# FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Aruba AP-65, AP-70, and AP-85 Wireless Access Points

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## 1 Introduction

This document constitutes the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the AP-65, AP-70, and AP-85 series Wireless Access Points with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation from Aruba Networks. This security policy describes how the AP meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2, and how to place and maintain the AP in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation of the product.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2, *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Web-site at:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html

This document can be freely distributed.

## 1.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations

**AES** Advanced Encryption Standard

**AP** Access Point

CBC Cipher Block Chaining CLI Command Line Interface

CO Crypto Officer

CPSec Control Plane Security protected

**CSEC** Communications Security Establishment Canada

CSP Critical Security Parameter
ECO External Crypto Officer
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference

FE Fast Ethernet
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GHz Gigahertz

**HMAC** Hashed Message Authentication Code

**Hz** Hertz

Internet Key Exchange **IKE IPSec** Internet Protocol security KAT Known Answer Test KEK **Key Encryption Key** L2TP Layer-2 Tunneling Protocol LAN Local Area Network **LED** Light Emitting Diode Secure Hash Algorithm SHA

**SNMP** Simple Network Management Protocol

SPOE Serial & Power Over Ethernet
TEL Tamper-Evident Label
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network

**SOE** Serial Over Ethernet

### 2 Product Overview

This section introduces the various Aruba Wireless Access Points, providing a brief overview and summary of the physical features of each model covered by this FIPS 140-2 security policy.

## 2.1 AP-65

This section introduces the Aruba AP-65 Wireless Access Points (APs) with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation. It describes the purpose of the AP, its physical attributes, and its interfaces.



Figure 1 - AP-65 Series Wireless Access Point

The AP-65 access point supports diverse deployment options, delivering secure user-centric network services and applications for high-performance enterprise and campus environments, branch offices and retail spaces, as well as deployments over public and private networks as a Remote/Mobile AP. The AP-65 supports dual, integral, high-performance omni-directional multi-band antennas.

### 2.1.1 Physical Description

The Aruba AP-65 Wireless Access Point is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of hardware and software, all contained in a hard plastic case. The module contains IEEE 802.11a and 802.11b/g transceivers, and 2 integrated omni-directional multi-band dipole antenna elements are attached.

The plastic case physically encloses the complete set of hardware and software components, and represents the cryptographic boundary of the module.

- The hardware version is designated as AP-65-F1 Rev.01
- The exact firmware version validated is: ArubaOS 6.1.2.3-FIPS, ArubaOS 6.1.4.1-FIPS

#### 2.1.1.1 Dimensions/Weight

The AP has the following physical dimensions:

- 3.9" x 3.9" x 1.4" (99mm x 99mm x 36mm)
- 0.4lb (0.18 Kgs)

#### 2.1.1.2 Interfaces

The module provides the following network interfaces:

• 1x 10/100 Base-T Ethernet (RJ45) Auto-sensing link speed and MDI/MDX.

The module provides the following output-only serial interface for status information:

• 1 x RJ-45 console interface, shares port with ENET

The module provides the following power interfaces:

- 48V DC 802.3af or 802.3at or PoE + interoperable Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) with intelli-source PSE sourcing intelligence
- 5V DC for external AC supplied power (adapter sold separately)

#### 2.1.1.3 Indicator LEDs

There are 4 single-color LEDs which operate as follows:

**Table 1- Indicator LEDs** 

PORT	COLOR	STATE	CONTROL	MEANING
PWR	Off	Off		No power
	Green	On	SW	Ready for operation
	Green	Blinking	SW	Not ready
ENET	Off	Off	E-net transceiver	No link
	Green	On	E-net transceiver	Link okay
	Green	Blinking	E-net transceiver	Link activity
WLAN (a and				
b/g)	Off	Off	Wireless MAC	Link disabled
	Green	Very slow blink	Wireless MAC	No association
	Green	Slow blink	Wireless MAC	Association, no activity
	Green	Fast blink	Wireless MAC	Association and activity

## 2.2 AP-70

This section introduces the Aruba AP-70 Wireless Access Points (APs) with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation. It describes the purpose of the AP, its physical attributes, and its interfaces.

Figure 2 - AP-70 Series Wireless Access Points



The AP-70 access point supports diverse deployment options, delivering secure user-centric network services and applications in enterprise and campus environments, branch offices, retail spaces, and to remote locations over public or private networks as an advanced featured Remote AP. The AP-70 provides dual 10/100 Ethernet Interfaces, redundant 802.3af PoE sourcing, and a USB 2.0 interface (disabled for FIPS) for service extension. The AP-70 features onboard dual, integral, high-performance omni-directional multi-band antennas and also supports external antennas through quad, detachable antenna interfaces.

### 2.2.1 Physical Description

The Aruba AP-70 Wireless Access Point is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of hardware and software, all contained in a hard plastic case. The module contains IEEE 802.11a, 802.11b, and 802.11g transceivers, and 2 integrated omni-directional multi-band dipole antenna elements may be attached to the module.

The plastic case physically encloses the complete set of hardware and software components and represents the cryptographic boundary of the module.

- The hardware version is designated as AP-70-F1: Rev 01.
- The exact firmware version validated is: ArubaOS\_6.1.2.3-FIPS, ArubaOS\_6.1.4.1-FIPS

#### 2.2.1.1 Dimensions/Weight

The AP has the following physical dimensions:

- 7.4" x 6.8" x 1.4" (188mm x 173mm x 36mm)
- 1.15lb (0.52 Kgs)

#### 2.2.1.2 Interfaces

The module provides the following network interfaces:

- 2 x 10/100 Base-T Ethernet (RJ45) Auto-sensing link speed and MDI/MDX
- Antenna

The module provides the following power interfaces:

- 48V DC 802.3af or 802.3at or PoE + interoperable Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) with intelli-source PSE sourcing intelligence (shared over both Ethernet ports)
- 1 x 5V DC up to 2.5A for external AC supplied power (adapter sold separately)

The module provides the following additional interfaces:

- 1 x USB 2.0 interface for service extension (disabled in FIPS mode by covering with a TEL)
- 1 x RJ-45 Serial-over-Ethernet (output only, shared with ENET0 interface)

#### 2.2.1.3 Indicator LEDs

There are 2 sets of 4 single-color LEDs (one on each side of the device just below the external antenna connectors) which operate as follows:

#### Table 2 - indicator LEDs

PORT	COLOR	STATE	CONTROL	MEANING
PWR	Off	Off		No power
	Green	On	SW	Ready for operation
	Green	Blinking	SW	Not ready
ENET	Off	Off	E-net transceiver	No link
	Green	On	E-net transceiver	Link okay
	Green	Blinking	E-net transceiver	Link activity
WLAN (a and b/g)	Off	Off	Wireless MAC	Link disabled
	Green	Very slow blink	Wireless MAC	No association
	Green	Slow blink	Wireless MAC	Association, no activity
	Green	Fast blink	Wireless MAC	Association and activity

### 2.3 AP-85 Series

This section introduces the Aruba AP-85 Wireless Access Points (APs) with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation. This series includes the AP-85TX, AP-85LX, and AP-85FX. It describes the purpose of the AP, its physical attributes, and its interfaces.

Figure 3 - AP-85 Series Wireless Access Points



The Aruba AP-85FX, AP-85LX and AP-85TX are fully-hardened, outdoor-rated, dual (high-power) radio (dual-band concurrent 802.11a plus b/g) wireless access points, capable of supporting multiple functions including WLAN access, air monitoring/wireless intrusion detection and prevention, high-performance secure outdoor enterprise mesh and LAN bridging across the 2.4-2.5 GHz and 5 GHz RF spectrums. The AP-85FX and the AP-85LX incorporate fiber optic network interfaces(FX multi-mode / LX single-mode) and are designed to operate from 90-288VAC mains power or +12VDC solar or vehicle battery power, while the AP-85TX operates from standard 802.3af compliant Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) or +12VDC solar or vehicle battery supplied power.

All models of the AP-85 access point support diverse deployment options, delivering secure user-centric enterprise network services and applications outdoors on campuses and storage yards, in indoor and outdoor warehouses and in extreme industrial production environments where exposure to corrosive substances, salt water, excessive moisture or flammable gases are often encountered in daily operation. Additionally, the AP-85FX and the AP-85LX are suited for use around metro city environments; where the available street light power tap kit allows the device to be powered directly from street lighting poles.

### 2.3.1 Physical Description

The Aruba AP-85 series Access Point is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of hardware and software, all contained in a robust metal case. The module contains IEEE 802.11a and 802.11b/g transceivers, and up to 3 integrated or external omni-directional multi-band dipole antenna elements may be attached to the module.

The metal case physically encloses the complete set of hardware and software components and represents the cryptographic boundary of the module.

- The validated hardware versions are designated as
  - o AP-85FX-F1: Rev 01
  - o AP-85LX-F1: Rev 01
  - o AP-85TX-F1: Rev 01
- The exact firmware version validated is: ArubaOS\_6.1.2.3-FIPS, ArubaOS\_6.1.4.1-FIPS

#### 2.3.1.1 Dimensions/Weight

The AP has the following physical dimensions:

- 10.8" x 12.64" x 3.07" (261mm x 321mm x 78mm)
- 4.1lbs (1.86 Kgs)

#### 2.3.1.2 AP 85 Interfaces

The module provides the following network interfaces:

- AP 85 FX
  - o 1 x 100 Base-FX multi-mode 1310nM wavelength dual-fiber LC interface. This is 100Base-FX Fast Ethernet interface.
  - 1 x RJ-45 console interface
- AP 85 LX
  - o 1 x 100 Base-LX single-mode 1310nM wavelength dual-fiber LC interface. This is 100Base-LX SFP (small form-factor pluggable) interface.
  - 1 x RJ-45 console interface
- AP 85 TX
  - o 1 x 10/100 Base-T Ethernet Auto-sensing link speed and MDI/MDX. This is 100Base-T Fast Ethernet interface.
  - o 48V DC IEEE compliant 802.3af Power-over-Ethernet (PoE)
  - Serial-over-Ethernet (SoE)
- Antenna
  - o 4 x N-type female interfaces (2 per radio)

The module provides the following power interfaces:

- AP 85 TX
  - o 48V DC 802.3af Power over Ethernet (PoE) (Maximum power draw 12 W at 48 V DC)

- o 1 x 12V DC for external DC solar supplied power
- 85 FX/LX
  - o 1 x 90-288 VAC/500mA auto-sensing interface
  - o 1 x 12V DC for external DC solar supplied power

### 2.3.1.3 Indicator LEDs

**Table 3- Indicator LEDs** 

Label	Function	Action	Status
PWR	PWR AP power / ready status Off		No power to AP
		Flashing	Device booting, not ready
		On	Device ready
ENET			Ethernet link unavailable
	Activity	On - Yellow	10Mbs Ethernet link negotiated
		On - Green	100Mbs Ethernet link negotiated
		Flashing	Ethernet link activity
WLAN G	2.4GHz Radio Status	Off	2.4GHz radio disabled
		On - Green	2.4GHz radio enabled in WLAN mode
		On - Yellow	2.4GHz radio enabled in WDS mode
WLAN A	5GHz Radio Status	Off	5GHz radio disabled
		On - Green	5GHz radio enabled in WLAN mode
		On - Yellow	5GHz radio enabled in WDS mode
RSSI (min-	RSSI Level (bridge link mode	Off	RSSI disabled / no reading
max)	only)	Min. 7 Step Progressive Bars	Increase in RSSI signal strength = displayed bar level

## 3 Module Objectives

This section describes the assurance levels for each of the areas described in the FIPS 140-2 Standard. In addition, it provides information on placing the module in a FIPS 140-2 approved configuration.

## 3.1 Security Levels

Section	Section Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	2
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
4	Finite State Model	2
5	Physical Security	2
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key Management	2
8	EMI/EMC	2
9	Self-tests	2
10	Design Assurance	2
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

## 3.2 Physical Security

The Aruba Wireless AP is a scalable, multi-processor standalone network device and is enclosed in a robust plastic or metal housing. The AP enclosure is resistant to probing (please note that this feature has not been validated as part of the FIPS 140-2 validation) and is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of the AP has been designed to satisfy FIPS 140-2 Level 2 physical security requirements.

## 3.2.1 Applying TELs

The Crypto Officer must apply Tamper-Evident Labels (TELs) to the AP to allow detection of the opening of the device, and to block the serial console port (on the bottom of the device). The TELs shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Vendor provides FIPS 140 designated TELs which have met the physical security testing requirements for tamper evident labels under the FIPS 140-2 Standard. TELs are not endorsed by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). Aruba provides double the required amount of TELs with shipping and additional replacement TELs can be obtained by calling customer support and requesting part number 4010061-01.

The Crypto Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper evident labels. The Crypto Officer should employ TELs as follows:

- Before applying a TEL, make sure the target surfaces are clean and dry.
- Do not cut, trim, punch, or otherwise alter the TEL.
- Apply the wholly intact TEL firmly and completely to the target surfaces.
- Ensure that TEL placement is not defeated by simultaneous removal of multiple modules.
- Allow 24 hours for the TEL adhesive seal to completely cure.

Record the position and serial number of each applied TEL in a security log.

Once applied, the TELs included with the AP cannot be surreptitiously broken, removed or reapplied without an obvious change in appearance:



Each TEL has a unique serial number to prevent replacement with similar label. To protect the device from tampering, TELs should be applied by the Crypto Officer as pictured below:

#### 3.2.2 AP-65 TEL Placement

This section displays all the TEL locations of the Aruba AP-65. The AP-65 requires a minimum of 3 TELs to be applied as follows:


### 3.2.2.1 To detect opening of the chassis cover:


- 1. Spanning the bottom and top chassis covers on the left
- 2. Spanning the bottom and top chassis covers on the right

#### 3.2.2.2 To detect access to restricted ports

3. Spanning the serial port adapter

Following is the TEL placement for the AP-65:





### 3.2.3 AP-70 TEL Placement

This section displays all the TEL locations of the Aruba AP-70. The AP-70 requires a minimum of 5 TELs to be applied as follows:


### 3.2.3.1 To detect opening of the chassis cover:


- 1. Spanning the top chassis cover and the fold-out antenna
- 2. Spanning the rear chassis cover and the fold-out antenna on the left
- 3. Spanning the rear chassis cover and the fold-out antenna on the right
- 4. Spanning the rear chassis cover and the USB port

### 3.2.3.2 To detect access to restricted ports

5. Spanning the serial port adapter

Following is the TEL placement for the AP-70:





### 3.2.4 AP-85 TEL Placement

This section displays all the TEL locations of the Aruba AP-85. The AP-85 requires a minimum of 8 TELs to be applied as follows:

### 3.2.4.1 To detect opening of the chassis cover:

- 1. Spanning the top chassis cover and bottom chassis cover on the left
- 2. Spanning the top chassis cover and bottom chassis cover on the right


### 3.2.4.2 To detect access to connectors

- 3. Spanning the AC power connector
- 4. Spanning antenna connector
- 5. Spanning antenna connector
- 6. Spanning antenna connector
- 7. Spanning antenna connector

## 3.2.4.3 To detect access to restricted ports

8. Spanning the serial port

Following is the TEL placement for the AP-85:



Note: The TELs placed over the antenna interface connectors in the preceding illustration are intended to prevent the antenna connections from being pushed into the enclosure.

TEL placement for an AP-85FX/LX with console cable connected:



TEL placement for an AP-85FX/LX with cap over console connector:



TEL placement for an AP-85TX with cap over Ethernet connector:



## 3.2.5 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms

Physical Security Mechanism	Recommended Test Frequency	Guidance		
Tamper-evident labels (TELs)	Once per month	Examine for any sign of removal, replacement, tearing, etc. See images above for locations of TELs		
Opaque module enclosure	Once per month	Examine module enclosure for any evidence of new openings or other access to the module internals.		

## 3.3 Modes of Operation

The module can be configured to be in the following FIPS approved modes of operations via corresponding Aruba Mobility Controllers that have been certificated to FIPS level 2:

- Remote AP (RAP) FIPS mode When the module is configured as a Remote AP, it is intended to be deployed in a remote location (relative to the Mobility Controller). The module provides cryptographic processing in the form of IPSec for all traffic to and from the Mobility Controller.
- Control Plane Security (CPSec) protected AP FIPS mode When the module is configured as a
  Control Plane Security protected AP it is intended to be deployed in a local/private location (LAN,
  WAN, MPLS) relative to the Mobility Controller). The module provides cryptographic processing
  in the form of IPSec for all Control traffic to and from the Mobility Controller.
- Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode When the module is configured in Mesh Portal mode, it is intended to be connected over a physical wire to the mobility controller. These modules serve as the connection point between the Mesh Point and the Mobility Controller. Mesh Portals communicate with the Mobility Controller through IPSec and with Mesh Points via 802.11i session. The Crypto Officer role is the Mobility Controller that authenticates via IKEv1/IKEv2 pre-shared key or RSA certificate authentication method, and Users are the "n" Mesh Points that authenticate via 802.11i preshared key.
- Remote Mesh Point FIPS mode an AP that establishes all wireless path to the Remote Mesh portal in FIPS mode over 802.11 and an IPSec tunnel via the Remote Mesh Portal to the controller.

In addition, the module also supports a non-FIPS mode – an un-provisioned AP, which by default does not serve any wireless clients. The Crypto Officer must first enable and then provision the AP into a FIPS AP mode of operation.

This section explains how to place the module in FIPS mode in either Remote AP FIPS mode, Control Plane Security AP FIPS Mode, Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode or Mesh Point FIPS Mode. How to verify that it is in FIPS mode. An important point in the Aruba APs is that to change configurations from any one mode to any other mode requires the module to be re-provisioned and rebooted before any new configured mode can be enabled.

The access point is managed by an Aruba Mobility Controller in FIPS mode, and access to the Mobility Controller's administrative interface via a non-networked general purpose computer is required to assist in placing the module in FIPS mode. The controller used to provision the AP is referred to below as the

"staging controller". The staging controller must be provisioned with the appropriate firmware image for the module, which has been validated to FIPS 140-2, prior to initiating AP provisioning.

After setting up the Access Point by following the basic installation instructions in the module User Manual, the Crypto Officer performs the following steps:

### 3.3.1 Configuring Remote AP FIPS Mode

- 1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
- 2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
- 3. Deploying the AP in Remote FIPS mode configure the controller for supporting Remote APs, For detailed instructions and steps, see Section "Configuring the Secure Remote Access Point Service" in Chapter "Remote Access Points" of the Aruba OS User Manual.
- 4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network > Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
- 5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP**Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the **Edit** button for the appropriate AP group, and then select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the "Fips Enable" box, check "Apply", and save the configuration.
- 6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power supply appropriate to the particular model of the module.
- 7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between the module and the staging controller.
- 8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page**, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select that AP, click the "Provision" button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision the AP as Remote AP by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section "Provisioning an Individual AP" of Chapter "The Basic User-Centric Networks" of the Aruba OS User Guide. Click "Apply and Reboot" to complete the provisioning process.
  - a. During the provisioning process as Remote AP if Pre-shared key is selected to be the Remote IP Authentication Method, the IKE pre-shared key (which is at least 8 characters in length) is input to the module during provisioning. Generation of this key is outside the scope of this policy. In the initial provisioning of an AP, this key will be entered in plaintext; subsequently, during provisioning, it will be entered encrypted over the secure IPSec session. If certificate based authentication is chosen, AP's RSA key pair is used to authenticate AP to controller during IPSec. AP's RSA private key is contained in the AP's non volatile memory and is generated at manufacturing time in factory.
- 9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully provisioned with firmware and configuration
- 10. Terminate the administrative session
- 11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller on the network.

## 3.3.2 Configuring Control Plane Security (CPSec) protected AP FIPS mode

- 1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
- 2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
- 3. Deploying the AP in CPSec AP mode, configure the staging controller with CPSec under Configuration > Controller > Control Plane Security tab. AP will authenticate to the controller using certificate based authentication to establish IPSec. AP is configured with RSA key pair at manufacturing. AP's certificate is signed by Aruba Certification Authority (trusted by all Aruba controller's) and the AP's RSA private key is stored in non-volatile memory. Refer to "Configuring Control Plane Security" Section in ArubaOS User Manual for details on the steps.
- 4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network > Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
- 5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP Configuration > AP Group** page. There, you click the **Edit** button for the appropriate AP group, and then select **AP > AP System Profile.** Then, check the "Fips Enable" box, check "Apply", and save the configuration.
- 6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power supply appropriate to the particular model of the module
- 7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between the module and the staging controller.
- 8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select that AP, click the "Provision" button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision the CPSec Mode by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section "Provisioning an Individual AP" of Chapter "The Basic User-Centric Networks" of the Aruba OS User Guide. Click "Apply and Reboot" to complete the provisioning process.
  - a. For CPSec AP mode, the AP always uses certificate based authentication to establish IPSec connection with controller. AP uses the RSA key pair assigned to it at manufacturing to authenticate itself to controller during IPSec. Refer to "Configuring Control Plane Security" Section in Aruba OS User Manual for details on the steps to provision an AP with CPSec enabled on controller.
- 9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully provisioned with firmware and configuration
- 10. Terminate the administrative session
- 11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller on the network.

## 3.3.3 Configuring Remote Mesh Portal FIPS Mode

- 1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
- 2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
- 3. Deploying the AP in Remote Mesh Portal mode, create the corresponding Mesh Profiles on the controller as described in detail in Section "Mesh Profiles" of Chapter "Secure Enterprise Mesh" of the Aruba OS User Manual.

- a. For mesh configurations, configure a WPA2 PSK which is 16 ASCII characters or 64 hexadecimal digits in length; generation of such keys is outside the scope of this policy.
- 4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network > Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
- 5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the Configuration > Wireless > AP Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the Edit button for the appropriate AP group, and then select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the "Fips Enable" box, check "Apply", and save the configuration.
- 6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power supply appropriate to the particular model of the module.
- 7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between the module and the staging controller.
- 8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page**, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select that AP, click the "Provision" button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision the AP as Remote Mesh Portal by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section "Provisioning an Individual AP" of Chapter "The Basic User-Centric Networks" of the Aruba OS User Guide. Click "Apply and Reboot" to complete the provisioning process.
  - a. During the provisioning process as Remote Mesh Portal, if Pre-shared key is selected to be the Remote IP Authentication Method, the IKE pre-shared key (which is at least 8 characters in length) is input to the module during provisioning. Generation of this key is outside the scope of this policy. In the initial provisioning of an AP, this key will be entered in plaintext; subsequently, during provisioning, it will be entered encrypted over the secure IPSec session. If certificate based authentication is chosen, AP's RSA key pair is used to authenticate AP to controller during IPSec. AP's RSA private key is contained in the AP's non volatile memory and is generated at manufacturing time in factory.
  - b. During the provisioning process as Remote Mesh Portal, the WPA2 PSK is input to the module via the corresponding Mesh cluster profile. This key is stored on flash encrypted.
- 9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully provisioned with firmware and configuration
- 10. Terminate the administrative session
- 11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller on the network.

To verify that the module is in FIPS mode, do the following:

- 1. Log into the administrative console of the Aruba Mobility Controller
- 2. Verify that the module is connected to the Mobility Controller
- 3. Verify that the module has FIPS mode enabled by issuing command "show ap ap-name <ap-name> config"
- 4. Terminate the administrative session

### 3.3.4 Configuring Remote Mesh Point FIPS Mode

1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2

- 2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
- 3. Deploying the AP in Remote Mesh Point mode, create the corresponding Mesh Profiles on the controller as described in detail in Section "Mesh Points" of Chapter "Secure Enterprise Mesh" of the Aruba OS User Manual.
  - a. For mesh configurations, configure a WPA2 PSK which is 16 ASCII characters or 64 hexadecimal digits in length; generation of such keys is outside the scope of this policy.
- 4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network > Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
- 5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the Configuration > Wireless > AP Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the Edit button for the appropriate AP group, and then select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the "Fips Enable" box, check "Apply", and save the configuration.
- 6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power supply appropriate to the particular model of the module.
- 7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between the module and the staging controller.
- 8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page**, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select that AP, click the "Provision" button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision the AP as Remote Mesh Portal by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section "Provisioning an Individual AP" of Chapter "The Basic User-Centric Networks" of the Aruba OS User Guide. Click "Apply and Reboot" to complete the provisioning process.
  - a. During the provisioning process as Remote Mesh Point, if Pre-shared key is selected to be the Remote IP Authentication Method, the IKE pre-shared key (which is at least 8 characters in length) is input to the module during provisioning. Generation of this key is outside the scope of this policy. In the initial provisioning of an AP, this key will be entered in plaintext; subsequently, during provisioning, it will be entered encrypted over the secure IPSec session. If certificate based authentication is chosen, AP's RSA key pair is used to authenticate AP to controller during IPSec. AP's RSA private key is contained in the AP's non volatile memory and is generated at manufacturing time in factory.
  - b. During the provisioning process as Mesh Point, the WPA2 PSK is input to the module via the corresponding Mesh cluster profile. This key is stored on flash encrypted.
- 9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully provisioned with firmware and configuration
- 10. Terminate the administrative session
- 11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller on the network.

#### 3.3.5 Verify that the module is in FIPS mode

For all the approved modes of operations in either Remote AP FIPS mode, Control Plane Security AP FIPS Mode, Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode or Mesh Point FIPS Mode do the following to verify the module is in FIPS mode:

1. Log into the administrative console of the Aruba Mobility Controller

- 2. Verify that the module is connected to the Mobility Controller
- 3. Verify that the module has FIPS mode enabled by issuing command "show ap ap-name <ap-name> config"
- 4. Terminate the administrative session

## 3.4 Operational Environment

This section does not apply as the operational environment is non-modifiable.

## 3.5 Logical Interfaces

The physical interfaces are divided into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2 as described in the following table.

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface	Module Physical Interface
Data Input Interface	10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports
	802.11a/b/g/n Radio Transceiver
Data Output Interface	10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports
	802.11a/b/g/n Radio Transceiver
Control Input Interface	10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports (PoE)
Status Output Interface	10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports
	802.11a/b/g/n Radio Transceiver
	LEDs
Power Interface	Power Supply
	POE

Data input and output, control input, status output, and power interfaces are defined as follows:

- Data input and output are the packets that use the networking functionality of the module.
- Control input consists of manual control inputs for power and reset through the power interfaces (5V DC or PoE). It also consists of all of the data that is entered into the access point while using the management interfaces.
- Status output consists of the status indicators displayed through the LEDs, the status data that is output from the module while using the management interfaces, and the log file.
  - LEDs indicate the physical state of the module, such as power-up (or rebooting), utilization level, and activation state. The log file records the results of self-tests, configuration errors, and monitoring data.
- A power supply is used to connect the electric power cable. Operating power may also be provided via Power Over Ethernet (POE) device when connected. The power is provided through the connected Ethernet cable.
- Console port is disabled when operating in each of FIPS modes.

The module distinguishes between	different forms	of data, co	control, and	status traffic	over the	network ports
by analyzing the packet headers and	d contents.					

## 4 Roles, Authentication and Services

### 4.1 Roles

The module supports the roles of Crypto Officer, User, and Wireless Client; no additional roles (e.g., Maintenance) are supported. Administrative operations carried out by the Aruba Mobility Controller map to the Crypto Officer role. The Crypto Officer has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.

Defining characteristics of the roles depend on whether the module is configured as a Remote AP mode or as a Remote Mesh Portal mode.

#### • Remote AP:

- Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
- o User role: in the configuration, the User operator shares the same services and authentication techniques as the Mobility Controller in the Crypto Officer role.
- O Wireless Client role: in Remote AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access/bridging services. In advanced Remote AP configuration, when Remote AP cannot communicate with the controller, the wireless client role authenticates to the module via WPA2-PSK only.

#### CPSec AP:

- Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
- o User role: in the configuration, the User operator shares the same services and authentication techniques as the Mobility Controller in the Crypto Officer
- Wireless Client role: in CPSec AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access services.

#### • Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode:

- Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
- O User role: the adjacent Mesh Point APs in a given mesh cluster. Please notice that Remote Mesh Portal AP must be physically wired to Mobility Controller.
- Wireless Client role: in Remote Mesh Portal FIPS AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access services.

#### Remote Mesh Point FIPS mode:

- O Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer role is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs. The first mesh AP configured is the only AP with the direct wired connection.
- O User role: the adjacent Mesh APs in a given mesh cluster. Please notice that User role can be a Mesh Point AP or a Mesh Portal AP in the given mesh network.

 Wireless Client role: in Mesh Remote Mesh Point FIPS AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access services.

### 4.1.1 Crypto Officer Authentication

In each of FIPS approved modes, the Aruba Mobility Controller implements the Crypto Officer role. Connections between the module and the mobility controller are protected using IPSec. Crypto Officer authentication is accomplished via either proof of possession of the IKEv1/IKEv2 pre-shared key or RSA certificate, which occurs during the IKEv1/IKEv2 key exchange.

#### 4.1.2 User Authentication

Authentication for the User role depends on the module configuration. When the module is configured as a Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode and Remote Mesh Point FIPS mode, the User role is authenticated via the WPA2 pre-shared key. When the module is configured as a Remote AP FIPS mode and CPSec protected AP FIPS mode, the User role is authenticated via the same IKEv1/IKEv2 pre-shared key/RSA certificate that is used by the Crypto Officer

#### 4.1.3 Wireless Client Authentication

The wireless client role defined in each of FIPS approved modes authenticates to the module via WPA2. Please notice that WEP and/or Open System configurations are not permitted in FIPS mode. In advanced Remote AP configuration, when Remote AP cannot communicate with the controller, the wireless client role authenticates to the module via WPA2-PSK only.

## 4.1.4 Strength of Authentication Mechanisms

The following table describes the relative strength of each supported authentication mechanism.

Authentication Mechanism	Mechanism Strength
IKEv1/IKEv2 shared secret (CO role)	For IKEv1/IKEv2, there are a 95^8 (=6.63 x 10^15) possible pre-shared keys. In order to test the guessed key, the attacker must complete an IKEv1/IKEv2 aggressive mode exchange with the module. IKEv1/IKEv2 aggressive mode consists of a 3 packet exchange, but for simplicity, let's ignore the final packet sent from the AP to the attacker.
	An IKEv1/IKEv2 aggressive mode initiator packet with a single transform, using Diffie-Hellman group 2, and having an eight character group name has an IKEv1/IKEv2 packet size of 256 bytes. Adding the eight byte UDP header and 20 byte IP header gives a total size of 284 bytes (2272 bits).
	The response packet is very similar in size, except that it also contains the HASH_R payload (an additional 16 bytes), so the total size of the second packet is 300 bytes (2400 bits).
	Assuming a link speed of 1Gbits/sec (this is the maximum rate supported by the module), this gives a maximum idealized guessing rate of $60,000,000,000$ / $4,672 = 12,842,466$ guesses per minute. This means the odds of guessing a correct key in one minute is less than $12,842,466/(6.63x10^{15}) = 1.94 \times 10^{9}$ , which is much less than 1 in $10^{5}$ .

Authentication Mechanism	Mechanism Strength	
Wireless Client WPA2-PSK (Wireless Client role)	For WPA2-PSK there are at least 95^16 (=4.4 x 10^31) possible combinations. In order to test a guessed key, the attacker must complete the 4-way handshake with the AP. Prior to completing the 4-way handshake, the attacker must complete the 802.11 association process. That process involves the following packet exchange:	
	Attacker sends Authentication request (at least 34 bytes)	
	AP sends Authentication response (at least 34 bytes)	
	Attacker sends Associate Request (at least 36 bytes)	
	AP sends Associate Response (at least 36 bytes)	
	Total bytes sent: at least 140. Note that since we do not include the actual 4-way handshake, this is less than half the bytes that would actually be sent, so the numbers we derive will absolutely bound the answer.	
	The theoretical bandwidth limit for IEEE 802.11n is 300Mbit, which is 37,500,000 bytes/sec. In the real world, actual throughput is significantly les than this, but we will use this idealized number to ensure that our estimate is very conservative.	
	This means that the maximum number of associations (assume no delays, no inter-frame gaps) that could be completed is less than 37,500,000/214 = 267,857 per second, or 16,071,429 associations per minute. This means that an attacker could certainly not try more than this many keys per second (it would actually be MUCH less, due to the added overhead of the 4-way handshake in each case), and the probability of a successful attack in any 60 second interval MUST be less than 16,071,429/(4.4 x 10^31), or roughly 1 in 10^25, which is much less than 1 in 10^5.	
Mesh AP WPA2 PSK (User role)	Same as Wireless Client WPA2-PSK above	
RSA Certificate based authentication (CO role)	The module supports RSA 1024 bit keys and 2048-bit RSA keys. RSA 1024 bit keys correspond to 80 bits of security. The probability of a successful random attempt is 1/(2^80), which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is less than 1/100,000.	

## 4.2 Services

The module provides various services depending on role. These are described below.

## 4.2.1 Crypto Officer Services

The CO role in each of FIPS modes defined in section 3.3 has the same services

Service	Description	<b>CSPs Accessed</b> (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)		
FIPS mode enable/disable	The CO selects/de-selects FIPS mode as a configuration option.	None.		
Key Management	The CO can configure/modify the IKEv1/IKEv2 shared secret (The RSA private key is protected by non-volatile memory and cannot be modified) and the WPA2 PSK (used in advanced Remote AP configuration). Also, the CO/User implicitly uses the KEK to read/write configuration to non-volatile memory.	<ul> <li>IKEv1/IKEv2 shared secret</li> <li>WPA2 PSK</li> <li>KEK</li> </ul>		
Remotely reboot module	The CO can remotely trigger a reboot	KEK is accessed when configuration is read during reboot. The firmware verification key and firmware verification CA key are accessed to validate firmware prior to boot.		
Self-test triggered by CO/User reboot	The CO can trigger a programmatic reset leading to self-test and initialization	KEK is accessed when configuration is read during reboot. The firmware verification key and firmware verification CA key are accessed to validate firmware prior to boot.		
Update module firmware	The CO can trigger a module firmware update	The firmware verification key and firmware verification CA key are accessed to validate firmware prior to writing to flash.		
Configure non-security related module parameters	CO can configure various operational parameters that do not relate to security	None.		

Service	Description	<b>CSPs Accessed</b> (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)	
Creation/use of secure management session between module and CO  Creation/use of secure mesh	The module supports use of IPSec for securing the management channel.	<ul> <li>IKEv1/IKEv2 Preshared Secret</li> <li>DH Private Key</li> <li>DH Public Key</li> <li>IPSec session encryption keys</li> <li>IPSec session authentication keys</li> <li>RSA key pair</li> <li>WPA2-PSK</li> </ul>	
channel	The module requires secure connections between mesh points using 802.11i	<ul> <li>WPA2-PSK</li> <li>802.11i PMK</li> <li>802.11i PTK</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL MIC Key</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL Encryption Key</li> <li>802.11i AES-CCM key</li> <li>802.11i GMK</li> <li>802.11i GTK</li> <li>802.11i AES-CCM key</li> </ul>	
System Status	CO may view system status information through the secured management channel	See creation/use of secure management session above.	

## 4.2.2 User Services

The User services defined in Remote AP FIPS mode and CPSec protected AP FIPS mode shares the same services with the Crypto Officer role, please refer to Section 4.2.1, "Crypto Officer Services". The following services are provided for the User role defined in Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode and Remote Mesh Point FIPS mode:

Service	Description	<b>CSPs Accessed</b> (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)	
Generation and use of 802.11i cryptographic keys	When the module is in mesh configuration, the inter-module mesh links are secured with 802.11i.	<ul> <li>802.11i PMK</li> <li>802.11i PTK</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL MIC Key</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL Encryption Key</li> </ul>	

Service	Description	<b>CSPs Accessed</b> (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)	
		<ul> <li>802.11i AES-CCM key</li> <li>802.11i GMK</li> <li>802.11i GTK</li> </ul>	
Use of WPA pre-shared key for establishment of IEEE 802.11i keys	When the module is in mesh configuration, the inter-module mesh links are secured with 802.11i. This is authenticated with a shared secret	WPA2 PSK	

## 4.2.3 Wireless Client Services

The following module services are provided for the Wireless Client role in each of FIPS approved modes defined in section 3.3.

Service	Description	<b>CSPs Accessed</b> (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)	
Generation and use of 802.11i cryptographic keys	In all modes, the links between the module and wireless client are secured with 802.11i.	<ul> <li>802.11i PMK</li> <li>802.11i PTK</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL MIC Key</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL Encryption Key</li> <li>802.11i AES-CCM key</li> <li>802.11i GMK</li> <li>802.11i GTK</li> </ul>	
Use of WPA pre-shared key for establishment of IEEE 802.11i keys	When the module is in advanced Remote AP configuration, the links between the module and the wireless client are secured with 802.11i. This is authenticated with a shared secret only.	WPA2 PSK	
Wireless bridging services	The module bridges traffic between the wireless client and the wired network.	None	

## 4.2.4 Unauthenticated Services

The module provides the following unauthenticated services, which are available regardless of role. No CSPs are accessed by these services.

- System status module LEDs
- Reboot module by removing/replacing power
- Self-test and initialization at power-on

## 5 Cryptographic Algorithms

FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms have been implemented in hardware and firmware.

The firmware supports the following cryptographic implementations.

- ArubaOS OpenSSL AP Module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
  - o AES (Cert. #1851)
  - o HMAC (Cert. #1099)
  - o RNG (Cert. #970)
  - o RSA (Cert. #934)
  - o SHS (Cert. #1628)
  - o Triple-DES (Cert. #1199)
- ArubaOS Module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
  - o AES (Cert. #1850)
  - o HMAC (Cert. #1098)
  - o RNG (Cert. #969)
  - o RSA (Cert. #933)
  - o SHS (Cert. #1627)
  - o Triple-DES (Cert. #1198)
- ArubaOS Linux kernel cryptographic module
  - o AES (Cert. #1847)
  - o HMAC (Cert. #1097)
  - o SHS (Cert. #1625)
  - o Triple-DES (Cert. #1197)
- ArubaOS IDT Bootloader cryptographic module
  - o SHA-1 (Cert. #1626)
  - o RSA (Cert. #932)

#### **Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms**

The cryptographic module implements the following non-approved algorithms that are not permitted for use in the FIPS 140-2 mode of operations:

• MD5

In addition, within the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the module supports the following allowed key establishment schemes:

• Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength)

# **6 Critical Security Parameters**

The following Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) are used by the module:

			STORAGE	
CSP	CSP TYPE	GENERATION	And	USE
			ZEROIZATI ON	
Key Encryption Key (KEK)	Triple-DES 168-bits key	Hard-coded	Stored in flash, zeroized by the 'ap wipe out flash' command.	Encrypts IKEv1/IKEv2 preshared keys and configuration parameters
IKEv1/IKEv2 Pre-shared secret	64 character preshared key	CO configured	Encrypted in flash using the KEK; zeroized by updating through administrative interface, or by the 'ap wipe out flash' command.	Module and crypto officer authentication during IKEv1/IKEv2; entered into the module in plaintext during initialization and encrypted over the IPSec session subsequently.
IPSec session encryption keys	168-bit Triple-DES, or 128/192/256 bit AES keys;	Established during Diffie-Hellman key agreement	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized when session is closed or system powers off	Secure IPSec traffic
IPSec session authentication keys	HMAC SHA-1 keys	Established during Diffie-Hellman key agreement	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized when session is closed or system powers off	Secure IPSec traffic

	STORAGE			
CSP	CSP TYPE	GENERATION	And ZEROIZATI ON	USE
IKEv1/IKEv2 Diffie- Hellman Private key	1024-bit Diffie- Hellman private key	Generated internally during IKEv1/IKEv2 negotiation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized when session is closed or system is powered off	Used in establishing the session key for IPSec
IKEv1/IKEv2 Diffie- Hellman shared secret	128 bit Octet	Generated internally during IKEv1/IKEv2 negotiation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized when session is closed or system is powered off	IKEv1/IKEv2 payload integrity verification
ArubaOS OpenSSL RNG Seed for FIPS compliant ANSI X9.31, Appendix A2.4 using AES-128 Key algorithm	Seed (16 Bytes)	Derived using NON- FIPS approved HW RNG (/dev/urandom)	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Seed ANSI X9.31 RNG
ArubaOS OpenSSL RNG Seed key for FIPS compliant ANSI X9.31, Appendix A2.4 using AES-128 Key algorithm	Seed key (16 bytes, AES- 128 Key algorithm)	Derived using NON- FIPS approved HW RNG (/dev/urandom)	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Seed ANSI X9.31 RNG
ArubaOS Cryptographic Module RNG Seed for FIPS compliant 186-2 General Purpose (X change Notice); SHA-1 RNG	Seed (64 bytes)	Derived using NON- FIPS approved HW RNG (/dev/urandom)	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Seed 186-2 General Purpose (X change Notice); SHA- 1 RNG
ArubaOS Cryptographic Module RNG Seed key for FIPS compliant 186-2 General Purpose (X change Notice); SHA-1 RNG	Seed Key (64 bytes)	Derived using NON- FIPS approved HW RNG (/dev/urandom)	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Seed 186-2 General Purpose (X change Notice); SHA- 1 RNG

		STORAGE		
CSP	CSP TYPE	GENERATION	And	USE
			ZEROIZATI ON	
WPA2 PSK	16-64 character shared secret used to authenticate mesh connections and in remote AP advanced configuration	CO configured	Encrypted in flash using the KEK; zeroized by updating through administrative interface, or by the 'ap wipe out flash' command.	Used to derive the PMK for 802.11i mesh connections between APs and in advanced Remote AP connections; programmed into AP by the controller over the IPSec session.
802.11i Pairwise Master Key (PMK)	512-bit shared secret used to derive 802.11i session keys	Derived from WPA2 PSK	In volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Used to derive 802.11i Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)
802.11i Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)	512-bit shared secret from which Temporal Keys (TKs) are derived	Derived during 802.11i 4-way handshake	In volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	All session encryption/dec ryption keys are derived from the PTK
802.11i EAPOL MIC Key	128-bit shared secret used to protect 4- way (key) handshake	Derived from PTK	In volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Used for integrity validation in 4-way handshake
802.11i EAPOL Encr Key	128-bit shared secret used to protect 4- way handshakes	Derived from PTK	In volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Used for confidentiality in 4-way handshake
802.11i data AES-CCM encryption/MIC key	128-bit AES- CCM key	Derived from PTK	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized on reboot	Used for 802.11i packet encryption and integrity verification (this is the CCMP or AES-CCM key)

			STORAGE	
CSP	CSP TYPE	GENERATION	And	USE
			ZEROIZATI ON	
802.11i Group Master Key (GMK)	256-bit secret used to derive GTK	Generated from approved RNG	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized on reboot	Used to derive Group Transient Key (GTK)
802.11i Group Transient Key (GTK)	256-bit shared secret used to derive group (multicast) encryption and integrity keys	Internally derived by AP which assumes "authenticator" role in handshake	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized on reboot	Used to derive multicast cryptographic keys
802.11i Group AES-CCM Data Encryption/MIC Key	128-bit AES-CCM key derived from GTK	Derived from 802.11 group key handshake	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized on reboot	Used to protect multicast message confidentiality and integrity (AES-CCM)
RSA private Key	1024/2048- bit RSA private key	Generated on the AP (remains in AP at all times)	Stored in and protected by AP's non-volatile memory. zeroized by the 'ap wipe out flash' command	Used for IKEv1/IKEv2 authentication when AP is authenticating using certificate based authentication

## 7 Self Tests

The module performs the following Self Tests after being configured into either Remote AP mode or Remote Mesh Portal mode. The module performs both power-up and conditional self-tests. In the event any self-test fails, the module enters an error state, logs the error, and reboots automatically.

The module performs the following power-up self-tests:

- ArubaOS OpenSSL AP Module
  - o AES KAT
  - o HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC SHA384) KAT
  - RNG KAT
  - RSA KAT
  - o SHA (SHA1, SHA256 and SHA384) KAT
  - o Triple-DES KAT
- ArubaOS Cryptographic Module
  - o AES KAT
  - HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC SHA384, and HMAC512) KAT
  - FIPS 186-2 RNG KAT
  - o RSA (sign/verify)
  - o SHA (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512) KAT
  - o Triple-DES KAT
- ArubaOS Linux Kernel
  - AES KAT
  - HMAC-SHA1 KAT
  - o Triple-DES KAT
- ArubaOS IDT Bootloader Module
  - o Firmware Integrity Test: RSA 2048-bit Signature Validation

The following Conditional Self-tests are performed in the module:

- Continuous Random Number Generator Test—This test is run upon generation of random data by
  the module's random number generators to detect failure to a constant value. The module stores
  the first random number for subsequent comparison, and the module compares the value of the
  new random number with the random number generated in the previous round and enters an error
  state if the comparison is successful. The test is performed for the approved as well as nonapproved RNGs.
- RSA pairwise Consistency Test
- Firmware load test

These self-tests are run for the Atheros hardware cryptographic implementation as well as for the Aruba OpenSSL and ArubaOS cryptographic module implementations.

Self-test results are written to the serial console.

In the event of a KATs failure, the AP logs different messages, depending on the error.

For an ArubaOS OpenSSL AP module and ArubaOS cryptographic module KAT failure:

AP rebooted [DATE][TIME] : Restarting System, SW FIPS KAT failed

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