Recently Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) called on the Obama administration to end its counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan by criticizing the war as not winnable and arguing that the U.S. should instead focus on counterterrorism efforts. Sen. Menendez is not the only critic of the counterinsurgency strategy, but he is one of the most senior ranking, along with Vice President Biden. But is counterinsurgency a tactic or a strategy? Many would argue that it’s a tactic.
Dr. Tom Mockaitis, a history professor at DePaul University, has written extensively on terrorism, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and peace operations. In his paper, “Resolving Insurgencies,” he explores counterinsurgency as a concept, the implications of its demise, and its legacy. Specifically, he asks “What exactly does winning a contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign mean–destruction of the insurgent organization, elimination of insurgent leaders, creation of a peaceful stable state that can defend itself, or some kind of negotiated settlement? Difficulty answering this question stems from a disconnect between military and political strategy.”
To contrast Dr. Mockaitis, Dr. David Ucko, assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University in Washington DC, takes a different approach. In “Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents” he writes: “Counterinsurgency provides neither a strategy for military intervention nor a campaign plan for deployed soldiers and will fail if mistaken for more than what it is. Counterinsurgency does offer a collection of insights, which, if used in a manner sensitive to local context, can help in the design and execution of expeditionary campaigns.”
Martin van Creveld, internationally renowned military historian, strategist and theorist, has often commented that counterinsurgency tactics used in the operational environment are not enough to win the war in Afghanistan when at the heart of the conflict there is a failed US national strategy.
FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency is the most prominent Department of Defense document that addresses counterinsurgency. It was written because the US Military lacked a common understanding of the issues inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It has been said that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. But since its release in 2006, has it made a difference in the way in which the US Military conducts counterinsurgency operations? Is counterinsurgency a strategy or a tactic? How is that question reflected in FM 3-24? Are the principles in counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 relevant to current and future operations? What needs to change?
Let us know what you think. (US Army Counterinsurgency Center Staff)
Sen. Robert Menendez article: http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/167425-menendez-says-counter-insurgency-strategy-in-afghanistan-not-winnable
Dr. Tom Mockaitis’ article: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1072
Dr. David Ucko’s article: http://swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2011_RP06_uck_ks.pdf
Martin van Creveld article: http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=671
Dr. Christopher Paul and Colin Clarke, Evidentiary Validation of FM 3-24: http://www.ndu.edu/press/evidentiary-validation-of-FM-3-24.html
11 Comments on "Is Field Manual 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) Relevant?"
LTC Jakola,
I think that’s a great distinction to make–and that we’re saying some of the same things. In this case, perhaps the FM should detail HOW to partner with Host Nation Government / Security forces during E-COIN. If I understand correctly, you’re stressing the importance of population perceptions being “won” by the host nation exclusively and not by an expeditionary force who is assisting. However, how do you partner without marrying the two (US & Host Nation) in the eyes of the populace?
I sincerely hope that we’ve captured the necessity for detailing our exit strategy (as you’ve described). I just hope we can articulate exactly how that plan will impact a CAMPLAN.
-B
I do not believe COIN is as relavent as it used to be. The enemy has figured out that they can wait us out.
Brent,
I recommend the next FM 3-24 make a distinction between conducting counter-insurgent operations within the borders of U.S. territory i.e., COIN and conducting expeditionary COIN (E-COIN). We have conducted E-COIN in places like Afghanistan and Iraq but not COIN.
The fundamental strategic difference in E-COIN is the requirement to develop and execute a plan for leaving the area where you are conducting the counter-insurgent operations. This difference changes the way we fight and our objectives. For example, in COIN it is imperative that the population supports the government and military more than the insurgents. In E-COIN this is not the case for the expeditionary government or military only for the local government and military force.
Thus U.S. forces conducting E-COIN can be successful without ever gaining significant local support. E-COIN allows the formulation of specific goals for completing a mission tied more directly to U.S. National interests and removes the U.S. requirement to please the local population. The strategic goal in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, was never to add these areas to America’s empire as the two newest states; but rather, to make stable secure areas where our adversaries would not have safe haven to attack us.
It is all about what we do while we are conducting operations on foreign soil and how we plan to leave the area before we begin the operation. Making the local government / military strong and popularly supported is the critical factor for success in E-COIN. In fact, to achieve consent of the governed the local rulers must make a distinction between their rule and the U.S. Only in this way can the local government attain legitimacy and not appear as an extension Washington.
LTC Bill Jakola
If there’s still discussion regarding whether or not COIN is a strategic endeavor vs. a tactical one–then that explains a lot about our ability to execute it, doesn’t it? (re: Unity of Effort)
COIN is a methodology and strategy–You plan and execute (tactical) tasks to support it! You don’t go out there and execute COIN TASKS within the operating environment… And if that was the expectation–then where is the soldier’s handbook that sorts right from wrong regarding what you do explicitly? …
…Exactly.
COIN needs to be understood as the strategy that we employ in order to reduce or eliminate the per-requisites for INSURGENCY. If we are clear on the LOO’s we are expected to tackle–then support them with sound and tangible Lines of Effort, we should see some positive gains (re: Legitimacy and the Populace’s Perceptions).
The problem, as far as I’ve experienced, is the level of bureaucracy associated with “staying the course”. All POL-MIL and CIV MIL factors aside… we have to move beyond standing idly-by when BCT CMDRs intentionally shape a message that isn’t consistent with the Campaign Plan. Also, reporting, and the interpretation of variables within the Operating Environment have to be REALISTIC and not succumb to group think–or result in products that underscore the seemingly “perpetual success” at every level and in every AOR.
For example, Village Stability Operations, is a great initiative… But who can answer what happens in terms of “sustainability” after the transition is is completed? And if there is a good answer; do we believe it? I’ve seen a lot of success stories from VSO (and I believe they are true), but don’t we get mired down with competing for relevance all the time? VSO isn’t all success stories… What about all the places in Afghanistan where VSO isn’t a feasible platform? I know some people would argue that it doesn’t matter what happens when once we transition… but that’s like saying that COIN is only important when we have to bleed and sweat over it…
PMESII-PT… Stabilize the country in a way that reduces or eliminates the per-requisites for an insurgency to exist…
I believe we’ve already seen BCT after BCT demonstrate that their soldiers don’t execute tactical COIN in a way that succeeds in this mission.
-B
Is FM 3-24 relevent, my answer would be Yes but there is no absolute fixes to any insurgency. Some Counter Insurency operations work and some don’t, I have found that all branches of DoD can have a dramatic effect on COIN Ops. To say that Specail Operations is going to take all of the COIN work is foolish, in my opinion If the Battlespace Owner comes to terms that we are no longer fighting Tank to Tank, we can win but the whole BCT has to think COIN. A native face is the only true way you can make a real difference in the COIN environment in which we are currently operating. BLUF; what is in it for the Native Man on the ground and his family?
Within the next few days another paper from the COIN Training Center- Afghanistan (CTC-A) will be posted on the JCISFA website. The paper looks at COIN related words, terms, and concepts the explanations and definitions in doctrine. RAND just published a technical report with a similar thesis.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1014.html
The RAND report deals with Assesing Freedom of Movement for COIN Campaigns. The two reports complement each other well.
The questionnaire is detailed but does address several critical topics, one of which is the whole of government approach and inter-departmental coordination and support. Questions 19, 20, 21, and 24 highlight the fact that military forces in COIN environments sometimes have to execute duties that really are best handled by other departments. These duties have to be executed but because other departments cannot or will not send personnel (due to security and other concerns) the military has no other choice but to pick up the tab.
As radical as this may sound I think what is really needed is not so much and update to FM 3-24 but rather the development of an inter-departmental doctrine. Developing an inter-departmental doctrine of how to address counter insurgencies (i.e. COIN inter-departmental publications for deploying personnel from DoD, DoS, DoJ, DoC, USAID etc) will be the best method to ensure that the most critical functions within a COIN effort are supported with the best and most qualified personnel while concurrently supporting the whole of government approach.
If an inter-departmental doctrine is developed then FM 3-24 can be updated to ensure DoD COIN doctrine is nested with the whole of government efforts thus enhancing interoperability and further contributions to mission success.
joerichardcampbell,
Thanks. We’ll look at the links and comment on the products as well as our direction ahead.
MAJ Chiu, COIN Center
Within the next 24-48 hours the Joint Center for International Security Force Assiatnce (JCISFA) will post four products from the CTC-A CRB that pertain to the FM 3-24 revision.
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx
A description of the first slide set and the CTC-A CRB results have already been posted on this blog.
The third document is a brief paper on observed Doctrinal Gaps in COIN. The four product is another slide set that consolidates the planning process from several different COIN related FMs. This snap shot approach of the planning process will be posted when done.
The intent is to provide a 3 or 4 page clear concise picture of the planning process as it pertains to COIN. This snap shot approach also saves valuable printing space and reading/research time since the work is already done. The finished document will of course be referenced and cited.
A slide set that was presented during the COIN Training Center – Afghanistan (CTC-A) Curriculum Review Board (CRB) that was held at Camp Julien Afghanistan 27 – 29 Aug. 2011 will be posted on the JICSFA web site this week (6 Nov thru 11 Nov):
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx
Participants in the CRB included the CTC-A Deputy Director, Chief of Training, several CTC-A Region Chiefs, SCETC personnel, and CAAT members. The complete list of participants and the results of the CRB will be included in the posting.
The slide set was prepared to enduce discussion and to gain feedback from relevant COIN stakeholders, in anticipation of the FM 3-24 revision.
Why did Paul and Clarke leave Sri Lanka out of their data? Sri Lanka validates COL Giaps comments and seems to weaken their “validation” of our COIN ops.
i’m no fan of limitied wars with limited objectives and fighting with our hands tied behind our backs. i could care less if this strategy is validated or not when it is so complex and the outcomes so unpredictable that it should be chosen as a method of last resort.. not first.