You may have noticed in the literature lately that people and leaders are concerned about retaining the lessons of the last ten years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is an important idea because the US military is concerned above all other entities to learn from mistakes and benefit from best practices – doing this actually saves lives. What then are the lessons from the last ten years – and what do we do with them?
Here are a few worth noting from our on-going review of studies, books, and articles and interviews and discussions with practitioners:
- Counterinsurgency theory works when applied as a tactic or operation. It is less clear if the theory is applicable as a national strategy.
- The principles of counterinsurgency are sound, however, strategic planners must be sensitized to the fact that counterinsurgency operations historically last many years and may devolve or evolve to enormously expensive nation-building. National leaders must choose their fights very carefully.
- Counterinsurgency must not be “centric” or focused on anything but warfighting. Population-centric, leader-centric, security-centric – all may restrict commanders from applying all the elements of combat power and critical thinking and problem solving to accomplishing the mission, given the operational environment and desired end-state.
- Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces combined are necessary to combating irregular or hybrid threats, therefore, we must take steps to integrate and make them more interdependent.
Each of these lessons may find their way into policy, doctrine, training or education in the coming months. Also, The Counterinsurgency Center just concluded an important conference on the revision of FM3-24, Counterinsurgency – you can see some of the principal take-aways on the next page. Do you have other ideas? Please comment on the Counterinsurgency Center blog or email us your ideas: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.
One other important note: we also have to say good bye to a terrific Soldier and Leader — LTC John Paganini. Through his dynamic leadership and dedication to our Soldiers, a first class counterinsurgency seminar was developed and implemented and the FM 3-24 revision is well underway. We wish John good luck and God speed as he moves on as a student in the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship here at Leavenworth, where again he will have a huge impact on our future Leaders. Thanks John for all you have done for the AIWFC and all the BCTs you and your team have touched.
Thanks for your service.
Dan French (Deputy Director)
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2 Comments on "Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell Newsletter"
MAJ Bert Baker
Student, CGSOC
Class 12-003
Fort Belvoir, VA
In regards to the need for both Special Operations and Conventional Forces I assume you are discussing larger conflicts. In smaller low density insurgencies, Special Operations augmenting Host Nation forces could be sufficient to limit the gains of the insurgency and prevent as large or enduring U.S. support requirement.
One thing I noticed through this blog is missing information regarding “green on blue” and how the Army needs to deal/train with this issue. Leaders at all levels must ensure risk is identified and appropriate risk mitigation measures are established to ensure Soldier safety through training, deployment and throughout operations.
An Afghan police officer shot and killed two US Soldiers in Farah Province. The spike of “green on blue” attacks caused Army Leaders to relook established systems and procedures on Afghan security personnel recruitment, training, and employment. Afghan security personnel have killed an estimated 93 NATO Soldiers since May 2007, including 31 in 2012, Bill Roggio, managing editor of the Long War Journal blog.
General Dempsey flew to Bagram, to ensure Army Leaders establish better systems and procedures in its efforts to eliminate the “green on blue” attacks and ensure Soldier safety. The most recent attack followed General Dempsey’s visit; another “green on blue” attack by an Afghan Soldier against NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in eastern Afghanistan. The Afghan Soldier fired on and killed two ISAF Soldiers on August 27, 2012..
May 2007 also represents the moment when the Army expanded their role in partnering with Afghan Security Forces to include provincial and district level police services, Afghan Border Police (ABP), and Afghan National Civil Order police (ANCOP). Army units tasked with partnering with the Afghan Police, ABP or ANCOP were primarily an ad hoc combination of active duty officers and NCOs mixed with Soldiers from the National Guard. These units were considered transition teams under the CJTF-Phoenix headquarters. The transition teams were units capable of limited tactical capability.
While conducting operations, organizational leaders must consider subordinate unit capabilities and Soldier safety prior to assigning tasks to subordinate units. Effective organizational leader consideration of subordinate unit capabilities and Soldier safety will ensure tactical mission success and prevent casualties.