[DOE LETTERHEAD]
National
Nuclear Security Administration
February 8, 2005
The Honorable John T. Conway
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20004-2901
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for your November 3, 2004,
letter on the Device Assembly Facility (DAF). �Ambassador Brooks asked me to respond to you.
In your letter, you expressed concern regarding concurrent
operations of existing and future mission activities at the DAF on the Nevada
Test Site with respect to facility design, modern nuclear safety requirements,
critical Safety Management Programs (SMPs), and facility infrastructure. �The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
is planning to increase the scope and operational tempo of activities at the
DAF. �We will continue to ensure that
hazards are properly identified and analyzed and that the SMPs and engineered
safety features credited in the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) are able to
safely support the proposed activities prior to authorization.
The scope of the current DAF DSA
includes such activities as subcritical experiment operations, glovebox operations
to support Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) and
storage of material, including receipt and storage of TA-18 nuclear materials. �The criticality experiments mission and the
downdraft table operations were not sufficiently defined for explicit inclusion
and require additiona1 DSA analysis. �The
downdraft table analysis is now complete and in the review process. �The Criticality Experiment Facility (CEF)
project is developing a preliminary DSA for the missions transferring from Los
Alamos National Laboratory, scheduled for completion in March 2005. �The current DAF scope of work does not include
interim criticality experiment or weapon dismantlement activities.
NNSA
and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory understand that nuclear operations demand a high
level of technical competence, analysis and documentation rigor, appropriate
physical systems and administrative processes, and increased federal oversight.
�We recognize the transition to
compliance with nuclear safety requirements mandates a change to the way DAF
had been operated. �As
summarized in
the enclosed report and detailed in the Safety Basis Implementation Plan
(DAF-PLN-MG-15) dated June 2004 (previously provided to your office), there is
a clear understanding of the path forward, supported both nuclear safety by a
sound technical basis and a strong management commitment to and programmatic
success in support of DAF activities.
Our vision of the DAF as a fully
subscribed Category 2 nuclear facility supporting vital national security
missions with a management and operational nuclear safety culture that is
established and maintained to the highest standards is well under way. �Resolutely focused on this course and in the
context of the security and safety posture of the NNSA complex, we will not
begin programmatic work until we assure the integrity and robustness of the DAF
safety basis. �Both NNSA
and LLNL are
committed to this vision and believe that the rigorous processes established
haw, and will continue to identify and address any deficiencies in the DAF, its
equipment, or safety management programs.
NNSA will continue to work with
your staff to ensure continued communication. �Please call me at 202-586-2179 if you have
additional questions.
Sincerely,
Everet H. Beckner
Deputy Administrator
�
for Defense Programs
cc: ��L. Brooks, NA-1
J.
Paul, NA-2
J. McConnell, NA-2.1