DIRECT SUPERVISION JAILS: INTERVIEWS WITH ADMINISTRATORS

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FOREWORD

In 1981, Contra Costa County, California, opened the first county jail facility designed and constructed to be operated as a podular/direct supervision (new generation) jail. Since that time, the National Institute of Corrections has worked very closely with other jurisdictions which have opted for this design and inmate management style for their new facilities.

For the first few years, much of the information available was based on the success of three direct supervision Federal Metropolitan Correctional Centers (M.C.C.s) opened in the 1970s. Of the three, the Chicago M.C.C. was perhaps the most influential because it combined a podular design—cells configured around a unit dayroom—with the direct supervision concept. It was also this facility that in many ways served as the model for Contra Costa.

Now there are at least a dozen podular/direct supervision county jails in operation and at least twice that many in design and construction. The question of whether the concept has applicability to local detention appears to have been answered,

The interviews contained in this volume are a mix of measured and candid responses by administrators of direct supervision facilities. They are case studies in capsule form, which should provide valuable insights to planners and administrators who may be considering a podular/direct supervision facility for their jursidictions.

Raymond C.. Brown, Director National Institute of Corrections

Intro<u>duction</u>

Podular/direct supervision jails (often called "New Generation" jails) have gained increasing acceptance in the last five years from local jurisdictions and national correctional organizations. The concept has been endorsed by the National Institute of Corrections Advisory Board, the American Correctional Association, the American Jail Association, and the American Institute of Architecture's Committee on Architecture for Justice.

"New generation" jails have a podular architectural design and utilize direct supervision of inmates rather than remote or intermittent inmate surveillance. Instead of cells arranged along corridors as in traditional jail design, housing units in podular/ direct supervision jails are grouped into manageable units or pods arranged around a common, multipurpose area. Each unit is staffed by one officer, who is in direct control of approximately 40 to 50 The direct supervision philosophy is based on the conviction that consistent application of specific supervision principles can effectively prevent inmates' most common negative Advocates of direct supervision also believe that jails behavi ors. should be designed to facilitate the enactment of these principles. Data gathered to analyze the success of podular/direct supervision jails indicate sharp reductions in vandalism, escape, disturbances, suicides, murders, and sexual and aggravated assaults.

Although podular supervision jails have received considerable attention in the corrections field in recent years, this publication is the first to provide details of the experiences of specific jurisdictions in developing and operating such facilities. To obtain this information, staff of the NIC Information Center recorded telephone interviews with administrators of eleven direct supervision jails around the country during October and November, 1986. The texts of those interviews, edited for clarity and consistency, make up this publication. A list of administrators interviewed, along with their addresses and telephone numbers, is provided in Appendix A.

Most of the administrators interviewed were surprisingly candid about their experiences, willing to point both to their errors and their successes. They addressed the difficulties they faced in implementing

W. Ray Nelson, Michael O'Toole, Barbara Krauth, and Coralie G. Whitmore, "Direct Supervision Models." <u>Corrections Information</u> Series. U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections information Center, May 1984, p. 23.

direct supervision and the tactics they employed in responding to problems that arose. All remained extremely positive about the overall success of the direct supervision approach.

Each interview was based on the same general framework of questions, although follow-up questions varied depending on the responses received to the initial questions. The basic questions elicited the administrators' response to the following:

- o The background factors that led to the original decision to make the facility a direct supervision jail;
- o The best and worst decisions made with respect to opening the facility;
- o The best and worst decisions made with respect to the early operation of the facility;
- o The problems experienced in dealing with administrators, direct supervision staff, first-line supervisors, support staff, and inmates;
- o The type of training provided to staff;
- o What things the administrator wished he or she had known before the process began;
- o What changes the administrator would recommend if he or she were to go through the process again; and
- o The administrator's opinion about the single most important factor determining the success of a direct supervision jail.

Despite the range of experiences evident in the interviews, some common threads run throughout them. For example, the administrators consistently emphasized two things: 1) the importance of maintaining the philosophy of direct supervision, and 2) the need for training of staff in that philosophy and the skills necessary to implement it prior to opening the facility.

Other themes also recur repeatedly. While some of those interviewed emphasized important issues precisely because they had failed to attend to them in their own planning, others pointed to the same issues because they had successfully addressed them. In any case, the administrators frequently reiterated the importance of the following:

- Ensuring adequate planning time prior to opening;
- Budgeting for a transition team with full-time responsibility for planning the transition;
- Attending to design and operational issues as well as to the direct supervision philosophy;
- O Checking and re-checking all systems; and
- Addressing the safety concerns of line officers.

Points Emphasized in the Interviews

Planning Issues

The importance of a long lead-in time between planning and occupying a facility is consistently emphasized in the interviews. In addition, a number of administrators point to the desirability of having a "transition team" whose only responsibility is to plan and manage the transition to a new facility. Contra Costa, California, the first system to adopt direct supervision on a county level, found that it was important not only to have a transition team but also to orient the rest of the staff to the activities of the team in order to prevent isolation of the transition team and to encourage support for the new philosophy on the part of the rest of the staff.

Visiting other facilities obviously had a strong impact on the planning process and decisions made in many of these jurisdictions. In some cases, visits to Federal Metropolitan Correctional Centers (M.C.C.s) or other direct supervision facilities led directly to the decision to develop a facility specifically designed to utilize direct supervision. In other cases, administrators incorporated in their planning what they learned from visits to jails that were encountering problems in making the transition to a new facility. Both groups of administrators strongly advocate in these interviews that policy makers and staff visit other facilities before designing and/or opening a new jail.

Related to the importance of planning is the problem of accurately forecasting inmate population. Several of these institutions were overcrowded soon after (one immediately upon) opening. Contra Costa, Erie, Middlesex, and Pima Counties needed larger facilities almost from the beginning. Middlesex County had a 40 percent population increase in six months; its facility was designed to hold 323 inmates, but the county now houses over 500 inmates, some in older facilities.

Because of the costs associated with construction, it is important to try to build at a capacity level that will meet the needs of the jurisdiction for years to come. Unfortunately, all population forecasting methods have a degree of error attached to them. In addition, jails tend to be capacity-driven systems: as they are built, they are filled. Planners need to recognize this fact and to incorporate it into the way they project populations, design facilities, and plan for staff.

Physical Plant Issues

A central aspect of facility planning is designing the physical plant and the internal systems to operate it. Administrators voice a range of objections to the plans of their facilities, from a lack of interface between a computerized booking system and other computer programs (Larimer County, Colorado) to the fact that the court holding and transfer holding areas are too small (Multnomah County, Oregon.)

The problems experienced by Erie County, New York, and the Manhattan House of Detention (formerly the infamous "Tombs") stemmed in part from the fact that the facilities were opened before they were completed. Tom Barry, who was the administrator at Manhattan when that facility was renovated, notes a large number of problems in the design of the facility. He points out the advisability of including someone on the planning board who has recently been involved in the operational aspects of a facility.

The administrators' comments on the operational, design, and physical aspects of their facilities (which should be studied closely on an individual basis) point again to the importance of allowing adequate planning time before the facility is constructed and of testing systems before the facility is opened.

Personnel Issues

o Direct Supervision Staff

Seven of the eleven respondents indicate that their facility's staff had at least initial adjustment problems. Not surprisingly, fear is at the root of many officers' difficulties in moving to a direct supervision facility. Trained and experienced in working only indirectly with inmates in traditional linear/intermittent supervision facilities, they are understandably apprehensive about being in direct

and solo contact all day with inmates. Most of those interviewed indicate that initial adjustment problems were eventually overcome and that officers now greatly prefer direct to indirect supervision. Their comments also suggest that many potential problems could be avoided through training.

Middlesex County, New Jersey, among other jurisdictions, experienced high turnover among staff in the beginning, and Rod Bottoms of Larimer County maintains that, initially, 'you might as well plan on up to 80 percent of your personnel leaving"; he believes that if officers have previously worked in linear/indirect supervision jails, they cannot adjust to direct supervision. Bottoms points out that high rates of attrition among security staff have been reduced in his jurisdiction through emphasizing professionalism and by hiring career-minded people who "know that there is, with the direct supervision jail, a field wide open in which to excel."

In addition to initial concerns about their safety, officers find they must cope with a sense of isolation--of being, as one administrator puts it, "as locked up as the inmates." After working in situations that included two or three other officers at all times, many officers find working alone in a pod difficult. This problem emphasizes the need to anticipate the changes in officers' social environment and to address the issue in training.

A different staff issue mentioned is the need for officers to adjust to a different way of relating to inmates. As R. J. Hagman of Vancouver, British Columbia, puts it, "It was the conceptual thing we had to deal with, the soft environment, and the need for politeness and courtesy toward the prisoners' and the demand that prisoners, in turn, be polite and courteous—the basic civilities that we seem to have gotten away from . . . We readopted those things; they work."

The question of whether it is more effective to use new officers or those accustomed to indirect supervision is not resolved in these interviews. Most staff in these facilities came from other facilities and were working in direct supervision for the first time. Although Sara Heatherly of Dade County, Florida, suggests that that facility perhaps made a mistake in utilizing new, inexperienced officers, Vancouver, which also hired mostly new officers, had no special problems. Despite the initial sense of Contra Costa County's administrators that only new personnel would be successful, according to Larry Ard, "old timers . . . reluctantly began working overtime and discovered that their skills, developed through years of dealing with the public, were directly applicable to the direct supervision model."

o First-Line Supervisors

Nearly all of the administrators indicate that their facilities have had problems with first-line supervisors. One reason for difficulties in this area, says Russell Davis of Pima County, Arizona, is that first-line supervisors have not "learned to supervise by remote control." He points out that as soon as the supervisor enters a housing module, the focus in the module changes, resulting in an inaccurate picture of the environment. Instead of trying to maintain their traditional approach, supervisors need to develop the ability to rely on subtle indicators of an officer's success or lack of it.

The larger problem, perhaps, is that in moving to a direct supervision facility, the role of first-line supervisors changes significantly. No longer are they responsible for overseeing the day-to-day decisions and actions of correctional officers. Indeed, as Rod Bottoms points out, the pod officers themselves become, in effect, first-line supervisors: "they make decisions, they plan, they need interpersonal skills." Because of this, first-line supervisors have difficulty identifying what their own roles should be.

New training programs are currently being implemented, including one supported by the National Institute of Corrections, which focus on identifying and preparing staff for appropriate roles as first-line supervisors.

0 Support Staff

Like security staff, support staff are sometimes initially uneasy about entering the housing module with inmates, according to those interviewed. Sara Heatherly says that the inmates at Dade County, Florida, tended to make more demands on support staff under direct supervision, especially maintenance staff, because their pride in the new facility made them emphasize upkeep as they hadn't before.

In addition, some administrators point to unexpected problems between support and security staff arising from a lack of understanding of each other's roles. Middlesex County addressed this problem by implementing joint training of corrections officers and psychologists, social workers, and other support staff.

o <u>Unions</u>

Although the interviews did not request information about unions, a few administrators mentioned significant problems relating to unions. In Erie County, New York, for example, union problems arose over staffing patterns that added to corrections officers' sense of isolation, despite the fact that those patterns had been established in conjunction with a number of professional organizations. The union also began to affect the staff's sense of security a few months after the facility opened. According to Joe Gallagher, Superintendent of the Erie County Detention Center, union/management problems are now being cleared up.

In the Manhattan House of Detention, on the other hand, the staff, which had been trained extensively in the principles of direct supervision, defended the facility in the face of union attacks based on its "soft" environment.

Inmates

Most of the administrators report no trouble with inmates' adjustment to direct supervision. Eight of the eleven respondents suggest that they had few, if any, real problems with inmates adjusting to direct supervision. In many facilities, inmates tended to test all rules in the beginning, but once they understood that the environment was both "fair and demanding," problems ceased. Multnomah County developed a videotape specifically designed to orient inmates to the facility, which smoothed the transition significantly.

Bill Harper of Snohomish County, Washington, refers to coordinating the inmates' transition as "the quietest, easiest thing that I've ever done in my entire life." Arthur Wallenstein of Bucks County, Pennsylvania notes that the "whole dynamic has changed" under direct supervision and says that discipline problems have declined dramatically. Russell Davis mentions the importance of dealing honestly with inmates in these facilities and of telling them in advance of changes in policy that will affect them.

Training

The importance of budgeting to provide adequate training is repeatedly emphasized throughout the interviews. The decision made by nearly all these jurisdictions to provide training for all staff prior to opening the facility is cited by many administrators as one of the best decisions made.

The subjects covered in staff training varied among the jurisdictions, but all training programs included interpersonal communications and training in the principles and dynamics of direct supervision. Some jurisdictions utilized the training offered by NIC and, in some instances, those who received the initial training were trainers who later provided the actual training to new staff. The NIC training emphasizes the direct supervision operational philosophy, rather than training in specific procedures, which must be developed by the In some places, everyone assigned to the jurisdiction itself. facility went through the same training, regardless of position or This approach helped to encourage camaraderie participants, according to administrators, and provided an opportunity for staff to get acquainted with one another before they moved into the facility.

A long time between completing and opening the facility is recommended by many of those interviewed not only to train the staff in the philosophy of direct supervision but also to familiarize them with the building itself. In at least one county, Vancouver, training was provided on-site for six weeks before any prisoners were taken. In Manhattan, training was ongoing in the early stages, which allowed staff to learn the facility before being left alone on a post.

The value of having staff gain hands-on experience is highlighted in these interviews. Larry Ard says that despite required classroom training, staff at Contra Costa started to revert to earlier practices once the facility actually opened. As he puts it, "Classroom training is vital, but it must be followed by actual practice, practice, and more practice." Some administrators arrange for their staff to obtain hands-on experience at another direct supervision facility. Robert Skipper of Multnomah County describes how 40 percent of his staff spent several days at Contra Costa, actually working alongside the Contra Costa staff at their posts.

A number of those interviewed emphasize that training is important not only in the beginning, but as an ongoing effort, so that new staff also receive training as they are hired. Manhattan's unit management concept, which created small teams within the jail, is another approach credited by Tom Barry as a way of inculcating the values of direct supervision in new staff. Pima County, Arizona, has implemented a Corrections Training Officers Program, which provides a link between classroom academic training and actual work in a housing module. The program is a formalized process that provides specific learning in phases, and it has been successful at making officers comfortable, cutting staff attrition, and dramatically lowering the number of confrontations between inmates and staff.

Opening the Facility

The eleven jurisdictions used a variety of approaches in opening and beginning to operate these facilities. The results suggest the importance of planning carefully for the transition process.

At Pima County, Arizona, the staff moved all inmates into the facility in one day and began operating it at once. At the time they chose this approach it was against all advice, but administrators believed that they could not afford to staff two buildings for more than one day. With sufficient advance preparation, a one-day move can be successful, says Russell Davis, and Pima's approach has since become a model for some other institutions. On the other hand, the Erie County facility was opened in stages as it was completed, because this approach saved money over waiting through construction delays until the building was completed. Although Joe Gallagher feels that this was a good decision overall, the move into an incomplete facility did cause problems, including two escapes attributed to inadequacies in the security envelope and security systems.

The Manhattan House of Detention was also occupied before construction was finished; the central control room was incomplete, there were no communications systems, and the doors wouldn't close. This meant that officers were often alone in an area with no means of contact except on-site observations by their supervisors. According to Tom Barry, excellent training enabled them to control the institution despite these difficulties. However, Barry calls the decision to open the facility prior to completion one of the worst decisions made.

Following NIC guidelines, the Middlesex County Adult Detention Center took time in opening the facility and based its new policies and procedures on a scenario approach. Units at Middlesex were opened one at a time, according to Anthony Pellicane, director of the facility. Administrators worked with a set of officers and inmates in one unit and then took half the officers and half the inmates from that unit to open the next unit. Multnomah County used a similar approach, which is designed to provide a smooth transition for new officers and inmates.

Dade County is using direct supervision in temporary facilities at present. Its new jail will be in operation by 1988. In occupying the temporary facilities, the inmates who had been involved in constructing the buildings were moved in first because of their sense of ownership for the facility, thus establishing a more positive environment for the inmates who followed.

Public Relations

The image of podular/direct supervision facilities, with their "normalized" environments, is often stereotyped by the public as "soft," "country-club-like." This attitude can create problems for administrators, especially during periods when criminal justice is emphasizing punishment over rehabilitation. Dependent on the public and on other officials for budgetary and political support, administrators have difficulties when their facilities are perceived, as R. J. Hagman of Vancouver says his is described, as "Hagman's Hilton North." Jurisdictions with podular/direct supervision jails need to find ways to convince the public that their philosophy of corrections is effective.

One way of improving public perceptions, used by Multnomah and Bucks Counties, was to "incarcerate" some members of the community overnight before the facility opened. This approach not only provided good training for officers, who were given an opportunity to test the systems in the facility, but was an excellent public relations tool. Arthur Wallenstein of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, points out that this simulated incarceration created "immediate community acceptance of the facility, which might otherwise have been characterized as something that was a little too good for prisoners."

Trips to other direct supervision facilities can also increase community acceptance, especially if media representatives are involved. Before the decision was made to build a new direct supervision facility in Dade County, Florida, architects and local officials toured some direct supervision facilities and, upon their return, participated in radio and television programs. Following this, county commissioners, accompanied by representatives of the media, also visited some direct supervision facilities. An account of the tour was reported in The Miami Herald, thus enlightening the community on the issue even before facility planning was complete.

Conclusion: The Success of the Concept

Despite the differing experiences of the administrators interviewed and despite the range of problems they identify, there is clearly no question in the minds of any about the overall success of the direct supervision concept. Although the interviews were not undertaken to solicit endorsements for direct supervision, the universally positive responses of the administrators interviewed might well convince others who are still skeptical -about the efficacy of the approach.

The following comments, taken verbatim from the interviews, summarize the attitudes of all these administrators toward direct supervision:

- o I believe that one can pay lip service to direct supervision, but one of the things you have to look at is its success. As successes, I could tell you that we've had one escape from our jail, a walkaway trustee; we've had one death in our jail, which resulted from natural causes; we've had four attempted suicides, all without success; we have had no major riots. You can call that luck, but I call it success. And it's got to be because of direct supervision. (Rod Bottoms, Larimer County)
- o I am convinced that the softer the environment in a minimum or medium security institution, the more manageable the inmate population is... We have people from all over the country visit here, and when they observe our positive staff-inmate interaction and the lack of tension in the facility, they just walk out of here shaking their heads. (Joe Gallagher, Erie County)
- o . . . I've been in the jail business 19 years. I started as a correction officer and worked my way through the ranks to warden, and in those years, I have become something of a cynic; that's what will happen to you in this business. A lot of people talk about doing wonderful things . . . and for the most part I have found all that to be mainly rhetoric. The direct supervision jail is the only real, physical application that is available today that expresses the stated philosophy of how we want to run jails in the United States. That's my opinion. It can turn you from being a cynic. It really is a positive, positive step. (Tom Barry, Manhattan House of Detention)

INTERVIEWS

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CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MAIN DETENTION FACILITY

Respondent: Larry R. Ard

Chief Deputy

Contra Costa County Main Detention Facility

Martinez, California

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: Low-rise, four-story maximum security

institution

Architect: Kaplan, McLaughlin and Diaz


Capacity: 386 Size: 186,000 sq. ft.

Cost: **\$24,500,000**

Opening Date: January 17, 1981

Staffing -- Security: 143

Program 23 Support: 50 Medical: 65



What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

After many years of negative reports from the State Board of Corrections, the grand jury, and selected citizens' committees, the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors elected in 1972 to proceed with the planning and construction of a new detention facility. A local architect was selected who had designed other county buildings, and work proceeded on the new facility.

The process of determining an appropriate design for the facility was very traditional. Everyone knew how a jail was supposed to be designed; they had the 1902 facility as a model. Little research was conducted, travel to other facilities was limited, and staff input was exclusively from the sheriff's department command staff. The final plans called for a traditional, linear jail with twelve-man gang cells, each emptying into a small dayroom. The one staff member for each floor of 200 inmates would be confined in a control room, with video cameras monitoring the hallways. The design was unique, in that the single staff member could not, from his planned location, view a single inmate.

After two years of planning, at an expense of \$1,250,000, the plan was unveiled to less than raving reviews. The estimated cost was \$28,000,000, one-third more than the county had anticipated. County citizens were outraged at both the cost and the design, and department staff were certain that the design would not work. Their attitude was that the new facility would compound existing problems. After the Board of Supervisors at first refused to redesign the facility, citizens mounted a campaign to place the issue on the ballot. After considerable political pressure from the public and the press, a change in the county administrator, and a new, hands-off approach from the then-Sheriff Harry Ramsay, the Board of Supervisors changed its position. On the day the new facility was to be put to bid, the project was discarded.

A new, broad-based citizens' committee was formed, with representatives from all stations and walks of life. Sheriff Ramsay selected Mr. Les Glenn, his budget and personnel director, as the department representative. A new architect and construction manager were selected and the process began anew. The newly-formed planning group then traveled extensively throughout the country, visiting new facilities to determine the present "state of the art." After visiting the new Chicago and San Diego Metropolitan Correctional Centers, the committee recommended that the Department construct and operate a direct supervision facility on the federal model. After much deliberation, Sheriff Ramsay decided to proceed on the committee's recommendation.

It should be understood that, at the time, there wasn't a direct supervision jail in the country, and there was considerable doubt that such a model could work at the county level.

What would you say were the best decisions made with respect to opening the facility?

Once the county had committed itself to utilizing the direct supervision model, it became apparent that the Department was ill-prepared to open and operate a facility that was so radically different from that which had been traditional within the Department. The Deputy Sheriffs' Association had grave reservations concerning the model and took a hands-off approach, neither supporting or opposing the project.

In June 1978, NIC sponsored a HONI [How to Open a New Institution] program at Mills College in Oakland. Not having any idea of the magnitude of the transition task before the Department, we sent a representative for training. Upon his return, it became apparent that without a transition process, the Department was heading for a massive failure. The Department, the citizens' committee, and the county administrator petitioned the Board of Supervisors for an extensive transition team to plan the opening and ultimate operation of the facility.

The most important decision we made was to use the standards recommended by the American Correctional Association's Commission on Accreditation as the basis for our operational procedures. We felt strongly that, due to the unique design of the planned facility, only the most professional methods of operation could ensure success. To accredit the facility and its operations became the goal of the transition team.

The transition team addressed all areas of the facility and its ultimate methods of operation. Team members inspected and tested the building, they wrote the entire policy and procedures manual, and they trained the staff in proper operations. During the two-and-a-half-year transition process, the entire building and its operations were tested and approved. We then knew what standards were expected of the Department, the advantages and limitations of the building, and exactly how it was to work for both the Department and the inmates.

What were the three best decisions made relating to the early operation of the facility?

The transition team felt strongly that consistency in developing and implementing our philosophy and operations was of paramount importance for the facility to be a success. We had developed our methods of operation with full consideration of what was required to achieve our goal. To arbitrarily change policy because of staff pressure would be counter-productive to the transition process and could result in failure. In simple terms, the Department stated, "This is the facility, here is the policy and procedures manual, and this is the only way we are going to operate. If you don't like it, look for a job elsewhere." A somewhat harsh attitude, but essential to communicate to staff our total commitment to accreditation and direct supervision.

Each staff member scheduled to work in the new facility was given 176 hours of intensive training in all aspects of the new philosophy and operation. The training arm of the transition team designed the curriculum, developed the instructional material, and presented the cl asses. That the transition team itself provided the training gave the staff confidence that its concerns were being addressed by peers, and that the new methods of operation were being developed and implemented by people who would eventually perform the tasks.

On the day the facility opened, the entire transition team converted its activities from planning to operations. Due to the team's extensive knowledge of the building and its operations, its members became the primary trainers and information resources for all other personnel. Each shift, every day of the week, was staffed for the first 90 days with transition team members. At all times during the difficult transition phase, there were trained and knowledgeable transition team members on hand to guide and correct staff, and to answer questions. The facility and its planned procedures were "their baby," and the team worked diligently to make the project successful.

What were the three worst decisions made?

The transition team was heavily weighted at the top and lower ends of our organization: administration, middle management, and line personnel. The role of the first-line supervisor and requirements for that position's duties and responsibilities were neglected during the planning phase. The result was that our first-line supervisors had considerable difficulty adjusting to the new environment, philosophy, and working conditions. Line personnel had their own trainers and informed peers, but the sergeants had no one to turn to except staff of lower rank--a difficult situation.

Secondly, the transition team operated independently from the remainder of the Department during the two-and-a-half-year project. As a result, very little support was generated for a successful opening. The transition team's isolation, the unpopular design of the facility, and natural resistance to change created an adversarial relationship between the transition team and the remainder of the department. Consequently, the transition team faced pressures of peer rejection that would have been alleviated had we spent more time orienting the department to the activities of the team.

Finally, the 176-hour classroom training program was originally considered sufficient to open the facility successfully. We soon learned that although the training provided was invaluable, practical experience was also required in order to translate the classroom materials to the operating module. Theoretical training and orientation were required, but once operation had actually begun, staff started to revert to past practices, an unacceptable situation. Classroom training is vital, but it must be followed by actual practice, practice, and more practice.

What specific problems did you have with staff?

With the exception of the transition team, the entire department did not like the facility, did not want to work in the facility, and frankly did not want to see the facility work. Fear of the unknown, combined with the negative group attitude, created a climate in which the most vocal opponents far overshadowed those who were willing to give it a chance. The result was that every incident, no matter how minor, was blown entirely out of proportion. The media stationed reporters out in the parking lot to interview deputy sheriffs for their opinions. Many staff who didn't even work in the building repeated to the media the untrue rumors they had heard about the terrible fear and violence within the facility.

Meetings of the Deputy Sheriffs' Association were held to complain about the facility and its operations. The Association held special meetings with Sheriff Rainey to attempt to persuade him to change back to an indirect supervision model. A special study team was formed, comprised of D.S.A. representatives and non-detention management, to conduct an in-depth study of the facility. The net result of all this activity was that everyone recognized that fear of the unknown had created hysteria among the staff that was unreasonable and yet understandable. Within 90 days, calmer heads prevailed. Sheriff Rainey firmly maintained his support of direct supervision, and the staff finally accepted direct supervision as its method and philosophy of detention management.

Most of the problem was experienced with direct supervision staff?

Most of the direct supervision staff were silent and came to work and did their jobs as specified. The vocal remainder were supported by personnel assigned to other divisions, who, by policy and contract, would be transferred to the detention division at some time in the future.

What difficulties, if any, did you experience with your administrators and first-line supervisors?

The administrative staff, for the most part, supported the new facility and its operations. On occasion during the initial opening and transition phase, administrative staff would recommend changes that diverged from the direct supervision philosophy, or during their shifts they would attempt to amend policy to fit their own views on detention management. Despite such early problems, the support of the administrative staff and the sheriff was critical to the eventual success of the transition.

As I mentioned earlier, the first-line supervisors were a problem in that we had no idea that position requirements would be so different from those in a traditional, linear facility. But in almost every case, first-line supervisory staff accepted the new facility, and if opposed, they were not vocal.

After considerable study, and following some experiments in Pima County, Arizona, we determined that our sergeants had no idea of the duties, responsibilities, and methods used by the line staff. Sergeants who had been promoted had never worked in the new environment and had never learned techniques for success in the direct supervision mode. An intensive training effort was undertaken, and now all sergeants receive the same training as line staff as a foundation, in addition to training in skills needed as a first-line supervisor.

Were there problems with the inmates' transition?

The majority of the inmates thought they had died and gone to heaven. Except for a few extreme cases, the inmates conformed with the expectations of staff. There were those that we had targeted for isolation, due their classification and previous incidents, who were Openly antagonistic and created substantial problems. They suddenly found that we had the space, capacity, and will to isolate them from the main population. The disciplinary module was designed to adequately handle these cases in an indirect supervision mode.

Those inmates soon learned that negative actions resulted in negative consequences.

We found that once the negative inmate leaders are isolated, mental health inmates are treated, and proper orientation is given to each inmate, 95 percent of those remaining will respond to rational and humane treatment.

Were there any transition problems with the support staff?

The problems we experienced with support staff were entirely different from those of line staff. Support staff handle and operate equipment and process paper and supplies, not inmates.

The clerical personnel became entirely frustrated with the new automated management system. We had moved from a "green-visor," pencil and typewriter inmate records system into a fully automated system, all in one day. The new staff, new system, new facility, etc., created severe problems. Nothing seemed to work correctly and everything seemed to break at the wrong time. Many of the experienced staff transferred to other divisions, and those who did not were considering it. Despite extensive training and orientation, it took approximately six months before staff understood and accepted computers as a substitute for their green visors.

Changing from a bulk feeding system to a quick-chill, portion-control method of inmate food service created problems of a different category. New and different equipment, combined with a new serving method, created a difficult situation for our food service personnel. For the first month, nothing was ready on time, food was either under- or over-prepared, and never was a cart loaded with the proper amount of food. We learned to expect the worst, and it usually happened. Again, initial training was not sufficient to prepare the food staff for actual operations. Only additional training and strict supervision resolved the problems in a relatively short period of time.

Other support staff, including custodians, mental health workers, teachers, substance abuse counselors, and religious personnel, were new to our detention facilities and therefore had some problems with staff recognition and support of their responsibilities. Who they are, what they do, when and how they do it—all were problems that had to be resolved quickly to facilitate the transition.

How many staff had come from the old facility?

With the exception of the transition team and a few deputy sheriffs, all personnel who opened the facility came from the old facility.

And what inmate-to-staff ratio were you operating under?

The facility was designed for a inmate/staff ratio of 46 to 1. Overcrowding has resulted in an increase to 65 to 1. Presently, we are in the planning and design phase of another facility, which is being designed with a ratio of 64 to 1.

What kinds of training were provided during the transition, and what topics were covered?

During the transition, the training group conducted a needs assessment of the skills required for staff to be successful in the new environment. Once that needs assessment was completed, the training group developed materials, identified instructors, and began conducting classes. The curriculum was as follows:

1) interpersonal communications; 2) fire and life safety evacuation and equipment use; 3) philosophy of the new facility and the elements of direct supervision; 4) automated systems orientation and operation; 5) orientation to the building; 6) the classification system; 7) care and treatment of the mentally ill; 8) inmate rights; 9) inmate programs in the new facility; and 10) legal issues.

This training was provided before the facility opened?

The initial 176 hours of training were conducted prior to opening day. However, we discovered as we opened that some areas required additional training, and we held further classes on those subjects.

As the pioneer in opening a direct supervision jail, what didn't you know ahead of time that you wish you had known?

It is certainly gratifying, being the first system to adopt direct supervision on a county level. However, as we got further into the transition and the opening phase of the experiment, we would have liked to have been able to visit and learn from others who had experienced similar pain. Being first is not the easiest path to follow. The old saying, "no pain, no gain," was certainly appropriate in our situation. Other direct supervision facilities

that have since opened throughout the country have had the benefit of learning from our mistakes and successes. We had to go it alone.

Were there particular gaps that became evident during the opening process?

The most important gaps we discovered were in equating classroom training with real-life experience. The training process would have been greatly improved if we had given the theoretical information to staff and then enabled them to put it to the test through practical application. For example, during training, all staff could make the computer terminals literally dance, but when a real, live inmate stood before them, they froze and were unable to accurately input the information. "Garbage in, garbage out" was the status of our automated system for the first month.

Secondly, we were under the impression that the only successful staff were going to be the new personnel who had not been "contaminated" by prior experience in the old jail and the patrol division. Following our Deputy Sheriffs' Association management audit, it was determined that we had insufficient staff to operate the facility properly. Overtime opportunities were offered to line staff of the other operating divisions. These "old-timers" reluctantly began working overtime and discovered that their skills, developed through years of dealing with the public, were directly applicable to the direct supervision model. The "old-timers" became role models for the younger staff, and in many cases they left their divisions to work in the new facility.

If you were to go through the process again, what would you do differently?

The transition team was developed late in the process: the building was being constructed and the department had no staff on board to begin planning facility operations. Earlier planning and orientation to the building would have led to an easier transition and better staff acceptance.

Overall, what would you say is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision facility?

Professional acceptance and implementation of the highest standards of operation are essential for successful operation of any detention facility, either of the direct or the indirect supervision model.

Larry R. Ard Contra Costa County Main Detention Facility Martinez, California

Any facility can be a success if the management is firmly committed to a truly professional operation. If the management is not professional, the staff will not respond accordingly, and the inmates will head straight to court for relief.

A direct supervision facility, by its very nature, gives management and staff the tools to begin developing a professional operation. Staff contact, the extensive training, the policies and procedures required, and the normalized living environment all contribute to a facility's success. But none of this is important if the management is not committed to the highest standards of professional conduct.

VANCOUVER PRETRIAL SERVICES CENTER

Respondent: R. J. Hagman

Director

Vancouver Pretrial Services Center

Vancouver, British Columbia

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: High-rise, seven story facility

Architect: Henriquez & Partners

Capacity: 168 Size: 56,000 sq.ft.

cost: \$15,500,000


Opening Date: August 2, 1983

Staffing -- Security: 100

Program: 10 Support: 7

Medical: 7 nurses in 24-hour coverage;

6 additional contract medical staff



What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

In British Columbia, most of our history has been in direct supervision, in our staffing and in working with the prisoners directly, whether in secure or open-custody facilities. We just followed through with that. The reasons behind it are, of course, it provides better security; it provides better safety by having the staff member in there getting to know prisoners directly; and, overall, it provides better control.

Was the physical design of your facility particularly suited to direct supervision?

Yes, it was designed with that in mind. In fact, part of the plan was to make sure we didn't have a formal staff station in the living units because of the tendency when this is done for staff to "homestead" the staff station and not be out with the prisoners. This is a high-security facility, by the way.

What would you say were the best decisions you made with respect to opening the facility?

One of the best was to ensure that we had a good staff-prisoner ratio. The average ratio is 1 to 15 on days and afternoons. Another good decision was the soft environment, that is, a normalized living environment.

Also, we provided adequate training and orientation at lead-in time for staff. And the training was on-site in an empty facility; in other words, once we moved staff into the facility, we didn't take any prisoners for six weeks. Staff were trained right on-site and became familiar with the building, which gave them the upper hand when the prisoners moved in.

How about the worst decisions?

I think the only bad one was the mechanical problem we had. We piggy-backed the HVAC onto the automated building security system. What we have is a computerized system with electric locking and central control of the facility. There were some consultants who said we should be able to do that without affecting the building security system, and such is not the case. We actually had to dismantle the HVAC off our computer system, which created an overall greater cost in the long run.

At what point did you discover that?

It has been an ongoing thing; the HVAC used to drag the security system down all the time. We had nothing but problems with the HVAC. That was probably one of the dumbest decisions made.

What were the three best decisions made relating to the early operation of the facility?

With the lead-in time, we had a lot of pre-planning in this facility. I was on board even when the drawings were being developed, in the design stage, so we really knew what we wanted to do. Then I hired my senior staff, and there was more lead-in time before we became operational. We used the time to train staff and impart the philosophy and concepts that would be used in the jail. All that really came together nicely.

About how much lead-in time did you have?

The planning goes way back; it was sort of on-again, off-again with the political people. I was on board for just about a year before it went to bid, and then it was almost two and a half years in construction. I started to hire my senior staff about one year before we occupied the building.

Any bad decisions at this point?

There are a couple of things in the design we would change, but those are really minor. It's more a question of space allocation and under-utilization in a couple of areas.

Overall, the building is extremely efficient. It's a high-rise, and the vertical dispersal has distinct advantages over horizontal, campus-style dispersal for control. That's especially true in this facility, with its transient population. We get quite a mixture, including some fairly heavy-duty people coming in at the same time as minor offenders. To this point, over three years now, there have been no suicides and no escapes. We've had very little vandalism and very, very few assaults, even between prisoners and by prisoners against staff.

Is that unusual for facilities of this type in Canada?

This facility stands out in Canada. They've built remand centers in metropolitan areas in Canada, but they sort of bastardized the soft environment. They're torn between the two intentions, to have a hard design and a soft design; most are not one or the other.

And is yours a manifestation of the pure philosophy?

Well, we managed to get it all in. I'm not so sure the ones that are following this one, even in British Columbia, are going to be able to go the same way. There's a perception of plushness and luxury, notwithstanding that it's cheaper to build this way than it is to put in terazzo tile and to tile the walls as they do in a typical institution. But it does give the impression of softness. Of course, corrections, like the criminal justice system generally, is kind of schizophrenic, torn between wanting to punish and trying to help.

Have there been any political problems because of the perception plushness?

I have heard that my attorney general calls it "Hagman's Hilton North." Anyway, we got the facility and it's working very well. The concept works and we pay tribute to what people developed in the States, specifically at the Chicago Metropolitan Correctional Center, the facility I toured. I was really impressed with Chicago. Anybody who has been to Chicago will certainly see elements of that facility here.

Did you have any problems with administrators or first-line supervisors related to the direct supervision aspect of your facility?

No. The only people we had problems with were the prisoners who had been in the system before and had come from facilities that didn't feature direct supervision or much involvement of staff in the living units. Some were also from con-run or prisoner-run prisons that had trustees in charge. Well, here we run the place and they're guests in our hotel. It's been quite a transition for some of those folks. But suprisingly, again, we've had very little overall problem even with them.

You didn't have any problem at all with the staff?

Most of our staff came directly from the community; they were brand new. About 35 percent came from another facility, an old-time secure facility, although they still had experienced a fair amount of direct supervision. It was the conceptual thing we had to deal with: the soft environment, the need for politeness and courtesy toward the prisoners, and the demand that prisoners, in turn, be polite and courteous—the basic civilities that we seem to have gotten away from in the late '60s and early '70s. We've readopted those things; they work. They are the basis for civil social intercourse.

You've talked a lot about your transition training. Who provided that training before you moved into the facility?

We did. Supervisors were all trained as instructors; we did it all. The people who were doing the training were going to work with those people as well. We also did our own hiring, and we had an assessment-center-type hiring process. Our supervisory staff did all of that as well.

Had you had prior training yourself or did you use consultants as part of the process?

We had initial training in the concept and how to carry it out. We had a consultant come in and train the senior staff and supervisory staff who were going to run the assessment center. Then we did the rest of it ourselves.

How long was the staff training process, and what topics were included?

It lasted about five weeks. We covered philosophy, tactical teams, physical fitness, problem prisoners, drug identification symptoms, basic first aid, C.P.R., the role of staff, the various duties, specialized training in the control center, admissions and discharge, how to deal with the "crazies," the use of force, the law, and all of our policies and procedures manual.

What didn't you know that you wish you'd known?

Nothing, really.

If you were to go through the process again, would you do anything differently at all, other than work with the hardware?

I'd do nothing substantial. We would fine tune, as we have done, as we continue to hire periodically. We fine tune the assessment center, and also we now have daily, in-house, staff training at lock-down times. Fifty percent of the staff are freed up during days and afternoons in order to conduct refresher training and introduce new topics.

You have daily training?

Yes, all within current resources, by the way. We developed that; we are the only ones doing that right now in the provinces. For example, we lock down at 10:00 p.m.; the staff doesn't go off until 11:00. We go into a night shift mode, which frees 50 percent of our staff. Our supervisors, who are all trained trainers, have a syllabus and lesson plans that are all made up. We train on anything from CPR to emergency evacuation, tactical team training, and sometimes just general fitness training. We go through it all. Staff rotate and we keep track so that some of those who really should be doing it don't slip through. On Saturdays and Sundays inmates get up an hour later, so we have staff come on at 7:00 a.m., and we have an hour then before we unlock in which to conduct in-house, on-site, staff training.

How has the staff responded to the training?

Really well. It's mandatory, of course, but I think it shows the employer's commitment to making sure he's got a highly trained and competent staff. Staff competency, which is really being good at what you do, translates into self-confidence, a better self-image, and a greater sense of professionalism and being an equal partner in the criminal justice system.

Overall, what would you say is the most important factor in the success of your facility?

The most important factor is the ongoing contact and interpersonal relations between the kept and the keepers.

LARIMER COUNTY DETENTION CENTER

Respondent: Rod Bottoms

Captain

Larimer County Detention Center

Ft. Collins, Colorado

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: Podular design facility; two-tier

housing units, one-story support area.

Architect: Joint venture, Edwards & Daniels Associates &

More Combs Burch


Capacity: 152 Size: 64,000 sq.ft.

cost: %7,600,000

Opening Date: October 1, 1983

Staffing -- Security: 43

Program: 7
Support: 12
Medical: 5



What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

Larimer County actually came under a court order in 1978 to open a new jail. Sheriff Black, who took office in 1979, was faced with satisfying that order. He started by forming a committee comprised of members of other criminal justice agencies, lay citizens from the community, the commissioner, some of the jail staff, and himself. We were to open in May 1983 but didn't open until October 16, 1983.

The jail committee looked into different physical plans to best suit our county's needs. We were not satisfied with traditional, linear-type, indirect surveillance, as it didn't afford a lot of the programs and things that we thought we needed in our facility. We contacted NIC and they prompted us, of course, to tour other jails. I think the most influential factor was our tour of Contra Costa. Contra Costa was only in the building stages then, it hadn't even opened its doors. It was only being talked of in terms of theory and philosophy, and there was nothing that we could be involved in in terms of hands-on experience.

The other most influential factor was what we saw at the Ventura facility, although it's not a direct supervision facility. Ventura was almost totally destroyed within a two-year period--its paint, the graffiti, things of this nature. Seeing what happened to Ventura made us think that maybe direct supervision was the way to go.

What would you say were the three best decisions made with respect to opening the facility?

First, our philosophy. That is, determining our goal and setting out to achieve it. Then stating it so that everyone could understand it, and then staying with it.

Second was prior training: prior training of staff from the line level to the top, including the jail administrator and the sheriff.

Third was operating the facility prior to opening it, a practice run on operating the doors, intercoms, electrical systems, everything.

What were the worst decisions?

Some of the worst decisions--and some of these we didn't really have direct control over--included opening prior to the completion of

training for all personnel. Although we got probably 70 percent of our people ready, we didn't start early enough. We could have used a little more hands-on training, theory training, and could have attended a lot of schools to get fully prepared for the direct supervision jail.

The second mistake was having a computerized booking program. That's not bad in itself, but it has to tie in with something; it can't be independent. You have to realize that your computerized booking should tie in with headquarters. As the beginning of a lot of master name-index programs, it's going to help the operation of other divisions within the sheriff's department, such as records. We had only computerized booking, independent of anything else. That was one of our worst decisions because now we've had to go back and expend the monies to fix what's broken. It took a lot to do that. I think people should realize up front that systems must interface with other computer programs.

The third mistake was our lack of hands-on experience. You cannot have enough hands-on experience in direct supervision jails. The more experience and practice your staff has, the better off you'll be when you open your own facility.

What were the three best decisions made relating to the early operation of the facility?

Again, understanding the philosophy and sticking to it was important. It's a way to have something solid to hang on to and know where you're going at all times. There are times when you may change your approach to reach 'that goal, but you certainly don't change your goal. That's the most important thing.

Developing policies and procedures before the facility opened was probably the second best decision we made.

I really couldn't decide whether programs or the classification system is more important. I have to say, though, that in a direct supervision jail your classification program is of utmost importance. The programs you're providing for your inmates are probably equally important. But then, staff involvement from the top to the line staff and from the line staff to the top is also very important when you first start a direct supervision jail. Without that communication link, you're not going to have anything go right.

The three worst decisions?

Changing administrators shortly after opening was a mistake. There was a change in which I had to take over the direct supervision jail. That was one of the worst things we did.

Our policies and procedures- needed to be directed to the American Corrections Association's standards. Without that, standards are virtually unworkable and their use is very limited. I think if I were an administrator going into a direct supervision jail, I would take the standards book and start developing policies based on it, even if I were not going for accreditation right away. I would make sure that my policies were aimed in that direction.

Also, we were faced with too much change in too short a time. We found ourselves changing procedures every day because of the newness of the direct supervision approach after the linear-type, indirect surveillance. When you have rapid change, and you are kind of forced into it and then allow yourself to get caught up in it, it causes performance to fall off drastically. You need to have a break-in or adjustment period for your staff. We were just changing so quickly that we couldn't give our staff the chance to perform.

What problems, if any, related to the direct supervision aspect of your facility did you face from your administrators and first-line supervisors?

The administrators were inexperienced, not in management techniques or anything of that nature, but in the direct supervision jail itself. Again, I have to emphasize that we were one of the first direct supervision jails to open its doors. We were right behind Contra Costa. So there weren't a lot of administrators available, or any training for administrators, to provide hands-on experience with direct supervision.

Were there any problems with your first-line supervisors?

I don't know that we have the answer to the first-line supervisor problem yet. Roles change completely from a linear-type, indirect surveillance facility to a direct supervision jail. Pod officers actually become first-line supervisors: they make decisions, they plan, they need interpersonal skills. They have all these roles, and sergeants (or whatever your first-line supervisors' rank may be) tend to get lost in the works. I noticed this on a tour of Contra Costa. Their lieutenants were having the same problem, of not knowing what their roles were. I've talked to several people and they've experienced the same problem.

Tucson required that their first-line supervisors spend two weeks as line officers in the pod and said that was one of the better things that they did.

I have a theory that we're going to have to make first-line supervisors managers, or give them some duties of managers, and then give them training on how to become managers. Then they'll be not supervisors, but managers, more involved in the overall picture of the facility than just in security or just in programs. That type of training is needed for first-line supervisors if a jail is going to use direct supervision.

Did you have difficulties with direct supervision staff?

I think the experience of working in the pods was a heck of an adjustment for those people to make. They were shocked at actually being confined with the inmates. Some of them were scared to death. It still holds true that, as a manager or facility administrator, you might as well plan on up to 80 percent of your personnel leaving because they just cannot adjust to it. If they've worked in an old linear type using indirect surveillance, they're not going to make this adjustment.

The other thing that was shocking to them was the independence they suddenly experienced, finding themselves able to make decisions and plans and taking action without first calling their supervisors for approval. They are actually running that housing unit or pod; they're making the decisions. If it's a policy decision, sure, they're going to get help. But the day-to-day decisions routinely made about who can go where and what behavior to expect of your inmates are entirely up to the direct supervision staff.

What problems did you have with inmates?

The inmates also had a lot of adjusting to do. We had many comments from inmates that they weren't used to having so much freedom, that they were really at a loss as to what behavior was expected of them. They were surprised to see that they had as much freedom as they had. But they found that the policies and procedures and inmate rules and regulations that we have in place are very fair and yet can be very stringent.

Were there any problems with support staff?

Suddenly, we allowed the support staff to do a lot of things that they only dreamed of in other facilities. I mean, the sky's the limit as far as medical and mental programs we can have. They had a big adjustment in completing their tasks and yet keeping their responsibility for security. In other words, the overall responsibility in any facility is for security, safety, and prevention of contraband. With all these new ideas and all this newfound freedom, staff sometimes forgot that security was their basic role. Other than that, they're delighted.

Was transition training provided before you moved to the facility?

We had a lot of help in this area. We called upon the National Sheriffs, Association for their correspondence course. We did a lot of interpersonal communications training: how to converse, and how to know yourself and your fears, strengths, and weaknesses.

We had a lot of in-house, hands-on training. In the facility itself, we had staff practice pushing the buttons and opening the doors. We had a lot of computer training because there were many people who didn't know how to operate a computer. We actually put our booking process into operation before we moved into the new jail.

We also did some training in prisoner control. We did a lot of emergency plan practices, such as fire evacuations, bomb calls, responses to medical emergencies and hostage situations. We did these things to try to prepare staff as best we could for the type of jail we were going into.

Is the training for new staff members coming on in a direct supervision jail different from that in other types of jails?

You bet. We developed a field training officers' program and we have instituted a lot of mandatory things that weren't in existence before. One of the things we do if we hire a person without any experience in a jail is to demand that he or she go through the National Sheriffs' Association correspondence course? additional in-house, on-the-job training, 40 hours of firearms, interpersonal communications, etc. Only then can new staff qualify for a raise. We've upped our training requirements so that staff have a 13-week training period before they're allowed to go into the pods by themselves.

What didn't you know that you wish you had known?

First, we should have been clearer about the first-line supervisors' role. There was a drastic change in their function and, quite frankly, I don't feel bad about our management staff, particularly myself, not tumbling to that because I've seen evidence of that throughout the country. As I said, Contra Costa was the first place I saw where they really didn't know what the supervisors' role was. No one has really come up with training for that or developed an accurate job description that shows how the role of first-line supervisors has changed, so that's one of the things I'd like to have done differently.

The other thing I wish I'd known more about was the gap, whether real or imagined, that seems to exist between support and security people. You have some security people who feel that support is nothing: "I give the inmates discipline and they give them basketballs to play with." You have to overcome that attitude. First of all, you have to realize that it's a natural feeling in this type of environment. It's much the same between police investigators and the patrolmen on the street. I think you have to work very diligently on closing that gap or at least on working toward some common goals.

One other thing I learned is the importance of management meetings. In a dynamic situation, such as you should have in a direct supervision jail, people need good communication skills. It has to start with management, in breaking down the old, traditional "pyramid"; you have to get into things like quality circles, management by walking around. You have to' do a lot of things in order to be successful.

Overall, what would you say is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision facility?

The underlying success of our particular direct supervision jail is the ability to identify, isolate, and in my opinion, at a 90 percent rate, solve problems in a pod area before those problems become emergencies. I think that is important for both inmates and staff.

How do you develop that ability?

You develop it by being able to communicate, by recognizing stress in your employees, or recognizing an inmate's stress by keeping

track of his daily activities. If he's up at 3:00 a.m. walking around, you know there's something wrong. You can satisfy the needs of the inmates a lot faster in direct supervision because you're right there with them. Inmates develop a rapport with the housing officer, not to a dangerous level, but a rapport that lets an officer know when the inmate is stressed out about his trial, or that he may be suicidal if he comes back after being convicted, and so forth. These are things that direct supervision jails really make possible.

If you were to go through the process again, what would you do differently?

Of course, I would take our own experiences and shortcomings in our first approach and improve upon them. I would try very hard to talk to the administrator of a direct supervision jail and request that my staff be allowed to come and observe and actually work shifts with his staff. There's no way you can experience direct supervision without working in a facility like that.

The other thing I would do is have a list of hires ready to come on board. I don't think you can carry vacancies after people quit and, as I already said, you have to plan on 80 percent staff turnover due to lack of adjustment. You need to have somebody ready to plug into that position right away.

If you had that kind of turnover at the transition, where staff just couldn't make the change from the linear to the direct supervision jail, do you continue to have a high turnover rate with new hires?

Not among the security staff. You do in the support staff. We've had a high turnover rate among the booking clerks. It's a highly stressful job; they're put into a situation they've never been in before. First of all, obviously, we hired booking clerks to save money. You don't have to have a highly trained officer doing clerical functions when you can hire a clerk. On the other hand, a clerk is not trained in interpersonal skills, and we found we had to come back and give those people training in that. We've also had some turnover in our counselors.

As far as security, though, turnover has slowed down a great deal because of a couple of things we did. We changed the hiring procedure, hiring correctional officers who are career-minded people, interested in staying in corrections, rather than people who

feel this is a foot in the department and eventually they'll get out to the street. We don't want to talk to those people. We want career-oriented people who know that there is, with the direct supervision jail, a field wide open in which to excel.

Is there parity with street officers in terms of pay?

Yes, there is. Our corrections officer makes just as much as the street deputy. They make not one penny less than a street officer does.

What do you think is the most important factor in direct supervision jails?

I believe that one can pay lip service to direct supervision, but one of the things you have to look at is its success. As successes, I could tell you that we've had only one escape from our jail, a walkaway trustee; we've had only one death in our jail, which resulted from natural causes; we've had four suicide attempts, all without success; we've had no major riots. You can call that luck, but I call it success. And it's got to be because of direct supervision.

This has been over the course of a little over three years now?

That's correct. I would also say our facility is probably cleaner than when we opened. There is no grafitti; there is no damage. If there is damage, we charge the people responsible. You can see pride, not only among the staff, but among the inmates. I think you can see that the inmates are getting into what we want them to do. It's working well, and yes, we do have people who do not want to go along with us. They serve time in Second North, which is our isolation or disciplinary area. I attribute our success to the philosophy of direct supervision, to the programs, and to the classification system that we use.

MANHATTAN HOUSE OF DETENTION

Respondent:

Thomas Barry

Former Warden

Manhattan House of Detention

New York, New York

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: High-rise, podular direct supervision

facility

Architect: The Gruzen Partnership

Capacity: 426 Size: 240,000 sq.ft.

cost: \$42,000,000


Opening Date: October 20, 1983

Staffing -- 227 correctional officers

30 captains (first-line supervisors)

11 warden staff 107 civilians

Medical services provided under contract



What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

Those decisions were made long before I came on board. A planning committee was organized with representation from the New York City Board of Correction, the Criminal Justice Coordinator's Office, the state Department of Corrections, and the Legal Aid Society. The Tombs had been closed because it could not meet the legal mandate of civil court judge Laska. This committee was necessary in order to make sure the new design would meet his consent decree requirements. Why they decided on direct supervision, I have no idea. Some of the people on the planning committee did, however, travel to see the Metropolitan Correctional Centers and a few facilities in California; Contra Costa had not yet been opened, but they did go through that facility. There now is no one left in the New York City Department of Corrections who was on that committee.

What would you say were the three best decisions made in opening the facility?

The best decision about opening the facility was that a transition team was budgeted; rather late, but it was budgeted. That was the best decision that could be made. Second, the budget also included special time for training. Third, a mission statement was clearly developed and defined for the facility, and I think that was very good.

What were the three worst decisions?

The facility was opened before construction was complete; it was nothing but problems. Second, the design failed to fill some staff operational needs. It didn't encompass the need for such things as a facility arsenal or for employee guns. Those are the two worst problems; I can't think of a third really bad one.

What were the three best decisions made relating to the early operation of the facility?

We were allowed to phase in the inmate population. That was an excellent decision and the process occurred over a period of three weeks. It allowed the staff an opportunity to run the facility with the inmates and get used to it. Also, unit management was employed in the facility. It brought together a more cohesive staffing arrangement. Third, training at the facility, was ongoing in the

early stages, which allowed staff to really learn the facility before they were left alone on post.

What were the worst problems you faced?

We had a lot of problems, but most of them had to do with the physical plant. The central control room was not completed, we had no communications, and the doors would not close. We had a lot of heavy security problems, but since the staff was properly trained in interpersonal communications and knew the facility and knew what we were trying to accomplish, we were able to control the inmate population in spite of the fact that officers were often left in an area without any outside contact at all, except for on-site visits by their supervisors.

How did you get your officers to work under those conditions?

During the training process, staff came to identify thoroughly with the success of facility and what we were trying to accomplish. What just about everybody wanted most was to make it work. Nobody wanted it to fail. So, in spite of the difficulties we had in the early stages, everyone used a maximum amount of initiative and teamwork in order to make things go as smoothly as possible.

What problems, if any, related to the direct supervision aspect of your facility did you face from the line staff?

We had problems with the union,' but not with staff. When we first opened the facility, the union attacked the facility as being soft on inmates because of what they call the "country club" environment; but since we had had transition training, the staff disagreed with the union and defended the facility.

In fact, on a side issue, there were no elective union delegates in that facility, because the union president didn't appoint delegates for a long time--I don't know why. Union delegates are elected, and between elections, the union president appoints the delegates. Two officers in the facility assumed the role, but they quit when they disagreed with the union stance, so that we had no union delegates in that facility for well over a year.

Did you have any problems with the acceptance of the direct supervision concept from any administrative personnel, supervisors, etc.?

In the beginning, there were questions in everyone's mind as to whether it would work. No one had direct supervision experience, and people wondered whether the system could even function with Manhattan adult male detainees; they're supposed to be the real bad guys. Unit management encouraged communication which pulled management and line officers very close together, and they quickly saw the very low number of incidents that were occurring in the facility. After a time, the facility itself and the way people worked in it won over even the heaviest doubters. Now, I'm not trying to tell you that everyone truly loved to come to work every day. It was still a jail and we still had the psychological stresses of a jail, but not to the intensity that prevailed in indirect supervision jails.

We could afford training only during the initial phase of opening the facility and, consequently, we couldn't continue it as new people came in. As it turned out, however, turnover was not so great that people couldn't assimilate themselves, and we had no real problems gaining acceptance for the direct supervision approach. People would come in who would have their doubts, especially the new supervisors, but their actual hands-on experience proved the jail out. The line staff convinced the new supervisors, as they came on, of the benefits of direct supervision.

The unit management concept was very helpful in this; it brought the people together into teams, so that they identified with each other for the success or failure of their segment of the jail. Under the unit management concept, the jail was divided into three segments, and each union manager had his own first-line supervisors and his own line staff to operate a kind of "mini-jail," if you will. Each of the units worked together as a team, and they started things like baseball leagues to improve the morale of individual units. Within these units were smaller groups of people, in which it was possible to inculcate new staff with the values that prevailed in the facility. New staff lost their fear of communicating with inmates and got involved in solving the support service problems that come up on a daily basis. That's what makes direct supervision work, but what reinforced it at the Manhattan House of Detention was unit management.

On what basis were those three units established?

They were of equal security levels, except the third unit had a slightly higher security designation. One unit was designated for new admissions as they came in from court and housed them through the classification period. The second unit was for the general population, and the third unit was slightly higher security, although was not specifically classified as higher security. The punitive segregation section was located in that unit, and consequently, the heavier cases had a tendency to be housed there. The staff knew how to handle those inmates and the group wasn't changed every day, as happens in a more traditional structure.

Did you have any problems with inmate adaptation to direct supervision?

Most of the inmates appreciated it right off the bat. however, did complain because they couldn't develop their power cliques, because everything they did was under the direct supervision of a correction officer. Some of them were frustrated and actually requested transfers to indirect supervision jails, but that was a real minority. Now, the Manhattan House of Detention held barely twenty percent of New York City's Manhattan cases in those days, and consequently, there was continual turnover out of the facility as inmates were classified. But none of the inmates really wanted to leave. They had extraordinary benefits there. When they had a particular problem, the problem could be solved usually within the same tour. If, for example, it's linen exchange day, and the linen did not appear as scheduled for some reason, one of the inmates would remind the officer if the officer did not remember himself, and the officer would get on the phone and try to find out what the heck happened with the linen.

Did you have any trouble with support staff adapting to direct supervision?

Quite frankly, the maintenance people loved it, and so did the medical people; everyone loved it after they got used to it. Once they were over their initial reaction of, "Hey, this is different and I'm not sure if I really want to do this," they liked it, and they were more successful in what they had to do. The same response was given by the social services people, although to a much more limited extent, because we hired social services staff from civilian life rather than from the jail community.

The chaplaincy services also found it much easier to work in the housing areas. These are outgoing people anyway and they like to go where the inmates are, so they had no difficulty in accessing the inmate population.

The medical people found that they were a lot more successful when they were able to go to the housing areas. As an example: all of the medical units in the New York City Department of Corrections keep monthly statistics, and one statistic that they use as an indicator of medical department efficiency is the percentage of PPD readings done on the incoming detainees; that's a test for tuberculosis. A new admission comes in, he gets a PPD test, and it has to be read within 48 hours of the test in order for the test to be valid. They keep stats on how many of these tests are actually read. The Manhattan House of Detention was the only facility ever to achieve a 100 percent rating. While that's not earthshaking in terms of operational effectiveness, the medical staff held themselves a little success party up there in the clinic.

What sort of transition training was provided before you moved into the facility?

Ray Nelson was in charge of the Jails Division of the National Institute of Corrections at the time, and he gave us a training grant under which we had some consultants brought in to help develop a curriculum. First our training captain went out to Boulder to attend the Academy's training for trainers class, and to Contra Costa, the Chicago M.C.C., and the San Diego M.C.C., to get an idea of what direct supervision was all about.

Then this captain sat down with some people in Boulder to develop a rough training curriculum because one had never been developed before. The Manhattan House of Detention was the first place to develop a formal training program for direct supervision jails. That group developed a working outline of the curriculum and we ran it by the transition team to discuss the issues and see if this was going to do it. A couple of changes were made at that point regarding subject material and then the final curriculum was drafted in Boulder. Then, some consultants came in to conduct training and to train some of our transition team people to take over further training.

We tested the training program on the transition team--the testing took a week, and it was really an emotional experience--and asked how they felt about the potential for the facility to succeed. We would go to the flip chart in the front of the room and say, "How do

you feel about this facility? Do you think it's going to be the best in the world, the best in the U.S., the best in New York City, as good as any in the city, or the worst in the city?" We did this before the training and again at the end of the week to assess any attitudinal change, and there was a definite improvement by the end of the week.

One of the most important pieces of the training was interpersonal communication skills. There was interactive work with the training group so we could test whether they were understanding it or not. There was some management philosophy training, in terms of what the jail was supposed to accomplish; we went over the mission statement, some supervision issues, and that was basically it, in a nutshell.

The training was not specific on procedures, but was general in terms of operational philosophy. That was tested on the transition team. After the initial training was done, we critiqued it and took it from a five-day training period down to four days. When the transition team had grown, we trained again, but this time, our staff conducted the training with the oversight assistance of NIC people. After that, we had the wherewithall to conduct our own training and a curriculum that we felt was necessary for the facility.

Thereafter,, everyone that was assigned to the facility went through that training program regardless of rank or position. Correction officers, cooks, court typists, the warden, deputy wardens, everybody, depending on how many people we could get in the room for each class. It created a little bit of camaraderie. It also gave the staff an opportunity to find out a little about each other as we were going into this new facility.

That's the training that we used and it worked pretty well. We needed retraining, and there should have been some specialized training for supervisors, but we didn't have it. As I said before, when we got new supervisors in, they adapted to the facility because of the unit management mode. At that time, NIC hadn't developed a training approach especially for first-line supervisors in the direct supervision jail, which I think is necessary. I don't think they've done that yet.

How was the staff trained in the operational aspects of the facility?

Operational aspects were actually done on post. One of the duties of the transition team was to write the procedures manual. We had four task forces within the transition team, and each group was

responsible for its section of the manual. The task forces were: one, administration functions, that is, personnel, organizational charts, meetings, communication modes, and overtime policies; two, support services, including the linen, laundry, and telephone services; three, program services, covering visits, recreation, chaplaincy programs, and social service programs; and four, security, including security checks and supervision.

There was an additional task force which was basically on training. The training task force was smaller than the others but it was effective. As these people wrote the procedures manual they developed a nucleus of people who could train on each segment of the manual, because they knew it better than anyone else. They knew it better than I did as the boss, because they wrote it.

When we opened, none of the transition team people was given a Monday-to-Friday job. They all were on a rotation until such time as the staff knew what was going on. When people volunteered for the transition team, they were told that they would be trainers when the facility was opened and therefore they'd be in this rotation. It took two or three months of actual operation for the process to be completed—there were a lot of mistakes in the earlier stages because we didn't have enough time or money to train for all of the operational functions.

What didn't you know that you wish you had known?

One thing, other than the design issues, is that if we could have focussed on a first-line supervisors training program, it would have been a great help in bringing new supervisors online quickly. Secondly, we proposed and opened this unit management thing, but we did it without a manual of operational procedures for unit management or even a written philosophy, which would have been a great help. Another problem we had was that lead-times on ordering materials were never enough. For example, when something was supposed to be delivered within three months it invariably didn't get delivered for six months. And then some things got delivered before we even had the space to store them. Had we known about these things ahead of time, we could have made some sort of contingency plans.

Would you discuss further some of the design problems you encountered?

As an example, more control rooms were designed into the facility than were needed. This led to staffing levels over and above what a

responsible correctional manager would find necessary, in my opinion. This was a design policy error, not an error on the part of any contractor or architect or consultant; people didn't believe direct supervision would work, so they put in these extra control rooms.

Secondly, the central control room was very poorly planned, given the way the New York City Department of Correction operates. It was also undersized for the size of the place and didn't include an arsenal, which is required by standard operational procedures. But, there was no space planned for it.

The elevators were sufficient in terms of numbers but insufficient in terms of their operation. They could be operated either like an office building's elevators or remotely, and the remote system via the control room was out-of-date and took up a tremendous amount of space.

The security communications system was totally inadequate, never even properly labelled, and we never figured out where all of the things went. Another problem was that the control room panels were laid flat, inviting staff to put a cup of coffee or a soda can right on top of them. That surely happened, and things shorted out. We modified what we could in the central control room; a minor change, but it helped to keep the systems working.

And we had very poor coordination with the installer and the manufacturer of the pneumatic sliding doors. As a result, the doors cost us two or three times their normal cost before we got them operational, in overtime costs and repairs.

You have some of these complaints whenever you plan a facility. I believe the planning committee was so intent on the philosophical issues that they didn't spend enough time on the operational side of the facility. The laundry, for example, was much too small, and the plumbing shop wasn't large enough to take a length of pipe, things like that. The facility operates in spite of all of its design difficulties, and it operates excellently, because the staff knows what they have to do in that jail and it's set up so they can do it.

Would you do anything differently if you were going through the process again?

Yes. I'd have more time for the transition if I could get it budgeted, and I would have more training time. And the facility

would have been completed and punched out, that is, checked by maintenance, before we moved in.

Also, I would recommend to anyone in the planning stages that they have someone on that planning board who has been or is an operational element in the facility. Someone who is doing the job, a deputy warden or warden that believes in what you're trying to accomplish. This person can talk to staff in the existing plant so that their needs are properly met. If that doesn't happen, the change can be so dramatic for employees that it's tremendously difficult to ensure that the services will work in the new facility. It's a perfect opportunity to make changes in running the facility, and you've got to make them knowing the character of your work force, knowing how staff approach the job. With that knowledge, your changes can be truly effective.

What is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision facility?

Proper preparation of staff. I don't care what you do with the walls, if the staff isn't confident, if they don't believe they can do it, if you don't have a support system to make sure they can succeed, the best design will be defeated. Staff has got to be the major focus in functioning, assuming normal security precautions in the design. Once you have the staff in line, once they know what they have to do and have the proper support mechanisms for being successful, you are going to have a successful facility.

Is there anything else you'd like to' add?

Well, as an aside, I've been in the jail business 19 years. I started as a correction officer and worked my way through the ranks to warden, and in those years, I have become something of a cynic; that's what will happen to you in this business. A lot of people talk about doing wonderful things--you can go to workshops, seminars, read the books and get suggestions, etc.--and for the most part I have found all that to be mainly rhetoric. The direct supervision jail is the only real, physical application that is available today that expresses the stated philosophy of how we want to run jails in the United States. That's my opinion. It can turn you from being a cynic. It really is a positive, positive step.

MULTNOMAH COUNTY DETENTION CENTER

Respondent: Robert G. Skipper

Chief of Corrections

Multnomah County Detention Center

Portland, Oregon

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: High-rise, multiple-use facility housing

county and municipal justice agencies; MCDC occupies 4th through 10th floors.

Architect: Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership

Capacity: 430 Size: 240,740 sq.ft.


cost: \$35,310,000

Opening Date: November 13, 1983

Staffing -- Security: 193

Program: 10 Support: 32 Medical: 33

N-main st



Robert G. Skipper Multnomah County Jail Portland, Oregon

What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

We had the opportunity to tour a number of direct supervision facilities, including the Chicago M.C.C. and the San Diego M.C.C., that were operational prior to actual jail planning.

What would you say were the three best decisions made with respect to opening the facility?

First, the fact that we provided intensive, hands-on training to all staff prior to the opening of the facility. Second, having all lieutenants, sergeants, and union representatives sent to two days' training on-site at the Contra Costa facility prior to the opening of our facility. Third, creating a transistion team for the facility while it was still under construction.

What were the three worst decisions?

Designing the court holding and transfer holding areas too small and not testing the emergency power system.

Did you have some sort of incident that brought the problem with the power system to light?

In that case, we didn't realize we had a problem until we had been in here a couple of years and the power went down on us. We had had our transition team check everything from locks to doors to furniture, you name it, but that's one of those things where we made the assumption that facilities management did it or was going to do it and it's supposed to work and then it doesn't. Like "the best laid plans," you occasionally miss something.

What were the three best decisions made relating to the early operation of the facility?

First, we put together an inmate orientation video, which was shown to every inmate coming in here from the old facility. Also, in moving from the old facility, we moved an initial group of inmates and then kept splitting up that group, so that when we moved in more inmates they had these inmates in the module with them—somebody that they could look to for a little direction as to how the rules were around here.

Second, we made sure of accurate posting of rules and procedures. Our third good decision was how well we trained the staff. And we developed a good inmate classification system. . . . I could list more.

What, then, were your worst decisions?

First, trying to accomplish too many support activities at the same time. Second, early on we allowed inmates to go to various destinations inside the facility unescorted. Finally, placing steel chairs inside the inmates' rooms turned out to be a mistake because of the glass windows. We decided to have a countertop in each cell, like a desk unit, and of course that had to have a chair. The state penitentiary came up with a chair that was non-destructible. Problem is that the inmates used the chairs on the windows at night during the graveyard shift when we have lockdown, in which we check the cells every half hour. After removing the chair, we found the inmates worked on the windows with their hard garbage cans, so now we remove the garbage can every night and have it sit outside the room.

What problems, if any, related to the direct supervision aspect of your facility did you face from your administrators and first-line supervisors?

Officer safety. Part of what we encountered with officer safety problems was just the need to emphasize that there would be officer safety. We put together a response team when we first moved in because we knew a real concern of people was that they be able to get cover if they had a problem in their module. Another thing we emphasized was that the inmates were routinely drilled to be locked down, so that when the officers said "lock down," they would respond immediately. We were able to reinforce to the officers that we could lock down a module in a matter of seconds and be out of that module and on the elevator, and if we had a problem, in less than 30 to 35 seconds we would have five or six officers in there. In a couple of minutes, we might have 20 officers in that module.

What problems did you encounter with your direct supervision staff?

There were too many activities occurring at the same time, and again, the staff needed to be convinced of its own safety.

The inmate population?

They had trouble learning the rules and our expectations.

The support staff?

I think I would just repeat the above answer on that: it was a matter of learning the rules and our expectations.

Was transition training provided before you moved to the facility?

We set up a 40-hour block of training with one week of interpersonal skills for all staff, plus on-site, hands-on training for all the different posts. We also included a "venting session," if you will, and a question and answer session with myself to deal with staff concerns and let them vent their frustrations somewhat. We followed that up with a hands-on situation where they were actually able to work the equipment and go through the different doors, that type of thing. And then, also, about 40 percent of our staff went to Contra Costa and actually spent the bigger part of two days there. I came up with the idea of having them take their uniforms, so they were working their posts, actually performing the position functions in uniform along with the Contra Costa staff--it gave our officers a lot better feeling.

One thing we did that was very, very good was an overnighter here for the public. The feedback we got from that indicated it was some of the best training the people had, because they had mock inmates in the system and were able to do everything from serving food to moving them to recreation. We really went through the whole scope. This was not only good for P.R., but really reassured the officers.

What didn't you know that you wish you had known?

I wish I had known what to expect in the way of inmate problems when you close a jail. Also, we didn't fully realize the need to plan for more time prior to opening the new facility to allow for maximum cross-training of staff. We did a good job of anticipating that need, I think, but you can always do better.

Another thing that we didn't expect was a barrage of minor complaints from other components of the criminal justice system: judges, attorneys, the bar association, the police, and so forth.

In opening this brand new jail--new generation, attractive building outside--we found that everybody wanted to see the inside. We became like a supermarket. Although people could handle something over the phone, they preferred to come in and do it in person with the inmate because that gave them an opportunity to see the facility. We had consolidated three jails into one (the courthouse jail, the women's jail, and the Rocky Butte jail), and suddenly had the attorneys that had been dealing with three different facilities converging on us.

Like I say, it felt like a supermarket in here until the "new" wore off. We had to be really open-minded about trying to sift out the complaints and figuring out better ways to handle situations. For instance, we originally decided that no one would be able to call into the module. We went back and changed that, so that, yes, attorneys would be able to call in with a code number and request to speak to the inmate and the officer would go ahead and connect them up. So there were things like that where we had to be flexible and willing to make changes.

If you were to go through the process again, what would you do differently?

Not build a high-rise facility unless it's necessary. Add more elevators if it must be a high-rise. And I'd move the kitchen from the tenth floor to the basement. As we're set up now, everything goes up and everything comes down. That causes a lot of high-volume traffic on the elevators.

I'd place the recreation area iadjacent to the modules. We are partial to Contra Costa's siting of the recreation area so that it doesn't take staff to transport inmates and you're not moving people all the time on the elevators.

I'd increase the court holding area and the transfer holding area; We process an awful lot of folks through here, looking at 25,000-plus inmates, so the court holding area would have been nicer had it been designed larger. We move a lot of folks between here and the state penitentiary as well, and the transfer holding area gets to be a real hubbub of activity. And again, there's an awful lot of traffic in the reception/booking area, and I'd plan for more space there, too.

Another good idea would be increasing the module capacity from 32 to 48 because it would be more cost-effective to operate. Finally, I'd install closed-circuit television to conduct inmates' arraignments, a thing we'd like to continue to pursue if we're able to.

Overall, what would you say is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision facility?

Trained staff, adequate supervision of staff, and realistic procedures and post rules.

Are there any comments you'd like to add?

The biggest thing we've learned is to maintain flexibility, and to try to <u>listen</u>, to deal with the problems at hand and with a couple of minor changes in the system. I think we have done that and, as a whole, we have been very satisfied.

PIMA COUNTY ADULT DETENTION CENTER

Respondent:

Russell Davis

Commander, Corrections Bureau Pima County Sheriff's Department

Tucson, Arizona

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Size:

cost:

Basic Description: High-rise facility. Main structure is

eight stories (four two-tiered housing units); annex is two, two-tiered floors.

Architect: Architecture I


Original Facility Annex Capacity: 468 beds 264 beds 140,000 sq.ft. 79,000 sq.ft. \$18,500,000 \$11,500,000 Opening Date: June 2, 1984 February 10, 1987

26

Staffing -- Security: 256

22 Program: 54 Support: Medical: 20

Judicial Security:



What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

Our jail was designed in 1979-80 as a result of a federal court order addressing the corrections system in Pima County. When our old jail was declared unconstitutional, we passed a bond election and designed a new facility. Neither I nor any of the current command staff had anything to do with the design of the facility. When our predecessors worked on the design, they took a look at the facility in Contra Costa County, California, which at that time was in its last stages of construction. They also looked at the Albuquerque, New Mexico jail, which is a remote supervision facility. They liked some of the things they saw but didn't like some of the others. What we ended up with is a conglomeration of direct supervision and remote supervision concepts.

In July 1983, when I took over as the corrections director for Pima County, the facility was about 90 percent complete. At that point, the staff and I took a good look at the facility, and it seemed to me that it didn't really lend itself to either remote supervision or direct supervision. We attended the NIC program on Managing New Generation Jails in Contra Costa, came back from that, and decided we were going to convert the facility to direct supervision. Well, that caused all kinds of heartache and grief for the architect in the county and for everyone else. But we did make the change to direct supervision from late 1983 to early 1984. We opened the facility on June 2, 1984. It is a 468-bed facility; at that time, we moved approximately 300 inmates into the facility.

Some of the other factors that led to our decision came from looking at our experience in the old jail, which was a traditional, linear, intermittent-surveillance facility. We could see the same problems we encountered there looming on the horizon for the new facility, if we operated it through remote supervision. The modules were too large, with 36-bed units, for remote supervision to be effective. Because of the design of the facility and because, basically, we felt very strongly that it's the right thing to do today, we believed that it was essential to operate the new jail through direct supervision. That's why we made the change.

What would you say were the best decisions made with respect to opening the facility?

We made a number of decisions during the transition process. Most of them stem from a visit to another jail that was being opened at

El Paso County, Texas. We saw all the problems they encountered as they were moving into the facility, and we saw the reasons for those problems. It was probably our most valuable training experience related to the transition to a new facility. Some of the things that came out of that visit determined the core of our moving process.

We decided that, as we moved into the building, we had to concentrate on three areas: we had to provide orientation and training for our staff; we had to prepare the inmates, by getting them ready for the move and for the change in philosophy; and we had to put the facility itself through shakedown testing. We also did some role-playing to orient ourselves to the facility.

The other major thing we learned at El Paso was to phase the transition so that we did only one thing at a time. It's important not to make multiple, major changes simultaneously. At 5:00 on a Friday evening, El Paso implemented a brand new, contract food service operation and a brand new, computerized booking system, and they moved into a new facility. They made these very dramatic changes all at the same time, which ended up in chaos. We phased our transition process so that we only did one thing at a time, and we organized it very much as the military or NASA does, with a countdown.

How much time elapsed before you completed the transition?

We moved our inmates into the building in one day. Seven hours. That was another major decision we made, and it was contrary to all advice from NIC and everyone else who had done it. They said you have to phase in the transition in over a long period of time. However, we were faced with the fact that we could not afford to staff two buildings for more than one eight-hour day. We felt it was more important for us to accomplish the transition in one day and not fatigue the staff than to try to operate two buildings for a long period of time. As it turned out, we were very successful. We had absolutely no problems with our transition process. Since that time, several people have used our model and made the transition to a new facility in one day. We proved that you can do it, if you have the right amount of preparation up front.

What were sane of the things you tried to do that, perhaps, didn't work out very well?

As far as the transition process itself, there were very few things that didn't work out. One of the things that did cause us problems was that we underestimated the number of staff we would need to operate the building. We have fought the budget game continuously since then. We underestimated the impact of attrition on the whole process and, as a result, we have never been up to the staffing level that we really need.

Is there any advice that you might be able to give to another jurisdiction? Do you have any idea why you underestimated?

One thing that we didn't fully understand is the fact that in a traditional jail facility, if you're short of staff, you can combine some posts and not make rounds quite as often. You have some flexibility to deal with shortages of staff. In a direct supervision facility, though, you have x number of posts and that's it; you have no flexibility whatsoever to deal with' staff shortages. If you need to have 25 posts filled, you have to have 25, not 24.

That's a hard thing for administrators to understand, but it's even harder for budget people to understand. They say, "Well, you've done it in the past, what's the problem now?" Budget people generally come from the viewpoint, "What is it you're asking for and what's the bottom line?" and, "What's the least you can get by with?" They absolutely do not understand that in a direct supervision facility those two numbers are the same. They use their traditional way to deal with staffing; you need to educate budget people early on.

Finally, we resolved most of our problems by asking our county budget staff to let an analyst come out here, sit down with us, and do an entire staffing of our building along with us. Once we did that, and they spent the time necessary to understand how the system works--why we had to staff these housing units 24 hours a day and so forth--then they bought off on it. Now we no longer argue about the number of staff we need, it's just that we don't have the money.

We put that budget battle to rest once we got the budget people involved in staffing from the very first. As far as a bad decision goes, I would say that we should have involved them earlier in the overall staffing and operational cost planning for opening the institution.

What were the best decisions made relating to the early operation of the facility?

A couple of things we did proved very useful. We had a mandatory rotation of officers, so the officers had to work all the different shifts and assignments over the first two years of operation. In our old facility, officers could bid for particular shifts and/or assignments by seniority. We felt strongly that, in the new facility, everyone needed to know the big picture. Consequently, it was necessary for staff to rotate positions. We spent two years rotating assignments and, during that time, virtually everybody has worked almost every assignment. We're now going back to our old system of bidding for assignments by seniority, but a new officer must work every shift during his one-year probationary period. Officers have to rotate between all the shifts, and we also concentrate on having them work as many different assignments as possible during their first year.

The other helpful decision we made had to do with training. Initially, we had a seven-week academic program, and at the end of that seven weeks, we put new employees on the floor and they worked as officers. We found that, although we had done a very good job of preparing them academically, they were scared to death when they were thrown into a housing module with a group of inmates. We developed what we call the C.T.O. program--Correction Training Officers Program--which is very similar to law enforcement's field training officer program. Now we have a seven-week academic and a seven-week C.T.O. program. We have seven separate phases of C.T.O., which is a very formalized process. Recruit officers are assigned to work with and under the direction of a C.T.O. officer. New officers learn certain things in each phase, and we have a weekly review to see if they have successfully passed that phase.

Once we implemented the C.T.O. program, our attrition in the initial probationary year dropped dramatically. The officers are much more comfortable, and the number of confrontational problems between staff and inmates has dropped. It's one of the best things we did. We have continued to improve on our C.T.O. program, and it's very much an integral part of our training program.

What were the worst decisions related to the early operation of the facility?

Probably the biggest mistake we made at first was not training the supervisors adequately. We really had a serious problem with the supervisors being out in left field, not knowing how to supervise.

When we first transferred over, we brought our officers and worked them as direct supervision officers, and we worked our first-line supervisors, that is, our sergeants, as sergeants. What we should have done is take all of our sergeants and work them for a period of time in the modules as officers, so that they could learn what an officer does and what an officer encounters, what types of decisions an officer has to make, etc. Our supervisors were pretty much in the dark. We had put them through training, but we did not train them how to supervise in a direct supervision jail. We just didn't think of it at the time, along with all the other agencies that have done transitions.

Since that time, we've had one phase where we assigned all our sergeants to two weeks as module officers, and we're getting ready to do a second phase. When we initially announced we were going to do that, we had to drag them down the hall kicking and screaming, and they threatened union action because it was degrading, demoralizing, and everything you could think of. However, after the initial two weeks were over, they said- almost to a person that it was the most valuable experience they'd ever had. They learned what the officers were talking about, and they also learned how the officers had been conning them--all their tricks for goofing off, their hiding places, etc.

The second mistake we made was assuming we would have vacant beds for a period of time. Anybody who assumes that he's going to have vacant beds in any jail is fooling himself. They'll be overcrowded no matter how big they build the jail. We are now overcrowded, and we are having to deal with the staff shortages that result.

The third decision we made is kind of particular to our facility. We have corrections officers who have an assignment called "I.D.," where they do mug shots and fingerprints in the booking process. Now again, we decided to rotate our corrections officers through all the different assignments, and we rotated the officers through the I.D. process also. The quality control on our fingerprints went right down the drain, which caused us some real problems. We had tunnel vision—we were thinking more about developing the officers in operating under direct supervision than about the impact the system would have on the support services delivery. We have since gone back to long-term assignments to I.D. to get that quality back up.

What problems, if any, did you face from your administrators?

The biggest problem we've had is defining the role of the first-line supervisor and where he fits in. Our supervisors haven't figured out how to supervise by remote control. The officers have direct interaction with the inmates; they become very good at leading, managing, and supervising people on a one-to-one, direct-contact basis. But the supervisor has to learn to figure out how well an officer is doing without going in there and pestering him all the As soon as the supervisor sets foot into a housing module, the focus of the module changes, and he gets a distorted perception of what the environment is really like in there. So he has to be able to pick up on subtle indicators that an officer is either successful or unsuccessful. It is part of the transition from a traditional jail, where the supervisors are more authoritarian, more autocratic, more directive in their dealings with the staff.

Were there problems with the inmates?

We really didn't encounter any problems from the inmates., nothing that we didn't expect. We knew we would have a honeymoon period for the first few weeks, when everything was so new and different, and that when the honeymoon period was over, we'd have a period of heavy boundary testing, which occurred. Fortunately, during the honeymoon period, the officers settled in and got comfortable with what they were doing and were ready for the boundary testing when it came. We were ready for it, we handled it, and really didn't have too many problems.

The main thing to remember with the inmates is, don't con them. Be honest with them. If you are going to make a change in policy that affects them, warn them ahead of time. Don't say, "Effective 5:00 p.m. today, commissary will only be one day a week instead of two." Tell them instead, "On the first day of next month we will reduce commissary to one day a week, and we are doing it because of these reasons.' Deal with them the same way you would deal with other people. Give them credit for having some intelligence because they are very much a part of the environment; they impact the environment significantly.

Did you have problems with support staff?

Support staff did not receive adequate training in the philosophy of direct supervision and their **role within** that philosophy.

had to address several times since then. We are now training all new support staff when they come in on the principles and dynamics of direct supervision, on what the whole philosophy is all about and how support staff fits in to the big picture. That has alleviated a lot of those problems.

Have you experienced problems with direct supervision staff?

We've had two big problems with direct supervision staff. Number one has been maintaining consistency between shifts and between housing modules. This has always been and always will be the primary problem in any type of jail facility, especially those using direct supervision.

That goes hand in hand with the second problem, which is isolation. The officers are so isolated from their peers and from support services that there is a tendency at times for them to feel like inmates. Sometimes they feel locked in and helpless and that they cannot meet their own needs. We have concentrated our supervisory training and support services training on this area to make sure that we don't do anything that the officers perceive as tending to isolate them more or make them more helpless.

What kind of transition training did you have? Was NIC involved?

Yes, it was. We had transition training that involved management leadership, principles, and dynamics and interpersonal communication skills, and then we did our own policies and procedures training. Initially, we did a one-day session for all employees, including clerical, food service, and medical staff, on what direct supervision was all about, what we were going to be doing here, and how our transition process was going to evolve. That helped alleviate some of the fears and anxiety about change. We should have come back and done more extensive training for the support services personnel.

Did the staff who had been in the old jail and who then had experience with the new direct supervision jail express a preference for either?

Very few said that they still preferred the old jail, and most of those who did have resigned. Out of 300-plus people, we are probably talking about four or five. Almost to a person, everyone has said he or she would never operate or work in a traditional jail again; direct supervision is the only way to go.

When we made the transition, we figured that some people just would not be able to cope with the new facility. We underestimated our staff, quite frankly. We felt that there would be a higher number that could not make the change. We also prejudged certain people, but we have been pleasantly surprised. Some of the people we felt would never cope with direct supervision have been very successful. To a certain extent, we made a mistake in underestimating the capacity of our staff to deal with the change and to have the sophistication necessary to manage inmates in a direct supervision jail. My advice to people since then has been to not underestimate your staff.

The other thing we did in the transition training program was to adopt the philosophy that we would take whatever time was necessary to convince staff that this would work. "If it takes one training session, fine; if I have to spend the next three solid weeks, fine. By the day we move, everybody will be convinced." There were a few people we had to spend a lot of time with, but as a result, we had 100 percent cooperation at the time we made the transition. A number of people said, "Well, I'm skeptical, but it's sure worth a try, so I'll try it."

What didn't you know that you wish you had known?

There really weren't many things. The big gap we had was in preparing our first-line supervisors. Everything else we felt we had prepared for adequately. We had learned by looking at other people that transitioned, picking up on every mistake that they made, and deciding we weren't going to make the same mistakes. The El Paso experience was extremely valuable to us because we saw everything they did wrong and the consequences.

What would you do differently if you had to it all again?

We would have more specific training for the supervisors, more specific training for the support staff, and possibly have some of the support staff work hand-in-hand with the officers for a period of time so they would better understand each other's role. It's easy in a traditional jail to understand each other's role because you have the opportunity for interaction in the hallways, as paths cross on the post and so on, but you don't have that opportunity in a direct supervision jail, because everyone's locked away someplace else.

We would also do everything we could, in the design of the facility, to facilitate every bit of interaction possible. It would help if we could make posts adjoining so that people could at least see each other through glass, if not talk to each other through a doorway. We would design telephone systems so that the officers could have the freedom to call other people. We would do everything we could to give officers and support staff as much flexibility in their assignments as possible.

What would you say is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision facility?

The most important factor is to train adequately, up front, on the principles, the dynamics, and the basic philosophical foundation for what you are going to do. Plan everything in light of your basic operational philosophy and your operation. Once you make the transition, judge yourself, examine yourself constantly in light of your basic philosophy of operational principles.

We have done some studies of the problems we encountered since we opened. On virtually every problem, when we sit down and examine it in detail, we find that we have begun to violate some of the principles of direct supervision. We see the result of not adhering to our philosophy of management. During in-service training, we go back over the principles and dynamics, we take the problems we've had and we strip away all of the emotion, all of the symptoms, and get down to the root problem. It's very easy to see symptoms and treat symptoms, because they're on the surface. We strip those away in our in-service training and discuss those problems in class. The officers can see how we've all made mistakes and how, when we make a decision that is not in compliance with the principles and our basic philosophy, it causes us problems in the future.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY ADULT CORRECTIONS CENTER

Respondent: Anthony Pellicane

Director

Middlesex County Department of Corrections, Adult Division New Brunswick, New Jersey

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: Single-story facility with two-story

housing units

Architect: Grad Partnership


Capacity: 323 Size: 132,500 sq.ft.

cost: \$18,000,000

Opening Date: June 27, 1984

Staffing -- Security: 189

Program: 13 Support: 32 Medical: 10



What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

One reason was the physical plan that I inherited. I assumed responsibility with 60 percent of the new institution completed. I looked at the control center, and there was no way that you could see inmates via the control center, which was the intent of direct supervision. I contacted NIC for assistance. They had brought the direct supervision model to my attention, and I had been using that model in our juvenile facilities for several years. Based on the physical plan and on my realizing direct supervision was the best method, we decided to take this approach.

Can you provide a little background about when the decision was made and when the facility was opened?

I was hired in June 1983. I decided to utilize the direct supervision model right after that, in July or August of 1983. I went to an NIC training program that summer, did a lot of work with Mike O'Toole of the NIC Jails Division, and went out to Contra Costa during that time. I took my county administrator and the warden and convinced them that this was a better method and that we needed additional staff and training. I would say the decision was made in the summer of 1983. We opened, then, in June 1984.

What would you say were the best decisions made with respect to opening the facility?

One was our decision to utilize NIC extensively. We followed the HONI program [How to Open a New Institution] basically to the letter. We took our time in opening the facility; we trained a whole lot of people; and we utilized a scenario approach to developing the policies and procedures. I had gone through the New Generation Jail Management program along with some other key staff. We listened to what NIC was telling us, and we opened the facility based on its guidelines.

We also opened up one unit at a time; we moved inmates into the facility a pod at a time; and we trained the inmates as well as the staff. We had a core of about 15 corrections officers who went through extensive training in interpersonal communications and other direct supervision methodologies. We had them train the other officers as we began opening the facility. It cost us some money, but we took our time and opened the facility properly.

What were some of your less successful decisions?

The worst decisions were really not planned. We had to keep open two older facilities that we didn't expect to: we became so overcrowded shortly after we opened that we had no choice other than to keep those facilities open. We strung our staff out; we incurred a lot of overtime; and we lost staff. That didn't help us follow the policies and procedures we had laid out via the HONI transition training. I wish I could have made the decision not to keep the other facilities open, but we really had no choice. As a result, we are now adding on to this facility so we can finally close the old facilities.

You still have some people in the other-facilities?

Yes. We have more in there now than we did five years ago when they planned the new jail. It's unbelievable. The population of this facility was to be 323, but we now have over 700.

What were the best decisions made relating to the early operation of the facility?

Again, not to be redundant, but I think the fact that we opened the units one at a time and thoroughly trained our staff was the best decision. We worked with a set of officers and inmates in one unit, and then when we opened up another unit, we took half the inmates and half the officers from the first unit and used them as an education process for the new officers and new inmates. We started to be very successful. We opened up this facility without any real difficulties. Again, we utilized the HONI training we received, and we applied the NIC training. Those were some of the good decisions we made.

How many pods do you have?

There are eight pods. Five are for the regular male housing, plus we have a female, a medical and a special needs unit.

What were your worst decisions?

The fact that we became so overcrowded and had to spread our staff out meant that it became difficult to adhere to some of the policies that had been set forth. A lot of the problems we incurred were out of our control.

Did you say you had visited Contra Costa?

Yes, I did. We did a lot of staff preparation. I had 40 people on a transition team, and we really prepared people for the direct supervision model. I had them involved in a lot of decision-making, in terms of everything from what kind of radios we were going to use to how we were going to staff the jail. I got people buying into how we were going to operate the facility. I feel that we had a lot of ownership from the staff, and, as a result, everything went very smoothly.

What problems, if any, related to the direct supervision aspect of your facility did you face from your administrators and first-line supervisors?

We had some administrators, some of the old-timers, who were not going to buy into this. We made it clear that either they went this way or they left. One very old warden finally did leave, but he was really one of the only ones. We had grumbling like crazy, but not a lot of problems.

Were there any problems with the direct supervision staff?

They totally bought in. I made it clear to them that promotions would come from the people working within the unit. We did a whole routine on professional correctional officers and what the role of a correctional officer should be in the unit, working with inmates. I changed the uniform at the time and changed the badge; I really gave them an image of professionalism, which made them feel very good about themselves.

We didn't have a lot of problems with them; in fact, they made it work. Some of the administrators who've been around a long time have given a whole lot. We found a lot of resources available at the line level; we found that we had a lot of talented people who had fire safety training, had been on rescue squads, etc., who helped us a whole lot with the policies and procedures development. We got them involved and had no problems with them.

Did you face any problems with the inmates?

We had no problem with them whatsoever, and I mean that. They adapted to this model with little difficulty. In fact, in the old workhouse was a big bullpen, a big dormitory, which for years had used direct supervision, more or less. It was not formalized, but that was the method they had been using.

Did the support staff adjust as well?

Some of the staff initially had a problem with going into the housing units. I made it clear that everybody went into the housing units, including our social workers, nurses, probation staff, and our recreation people. There was a little reluctance there, but I explained it and had the social work staff and corrections staff train together. They got to know each other's role and worked with each other. After that training, there was no problem.

What kind of turnover did you experience?

In terms of correctional officers, we had quite a bit of turnover for a while. It's really stabilized in the last year or so. We raised salaries and got people buying into the professionalism of the job. Initially, I was hiring people I wanted who stayed there until there was an opening at the top. That's changed a bit; we've changed recruiting practices by screening during testing, using psychological testing, and using a panel of peers.

Is there parity between the jail and the street in terms of pay?

We're still below, but we're working on it.

Was transition training provided before you moved to the facility?

Yes. We covered all the interpersonal communications, emergency procedures, etc. Herb Sigurdson and Mike O'Toole did the direct supervision training. We had the HONI program and the people who did that were Janie Jeffers, Debbie Halley, and Dave Dupree. We had the whole nine yards, and NIC was very helpful to us, very generous. If it were not for NIC, I would have been in a real mess.

What didn't you know that you wish you had known?

I wish I had known how many damn inmates we were going to get as a result of this. The fact that we got 150 more inmates right off the bat, that we weren't prepared for, meant that our staffing and policies and procedures had to be renovated as we went. We had to adjust to a lot of things that we hadn't planned for. I guess we could have done a lot more "what if?"-type planning, but you can't anticipate everything. I think we had a 40 percent increase in population in the first six months after we opened.

At the time of the transition, were the mid-level people placed into the pods in almost a correctional officer's role so that they would have some first-hand experience?

Yes, I picked a group that was. The ones who were going to be in housing went into the modules and trained with the officers. The problem was, we got so crowded, so immediately, that we had to use officers who had not had that training. We should have done more training for all the sergeants.

I don't think we concentrated enough on the real role of middle management. It's tenuous in this kind of model because you try and give the officers in the pods a sense of ownership. When the officer comes in, he's really not sure what his role is and the inmates play on that a bit.

If you were to go through the process again, what would you do differently?

First of all, we are doing it differently with the new addition, by planning the physical plan properly. That's one thing that was not done initially. By the time I was hired, it was too late, because the building was 60 percent complete. We're taking a whole different approach with the architects and the design, to reflect direct supervision more clearly. We also started a little earlier with the whole process.

To tell the truth, there's not a whole lot I would do differently in terms of how we opened the original facility. I was pleased with that part of it, although of course I was not pleased with the terrible overcrowding, which I had no control over.

Overall, what would you say is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision facility?

I feel that the commitment of the mid-level managers and the full support of the administration are most important. We're doing a grant now on mid-level management in direct supervision. I was involved in the training with Herb Sigurdson and we talked about it. We trained the top level management and the line staff, 'but left out the middle guys. Herb is working on a program that addresses the needs of the mid-level managers. It's very important that they be the conduit to carry out your mission, so to speak, your philosophy of management.

BUCKS COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Respondent: Arthur M. Wallenstein

Warden

Bucks County Correctional Facility

Doylestown, Pennsylvania

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: Single story building withhousing

modules

Architect: Ronald Vaughn Associates

Project Manager: O'Donnell & Naccarato


Capacity: 400 Size: 129,000 sq.ft.

cost: \$13,421,931

Opening Date: June 19, 1985

Staffing -- Security: 121

Program: 25 Support: 29 Medical: 13



What events or factors led to the decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

It was a combination of past practice, that is, of already having officers in direct contact with inmates, and completely rejecting the officer-in-a-cage model. For at least 20 years in the old linear prison, our officers had direct contact with the inmates, and we wanted no part of podular, remote supervision. We could see no value in having a corrections officer hiding in a glass cage. We knew within ten seconds of walking onto the first module out in Contra Costa that it was the exactly the kind of design we were looking for. It was almost an instantaneous decision,

What would you say were the three best decisions made with respect to opening the facility?

Certainly going to a new generation, direct supervision jail would rank number one.

Second would be holding a simulated incarceration for over 200 community leaders, so that they could see that the new jail wasn't a country club or some kind of Taj Mahal. As a result, we enjoyed immediate community acceptance of the planned facility, which might otherwise have been characterized as something that was a little too good for prisoners. This also took us light-years down the road in terms of ongoing support from the community.

The third thing was the intensive transition training that we conducted. That gave us a chance to retrain all of the senior correctional officers and of course to train the new officers that we hired for the jail.

Can you identify three decisions that were made in opening the facility that were not successful?

I can only come up with one thing, and that is that we did not tie a special salary study to the opening of the new prison. There must be a job specification study and a salary study connected with the opening of any new institution, especially a direct supervision jail. We are totally unionized and were in the middle of a contract period when we opened the facility, but nonetheless, we should have insisted that the county commissioners do a salary study. We then could have encouraged them to bring about a substantial pay increase for the correctional officers who would be operating the new jail. Beyond that, I do not feel we had any problems with the opening of the jail.

What were the three best decisions made relating to the early operation of the facility?

Certainly our best decision was to go with the direct supervision model. We recognized immediately that our disciplinary problems would be substantially reduced: within the first ten days, the number of fights among the inmates dropped 75 percent, and it's stayed there ever since. Direct supervision was definitely the way to go.

Secondly, centralized dining and a single-story building proved to be enormously successful. We're able to serve meals to the inmates very promptly and we also have all the economies that go along with centralized dining. We don't have to move between the buildings, and the cooks get positive feedback because they're serving hot food right off of the line.

Third, the centralized recreation area has worked out well, much better than smaller athletic areas would have. We have a very good athletics program at the facility.

What three decisions concerning the early operation of the facility didn't work out as well?

One decision that didn't work out was rather mundane. We tested almost every single item that we put into the new prison. We did not test the tennis shoes, the \$3.75 gym shoes. Because of the large recreation yard and gym, our inmates get a lot more recreation. That's great for us, but the shoes we originally got were lousy and the inmates really went through them. So, we had to rebid a one-step-up improvement in the tennis shoes.

We made a couple of other decisions that weren't very good. At first, we didn't permit inmates to wear T-shirts in the living unit; they had to be in full uniform. We relented on that at the request of the module correctional officers. As long as the inmates were clean, neat, and fully clothed when they left the unit, there was no need to insist that they wear the green uniform top along with their T-shirts. When we made that rule, we were concerned with cleanliness and decorum, but we found in the new jail that their looks improved dramatically anyway, because of the brighter lighting and positive environment. Rules shouldn't be put into effect that really have no purpose, and this one didn't have a purpose.

Thirdly, we had to increase the number of underwear, T-shirts and socks that we gave out to the inmates. Beyond that, I don't feel there were any problems.

What problems related to the direct supervision aspect of your facility did you face from your administrators and first-line supervisors?

Neither the administrators nor the supervisors have been a problem at all. Our first-line supervisors had been well acclimatized to direct supervision and several of them had visited other direct supervision jails. We did have to ensure that they visit every unit once during their shift and that they not take over the unit while they were there. Any questions that came to them had to be directed back to the module officers, so there was no question about who was running the module.

We had no difficulty with our administrators because, again, they had all been exposed to direct supervision through visits. The jail was such a decent place the administrators were spending much more time roaming around the jail, "managing by wandering around" and that sort of thing. I now have to call people back to their offices, rather than knowing they'll be in their office when they should be out keeping an eye on the jail.

Did you have any difficulties with direct supervision staff?

There was initial concern about direct supervision, although the men and women were all trained and the concern quickly gave way to acceptance. We faced very little opposition once they got used to it. Again, the staff here had always worked in direct contact and didn't fear the inmates, so we didn't have to fight that battle. And there was no radical change in the amount of time that the inmates were unlocked: in the 'old jail our inmates were out of their cells from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. The staff was so pleased to have one inmate per cell, instead of four or five, that most of them found it very satisfactory.

One staff problem we are having is that our female correctional officers don't want to work in the female unit anymore, they want to be assigned to the male units. We've integrated our staff now to the point where we have women working in male housing units.

How did the inmate population in your institution adapt to direct supervision?

They went through a tough period during the first 30 days. They told us they didn't like anything: they didn't want to wear prison clothes, they didn't want air conditioning, they didn't want a lot of things. Now they're about the most content human beings you could ever see. The whole dynamic has changed and, as I said, the number of disciplinary problems has gone down dramatically. We've made changes that should have been made, such as with the clothing, and the inmates have had ample time to express their concerns.

By and large, we get nothing but positive comments. Except for some dissatisfaction from the few manipulative inmates that miss the opportunity for intimidation, for theft, and some of the strong-arm tactics, that are so easy to do in a linear jail.

Did the support staff adapt easily?

We had no problems with the support staff because they were fully involved in the process. Many professional staff participated in transition planning and training for as much as seven months beforehand.

What transition training was provided before you moved into the facility?

We did a formal, 56-hour transition training program for all staff from the warden on down. It was conducted by the transition team and our training staff and included everything from a review of standard operating procedures to live-action emergency drills and module operation. We had formal classrooms and a six-day, hands-on course for every staff member. Plus, there was additional training for such specialized assignments as the control center, admissions and computerized booking, things of that sort. The process took eleven weeks, and we trained no more than twenty people at a time. We made it as personal as possible.

What didn't you know that you wish you had known?

That's a good question. In fact, that's what we asked the other jails we visited. Now, our commissioners were so good to us in terms of giving us the flexibility to travel and study, there was very little that we missed, and I don't mean that as a conceited

comment. Anything we missed would've been due to stupidity, because we visited ten facilities, did detailed observations, kept notes on meetings, and everything else.

We certainly never expected AIDS to come up. I suppose if we had known that something like that would happen, we would have added three medical isolation cells. With most cases that test positive for AIDS, you don't have to do any special isolation, especially in a county jail. Nonetheless, I definitely would like to have included a couple of medical isolation cells for highly communicable diseases. They'd be nice to have.

Beyond that, there isn't a great deal that I'm concerned about. If the commissioners came to me today and said, "Here's a million dollars, what would you like to correct?", outside of using some epoxy paint where we used regular paint and buying a better-quality floor, I think I'd ask for virtually nothing. Or, maybe we'd improve the showers; some of our showers back up against the cells and as a result we've gotten some rusting of some plates in there.

If you were to go through the process again, is there anything you would do differently?

I would insist upon a salary and staffing review as part of the process. If you're going to consider new concepts for jail design, you've got to consider where you want to go with the staff. That's the only major area I would have pushed harder on.

Overall, what would you say is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision facility?

Quality staff, without question. Training and the quality of the staff working in the module. Everybody in the facility should understand that the focus of the jail is the housing unit and the classification of new people coming in. We've always had good classification and good interview techniques, but in this larger plant we have more alternatives, and so we've developed a new method of classification. We've also computerized our entire data system and that helps a great deal with classification.

Is there anything else you'd like to add?

I was at a state wardens' meeting this week, and I Yes, there is. realized that a lot of jails get off to a bad start because insufficient time and energy are devoted to equipment and supplies. It always comes up at the end of the construction project. Often the architect has lost interest, the budget's been eaten up by cost overruns, and there's nobody around to develop thorough specifications on equipment and materials selection, or to fill the warehouses and make sure the supplies are there. Many very well-designed jails have poor equipment and furnishings that start to fall apart right away, because they were either poorly bid, improperly bid, or there simply was no money left. It's absolutely essential, and it's the responsibility of project management, that requirements or contracts with architects give priority attention to equipment, furnishings, and supplies. I've seen this not done in jail after jail.

Second, many jails don't have sufficient storage space. I've seen some of the best jails in the country with no storage space. They are quickly burdened with inmate property and a whole raft of other things because they just didn't think "storage" when planning the new facility. It's important that the planners ask when they consider every unit in the prison, be it a housing unit, a program unit, or an operational unit, "Now, where is the storage for this area?" Warehouses aren't sufficient; there's got to be storage capacity in each unit, and with proper shelving. This is another thing that people often pass up. They'll say, "Oh, yes, we'll get shelves." They don't realize that good metal shelving can cost thousands of dollars, and there's no money to do it because it should have been put in the original program plan.

ERIE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Respondent: Joe Patrick Gallagher

Superintendent

Erie County Correctional Facility

Alden, New York

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: Integrated, low-rise, modular direct

supervision facility

Architect: Milstein, Wittek & Associates, P.C.

Capacity: 402+ Size: 208, 820 sq. ft.


cost: \$23, 451, 711

Opening Date: December 26, 1985;

full occupancy February 1, 1986

Staffing -- Security: 144

Program 19 Support/Administration: 25 Medical: 7



What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

Primarily, it was the research we had done in direct supervision. Since we were going to build a new facility, we wanted to be state-of-the-art. Also, we went from a maximum security facility of. 1,000 beds to a minimum to medium security facility of about 450 beds. We visited Contra Costa and Pima County and several other institutions around the country, and we felt it was the appropriate way to go since it was a better management system than we had been using in the past.

What would you say were the three best decisions made with respect to opening the facility?

We decided to occupy the facility as it was completed, rather than hold off because of construction delays. I had sold our old facility to the state and took the proceeds from the sale to build the new facility. Under that contract I had to deoccupy my facility within 24 months. Now, we have snow here about five months of the year, and although we fast-tracked, we ran into construction problems that delayed completion of the facility. If we hadn't moved I would have had to pay the state a significant amount of rent while occupying the old facility. In fact, we're still punching the building and we've been here since last December. The final construction punch has not been completed; we're about 99 percent complete but we're still doing the finish work.

Secondly, the time pressure under which we opened demanded that staff respond appropriately. The first day we moved, we had one housing unit available and food service. Over the next 45 days, more housing units and services came online, so it was kind of a programmed move in that respect. My general feeling about corrections is, when you're at full capacity, the institution operates appropriately because the men don't have time to complain about their lot in life; they just have time to do their job. I try to keep my facility at maximum capacity, and that also held true during the transition. My men had to work so hard that they didn't have time to be unhappy about the move.

The other good decision we made was to conduct significant training prior to occupying the new facility--we did interpersonal communications training and I sent people to the National Academy of Corrections to be trained. We also had a transition team, which allowed us to spend 80 hours with each individual before we entered the institution, and that was extremely helpful.

What were the three worst decisions that were made related to opening the facility?

We should have had all of our systems operating before we attempted to operate the entire facility. We had two escapes early in the operation of the facility, the first about five months after we opened. An inmate was able to compromise a secure sallyport and escape. I believe that was caused also by not doing enough training in the area of the electronic locking mechanisms. Then we had a mass escape of seven inmates one month later, which was possible because we moved in here without the security envelope being complete. The internal security systems and about half of the external security systems were complete at that time.

The second bad decision was that I was not insistent on getting more training for my staff; we only did about 80 hours. We are about to correct that particular weakness. I'm sending some people, with help from NIC, to Bucks County, Pennsylvania, to be trained as trainers and to work in a direct supervision facility that's been open for a while. Those people will come back and conduct about 40 hours of training for each of my security officers, and we're on our way to accreditation as a result of that decision.

The third mistake I made was not anticipating the individual officers' shift from feeling comfortable to feeling uncomfortable, which was caused by what is called "anomie." We went from a linear jail, where we had two or three officers assigned to a housing unit or a block, to a direct supervision module, where there would be only one officer in each mod. It didn't allow the officers to socialize and that caused a feeling of isolation, which resulted in a massive union management problem. For about 60 days, I engaged in almost open warfare with my employees' union over the staffing patterns, which, by the way, were established in conjunction with NIC, ACA, and the New York State Commission on Corrections. We just did not train our officers to become independent, and it was the worst personnel problem I had in opening the new facility. talked to people from NIC and they said the same problems occurred in similar facilities when the negative change in the staff's social environment wasn't anticipated.

What were the three best decisions that were made in the early operation of the facility?

One was that I decided to use whatever overtime was necessary to provide additional security until the security envelope was

completed. We expended about \$250,000 in unanticipated overtime to reassure our people that they were operating a safe facility. I don't mean to make our people sound like a bunch of cry babies, but frankly, they were insecure for the first couple of months, going into the softer environment where there were no bars separating them from the inmate population and where they had to work among as many as 48 inmates. I double-staffed most of my housing units and my secure sallyports to give them a feeling of comfort and we were able to get through that period well. We then returned to appropriate staffing patterns when security construction and installation was completed.

The second thing was how we trained the inmates. Our old facility was about 90 percent custody and 10 percent care--a traditional, James Cagney-type joint, built maximum and operated maximum. This facility, for all intents and purposes, is a college campus. We trained our inmates for the changeover, which avoided a lot of alarm among the population, 70 percent of whom had been here before and were used to being relatively controlled. We felt that if they had the impression there was no control in the new environment, they would be more dangerous to work with. broke in our inmates kind of the way we broke in our officers. We involved an inmate liaison committee and brought them into construction meetings, and we trained a cadre of inmates in how they were to be housed and that kind of thing. The cadre reassured the rest of the population relative to the move, which worked out very well.

The third thing we did was develop programs--our institution is now about 30 percent custody and 70 percent care. We initiated seven separate educational programs, and continued two of our prison industries and are developing three more. What we now provide, in conjunction with a consortium of local educational institutions, is a program that teaches basic literacy skills, both reading and writing, and a pre-G.E.D. program that prepares people for our high school education certificate program. We also have two life skills programs that are operated in conjuction with our board of cooperative educational services and one of the local colleges. These include pre-vocational training and things like how to prepare employment applications and prepare for interviews. We also have a pre-college, remedial program for kids who have graduated from high school but can't cut it in college, and offer college courses to both inmates and staff in programs operated by a business school and our local community college.

We also operate our prison industries. We have a bakery which supplies baked goods for five different county institutions, and we operate a 1,000-acre farm that produces milk and milk products for the county. We also operate our own food services here, and provide employment for inmates in a hotel management and culinary arts program in conjunction with a local community college. Plus we're looking at two new programs. We intend to take over all the small engine repair for 45 county departments and we're looking at contracting with local manufacturers for assembly operations that we would operate under contract with them.

What three decisions made in the early operation of the facility were the least successful?

The worst decision was not to insist that our security envelope be complete. We did not plan to have the envelope complete for at least six months after we opened. That was an error because it reinforced the attitude, both in staff and inmates, that we were unsafe. We should have insisted the full security systems be online and operating at occupancy.

We also should have anticipated the union problem. The whole planning and transition process had been democratic--our transition team, made up of execution-level employees and one supervisor, actually wrote the policies and procedures for the institution. As the union problem arose, I increased my control of the institution rather than relying on consensual management. That caused the union management situation to deteriorate and caused a great deal of dissension. It's taken us about two months to negotiate a "peace agreement" between union and management.

Our third mistake was not insisting on completion of our outdoor recreation capability. It was not planned to be completed until very late fall, after completion of the remainder of the facility. (We opened December 26, 1985, and were due to be structurally complete in July, 1986.) This forced us to keep our population inside the buildings for most of the summer, which caused a lot of pressure.

Did you face any problems with your staff's adaptation to direct supervision? Specifically, from administrators or first-line supervisors?

We had a we/them syndrome--"we" being the administration, "them" being supervision and execution. A bit more training before the transition could have prevented its escalation into an adversarial relationship between administration and supervision and execution level staff. Again, I believe it was caused by the officers' feeling of isolation, being locked down most of the day with 48 inmates. In the old units, you might have four or five officers working a unit and they could shoot the shit and drink coffee and kabitz. It made them feel not only safer, but accompanied. Here, the officers have to talk to the inmates and deal with the inmates all day and they don't talk to many staff--it's been a significant personnel problem.

Because they are unit managers, the first-line supervisors normally would identify with administration and upper level supervision. In this case, however, they identified with line staff rather than their peers or superiors. I sent eight of my sergeants to' school immediately when I saw this problem arising and we were able to nip it in the bud.

So the line staff had a great deal of trouble adjusting to the direct supervision model?

Oh, yes. Something unique happened here, although I've been told it's not very unique in terms of the industry. Our staff felt very secure and happy with this facility for about the first three months. Then, as we began to have some union problems, people began believing the facility was unsafe, and their reasons included many items which were myths or misconceptions. The union line became the psyche of the correctional staff.

Toward the end, before we decided to make peace with these people, what had begun as a union position opposing some of the things we were doing became an institutional union belief. The union then contacted my legislators and a few other groups brought intense political pressure; even the international union began to mouth the union line, if you will.

All of these little construction questions became significant security issues in the minds of these people. For example, our officers had always carried a key to the recreation courtyards in both the old and new facilities. Suddenly it became dangerous to

have that key on the ring, because if the officers were taken hostage those keys could compromise the recreation areas. That issue had been moot for 50 years and now it became a security issue.

We also had what began as a glitch in the 'mounting of about 400 security screens covering our air-handling system. It started out as a mere construction problem that was going to be addressed, and all of a sudden this security screen became a potential weapon and no one was safe inside the units. The fact is that the security screens were never used against the staff, either in a threatening way or to compromise the security of the facility.

As a final example, the exterior security walls were solid-grouted, that is, the blocks themselves were grouted inside to make them solid. We had indications that the grout didn't go through all the block in two areas of the facility, and that was talked into a situation where all the exterior walls were unsafe. We had to spend probably \$13 - \$14,000 to test the density of all of our external security walls, and found maybe three or four small areas where the grout hadn't reached the full density of the block.

Did any conflicts reach the administrative level?

 $_{
m No}$, one thing we do have here is a very strong administrative cadre. We're not only close professionally, we are close personally, and we have worked together for a very long time. I didn't have any disloyalty at all with any administrators or senior security staffing or program, people. They did not involve themselves in this--my problems' were primarily with execution-level security employees.

Did the inmates themselves present any problems?

Only in that they were able to observe very quickly the disorganization and animosity we were experiencing—and frankly, the inmates identify with the administration here.

I took over this facility about nine and a half years ago, and then it was a traditional anti-inmate facility. We had goon squads and 60 administrative segregation beds that were full all the time, and our punitive segregation unit always had 15 or 18 inmates in it. We began a collective bargaining process to handle not only problems with staff, but with supervision and administration. The inmate liaison committee meets with a deputy superintendent at least once a

week, and the deputy has the authority to broker food services, commissary--everything but discipline--so that whatever the issue is, it is negotiable. And we work very, very hard to lower our recidivism rate and improve the quality of life for our inmate population. About 70 percent of our population have been here before, and as I say, they identify very strongly with the administration.

Did you have any problems with the support staff during or after the transition?

We had minor problems, nothing I would consider significant. We went from a decentralized storage system to a centralized storage system and had to make some changes in terms of organization, and people tried to fight for more space. But no problems of any significance at all. In fact, the whole support operation has really been handled well in this facility.

Can you break down what was included in the 80 hours of transition training that was provided before you moved into the facility?

In the actual transition training itself, there were about 45 to 50 hours of interpersonal communications training, ten hours of methods and materials, that is, introducing the new policies and procedures manual, and about five to six hours on new rules for employees and for inmates. We also trained routinely; the state trains our recruits for 80 hours and we provide about 32 hours of orientation and also provide 60 hours of peace officer training. There are an awful lot of other training things that occur, but the specific thing for occupancy was the 80 hours of transition training.

What didn't you know ahead of time that you wish you had known?

I would have liked to have known what problems we'd encounter in the first year of operating a county direct supervision facility, and there just aren't any that are comparable to us. Our facility is as big as the state facilities, and we have the same types of programs and opportunities. I mean, there are some county facilities that have direct supervision and have 36 beds. We have 20 beds in our infirmary alone.

No one had occupied their facility similarly. We looked at Pima County and although they had similar problems, they were so much smaller that their problems appeared insignificant to us. We went

to [FCI] Otisville, which is a large, direct supervision podular facility in upstate New York, with a population more than double ours, and they were already double-bunking and doing a lot of crazy things that were not part of an orderly transition. Plus their inmates were doing 20 years and our inmates were doing 90 days, so it was difficult to compare the two facilities. We visited 15 direct supervision facilities across the country, but none of them was even close to what we operate here.

Our greatest weakness was 'a lack of knowledge because no one had done it before. We're inventing the wheel here, and we almost have to make our mistakes in order to learn. But if we had anticipated or were told about some of the problems that we were going to face before we faced them, I think we could have reacted to them much better.

What were some of those problems?

We found that we had to enhance the exterior security systems. This facility was built minimum to medium on the inside security, envelope and maximum on the outside security envelope. Although the best architects and designers in the country were here, they did not anticipate the special security needs that we face because basically the whole population is trusties. By the way, I have five external security systems and two internal security systems, as well as five separate communications systems. What we had was not enough.

We also had problems with construction. When you fast-track construction, the inspection of completed. work is not thorough enough to detect all the weaknesses there may be. We had problems with our windows; I don't think there was enough inspection of the installation of the windows and the contract change order never came across my desk.

Probably the most positive thing that has happened here was the mass escape. It resulted in more studies and more resources and greater oversight on the part of architects, consultants, the management of this facility here, and the construction people in the county. I think we're much stronger and much better run than we would have been had there not been an escape.

If you were to go through the opening process again, what else would you do differently?

I would build a larger facility for economic reasons. Corrections in New York State is a growth industry, and I now generate about

78 percent of my budget with revenues from renting beds. With another 190 beds, I could put money in the bank every year.

Also, I would focus even more on programs and program space rather than security, and I would use dormitories for minimum security inmates rather than individual secure rooms. Probably 30 percent of my population don't belong in jail, they belong in correctional alternatives.

Had I designed the facility, I would have utilized the space differently, and in ways that were not in the original design. Now that I see the actual building, it's a lot different from the line-of-sight drawings and blueprints. For example, our operations center originally consisted of about two and a half rooms for the assistant superintendent of programs, the prison industry supervisor, seven lieutenants, seven sergeants, and the security services and secretarial staff. We had a counseling center that had ten workstations, six offices, all sorts of good communications systems and a conference room. So we reversed. The oр became the counseling center and the counseling center became the op And my library you could play indoor football in--it's two and a half stories high and it has some 80,000 volumes. magnificent library, but there are two stories that are just air. We never anticipated the amount of participation that we would have in our inmate education programs, and we could use about six more classrooms instead of those two stories of space.

I would have liked to have built a small mess hall here to feed about 100 people. We're feeding inmates in two to four maximum security units, and we have to run a food cart in there with implements, and in effect, we are providing weapons to those people to do with whatever they wish. We could control that in a small mess hall setting. In most direct supervision facilities they like to serve food in the units and that's fine where there's no security problem, but in secure units or units where you have people with heavy warrants, or in disciplinary units, I think it compromises security.

I also would do more training. I think that was a major misjudgement on my part; our people could have used another 80 hours of training. So we've learned a lot from issues like these. All things considered, we are operating quite well.

What would you say is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision facility?

I am convinced that the softer the environment in a minimum or medium security institution, the more manageable the inmate population is. In the old institution, our staff and inmates were separated by great sets of bars, both in the gallerys and the individual cells. Now we look more like a community college than a correctional institution. We don't have to deal with traditional inmate attitudes toward staff or the environment. It's not the keepers and the kept here, it's the helpers and the helped. I know that sounds like bullshit, but it's a fact. We have people from all over the country visit here, and when they observe our positive staff-inmate interaction and the lack of tension in the facility, they just walk out of here shaking their heads.

SNOHOMISH COUNTY JAIL

Respondent:

William B. Harper

Director

Snohomish County Jail Everett, Washington

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: Eleven-story, high-rise facility

Architect: WMFL, P.F.

Capacity: 277


Size: 126,984 sq.ft.

cost: \$16,000,000

Opening Date: March 3, 1986

Staffing -- Security: 93

Program: 10 Support: 22 Medical: 7



SNOHOMISH COUNTY JAIL

What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

Don Manning from Spokane started going around the country, looking at different kinds of jails. In fact, he was the one who finally helped me convince our council and sheriff and county executive to start thinking of a direct supervision jail. The other factor was that the architects we hired liked the direct supervision facilities but hadn't had a lot of success in talking anybody else into doing one. From what I could pick up from Mr. Manning and the architects, we were satisfied that direct supervision was the way to go.

What facilities did Mr. Manning visit?

Ventura County and Contra Costa were the two he started with, and then he ended up at one in Maryland and spent a lot of time in Pima County. I didn't see a direct supervision jail in operation until after this one was almost completely built. I was sold on it, by him and by the architects. I wish I could take the credit for being progressive, but basically, I listened to other people.

What would you say were the best decisions made with respect to opening the facility?

Probably the most important thing we did in terms of opening the facility was to start a transition team about two to two and a half years before we opened. That's one thing I don't think you can live without.

What about some things that didn't turn out as well?

Kathie Deviny, the transition coordinator, and I were, along with staff volunteers, basically, the transition team. We needed to have a staff. Personally, I think you need to have a paid staff whose sole function is 'to manage the transition. We were trying to run a jail and make the transition into a new facility at the same time, and that doesn't work. Trying to do that was one of our worst decisions.

In terms of the early operation of the facility, what were some of the most successful things that you did?

We're still making the transition now. We have transition meetings, and we expect to have those at least for the first year. We meet once a week and talk about problems we've had the week before. We don't limit ourselves just to building processes or just to policies. We get right down to basics. Sometimes we've even started talking about there not being enough food sent to the inmates, now that they're exercising, whereas before they weren't.

We got a grant from NIC to have Larry Ard come up from Contra Costa with one of his sergeants. They spent two days with us and did a twelve-week evaluation. I think that an outside evaluation is a must--have someone come in and tell you how you are doing after you've been there a while.

This was an outside, preliminary evaluation of how things were going?

Yes; we had been in the facility twelve weeks, and my comment to them was, "What I don't know is whether we just have the twelve-week jitters or whether this place is falling down around our ears, because something's wrong." We found out it was nothing more than twelve-week jitters.

What kind of mistakes did you make in terms of the early operation of your facility?

Our S.O.P. manual, the policies and procedures manual, wasn't finished when we moved in. We just didn't have enough staff to get it completed and do all the other things. That's where we get back to the importance of having paid transition staff. We should have taken Kathie out of her job, put somebody else into Work Release and Programs, and just let her go full-time, without staff meetings a couple of times a week.

Secondly, we had a construction manager who wouldn't let us on the site during construction. We have a decent facility; we don't have any problems with it; but it wasn't until the last six months that I was able to come on-site with any freedom at all. My staff didn't get into the building until after it was completed on March 3, 1986.

Was that an agreement that you worked out beforehand?

No. We were hoping we would be able to regulate our access. All the other jail managers around the state were able to take people through their facilities, as long as they wore hard hats and signed waivers. They had access as long as they didn't get in the way and checked with the construction people to find out what they should stay out of. But we virtually didn't get any of our staff in until after the building was finished.

Was the main reason safety?

No, I don't think so, although that's what they said. I don't think the problem was so much with the construction people as with our own county employees.

Do you have any comments regarding anything that could have been done better in terms of the early operation of the jail?

I think we should have opened up all the modules—which we still haven't—if we could have had all the staff hired by the time we got in here. Our personnel department wasn't prepared for hiring 50 to 75 new people, in spite of having a transition team. Personnel doesn't report to me; they thought they could do it without any new staff to help.

Basically, I was taking a staff that was already trying to run a jail, to make the transition into a new one. And then we had to go over and help Personnel, because we had to hurry the process along. We have a pretty extensive screening process--I'm sure it's not a lot different from anyone else's--including psychological testing, with a polygraph, and physicals. As I mentioned, we haven't opened all the modules, because the county has not authorized us to open them yet.

I think that we tried to be honest with the county; we said we needed a certain level of staffing now, but we wanted the opportunity to evaluate our needs in one year. We did that evaluation after eight months, and we filled three new positions using existing money, which was the agreement we had—to stay within the 1986 allocation. We stayed within the 1986 allocation by shifting around some personnel. However, our allocation was cut during the budget process and we ended up losing positions.

So you weren't allowed the freedom to make such internal budgeting decisions?

No. That's been a real problem, in that they have not given us the opportunity to do so. I have three maintenance men in this building and, I can tell you right now, we need four. I don't have enough clerical staff in the record-keeping area. We split from the sheriff's department, so we don't have their records system or have access to their property room. We came into a facility with staff that had no idea what a criminal justice records system was, and basically, we're having to learn that now. It's unfortunate.

Any problems with administrators?

Our first-line supervisors we call "watch commanders" or "shift We're still experiencing some problems with them. commanders." Some came out of prison systems, and others just don't like the direct supervision approach. Our managers and first-level supervision staff don't know how to supervise from remote areas. They think they have to be right in there, on top of everybody, and I'm not liberal myself, but I deciding what's going to happen. guess I'm pretty close. In any case, we are having a problem with our shift commanders, as Larry Ard said we would. Everyone I talked to prior to moving in said we would. I was going to train and make sure we didn't, but I guess I didn't do a very good job in that area, because I'm still having the same problems that other people told me they've experienced.

Do you have any remedies, any suggestions?

My problem now is that I can't afford to send them off somewhere for two weeks, like to Contra Costa, and say, "Okay, now just follow that supervisor around, and when you come back, I want you to be just like him." When we did send people for two and three days, they came back excited. But it was another three months before we moved in, so all of that got wasted. What we need right now is to send our shift commanders off to Pima County or Contra Costa. I need to be able to send those people down for two weeks and say, "Don't come back until you learn their system and are willing to implement it."

Have you had problems with direct supervision staff?

They're slowly but surely getting acclimated. The biggest problem we're dealing with is fear--"Oh, my God, I'm in here with 40 prisoners.** Really, we aren't having any serious problems at all.

What about problems with the inmates?

There were absolutely no problems at all with the prisoners. We only had 130 prisoners to move. We did it in two days. It was just the quietest, easiest thing that I've ever done in my entire life, They came in, they looked at the digs, they got new coveralls, new shoes, blankets, mattresses, new everything. They went into their module, and just the awe of this brand-new place . . . Of course, you have to remember the dungeon we came out of was a 1934 design, built in 1966-67, and it was just a piece of junk. It wasn't worth the powder to blow it up. The prisoners came out of that, and there were absolutely no problems. They tested each one of our policies, which we expected, but for the most part, we had no problems.

Did you have problems with support staff?

I think the biggest issue with support staff was the move itself. It was, "Oh, my God, all my work is over here and I've got to put it in a box, and I don't know when I lost this and I lost that" I kept trying to tell them it's okay to screw up, it's okay to make a mistake. I think probably the biggest issue with them is that it's overwhelming. There are twice as many personnel as before, almost three times as many prisoners as before. They're finally getting into the groove, and now we have just the normal, day-to-day staff complaints.

What kind of transition training did you have?

Let me just give you an overview of the course. We had a two-week class. The first day we started out, we had a motivational speaker come in from 10:00 to 2:00. Then we covered prisoner discipline, key control, custodial care, standards of this State, and computers. (We have a brand-new computer system that was designed for this building, so they had to play with that a little bit.) We also got into booking and release, because they were different from what we had done before.

We are lucky, in that our in-house mental health professional did some training in suicide prevention and hostage negotiations. We also got into prisoner classification and cultural awareness training.

We provided a familiarization with each area--control room, medical services, food service, maintenance, clerical, and counselling. Everyone got to talk about his or her area. We also covered interpersonal skills, communications, writing, control of contraband, shakedowns, fire procedures, use of restraints, searches, prisoner visits (that is, social and professional visiting), drugs and drug I.D., maintenance and food service, and reception. (We've never had a receptionist before)

We had to run this class three times- just for staff. We jammed all that into two weeks. The county executive and I and all the trainers got together on the last day, invited all the groups together, and had a graduation ceremony where we passed out certificates and plaques.

How are you training new staff that come on?

One-on-one, mostly. We have been very lucky, in that we haven't lost a lot of staff. We lost two the first week, one because he had to go into the military. One guy who was an old-timer quit, and he's already back with us, having realized when he got out in the real world that what he had was a lot better. We have not had the turnover that we expected, so we're pleased with that.

What didn't you know that you wish you had known?

I wish I had known more about direct supervision jails. I wish I had known more about security, more about how to run them. I wish that, during the design phase, our architect had pushed us to go look at other facilities, because we have some design problems with the building. We're too secure. I don't think anyone is going to escape from this building; you have to go through ten doors to get out of the building. You need a key for every other door, and each is a different key than the one before. I think that just, pure negligence is the only way anybody is going to escape from inside the building.

In terms of the environment, though, you do have the traditional, "soft" environment of a direct supervision facility, don't you?

Yes. The modules themselves are almost identical to Contra Costa's. Contra Costa's modules have 40 beds, and because of the footprint of this building, which is 210 feet long and 58 feet wide, we also have 40 beds. I wish they were 50-bed modules or 55-bed modules. I think we could take care of them.

The biggest problem we have in direct supervision jails today is that we don't tell the supervisors to go sit at their desks and do paperwork and leave the people in the modules alone. If the officers screw up, then we'll take care of them and train them to do their job better.

If you were to go through the process again, what would you do differently?

First of all, I would start training the supervisors the minute we started the transition, about two years before completion, I'd start sending them out to other places, get them to believe in direct supervision. For this whole process to work, you've got to believe in what you're doing.

I would also look for a good management team; that's the way I like to work. Kathie and I have worked together for ten years, so we didn't have any problems. But I would go out and look for the rest of the management team, specifically, a detention manager and a programs manger, who are committed to direct supervision. In fact, I would be bold enough to say that unless you're committed and sold to the extent that you live, breathe, eat, talk, and think direct supervision, you need to leave, because it's not going to work.

The bottom line for this whole direct supervision thing is that it's cheaper. It doesn't cost me as much. I don't have prisoners with broken arms or broken jaws; I don't have fights. We recently did something that I would have argued about two years ago: we're putting heavy bags in the jail now. You want to fight, go fight the bag. It'll take everything you can give it. I'll let you know how it works.

If I had it to do over again, I would do a whole bunch of things differently. I would put light switches handier to staff. I wouldn't put as many things behind lock and key. I wouldn't make it

quite as secure, in terms of inside activity. In terms of the outside perimeter, I would be just as secure as we are now, maybe a little more so. Inside, where are you going to go? We're a high-rise, eleven stories tall, and if you want to jump out of the eleventh story, hey, see you later.

I don't know how I got into this business, because I don't like people to die. I started out as a jailer's aide in this facility, which is such a low classification, they threw it out. When I became a supervisor, I was the first civilian supervisor in Snohomish County to run a jail. I was also, at one time, the youngest jail manager in the State of Washington. In 1974, nine days after I got the job as supervisor, a guy hung himself in a cell about 50 feet away from where I was standing. . . I hate that stuff.

It hasn't happened again, has it?

That hasn't, but other things have. Of all the years since 1886, I think it was, when this county was formed, I hold the record in number of escapes. The most creative one was the guy who sat in a garbage can for ten hours to be taken out in the trash the next day.

What would you say is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision jail?

Again, we have to allow the module officers to do what we hired them to do--that is, to run the module and to tell us when they need help. and then we have to respond to that need. That's oversimplified, but basically, we have to give them more authority. We also have to give them more training than I gave them in two weeks, and then we have to start treating the people we hire as custody staff more as supervisors, saying, "It's your town, you're the mayor. If you want to get rehired, I'm going to give you the skills to do the job right, so there's no excuse if you don't."

I think the whole communication issue is crucial. We have to spend more time on learning to communicate with each other. Just because I'm the director of the facility doesn't mean you can't call me Bill when I come to the module to talk to you. There again, maybe that's not the way some people would do business, and maybe that's not exactly the way I feel about it, but there's got to be communication, so people aren't afraid to say, "Bullshit, it doesn't work that way."

I tried to tell everybody that our policies and procedures manual was designed around somebody who was trying to think new, but was still stuck in the old operation, just like I was. Trying to build a policies and procedures manual around an idea that we had never seen, and around a drawing of a building that we hadn't been in, was crazy. "Whatever you do," I said, "I'm going to be the most flexible person in the world. If you see something that's wrong and you don't like it, and you know it's not going to work, or you've proved that it doesn't work, say, 'It won't work, let's do this.'"

Have you made any changes to your manual since you opened?

Yes--not major revisions yet, but certainly a few changes. I started a committee I called the Modules Operation Committee. Those people meet for two hours a week and they're setting up rules and regulations for the modules.

Also, we have a psychiatric unit of 17 beds, which is different from everybody else's, and we want officers to run it. I want them to work for a mental health professional. The custody types want to go in and tie everybody down. You don't do those things any more. We have to get out of the 1934 design and move into the 1980s. I think it's just a matter of time; I'm committed to being the best.

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY STOCKADE EXPANSION

Respondent: Sara F. Heatherly

Director, Support Services Division

Metropolitan Dade County

Corrections and Rehabilitation

Miami, Florida

** Note: This facility iscurrently under construction and is as yet unnamed. In the interim, the County is operating a pretrial detention center and other temporary units under direct supervision principles.

FACILITY BACKGROUND

Basic Description: Multi-tiered facility with 21 direct-

supervision modules

Architect: Harper and Carreno


Capacity: 1,000 Size: 420,000 sq.ft.

cost: \$39,010,000

Projected Opening Date: 1988

Staffing -- Security: 225

Program: 22 Support: 43 Medical: 25



What events or factors led to the original decision to make your facility a direct supervision jail?

First, let me explain that we currently do not have a facility in operation that was specifically designed for that purpose. In October 1982, we were in the schematic design phase of a second-generation jail when our director, Fred Crawford, attended a Mega Jail Management seminar at NIC in Boulder. While he was there, he learned from Ray Nelson about the direct supervision philosophy. Upon his return, we addressed that philosophy through all the proper channels, including staff, our county manager, and the Board of County Commissioners. We currently have a 1,000-bed, new generation jail under construction, which is scheduled to be operable probably by spring or summer 1988.

However, in the meantime, we have built some temporary units to house inmates in a dormitory-type setting, and we use direct supervision there. We also utilize direct supervision in one of the wings in our Pretrial Detention Center, which is also a dormitory setting. The new facility will have all the amenities associated with the direct supervision concept, while the temporaries were built in an expeditious manner because of crowding.

We were glad to have the chance to implement the philosophy in advance. Mr. Nelson initially had some concerns about our utilizing the philosophy in temporary units, without the amenities. It has really worked beautifully for us, and has given us the opportunity to have related classroom and on-the-job training, thus helping to prepare us for when the new jail opens.

I think that what I'm going to tell you will be useful even though we are using direct supervision in a different setting than you anticipated. There was a great deal of decision-making that went on in efforts to utilize the philosophy, which has helped in the construction process and was quite positive in itself.

I would like to hear about some of the decisions you made with respect to incorporating the new philosophy into that large a facility.

Again, we were in the schematic design phase of a 600-bed, second-generation jail. After being enlightened, it seemed the natural and most progressive way to proceed.

Did you have any problems with that shift in terms of the public?

With NIC's assistance, the architects, the G.S.A. project manager, and I all first went on a tour of direct supervision facilities, including Contra Costa. We toured three different facilities, and when we returned, we were better able to address the issues. We participated in radio and television programs, and Mr. Nelson made a presentation to the county commissioners. Before the commissioners felt they could make a decision, they also wanted to visit some facilities that utilize the concept. They did, and they came back convinced. Representatives of the media went with the commissioners on their trio and sent back articles to the largest The community publisher in the community, The Miami Herald. learned what was happening while they were on the trip, so it was quite an event.

We also sent some P.B.A. representatives of our union to work at the Contra Costa facility for a week. And in the meantime, we continued with our regular staff training so that all the employees would have the best information they could. Mr. Nelson came again, and the union representatives explained how they personally felt while working in Contra Costa.

All the information that was acquired was assessed, and the county commission voted to build a 1,000-bed, direct supervision facility, rather than a 600-bed, remote supervision facility. Now we have a fantastic facility under construction. We feel that we have incorporated all that was best of the facilities we visited, and, in fact, enhanced them. I know that everyone with a new facility feels they have done the same thing, and we've made it a point to visit back with some of those that have been started in the meantime to ensure that we are still state-of-the art in all respects.

Do you have any sense of decisions having been made that were perhaps not as successful? Is there anything that you wish you could undo?

Not really. Right now, we feel pleased with what we are doing.

In terms of the early operation of the 600-bed unit that you're now using, can you note any particularly good operational decisions made, in addition to incorporating the direct supervision philosophy whenever you could?

We felt that that was the best decision. Prior to training our officers, we had NIC staff come down and train our trainers, so our trainers, in turn, started an ongoing, interpersonal communications skills training program. All staff assigned to work in those units were pre-trained. We did not make any exceptions.

Let's move on to problems with specific groups. Did you face any problems related to the direct supervision aspect from your administrators or first-line supervisors?

Because of the process we had gone through in indoctrinating both the staff and the public on the issues, we were probably unusually enlightened. Initially, we did place more less-experienced people in the units than we should have, and some of the administrators had not yet bought into the program. We probably should have done more hands-on training or used more experienced officers than we did.

A number of people I've talked to have said that first-line supervisors who came from a different environment had a hard time finding a role for themselves in direct supervision. Did you experience any of that?

That tendency was eliminated for the most part, because of the training.

How about the direct supervision staff itself? I think that was what you meant by placing some less-experienced people?

Yes. Several of the people who worked in there initially were newer members of our staff and, even with the training, perhaps lacked some of the awareness of what reactions might be forthcoming from the inmates.

Did you experience any problems with the inmates themselves?

We experienced varying reactions from the inmates. The first inmates we moved in were those who had been involved in construction of the project. Because we were under federal mandate and we did What didn't you know that you wish you had known?

Because of the circumstances, we were quite familiar with the philosophy. We didn't know, however, about the large demand that would be placed on the support staff. They said that during a short period of time there were many more demands from the inmates than in the previous system, in which there was not that much interaction. That was an adjustment period for them. Probably, based on that, we should have increased support staff, at least for the initial period. Maybe we should have done a little more pre-planning in that area. Some issues could be anticipated, but others could be addressed only as they arose.

What would you say is the most important factor in the success of a direct supervision facility?

Staff should be well trained and committed to the philosophy. It is especially important to believe, as we did, "This is going to be successful."

What is going to happen to your present facility when the new one is operational?

We have five facilities right now that were built as temporary units. They are dormitory-type buildings that can be used for a number of things, including recreation, various kinds of programing, or for warehouses. We built them so they would have multiple uses, once we're fortunate enough to be able to vacate them.

If you were to go through the process again, what would you do differently?

We would provide better orientation for the inmates. That way, they would be more aware of the concept and more comfortable with the setting, which is important. The other thing is that we would use staff with experience, especially hands-on experience in interacting with inmates, rather than staff just out of the academy, when initially moving into the facility. However, the practicum now included in the academy training is addressing that concern.

Do you have any other comments?

We are very proud that we have adopted and are committed to the direct supervision concept. It's been a learning experience for lots of people and an experience that has taught us that we really believe in participatory management. We feel very fortunate.

You asked for problems (we prefer the word "opportunities"), and I made an effort to respond to that. To date, when the staff speaks of the transition process they are quick to say that we haven't had any difficulties, because those we experienced were so minor they are now considered insignificant.

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A LIST OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS

Larry Ard Contra Costa Main Detention Facility 1000 Ward Street Martinez, CA

(415) 372-4497

Thomas Barry Bronx House of Detention 653 River Avenue Bronx, NY 10451

(212) 665-8520

Rod Bottoms Larimer County Detention Center 200 West Oak Street Fort Collins, CO

(303) 221-7120

Russell Davis Pima County Adult Detention Center P.O. Box 910 Tucson, AZ 85702

(602) 882-2848

Joe Patrick Gallagher Erie County Correctional Facility P.O. Box X Alden, NY 14004

(706) 937-9101

R. J. Hagman Vancouver Pretrial Services Center (215) 348-6746 275 East Cordova Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6A 3W3

(604) 683-0381

William B. Harper Snohomish County Jail Courthouse Complex Everett, WA 98201

(206) 259-9395

Sara F. Heatherly Metropolitan-Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department 1500 N.W. 12th Avenue, Suite 772 Miami, FL 33136

(305) 547-7029

Anthony Pellicane Middlesex County Adult Corrections Center P.O. Box 266 New Brunswick, NJ 08903

(201) 297-8839

Robert G. Skipper Multnomah County Detention Center 1120 S.W. Third Avenue, Room 316 Portland, OR 97204

(503) 248-5091

Arthur M. Wallenstein Bucks County Correctional Facility 138 S. Pine Street Doylestown, PA 18901

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