[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]
August 7, 2003
The Honorable Spencer Abraham
Secretary of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585-1000
Dear Secretary Abraham:
For a number of years, the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (Board) has emphasized the need for a sustained and
significant commitment to nuclear criticality safety. The Board has stressed the value of proactive rather than
reactive initiatives as key elements in the enhancement of nuclear criticality
safety throughout the Department of Energy’s (DOE) defense nuclear
complex. The Board formally
communicated its concerns regarding criticality safety in Recommendation 97-2, Continuation
of Criticality Safety at Defense Nuclear Facilities in the Department of Energy.
The Board is satisfied with DOE’s progress
on the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 97-2, and views closure of the
recommendation to be appropriate. The
Board is closing Recommendation 97-2 because the specific actions outlined in
DOE’s Implementation Plan have been completed.
Through these actions DOE has significantly enhanced its Nuclear
Criticality Safety Program. However,
the Board remains concerned with the endurance of these enhancements.
In particular, the Board is concerned about
DOE’s ability to continue conducting criticality experiments, which are
essential to maintaining analytical capabilities within the Nuclear Criticality
Safety Program. Senior DOE Management
must ensure that this experiment capability remains viable. If the proposed relocation of the Los Alamos
Critical Experiments Facility is pursued, it must be orchestrated carefully to
minimize any disruption in DOE’s ability to conduct these experiments.
The Board is also concerned with the quality
of the training and qualification programs for criticality safety engineers, as
well as levels of staffing at each site.
For example, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National
Laboratory do not have approved contractor training and qualification plans. In addition, DOE has been slow to fill key
positions for federal criticality safety engineers at the Los Alamos Site
Office. These shortcomings must be
addressed aggressively if the progress achieved in DOE’s Nuclear Criticality
Safety Program is to be preserved.
As discussed in the Board’s technical report
Criticality Safety at Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities
(DNFSB/TECH-29) DOE and its contractors must continue to ensure that
criticality safety engineers are aware of the day-to-day operations in their
facilities. This is a key component of
Integrated Safety Management, as familiarity with daily operations and
processes is crucial to the criticality safety engineers’ involvement in the
identification and analysis of hazards, the development of controls, and the
feedback and improvement process.
The recently developed DOE standard Self-Assessment
Standard for DOE Contractor Criticality Safety Programs (DOE-STD-1158-2002)
provides guidance for formal and rigorous contractor self-assessments, but
limited data exist regarding the standard’s application. The Board is concerned that DOE is not
aggressively reviewing these self-assessments to ensure that all contractors
are meeting the intent of the standard.
Further, the Board wishes to emphasize that DOE must maintain strong
oversight of nuclear criticality safety at all sites. This oversight should include establishing a requirement for
DOE-Headquarters personnel to conduct periodic trending and analysis of
nonreportable, as well as reportable, criticality-related occurrences across
the complex, using data collected by each site.
More generally, the Board continues to
monitor closely DOE’s management of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program,
including the apparent difficulties DOE has experienced in maintaining stable
funding for the program. It is
essential that responsibility and accountability for the management and funding
of this cross-cutting program, which affects all of DOE’s nuclear programs,
remain at the most senior management levels, ensuring that the program will remain
vigorous.
Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(d), the Board hereby establishes an
annual reporting requirement on the status of DOE’s Nuclear Criticality Safety
Program. The first annual report will
be due within 1 month of the close of this calendar year. The enclosure to this letter provides an
outline of the specific aspects of nuclear criticality safety that each annual
report should address, at a minimum. In
addition to these items, the first annual report should include the results of
a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of the actions DOE has taken to
improve nuclear criticality safety in response to Recommendation 97-2,
DNFSB/TECH-29, and the Board’s letter of July 20, 2001, with particular
attention to whether these improvements have been institutionalized within the
Nuclear Criticality Safety Program.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
c:
Mr. David H. Crandall
Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.
Enclosure
Enclosure
Specific
Subjects to be Addressed in the
Department
of Energy’s Annual Reports on Nuclear Criticality Safety
The Department of Energy’s (DOE) annual
reports on nuclear criticality safety should address, at a minimum, the
following items: