

FINAL MEETING SUMMARY

**HANFORD ADVISORY BOARD
Health Safety and Environmental Protection Committee Meeting
January 13, 2011
Richland, WA**

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This is only a summary of issues and actions in this meeting. It may not represent the fullness of ideas discussed or opinions given, and should not be used as a substitute for actual public involvement or public comment on any particular topic unless specifically identified as such.

Welcome and Introductions

Mike Korenko, Health Safety and Environmental Protection Committee (HSEP) vice-chair, welcomed everyone and introductions were made. The committee approved the November meeting summary.

Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS)

Keith Smith, HSEP chair, provided background on past Hanford Advisory Board (HAB or Board) activities related to Integrated Safety Management Systems (ISMS) and offered reasons why ISMS has not continually improved across the Hanford Site. He said the purpose of the following presentation is to receive an update on ISMS from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and learn what has worked and what hasn't from safety representatives.

Ed Parsons, Senior Technical Advisor to DOE-Richland Operations (RL) Environmental Health and Safety introduced himself by saying he is a Certified Health Physicist (CHP) and has worked in nuclear energy worldwide for many years. His presentation provided background on ISMS and how DOE translates their expectations for ISMS implementation to contractors.

Ed discussed the basis of ISMS as defined by Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Technical Report 16 and described how quality and safety increase when organizations use

ISMS. DNFSB Technical Report 16 provided the first definition of core functions, multi-level integration concept, and environmental as a component concept.

Ed said DOE adopted a safety management system to develop a more thorough understanding of the issues. He emphasized that the system is not just another safety program. ISMS combine efficiency with safety. Ed defined the management system as an orderly set of components that serve to accomplish one or more objectives of the organization. A system's goal may be to facilitate the flow of information, improve quality, or improve safety. However, the underlying goal of all management systems is to reduce entropy (i.e., energy expended that is not used to do work.)

Ed discussed the concept of ISMS along with the roles and responsibilities for ISMS from the DOE level through the contractor level. DOE is responsible for ISMS objectives. Subsequently, the role of DOE decreases through the implementation level, which is the responsibility of the contractor. Ed said there is quite a bit of grey area within these levels. Ed said that when you move into the mechanisms concept, the responsibilities and outcomes change depending on the contractor because mechanisms are tailored to the specific risk and work responsibilities.

Ed synthesized the main points of the policy objective of ISMS as “the Department and Contractors must systematically Integrate Safety (ES&H) into management and work practices at all levels so that missions are accomplished while protecting the public, the worker, and the environment.” Ed said there is also a sentence before this quote that states the workforce must be involved to make ISMS effective. He said that DOE sets the objective through the policy.

Ed said it was necessary to have an implementing process to propagate ISMS from the policy level to a functional format that the contractor could operate under. DOE has several contractual mechanisms it can use for this purpose and Ed said DOE mainly uses the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) clause. The DEAR clause integrates environment, safety and health into work planning and execution. ISMS manuals reemphasize the DEAR clause. Ed said another mechanism for ensuring contractors use ISMS is through profit incentives, such as the conditional payment of fee clause, which is usually in Section B. This clause is brought to the contract before the scope of the work has been determined. If contractors do not use ISMS, the head contracting authority can remove fees for failing to comply with the requirements under the DEAR clause. Ed said DOE has used this clause in the past year and will continue to use it whenever performance is below expectations.

Ed next reviewed the seven principles of ISMS: line management responsible for safety, clear roles and responsibilities, competence commensurate with responsibilities, balanced priorities, safety requirements identified, hazard controls tailored to work, and operations authorization.

Ed also described the core functions of ISMS: define scope of work, identify hazards and requirements, analyze hazards and implement controls, perform work within controls, and provide feedback and improvement.

Ed provided an overview of the status of the DOE-RL ISMS review at CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC).

Ed said there were two verification processes. In Phase I, DOE reviews the ISMS documents and determines whether the documented system will be adequate. In Phase II, field managers examine how the contractors are implementing the approved ISMS. DOE accepted the overall ISMS for CHPRC, except for the Waste Retrieval Project (WRP) portion. There were concerns about failures to deal with emergency processes, ineffective training, and other issues. DOE would not accept the ISMS for WRP until CHPRC corrected these concerns.

Ed said that after the initial Phase II review, CHPRC had the opportunity to address the concerns identified. The team found that the six corrective actions resulting from the February 2010 review at WRP had been largely implemented and effective, and DOE-RL now considers the CHPRC ISMS adequately implemented.

Ed next provided an update on the DOE-RL review of the ISMS at Mission Support Alliance (MSA). He said DOE-RL performed a combined Phase I/II verification in November and December of 2010. The review team recommended approval of the MSA ISMS. They identified one good practice (mentoring program) and four cross-cutting concerns plus one concern related to Hazard control (Nuclear Safety). The review team found roughly 100 opportunities for improvement and 20 observations, most of which are incorporated in the four cross-cutting concerns.

Ed concluded his presentation by reviewing DOE-RL's expectations from ISMS. He said DOE-RL expects mission accomplishment improvement, work that complies with standards, optimized event rates/exposure, increased worker ownership, increased safety efficiency, process improvements, and improvement in supervisor credibility.

Committee Discussion

- Keith asked if there was a mechanism in place for identifying whether contractors have robust continuous improvement mechanisms. Ed said DOE-RL has many mechanisms. He said there is an integrated evaluation plan and operational awareness (OA) program that has been effective. The OA process had 7,000 observations last year and 1,500 turned into real findings. 700 were identified as opportunities for improvement and DOE-RL also found 30-40 good practices. Ed said DOE also had formal surveillance and audit processes plus monthly performance meetings with contractors to compare how the contractors felt they were performing versus what DOE observed. Brian Harkins, Department of Energy-Office of River Protection (DOE-ORP) said there were also efforts within the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) and the Hill System plus a new lessons learned system. He said those programs were being used extensively and there was quite a bit of continuous improvement on the Hanford Site.
- Jill Molnaa, CHPRC, said all contractors have safety representatives. She asked where those representatives fit into the ISMS hierarchy Ed presented. Ed said DOE has its own

surveillance and uses opportunity awareness. He said representatives examine the daily work operations and subject matter experts (SME) look at the programmatic elements, such as fire protection systems and nuclear safety. At the bottom of the tier, contractors are responsible for their worker safety.

Contractor Safety Representative Perspectives

Jill Molnaa said they were making progress and would be continuing to improve. She said CHPRC has had challenges, such as moving from production to decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). She said the company has involved workers when issues appear in the field. Jill said the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is a good example. Work groups were put together to resolve big issues, like breaching of the glove boxes. CHPRC used outside assessments to identify root causes of problems. Jill said the work control planning process has been re-worked, but workers in the field will not see these changes because they are related to moving from production facilities to D&D. Jill talked about the Automatic Job Hazard Analysis, which is a computer program that allows workers to do a pre-job walk down and sit with a planner to analyze how to act under various scenarios.

- Keith asked if workers in the field would be able to see the changes. Jill said the field workers are still able to do their walk downs and the changes are administrative. John Jeskey said there are more requirements for involvement from planners and schedulers on the administrative side. He said the changes require more walk downs to understand what workers see in the field.
- Jill said that with the focus on D&D, the facilities are changing constantly and it can be a challenge to adapt. The facilities did not change during the production phase.
- Susan Leckband asked whether the safety representatives felt management is encouraging the fundamentals of ISMS. Jill said yes for the most part, although there were hot spots. Susan asked if Jill was getting helpful feedback from field workers. Jill said she was.

John Jesky said he recently completed the ISMS review at MSA. He said MSA is different because the company provides maintenance for the site with 12,000 maintenance workers. MSA is responsible for the roads at Hanford and fire protection. John said the biggest challenge for MSA right now is the roads because of the number of drivers. He said that all MSA workers need to be cross-trained since they work with different contractors who all perform different jobs.

John said the average age of an MSA worker is 57, which is comparatively old. He said the reason for the older work force is that most workers started at the same time and have stayed with the company. The challenge for MSA over the next few years will be to fill these positions when the current workforce retires.

John said he did not have a lot of safety concerns with MSA on the whole. He said there was a new senior management team. Communication is critical to understand the site, but it can be

tough since Hanford is such a large area with many sites. John said they are continuing to make progress. He said the older workforce is vocal and not afraid to speak out about any concerns or to use their stop work ability. John said MSA was able to get consistent respiratory protection across the site, including equipment training and proper maintenance. John complimented DOE on allowing workers to participate in unions and organizations that represent the workers.

Jill said these site-wide programs are a perfect example of continuous improvement.

John said that the unions have been asking for these programs for quite a while. He said that the beryllium was a long process covering many issues. John said he oversees the representatives from Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) and they have come a long way over the last year with the beryllium safety program. He said they had changes in management, which helped address the issue. John said they need to maintain the processes, support and communication.

Committee Discussion

- Keith asked if senior management is improving across the site. John said they were in terms of dealing with site-wide committees. He said he works with Jill frequently because his workers go into her facilities and observe some of the processes she is using. John said this is one of the reasons he would like site-wide programs. He thinks senior management is on board, although he said they sometimes need to be reminded where the emphasis should be. He said middle management was in a tough position because they deal with pressure to complete the job safely within budget while the workers want to complete the job safely.
- John said there have been problems with miscommunication about needing to either stop work or take a pause from the work. He said there are 15 site-wide committees who do not want to use pause codes. They say whenever a safety concern is raised and work should be suspended to use the phrase “stop work” no matter how much time the work suspension is expected to take.
- Rick Ennis, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), said he was originally on the Hanford Site with Bechtel and has worked throughout the site. He said these assessments get him involved across company lines and that they have been scrambling since the America Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) money became available. Rick said there has been a struggle with the interface and communications aspect plus the contractual requirements to complete the work. He said ISMS still needs to be communicated realistically at all levels from upper-management to field workers. They are trying to maintain effective communication channels, but the mechanisms are not working completely. Rick said over the last year WRPS has been working to implement ISMS across the site, but the planners who have been working at Hanford are relying on old information and not recognizing the changes that have taken place at the site over the past few years. Rick said communication is the major challenge. He said WRPS is a little lax on corrective action, but everyone is trying and management got on board in 2010.

- Jill agreed with Rick that it was a scramble at first. At CHPRC, they did their best to mentor staff and it has gotten better. She said overall the workers are more comfortable in their facility and their job.
- Keith asked about the new workers. Rick said their older workforce was very conscientious when new workers started at the site to ensure they were safe. John said MSA has not dealt with new workers very much because of their older workforce, but as workers begin retiring in the near future MSA will need to address this and it will be a challenge.
- Mike Korenko asked about DOE's failure to perform and why DOE did not use the ISMS vehicle for the beryllium issue over the past 10 years when there was continuous disease. He said DOE could have fined the contractor. Ed said that would be covered in the next presentation.
- Mike said that ISMS has failed in many cases. Two of the main failure mechanisms were related to management principles of behavior and integration. He said the optimal management principle of behavior is caring for the workers. When there are multiple layers of management, if one level does not function properly than anything below that level becomes affected. Mike is concerned that the audit looks too closely at the contractors and does not consider the overall management culture. Ed said DOE does look at management culture through a management review team. He said they use a common sense approach which tells them there are supporting and initiating principles that would not be apparent without ISMS. DOE is a big supporter of the VPP and Human Performance Improvement (HPI) processes as well as worker involvement. He said there are pockets of resistance that DOE sees and he is aware others see resistance as well. The resisters are brought to the contractor's attention and if the contractor does not follow up, DOE will step in with their tools. Ed said that newer contractors are more resistant to the approach, but they ultimately have a moment where they understand the importance and simplicity of ISMS.
- Mike asked how DOE is looking for multi-levels of control when considering multi-level integration, especially at the second level where management is assessing risk and putting together a plan for enhanced worker protection. Ed said DOE has a team that examines aspects of business and budget. DOE considers whether they are appropriately communicating with the contractor, whether they are budgeting properly for safety, if the management is knowledgeable about all the management processes, and whether roles and responsibilities are well defined.
- Laura Hanses said she had an administrative job at the site for a long time and did not see where ISMS is being applied at the administrative and process levels. Laura said that field workers receive excellent training, but the administrative piece is largely absent in the ISMS. Keith and John agreed. John said they were working on improving in that area.
- Susan said the principles and functions of ISMS all focus on a single organization and do not consider three companies working together. She appreciates hearing about the integration between John and Jill and said it is very important to integrate processes between companies because the geographic site does not recognize contract boundaries.

- Keith said HSEP should have another review in six months to see if there has been measurable improvement. He would like to hear from everyone again at that time.
- Susan said HSEP should also receive an update on the impact to ISMS of losing the ARRA workforce since in six to nine months the money will be gone. She would like to know how ISMS will move forward in the face of the reduced workforce.

Beryllium

Mike introduced the next topic. He said HSEP has been working hard to draft comments on DOE's request for comments to changes to beryllium rule-making, which will be due soon. Mike said there could be a chance to institutionalize across the process. He said data management is another piece that should be on HSEP's agenda next time.

Pete Garcia, DOE-RL, is the director of the Safety Division. He is the DOE lead for development of implementation of the corrective action plan for beryllium in response to the health and safety inspection last year. Pete provided an updated version of the presentation he gave to the full Board in November by incorporating current activities and making changes suggested by Mike. He said there was particular interest in the two affected workers that had beryllium exposures beyond the levels needed to take action and the workers newly diagnosed in 2010.

Committee Discussion

- Mike said the shortfall of the existing plan is that each contractor had their own plans that were fragmented and not integrated. He said integrating the plans under one category would be an effective mechanism. Pete said it was important to get the right people involved who understand the process. Mike said the Board should also be an integral part of the process. The language states that they should be, but he was not sure if it was an issue. He said that the Board did not need to delve into the technical details. If the Board is satisfied with the direction the plan is heading, he suggested the Board does not need to be involved.
- Susan asked what the timeline is for the action plan. Pete said the timeline is ongoing for each deliverable. Different deliverables require different amounts of time. He said DOE intends on getting everything completed by the end of the Fiscal Year (FY).

Reporting Beryllium Exposures to the DOE Beryllium Registry

Emily Millkin, WCH, gave a presentation on reporting beryllium exposures to the DOE Beryllium Registry. She is director of Safety, Health, and Policy for WCH.

Emily said WCH submitted two potential beryllium exposures above the 0.02 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ level to the June 2010 Beryllium Registry data.

Registry data submitted for these samples:

- Time Weighted sample results of $<0.021 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ and $<0.021 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ for eight hour exposures
- Reported Actual Exposures of $<0.0186 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ and $<0.0189 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ for work performed at eight hours forty three minutes and eight hours thirty one minutes respectively

Emily reviewed the WCH Beryllium registry submittal process. She said WCH identified the samples in question, contacted the lab to ensure results were correctly reported, confirmed the samples are less than the contractual limit of detection ($0.03 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$), contacted the lab to determine what was the actual limit of the analysis equipment ($0.005 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$), and recalculated the eight hour TWA ($<0.0034 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ for both sampling events) based on the limit of $0.005 \mu\text{g}/\text{sample}$.

Two Certified Industrial Hygienists conducted a third party assessment. Emily said the hygienists reviewed the sampling event and evaluated data provided by WCH. They contacted the lab and verified that the sample data provided by WCH was correct. The hygienists identified that the contractual detection limit was higher than the capability of the equipment so they discussed with the lab the actual detection limit for the equipment and verified it to be $0.005 \mu\text{g}/\text{sample}$. This third party assessment concluded that samples were below both the contractual detection limit and the actual detection limit. There were no measurable exposures to beryllium based on analytical results.

Committee Discussion

- Mike said he is concerned about using an eight hour average of beryllium (Be) exposure. He said there is a large difference if the entire amount of exposure was received in one hour. He asked whether it would be possible to limit exposures for a one hour job to 1/8 of the eight hour level. Tony James said the exposure number is a concentration limit. Mike said it is an air intake ingestion issue. Tony said Be is expressed as a concentration, which will always be an issue. Cathy McCague suggested discussing the issue at the issue manger level.
- Pete said they were lucky in this case that the exposures did not occur. He said there was not an immediate response like there should have been. Now people are much more calibrated to respond quickly to these actions levels.
- Mark Fisher, chair of Beryllium Awareness Group (BAG), said originally there were two workers exposed without respiratory levels above 0.1. He asked for clarification. Pete said that was an error made in interpreting the data.
- Mark asked if the suspected exposed workers were allowed to talk to people and what the requirements for that were. Emily said they were given the ability to talk to someone, but they did not follow through. She said that was a failure that will be captured in the Lessons Learned as the Be process evolves.

- Mark said that, coming from a medical professional perspective, a time-weighted average is not effective for gauging Be exposure because it requires only one exposure. He said they do not believe in an eight hour time-weighted average for affected workers because that approach will indicate the worker was not exposed. Tony asked if Mark would prefer using a threshold. Mark said there does have to be practical criteria for running a sample. Emily said that can be done using Radiological Control (RADCON).
- Tony asked if the Be registry was the affected worker registry. Emily said it was the official registry.

Chris Hoffman, epidemiologist for AdvanceMed Hanford (AMH), gave a presentation titled analyzing newly sensitized beryllium workers for FY10.

Chris said there were sixteen newly diagnosed Beryllium Sensitized workers in FY10. He said four diagnosed on initial screening for Be work clearance had no prior Hanford work history, but significant other DOE/Department of Defense (DOD) work history. These workers were previously employed in facilities such as Palo Verde, Shearon Harris, and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) where they moved Be waste containers and participated in non-Hanford radioactive waste disposal. Two of the workers had prior Hanford work history and potential significant non-Hanford DOE/DOD experience. These workers were previously employed in facilities such as INL from 1989-1993 and the U.S. Navy. Ten had prior Hanford work history and no potential for significant non-Hanford DOE/DOD experience.

Chris presented a chart showing the occupations of the 12 workers with Hanford history prior to diagnosis. There were two occupations that were more common among workers than others: radiation control technicians and nuclear chemical or process operators.

Chris discussed the buildings and areas that workers with previous Hanford work history indicated they had experience. He said all of the top ten buildings were already suspected of being Be facilities. There were some buildings which were only mentioned once. Chris thought these may have been the result of errors or typos.

Chris provided an update on newly diagnosed workers. He said these workers were given the Be work history questionnaire to investigate potential sources of their Be exposure. Responses were/will be added to the current database that is analyzed on a quarterly basis. This database is analyzed for new trends that may be appearing in the newly diagnosed workers. Workers are also interviewed by the case managers and the Site Occupational Medical Director to obtain additional useful work history data.

Chris gave an analysis of newly diagnosed workers. He said AMH is laying the groundwork and improving data collection methods to allow for better analysis. Chris said AMH implemented a newly revised work history questionnaire on January 1, 2011. The analysis is due in May. Chris said AMH is conducting in-depth work history interviews of Be affected workers using an industrial hygienist. AMH is drafting additional questions for inclusion in the interview and will be asking the BAG for feedback. This analysis is due in September.

Committee Discussion

- Mike asked if any of the workers were ARRA workers. Chris said that four were workers new to Hanford, but he was not sure whether they were brought in through ARRA.
- Mike asked what a single positive meant. Chris said it is based on the current flow chart and what it means to be desensitized. He said the single positive is not included in the numbers presented here because it is not included in people being desensitized. Sandy added that workers who had single positives cannot do work where they might be exposed to Be.
- Mike asked about the people on the border line with single positives. He said there was a very small data set and wondered why the single positives were not being tracked anymore. Chris said he would have to check on that. Pete said they were going to be re-interviewing all the affected workers. Chris said these affected workers to be interviewed included workers other than just the new cases, which will give them more data to use for the analysis. Mike said he would rather look at a new single positive who has not been at Hanford before because that would tell them if there is a Be facility they need to know about.
- Liz asked if the committee could have a copy of the questionnaire that was mentioned during the presentation. She also asked for a copy of the interview questions. Chris said the questionnaire is on the AMH Be webpage and he will send a copy. He said the interview is not developed yet.
- Keith asked Sandy if he was able to follow-up on the employee representative at the last meeting who wanted a blood test. Sandy said he did check on that. The woman was spoken to and received information. Sandy said he knows there was corrective action taken.
- Sandy asked if their algorithm was sensitive to business. He said it was undergoing further change and had shifted from a year ago. He said it was worth looking at how complex it is.

Beryllium Rule-Making

- Mike said he and Keith assimilated draft comments on the rule-making and asked the committee to review their comments and add if they have additional ones. He would like to bring it to the Board as it is a timely topic. Keith said consensus would be valuable, as they prefer to have it as a draft letter and not create formal advice. Susan said she thought a letter would be better because in order to do advice, it would be incumbent on them to educate the board and reach a consensus. Mike said they would still need to reach a consensus in HSEP and that the letter would still follow the same process as advice, except the agencies would not be required to respond. Cathy said that if HSEP adjusted the format to make it easier to read and put it in letter format, it should be fine. Mike said they will assimilate comments into the draft letter and asked committee members to send comments back to himself and Keith. Then they will send comments to Cathy, who will send it out to the full committee. Cathy said she will emphasize to the HAB that they are

commenting on a document and not advice. Tony said he thought the agencies were requesting pretty formal comments and not simply opinion. He said they were looking for supported statements.

The committee reached consensus to bring a letter to the full Board on the proposed Be rule-making.

Medical Support Contractor Draft Advice

- Mike introduced the Medical Support Contractor draft advice. He said the genesis of this advice came from a meeting they were invited to at DOE. Mike said it was positive that DOE asked the Board to get involved so early in the process. DOE subsequently decided they would appreciate full advice from the Board on the request for proposal (RFP) for the medical support contractor. He said it was not a simple issue and they tried to be cognizant of the relative roles and limitations contractors face. Mike said Cathy emailed the draft advice previously and it had gone through several stages of editing. He asked for new comments and mentioned that the advice needed committee consensus.
- Roger Pressentin introduced himself as the lead for DOE in the RFP process. Russell Walker is from the DOE-RL contracting office for procurement.
- Laura asked when the RFP was coming out. Roger said that the contract is complex and many people are involved. He said he is dealing with procurement sensitive information, and appreciates the Board's sensitivity to that. He said the Draft RFP will be out in the spring. Roger said last October they researched who could perform the work. The current contract ends on September 30, 2013 (if all the extensions are exercised). He said that DOE would appreciate comments from HAB on the draft RFP and thanked the committee for inviting him to hear their conversations on the topic.
- Susan Leckband asked if the advice would be more useful after the draft RFP comes out or if the Board could offer advice both before and after. Roger said he would really appreciate advice now. He said DOE's goals are aligned with the Board's for a healthy workforce.
- Mike provided some information about the advice. He said they asked DOE to clarify contractor roles, which would lead to a crispness that would help with the RFP. He suggested working towards finding an agreement early to avoid fighting and blaming others in the future. Mike went through the advice bullets to provide background for Roger and Russell.
 - #3 – The medical support contractor should be an active member of the site worker health team and take an active role in site objectives.
 - #4 – He said the sub-bullets are self-explanatory
 - #5 – Mike said this was a very important point. DOE should require leadership of the prospective medical provider to exhibit principles of behavior like caring for employees, which is hard to gauge from written responses. He said determining

the level of care requires oral interviews and testing, such as using case testing. He said it is a qualitative determination.

- Roger agreed that key personnel are important and that situational awareness interviews are very revealing and can be quite useful. Mike added that having the right leadership skills can be more important than the person's credentials. He said that doctors are good, but leadership skills are crucial.
- Marjorie said that the previous contractors did not work easily with medical staff. She said it is important to put forth to the contractors that they share responsibility for their worker's health. She stressed the importance of sharing information with the medical group and not hiding things. She said working as a team is very important as is including the staff in safety meetings. Marjorie added that at sites with only one contractor, like Rocky Flats, the contractor also acted as the medical team. The contractor was entirely responsible for the employees, which is much easier to do. That has never happened at Hanford.
- Liz asked about how workers rights are communicated and what their medical rights are when they require medical treatment. She said there have been issues in the past where an advocate sits in on medical appointments, but the worker does not know who they are or why they are there. Tom Carpenter asked if the patient should have a right to see the doctor without having someone from the company there. Marjorie said she had never heard of a contractor sitting in on a medical appointment, but she has heard of people requesting union members to be with them. Tom said it is standard procedure for a contractor to send someone with the worker to the appointment. He is not clear whether the worker has control over that. Sandy said someone always goes to medical appointments with workers, but he is not sure if they go into the exam with that worker. Marjorie said that would violate the Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. She said they could use an ombudsman and give the patient the choice of having an independent ombudsman. The employee would have the right to determine who is with them for medical appointments and whether they would like an ombudsman.

Liz and Mike will work on drafting a new advice bullet on a patient ombudsman. Cathy will send out a revised draft with the new bullet for the committee to review. Mike proposed adding back in a previous bullet on integration of the medical contractor with other site contractors. The committee agreed to the advice and the addition of these two advice bullets and decided to come to consensus over email.

Committee Business

The committee discussed the six month workplan. They decided to tentatively schedule a tank farm tour in March with the Tank Waste Committee, which EnviroIssues will coordinate through Pamela McCann, DOE-Office of River Protection.

Tom said the committee should add the series of chemical exposures at 222-S Lab to the March workplan. Mike said the tour would not leave much time for other topics.

HSEP agreed to bring two items to the February Board meeting – medical contractor advice and the beryllium letter. Barb Wise, MSA, suggested and Cathy concurred, that Keith and Mike review past Board letters to ensure their beryllium letter meets the intent of the Board’s process on letters. Cathy noted that the letter sounds like policy advice and that at the Board meeting, members may suggest the letter be advice. Keith said the letter must come out of committee as a final product.

Attendees

HAB Members and Alternates

Tom Carpenter (phone)	Laura Hanses	Tony James
Mike Korenko	Susan Leckband	Liz Mattson
Keith Smith	Margery Swint	

Others

Brian Harkins, DOE-ORP	Erika Holmes, Ecology	Chris Hoffman, AMH
Pamela McCann, DOE-ORP		Chris O’Leary, AMH
Paula Call, DOE-RL		Sandy Rock, AMH
Pete Garcia, DOE-RL		Mark Fisher, BAG Chairman
Ed Parsons, DOE-RL		Jill Molnaa, CH2M PRC/HAMTC
Roger Pressentin, DOE-RL		John Jeskey, HAMTC/MSA
Russell Walker, DOE-RL		Nicole Addington, EnviroIssues
		Hillary Johnson, EnviroIssues
		Cathy McCague, EnviroIssues
		Paul Kruger, MSA/Safety
		Frances Aiston, WCH/URS
		Peter Bengtson, WCH
		Emily Millikin, WCH
		Mike Peterson, WCH
		John Britton, WRPS
		Rick Ennis, WRPS