II. The Decision to Introduce U.S. Forces Into Lebanon, June 10–July 17, 1958: Establishment of the U.N. Observation Group; Chamoun’s Rejection of Nasser’s Formula for Settlement; Lebanon’s Request for Military Intervention; The U.S.–U.K. Decision to Intervene; Introduction of U.S. Forces (Documents 66-154)
5080. View fact that date approaching when under Lebanese constitution election of new President can be held, and of need for US, UK and France know Chamoun’s thinking as far in advance of election as possible what candidate would be most suitable in current circumstances, we believe that, either jointly or separately, you and your British colleague, and your French colleague if Paris has instructed him, should seek early opportunity to discuss this problem with President Chamoun.
In conversation with Chamoun you should refer to fact that he has on several occasions stated clearly to us that he does not plan to seek reelection. You should state that in these circumstances it seems to us most desirable that his great influence in Lebanon be used to insure the greatest possibilities for the election of a person in whom he has confidence and who shares his determination to defend independence and integrity of Lebanon. Accordingly and in view of our desire to be helpful to Lebanon in this matter we would appreciate receiving his views as to who might be desirable candidate. We will naturally hold these views in strictest confidence.
These instructions coordinated with UK. French Embassy informed.
UK and French Ambassadors Beirut presumably will receive similar instructions for coordination with you.
Dulles
1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–2858. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and cleared by Rountree, Deputy Assistant Secretary Frederick W. Jandrey in EUR, and Dulles. Repeated to London, Paris, and USUN. When Rountree telephoned Dulles on the morning of June 28 to obtain his clearance for this telegram, Dulles instructed that the text be changed to solicit Chamoun’s opinion as to the most suitable candidate for the presidency rather than to make reference to U.S. efforts to help facilitate the election of a suitable candidate. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations; included in the microfiche supplement)