# FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Aruba AP-134, AP-135 and Dell W-AP134, W-AP135 Wireless Access Points

Version 1.4 January 2013



Aruba Networks™ 1322 Crossman Ave. Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1113



#### Copyright

© 2011 Aruba Networks, Inc. Aruba Networks trademarks include

Aruba Networks®, Aruba Wireless Networks®, the registered Aruba the Mobile Edge Company logo, Aruba Mobility Management System®, Mobile Edge Architecture®, People Move. Networks Must Follow®, RFProtect®, Green Island®. All rights reserved. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Open Source Code

Certain Aruba products include Open Source software code developed by third parties, including software code subject to the GNU General Public License (GPL), GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL), or other Open Source Licenses. The Open Source code used can be found at this site:

http://www.arubanetworks.com/open\_source

#### **Legal Notice**

The use of Aruba Networks, Inc. switching platforms and software, by all individuals or corporations, to terminate other vendors' VPN client devices constitutes complete acceptance of liability by that individual or corporation for this action and indemnifies, in full, Aruba Networks, Inc. from any and all legal actions that might be taken against it with respect to infringement of copyright on behalf of those vendors.

#### Warranty

This hardware product is protected by the standard Aruba warranty of one year parts/labor. For more information, refer to the ARUBACARE SERVICE AND SUPPORT TERMS AND CONDITIONS.

Altering this device (such as painting it) voids the warranty.

#### Copyright

© 2011 Aruba Networks, Inc. Aruba Networks trademarks include , Aruba Networks®, Aruba Wireless Networks®, the registered Aruba the Mobile Edge Company logo, and Aruba Mobility Management System®. Dell™, the DELL™ logo, andPowerConnect™ are trademarks of Dell Inc.

1	IN	ГROD	UCTION	5
	1.1	Arui	BA DELL RELATIONSHIP	5
	1.2	ACRO	DNYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	5
2	PR	ODUC	CT OVERVIEW	7
	2.1	AP-1	34	7
	2.1.	.1	Physical Description	7
	2	2.1.1.1	Dimensions/Weight	7
	2	2.1.1.2	Interfaces	7
	2	2.1.1.3	Indicator LEDs	8
	2.2	AP-1	35	9
	2.2.	.1	Physical Description	9
	2	2.2.1.1	Dimensions/Weight	9
	2	2.2.1.2	Interfaces	9
	2	2.2.1.3	Indicator LEDs	10
3	MC	DUL	E OBJECTIVES	11
	3.1	SECU	RITY LEVELS	11
	3.2	PHYS	ICAL SECURITY	11
	3.2.	.1	Applying TELs	11
	3.2.	.2	AP-134 TEL Placement	12
	3	3.2.2.1	To detect opening of the chassis cover:	12
	3	3.2.2.2	To detect access to restricted ports	12
	3.2.	.3	AP-135 TEL Placement	14
	3	3.2.3.1	To detect opening of the chassis cover:	14
	3	3.2.3.2	To detect access to restricted ports	14
	3.2.	.4	Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms	16
	3.3	Mod	ES OF OPERATION	17
	3.3.	.1	Configuring Remote AP FIPS Mode	17
	3.3.	.2	Configuring Control Plane Security (CPSec) protected AP FIPS mode	18
	3.3.	.3	Configuring Remote Mesh Portal FIPS Mode	19
	3.3.	.4	Configuring Remote Mesh Point FIPS Mode	20
	3.3.	.5	Verify that the module is in FIPS mode	21
	3.4	OPER	ATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	21
	3.5	Logi	CAL INTERFACES	21
4	RO	LES,	AUTHENTICATION AND SERVICES	23
	4.1	Role	SS	23
	4.1.	.1	Crypto Officer Authentication	24
	4.1.	.2	User Authentication	24

7	SELF T	ESTS	35
6	CRITIC	CAL SECURITY PARAMETERS	3
5	CRYPT	OGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS	30
	4.2.4	Unauthenticated Services	
	4.2.3	Wireless Client Services	
	4.2.2	User Services	
	4.2.1	Crypto Officer Services	
4.	2 Sei	RVICES	20
	4.1.4	Strength of Authentication Mechanisms	22
	4.1.3	Wireless Client Authentication	24

## 1 Introduction

This document constitutes the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the AP-134, AP-135 Wireless Access Points with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation from Aruba Networks. This security policy describes how the AP meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2, and how to place and maintain the AP in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation of the product.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2, *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Web-site at:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html

This document can be freely distributed.

## 1.1 Aruba Dell Relationship

Aruba Networks is the OEM for the Dell PowerConnect W line of products. Dell products are identical to the Aruba products other than branding and Dell firmware is identical to Aruba firmware other than branding. For example, Aruba "AP-134-F1" is equivalent to Dell "W-AP134-F1", and "ArubaOS\_6.12.3-FIPS" is equivalent to "DELL\_PCW\_6.1.2.3-FIPS"

Table 1 - Corresponding Aruba and Dell Part Numbers

Aruba Part Number	Aruba Firmware	Dell Part Number	Dell Firmware
AP-134-F1	ArubaOS_6.1.2.3-FIPS, ArubaOS_6.1.4.1-FIPS	W-AP134-F1	DELL_PCW_6.1.2.3-FIPS, DELL_PCW_6.1.4.1-FIPS
AP-135-F1	ArubaOS_6.1.2.3-FIPS, ArubaOS_6.1.4.1-FIPS	W-AP135-F1	DELL_PCW_6.1.2.3-FIPS, DELL_PCW_6.1.4.1-FIPS

NOTE: References to Aruba, ArubaOS, Aruba AP-130 Series wireless access points in the following context will apply to both the Aruba and Dell versions of these products and documentation

## 1.2 Acronyms and Abbreviations

**AES** Advanced Encryption Standard

AP Access Point

CBC Cipher Block Chaining CLI Command Line Interface

CO Crypto Officer

**CPSec** Control Plane Security protected

CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada

CSP Critical Security Parameter
ECO External Crypto Officer
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference

FE Fast Ethernet
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GHz Gigahertz

**HMAC** Hashed Message Authentication Code

Hz Hertz

IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPsec Internet Protocol security
KAT Known Answer Test
KEK Key Encryption Key
L2TP Layer-2 Tunneling Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light Emitting Diode
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm

SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol SPOE Serial & Power Over Ethernet

SPOE Serial & Power Over Ethernet
TEL Tamper-Evident Label
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network

### 2 Product Overview

This section introduces the various Aruba Wireless Access Points, providing a brief overview and summary of the physical features of each model covered by this FIPS 140-2 security policy.

### 2.1 AP-134

This section introduces the Aruba AP-134 Wireless Access Point (AP) with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation. It describes the purpose of the AP, its physical attributes, and its interfaces.

The Aruba AP-134 is high-performance 802.11n (3x3:3) MIMO, dual-radio (concurrent 802.11a/n + b/g/n) indoor wireless access points capable of delivering combined wireless data rates of up to 900Mbps. These multi-function access points provide wireless LAN access, air monitoring, and wireless intrusion detection and prevention over the 2.4-2.5GHz and 5GHz RF spectrum. The access points work in conjunction with Aruba Mobility Controllers to deliver high-speed, secure user-centric network services in education, enterprise, finance, government, healthcare, and retail applications

### 2.1.1 Physical Description

The Aruba AP-134 series Access Point is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of hardware and software, all contained in a hard plastic case. The module contains 802.11 a/b/g/n transceivers and supports external antennas through 3 x dual-band (RP-SMA) antenna interfaces for supporting external antennas.

The plastic case physically encloses the complete set of hardware and software components and represents the cryptographic boundary of the module.

The Access Point configuration validated during the cryptographic module testing included:

Aruba Part Number	Dell Corresponding Part Number
AP-134-F1	W-AP134-F1

The exact firmware versions validated were:

- ArubaOS 6.1.2.3-FIPS, ArubaOS 6.1.4.1-FIPS
- DELL\_PCW\_6.1.2.3-FIPS, DELL\_PCW\_6.1.4.1-FIPS

validated

#### 2.1.1.1 Dimensions/Weight

The AP has the following physical dimensions:

- 170 mm (H) x 170 mm (W) x 45 mm.
- 760 g (1.68 lb)

#### 2.1.1.2 Interfaces

The module provides the following network interfaces:

- 2 x 10/100/1000 Base-T Ethernet (RJ45) Auto-sensing link speed and MDI/MDX
- Antenna
  - o 3x RP-SMA antenna interfaces (supports up to 3x3 MIMO with spatial diversity)

• 1 x RJ-45 console interface

The module provides the following power interfaces:

- 48V DC 802.3af or 802.3at or PoE + interoperable Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) with intelli-source PSE sourcing intelligence
- 12V DC for external AC supplied power (adapter sold separately)

#### 2.1.1.3 Indicator LEDs

There are 5 bicolor (power, ENET and WLAN) LEDs which operate as follows:

**Table 1- AP-134 Indicator LEDs** 

Label	Function	Action	Status
PWR	AP power / ready status	Off	No power to AP
		Red	Initial power-up condition
		Flashing – Green	Device booting, not ready
		On – Green	Device ready
ENET0 ENET1	Ethernet Network Link Status / Activity	Off	Ethernet link unavailable
		On – Amber	10/100Mbs Ethernet link negotiated
		On – Green	1000Mbps Ethernet link negotiated
		Flashing	Ethernet link activity
11b/g/n	2.4GHz Radio Status	Off	2.4GHz radio disabled
		On – Amber	2.4GHz radio enabled in non-HT WLAN mode
		On – Green	2.4GHz radio enabled in HT WLAN mode
		Flashing – Green	2.4GHz Air monitor
11a/n	5GHz Radio Status	Off	5GHz radio disabled
		On – Amber	5GHz radio enabled in non-HT WLAN mode
		On – Green	5GHz radio enabled in HT WLAN mode
		Flashing – Green	5GHz Air monitor

#### 2.2 AP-135

This section introduces the Aruba AP-135 Wireless Access Point (AP) with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation. It describes the purpose of the AP, its physical attributes, and its interfaces.

The Aruba AP-135 is high-performance 802.11n (3x3:3) MIMO, dual-radio (concurrent 802.11a/n + b/g/n) indoor wireless access points capable of delivering combined wireless data rates of up to 900Mbps. These multi-function access points provide wireless LAN access, air monitoring, and wireless intrusion detection and prevention over the 2.4-2.5GHz and 5GHz RF spectrum. The access points work in conjunction with Aruba Mobility Controllers to deliver high-speed, secure user-centric network services in education, enterprise, finance, government, healthcare, and retail applications

### 2.2.1 Physical Description

The Aruba AP-135 series Access Point is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of hardware and software, all contained in a hard plastic case. The module contains 802.11 a/b/g/n transceivers and supports 3 integrated omni-directional multi-band dipole antenna elements (supporting up to 3x3 MIMO with spatial diversity).

The plastic case physically encloses the complete set of hardware and software components and represents the cryptographic boundary of the module.

The Access Point configuration validated during the cryptographic module testing included:

Aruba Part Number	<b>Dell Corresponding Part Number</b>
AP-135-F1	W-AP135-F1

The exact firmware versions validated were:

- ArubaOS\_6.1.2.3-FIPS, ArubaOS\_6.1.4.1-FIPS
- DELL\_PCW\_6.1.2.3-FIPS, DELL\_PCW\_6.1.4.1-FIPS

#### 2.2.1.1 Dimensions/Weight

The AP has the following physical dimensions:

- 170 mm (H) x 170 mm (W) x 45 mm.
- 760 g (1.68 lb)

#### 2.2.1.2 Interfaces

The module provides the following network interfaces:

- 2 x 10/100/1000 Base-T Ethernet (RJ45) Auto-sensing link speed and MDI/MDX
- Antenna
  - o 3x RP-SMA antenna interfaces (supports up to 3x3 MIMO with spatial diversity)
- 1 x RJ-45 console interface

The module provides the following power interfaces:

- 48V DC 802.3af or 802.3at or PoE + interoperable Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) with intelli-source PSE sourcing intelligence
- 5V DC for external AC supplied power (adapter sold separately)

### 2.2.1.3 Indicator LEDs

There are 5 bicolor (power, ENET and WLAN) LEDs which operate as follows:

**Table 2- AP-135 Indicator LEDs** 

Label	Function	Action	Status
PWR	AP power / ready status	Off	No power to AP
		Red	Initial power-up condition
		Flashing – Green	Device booting, not ready
		On – Green	Device ready
ENET0 ENET1	Ethernet Network Link Status / Activity	Off	Ethernet link unavailable
		On – Amber	10/100Mbs Ethernet link negotiated
		On – Green	1000Mbps Ethernet link negotiated
		Flashing	Ethernet link activity
11b/g/n	2.4GHz Radio Status	Off	2.4GHz radio disabled
		On – Amber	2.4GHz radio enabled in non-HT WLAN mode
		On – Green	2.4GHz radio enabled in HT WLAN mode
		Flashing – Green	2.4GHz Air monitor
11a/n	5GHz Radio Status	Off	5GHz radio disabled
		On – Amber	5GHz radio enabled in non-HT WLAN mode
		On – Green	5GHz radio enabled in HT WLAN mode
		Flashing – Green	5GHz Air monitor

## 3 Module Objectives

This section describes the assurance levels for each of the areas described in the FIPS 140-2 Standard. In addition, it provides information on placing the module in a FIPS 140-2 approved configuration.

## 3.1 Security Levels

Section	Section Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	2
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
4	Finite State Model	2
5	Physical Security	2
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key Management	2
8	EMI/EMC	2
9	Self-tests	2
10	Design Assurance	2
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

## 3.2 Physical Security

The Aruba Wireless AP is a scalable, multi-processor standalone network device and is enclosed in a robust plastic housing. The AP enclosure is resistant to probing (please note that this feature has not been validated as part of the FIPS 140-2 validation) and is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of the AP has been designed to satisfy FIPS 140-2 Level 2 physical security requirements.

## 3.2.1 Applying TELs

The Crypto Officer must apply Tamper-Evident Labels (TELs) to the AP to allow detection of the opening of the device, and to block the serial console port (on the bottom of the device). The TELs shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Vendor provides FIPS 140 designated TELs which have met the physical security testing requirements for tamper evident labels under the FIPS 140-2 Standard. TELs are not endorsed by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). Aruba provides double the required amount of TELs with shipping and additional replacement TELs can be obtained by calling customer support and requesting part number 4010061-01.

The Crypto Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper evident labels. The Crypto Officer should employ TELs as follows:

- Before applying a TEL, make sure the target surfaces are clean and dry.
- Do not cut, trim, punch, or otherwise alter the TEL.
- Apply the wholly intact TEL firmly and completely to the target surfaces.
- Ensure that TEL placement is not defeated by simultaneous removal of multiple modules.
- Allow 24 hours for the TEL adhesive seal to completely cure.

Record the position and serial number of each applied TEL in a security log.

Once applied, the TELs included with the AP cannot be surreptitiously broken, removed or reapplied without an obvious change in appearance:



Each TEL has a unique serial number to prevent replacement with similar label. To protect the device from tampering, TELs should be applied by the Crypto Officer as pictured below:

#### 3.2.2 AP-134 TEL Placement

This section displays all the TEL locations of the Aruba AP-134. The AP-134 requires a minimum of 5 TELs to be applied as follows:

#### 3.2.2.1 To detect opening of the chassis cover:

- 1. Spanning the bottom and top chassis covers and placed in the front left corner
- 2. Spanning the bottom and top chassis covers and placed in the back left corner
- 3. Spanning the chassis screw on the bottom left corner
- 4. Spanning the chassis screw on the bottom right corner

#### 3.2.2.2 To detect access to restricted ports

5. Spanning the serial port

Following is the TEL placement for the AP-134:



Figure 1: AP-134 Front view



Figure 2: AP-134 Back View



Figure 3: AP-134 Left View



Figure 4: AP-134 Top View



Figure 5: AP-134 Right View



Figure 6: AP-134 Bottom View

#### 3.2.3 AP-135 TEL Placement

This section displays all the TEL locations of the Aruba AP-135. The AP-134 requires a minimum of 5 TELs to be applied as follows:

#### 3.2.3.1 To detect opening of the chassis cover:

- 1. Spanning the bottom and top chassis covers and placed in the front left corner
- 2. Spanning the bottom and top chassis covers and placed in the back left corner
- 3. Spanning the chassis screw on the bottom left corner
- 4. Spanning the chassis screw on the bottom right corner

#### 3.2.3.2 To detect access to restricted ports

5. Spanning the serial port

Following is the TEL placement for the AP-135:



Figure 7: AP-135 Front view



Figure 8: AP-135 Back view



Figure 9: AP-135 Left view



Figure 10: AP-135 Right view



Figure 11: AP-135 Top view



Figure 12: AP-135 Bottom View

# 3.2.4 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms

Physical Security Mechanism	Recommended Test Frequency	Guidance
Tamper-evident labels (TELs)	Once per month	Examine for any sign of removal, replacement, tearing, etc. See images above for locations of TELs
Opaque module enclosure	Once per month	Examine module enclosure for any evidence of new openings or other access to the module internals.

## 3.3 Modes of Operation

The module can be configured to be in the following FIPS approved modes of operations via corresponding Aruba or Dell Mobility Controllers that have been certificated to FIPS level 2:

- Remote AP (RAP) FIPS mode When the module is configured as a Remote AP, it is intended to be deployed in a remote location (relative to the Mobility Controller). The module provides cryptographic processing in the form of IPSec for all traffic to and from the Mobility Controller.
- Control Plane Security (CPSec) protected AP FIPS mode When the module is configured as a
  Control Plane Security protected AP it is intended to be deployed in a local/private location (LAN,
  WAN, MPLS) relative to the Mobility Controller). The module provides cryptographic processing
  in the form of IPSec for all Control traffic to and from the Mobility Controller.
- Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode When the module is configured in Mesh Portal mode, it is intended to be connected over a physical wire to the mobility controller. These modules serve as the connection point between the Mesh Point and the Mobility Controller. Mesh Portals communicate with the Mobility Controller through IPSec and with Mesh Points via 802.11i session. The Crypto Officer role is the Mobility Controller that authenticates via IKEv1/IKEv2 pre-shared key or RSA certificate authentication method, and Users are the "n" Mesh Points that authenticate via 802.11i preshared key.
- Remote Mesh Point FIPS mode an AP that establishes all wireless path to the Remote Mesh portal in FIPS mode over 802.11 and an IPSec tunnel via the Remote Mesh Portal to the controller.

In addition, the module also supports a non-FIPS mode – an un-provisioned AP, which by default does not serve any wireless clients. The Crypto Officer must first enable and then provision the AP into a FIPS AP mode of operation.

This section explains how to place the module in FIPS mode in either Remote AP FIPS mode, Control Plane Security AP FIPS Mode, Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode or Mesh Point FIPS Mode. How to verify that it is in FIPS mode. An important point in the Aruba APs is that to change configurations from any one mode to any other mode requires the module to be re-provisioned and rebooted before any new configured mode can be enabled.

The access point is managed by an Aruba Mobility Controller in FIPS mode, and access to the Mobility Controller's administrative interface via a non-networked general purpose computer is required to assist in placing the module in FIPS mode. The controller used to provision the AP is referred to below as the "staging controller". The staging controller must be provisioned with the appropriate firmware image for the module, which has been validated to FIPS 140-2, prior to initiating AP provisioning.

After setting up the Access Point by following the basic installation instructions in the module User Manual, the Crypto Officer performs the following steps:

### 3.3.1 Configuring Remote AP FIPS Mode

- 1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
- 2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
- 3. Deploying the AP in Remote FIPS mode configure the controller for supporting Remote APs, For detailed instructions and steps, see Section "Configuring the Secure Remote Access Point Service" in Chapter "Remote Access Points" of the Aruba OS User Manual.
- 4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network > Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.

- 5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the Configuration > Wireless > AP Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the Edit button for the appropriate AP group, and then select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the "Fips Enable" box, check "Apply", and save the configuration.
- 6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power supply appropriate to the particular model of the module.
- 7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between the module and the staging controller.
- 8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page**, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select that AP, click the "Provision" button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision the AP as Remote AP by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section "Provisioning an Individual AP" of Chapter "The Basic User-Centric Networks" of the Aruba OS User Guide. Click "Apply and Reboot" to complete the provisioning process.
  - a. During the provisioning process as Remote AP if Pre-shared key is selected to be the Remote IP Authentication Method, the IKE pre-shared key (which is at least 8 characters in length) is input to the module during provisioning. Generation of this key is outside the scope of this policy. In the initial provisioning of an AP, this key will be entered in plaintext; subsequently, during provisioning, it will be entered encrypted over the secure IPSec session. If certificate based authentication is chosen, AP's RSA key pair is used to authenticate AP to controller during IPSec. AP's RSA private key is contained in the AP's non volatile memory and is generated at manufacturing time in factory.
- 9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully provisioned with firmware and configuration
- 10. Terminate the administrative session
- 11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller on the network.

## 3.3.2 Configuring Control Plane Security (CPSec) protected AP FIPS mode

- 1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
- 2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
- 3. Deploying the AP in CPSec AP mode, configure the staging controller with CPSec under Configuration > Controller > Control Plane Security tab. AP will authenticate to the controller using certificate based authentication to establish IPSec. AP is configured with RSA key pair at manufacturing. AP's certificate is signed by Aruba Certification Authority (trusted by all Aruba controller's) and the AP's RSA private key is stored in non-volatile memory. Refer to "Configuring Control Plane Security" Section in ArubaOS User Manual for details on the steps.
- 4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network > Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
- 5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP Configuration > AP Group** page. There, you click the **Edit** button for the appropriate AP group, and then select **AP > AP System Profile.** Then, check the "Fips Enable" box, check "Apply", and save the configuration.

- 6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power supply appropriate to the particular model of the module
- 7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between the module and the staging controller.
- 8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select that AP, click the "Provision" button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision the CPSec Mode by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section "Provisioning an Individual AP" of Chapter "The Basic User-Centric Networks" of the Aruba OS User Guide. Click "Apply and Reboot" to complete the provisioning process.
  - a. For CPSec AP mode, the AP always uses certificate based authentication to establish IPSec connection with controller. AP uses the RSA key pair assigned to it at manufacturing to authenticate itself to controller during IPSec. Refer to "Configuring Control Plane Security" Section in Aruba OS User Manual for details on the steps to provision an AP with CPSec enabled on controller.
- 9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully provisioned with firmware and configuration
- 10. Terminate the administrative session
- 11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller on the network.

### 3.3.3 Configuring Remote Mesh Portal FIPS Mode

- 1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
- 2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
- 3. Deploying the AP in Remote Mesh Portal mode, create the corresponding Mesh Profiles on the controller as described in detail in Section "Mesh Profiles" of Chapter "Secure Enterprise Mesh" of the Aruba OS User Manual.
  - a. For mesh configurations, configure a WPA2 PSK which is 16 ASCII characters or 64 hexadecimal digits in length; generation of such keys is outside the scope of this policy.
- 4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the **Configuration > Network** > **Controller > System Settings** page (this is the default page when you click the **Configuration** tab), and clicking the **FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable** checkbox.
- 5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP**Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the **Edit** button for the appropriate AP group, and then select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the "Fips Enable" box, check "Apply", and save the configuration.
- 6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power supply appropriate to the particular model of the module.
- 7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between the module and the staging controller.

- 8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page**, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select that AP, click the "Provision" button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision the AP as Remote Mesh Portal by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section "Provisioning an Individual AP" of Chapter "The Basic User-Centric Networks" of the Aruba OS User Guide. Click "Apply and Reboot" to complete the provisioning process.
  - a. During the provisioning process as Remote Mesh Portal, if Pre-shared key is selected to be the Remote IP Authentication Method, the IKE pre-shared key (which is at least 8 characters in length) is input to the module during provisioning. Generation of this key is outside the scope of this policy. In the initial provisioning of an AP, this key will be entered in plaintext; subsequently, during provisioning, it will be entered encrypted over the secure IPSec session. If certificate based authentication is chosen, AP's RSA key pair is used to authenticate AP to controller during IPSec. AP's RSA private key is contained in the AP's non volatile memory and is generated at manufacturing time in factory.
  - b. During the provisioning process as Remote Mesh Portal, the WPA2 PSK is input to the module via the corresponding Mesh cluster profile. This key is stored on flash encrypted.
- 9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully provisioned with firmware and configuration
- 10. Terminate the administrative session
- 11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller on the network.

To verify that the module is in FIPS mode, do the following:

- 1. Log into the administrative console of the Aruba Mobility Controller
- 2. Verify that the module is connected to the Mobility Controller
- 3. Verify that the module has FIPS mode enabled by issuing command "show ap ap-name <ap-name> config"
- 4. Terminate the administrative session

### 3.3.4 Configuring Remote Mesh Point FIPS Mode

- 1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
- 2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
- 3. Deploying the AP in Remote Mesh Point mode, create the corresponding Mesh Profiles on the controller as described in detail in Section "Mesh Points" of Chapter "Secure Enterprise Mesh" of the Aruba OS User Manual.
  - a. For mesh configurations, configure a WPA2 PSK which is 16 ASCII characters or 64 hexadecimal digits in length; generation of such keys is outside the scope of this policy.
- 4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network > Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
- 5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the Configuration > Wireless > AP Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the Edit button for the appropriate AP group, and then select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the "Fips Enable" box, check "Apply", and save the configuration.
- 6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power supply appropriate to the particular model of the module.

- 7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between the module and the staging controller.
- 8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the **Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page,** where you should see an entry for the AP. Select that AP, click the "Provision" button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision the AP as Remote Mesh Portal by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section "Provisioning an Individual AP" of Chapter "The Basic User-Centric Networks" of the Aruba OS User Guide. Click "Apply and Reboot" to complete the provisioning process.
  - a. During the provisioning process as Remote Mesh Point, if Pre-shared key is selected to be the Remote IP Authentication Method, the IKE pre-shared key (which is at least 8 characters in length) is input to the module during provisioning. Generation of this key is outside the scope of this policy. In the initial provisioning of an AP, this key will be entered in plaintext; subsequently, during provisioning, it will be entered encrypted over the secure IPSec session. If certificate based authentication is chosen, AP's RSA key pair is used to authenticate AP to controller during IPSec. AP's RSA private key is contained in the AP's non volatile memory and is generated at manufacturing time in factory.
  - b. During the provisioning process as Mesh Point, the WPA2 PSK is input to the module via the corresponding Mesh cluster profile. This key is stored on flash encrypted.
- 9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully provisioned with firmware and configuration
- 10. Terminate the administrative session
- 11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller on the network.

### 3.3.5 Verify that the module is in FIPS mode

For all the approved modes of operations in either Remote AP FIPS mode, Control Plane Security AP FIPS Mode, Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode or Mesh Point FIPS Mode do the following to verify the module is in FIPS mode:

- 1. Log into the administrative console of the Aruba Mobility Controller
- 2. Verify that the module is connected to the Mobility Controller
- 3. Verify that the module has FIPS mode enabled by issuing command "show ap ap-name <ap-name> config"
- 4. Terminate the administrative session

## 3.4 Operational Environment

This section does not apply as the operational environment is non-modifiable.

## 3.5 Logical Interfaces

The physical interfaces are divided into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2 as described in the following table.

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface	Module Physical Interface
Data Input Interface	10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports
	802.11a/b/g/n Radio Transceiver
Data Output Interface	10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports
	802.11a/b/g/n Radio Transceiver
Control Input Interface	10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports (PoE)
Status Output Interface	10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports
	802.11a/b/g/n Radio Transceiver
	LEDs
Power Interface	Power Supply

Data input and output, control input, status output, and power interfaces are defined as follows:

- Data input and output are the packets that use the networking functionality of the module.
- Control input consists of manual control inputs for power and reset through the power interfaces (5V DC or PoE). It also consists of all of the data that is entered into the access point while using the management interfaces.
- Status output consists of the status indicators displayed through the LEDs, the status data that is output from the module while using the management interfaces, and the log file.
  - o LEDs indicate the physical state of the module, such as power-up (or rebooting), utilization level, and activation state. The log file records the results of self-tests, configuration errors, and monitoring data.
- A power supply is used to connect the electric power cable. Operating power may also be provided via Power Over Ethernet (POE) device when connected. The power is provided through the connected Ethernet cable.
- Console port is disabled when operating in each of FIPS modes.

The module distinguishes between different forms of data, control, and status traffic over the network ports by analyzing the packet headers and contents.

## 4 Roles, Authentication and Services

### 4.1 Roles

The module supports the roles of Crypto Officer, User, and Wireless Client; no additional roles (e.g., Maintenance) are supported. Administrative operations carried out by the Aruba Mobility Controller map to the Crypto Officer role. The Crypto Officer has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.

Defining characteristics of the roles depend on whether the module is configured as a Remote AP mode or as a Remote Mesh Portal mode.

#### • Remote AP:

- Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
- o User role: in the configuration, the User operator shares the same services and authentication techniques as the Mobility Controller in the Crypto Officer role.
- O Wireless Client role: in Remote AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access/bridging services. In advanced Remote AP configuration, when Remote AP cannot communicate with the controller, the wireless client role authenticates to the module via WPA2-PSK only.

#### CPSec AP:

- Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
- o User role: in the configuration, the User operator shares the same services and authentication techniques as the Mobility Controller in the Crypto Officer
- Wireless Client role: in CPSec AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access services.

#### • Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode:

- Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
- o User role: the adjacent Mesh Point APs in a given mesh cluster. Please notice that Remote Mesh Portal AP must be physically wired to Mobility Controller.
- Wireless Client role: in Remote Mesh Portal FIPS AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access services.

#### Remote Mesh Point FIPS mode:

- Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer role is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs. The first mesh AP configured is the only AP with the direct wired connection.
- O User role: the adjacent Mesh APs in a given mesh cluster. Please notice that User role can be a Mesh Point AP or a Mesh Portal AP in the given mesh network.

 Wireless Client role: in Mesh Remote Mesh Point FIPS AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access services.

### 4.1.1 Crypto Officer Authentication

In each of FIPS approved modes, the Aruba Mobility Controller implements the Crypto Officer role. Connections between the module and the mobility controller are protected using IPSec. Crypto Officer authentication is accomplished via either proof of possession of the IKEv1/IKEv2 pre-shared key or RSA certificate, which occurs during the IKEv1/IKEv2 key exchange.

#### 4.1.2 User Authentication

Authentication for the User role depends on the module configuration. When the module is configured as a Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode and Remote Mesh Point FIPS mode, the User role is authenticated via the WPA2 pre-shared key. When the module is configured as a Remote AP FIPS mode and CPSec protected AP FIPS mode, the User role is authenticated via the same IKEv1/IKEv2 pre-shared key/RSA certificate that is used by the Crypto Officer

#### 4.1.3 Wireless Client Authentication

The wireless client role defined in each of FIPS approved modes authenticates to the module via WPA2. Please notice that WEP and/or Open System configurations are not permitted in FIPS mode. In advanced Remote AP configuration, when Remote AP cannot communicate with the controller, the wireless client role authenticates to the module via WPA2-PSK only.

### 4.1.4 Strength of Authentication Mechanisms

The following table describes the relative strength of each supported authentication mechanism.

For IKEv1/IKEv2, there are a 95^8 (=6.63 x 10^15) possible pre-shared keys. In order to test the guessed key, the attacker must complete an IKEv1/IKEv2 aggressive mode exchange with the module. IKEv1/IKEv2 aggressive mode consists of a 3 packet exchange, but for simplicity, let's ignore the final packet sent from the AP to the attacker.
An IKEv1/IKEv2 aggressive mode initiator packet with a single transform, using Diffie-Hellman group 2, and having an eight character group name has an IKEv1/IKEv2 packet size of 256 bytes. Adding the eight byte UDP header and 20 byte IP header gives a total size of 284 bytes (2272 bits).
The response packet is very similar in size, except that it also contains the HASH_R payload (an additional 16 bytes), so the total size of the second packet is 300 bytes (2400 bits).
Assuming a link speed of 1Gbits/sec (this is the maximum rate supported by the module), this gives a maximum idealized guessing rate of $60,000,000,000$ / $4,672 = 12,842,466$ guesses per minute. This means the odds of guessing a correct key in one minute is less than $12,842,466/(6.63x10^{15}) = 1.94 \times 10^{-9}$ , which is much less than 1 in $10^{5}$ .

Authentication Mechanism	Mechanism Strength
Wireless Client WPA2-PSK (Wireless Client role)	For WPA2-PSK there are at least 95^16 (=4.4 x 10^31) possible combinations. In order to test a guessed key, the attacker must complete the 4-way handshake with the AP. Prior to completing the 4-way handshake, the attacker must complete the 802.11 association process. That process involves the following packet exchange:
	Attacker sends Authentication request (at least 34 bytes)
	AP sends Authentication response (at least 34 bytes)
	Attacker sends Associate Request (at least 36 bytes)
	AP sends Associate Response (at least 36 bytes)
	Total bytes sent: at least 140. Note that since we do not include the actual 4-way handshake, this is less than half the bytes that would actually be sent, so the numbers we derive will absolutely bound the answer.
	The theoretical bandwidth limit for IEEE 802.11n is 300Mbit, which is 37,500,000 bytes/sec. In the real world, actual throughput is significantly less than this, but we will use this idealized number to ensure that our estimate is very conservative.
	This means that the maximum number of associations (assume no delays, no inter-frame gaps) that could be completed is less than 37,500,000/214 = 267,857 per second, or 16,071,429 associations per minute. This means that an attacker could certainly not try more than this many keys per second (it would actually be MUCH less, due to the added overhead of the 4-way handshake in each case), and the probability of a successful attack in any 60 second interval MUST be less than 16,071,429/(4.4 x 10^31), or roughly 1 in 10^25, which is much less than 1 in 10^5.
Mesh AP WPA2 PSK (User role)	Same as Wireless Client WPA2-PSK above
RSA Certificate based authentication (CO role)	The module supports RSA 1024 bit keys and 2048-bit RSA keys. RSA 1024 bit keys correspond to 80 bits of security. The probability of a successful random attempt is 1/(2^80), which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is less than 1/100,000.

## 4.2 Services

The module provides various services depending on role. These are described below.

## 4.2.1 Crypto Officer Services

The CO role in each of FIPS modes defined in section 3.3 has the same services

Service	Description	<b>CSPs Accessed</b> (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)	
FIPS mode enable/disable	The CO selects/de-selects FIPS mode as a configuration option.	None.	
Key Management	The CO can configure/modify the IKEv1/IKEv2 shared secret (The RSA private key is protected by non-volatile memory and cannot be modified) and the WPA2 PSK (used in advanced Remote AP configuration). Also, the CO/User implicitly uses the KEK to read/write configuration to non-volatile memory.	<ul> <li>IKEv1/IKEv2 shared secret</li> <li>WPA2 PSK</li> <li>KEK</li> </ul>	
Remotely reboot module	The CO can remotely trigger a reboot	KEK is accessed when configuration is read during reboot. The firmware verification key and firmware verification CA key are accessed to validate firmware prior to boot.	
Self-test triggered by CO/User reboot	The CO can trigger a programmatic reset leading to self-test and initialization	KEK is accessed when configuration is read during reboot. The firmware verification key and firmware verification CA key are accessed to validate firmware prior to boot.	
Update module firmware	The CO can trigger a module firmware update	The firmware verification key and firmware verification CA key are accessed to validate firmware prior to writing to flash.	
Configure non-security related module parameters	CO can configure various operational parameters that do not relate to security	None.	

Service	Description	CSPs Accessed (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)	
Creation/use of secure management session between module and CO  Creation/use of secure mesh	The module supports use of IPSec for securing the management channel.  The module requires secure	<ul> <li>IKEv1/IKEv2 Preshared Secret</li> <li>DH Private Key</li> <li>DH Public Key</li> <li>IPSec session encryption keys</li> <li>IPSec session authentication keys</li> <li>RSA key pair</li> <li>WPA2-PSK</li> </ul>	
channel	connections between mesh points using 802.11i	<ul> <li>WFA2-F3K</li> <li>802.11i PMK</li> <li>802.11i PTK</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL MIC Key</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL Encryption Key</li> <li>802.11i AES-CCM key</li> <li>802.11i GMK</li> <li>802.11i GTK</li> <li>802.11i AES-CCM key</li> </ul>	
System Status	CO may view system status information through the secured management channel	See creation/use of secure management session above.	

## 4.2.2 User Services

The User services defined in Remote AP FIPS mode and CPSec protected AP FIPS mode shares the same services with the Crypto Officer role, please refer to Section 4.2.1, "Crypto Officer Services". The following services are provided for the User role defined in Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode and Remote Mesh Point FIPS mode:

Service	Description	CSPs Accessed (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)
Generation and use of 802.11i cryptographic keys	When the module is in mesh configuration, the inter-module mesh links are secured with 802.11i.	<ul> <li>802.11i PMK</li> <li>802.11i PTK</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL MIC Key</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL Encryption Key</li> </ul>

Service	Description	CSPs Accessed (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)	
		<ul> <li>802.11i AES-CCM key</li> <li>802.11i GMK</li> <li>802.11i GTK</li> </ul>	
Use of WPA pre-shared key for establishment of IEEE 802.11i keys	When the module is in mesh configuration, the inter-module mesh links are secured with 802.11i. This is authenticated with a shared secret	WPA2 PSK	

## 4.2.3 Wireless Client Services

The following module services are provided for the Wireless Client role in each of FIPS approved modes defined in section 3.3.

Service	Description	<b>CSPs Accessed</b> (see section 6 below for complete description of CSPs)	
Generation and use of 802.11i cryptographic keys	In all modes, the links between the module and wireless client are secured with 802.11i.	<ul> <li>802.11i PMK</li> <li>802.11i PTK</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL MIC Key</li> <li>802.11i EAPOL Encryption Key</li> <li>802.11i AES-CCM key</li> <li>802.11i GMK</li> <li>802.11i GTK</li> </ul>	
Use of WPA pre-shared key for establishment of IEEE 802.11i keys	When the module is in advanced Remote AP configuration, the links between the module and the wireless client are secured with 802.11i. This is authenticated with a shared secret only.	• WPA2 PSK	
Wireless bridging services	The module bridges traffic between the wireless client and the wired network.	None	

## 4.2.4 Unauthenticated Services

The module provides the following unauthenticated services, which are available regardless of role. No CSPs are accessed by these services.

- System status module LEDs
- Reboot module by removing/replacing power
- Self-test and initialization at power-on

## 5 Cryptographic Algorithms

FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms have been implemented in hardware and firmware.

The firmware supports the following cryptographic implementations.

- ArubaOS OpenSSL AP Module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
  - o AES (Cert. #1851)
  - o HMAC (Cert. #1099)
  - o RNG (Cert. #970)
  - o RSA (Cert. #934)
  - o SHS (Cert. #1628)
  - o Triple-DES (Cert. #1199)
- ArubaOS Module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
  - o AES (Cert. #1850)
  - o HMAC (Cert. #1098)
  - o RNG (Cert. #969)
  - o RSA (Cert. #933)
  - o SHS (Cert. #1627)
  - o Triple-DES (Cert. #1198)
- ArubaOS Kernel implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
  - o AES (Cert. #1847)
  - o HMAC (Cert. #1097)
  - o SHS (Cert. #1625)
  - o Triple-DES (Cert. #1197)
- ArubaOS UBOOT Bootloader implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
  - o RSA (Cert. #935)
  - o SHS (Cert. #1629)
- Aruba Atheros hardware CCM implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
  - o AES (Cert. #1849)

#### **Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms**

The cryptographic module implements the following non-approved algorithms that are not permitted for use in the FIPS 140-2 mode of operations:

• MD5

In addition, within the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the module supports the following allowed key establishment schemes:

• Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength)

# **6 Critical Security Parameters**

The following Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) are used by the module:

			STORAGE	
CSP	CSP TYPE	GENERATION	And	USE
			ZEROIZATI ON	
Key Encryption Key (KEK)	Triple-DES 168-bits key	Hard-coded	Stored in flash, zeroized by the 'ap wipe out flash' command.	Encrypts IKEv1/IKEv2 preshared keys and configuration parameters
IKEv1/IKEv2 Pre-shared secret	64 character preshared key	CO configured	Encrypted in flash using the KEK; zeroized by updating through administrative interface, or by the 'ap wipe out flash' command.	Module and crypto officer authentication during IKEv1/IKEv2; entered into the module in plaintext during initialization and encrypted over the IPSec session subsequently.
IPSec session encryption keys	168-bit Triple-DES, or 128/192/256 bit AES keys;	Established during Diffie-Hellman key agreement	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized when session is closed or system powers off	Secure IPSec traffic
IPSec session authentication keys	HMAC SHA-1 keys	Established during Diffie-Hellman key agreement	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized when session is closed or system powers off	Secure IPSec traffic

			STORAGE	
CSP	CSP TYPE	GENERATION	And ZEROIZATI ON	USE
IKEv1/IKEv2 Diffie- Hellman Private key	1024-bit Diffie- Hellman private key	Generated internally during IKEv1/IKEv2 negotiation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized when session is closed or system is powered off	Used in establishing the session key for IPSec
IKEv1/IKEv2 Diffie- Hellman shared secret	128 bit Octet	Generated internally during IKEv1/IKEv2 negotiation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized when session is closed or system is powered off	IKEv1/IKEv2 payload integrity verification
ArubaOS OpenSSL RNG Seed for FIPS compliant ANSI X9.31, Appendix A2.4 using AES-128 Key algorithm	Seed (16 Bytes)	Derived using NON- FIPS approved HW RNG (/dev/urandom)	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Seed ANSI X9.31 RNG
ArubaOS OpenSSL RNG Seed key for FIPS compliant ANSI X9.31, Appendix A2.4 using AES-128 Key algorithm	Seed key (16 bytes, AES- 128 Key algorithm)	Derived using NON- FIPS approved HW RNG (/dev/urandom)	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Seed ANSI X9.31 RNG
ArubaOS Cryptographic Module RNG Seed for FIPS compliant 186-2 General Purpose (X change Notice); SHA-1 RNG	Seed (64 bytes)	Derived using NON- FIPS approved HW RNG (/dev/urandom)	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Seed 186-2 General Purpose (X change Notice); SHA- 1 RNG
ArubaOS Cryptographic Module RNG Seed key for FIPS compliant 186-2 General Purpose (X change Notice); SHA-1 RNG	Seed Key (64 bytes)	Derived using NON- FIPS approved HW RNG (/dev/urandom)	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Seed 186-2 General Purpose (X change Notice); SHA- 1 RNG

			STORAGE	
CSP	CSP TYPE	GENERATION	And	USE
			ZEROIZATI ON	
WPA2 PSK	16-64 character shared secret used to authenticate mesh connections and in remote AP advanced configuration	CO configured	Encrypted in flash using the KEK; zeroized by updating through administrative interface, or by the 'ap wipe out flash' command.	Used to derive the PMK for 802.11i mesh connections between APs and in advanced Remote AP connections; programmed into AP by the controller over the IPSec session.
802.11i Pairwise Master Key (PMK)	512-bit shared secret used to derive 802.11i session keys	Derived from WPA2 PSK	In volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Used to derive 802.11i Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)
802.11i Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)	512-bit shared secret from which Temporal Keys (TKs) are derived	Derived during 802.11i 4-way handshake	In volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	All session encryption/dec ryption keys are derived from the PTK
802.11i EAPOL MIC Key	128-bit shared secret used to protect 4- way (key) handshake	Derived from PTK	In volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Used for integrity validation in 4-way handshake
802.11i EAPOL Encr Key	128-bit shared secret used to protect 4- way handshakes	Derived from PTK	In volatile memory only; zeroized on reboot	Used for confidentiality in 4-way handshake
802.11i data AES-CCM encryption/MIC key	128-bit AES- CCM key	Derived from PTK	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized on reboot	Used for 802.11i packet encryption and integrity verification (this is the CCMP or AES-CCM key)

			STORAGE	
CSP	CSP TYPE	GENERATION	And	USE
			ZEROIZATI ON	
802.11i Group Master Key (GMK)	256-bit secret used to derive GTK	Generated from approved RNG	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized on reboot	Used to derive Group Transient Key (GTK)
802.11i Group Transient Key (GTK)	256-bit shared secret used to derive group (multicast) encryption and integrity keys	Internally derived by AP which assumes "authenticator" role in handshake	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized on reboot	Used to derive multicast cryptographic keys
802.11i Group AES-CCM Data Encryption/MIC Key	128-bit AES-CCM key derived from GTK	Derived from 802.11 group key handshake	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory; zeroized on reboot	Used to protect multicast message confidentiality and integrity (AES-CCM)
RSA private Key	1024/2048- bit RSA private key	Generated on the AP (remains in AP at all times)	Stored in and protected by AP's non-volatile memory. zeroized by the 'ap wipe out flash' command	Used for IKEv1/IKEv2 authentication when AP is authenticating using certificate based authentication

## 7 Self Tests

The module performs the following Self Tests after being configured into either Remote AP mode or Remote Mesh Portal mode. The module performs both power-up and conditional self-tests. In the event any self-test fails, the module enters an error state, logs the error, and reboots automatically.

The module performs the following power-up self-tests:

- Aruba Hardware known Answer tests:
  - o AES KAT
  - AES-CCM KAT
  - HMAC-SHA1 KAT
  - Triple-DES KAT
- ArubaOS OpenSSL AP Module
  - o AES KAT
  - HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC SHA384) KAT
  - o RNG KAT
  - RSA KAT
  - o SHA (SHA1, SHA256 and SHA384) KAT
  - o Triple-DES KAT
- ArubaOS Cryptographic Module
  - o AES KAT
  - o HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC SHA384, and HMAC512) KAT
  - o FIPS 186-2 RNG KAT
  - o RSA (sign/verify)
  - o SHA (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512) KAT
  - Triple-DES KAT
- ArubaOS Uboot Bootloader Module
  - o Firmware Integrity Test: RSA 2048-bit Signature Validation
- Aruba Atheros hardware CCM
  - o AES-CCM KAT

The following Conditional Self-tests are performed in the module:

- Continuous Random Number Generator Test—This test is run upon generation of random data by
  the module's random number generators to detect failure to a constant value. The module stores
  the first random number for subsequent comparison, and the module compares the value of the
  new random number with the random number generated in the previous round and enters an error
  state if the comparison is successful. The test is performed for the approved as well as nonapproved RNGs.
- RSA pairwise Consistency Test
- Firmware load test

These self-tests are run for the Atheros hardware cryptographic implementation as well as for the Aruba OpenSSL and ArubaOS cryptographic module implementations.

Self-test results are written to the serial console.

In the event of a KATs failure, the AP logs different messages, depending on the error.

For an ArubaOS OpenSSL AP module and ArubaOS cryptographic module KAT failure:

```
AP rebooted [DATE][TIME] : Restarting System, SW FIPS KAT failed
```

For an AES Atheros hardware POST failure:

```
Starting HW SHA1 KAT ...Completed HW SHA1 AT
Starting HW HMAC-SHA1 KAT ...Completed HW HMAC-SHA1 KAT
Starting HW DES KAT ...Completed HW DES KAT
Starting HW AES KAT ...Restarting system.
```