V. Reestablishment of Political Stability in Lebanon and Jordan and the Withdrawal of U.S. and U.K. Forces, August 22–October 31, 1958: The “Arab Resolution”; Hammarskjöld’s Trip to the Middle East; U.S.–U.K. Coordination on Planning for Withdrawal; Negotiations with Lebanon Concerning U.S. Withdrawal; Negotiations Concerning Jordanian Security; Establishment of the Chehab Government; Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From Lebanon; Withdrawal of U.K. Forces From Jordan (Documents 288-362)
The Secretary General commented that he expected this session of the GA to be an important one. Although there were not many important items on the agenda, they would offer a springboard for the Assembly to consider a good many important problems.
[Here follows discussion of the Sino-Soviet bloc]
Mr. Hammarskjold reported in some detail on his trip to the Middle East. His report compares with that contained in USUN 362 which reported on Mr. Barco’s conversation of September 14. The following points may be added:
(1) Prime Minister Rifai of Jordan told the SYG in utter confidence that if it were not for the King’s emotional reactions, he thought it would be possible to establish relationships and work with the regime in Iraq. Because of the King’s reactions, however, he did not believe the time was propitious for such a move.
(2) With respect to Lebanon, the Secretary General commented that he had developed a high regard for Chehab whom he believed to be a deeply patriotic man. He got the impression that Chehab, as a military man, was fed up with politicians, and he doubted Chehab’s capacity to deal with complex situations. On the whole, however, his impression of Chehab was very good.
(3) Hammarskjold did not cover the question of withdrawal of US or UK forces in his report. He said he wanted to see what developments take place after Chehab’s inauguration.
(4) With respect to the resumption of Jordanian-UAR relations, he said that both countries seemed favorably disposed in principle. Nasser pointed out that Jordan broke relations and it was up to Jordan to resume them. Hammarskjold said that he had given some thought to the possibility of Husseini’s (Arab League) acting as a middle man in this respect, but he had the impression Husseini did not carry much weight. In any event, the Arabs, thorough their own organization, ought to try to bring about a resumption of relations.
(5) Nasser assured Hammarskjold that air and land traffic with Jordan would be resumed soon. It was merely a question of timing. He probably would wait until Chehab took over in Lebanon in order to tie in the resumption of traffic with the general improvement in Arab relationships.
(6) In general, Hammarskjold’s attitude was one of guarded optimism. His description of the general situation was not unduly pessimistic. He seemed to feel that with good luck and careful handling an explosion in the Middle East might be avoided.
In conclusion Hammarskjold said he thought it would be sufficient if the GA would merely note the SYG’s report on the Middle East and not take any further action.
1 source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1107. Secret. Drafted by Wilcox. The source text indicates the conversation took place in the U.N. Building. Dulles headed the U.S. Delegation at the Thirteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 14–20.