V. Reestablishment of Political Stability in Lebanon and Jordan and the Withdrawal of U.S. and U.K. Forces, August 22–October 31, 1958: The “Arab Resolution”; Hammarskjöld’s Trip to the Middle East; U.S.–U.K. Coordination on Planning for Withdrawal; Negotiations with Lebanon Concerning U.S. Withdrawal; Negotiations Concerning Jordanian Security; Establishment of the Chehab Government; Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From Lebanon; Withdrawal of U.K. Forces From Jordan (Documents 288-362)
1901. Publication of our communiqué22. See Document 346. on withdrawal of forces has raised new furor in Moslem population of Lebanon who have construed phrase in first paragraph, “barring unforeseen developments”, as deliberately intended to foreshadow indefinite stay of US troops in this country.
This morning President Chehab and Foreign Minister Takla separately spoke to me of their great concern over this palpable distortion of our intent and agreed with me that, taken in context of entire communiqué, this clause bore on international security situation rather than on internal affairs of Lebanon. However, they said reasonably enough that one could not expect reason from the Moslem faction. In particular, Karami was extremely exercised and wanted a note sent to us formally demanding withdrawal of US forces at once.
I pointed out to President and later to Takla, whom I have just seen, that such a note could make Lebanon Government seem ridiculous coming on top of our published communiqué, and that anything Karami might say should be uttered with extreme care lest he should find himself mouth piece for radio Cairo, Damascus, Moscow and Peking.
At Takla suggestion we then went up to see Prime Minister Karami, who made some extremely cordial statements about his personal regard for me and his appreciation for all the US had done for Lebanon. He did say, however, that clause “barring unforeseen developments” had “torpedoed” agreement on withdrawal in eyes of Moslem population.
I believe these measures will forestall angry blast from Karami which might have had adverse propaganda repercussions in Middle East and been exploited by Communist media.
McClintock
1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–958. Secret; Priority.
3 In telegram 1908 from Beirut, October 9, McClintock reported that Takla had conveyed to him the letter outlined in this telegram. He also reported that the meeting of Admirals Holloway and Ekstrom with Karame “went off very smoothly.” Holloway gave Karame an off-the-record indication of his evacuation plans and the Prime Minister was visibly relieved. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–958; included in the microfiche supplement)