58. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State ¹1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–458. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Beirut.

Baghdad,June 4, 1958—11 a.m.

1999. Foreign Under Secretary Gailani asked Fritzlan²2. A. David Fritzlan, Counselor of Embassy. call on him evening June 3 to discuss important and urgent question which turned out to be Lebanese situation.

Gailani, stating he was speaking on behalf Arab Union Government, said that reports received from Iraqi Embassy Beirut indicate position of Lebanese Government steadily deteriorating and that drastic treatment will be needed if situation is to be retrieved. There had been, he remarked, some expectation that General Chehab would be asked to head a government, and that would have helped, but now it seemed doubtful if Chamoun would do this.

Coming to the point, Gailani said AUR Government believed time had come to apply Eisenhower Doctrine to Lebanon and that Lebanon’s friends should encourage Chamoun to invoke Doctrine.

Fritzlan commented that question of applicability of Eisenhower Doctrine to Lebanon was under constant study by US and that doubtless Chamoun himself was giving it much thought, that implications of invocation of Doctrine were very far reaching and to a large extent unfavorable to Chamoun’s position and that he seemed to realize this. There was, of course, basic question of whether threat to Lebanon came from countries under control of “international Communism”. Gailani appreciated these difficulties but continued to press for application of Doctrine as only way of saving Lebanon from domination if not absorption by UAR.

In response to a question as to exact thinking of AUR Government concerning remedy to situation Gailani said US and UK should respond to an appeal from Chamoun by making available forces which would quickly quell insurgency. Gailani indicated he was going to

make similar representations to British Embassy. Gailani had no faith in Arab League’s ability to help Lebanon and very much doubted UNSC would be able take any effective action.

Fritzlan asked if AUR Government had yet urged Chamoun to invoke Eisenhower Doctrine. Gailani said he believed Jamali en route to New York had done so in talk with Chamoun. Beyond this there had been no “official démarche” on subject.

I would appreciate receiving Department’s instructions as to what should be said to Gailani on question he now raised.³3. The Department responded in telegram 3154 to Baghdad, June 4, with an assurance for the Arab Union government that the United States was determined to take whatever steps would prove necessary to insure the independence and integrity of Lebanon. Ambassador Gallman was instructed to call on Prime Minister Nuri al-Said to convey this assurance, but, at the same time, to note that the United States would not take such measures in order to insure the maintenance or installation of any individual in the presidency, or in situations in which Lebanese security forces were willing to take firm and effective action in defense of Lebanese independence. Gallman added: “At this juncture we feel possibility situation developing to point where US armed forces would be required, and could be usefully employed, receding rather than advancing.” (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–458; included in the microfiche supplement)

Gallman