenever they contemplate the notion that people are going
13 to look at costs and look at benefits because they think
14 somehow or other that is going to feed into the knowledge
15 that all of the big problems in the world can be solved by
16 mathematical calculations.

17 I have experienced all my life some itchiness in
18 certain quarters about the whole notion of cost benefits.
19 What I would just like to do in about five minutes here is
20 to ease any feelings that any of you might have on that
21 subject in case you have them.

22 Our mission in the Federal Trade Commission is
23 not ultimately to make policy judgments. It is to help
24 people who have to make those judgments, to inform them
25 about things that we know something about or are capable of

1 finding out something about.

2 One of the things that we have the capability of
3 doing, with your help, is collecting information on costs
4 and benefits associated with sharing of consumer
5 information in a commercial context. That doesn't mean
6 that we are capable of resolving all of the value judgments
7 that may be associated in that field. We're not
8 necessarily capable of even quantifying them or attempting
9 to quantify them. But our basic pitch, our basic message
10 to you is that people are better off with more information
11 about things like this rather than less.

12 Let me give you just a very, very simple analogy.
13 I doubt very much that anyone in this room will buy a house
14 on the basis of the lowest cost per square foot of living
15 space. I don't think that people make ultimate decisions
16 on something of that importance simply based on statistics.

17 However, I think that probably everyone in this
18 room would feel better informed when you were making that
19 kind of a decision if you knew something very basic about
20 how much the house was going to cost, what the taxes are
21 going to be.

22 Maybe if it means that you're either going to
23 have to buy another family car or get rid of a family car
24 what the cost implications of that are, what the cost
25 implications are of whether or not you can send your kids

1 to private school in that neighborhood, et cetera.

2 What is likely to happen to the costs and the
3 selling prices of the surrounding houses? What does the
4 rest of the neighborhood look like? All of these things
5 can be pertinent to your evaluation and they may be able to
6 be reducible to some kind of a number which will help
7 inform your decisions.

8 So as I see it, that's what we're about here
9 today. We want to see what information with your help we
10 can put together in order to aid decision-makers who have
11 to decide these things. There are many other values
12 involved when you're talking about an issue like this
13 you've got privacy considerations. You've got First
14 Amendment considerations. You have considerations of the
15 value that maybe people place on human freedom to do things
16 or not do things.

17 All of these things are intangibles that may
18 ultimately drive someone's bottom line determinations. But
19 it's always a good idea, if you're deciding on something on
20 a policy ground, to be aware of the price that you are
21 paying if you go down that road. That's what we're about
22 and that's what we're here to listen to you and I wish you
23 well, and I thank you for being here.

24 MR. ZYWICKI: Thank you, Commissioner Leary.

25 (Applause.)

1 MR. ZYWICKI: My name's Todd Zywicki. I'm the
2 Director of the Office of Policy Planning here at the
3 Federal Trade Commission.

4 I wanted to thank Maureen Ohlhausen who is the
5 Assistant Director of the Office of Policy Planning for her
6 hard work in putting this together. I want to thank all
7 the Commissioners but especially Commissioner Swindle and
8 his staff for their enthusiasm and commitment and input
9 into making this program today such a smash success.

10 I think that as we look back over the course of
11 the day, one thing that emerges is that the question that
12 is often phrased in the popular press or in many people's
13 mind should we trade off privacy for convenience is really
14 not the right question in most situations. In many ways
15 it's meaningless to pose it at such a high level of
16 abstraction.

17 I think what we've heard this morning is that
18 there are many situations where consumers benefit, often in
19 ways that they don't even know or contemplate that they may
20 benefit, and other situations where there may be dangers
21 that they may not be aware of or even contemplate.

22 So the question becomes not whether information
23 should be shared but how much and what kinds. I think what
24 we've done today is look at the details of this particular
25 question.

1 I recently saw a survey where they asked people
2 would they be willing to get to the airport 20 minutes
3 earlier for increased airport security and a majority of
4 people said yes. They asked them would you be willing to
5 get to the airport two hours early for a flight for
6 increased security and very few people said yes.

7 I think what that illustrates and one of the
8 things that we're trying to get at today is where is the
9 margin? Where can we find out what kind of trade-offs
10 people willing to make in particular contexts, in
11 particular situations.

12 In order to try to find out where to draw the
13 line I think we need to figure out how to draw the line.
14 As Commissioner Leary just mentioned and has come out
15 during the course of the day the question becomes how do we
16 figure out all of the various costs and benefits and
17 tangible and intangible costs and benefits that may be part
18 of this question.

19 That is the purpose of this panel, to ask not
20 just what are the trade-offs but more fundamentally how do
21 we think about the trade-offs. That's why we have
22 specifically titled this the methodology of how to think
23 about these particular questions. We've got a very
24 distinguished group here today to talk about this and I'm
25 delighted to be part of it.

1 Immediately following this panel Wayne Abernathy,
2 the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions in the
3 Department of the Treasury will be presenting closing
4 remarks. So we'll just go straight from this panel into
5 his comments once he gets here around 4:45.

6 Our group on the panel will be first Michael
7 Turner who is the President and Senior Scholar of the
8 Information Policy Institute. Michael Staten who is the
9 Director of the Credit Research Center, Georgetown
10 University. Robert Hunt who's an economist at the Federal
11 Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

12 Solveig Singleton, Senior Policy Analyst at the
13 Competitive Enterprise Institute. And finally, Professor
14 Peter Swire, Professor of Law at Ohio State University. I
15 will turn the podium over to Michael Turner.

16 MR. TURNER: I'd like to begin by thanking the FTC
17 for their leadership on this issue and for Todd Zywicki for
18 actually thinking to invite me to this. I welcome the
19 opportunity.

20 The focus of this panel as Todd mentioned is on
21 methodology, and as some of you in this room may be aware
22 yesterday the Information Policy Institute, in
23 collaboration with the National Chamber Foundations, the
24 501©) 6 think tank of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, rolled
25 out a study on the economic importance of uniform national

1 standards and the implications of failure to reauthorize
2 the Fair Credit Reporting Act preemptive revisions.

3 I am going to speak very briefly today. I'm
4 going to basically discuss the methodology of that study
5 and top line some of the findings.

6 Basically, the premise of our study and the theme
7 that's been resonating throughout today is that more
8 information, particularly in the context of our national
9 credit reporting system, yields less risk. Of course, the
10 corollary of that would be less information increases risk
11 throughout the system.

12 Our findings, in short, highlight these themes.
13 We see that the national credit reporting system today,
14 full file credit reporting, that is the positive and
15 negative credit facts on consumers, maximizes the fairness
16 and efficiency in the national credit system. Fairness is
17 who accesses credit, who may access credit and efficiency
18 is the functioning, how the financial system works, how the
19 credit system works.

20 Here again, we look at broadening consumer access
21 to credit as a result of these data flows and reducing the
22 price or the cost of credit to consumers.

23 Now, in terms of our research design, we came up
24 with three case studies to test these premises and they
25 focused on these following themes. Essentially, we tested

1 credit scores against different types of data but we
2 controlled for quantity and quality of data. I'm going to
3 get into that when I discuss the scenarios we developed
4 based on state legislation in our full file case study.

5 But essentially, we looked at the relationship
6 between preemption and the quality of data in the report
7 and I would add to that the quality and quantity of data in
8 credit reports, and then, again, the relationship between
9 the quality and quantity of data reports and access and
10 price to credit.

11 Now, the three case studies we examined dealt
12 with automated underwriting and here we're discussing
13 consumer mortgages, prescreening, which in the context of
14 credit cards only, not insurance, and then full file credit
15 reporting and the ability to risk model, assess risk.

16 In terms of the prescreening component we
17 surveyed seven major credit card issuers. Here I will
18 state for purposes of full disclosure this was not a random
19 sample of credit cards or credit card issuers. We worked
20 with a group of companies who have already organized around
21 this issue and surveyed them as well as other credit
22 issuers with whom the Information Policy Institute has a
23 relationship.

24 However, we feel very strongly that this is a
25 representative sample both in terms of firm size and for

1 the fact that they account for 281 million existing Visa
2 and MasterCard accounts.

3 Now, essentially what we did was we surveyed
4 these credit card issuers and we asked them what is the
5 cost of acquiring a new customer across different channels.
6 What is the cost of acquiring a customer when you prescreen
7 across these channels and if you were prohibited, if
8 prescreening were prohibited, what would be the cost of
9 acquiring new accounts and how would you do it.

10 In terms of the full file credit reporting silo
11 basically we tried to ascertain what a post FCRA world
12 would look like. And to do this we culled from 46 state
13 databases, state legislation or proposals that had been
14 introduced between January and April of 2003 that were FCRA
15 germane.

16 We categorized them in about a dozen broad
17 categories and then we said well, what's likely to happen
18 if preemption goes away? What types of laws can we expect?
19 So we constructed a range of scenarios from very moderate
20 to more severe so we could capture a host of possible
21 outcomes.

22 In two of our scenarios essentially we looked at
23 impact on the behavior of data furnishers. Those were the
24 scenarios A and B in our study where we assumed a data
25 furnisher liability in the form of a private right of

1 action.

2 In the first scenario we held constant the type
3 of credit that would be affected. It was revolving credit,
4 credit card credit. But we varied the firms' size so small
5 and medium and large data furnishers dropped out.

6 In the second scenario, scenario B, we held
7 constant firm size, only large furnishers dropped out,
8 eight large furnishes, but we varied the type of credit and
9 it was revolving and nonrevolving credit so it was credit
10 card credit, auto loans, boat loans, home loans, student
11 loans.

12 In terms of the number of files we purged, in the
13 first scenario we had 13 percent of trade lines were
14 purged. In the second scenario it was 21 percent of trade
15 lines were purged. So this was really the impact on the
16 quantity of data being provided in a voluntary system.
17 This is important because if, in fact, a private right of
18 action is introduced in a voluntary system there are some
19 furnishers that may drop out.

20 There are reasons, different reasons but very
21 good reasons, to believe that maybe small and medium-sized
22 data furnishers who don't have the wherewithal to withstand
23 a legal challenge on one hand. On the other hand it also
24 may be very large data furnishers. Certainly if I were an
25 enterprising young lawyer and I had an ability to build a

1 class-action lawsuit against a data furnisher, I'm going to
2 target a Citi or a Chase or a large furnisher and not the
3 community bank of the local credit union. So for that
4 reason this is why, this is basically the rationale for
5 varying our scenarios.

6 In the second two scenarios we looked at state
7 proposals, and again, all of these are based on state
8 proposals that have been introduced this year. We looked
9 at basically accelerating the obsolescence rate for
10 derogatories which is jargon for, in essence, you purge
11 negatives, late payments, delinquencies. Instead of
12 maintaining them for seven years you maintain them for only
13 five or four years.

14 Similarly, public record information, for
15 example, if you file for bankruptcy, or if there is a tax
16 lien against your property, is maintained now for at least
17 seven years. There are proposals that would either purge
18 this data after three years or, in fact, upon payment of
19 the settlement.

20 So if I file for bankruptcy and agree to a
21 settlement with my creditors and pay that the following
22 day, this could be purged instantly, with no history of my
23 bankruptcy. So that is the type, those two scenarios deal
24 with the contents of the credit report.

25 We were able to access six different scoring

1 models and this is important. We had four commercial
2 scoring models from two credit bureaus, from TransUnion and
3 Fair Isaac and two credit scoring models from major credit
4 card issuers.

5 We then constructed basically using this we ran
6 3.6 million actual credit files against these four
7 scenarios so the data was modified according to these state
8 proposals. We were then able to measure the impact on the
9 predictive power of these models, the impact on the number
10 of scores that were affected and the impact on the
11 decisions in the case of the score or the credit card
12 models whether they were accepts or rejects.

13 We were able to compare this in both cases again
14 because these were actual credit files, 3.6 million actual
15 credit files taken from December 2000 and December 2002.
16 So we had performance. We could see how these consumers
17 performed from data gathered in the real world and then
18 compared it with our modified scenarios.

19 This is basically a chart that's in the study
20 that sums up the methodology, exactly what we did. We
21 divulged everything in the development of our model.
22 Again, we adhered strictly to the scientific method,
23 transparent methodology, clear and concise, replicable.

24 Now, I'm talking about some pilot methodologies
25 and scientific method. In the discussion of methodology

1 and information tools I think it's also important to talk
2 about some dubious methodology. Here I'm referring to an
3 argument that you've all heard, even today, in the context
4 of prescreened offers of credit and identity theft.

5 Well, this argument runs thus. There have been
6 more prescreened offers of credit in the mail and the
7 incidence of identity theft has also increased. Therefore,
8 they must be linked. That's co-variation. In Economics
9 101 they teach you that the hemline of a woman's skirt
10 rises with the increase in the Dow Jones. That's co-
11 variation. They're not related.

12 This has been touted in front of the House of
13 Representatives in testimony by Joel Reidenberg who said
14 that dumpster divers are diving into your trash to get your
15 prescreened firm offers of credit. It's good that it's
16 dumpster divers because that's rubbish.

17 There's nothing in a prescreened offer of credit,
18 apart from your name and your address, that would be of any
19 value to a would-be identity thief. It's the same
20 information that comes to you on a Time Magazine or, more
21 germanely, an issue of The Economist.

22 There's also in the issue of Privacy Times that
23 came out two days ago in the article about organized
24 criminals stealing the prescreened firm offers of credit,
25 there's nothing causally that links these two. In fact, in

1 my study, I show how prescreened firm offers of credit have
2 a much lower incidence of identity theft than other forms
3 of application fraud.

4 Another dubious methodology is this notion that
5 Vermont, California and Massachusetts are exempted from the
6 strength and preemptive provisions of the FCRA and are
7 outperforming many states despite these exemptions.

8 Well, here again, this is a little misleading.
9 In fact Vermont's exemption deals with affiliate sharing
10 and has nothing to do with scoring. It has nothing to do
11 with how your mortgage rate is set.

12 California and Massachusetts, again, an
13 incredibly narrow exemption from the preemption provisions
14 dealing with data furnisher liability but there's no
15 private right of action. They have no disincentive to
16 impact data furnishers from providing full file
17 information.

18 This is misleading and it is harmful to policy.
19 They are bound by the strength in preemptive provisions.
20 They are not exempted from the preemptions in the FCRA.
21 The citizens of these states enjoy the benefits from the
22 uniform national standards of the full file credit
23 reporting system in this country.

24 Some serious methodology you also heard today,
25 the Consumer Federation of America study. This, in fact,

1 was an excellent study. The scientific method was applied.
2 There was a very robust sample, a representative sample,
3 and there was a sound interpretation. Unlike other studies
4 I referenced, there were no quantum leaps of logic in this
5 study.

6 This is a study that needs to be given serious
7 consideration and I would like to say, inasmuch as I have
8 worked very intimately with the Consumer Federation of
9 America and Consumers Union in the work I do in media
10 ownership, I've always admired CFA's adherence to the
11 scientific method and their use of data.

12 We filed comments before the FCC on media
13 ownership and collaborated with Mark Cooper from Consumer
14 Federation of America and Gene Kimmelman from Consumers
15 Union.

16 I can't get into the findings, unfortunately,
17 because I've been told to stop. I will actually respect
18 the rules, but the findings are all in the study. I would
19 be happy to answer any questions about the findings. I'm
20 sure you'll see them in the trades, both good and bad,
21 hopefully for the better. But I'd be happy to meet with
22 you afterward as well. Thank you very much.

23 MR. ZYWICKI: Thank you, Michael. Now Mike Staten
24 from the Credit Research Center.

25 MR. STATEN: Thanks, Todd, and thanks also to the

1 FTC for convening what I think has been a great event
2 today. I was here from the opening kickoff and I've
3 enjoyed all the panels. And, in fact, the panels have
4 largely stolen some of my thunder here.

5 You have essentially done the same sort of
6 methodology that we set out to do in terms of trying to
7 understand what the costs of privacy are in terms of
8 understanding it from the standpoint of what are the
9 benefits from information flows.

10 We have a status quo system out there that has
11 evolved over the last 15, 20 years as data processing
12 technology has progressed that had given us many additional
13 benefits that we never enjoyed before. We've got the
14 privacy debate to the point now where we're beginning to
15 think about additional proposals that would restrict those
16 flows, naturally raising the question what do you give up
17 relative to the status quo now in terms of benefits if
18 those flows are restricted?

19 That's the way we came at this whole issue.
20 Essentially, it's not nearly as elegant as what Michael
21 Turner just described to you. It's more of what I would
22 characterize as the brute force method in terms of -- and
23 when I say, we, I mean my co-author and I, Fred Cate. Fred
24 you've already heard from earlier today in doing a series
25 of case studies on the way companies use information.

1 The more we listen to events like this and panels
2 as we've heard earlier today and just talking with various
3 company representatives, the more we realize we didn't know
4 beans about, to some degree, about how information was
5 being used and, in fact, we're probably representative of
6 many consumers out there in that we're fairly ignorant of
7 all of the ways, sophisticated ways, that companies were
8 using information.

9 You have benefitted today from some of the most
10 informed people on the planet telling you about how
11 information is used. But this is not a representative
12 sample of folks out there.

13 So we just decided that the best way to learn
14 about such things was to call up some companies and ask
15 them, and do it a little bit more systematically than that,
16 of course, but essentially to undertake a series of case
17 studies where we go in and rather than spending 10 or 12
18 minutes, we'd spend several days and then make follow-up
19 visits. We sit down and talk to a number of people within
20 the organizations about exactly how they collected
21 information, why they collected information, what they were
22 doing with it.

23 Then we wanted to take the next step and try and
24 get a sense from these conversations and from any data that
25 they could give us if there were restrictions imposed on

1 their ability to collect data. We tried to define what
2 those restrictions would be to help clarify the process,
3 what would it mean for their operations, what would it mean
4 for the consumers that they served. That's essentially is
5 and is continuing to be our methodology as we move through
6 these cases.

7 So basically we have three objectives. First of
8 all is just simply to determine all the different ways that
9 personal information was being used to deliver products,
10 services and value to consumers. That sort of highlights
11 what is at risk.

12 The next step was to determine the impact of opt-
13 in rules and I'll tell you about that in a second because
14 we wanted to try to clarify what we meant by opt in as best
15 as we could. What would be the impact on company
16 operations and in so doing all of this we eliminate the
17 cost of additional privacy. We must identify what's at
18 risk if opt-in rules prevent or interrupt those data flows.

19 Most of this in the case studies that we
20 conducted is qualitative but we tried to inject
21 quantitative estimates wherever we could get data that
22 would help us do that.

23 I co-authored with Fred Cate. What we intend is
24 for all of these cases ultimately to be collectively
25 joined. We selected our corporate subjects to try and get

1 at different dimensions of data usage, much as the way the
2 panels earlier today were assembled. You got different
3 slices from different kinds of industries. The ways that
4 they used data and what they're providing their customers
5 and the implications of opt in are a little different as
6 you move across different industries, different companies
7 within those industries.

8 Let me just spend a second talking about our
9 subjects. This has been a project that has been underway
10 for I would say two and a half years probably. We had the
11 great advantage of starting this project right on the heels
12 of corporate attempts to comply with Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB
13 Act).

14 In fact, if we tried to do this, I suspect, five
15 or six years ago we would have not made nearly the progress
16 that we were able to do this time. One of the things we
17 found out as we started our interviews was that most
18 companies a couple of years prior to our talking to them
19 wouldn't have had any idea of what they were doing with
20 personal information in terms of all the different units of
21 the businesses.

22 That was one of the great almost herculean
23 efforts for some companies was to convene all of the
24 different units of the business and have extended
25 discussions themselves as they tried to comply with GLB Act

1 to determine how information was being used and the privacy
2 implications within their company operations.

3 Fresh on the heels of that, it made these
4 interviews go much easier because they were already
5 accustomed to thinking in these terms. Nevertheless, we
6 found that they were learning during the process of our
7 interviews just as we were. Sometimes all we did was just
8 sit back and listen to them talk amongst themselves.

9 The very first company that we tackled was in
10 financial services because so much of, as you've heard
11 earlier today, so much of that business is information
12 driven.

13 In some sense since we abandoned the days, as
14 Pete was referring to of a hundred years ago, where Wells
15 Fargo was toting gold bars back and forth and cash, all of
16 its information now is in the sense of digits being
17 transferred from one account to another. So it's all about
18 information flows in terms of the products that they're
19 providing.

20 The financial services industry is almost the
21 epitome of an information-driven industry. You would think
22 privacy would be at the fore and certainly it is, and we've
23 heard that companies are aware that it is.

24 So we wanted to understand just the role of
25 personal information in extending credit and other retail

1 financial services. We picked MBNA. We picked them for a
2 very specific reason: because they're the epitome of a
3 startup, a company that didn't exist 25 years ago and has
4 gone from essentially well, I'll say, 600,000 accounts when
5 the company was created as a spinoff unit of Maryland
6 National Bank back in 1980 to over 50 million accounts in
7 less than 20 years.

8 Now, they did all of this without any physical
9 brick and mortar presence. No branches. They reached out
10 and they touched customers across the country and now
11 overseas and they did it by managing information.

12 It's an incredible example of how targeted
13 marketing frees a provider of services, in this case a
14 lender, from brick and mortar constraints and allows them
15 to compete for customers, 2000, 4000, 6000 miles away
16 without ever having met the customer and yet can do that
17 with enough confidence that the customer will be interested
18 in their offer and, in fact, will pay them back when they
19 make them unsecured offers of credit. That's a pretty bold
20 risk, and they were able to do it very successfully.

21 Because information is available to target market
22 it lowers the barriers to entry and, of course, they're not
23 the only ones that have followed this model. There have
24 been plenty of other startup credit card companies that
25 have jumped into the business under the auspices of FCRA,

1 for example, and are able to target consumers effectively.

2 It has boosted competition in the credit card
3 industry, and we heard something about that earlier today.
4 So it's a very good example of the boost to opportunities
5 for consumers through the competitive market associated
6 with firms being able to use information to target market.

7 So that's really the focus of the MBNA case.
8 That was the first one we did. It's completed. The
9 article that we wrote on that is actually forthcoming any
10 day now, literally, in the Duke Law Journal.

11 The next case we tackled was Travelocity. Here
12 we wanted something in the online environment so we picked
13 an online service provider. This happens to be, as you
14 know, a database-driven travel marketing and transaction
15 company. It customizes much as we heard earlier today from
16 Bluefly, for example, it customizes travel offerings based
17 on personal information and clickstream data from customers
18 browsing sessions so that it can tailor banner ads and
19 different promotional opportunities to customers that have
20 visited the website.

21 In so doing, this is really the company's words
22 now, it delivers personalized travel service to 30 million
23 members faster and at far lower cost than would be possible
24 in the physical shopping environment. It's essentially
25 brought a individual's own personal travel agent to that

1 person, and in many, many cases to somebody that would
2 never have had access to a personal travel agent otherwise,
3 and done it in the comfort of their own home. So
4 interesting issues about the data collection, usage and
5 clickstream monitoring from the company.

6 We picked a national retailer and we're working
7 on this case right now. It's not finished yet. But we
8 picked a retailer that has a large complex organizational
9 structure so that it has a basic retail store unit. It has
10 affiliates. It has nonaffiliated brand licensees. It has
11 branded service providers, a whole range of entities all
12 operating under the same retail banner, so transparent to
13 the customer, and yet very different legal and corporate
14 entities across which information has to flow.

15 This particular retailer, like many, has very
16 aggressively adopted a customer relationship management
17 strategy which requires a whole house view of the customer
18 to provide the customer service, to link information from
19 all the different touch points across all these different
20 business units to try and deliver personalized service and
21 event-driven marketing strategies to benefit their
22 customers.

23 It's a great example of what happens if then you
24 try to interrupt artificially the flow of data across these
25 different business entities that happen to be either

1 affiliates or sometimes not even affiliated in terms of
2 ownership but nevertheless are operated under the brand
3 name.

4 What happens if you interrupt those data flows as
5 would happen under various proposals for opt in or opt out
6 associated with affiliate share. That's the focus of that
7 case.

8 The fourth case we decided on, actually after we
9 had started all of these and started realizing how a lot of
10 these firms were using information and where they were
11 getting some of this information, and we realized this
12 whole issue of third-party data is sort of a black hole to
13 us. Or at least it was a black hole to me, and I didn't
14 fully understand where this was coming from and so the
15 fourth subject of our case studies was Acxiom.

16 As one of those information aggregators out there
17 that you've already heard about to a great degree earlier
18 today Acxiom pulls together and aggregates information and
19 then provides it to clients. By their own statement they
20 have third-party information on 95 percent of U.S.
21 households, 13 million U.S. businesses, 70 million
22 properties throughout the U.S. This information is used we
23 discovered in lots of very interesting ways that we had no
24 idea about.

25 It's used to accurately identify customers and

1 consumers. It's used to assist clients in conducting
2 target marketing to help them implement their customer
3 relationship management programs. It's able to assist
4 those companies in linking the different pieces of
5 information they get through the different touch points all
6 back to the same customer household file which is a very
7 difficult task to get -- there's 60,000 John Smiths in the
8 United States, and if you're a large retailer and you've
9 got customers who are coming in through your website or
10 through any one of a thousand physical stores in different
11 affiliated units and the name is John Smith and you want to
12 make sure you're capturing the information and linking it
13 together properly that's a very difficult task to do.

14 Well, Acxiom has some tools that allow firms to
15 do that based on matching identification and contact data.
16 So it helps them link together this information to
17 implement CRM strategies. It also helps them to prevent
18 fraud, I.D. theft and a variety of other kinds of losses
19 and these data can help to prevent or protect public
20 safety, prevent terrorism. It has a whole range of
21 applications.

22 They're not the only firm that does this.
23 There's some other notable ones. Experian is another
24 example we heard from today. They make an excellent case
25 study because they're the source of a lot of third-party

1 data that other firms are acquiring to do many of the
2 things that you heard about earlier today.

3 Part of the methodology is to try and to
4 conceptually impose an artificial constraint on the
5 information flows as they exist today. So we wanted to try
6 to analyze three different opt in scenarios, ranked here on
7 this slide from least restrictive to most restrictive.

8 Least restrictive in our taxonomy would be opt in
9 for third-party sharing which we have - it's probably the
10 most commonly proposed out there. It's not something that
11 has occurred yet under GLBA but has often been proposed as
12 a supplement to GLBA. We've got opt out under GLBA right
13 now for personal financial information. But this would be
14 opt in that would require explicit customer consent for any
15 sort of third-party sharing.

16 MR. STATEN: The second most restrictive would be
17 opt in for affiliate sharing which brings it a little
18 closer to home. This is affecting now information that
19 companies already legally possess among their affiliates
20 and then finally blanket opt in or permission-based
21 marketing as it's sometimes called. The restriction on
22 information used for purposes other than that for which it
23 was collected.

24 Basically, one of the components of this set of
25 case studies is to assemble as much empirical information

1 on the impact of opt in itself. Why opt in poses such an
2 obstacle for information transfer, largely because of the
3 nature of the default rule here that it's very difficult to
4 get customers to consent or to even recognize or respond to
5 invitations to consent for these kinds of offers.

6 Over 50 percent of unsolicited mail is not even
7 opened according to the U.S. Postal Service. So many times
8 if you put out an invitation to opt in to something, you're
9 not even going to get your message heard by the consumer.

10 So we try to incorporate that into the
11 methodology here where basically we model opt in as
12 essentially setting the information flow to zero. Then we
13 go back through the different uses to which the company has
14 put the data and determine what then goes away in terms of
15 benefits or elements of their operations if that
16 information is shut off in each of those different
17 scenarios.

18 I'm getting the hook here so I'll resist going on
19 with the rest of my slides which really left methodology
20 and went into results anyway. I couldn't resist putting
21 them in but we'll save that for another day. Thanks.

22 MR. ZYWICKI: Thanks. Our next speaker is Robert
23 Hunt from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

24 MR. HUNT: So I think I'm the only person here
25 today that has to issue a disclaimer like this. These

1 views are my own and not necessarily those of the Federal
2 Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve system.

3 About a year ago I had the opportunity to
4 interview the manager of one of the credit bureaus in
5 Sweden and he was explaining to me that under Swedish law
6 you can only retain derogatory information for something
7 like three years. I asked him well, is that a bad thing?
8 And he said, no, not really because Swedes don't borrow
9 anyway.

10 Back to the U.S. There are two problems that
11 confront lenders. The first we call adverse selection,
12 that is how well do I distinguish between borrowers of
13 different risk. That's going to determine who gets credit,
14 how much and on what terms. The other problem we call
15 moral hazard. How can I induce the borrower to repay once
16 I have decided to give him a loan?

17 Well, if I don't have collateral to take, one of
18 the few tools I have available is reputation. If you don't
19 pay the loan I'm going to tell all the other lenders out
20 there that you're not very good about paying your debts.

21 It turns out credit bureaus are able to mitigate
22 both of these problems because they provide information
23 that improves the assessment of risk and the pricing of
24 credit risk, and, of course, they are the mechanism for
25 implementing reputation as a way of convincing borrowers

1 that their payment histories matter in the future.

2 What is interesting about credit reporting in the
3 United States and we've said this a few times today is that
4 what we have is a voluntary information sharing
5 equilibrium. This is actually kind of a puzzler because
6 it's not, a priori, sensible for lenders to be sharing this
7 information in the first place.

8 There are trade offs. On the one hand if I have
9 more information about the customers of my rival that means
10 I can do a better job of making an offer to them and as a
11 result I will get these customers and I will earn profits
12 on that. But there's a cost and that's because the rivals
13 are doing exactly the same thing to me and that means I've
14 got to compete more aggressively to retain my own
15 customers. That means I earn less profit. So at the
16 extreme a voluntary equilibrium may not happen. If there's
17 too much competition lenders are not going to share
18 information.

19 One point that comes out in the working paper
20 that is the basis for this talk is that the U.S. experience
21 is due in part to the structure of retail and credit
22 markets that we had 50 or 100 years ago. This is rather
23 different than you see in other countries and it might
24 explain why in many other countries they had to legislate
25 credit bureaus into existence rather than to have them

1 arise voluntarily.

2 Another interesting feature about this is that
3 credit bureaus exhibit network effects. Joining a bureau
4 is more attractive if it already has many members because
5 if I get a credit report it means I get a comprehensive
6 snapshot of the borrowing habits of a person.

7 What this means is that it's hard to set up a
8 bureau but if you have any success there tends to be a
9 bandwagon effect. Everybody joins along. That also means
10 there's a tendency towards a concentrated credit reporting
11 industry.

12 When should we expect to see credit bureaus, that
13 is, when should we expect to see this voluntary
14 equilibrium? When you have conditions that are conducive
15 to a lot of unsecured lending that helps you amortize the
16 fixed costs of establishing these bureaus, when lenders are
17 small relative to their market, that is, when lending
18 markets are not very concentrated or, for example, when
19 people are mobile. In that case lenders don't know
20 everything about the entire universe of potential borrowers
21 that they encounter.

22 When the lending markets are fragmented either
23 geographically or functionally as they were in the United
24 States until just recently, that suggests that not all the
25 profits are going to be competed away. Something I should

1 have added to this slide is that historically credit
2 bureaus were also fragmented geographically and
3 functionally over time and this changed over the century.

4 Finally, when people borrow from many lenders at
5 the same time because this creates an externality. Each
6 loan I take out changes the probability that I'm going to
7 be able to pay any of my loans. Lenders want to know that.

8 Now, one of the issues that we've talked a little
9 bit about today is the accuracy of credit bureau
10 information. Now, we know it's valuable because lenders
11 are willing to pay for it and they use it in automated
12 credit decisions but we don't have a great deal of
13 information about the quality of the information that is in
14 credit bureau files. Until very recently we really didn't
15 have scientific studies. That's just begun to change in
16 the last year or so and you actually heard a description of
17 one of those studies earlier today.

18 I would emphasize that it's important to
19 distinguish between any error in a credit report and major
20 errors that will affect decisions about credit, insurance,
21 and employment. Not all errors are equal in terms of an
22 effect on a credit score.

23 The next thing to emphasize is that even a very
24 small incidence of major errors translates into tens of
25 thousands of erroneous credit decisions and that's simply a

1 fact of the number of credit decisions that we make in this
2 economy every year.

3 Of course, there are remedies for noisy
4 information. You can design a robust credit score. You
5 can use a median credit score based on several credit
6 reports that you obtain. And, of course, consumers can
7 dispute information that's contained in the report.

8 Well, what are the incentives for accuracy?
9 Borrowers typically want accurate information. In fact,
10 they have a comparative advantage in detecting errors.
11 When I look at my credit report I know what my borrowing
12 behavior is and it's easy for me to see where the mistakes
13 are. So it's not surprising that you see a dispute process
14 where bureaus ask us to correct these errors. That
15 improves the average quality of the information in the
16 file.

17 Lenders typically want accurate information, too.
18 They especially want the most accurate information they can
19 get provided through their rivals, but they don't want to
20 spend a lot of money providing their own information to the
21 credit bureau and they certainly don't want to pay a lot of
22 money to access the credit bureau data.

23 Credit bureaus act as a control mechanism. The
24 price that they can charge for their data depends on
25 quality, comprehensiveness and timeliness of their data.

1 So that means they have an incentive to provide high
2 quality data. Credit bureaus, in fact, set reporting
3 standards and they have very elaborate programs for
4 auditing incoming data. It's also the case that credit
5 bureaus process most of the consumer disputes.

6 The next question though is does this get us to
7 an optimal level of accuracy? That is, do credit bureaus
8 spend resources on accuracy to the point that the marginal
9 benefit of additional accuracy is equal to the marginal
10 cost?

11 I would argue very tentatively the answer may be
12 no. This is based on a sketch of a model, not even a
13 model. So this is tentative. First of all, lenders
14 probably care more about what I call Type 1 errors, that's
15 making a loan on the basis of erroneous information. For
16 example, there was a derogatory that should have been in
17 the file but wasn't there.

18 Borrowers probably care more about Type 2 errors.
19 They can't obtain a loan because there was derogatory
20 information in the file that shouldn't have been there.
21 Now, it's possible that bureaus may be more responsive to
22 the needs of lenders than to the needs of borrowers; after
23 all, lenders are the principal sources of revenues for the
24 industry. It's possible that bureaus are going to be more
25 preoccupied with Type 1 errors and relative to some measure

1 of the social optimum, that means we're going to get the
2 wrong mix of mistakes.

3 If it's also the case that bureaus ignore
4 consumer losses we're also going to get too many mistakes.
5 It may be the case of bureaus underfunding consumer dispute
6 process as well and the reason is pretty obvious. The
7 bureaus are incurring most of the cost of this process and
8 yet they're sharing the benefits with consumers.

9 Now, I would argue that bureaus do subsidize this
10 process. The question is whether they subsidize it enough.
11 Well, is this a rationale for government intervention? In
12 fact, this intuition that I've described is contained in
13 the legislative history of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
14 I would also argue that the Fair Credit Reporting Act is a
15 pretty good example of sort of a sophisticated design of a
16 regulation with costs and benefits in mind. Congress
17 thought about this when they were developing the act in the
18 first place.

19 The first thing that the FCRA does is establish a
20 custom negligence rule for credit bureaus and users of
21 credit reports. It specifies different standards of care
22 for different parties. For example, for information
23 providers the hurdle is not very high. All you have to do
24 is avoid disseminating information that you know is wrong,
25 and you have to respond to requests to verify your

1 information.

2 Bureaus, on the other hand, have to take
3 reasonable precautions to ensure that the data in their
4 files is accurate, and they have to avoid unauthorized
5 disclosure. The point here is the reasonable precautions.
6 The fact that there's an error in a credit report is not a
7 violation of the act. Users can access credit reports but
8 only for purposes that are authorized under the act and
9 they're responsible for notifying consumers of their
10 rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

11 The other thing that the FCRA does is that it
12 specifies different remedies for different parties. For
13 example, a variety of regulatory agencies can sue any of
14 the participants in this process, information users, credit
15 bureaus, or information providers.

16 However, in terms of people that consumers can
17 sue under the act, that's a little more limited. They can
18 sue information users and credit bureaus generally, but
19 you'll notice that information providers are not on that
20 list.

21 Bureaus can also sue under the act, but in
22 general they can only sue their customers. There's also
23 criminal penalties for information users and credit bureau
24 employees that violate the privacy rights of consumers.
25 The other thing that the act does is encourage error

1 correction. And the most obvious way it does that is it
2 subsidizes consumer access to credit reports.

3 FTC sets a fee every year on what it will cost me
4 to get my credit report under normal conditions. If I get
5 dinged on an application for a credit card it's actually
6 free, which makes sense because it's exactly in that
7 circumstance where the cost of a mistake would be highest.

8 It's easy to dispute information in your file.
9 You just write a letter. Bureaus are subject to fairly
10 precise performance requirements. They have to verify
11 information within 30 days or it has to be removed from the
12 file. If they put it back in the file they've got to
13 notify consumers. If you're a national bureau you've got
14 to share corrected information with other national bureaus.
15 And you've got to staff these 800 lines so that consumers
16 can actually reach you.

17 I would point out that this dispute process is
18 actually quite costly for the bureaus. Technological
19 changes allowed them to reduce the unit costs of handling
20 disputes but the volume is rising even faster and perhaps
21 for strategic reasons that may actually be affecting the
22 efficacy of this process.

23 In conclusion, there are a variety of techniques
24 for measuring the costs and benefits of information
25 sharing, and you've heard quite a few today. Some work has

1 already been done and there's a lot more work to do. This
2 is not a very easy problem because it's not easy to choose
3 the right counterfactuals for this kind of analysis. And
4 not everything we're interested in is priced in a market.

5 I would also emphasize that it's important to
6 understand the nature of the equilibrium. Institutions
7 matter, regulations matter, financial market
8 characteristics matter.

9 I'll give you one example. This is the market
10 share of the top ten banks with credit card receivables
11 over time and you'll notice that the share of these top ten
12 banks rose about 25 percentage points in the last five
13 years of the 1990s. It's now at about 65 percent.

14 Why do I point this out? This is an era when the
15 competition in the credit card market was intense. It's
16 also a period when the largest lenders were sharing
17 information with their rivals and customers were being
18 poached.

19 It happens to coincide with a period, and we've
20 already talked about this today, when some issuers reported
21 less information. In particular they stopped reporting
22 credit lines and high balances. I need that information to
23 run a credit score.

24 That means there are competitive implications of
25 this. At one point this was affecting one-third of

1 revolving credit accounts. These were some large lenders
2 and it tended to occur more for sub-prime accounts.

3 So what happened? Well, the credit bureaus and
4 the regulators responded. Basically, the regulators
5 rattled their sabers and the story is that bureaus
6 threatened to enforce the reciprocity rule. If you don't
7 share credit lines and high balances you won't be able to
8 get credit lines and high balances back. That's the story.

9 I would like to ask the question about how the
10 bureaus actually enforce this reciprocity rule because the
11 \$64,000 question is will it happen again? Thank you very
12 much.

13 MR. ZYWICKI: Thanks, Bob. Next us is Solveig
14 Singleton, Senior Policy Analyst with the Competitive
15 Enterprise Institute.

16 MS. SINGLETON: Thank you. I'm going to talk --
17 I'm going to have a much more general talk which is roughly
18 entitled, "Things that are Difficult to Measure."

19 What I'm going to talk about are three different
20 things. First of all, I'd like to move from some of the
21 concrete examples we've heard about today to talk about the
22 function of consumer information flows in the big picture
23 of the economy, and I'd like to bring to your attention
24 some of the functions of information flows that do not yet
25 exist.

1 Then secondly, I'm going to talk a little bit
2 about the information flows versus privacy debate and some
3 of the methodology of market failure arguments. Third, I'd
4 like to talk briefly about the slippery question of values
5 versus costs and benefits which the commissioner touched on
6 earlier.

7 To start the first chunk that I hope to cover,
8 you heard some concrete examples today of how information
9 functions to help companies cut costs, improve security,
10 develop services, offer products, and so on. Michael
11 Staten talked about this, too.

12 Essentially, these are small pieces of the
13 picture, and I'd like to try to give some rough indication
14 of what the rest of the picture looks like. Basically,
15 what's going on is this information moving through the
16 economy is enhancing competition; that is, it's giving
17 consumers more choices.

18 This is part of the reason that when the FCC was
19 given the task of trying to break open the phone markets
20 and competition, one of the things that they had to do was
21 figure out how to give new entrants into the market access
22 to consumer information that previously had only been held
23 by one company.

24 So this whole thing, what's really going on is
25 competition. This also goes back to some empirical studies

1 that began to come out and have an impact in the '70s and
2 the '80s and have a particular impact with the FTC on the
3 role that advertising played in the economy.

4 At one time it was believed that advertising was
5 essentially a wasteful activity that forced consumers to
6 buy things that they didn't really want. Then empirical
7 studies began to show that markets where there were lots of
8 advertising generally showed lower prices, more choices for
9 consumers and more quality.

10 What was going on was even the most biased ads
11 are giving information to consumers saying, look, here's a
12 product. Even if you discount the entire rest of what the
13 ad is saying and doing as being biased, you still are aware
14 of a choice that you weren't aware of before.

15 In that context the regulation of advertising
16 became somewhat more relaxed than it had been with no
17 negative effects on consumer confidence in the veracity of
18 those ads.

19 Now, to bring this up to the discussion about
20 consumer information today, when we think of advertising
21 and what has been studied before it generally has meant
22 broadcast advertising, mass market advertising. What you
23 are seeing today with prescreened credit offers and so on
24 is that advertising is changing so that now it is reaching
25 down into smaller niche markets where mass marketing would

1 not be economical.

2 Now, just a final point about what the big
3 picture looks like here. In addition to the companies and
4 services that you've heard from and about today I think a
5 very important part of this is the companies and services
6 that you can't hear from today because they don't exist
7 yet.

8 To give as an example of what I mean if the FTC
9 was having this hearing about consumer information in the
10 late 19th Century, they wouldn't get to hear about credit
11 reports. If, at the conclusion of the hearing, not having
12 heard about credit reports they decided to restrict flows
13 of consumer information through the economy, credit reports
14 and the associated benefits of those would never have come
15 into existence.

16 If there had been restrictions on consumer
17 information flows just a few years ago, authentication
18 databases that are used for e-commerce security would not
19 have come into existence. Those things require that
20 information be transferred around the economy.

21 I think that if I can refer back to the economist
22 Frederick Bastiat a couple of centuries ago he wrote a very
23 great essay on economics called, "The Seen and the Unseen."
24 He pointed out that some of the hardest things to grasp
25 when you're doing economic policy are not the things that

1 you see but the things that you don't see.

2 With that, I'll leave this first section of my
3 talk.

4 Now, I want to discuss the tension in the debate
5 about the flow of information and privacy and
6 confidentiality. Now, in some sense, both the flow of
7 information and privacy are good things that people want.
8 I think it would be possible to say we have some good
9 benefits in the flow of information but as a general rule
10 people want more privacy and we don't see enough of that.
11 At that point they begin to think, well, maybe there's some
12 kind of market failure here.

13 I think that this argument runs into some very,
14 very thorny methodological problems right from the start.
15 First of all, confidentiality is certainly a good as are
16 the other things, but none of these are absolute goods. So
17 how do you judge what their relative value is? How do we
18 judge what the value of privacy is relative to the value of
19 having cheaper credit?

20 One might say that consumer opinion polls give
21 you some evidence that privacy is, in fact, a greater good
22 than the benefits of information flows. However, those
23 answering the queries of pollsters, to grossly truncate a
24 very sophisticated economic argument, don't bear the costs
25 of expressing the preference for privacy that they do in

1 the polls the same way they would if they were acting to
2 buy privacy as a good in the market.

3 For that reason, the vast majority of people who
4 do economic methodology find consumer opinion polls to be a
5 very unreliable guide to what peoples values, in fact, are.
6 That is to say, their actions speak louder than words.

7 As a general rule, people seem to be willing to
8 take steps to avoid very concrete privacy problems like
9 identity theft. They are very interested in that security,
10 but they don't seem to have any deep philosophical need to
11 avoid marketing as a general practice.

12
13 Now, one might also talk about privacy as a sort
14 of positive externality because market failures sometimes
15 occur when property rights are not defined. You can say
16 well, consumers don't have an exclusive right in
17 information about themselves. So let's view privacy as a
18 positive externality.

19 Then I think this becomes very tricky. It's
20 questionable, particularly given some of the functions of
21 consumer information that we've heard about today, whether
22 privacy is always a positive externality.

23 That is, I think that if consumers were able to
24 veto businesses' attempts to learn about their behavior by
25 asserting a property right over their information, the type

1 of externalities that would often be produced would, in
2 fact, be negative. That is to say, the benefits we get
3 from using information, whether that's security, being able
4 to locate witnesses and fleeing judgment debtors, donors to
5 political groups and charities, starting magazines that are
6 targeted at some strange niche audience, those benefits,
7 since they don't depend on the contribution of any one
8 individual's information but instead depend on the
9 functioning of the system as a whole, are themselves
10 positive externalities and have some of the qualities of a
11 public good.

12 So I think the externalities argument ultimately
13 there doesn't work, and I think it's pretty questionable
14 whether you should start to think of property rights in
15 information any broader than those we already have in
16 copyright and defamation and so on.

17 Finally, there is the whole question of
18 information costs and transaction costs which is a staple
19 of law and economics. I think, somewhat ironically,
20 economists who do methodology seriously have a lot more
21 difficulty with these concepts than lawyers do. That is
22 from Coase and Gordon Tulloch.

23 Authorities on economic methodology have said
24 that it really is very questionable as to whether you
25 should take a world of zero information costs or zero

1 transaction costs as a standard by which to judge our own.
2 That is, information and transactions are scarce resources
3 like any other just like labor or resources.

4 There's no particular reason to use a world with
5 lowered or zero information or transaction costs as your
6 standard of efficiency as opposed to using something like
7 Pareto efficiency.

8 Secondly, empirical economists have shown that
9 markets seem to be quite good at resolving their own
10 failures due to information costs. That is, if information
11 is scarce markets tend to develop some mechanism to produce
12 it. As a result over time real market failures seem to be
13 very scarce indeed.

14 Then finally to bring this back into the argument
15 about the functions that information is serving in the
16 economy, the market does, in fact, seem to be producing a
17 wide range of the goods that are variously known as
18 privacy, those that are most closely related to solving
19 some real problems in the world. The chief of these is
20 security.

21 Banks and credit reporters and so on don't shout
22 out information about accounts in the street or publish
23 them in the paper. Information sharing is by and large
24 limited to or attempted to be limited to other legitimate
25 businesses, and those businesses in turn value the exchange

1 precisely because they believe that ultimately the consumer
2 will value the exchange. There are passwords, there are
3 pin numbers. There are good spam filters. There are
4 mailing houses and so on. Most legitimate e-mail
5 marketing, for example, Eddie Bauer, is opt in.

6 There's not much left for the alleged market
7 failure to fail to provide other than the kind of broad
8 restrictions on information flows that are imposed by law
9 in the European Union, but it's completely unclear what
10 practical use these broad restrictions serve or why
11 consumers would, in fact, demand them. That is, they are
12 not an effective tool to address any real concrete problems
13 whether it's spam or identity theft, both of which are
14 largely enforcement problems.

15 MR. ZYWICKI: Thank you, Solveig. Our final
16 speaker is Professor Peter Swire from Ohio State
17 University.

18 MR. SWIRE: Greetings. My thanks to Professor
19 Todd Zywicki and the Commission and Commissioner Swindle
20 for sticking with us through the afternoon.

21 I'm going to start by saying that I love many,
22 many, many data flows, but I don't love all data flows.
23 Some are not good. Handing out people's passwords is not
24 good. Handing out people's Social Security numbers in a
25 world where Social Security numbers are a key to people's

1 identity is not good. In a lot of settings, data flows may
2 be good but you have to have good protections built in. If
3 you don't it turns out that having institutions that work
4 well at holding on to that data leads to various kinds of
5 problems.

6 In this panel in some ways I'm the one who's
7 going to emphasize some problems with data flows. I'm
8 leaning on that side of my own views to sort of bring out
9 points on methodology that maybe haven't come out so much
10 thus far today.

11 I going to make just a couple of points in
12 response to some of what we heard. First of all, I commend
13 Robert Hunt's paper, which I hadn't heard until today. I
14 thought it was very elegant at showing why we have the Fair
15 Credit Reporting Act and private rights of action with
16 enforcement, with a whole series of reinforcing rules.

17 One of the things that we have there is a set of
18 rules that lead to reasonable precautions in the handling
19 of this important data. We have transparency to consumers
20 about how that data is used. It's because of those factors
21 that we are likely to think that FCRA is roughly efficient.

22 If it turns out we have other settings where we
23 don't have reasonable precautions in place or we don't have
24 very good transparency, we might have less confidence that
25 we would come anywhere near an equilibrium that economists

1 would say is the right one.

2 I also have read some of Michael Turner's paper.
3 I didn't get to read the whole thing in advance, but
4 there's much to commend in the careful numbers that have
5 been run there. However, in comparing where we are today
6 to 30 years ago, which part of what the paper does is
7 compare the enormous growth in credit since 30 years ago or
8 ten years ago, 30 years ago there were just a few
9 mainframes. There were no PCs, there were no faxes, there
10 was no e-mail, there was no web. So you would expect
11 information costs to have fallen enormously in an
12 information-intensive industry in the last 30 years. We
13 would expect much greater efficiency in many dimensions.

14 So I think, and maybe if I went through all the
15 tables it would turn out that the different scenarios do
16 this, but we can't easily conclude that exactly the rules
17 that have gotten us through the past 30 years are the right
18 rules going forward. A lot about the improvements we've
19 had come from the better technologies, and we may need to
20 be tweaking laws as we go to the next phase because as Mr.
21 Hunt showed the equilibria are going to shift.

22 What I'm going to try to do in this time is give
23 an overview in part based on an article on efficient
24 confidentiality that's at these websites. I'm going to
25 take on the idea that the market works and then in some

1 contrast to Solveig Singleton say that there are some
2 market failures that should be included in the cost-benefit
3 analysis.

4 I'll try to show what is typically left out of
5 cost-benefit analysis, and I was reminded today that my
6 first academic conference ever was on cost-benefit
7 analysis. That was in 1979. I gave my first academic
8 paper on the subject. I hope I've learned some things
9 since but it's sure been a long time.

10 Show us the data. This morning I believe it was
11 Commissioner Swindle who asked us to show him the data.
12 One place where we've seen data on cost-benefits is a
13 hundred page cost-benefit analysis of the Health Insurance
14 Portability and Accountability Act(HIPAA) medical privacy
15 rule. So that's the only substantial cost-benefit of a
16 major privacy rule by a federal agency that I'm aware of,
17 and I think it should be looked at.

18 Also, when I was working with Robert Layton on a
19 book about the European directive, we spent two years
20 trying to figure out how to measure costs and benefits of
21 the directive. We ended up not being able to come up with
22 a dollar estimate that we could put our names to.

23 I think it's extraordinarily difficult to do
24 quantitative estimates here. One point and this partly for
25 Todd Zywicki who loves the Coase Theorem and Coasian

1 analysis, one point in these cost-benefit analyses is where
2 you start is going to tell you what the costs are of
3 getting to a different solution.

4 So if you assume, for instance, that the
5 individual has a strong property right in the data, then
6 there's all sorts of costs that it's going to take to move
7 the customer away from that. If you assume instead that
8 business owns all the data, then there's going to be large
9 costs anytime you change businesses' expectations, what
10 Michael Staten called the status quo.

11 These rules, the default rules, matter enormously
12 here because I think people who have looked at it have come
13 to believe that opt out and opt in differ. We get really
14 low changes from the default rules either way.

15 That's a sign of high transaction costs. That's
16 a sign that bargaining is hard to do and so the default
17 rule we set is going matter. We're going to be forced, as
18 a society, to decide roughly as our best guess what kind of
19 flows are going to happen and are not going to happen by
20 our default rule.

21 In the paper I talk about my experience with
22 economists and privacy. I had sort of a predictive index
23 of people who didn't understand privacy, and that was those
24 with graduate training in economics. I went to a lot of
25 meetings when I was at the White House with many different

1 people, and if I were just going to predict up front the
2 people who thought that privacy is less important, graduate
3 training in economics was the leading indicator for this.

4 There could be a lot of reasons for that, but one
5 reason is that economists are taught in the first year of
6 economics that perfect competition is a good thing. We're
7 in favor of that. And by the way, perfect information is
8 the world of perfect competition. The closer we are to
9 matching all the buyers and sellers the closer we are to
10 perfect competition. You get to Pareto Heaven.
11 Everything's great.

12 There's a possibility that economists trained in
13 this world view think that other people are like them.
14 Then if other people have other views that privacy matters
15 more, there's a gap and we can have this bad prediction by
16 at least some economists on the issue.

17 Now, another thing when we think about cost-
18 benefit is a starting point in our society that the market
19 works. The idea is we the company only use data in the
20 ways that customers want. Otherwise, we are going to lose
21 trust. We're going to spend our marketing dollars on
22 people who don't want our offers.

23 I think we heard that today, and this is an
24 important truth about the ways that markets work. I'm
25 going to emphasize the market failures because that is my

1 job on the panel. Here's one.

2 Let's imagine a telemarketing world and let's
3 imagine what turns out to be a pretty good response rate
4 today which is a 3 percent response rate to phone calls.
5 Let's imagine that 17 people out of a hundred just don't
6 care if they get the phone call. Let's imagine, which is
7 consistent with polling, that 80 people don't want to get
8 that phone call.

9 So the economists would say, well, there's some
10 negative utility, that's economist speak for somebody got
11 mad, or their dinner was ruined or something, there's
12 negative utility from the marketing call to the 80 people.

13 So our overall question is, do the losses for
14 those 80 outweigh the gains to the three plus to the
15 marketing company? If so, if the telemarketer can make
16 money on three sales they're going to keep marketing even
17 though there's this external cost on the 80 people who
18 didn't want to get the call.

19 If you think it's possible in telemarketing, it's
20 also possible with spam where the response rate is .000 --
21 keep adding zeros -- 37. Lots of people don't want to get
22 the spam, and they dread going to their e-mail box. We are
23 likely to think there's negative externalities from being
24 cluttered with spam. That's even though the spam artists
25 are making money. So the fact that they market doesn't

1 prove as a society that it's efficient.

2 Without trying to defend in great detail, I'm
3 going to briefly just touch on other market failures that
4 you can see in the privacy area. One is that it is very
5 expensive and hard for consumers to understand how data is
6 being used. We know that because we know it's hard for
7 companies to know how data is being used inside the
8 company. It's that much harder for consumers.

9 It's high monitoring costs for consumers who
10 enter into a contract so if your name or information gets
11 out in various ways you don't know who leaked the data.
12 This which means that people can gain from using or selling
13 the data, but you as an individual don't know who leaked
14 it. You have weak enforcement, weak monitoring and likely
15 overuse of data.

16 There are high bargaining costs for consumers.
17 In a lot of markets it's really hard for you to figure out
18 a different market on what data is going to be used with
19 the company you're doing business with.

20 There's the externalized cost, and this was
21 touched on a little bit by Robert Hunt, about mistakes in
22 credit reports. The cost of the mistakes are borne by you
23 the individual consumer, but we don't know who leaked the
24 improper data. We don't know where the problem happened so
25 there's an externalization.

1 Then another thing that makes bargaining in this
2 space very hard and makes markets less effective is that a
3 lot of the data and the data sharing is done by third
4 parties. It's one thing if you're dealing with your bank
5 or you're dealing with your store and they then give out
6 that data and you figure it out. The problem in this world
7 is that it goes from the bank to six other places and from
8 the store to 12 other places and those downstream
9 recipients don't even know you as a customer.

10 So if they make the mistake there's not the usual
11 market discipline of angering you the individual. They
12 don't even have you as a customer. Credit reporting
13 agencies are a famous example where the customers are the
14 banks and not the individual consumers.

15 So, in short, the size and magnitude of these are
16 hard to judge. We can argue about it but this is at least
17 the homework to go through to see what the possible market
18 failures are in these markets for information.

19 Here are some other critiques of standard cost-
20 benefit analysis I'll just hit on briefly. The first one
21 is one that Mozelle Thompson alluded to today which is
22 there might be a real dichotomy between short run and long
23 run here.

24 When Todd Zywicki asked well, what's the marginal
25 cost my answer back was that might not capture it all. The

1 marginal trade might be I get a 10 percent discount if I
2 give you more data. But the long run concern might be
3 about privacy, a society where the government knows
4 everything or a society where all data about people is
5 known. That's a qualitatively different society and we
6 might have different views.

7 A second critique in cost-benefit analysis is
8 something that's been called a dwarfing of soft areas.
9 It's easy to quantify some things. It's harder to quantify
10 others. Privacy is hard to quantify. How much does it bug
11 you if these things happen. That soft stuff tends to get
12 squeezed out in the equation.

13 A third one, and law professors are familiar with
14 this point but I think real people aren't, is that in cost-
15 benefit analysis violation of rights don't count. So if
16 you thought you had a human right to certain information or
17 a property right and you thought there was some bad thing
18 that happened because your rights were violated, ordinarily
19 in economic analysis the fact that a right was violated
20 doesn't count. It's just how much utility is over here,
21 and how much utility is over there.

22 So the many different rights-based arguments in
23 this space usually get just taken out when you go into
24 cost-benefit analysis.

25 In the federal system the e-government act last

1 year now requires privacy impact assessments for new
2 federal agency computer systems. OMB is supposed to issue
3 guidance. What equivalent, if any, will happen in the
4 private sector? Larry Ponemon spoke earlier about the
5 privacy management process. How is that going to happen?
6 It will happen for the intense brand companies that have
7 their brand on the line but for the other 98 percent of
8 companies in many instances it won't happen as intensively.

9 A related question is how can the FTC help us
10 along a path towards encouraging the good flows of data and
11 having thoughtful critique of the bad flows so we can have
12 these reasonable precautions and this transparency the FCRA
13 has.

14 Flows of information between companies that are
15 using the data are not free. I've tried to point out
16 externalities and other market failures. We've heard about
17 I.D. theft. Some flows of data are security breaches.
18 Some flows of data might violate the rights of individuals.
19 It might lead to a society we don't want to live in.

20 I think the cost-benefit analysis can't be
21 between free flow and the market works perfectly or we have
22 to have opt in for everything, close everything down. I
23 try in my own work, as I know many others also do, to have
24 more nuance and less ideology here, but I hope to have at
25 least touched on some of the questions raised by today's

1 workshop. Thank you.

2 MR. ZYWICKI: Thanks, Peter. Before we get to my
3 inevitable question about the Coase Theorem we've got a
4 request for our team of Michaels down to the right to give
5 us a brief summary of the findings that they found in their
6 various studies. So, Michael Turner, do you want to tell
7 us a little bit about what your study found?

8 MR. TURNER: Sure. I'll talk on the key findings
9 from the three case studies. The first case study, in
10 terms of automated underwriting, here are some of the
11 highlights again. Prior to automated underwriting
12 systems(AUS) and automated underwriting systems are risk
13 models that rely on full file credit reports and access to
14 robust data sets, approving alone took approximately three
15 weeks. In 2002 over 75 percent of all loan applications
16 received approval in two to three minutes.

17 Origination costs were decreased by 50 percent or
18 \$1500 per loan. With 12.5 million sales of new and
19 existing homes in 2002 this produced direct savings to
20 consumers of \$18.75 billion.

21 In terms of the efficiencies, the better
22 performance and higher acceptance rates, automated
23 underwriting consistently outperformed manual underwriting
24 or manual underwriting with a guideline both in terms of
25 approval rates, overall approval rates were 36 percent

1 higher using automated underwriting than manual, and
2 particularly for traditionally underserved communities.
3 The one version of AUS used by Freddie Mac accepted
4 minorities at the rate 29 percent higher than manual
5 underwriting even with the guideline.

6 Prescreening, the second silo, the second case
7 study. Our survey showed that the average cost to acquire
8 a new account using prescreening was roughly \$58. When we
9 ran it across our four scenarios, scenarios A through D,
10 the cost increased from \$61 to \$73.

11 Now, that doesn't sound substantial but think
12 about when you aggregate it, and again, I'd like to talk
13 about the secondary effects. The marketing cost would
14 increase between \$269 million to \$1.4 billion.

15 When you're making a decision about who you're
16 going to lend to, you look at the expected lifetime value
17 of a borrower; obviously more borrowers qualify at \$58 than
18 at \$72. So in essence, what you're going to be doing is by
19 restricting prescreening or excluding it from the
20 preemptive provisions, you're going to contract access to
21 credit. You're going to deny access to credit.

22 Our findings, again because we layered our 3.6
23 million actual credit files with sociodemographic data on
24 age, on gender, on race and on income people who would be
25 most impacted by this.

1 Even if it's only a thousand or ten thousand in
2 this case are going to invariably be lower income
3 Americans, members of ethnic minority groups and the lowest
4 income quintile.

5 The competitive effect we've seen from
6 prescreening, and this goes to Peter's point about the
7 units of information cost perhaps not being considered,
8 here we looked at between 1990 and 2000. Prescreening just
9 came onto the scene and Michael Staten did some of this
10 analysis in his work on MBNA. This was a company that
11 didn't exist.

12 Empowered by prescreening you see cycles of
13 competition of sustained competition in the credit card
14 industry. We estimate that this yields, if you hold prices
15 constant from 1997, savings to consumers of \$30 billion a
16 year on the price of credit.

17 Now, this is based on an analysis done by Evans
18 and Schmalensee of MIT and MIRA. I've spoken with David
19 Evans and he's coming out with his price index next year in
20 the update for "Paying with Plastic" and he says in fact
21 that prices haven't remained constant since 1997. They've
22 gone down. So this is a conservative estimate, \$30 billion
23 per year.

24 Our own analysis shows that prior to 1990 or
25 during 1990, 73 percent of all outstandings on credit cards

1 were at 18 percent or more. Only 6 percent were below 16.5
2 percent. That's in 1990. In 2002 compared to 73 percent
3 only 26 percent of outstandings were above 18 percent.

4 On the other end, remarkably, 15 percent of all
5 outstandings were below 5.5 percent. Thirty-one percent
6 were between 5.5 and 10.9 and 25 percent were below 16.5.
7 So instead of three-quarters paying more than 18 percent
8 now three-quarters are paying considerably less than even
9 16.5 percent. These are real savings. The cost of credit
10 has gone down for most Americans, and this is driven
11 largely by prescreening. So just is to consider the
12 multiple context, is it marketing versus scoring? There's
13 a competitive effect that needs to be considered as well.

14 I will discuss identity theft. In essence, the
15 data we have on identity theft of prescreened offers of
16 credit, if it's going to be associated with identity theft,
17 is by definition a form of application fraud. Of all
18 credit card fraud the broad application fraud is only 4.5
19 percent of all credit card fraud. Therefore, prescreening
20 linked to identity theft is less than 4.5 percent of credit
21 card fraud and its percent of sales volume is .004 percent.

22 In addition, prescreening firm offers of credit
23 are screened against the National Fraud Database by the
24 credit bureaus. Deceased individuals are removed. Any
25 suspicious addresses are taken out of the process before

1 they are even sent to the issuers.

2 The issuers then use these technologies,
3 sophisticated identity verification authentication
4 technologies, that capture again from our data between 60
5 to 80 percent of all potentially fraudulent applications
6 before the loan is approved. They are far less risky than
7 any other form of credit application. Perversely, limiting
8 or prohibiting prescreening might actually have the ironic
9 effect of increasing identity theft.

10 In terms of our full file credit reporting
11 analysis, every adult in this room right now has a credit
12 file. Nearly nine in ten would be impacted if the
13 preemptive provisions were to expire or if Congress were to
14 act in ways consistent with the real proposals that we
15 analyzed in our study.

16 The change is not always for the better. Scores
17 sometimes go up; scores sometimes go down. And they're
18 consequential. But the real impact here is on the
19 predictive power of models. If creditors or if lenders are
20 not able to ascertain risk associated with making decisions
21 they have one of two choices. They will either reduce
22 access to credit or they will increase the cost of credit.

23 We have a trade-off graph that shows essentially,
24 again, the more information the less risk; the less
25 information the more risk. You can either hold access

1 constant and your delinquency rates are going to
2 progressively increase, or you can hold the delinquency
3 rate constant and with the less information your acceptance
4 rates are going to decrease.

5 Basically, we measure and plot that for all four
6 of our scenarios and what we see is this, if you hold
7 acceptance rates constant and if you run it across these
8 four scenarios, delinquencies will increase between 10 and
9 70 percent. What that means is that we translate into
10 dollars the charge-off costs are going to increase between
11 \$3- and \$22 billion per year which will be in a competitive
12 market passed on to consumers. For the average American
13 family this means that they would have to assume an
14 additional cost of between \$40 and \$270 per family.

15 Now, if you look at the other option, if you hold
16 the delinquency rates constant, essentially acceptance
17 rates would decrease between 10 and 30 percent. And what
18 this means is that between 14 and 41 million Americans who
19 apply for credit would be rejected each year.

20 Those are essentially the key findings from this.
21 There's a downloadable PDF version of this study on our
22 Website at www.infopolicy.org. We also have a fancy three-
23 dimensional interactive data flow tool that highlights how
24 information is shared in the financial industry, banks,
25 insurance companies, credit bureaus, information

1 aggregators.

2 It's all here. You can e-mail me, call me. I'd
3 be happy to get a copy of this into your hand. This was
4 unveiled on the Hill a week ago with the financial services
5 roundtable, and I'd be happy to make this available to
6 members of the Commission.

7 Finally, a couple of other issues. There's the
8 Bob Gellman study called "The Cost of Not Enacting Consumer
9 Privacy Protections." There is certainly cost to
10 inefficiencies or inadequate protections. Gellman did a
11 piece on this. I think Beth Givens referenced it. We do
12 factor that into our cost-benefit analysis. It doesn't
13 tend to get picked up by everybody, but I have written a
14 rebuttal to that and I encourage you to look at that. It's
15 on our website as well. There's a short version and a long
16 version. Thank you.

17 MR. ZYWICKI: Thanks, Michael. Mike Staten, do
18 you want to tell us about what you found in your studies?

19 MR. STATEN: Yes, real quickly. This isn't going
20 to be as quantitatively oriented as Michael's results were,
21 but these are just some lessons that we found emerging from
22 these case studies.

23 Now, the first lesson really is that most of the
24 companies, certainly all the companies we talked to and
25 just about everybody I think you heard from earlier today

1 don't derive any revenue from the sale of their personal
2 information about their customers.

3 So if you think about the privacy issue the real
4 impact of opt in is on companies who are trying to move
5 information about their customers that they already have in
6 one of their various business units or across their
7 licensed business affiliates back and forth to better serve
8 those customers.

9 If we accept Peter's proposition on opt in, which
10 I happen to agree with, the transacting is costly. If you
11 initially assign the rights to use the information to the
12 consumer and the company is tasked with trying to bargain
13 those rights back then effectively that eliminates those
14 information flows under an opt-in scenario.

15 So what you need to be thinking about is the
16 impact it has on a company's ability to use information
17 primarily that they already have but may be located at
18 different units.

19 Secondly is the point that's been raised many
20 times today and again with Michael's results. Personal
21 information is used to target market. That brings more
22 competition to market. It lowers barriers to entry and
23 lowers prices, increases options for consumers, increases
24 consumer choice. There's no way around it. That's one of
25 the clear trade-offs. If you truncate the ability to use

1 personal information to target market you're going to give
2 something back in terms of those gains to the competitive
3 markets.

4 Third point, with respect to information flows
5 and service delivery. Exchange of personal information
6 across the business units is absolutely critical to
7 customer relationship management strategies. Opt in will
8 kill CRM, and there's no other way around it. If opt in
9 truly erects that barrier, and the stricter the opt in the
10 more so this is going to be true, it will truncate attempts
11 for companies to know and learn more about their customers
12 and establish those relationships.

13 Fourth point, there are positive externalities
14 that derive from the assembly of personal information for
15 commercial purposes. Acxiom provided several great
16 examples of this. Many of the tools that they offer to
17 their customers, they're available for sale in terms of
18 helping CRM development, helping target market. That's
19 paying the freight for maintaining the database that they
20 can then offer government authorities for law enforcement,
21 anti-terrorism efforts, fraud prevention, I.D. theft
22 prevention, et cetera, et cetera.

23 The devil's in the details, and we don't have
24 time to get into how this happens to work. The point is
25 that opt-in exemptions that would exempt information usage

1 for those positive social purposes like fraud prevention or
2 crime prevention will not be sufficient to preserve the
3 maintenance of the database that is paid for through the
4 ability to sell those products for other commercial target
5 marketing type purposes. So those are those positive
6 externalities that may go away if opt in prevents the
7 information flows of gathering that data.

8 Last point, I guess, is that there clearly is
9 sign of progress in the market. Not only is there
10 technological progress in moving data but there's progress
11 in terms of company sensitivity to consumer preferences
12 with respect to how their data is handled.

13 So there are many choices that consumers are
14 being given even under the status quo without new, say, opt
15 in restriction. The required opt out choices under FCRA
16 and GLBA, do-not-call lists mandated by state and local
17 governments, federal government, company-sponsored do-not-
18 promote lists.

19 Actually, many companies now offer choices to
20 customers as to how they want to be contacted, whether it's
21 through e-mail, whether it's through direct mail, whether
22 it's through telemarketing, or not at all. Many companies
23 are being progressive about that because they recognize
24 that it makes a difference. It makes a difference in their
25 ability to attract the customer and to keep that customer

1 over time.

2 So there's greater sensitivity there and as we
3 heard this morning, that greater sensitivity is going to
4 impose an important new and more powerful discipline on
5 companies to the extent that privacy is a concern of
6 consumers that actually translates into action on their
7 part.

8 MR. ZYWICKI: Thanks, Mike. That's a good segue
9 into a question I have for the panel which is a question
10 relating to opt in versus opt out. Economic theory, as
11 Peter Swire mentioned, tells us that in a world without
12 transaction costs it doesn't really matter where we start,
13 whether it's opt in or opt out.

14 That just really focuses us on the question of
15 what the transaction costs are, and I just would address
16 the entire panel, how valuable is this information to
17 businesses versus consumers? How high are the transaction
18 costs, and does either side have a comparative advantage in
19 processing this?

20 So for instance, maybe if I just think about my
21 telephone company they may have to try to call me four
22 times in order to get me to do something versus a company
23 that has 24-hour customer service and expertise in
24 processing these requests, things like that. What evidence
25 do we have and what's the state of the knowledge on the

1 cost, the transaction cost associated with opt out versus
2 opt in? Michael Turner.

3 MR. TURNER: In an earlier study that I did I
4 referenced an experience that U.S. West, now Qwest, had
5 regarding encouraging its customers to opt in to share
6 information among its affiliates.

7 The problems they had were basically thus,
8 contacting individuals in the households that were of age
9 to give consent, actually getting someone to the telephone
10 or to respond to a mail notification and then explaining to
11 them the need for the information that they were sharing
12 and the functions it served.

13 Their experience was telling. This is a company
14 with enormous household brand name recognition. I mean,
15 everyone knows they're a phone company. Generally, people
16 tend to trust their phone company. They may not always be
17 satisfied with the service but they incurred costs and they
18 tried a number of different methods. They preselected for
19 outbound phone calls. They preselected for inbound phone
20 calls and they did direct mail with and without incentives,
21 where they would give away one dollar phone card and \$5
22 phone cards.

23 The cost of obtaining an opt in ranged from, and
24 I don't remember the exact numbers, but it was between
25 about \$20 and \$35 per opt in. It took, on average, for the

1 phone calls, even with those individuals who were most
2 likely to respond favorably and a script written by a
3 Madison Avenue public relations agency, it took about half
4 an hour to explain, on average.

5 This is incredibly telling. I can't imagine
6 being a startup, a small or new company where no one knows
7 my business, never heard of my company. What would it take
8 to encourage a customer to opt in and give consent to
9 information share in that case?

10 So for me this is a barrier. If you require opt
11 in, it's going to benefit companies who have high name
12 recognition to the detriment of competition because it will
13 handicap new entrants and small companies.

14 MR. ZYWICKI: Peter?

15 MR. SWIRE: I think there's a lot of consensus
16 that transaction costs are high; where you set the default
17 rule leads to very different outcomes. So that means for
18 areas that you're concerned about where you think the data
19 is sensitive, you have to really work through what that
20 default rule is.

21 In the medical privacy rule, for treatment
22 purposes and payment and health care operations, there is
23 no default rule at all. That information just flows with
24 no customer choice. For sending the names to outside
25 people it's an opt in. For whether clergy get your data,

1 whether you go into the hospital directory is opt out.

2 There was an attempt in the rule to make a guess
3 about where most people would be. Because the transactions
4 costs are so high that's probably the right way to go when
5 there's data that's important to regulate at all. I knew
6 that "regulate at all" would have to get a rise.

7 MS. SINGLETON: Actually, I have just a very
8 general comment on that. I think one of the things that
9 Coase himself emphasized repeatedly in his very important
10 article in which he creates a model of a world with zero
11 information costs was that the model has extremely limited
12 relevance to the real world.

13 He emphasized again and again that in the real
14 world the costs that you bear in working out a transaction
15 or getting information are just as much a part of the
16 economic process as the costs used, the amount of resources
17 you expend on the resources or what have you. So when
18 we're thinking about default rules and what the ideal rules
19 are I think that it's important to keep in mind that when
20 you're doing good economic methodology, you don't
21 necessarily get to a better world by forcing, say,
22 lawnmower manufacturers to include with all their
23 lawnmowers a 300-page treatise on metallurgy.

24 I mean, forcing things to move to a world with
25 perfect information just probably isn't going to be the

1 answer. So I think the default rules do matter and it
2 matters to get them right.

3 Then the question is what is right? I think as a
4 general rule the American tradition has been that we
5 occasionally give people veto power over facts or opinions
6 of observations about themselves that other people may make
7 when we have an extremely good reason for doing so like in
8 the medical context.

9 But as a general rule, we should be very, very
10 hesitant to let anybody veto the movement of information
11 unless we have a really good reason for doing so and we
12 know that by doing so it would make things better. I think
13 that often even when we think we have a really good value-
14 based reason for intervening in the market the intervention
15 doesn't necessarily improve the market.

16 I'd just like to say that I think a final good
17 comparison is to copyright law. I mean, yes you get
18 property rights information but they're pretty limited.
19 They don't cover facts and ideas. I think that any kind of
20 expansion of copyright law is rightly viewed with some kind
21 of suspicion. I think that that's generally been our
22 approach to information rules in American society because
23 that's been a very good one.

24 MR. ZYWICKI: Let me just address one other
25 question to the panel. Most of the discussion today

1 elsewhere basically is phrased in terms of two
2 constituencies which is business and consumers and their
3 shared interests or rival interests. But there's a third
4 constituency which is near and dear to all of our hearts on
5 this panel which is academic research. Without good
6 research it becomes impossible to make good policy.

7 I think that the interests of our little part of
8 the world are sometimes forgotten. My guess is that most
9 people would not be perhaps quite as concerned about what a
10 researcher might do with their data as opposed to a
11 business. Maybe they would be.

12 But I just wondered in terms of those who have
13 done empirical research in particular in this area to the
14 extent that it becomes more costly to do academic research
15 obviously you get a lower supply of research, reducing the
16 flow to policymakers.

17 I just wonder if those who have dealt with this
18 could talk about what costs, if any, they have run into in
19 trying to resolve the tension between privacy rules and
20 academic research. How costly that may have been and any
21 suggestions that any of you have for making that process
22 work better?

23 MR. TURNER: Well, this project in my years of
24 doing empirical economic analysis is unprecedented in terms
25 of its magnitude and scope. Particularly because we were

1 using 3.6 million actual credit files there were deep
2 concerns about privacy laws and staying well within the
3 parameters of the law.

4 For us to be able to append sociodemographic data
5 on top of actual credit files was cumbersome because as you
6 know the credit bureaus don't have the sociodemographic
7 data and do not link them. It took legions of lawyers
8 weeks of discussion to decide about how we would actually
9 execute this and whether we could and under what
10 conditions.

11 We finally figured out a method of doing this
12 through a third party and washing all personal identifying
13 information. What we got in terms of our output was so
14 much code that we had to run through SAS. So we never saw
15 any personal identifying information.

16 So, yes, the privacy rules do matter. They weigh
17 heavily on research, and I would even suggest that our
18 ability to obtain participation from firms who are involved
19 in this industry. Obviously, if you're analyzing credit
20 scores in the credit industry you need participation from
21 industry. You can't do it without them.

22 But in fact some had fears that if they lent
23 their models they didn't know what the outcome would be
24 from the resulting analysis. If the outcome were
25 suggestive of some privacy violations they would not be

1 immune to discovery, so that impeded some firms from
2 actually ultimately deciding to lend data to us.

3 Perhaps if they were exempted from legal
4 ramifications for research purposes there might have been a
5 higher participation rate. But here again, concerns for
6 privacy do, in fact, in some sense serve as a real barrier
7 to our ability to do robust, economic research. We were
8 very fortunate in this case. We were given unprecedented
9 access to proprietary data from a large number of firms and
10 then had to be very sensitive to the laws that regulate
11 this.

12 MR. ZYWICKI: Michael Staten.

13 MR. STATEN: I can give you one specific example
14 here. Let me also state that we have for years used bureau
15 data as well. That's always been with the understanding
16 that it was stripped of all personally identifying
17 information. I don't see that changing nor do I see a
18 reason for that to change in the future.

19 It is perfectly acceptable, as I understand it
20 now, for research purposes, model building, et cetera, to
21 use those tools in that fashion as long as the customer's
22 name and identification isn't attached to it.

23 There are some interesting examples of unintended
24 side effects of regulations. In this case it was Randall
25 H. Bliley on Reg P that followed the passage of that act

1 three years ago.

2 We had been working since 1998 with one of the
3 major bureaus who had basically taken credit report
4 information and aggregated it down to specific geographic
5 levels like county or ZIP code or whatever and then
6 provided it for analytical purposes. It was on a large
7 random sample of 30 million credit reports every quarter.

8 We worked with a developed product. It was
9 showing a great deal of promise in terms of assessing
10 credit trends across the country. The Federal Reserve
11 Board was quite interested in it not only for safety and
12 soundness monitoring but just for understanding how
13 consumer credit was growing, et cetera. There were a lot
14 of ancillary benefits associated with this product.

15 When Reg P was first promulgated there was
16 initially uncertainty, but it wasn't FCRA considerations
17 because all of these files had been stripped of personally
18 identified information. However, there was the question of
19 whether information was being used for a purpose other than
20 for which it was initially collected and whether the bureau
21 had to get consent from customers or consumers for
22 permission to use it in these other ways.

23 The bureau actually suspended the product for
24 research purposes for anybody that wasn't using it to make
25 a credit granting decision for about two years until that

1 was clarified. It essentially put our project out of
2 business and put on hold lots of other little research
3 projects that have been undertaken or at least started with
4 that product.

5 It has since been resolved. That product is now
6 back in business, but for a two-year period it wasn't clear
7 whether it was permissible or not. So all indications were
8 that the regulators never intended for that to happen out
9 of the regulation, but there is always sufficient vagueness
10 when you pass these rules that you're never quite sure what
11 is going to result. So that's one example where it
12 impacted research.

13 MR. ZYWICKI: Peter?

14 MR. SWIRE: Going to back to HIPAA, medical data
15 is very sensitive and confidential. Medical research is
16 also a very, very good thing and we all want it to succeed.
17 So there's been a huge amount of work done on how do you do
18 medical research consistent with confidentiality.

19 Under the HIPAA rule there's three ways
20 researchers can get data. One is they can deidentify,
21 which is what you were talking about. The second is it can
22 be with the permission of the individual data subject. The
23 third is in the medical world they have IRBs, Institutional
24 Review Boards, which are basically ethical boards to say
25 yes, these researchers have promised to be very, very good

1 and yes, the benefits of the research outweigh the costs
2 and on balance we're going to say go ahead with this.

3 That structure exists for medical research
4 because of all the human subject data. That ability to let
5 identified data be used for research, subject to some
6 checks and balances, is something that could be extended
7 beyond medical in the future.

8 MS. SINGLETON: Understand that even in the HIPAA
9 context that there are sometimes problems with doctors
10 discussing individual case reports at conferences because
11 you can use the details of a rare individual case to trace
12 back to an individual, at least in theory.

13 I'm not sure if academic research is so dear to
14 my own heart. An area that I think is often overlooked
15 that is dear to my own heart is the role that consumer
16 information has in nonprofits because as you can see from
17 the scratches on my hand, I'm a very active volunteer with
18 the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.

19 There's a tremendous amount of work that goes
20 into just figuring out who we might possibly persuade to
21 help us keep our sort of tiny little budget going a little
22 bit longer. Direct-mail is a very important part of that.

23 MR. ZYWICKI: Let's thank the panel for their
24 outstanding presentation.

25 (Applause.)

1 MR. ZYWICKI: Now, we're going to move on to our
2 closing remarks of the day. We have with us Wayne
3 Abernathy, the Assistant Secretary for Financial
4 Institutions, Department of the Treasury who will talk
5 about the use of information to fight identity theft.
6 Secretary Abernathy.

7 SECRETARY ABERNATHY: Thank you for the privilege
8 of visiting with you this afternoon. I am in a very
9 unenviable position as all the good things have already
10 been said today, I suspect. I'm probably all that stands
11 between you and the exit door. So I will try to do my best
12 to keep myself focused perhaps on some subjects that
13 haven't been fully addressed today.

14 I have often been described as an economist, but
15 I have never made that claim myself. I did take economics
16 courses in college only because I was forced to. It was
17 part of the curriculum I needed for my undergraduate degree
18 and then when I went into my graduate program you could
19 take three particular majors as long as one of them was
20 International Economics. Everybody had to do that. So I
21 took International Economics.

22 I was much more interested in the theory and
23 practice of International Relations, but I found after
24 taking those subjects I learned something that some of the
25 things that you're required to do by those who have been

1 down the road ahead of you often are for your good. I
2 learned an awful lot; not enough to claim to be an
3 economist, but enough to claim to be a consumer of economic
4 information and economic presentations.

5 I want to talk to you today about what I believe
6 to be the most significant problem facing consumers of
7 economic products today: the problem of identity theft.

8 There are several reasons why I think that is the
9 most significant problem facing consumers today. First of
10 all, because they say it is. In a recent large, nationwide
11 survey that was conducted of homeowners for the Fireman's
12 Fund several questions were asked in addition to various
13 insurance questions that the Fireman's Fund was really
14 interested in. They asked the question have you ever been
15 a victim of identity theft?

16 Interestingly, 12 percent responded that they
17 had. Twenty-two percent responded that they knew somebody
18 who had as in a family member or acquaintance or friend.
19 Most interestingly, 90 percent feared, were concerned that
20 they were in danger of being targeted for identity theft.

21 Twelve percent. Let's start with that number to
22 begin with. Can you think of any other significant crimes
23 affecting homeowners that affects 12 percent of homeowners
24 other than perhaps excessively high real estate taxes?

25 Then add on top of that 78 percent more that are

1 worried that they might be candidates next. How does that
2 affect the behavior of that 78 percent? I think it affects
3 them profoundly. I think it affects the way they deal with
4 economic transactions, financial transactions and
5 particularly financial transactions where they are
6 concerned that they might be excessively vulnerable to
7 identity theft.

8 We find that particularly in the area of
9 electronic commerce. We have today in the United States
10 tremendous availability to electronic commerce. Something
11 like 75 percent of all households now, I think, have a
12 computer hooked up to the Internet either at home or some
13 other place where there's easy access. Those numbers are
14 constantly growing.

15 These people all shop on the Internet, kind of.
16 They do what I would call electronic window shopping.
17 They'll surf around. They'll look for a product. They'll
18 compare. They'll focus in on the product and then they'll
19 call the 800 number that's on the screen to engage in that
20 transaction because they're concerned that if I fill out
21 all that information on that screen and then hit that
22 button that says send, I don't know where that's going. I
23 don't know who's got access to it.

24 Businesses are doing the best to try to convince
25 people that it's all encrypted and it's actually safer if

1 you send it over the Internet than if you do it over the
2 telephone. So far, we're not having great success in
3 helping people to believe that except in the area of
4 discount brokers.

5 There not only are we convincing people but we're
6 giving people a very strong economic incentive to engage in
7 your stock transaction over the Internet. In some cases
8 you go from a \$35 per trade transaction down to \$8. In
9 some cases, zero. People seem to be willing to take that
10 chance.

11 Beyond that, we still have only somewhere in the
12 neighborhood of 5 percent of economic transactions taking
13 place over the Internet, yet 75 percent are window
14 shopping.

15 That's important because of the convenience to
16 the consumer and the ability of the consumer to window shop
17 and to look at a lot of different varieties of products at
18 any one particular time when that consumer is comfortable
19 at doing that, which is usually somewhere between 8:00 and
20 12:00 at night. But it's also important because of the
21 ability of the provider to connect with this particular
22 consumer.

23 Let me give you an example of that very
24 practical, what happened in my life. One of the
25 consequences of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was that I got a

1 new car. I didn't get a new car because I was passing the
2 act. I got a new car because while I was working on the
3 legislation, my wife was shopping for a new car. I came
4 home and we got a new car. It was a good car, and I didn't
5 have the heart to tell her anything other than that.

6 It's interesting because the day we actually got
7 that car was a Saturday. Our bank isn't open on Saturday.
8 We finally made the choice though on a Saturday, and we
9 said to the car dealer we like the car. We'll take the
10 car. We'll be here on Monday to pick it up.

11 He said, why Monday? Why don't you take it now?
12 I said, well, we've already worked out our financing with
13 our local credit union. We like the rate, we're all set
14 there. We've been approved, we just have to give them the
15 amount. We have to tell them on Monday. They'll cut the
16 check and we'll bring it to you.

17 The auto dealer said, that's fine. Take the car
18 now and bring us the check on Monday. Why could he do
19 that? He could do that because he had access to a lot of
20 information, and it was important to him that I made that
21 decision while I was shopping and interested because
22 statistics show that if I walked away from that dealer that
23 Saturday chances went way down that I'd walk back on
24 Monday.

25 Chances go up dramatically that I'll be thinking

1 about it. I'll be thinking, well, you know, maybe that
2 isn't the right color. Are you sure we got the right
3 price? Well, look at this, honey. This Saturday paper is
4 advertising a car that's a lot cheaper than the other.
5 Then we'd go shopping some more. It was important to that
6 merchant that he make the sale when we're interested.

7 It was important to us too. We were happy
8 because we could take that car right then and there. It
9 simplified a whole lot of things, and we were happy
10 consumers.

11 That can happen on the Internet with electronic
12 commerce, and particularly financial services, if people
13 will feel comfortable. But it's hard for people to feel
14 comfortable with engaging in those transactions when close
15 to a million people this year will be new victims to
16 identity theft, when there are somewhere in the
17 neighborhood of 11 to 12 million people who already number
18 its ranks, and when the most virulent and difficult form of
19 identity theft is the fastest growing.

20 That's not the case of identity theft where
21 somebody takes your credit card and engages in a fraudulent
22 transaction. That is the most common form of identity
23 theft, but it is not the fastest growing. Because of a lot
24 of work that has been done by the credit card industry
25 regarding the use of information on their part, that's the

1 easiest to deal with from the point of view of the
2 consumer. The hardest one is where somebody somewhere
3 uses your name in a place that you've never been to open up
4 an account that's mailed to an address that's in a land
5 far, far away from where you happen to live. And the bills
6 are sent to that address.

7 Interestingly, the thieves will service that
8 account for a while. They'll make the minimum payments.
9 Why do they do that? They want to work up that maximum.
10 When they've finally worked it up about as far as they can
11 go, the payments stop. Then the creditors come looking.
12 But they don't look for the crook. They look for you.

13 Then you discover this identity theft that's been
14 going on for maybe a whole year when you can't pay for your
15 dinner one evening because your credit card won't clear, or
16 when you can't get that second loan on your second mortgage
17 on your home because there's already a huge lien against
18 your house that you knew nothing about, or when your
19 employer comes to you and says, Bob, you've been such an
20 exemplary employee I'm very, very sorry to have to let you
21 go but this is such an important job, a very sensitive job
22 that you have, and someone with your credit history we just
23 can't run that risk for the company that you're in this
24 sensitive position. Now, we had no idea that you're credit
25 record was so bad until we did our routine check that we

1 have to on our sensitive employees. And wow, it's just
2 awful.

3 Maybe you'll be able to explain it. Maybe you'll
4 be able to deal with it but that's when you first heard
5 about it. Are these real? Are these real circumstances
6 that happen? All the time. In fact, it was just driven
7 home to my team that's been working on the identity theft
8 issue. My lead staffer who's been working on this issue
9 discovered just a few days ago that she'd been victimized
10 by identity theft. Now she's trying to work her way out of
11 the problem that she's been fighting a long time to deal
12 with.

13 We at Treasury believe that this is the number
14 one concern that needs to be addressed, and we're trying to
15 address it in three ways. We think there are three aspects
16 to this problem. All three of them need to be dealt with
17 if we're going to get this risk of identity theft down to a
18 level where people feel comfortable, more comfortable to
19 engage in the kinds of transactions that are right there
20 for them to engage in, that will improve their life and
21 will increase the amount of commerce that's able to take
22 place and decrease the costs of that commerce.

23 The three aspects that we want to deal with is we
24 need to increase the deterrence. The first line of
25 defense. What can we do to prevent the crime from even

1 occurring or to stop the thief right in his tracks? Number
2 one.

3 Recognizing that deterrence won't be perfect,
4 we're also looking for increased tools that we can use to
5 improve the chances of apprehending the identity thief.
6 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, what can we do to
7 reduce the amount of time it takes to restore the record,
8 the credit history of the victim of identity theft?

9 As we began the process of gathering the
10 information, the detailed information on fraud we came
11 across countless cases of people who have taken years to
12 restore their credit record. The GAO came up with an
13 estimate that it is about 175 hours, man hours of work, to
14 restore your credit record if you become a victim of
15 identity theft. That is a whole month of eight hours a
16 day, five days a week, full-time work. Of course, that
17 spreads out over a long period of time.

18 We came across the case of a lady in south
19 Florida who had been victimized by identity theft. She was
20 lucky in one sense; they caught the crook. The crook was
21 prosecuted. The crook was found guilty and punished, sent
22 to jail for 43 months. He served his whole time, didn't
23 come out on parole, served all 43 months. He came out, and
24 she was still in the process of correcting her record. The
25 crook served his time. The victim was still serving her

1 time.

2 We have got to address that and bring that time
3 dramatically down. Now, what role does information have in
4 dealing with that? I think we have to realize to begin
5 with that identity theft is not caused by information.
6 Identity theft is caused by lack of information. Let me
7 put it this way. Identify theft is caused by information
8 just as much as bank robberies are caused by putting money
9 in banks. Now, it's true it is much easier to rob the
10 whole town when everybody puts their money in one place.
11 You don't have to hit every single house in town in order
12 to rob everybody if you can just find some way to get into
13 that bank.

14 Now, banks have been robbed. Some banks have
15 historically failed because they have been dramatically
16 robbed. We have never thought that the policy in dealing
17 with bank robbery is to eliminate banks. We have suggested
18 that the way to deal with bank robbery is to improve the
19 security measures. Improve the ability to apprehend the
20 banking thieves and find ways to protect the depositor in
21 the case of loss of funds due to robbery. We've got the
22 FDIC in place. We've dealt with all three of those
23 aspects.

24 The same is true with information. Now, it's
25 true that the thief uses a little bit of information in

1 order to engage in identity theft. He has to know
2 something about the person he is trying to impersonate
3 because he's trying to craft a mask. The identity thief
4 wears a mask. But it's incomplete information. It's not a
5 perfect mask.

6 If we have enough information to see past that
7 mask we can stop that identity theft from occurring. It is
8 not information that is causing the crime; it's the fact
9 that the merchant, the banker, the person that is in front
10 of the thief does not have more information than the thief
11 does on his customer.

12 So the solution is to empower the merchant, the
13 banker, to have better information on his customers than
14 the thief does. Is that possible? Not only is it
15 possible, it's happening in many, if not most, cases today.

16 The credit card industry has figured it out by
17 and large because they have this tremendous network of
18 information. Because people use credit cards so much the
19 credit card companies have amassed a significant amount of
20 information. They use that information to detect identity
21 theft as it happens or shortly after it happens to keep it
22 from recurring.

23 A very interesting example of that in my own
24 life. We recently experienced a case when my family, my
25 in-laws live in upstate New York where I lived as a young

1 child and where I met my wife. We moved down here because
2 you can't find jobs in upstate New York, at least not in
3 the town where we came from. So we moved to the Washington
4 area.

5 Well, my wife was a little bit concerned that her
6 mother was spending too much time mowing the lawn so she
7 figured, let's buy dad a riding lawn mower. So we got dad
8 a nice riding lawn mower and now we can't get him to stop
9 mowing the lawn. Now, this year that's a good thing. The
10 grass is growing as fast as he cuts it. He rides that
11 riding lawn mower all around.

12 We bought that on a credit card from a place we
13 have never been before, from a lawn and garden store
14 located nearby where my in-laws live.

15 Very shortly after that purchase was made my wife
16 got a phone call. Hello, this is the Visa fraud division.
17 Did you make a significant purchase at a lawn and garden
18 store in upstate New York? My wife was very pleased to get
19 that call not because she was thinking well, why are you
20 questioning me. She said, yes, I made that purchase and
21 I'm glad somebody's watching and asking about that.

22 That's probably happened to many of you when
23 you've taken your vacation to some place you haven't been
24 before. You're checking out of the hotel and they might
25 ask you this is a little bit odd of a transaction. Is this

1 really you? And then they try to verify that it's really
2 you.

3 Now, the big credit card companies can do that
4 because they have large amounts of data. How does the
5 small guy do it? How does he have access to that kind of
6 data? Over the last decade or so we have been busy
7 creating that kind of database that the small guy can have
8 access to.

9 Through the Uniform National Standards under the
10 Fair Credit Reporting Act we have amassed the kind of
11 information that a credit card company has, that a big
12 company can use. A small company can now access that. A
13 company in any part of the country. Information can be
14 harnessed to fight identity theft to prevent the crime.

15 If you're a small merchant and you've got a
16 customer you're never seen before who wants to make a very
17 significant purchase and doesn't want to deal with a credit
18 card for some reason, maybe he knows what the credit card
19 people are doing. He wants to use your own company card.
20 He says I'll take your company card if you give me instant
21 credit. I'd like to make my purchase.

22 Well, as a small merchant I have to decide do I
23 turn away that big business or do I find the means to
24 verify whether that's a legitimate customer or not. If I
25 can verify that that's a legitimate customer I can please

1 my customer and I can compete with the big guys and I can
2 give him additional choices.

3 Today you can do that because the information is
4 shared all across the country in a uniform, standardized
5 way. I can find out whether that person is legitimate or
6 not. We can prevent the crime right there.

7 But how about if a crime has actually occurred
8 and I'm a law enforcement officer. What does my staffer do
9 who has now been victimized by identity theft? Where does
10 she go? Does she go to the Montgomery County Police? Does
11 she say, well, you know I've been victimized by identity
12 theft. Well, where did this happen? Well, it was on my
13 local department store card.

14 Well, is this a national department store? Well,
15 yes it was. Oh, but the charge took place locally? Well,
16 no, actually it took place in Illinois. Oh, well, let me
17 give you the name and number of the police department in
18 Illinois so you can get in touch with them because that's
19 where the crime took place.

20 Contact the people in Illinois. Well, this crime
21 took place there. Well, how do you know about it? Well, I
22 found out about it here in Montgomery County. Well, that's
23 in Montgomery County. How do we cooperate? How do we
24 communicate with one another? How do you get all that
25 information together?

1 Unless you have a standardized system of
2 information sharing, how do you get the information to all
3 the different law enforcement venues that identity theft
4 has occurred and has occurred in the name of so and so?
5 People ought to be on the lookout for it and can we amass
6 the different data points that might be occurring around
7 the country, because many of these identity thieves are
8 getting pretty smart and they hide behind the different
9 state boundaries to try to get away from their crime.

10 How can you put all those pieces together? You
11 can do it with the information that's available today in
12 the uniform sharing of information as well as other systems
13 that are in place using this wide national sharing of
14 information.

15 Then, of course, the third point is if you've
16 been victimized and it isn't the type of victimization by
17 somebody you know, it's somebody you don't know. It's
18 happened in who knows how many different places, how do you
19 know where it's all happening? How do you get the word out
20 to everybody, I'm not the person who had this account
21 headquartered in Peoria. I'm located here in the
22 Washington, D.C. area.

23 Unless you can instantaneously send out the
24 information put an alert on all your credit records, watch
25 for anybody who's trying to open up a new account in my

1 name, watch for anybody who's engaged in a significant
2 transaction in my name that meets the following
3 characteristics.

4 You can share that information instantaneously.
5 You can start the process of cleaning up your record. You
6 can gather the information you need to start correcting the
7 accounts that might have polluted. And you can start the
8 process by putting a stop on any further of these
9 transactions of repolluting your record, which is one of
10 the biggest problems in dealing with identity theft. You
11 get a transaction cleared up and that debt maybe has been
12 sold to another debt collector and it appears right back up
13 again.

14 Unless you have some means to get the word around
15 to wherever that debt might be sold to you're going to get
16 that information popping right back up again time after
17 time back in your record.

18 Now, in saying this I don't want to pretend that
19 the law does not need to be changed. We have been engaging
20 in the last several months in conversations with a wide
21 range of individuals, people in academia, people in law
22 enforcement, regulators, victims groups, people in business
23 and industry and we have gathered a number of tremendous
24 ideas that we're currently evaluating that deal with all
25 three aspects of this fight against identity theft.

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1
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