IV. Diplomatic Efforts to Resolve the Crisis in Jordan, July 18–August 21, 1958: Jordanian Request for U.S. Troops; The Murphy Mission; U.S. Response to a Soviet Proposal for a Heads of Government Meeting; The Lebanese Presidential Election; Jordanian Request for Additional Military Aid and a Mutual Defense Treaty; Negotiations with the United Arab Republic; Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly (Documents 190-287)
Mr. Lloyd then read an analysis from the British Embassy, Moscow, which concluded that there were advantages in talking with the Russians: first, because of the danger of war that might arise from a Soviet miscalculation of Turkish intentions and secondly, because the make-up of the meeting Khrushchev proposed was better than might
be expected. Mr. Lloyd thought Nehru and Hammarskjold would be helpful if our objective was some UN or international status for Lebanon. The Secretary saw some advantage in the UN forum as being more orderly and one in which agenda and other procedures had to be followed but there were certain disadvantages such as the participation of people not directly involved, the problem of Iraqi credentials, and others. Mr. Lloyd felt we should make some positive proposal in reply to Khrushchev’s letter. The Secretary observed that to accept the proposal would be to have a meeting at the Summit on terms we have always resisted. Such a meeting would be unprepared, limited to the Middle East and produce nothing but demagoguery. Mr. Lloyd thought we had a good issue in the independence of little states. The Secretary assented but pointed out that many of the little Arab states did not seem to want independence. He cited a recent report33. Not further identified. from the Arab Section of Jerusalem and referred to the Yugoslav Chargé’s view of the “historic inevitability” of the Pan-Arab movement. The Secretary believed our position in Lebanon and the British position in Jordan was going to become very dangerous shortly. To Mr. Lloyd’s question what the Russians meant when they referred to the “Middle East”, the Secretary recalled that last year Gromyko had interpreted it to mean all of the Middle East.
Baghdad Pact—With reference to the Baghdad Pact states, the Secretary said it would be a source of bitterness if we had a Summit meeting before talking to them. Our basis for action in Lebanon and Jordan was in response to the appeal of small countries. If we rushed into a Summit, it would jeopardize the support we have gotten on this basis. Mr. Lloyd recalled that the Baghdad Pact meeting was scheduled to be held in London next Monday.44. July 28. After some discussion as to whether there was any advantage in advancing it a couple of days, it was agreed that on balance it was better to hold it as scheduled. The Secretary undertook to reach London on Sunday and be available for informal talks and to stay on through Monday to attend the first day of the regularly scheduled meeting of the organization.55. Documentation on the Baghdad Pact meetings in London, July 28–29, is scheduled for publication in volume XII.
1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4111/7–2058. Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt. The source text indicates that the conversation took place at a breakfast meeting at the Secretary’s residence.
2 A copy of this draft reply was sent to London and Paris for comment on July 20 in telegrams 708 to London and 298 to Paris. (Ibid., 396.1/7–2058) Copies of these telegrams initialed by Eisenhower are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series.