

**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**  
**OSC File No. DI-09-1734**

**INFORMATION INITIATING THE INVESTIGATION**

By letter dated March 24, 2009, the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) referred to the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) for investigation a whistleblower disclosure from Mrs. Stephanie Armel, a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Assistant at Sheppard Air Force Base (AFB) Texas (OSC Referral letter).<sup>1</sup> According to OSC, Mrs. Armel has alleged that “employees at the Department of the Air Force [AF], ... , 82<sup>nd</sup> Training Wing [TRW], Sheppard AFB, Texas, have violated AF rules and procedures by allowing an employee [Colonel Marcia Rossi] to adopt multiple leadership roles,” including Inspector General (IG), “thus failing to maintain the Independence and Integrity of the IG position.”

After review and based on the information disclosed by Mrs. Armel, OSC “concluded that there was a substantial likelihood that the information provided discloses a violation of a law, rule or regulation, including but not limited to, violations of the policies contained in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, May 15, 2008.” OSC also determined based upon the information disclosed “that there is a substantial likelihood that the actions of the employees constituted gross mismanagement and an abuse of authority.” See OSC Referral Letter.

**OSC SUMMARY OF DISCLOSURE INFORMATION**

According to the OSC Referral Letter, Mrs. Armel provided the following information to OSC:

- (1) Based upon several documents provided by Mrs. Armel, Colonel Marcia Rossi had multiple roles that overlapped. Specifically, Colonel Rossi held the positions of 82 TRW Inspector General (IG), 82 TRW Director of Staff (DS) and 82 TRW Director of Competitive Sourcing (CCO) in violation of AF policies. According to Mrs. Armel, “Colonel Rossi was appointed into these positions by General [WC1], former Wing Commander, General Richard Devereaux, former Wing Commander and/or General Otis Mannon, current Wing Commander.”
- (2) Mrs. Armel has alleged that “maintaining these three positions simultaneously is against AF rules.” According to the OSC Referral letter, “Air Force policy states that all Inspectors General (IGs) must maintain a clear distinction between being an extension of the commander and their sworn duty to serve as fair, impartial and objective fact-finders and problem solvers. IGs must be sufficiently independent so that those complainants

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<sup>1</sup> Mrs. Armel, according to the OSC Referral Letter, has consented to the release of her name in conjunction with this report of investigation.

requesting IG help will continue to do so, even when they feel that the commander may be the problem. *See* AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, ¶1.2.3, *the IG System*, May 15, 2008.”

- (3) According to OSC, “[t]he independence of the IG must be firmly established and supported to overcome any perceived lack of autonomy that would discourage potential complainants and preclude disclosures of wrongdoing from being brought to the attention of the IG. *See* AFI 90-301, ¶1.27.3, *Roles of the IG in Relation to the Commander*. The Secretary has also declared that the ‘focus of installation/wing IGs must be the Air Force Complaints Resolution and FWA [fraud, waste and abuse] Programs ... The IG position will not be combined with another position in the organization ... Therefore, IGs and IG staff members must not be ... [a]ssigned any duties (such as Director of Staff) that subsequently disqualify them from conducting an unbiased analysis of complaints ...’ AFI 90-301, ¶1.24 *Assigning Additional Duties to Installation IGs*. This provision specifically prohibits the IG from being Director of Staff.” Mrs. Armel alleged that, “Colonel Rossi has violated this rule because she is both IG and DS.”

### CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1213(c), an agency is afforded 60 days to complete the report required by Title 5, U.S.C. § 1213. The AF has been granted several extensions until January 22, 2010 within which to submit the required report.

As the OSC Referral Letter to SECAF highlighted potential wrongdoing by AF senior officials, the letter was forwarded to the Air Force Inspector General (SAF/IG) and then to the Senior Officials Directorate (SAF/IGS) of SAF/IG for action. On April 24, 2009, the Inspector General (TIG) approved a recommendation that SAF/IGS conduct an investigation into the whistleblower allegations contained in OSC’s Referral Letter. The case was assigned to the investigative officer (IO) (who holds a SAF/IG appointment letter dated March 6, 2006), and the investigation started on April 28, 2009.

In the course of the investigation, the IO interviewed 13 witnesses including Mrs. Armel. The IO also collected and examined various memoranda, e-mail, and relevant Officer’s Performance Reports (OPR) pertaining to the allegations. He also reviewed the applicable law, including the last three editions of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution* which set forth the guidance/requirements for installation IGs.

The IO noted that during her complaint clarification interview with SAF/IGS, Mrs. Armel mentioned several times that she felt the problem of Sheppard’s IG being multi-hatted was the responsibility of the installation IG herself, Colonel Rossi, and not the wing commanders. However, as pointed out in the OSC Referral Letter to SECAF, the installation IG is appointed directly by, and works directly for, the wing commander. Hence, the IO in his investigation looked into the actions of the installation IG, as well as three wing commanders of the 82d Training Wing (82 TRW/CC) -- Major General WC1, Brigadier General Richard T. Devereaux,

and Brigadier General Otis G. Mannon – all of whom served during the time Colonel Rossi served as the installation IG.

It should be noted that OSC had previously been in receipt of whistleblower disclosures filed by Mrs. Armel in 2008 alleging wrongdoing against Mrs. Armel's immediate supervisor, the installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC). In her interactions with OSC, Mrs. Armel indicated that she felt she could not go to Colonel Rossi regarding her problems because some of her (initial) allegations dealt with Colonel Rossi in her capacity as the DS. On January 4, 2010, the AF submitted a separate report (OSC File No. DI -08-1283) relating to Mrs. Armel's initial whistleblower disclosures.

### **SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE**

Mrs. Armel filed a whistleblower disclosure with OSC alleging that Colonel Rossi, the installation IG at Sheppard AFB, violated AF rules, specifically AFI 90-301, ¶¶1.2.3, 1.24 and 1.27.3, by serving in multiple leadership roles, thus failing to maintain the independence and integrity of the Inspector General position.

The IO found that from February 2005, when Colonel Rossi was originally assigned to the 82 TRW, through March 2009, she spent about 40 months as the 82 TRW/IG. At all times, she was also the CCO, and from November 2006 onward, she was also the DS, triple-hatted for 20 months. Her pertinent duty history is as follows:

- Feb 05 – Mar 05 – Director of Competitive Sourcing only (CCO)
- Mar 05 – Jun 05 – CCO and Inspector General (IG), 3 months
- Jun 05 – Jan 06 – CCO only
- Jan 06 – Nov 06 – CCO and IG, 11 months
- Nov 06 – May 07 – CCO, IG and Director of Staff (DS), 6 months
- May 07 – Jul 07 – CCO and DS
- Jul 07 – Mar 09 – CCO, DS, IG, 20 months

Each time Colonel Rossi served as the installation IG at Sheppard AFB, she was appointed to the IG position by the wing commander. During this time period, three senior officers served as the wing commander at Sheppard AFB. General WC1 served from July 2004 through August 2006. General Richard T. Devereaux served from August 2006 through July 2008, and General Otis G. Mannon served from July 2008 to the present. As previously stated and as discussed below, the IO in his investigation looked into the actions of Colonel Rossi as well as three wing commanders.

As part of his investigation, the IO prepared a chronology of relevant events which is set forth below. He also examined the applicable AF rules which are summarized in the table also set forth below. Based upon this information, the IO then analyzed whether AF rules were violated by Colonel Rossi and the three wing commanders. The evidence and analysis is summarized below.

## Chronology

The IO provided the following chronology:

DATE	EVENT
Jul 04	General WC1 assumed command of the 82 TRW, Colonel JB was the IG
Feb 05	Colonel Marcia Rossi arrived at Sheppard AFB and was appointed Director of Competitive Sourcing (A-76), filling a new manpower billet the 82 TRW had been given by AETC [Air, Education and Training Command]; the A-76 study had not started
Feb 05	AFI 90-301 revised edition published and effective
Mar 05	The Sheppard IG departed PCS [permanent change of station] and Colonel Rossi was appointed as IG by General WC1
Jul 05	Colonel-select AC PCS'd to Sheppard AFB from Vandenberg AFB and was hired as the installation IG
Jan 06	782 TRG/CC, Colonel DR deployed to the AOR; Colonel AC replaced her as 782 TRG/CC, Colonel Rossi was again appointed IG, the A-76 study still had not yet begun
28 Jan 06	Colonel Rossi's first OPR as CCO. Listed IG as Additional Duty. OPR ends with "Ready for permanent IG job!"
Feb 06	82 TRW/IG won best IG in AETC for 2005
Aug 06	General Devereaux assumed command of the 82 TRW
5 Sep 06	General Devereaux received IG orientation briefing from Colonel Rossi, no mention that her dual-hatting may have violated AFI 90-301
Oct 06	82 TRW and 80 FTW both successfully completed their Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI); no mention in 82 TRW's report about there being a problem with dual-hatting the installation IG; neither ORI report addresses the IG office, or its Complaint Resolution or FWA Program. However, General Devereaux testified that Colonel D, the lead inspector, expressed awareness that Colonel Rossi was going to lead the A-76 study, kicking off immediately after the ORI
Oct 06	Public announcement that A-76 study "kicked-off" at Sheppard AFB, studied three areas for potential conversion to contractor work; study eventually led to one area, civil engineering being out-sourced
11 Oct 06	Commanders of 882 TRG & 82 MDG "identified potential Lieutenant Colonel candidates for the IG position" & were "discussing the job with candidates"
23 Oct 06	General Devereaux sent request to HQ AETC/IG & SAF/IG, in turn, for "waiver to fill our vacant IG position with a lieutenant colonel as soon as possible," explaining that Colonel Rossi was "originally assigned as the Director of Competitive Sourcing...but dual-hatted as interim installation IG in Jan 06," and that, "in Sep 06, we started a large A-76 process that requires a full-time Director of Competitive Sourcing, leaving Colonel Rossi unable to fulfill IG duties." Colonel Rossi previously coordinated this with AETC/IGQ
1-2 Nov 06	82 TRW/IG communicated w/AETC/IG and A1 about sourcing O-5 for IG

6 Nov 06	General Devereaux created the wing's Director of Staff position; Colonel Rossi was assigned to the new DS position while keeping her other two positions
Nov 06	General Devereaux notified by AETC/A1 that a Colonel-select L was seeking a humanitarian assignment to North Texas and could fill the 82 TRW/IG billet
Dec 06	General Devereaux notified by AETC/A1 that the 82 TRW/IG position was being downgraded to a lieutenant colonel (O-5) billet which meant that Colonel-select L now could not be assigned to it. Downgrade effective December 20, 2006
28 Jan 07	Colonel Rossi's OPR closed-out; duty title "Director, Competitive Sourcing (CCO)/IG/Director of Staff (DS)"
Feb 07	82 TRW/IG won best IG in AETC award for 2006, the second straight year
Mar 07	Efforts to fill IG position with base O-5 underway again; list of candidates identified, presented to Colonel Rossi in late March
May 07	Major WY, a lieutenant colonel-select civil engineer (CE), was appointed as the 82 TRW/IG
Jul 07	82 TRW tapped for a short-notice 179-day deployment (CE officer) to the AOR; Lieutenant Colonel-select WY only qualified officer available, he departed for training; Colonel Rossi appointed interim IG
Aug-Sep 07	Major WY returned from training, worked for a month as the IG, and then deployed to the AOR; Colonel Rossi was interim IG (awaiting WY's return from deployment)
Sep 07	AETC/IGQ conducted a Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) with 82 TRW/IG; made note of the problem with multi-hatting the installation IG, recommended staffing waiver to SAF/IGQ to operate outside the regulation
Oct 07	AETC/IG sent their SAV trip report to 82 TRW/CC; report highlighted the problem of multi-hatting the installation IG
Oct 07	Colonel Rossi, as DS, signed Mrs. Armel's career brief—for SARC duties
Dec 07	Mrs. Armel raised FWA concerns about her supervisor, Ms. SARC, to the vice commander (CV)
Dec 07	General Devereaux received an email from AETC/A1 concerning a question from the <i>Federal Times</i> about Colonel Rossi's dual-hatting; AETC/JA opined that her being the IG while running the A-76 study was a conflict of interest; he corresponded with AETC/A1, Colonel BL on the matter
Dec 07/ Jan 08	Colonel Rossi removed SARC credit from Mrs. Armel's career brief and called Mrs. Armel into her office to discuss this with her
Jan 08	Colonel Rossi met with Mrs. Armel a second time about changes in the SARC office
28 Jan 08	Colonel Rossi's second OPR with duty title "Director, Competitive Sourcing (CS)/IG/DS"
Jan/Feb 08	Mrs. Armel had additional concerns of FWA and retaliation by Ms. SARC but did not contact Colonel Rossi as IG
Mar 08	Major WY returned from deployment but PCS'd to Kunsan AB, Korea to be the Civil Engineering squadron commander; Colonel Rossi remained as the IG
Apr 08	Colonel Rossi notified Mrs. Armel that Mrs. Armel was detailed to a secretary position

15 May 08	AFI 90-301 revised edition published and effective; 82 TRW/IG staff member e-mailed General Devereaux the specific language that IG will not be combined with another position and prohibiting additional duties, specifically DS; General Devereaux directs efforts to identify IG fill from base O-5s
Jun 08	80 FTW identified an officer to be "detailed" as the installation IG but to remain on the 80 FTW's books; AETC/IG informed the 82 TRW/IG that this could not be done, since the IG has to work for the host wing commander; two other new officers identified as possible candidates for the IG position
Jul 08	General Mannon assumed command of the 82 TRW; he was briefed that there was a solution set in place: General Devereaux had requested the 80 FTW identify a fill, and in case the 80 FTW could not, he had also identified two majors as potential candidates
Oct 08	Lieutenant Colonel TR, 882 Training Group (TRG) was identified as the next IG; her availability date was spring 2009
Jan 09	Colonel Rossi's 3rd OPR as CS/IG/DS closed
Mar 09	Lieutenant Colonel TR appointed as IG

### *Applicable AF Rules*

In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 8014, SECAF has sole responsibility for the function of the AF IG and is required to establish a single office within the Office of the SECAF to conduct IG functions.<sup>2</sup> Section 8014 statutorily mandates that the TIG position be part of the Office of the SECAF. When directed by the SECAF or the Chief of Staff of the AF, the IG has the authority to inquire into and report on the discipline, efficiency, and economy of the AF and perform any other duties prescribed by the SECAF or the Chief of Staff.

The IO examined the applicable AF rules regarding installation IGs. According to the IO, "[t]he concept of independence of the inspector general function has been highlighted throughout history...in the United States, going back to the Army under General George Washington. The IG concept is that he will work directly for the commander and will be able to report on the good order and discipline of the force/units without any bias, interference, or outside pressure -- the IG will be fair and impartial at all times..." Translated to the AF at wing level, this IG independence means that the wing IG should work directly for the wing commander and should have no other duties. This is codified in the AF instructions. AF Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-3, *Inspector General—The Complaints Program* (November 1, 1999), directs, at paragraph 3: "Independent Installation IGs will be established at all active duty and Air Force Reserve installations and ANG [Air National Guard] wings. The Installation IG will report directly to the installation commander."

<sup>2</sup> The Inspector General Act of 1978, §6, 5 U.S.C. App.3, sets out the authorities given to certain independent agency inspector generals. The statute provides that "each Office of Inspector General shall be considered to be a separate agency; and the Inspector General who is the head of an office shall ... have the functions, powers and duties of an agency head or appointing authority under such provisions." The Department of Defense IG authority is derived from the Inspector General Act of 1978. The AF IG does not derive its authority from this statute and is not considered to be an "independent" IG office.

AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, implements AFPD 90-3. It covers the responsibilities of the installation IG and the installation IG program. In the past decade, three editions of this instruction were in effect – the dates of these AFIs were January 30, 2001, February 8, 2005 (2005 edition), and May 15, 2008 (2008 edition). Only the last two published editions of this AFI are applicable to this case. For comparison purposes, the following table sets forth texts pertinent to this case from each of the three editions of AFI 90-301 (key portions highlighted in **bold** by the IO).

In comparing the applicable language of the three editions, the IO noted the following:

- All three editions stressed the need for an independent IG to work directly for the installation commander;
- The 2001 and 2005 editions stipulated IG positions at “large” installations (5,000 or more) be Colonels; selection of an individual lower in grade required SAF/IG approval;
- The 2008 edition stipulated IG positions at large installations be lieutenant colonels; this requirement was waivable by the Complaints Resolution Directorate of SAF/IG (SAF/IGQ);
- The 2001 edition’s language with regard to IGs was firmly stated and explained what additional duties were not acceptable;
- The 2005 edition’s language with regard to IGs and additional duties was “softened” somewhat and used words such as “normally not acceptable” and “should not be...”
- The 2008 edition’s language used “are not acceptable” and “the IG position will not be combined with another,” and specifically states DS as an example of prohibited additional duty (stronger verbiage than its 2005 predecessor); and
- Of overall importance to all three editions is the concept of the independent IG being able to conduct an unbiased analysis of any issue brought to their attention.

AFI 90-301	2001 Provision	2005 Provision	2008 Provision
<b>Installation IG Program Background</b>	1.13. Installation IG Program Background. 1.13.1. The concept of <b>separate full-time Installation IGs was implemented to remove any perceived conflict of interest, lack of independence, or apprehension by Air Force personnel as a result of a previous practice of assigning chain of command and IG roles to the same official.</b> 1.13.2. To sustain a trustworthy relationship with Air Force personnel, the	1.15. Installation IG Program Background. 1.15.1. <b>The concept of separate full-time installation IGs was implemented to remove any perceived conflict of interest, lack of independence, or apprehension by Air Force personnel as a result of a previous practice of assigning vice commanders and IG roles to the same official.</b> 1.15.2. To sustain a trustworthy relationship with Air Force personnel, the installation IG must be independent. <b>Air Force personnel must be free from any form of retribution, retaliation, or reprisal for</b>	1.20. Installation IG Program Background. 1.20.1. <b>The concept of appointing a separate full-time installation IG was implemented to remove any perceived conflict of interest, lack of independence, or apprehension by Air Force personnel as a result of a previous practice of assigning vice commanders IG duties.</b> This issue was identified in Committee Report H.R. 4301 of the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act.

	Installation IG must be independent. <b>Air Force personnel must be free from any form of retribution, retaliation, or reprisal for communicating with the Installation IG.</b>	<b>communicating with the Installation IG.</b>	
<b>Establishment of the Installation IG Program</b>	1.14. Establishment of the Installation IG Program. 1.14.1. <b>Independent</b> Installation IGs will be established at all active duty and AFRC installations; the 88 ANG flying wings. <b>IGs at installations with 5,000 or more assigned will be in the grade of Colonel</b> ; those installations with less than 5,000 will be in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel.	1.16. Establishment of the Installation IG Program. 1.16.1. <b>Independent</b> installation IGs will be established at all active duty and Air Force Reserve installations and all Air National Guard wings. <b>IGs at installations with 5,000 or more military members and civilian employees assigned will be in the grade of colonel</b> ; those installations with less than 5,000 military and civilians assigned will be in the grade of lieutenant colonel. 1.16.1.1. <b>Selection or assignment of officer in lower grade (e.g., O-4 for O-5 IG position) requires coordination and approval by SAF/IG.</b>	1.21. Establishment of the Installation IG Program. 1.21.1. <b>Independent</b> installation IGs will be established at all active duty bases and at Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard wings. <b>IGs at Air Force installations with a base population (military, civilians, and dependents) of 5,000 people or more will be in the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel</b> ; those installations with a base population of less than 5,000 people will be in the rank of major or lieutenant colonel. 1.21.1.1. <b>Selection or assignment of an officer of a lower rank (e.g., major for lieutenant colonel IG position) requires coordination and approval by SAF/IGQ.</b> 1.21.1.2. Commanders may appoint a civilian of appropriate grade in lieu of a military member.
<b>Assigning Additional Duties to Installation IGs</b>	1.18. Assigning Additional Duties to Installation IGs. 1.18.1. The focus of Installation IGs must be the Air Force Complaints and FWA Programs. Any activities that may diminish the effectiveness of Installation IGs in the performance of their complaints management and FWA responsibilities <b>are not acceptable.</b> 1.18.2. Additional Duties that are Not Allowed. IGs <b>will not</b> be constrained by additional duties that detract from their primary responsibilities.	1.21. Assigning Additional Duties to Installation IGs. 1.21.1. The focus of installation IGs must be the Air Force Complaints Resolution and FWA Programs. Any activities that may diminish the effectiveness of installation IGs in the performance of their complaints management and FWA responsibilities <b>are normally not acceptable.</b> 1.21.2. IG Additional Duties. IGs <b>should not</b> be constrained by additional duties that detract from their primary responsibilities. Therefore, IGs and IG staff members <b>should not</b>	1.24. Assigning Additional Duties to Installation IGs. 1.24.1. The focus of installation/wing IGs must be the Air Force Complaints Resolution and FWA Programs. Any activities that may diminish the effectiveness of installation IGs in the performance of their complaints resolution and FWA responsibilities <b>are not acceptable.</b> 1.24.2. The IG position will not be combined with another position in the organization. 1.24.3. IGs must not be constrained by additional



	<p>Therefore, IGs and IG staff members <b>will not be</b>:</p> <p>1.18.2.1. Assigned duties that subsequently disqualify them from conducting an unbiased analysis of complaints against functions or activities of the command (or installation) to which they are assigned or organizations for which they have IG functional responsibility.</p> <p>1.18.2.2. Appointed as IOs to conduct commander-directed investigations or inquiries.</p> <p>1.18.2.3. Given responsibility for the installation commander's "action line."</p> <p>1.18.2.4. The primary focal point for readiness or inspection programs.</p>	<p><b>be:</b></p> <p>1.21.2.1. Assigned any duties that subsequently disqualify them from conducting an unbiased analysis of complaints against functions or activities of the wing or installation to which they are assigned or organizations for which they have IG functional responsibility.</p> <p>1.21.2.2. Appointed as an IO to conduct a commander-directed investigation.</p> <p>1.21.2.3. Given responsibility for the installation commander's "action line."</p>	<p>duties that detract from their primary responsibilities.</p> <p>Therefore, IGs and IG staff members <b>must not be</b>:</p> <p>1.24.3.1. Assigned any duties (such as Director of Staff) that subsequently disqualify them from conducting an unbiased analysis of complaints against functions or activities of the wing or installation to which they are assigned or organizations for which they have IG functional responsibility.</p> <p>1.24.3.2. Appointed as an IO to conduct a commander-directed investigation.</p> <p>1.24.3.3. Given responsibility for the installation commander's "action line."</p>
<p><b>Roles of the IG in Relation to the Commander</b></p>	<p>[not included by IO]</p>	<p>1.27. Roles of the IG in Relation to the Commander.</p> <p>1.27.3. The independence of the IG must be firmly established and supported to overcome any perceived lack of autonomy that would discourage potential complainants and preclude disclosures of wrongdoing from being brought to the attention of the IG.</p>	<p>1.27. Roles of the IG in Relation to the Commander.</p> <p>1.27.3. The independence of the IG must be firmly established and supported to overcome any perceived lack of autonomy that would discourage potential complainants and preclude disclosures of wrongdoing from being brought to the attention of the IG. IG offices should be located in areas that foster open and unfettered access to everyone and which are not in close proximity to the commander's office.</p>

To ensure complete understanding and interpretation of the above instructions, the IO interviewed subject matter experts on AFI 90-301 from SAF/IGQ (Colonel JD and Mr. MW) and Air Education and Training Command IG Complaint Resolution Directorate (AETC/IGQ) (Ms. IW). Part of their testimony focused on the changing language of the last three iterations of the AFI, the intent behind the AFI and the interpretation of the AFI's language by wings in the field.

The subject matter experts from SAF/IGQ stated the intent behind the verbiage in all three editions of the AFI was to ensure an independent installation IG. When asked directly whether or not it was a violation of the AFI to assign someone duties as a Director of Staff, Inspector General and Director of Competitive Sourcing at the same time, they replied, "yes" – and it

applies to all editions of the AFI. Both experts also pointed out that the AFIs talked to “additional duties”<sup>3</sup> in the traditional sense (*i.e.* CFC, AF Assistance Fund, etc). Both believed the duties being discussed in this case were not the traditional “additional duties” but were actually other full-time jobs. They both stated the intent of all three editions of the AFI in ensuring the independence of the IG would rule out other, full-time duties.

The subject matter expert from AETC/IGQ stated she and those in her office felt there was a problem with multi-hatting an installation IG, especially after the AFI’s language became stronger with the 2008 edition. With regard to the field’s interpretation of the wording in the 2005 edition, she testified that “I think the [wing] commanders at that time ... were reading what the older edition ... wording was, that it gave them you know, wiggle room... And so they, as commanders, thought that it didn’t specifically mandate them or, you know, preclude them from using their IG in a dual capacity.” She also testified that the feedback she received in 2008 (with regard to the May 2008 AFI) from commanders was that they were trying to get a fulltime IG assigned at their installations. “[T]here were attempts, but that they themselves, the commanders were facing problems in trying to either find somebody qualified... in other words there were just, in some instances, there just wasn’t anybody to, you know, to pick from.”

The IO found that while it appears each published edition of AFI 90-301 intended to emphasize the need for an independent IG and for an installation IG to have no other duties that would diminish the IG’s ability to effectively and independently carry out their role, the wording in the 2005 edition left the issue open to interpretation by its use of the terms “should” and “normally.”

### ***Analysis***

According to the IO, the key criteria in this case involves whether or not the duties assigned to Colonel Rossi diminished her ability to function independently as the installation IG. The evidence and analysis with regard to Colonel Rossi and each of the wing commanders is set forth below.

#### ***General WC1 and Colonel Rossi (March 2005 – August 2006)***

As discussed below, the IO found, based upon the documentation and testimonial evidence, that General WC1 did not violate the 2005 edition of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, when he assigned Colonel Rossi, the 82 TRW/CCO, to be the 82 TRW/IG. Likewise, the evidence does not support a finding that Colonel Rossi violated the

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<sup>3</sup> In the AF context, the term “additional duty” normally refers to a relatively minor duty assigned to a member that is performed in addition to their regular full-time job. For example, a pilot of a flying squadron may be assigned to be in charge of the squadron’s Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) drive for the year. This duty would be in addition to his flying duties. On the other hand, if this same pilot would become the Assistant Operations Officer of the squadron, that duty would be his full-time job even though he would still be flying. Additional duties, for the most part, tend to be minor duties not directly related to the unit’s specific mission whereas full-time duties are tied directly to the mission.

2005 edition of AFI 90-301 when she held both the 82 CCO and IG positions during the time period when General WC1 was the 82 TRW/CC.

Colonel Rossi was assigned to the 82 TRW on February 25, 2005 as the CCO. AETC had given the 82 TRW an additional colonel manpower authorization for the duration of the A-76 study.<sup>4</sup> As the 82 TRW/CCO, Colonel Rossi was responsible for overseeing Sheppard AFB's "A-76" study. When she arrived at Sheppard AFB, the A-76 study was still in a delayed status – work on the actual study had not begun and the effort was mainly in a "data gathering" phase waiting new guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and AETC Headquarters. The actual study would not start for another year and a half (October 2006) and Colonel Rossi felt under-utilized. During these 20 months, Sheppard AFB's A-76 effort was limited to gathering mostly background statistical data on the base functions that would eventually be studied in much greater depth.

When the installation IG, Colonel JB, departed Sheppard AFB on permanent change of station (PCS) orders in March 2005, Colonel Rossi discussed the now-vacant IG situation with her boss, General WC1, indicating that she could take on the IG role for a short time until another permanent IG was assigned. Prior to her arrival at Sheppard AFB, Colonel Rossi had been assigned to the AF Personnel Center (AFPC) where she held positions as the DS and installation IG simultaneously.

In February 2005, the revised AFI 90-301 became effective. It required that "IGs at installations with 5,000 or more military members and civilian employees assigned will be in the grade of colonel." Based upon its size, the Sheppard installation IG had to be a colonel. Because of its mission, Sheppard AFB had fewer officers than many air bases from which to select an IG. Sheppard AFB is Air Education and Training Command's (AETC) only base to conduct both technical training and flying training. The 82 TRW is the host wing and conducts technical training in a wide array of skills, concentrating in the areas of maintenance and logistics. The 80<sup>th</sup> Flying Training Wing (80 FTW) is a tenant wing and conducts pilot training for both United States (US) and Allied student pilots.

Since technical training is predominately focused on the initial and advanced training of enlisted personnel, the 82 TRW could be termed an "enlisted-intensive" wing. Most of the instructor personnel in technical training are either enlisted (senior airman to chief master sergeant) or AF civilians. Hence the groups and squadrons in the 82 TRW do not have many officer personnel. This insight is verified through AF current and historical demographic data. This data shows that over the past five years officers have comprised approximately 20% of the

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<sup>4</sup>The origin of the A-76 process at Sheppard AFB and AETC goes back to the late 1990's when the military Services were under increasing pressure to outsource many base functions that were being performed by military members or government civilian employees. The A-76 process was designed to study and compare a contractor-performed function against an in house-performed function (called Most Efficient Organization [MEO]) to determine the best value for the taxpayer dollar. One example of a function to be studied was base civil engineering. AETC's philosophy on this issue was to pick several bases and conduct an A-76 study on many base functions. Sheppard AFB's study was originally to start around 1998 but was delayed many years for a variety of reasons. Once underway, the study focused on three areas--civil engineering, training operations, technical training support--affecting 426 jobs on base, including 10 officer positions, 183 enlisted positions, and 233 civilians.

active duty members AF-wide but they comprise only 8% of the active duty force of the 82 TRW. Additionally, the active duty force has about 1% colonels and 3.1% lieutenant colonels, while the 82 TRW has .3% colonels and .7% lieutenant colonels. Additionally, the raw number of colonels and lieutenant colonels in the wing remained relatively stable between 2005 and 2009 while the overall size of the wing increased.

The 80 FTW on the other hand is “officer-intensive” since its instructor personnel are pilots and hence officers. Because of its Euro-NATO mission, many of the 80 FTW officers are foreign instructors and as such the European nations have a direct say in the utilization of all 80 FTW manpower billets to include the US billets. General Devereaux confirmed this point in his testimony, stating that since the Europeans share in the overall cost of the entire pilot training program, pilot instructor billets are often “protected” from deployments and other detailing.

After Colonel JB departed as the IG, General WC1 selected Colonel Rossi to replace him on an interim basis. He testified as follows concerning his reasoning:

W: ...he [JB] left and that's when I had a decision to make on how to backfill him.

IO: Yes sir. Okay. So what were some of the parameters and what were you looking at that time. What kind of advice was given you or, you know...

W: Well the one thing that I, that I considered but, but dismissed almost right away was letting the one field grader who was, who was in there be in charge of that... And the reason that I, I dismissed that course of action was because, because of the nature of not only the 82nd Training Wing, but also being the host...for both the 82nd and the 80th, I felt that was a little much for a, for a [m]ajor to handle and it felt like we needed to have a little higher level...in charge of the IG shop. Col[onel] Rossi came to me from, from AFPC where she had been the Director of Staff and the IG...simultaneously...Okay. She actually suggested as we, as I was looking at options for covering down on, on that, that she had some experiences in the IG business...and then, you know, congressional inquiries and those sorts of things and it went okay, seems like, seems like a reasonable fit because at the time, the competitive sourcing business was still, it's coming, it's coming, it's, you know, it's still around the corner...and we're not actively involved in that. And so it seemed like a decent fit to me at the time. I didn't want to leave the shop uncovered with a, with a more junior field grader and...and her competitive sourcing job wasn't one that was taking the, the, the full attention and measure of a, of an O-6.

In her testimony, Colonel Rossi indicated that both she and General WC1 felt she could easily handle the IG job on a temporary basis until a new, permanent IG could be found. She added that the deputy director for competitive sourcing was strong, which would allow her to devote sufficient time to her IG position. Additionally, the noncommissioned officer in charge of the IG office was an experienced senior master sergeant. Finally, there was a tacit

understanding that she would recuse herself from any issue that could be viewed as a conflict of interest.

Colonel Rossi initially served as the IG for a four-month period until General WC1 hired Lieutenant Colonel AC who came to Sheppard AFB from being the Deputy Group Commander at Vandenberg AFB California. At the time (July 2005) he was a colonel-select. Colonel Rossi reverted to her single role as the CCO. However, in January 2006, the 782 Training Group (TRG) Commander, Colonel DR, deployed to the area of responsibility (AOR)<sup>5</sup> and General WC1 now needed to fill one of his colonel training group command billets. General WC1 deemed Colonel AC to be qualified to command the 782 TRG and gained approval from his numbered Air Force and major command to make this move. This left the IG position vacant again.

General WC1 then decided to rehire Colonel Rossi into the IG position. The A-76 study had not yet begun. With regard to his reasoning, General WC1 testified:

W: Once again, now I'm trying... my, my preferred course of action would be to get another [c]olonel in...that I could, that I could stick, stick in there. That wasn't going to happen any time soon according to the, the personnel folks...So the choices are once again leave it, leave it kind of uncovered or we still haven't kicked off on the competitive sourcing full bore yet in terms of the, the actual study. I have somebody who, who'd held down the fort for a few months previous, so I went, okay I'll, I'll let her do that until we, we get a...a full time replacement ... And so until that full blown study kicked off I, I felt like using Col[onel] Rossi in that, in the capacity was probably the prudent thing to do.

IO: ...You mentioned the personnel folks said there wasn't anything, you know, coming. Was, or this, was this coming from your MSS [Mission Support Squadron] Commander, was this coming from AFPC or?

W: Ah, and the command, AETC. Talking with the, the senior guys there.

IO: The A-1 folks down there?

W: Yeah, yeah. Just that it might be a little while before I got, got somebody.

IO: Got a [c]olonel.

W: Got a [c]olonel, yeah...So, and that, that's not unusual...And having, you know, I didn't work [c]olonel's assignments but I was the director of assignments down at personnel center, so I kind of, kind of...knew the, kind of knew that process...And so, you know, at the time I felt like, okay, we've got these

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<sup>5</sup> The AOR is the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority.

resources on hand. I've got to, I've got to play the hand that I've been dealt the best I can...to make sure the mission stays covered.

Colonel Rossi testified that, during General WC1's tenure as wing commander, the competitive sourcing business was very slow and she had lots of time to devote to her IG duties. Further, she said since the A-76 study had not yet started there could be no conflict on potential A-76 study-related issues (*i.e.* the issues that often arise when an A-76 study formally compares the merits of a base function staying governmental or being outsourced).

General WC1 testified that no one had ever advised him that dual-hatting Colonel Rossi might violate AFI 90-301. He said that when this investigation started, he pulled out the AFI and read it for the first time. Ms. PD, who had worked in the IG office as a secretary and an investigative assistance since 1993, testified that she recalled that General WC1 was told by either Master Sergeant DD or Colonel Rossi that the AFI does not allow the IG to hold other positions.

With regard to Ms. PD's testimony referenced above, the IO noted that Sergeant DD had not yet been assigned to the Sheppard IG office – he did not come on board until early 2007 (after General WC1 had departed). According to the IO, Ms. PD's memory was apparently mistaken about Sergeant DD being assigned to the IG office at that time. In fact, Senior Master Sergeant GK was the IG superintendent during General WC1's tenure. During his interview, Sergeant GK was specifically asked whether or not he knew if anyone had spoken to General WC1 about the verbiage in AFI 90-301 – he answered, "I do not." Thus, neither Sergeant GK nor Ms. PD spoke directly to General WC1 about the dual-hatting issue; they only thought that someone else might have.

During her interview, Colonel Rossi was asked about her interpretation of the language in the 2005 edition of AFI 90-301. She testified as follows:

IO: ... What, what was your interpretation of the regs, that portion of the reg as to whether or not you, you can be multi[-]hatted or not, on the old reg and then on the current reg?

W: Well [IO], I saw that as guidance that, you know, if it is all possible, that there should be an IG and that's all that that IG does is one job alone, but there was no one to fill in the gap and there were people who needed an IG on this base...I don't know what the option would've been if I wouldn't have stepped in. Perhaps someone of a much lower grade could have stepped in, I don't, I don't see how. We we're, we're a very busy base with a lot of airmen...A lot of congressional cases coming in about the training. The interpretation I put on it, okay, this is guidance and I'll follow that guidance and I will make plans that if there's ever a conflict of any kind, that I step down. The competitive sourcing job dealt mostly with civilian issues...As such, I would refer them to CPO [Civilian Personnel Office] if they had concerns. The IG did not handle that. There were no military issues that came up on the competitive sourcing scope that would anywhere come near the IG. People were more concerned about their

assignments. All of our military people would receive assignments out of Sheppard. The civilians were the ones who were concerned about their jobs. And the only one who could answer their concerns about jobs was the civilian personnel office.

General WC1 testified as follows regarding his view of the independence of the installation IG:

IO: The final question, what else do I need to know? What aren't we smart enough to ask?

W: No, I think you, I think you hit most of the, most of the right questions...I mean the answer to the question, did I have an IG that had other duties, yes I did. I mean I did. Had I, had I read the, the AFI that says that they have to be singly focused and, and not... no, I didn't do that. I had not read that and, and, and did not realize I was violating an AFI by doing that. What I did try to do is ensure that the wing had a senior oversight of, of the IG office at the time and I didn't perceive any, any conflict of interest at all.

IO: Based on where her other duty was at the time, do you feel then that she and her office had the independent authority that you needed to advise you as the Wing Commander?

W: Absolutely.

Based on documentation and testimony, the IO summarized the situation/actions during General WC1's tenure as 82 TRW/CC as follows:

- General WC1 appointed Colonel Rossi to the IG position twice, each for what he believed would be on a temporary or interim basis; the first appointment was precipitated by the PCS of the incumbent IG and the second appointment was precipitated by an overseas deployment to a war zone that led to a vacancy in a critical group command billet;
- Both times, Colonel Rossi maintained her position as the CCO;
- Sheppard's A-76 study had not yet begun and the CCO office during General WC1's tenure was limited to background data collecting;
- General WC1 was told by both AETC/A1 (office that handles military personnel) and AFPC he would likely not get a colonel inbound to permanently fill the IG position;
- General WC1 was not told about any AFI restrictions for this situation; he stated he was unaware of language in the AFI that spoke to the necessity of full independence in the IG;
- Colonel Rossi interpreted the 2005 AFI 90-301 language regarding additional duty as "guidance" since it used the words "should" and "normally" and was not meant to be mandatory;

- While Colonel Rossi did not assign herself to the IG position, her wing commander asked her and she advised him that she could hold both positions while still serving as an independent IG;
- Because of the AF's regimentation of colonel assignments, limited personnel resources overall, the lack of many officers in the wing and the base's requirement to support AF war deployment taskings, GC1 could not hire a "spare" colonel from within his wing – he did not have any colonels that did not already have full time jobs;
- General WC1 made a conscious decision to move/use/assign a colonel with some IG experience rather than let the position go vacant or hire an officer below the rank of colonel with no IG background; he had these three options available, he chose to hire Colonel Rossi; and
- With little activity on Sheppard's competitive sourcing during General WC1's tenure, Colonel Rossi's duties while "dual-hatted" were primarily focused on her IG job.

According to the IO, at issue was not simply whether Colonel Rossi 'wore two hats,' but whether Colonel Rossi's dual-hatting as CCO and installation IG under General WC1 prevented Sheppard AFB from having an independent installation IG, as required by the 2005 edition of AFI 90-301. In assessing this, the IO reviewed and analyzed the requirements of the instruction with respect to the specific facts and circumstances of Mrs. Armel's allegation.

AFPD 90-3, the policy directive driving AFI 90-301, requires an "Independent Installation IG," but does not elaborate on whether this strictly prohibits the IG from serving in more than one position or from holding additional duties. According to the IO, the 2005 edition of AFI 90-301, ¶1.20.1 (describing "Installation IG Program Background"), suggests that the "Independent Installation IG" should be based on a "concept of separate full-time installation IGs." It states that this concept "...was implemented to remove any perceived conflict of interest, lack of independence, or apprehension by Air Force personnel as a result of a previous practice of assigning vice commanders and IG roles to the same official."

However, this language, describing "implementation" of a "concept", does not expressly mandate a "separate full-time installation IG." Similarly, AFI 90-301, ¶1.21.1. does not expressly prohibit "additional duties" but, rather, states that they "are normally not acceptable" if they are activities that "may diminish the effectiveness of installation IGs in the performance of their complaints management and FWA responsibilities." "IGs and IG staff members should not be...assigned any duties that subsequently disqualify them from conducting an unbiased analysis of complaints ..." ¶¶ 1.21.2 and 1.21.2.1. The IO found that the language of the 2005 AFI 90-301 "leaves room to conceive of a nonstandard situation in which additional duties might be acceptable, and in which additional duties might even be assigned in spite of the possibility of disqualifying the installation IG from analyzing a complaint."

Colonel JD and Mr. MW, of SAF/IGQ, the office of primary responsibility to interpret AFI 90-301, opined that assigning a person duties as the installation IG, DS, and CCO would violate both the 2005 and 2008 editions of AFI 90-301. However, they also conceded that "with regard to "multi-hatting" installation IGs, the verbiage was softened in the 2005 update to AFI



90-301, stating that the overall intent was to emphasize the “need for an independent installation IG to be able to avoid any real or perceived conflict of interest.” They pointed out that the 2005 edition highlights “how making the IG someone in the chain of command did not allow that individual to be independent.”

The IO found that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the allegation that General WC1’s actions of appointing Colonel Rossi as interim IG, while she was under-utilized as the CCO during the A-76 ramp-up, diminished the independence of his IG in violation of the 2005 AFI 90-301. Colonel Rossi’s OPR for January 29, 2005 through January 28, 2006 describes what seems to be substantial duties and accomplishments related to the A-76 study. However, she testified repeatedly that actual work in this area amounted to no more than overseeing data-gathering and that she was not fully employed. As CCO, Colonel Rossi was only in the chain of command for the five civilians doing the initial A-76 data gathering. One of those five was her civilian deputy, whom she credits for leading the effort. The IO determined that, in spite of Colonel Rossi being assigned to the CCO position, the level of effort at this time was more on par with additional duties than a separate full-time job.

While AFI 90-301 indicates that additional duties are “normally not acceptable if they diminish the effectiveness of the installation IG,” the facts do not suggest that the A-76 work had a measurable impact on Colonel Rossi’s effectiveness as the IG. At the time, the study was not treated as a public event; media attention and townhall gatherings did not begin until after public announcement of the study in October 2006. The lack of attention on A-76 efforts made it unlikely members of the base perceived a conflict of interest. When interviewed, IG staff members from that time, Ms. PD and Sergeant GK, expressed a valid concern about whether the “dual hatting” complied with AFI 90-301, noting that the installation IG office could become conflicted out of reviewing a complaint raised by a member of the A-76 team. However, neither recount facts that otherwise suggest an actual diminished effectiveness of Colonel Rossi’s ability to serve as installation IG. In addition, both Colonel Rossi and General WC1 testified that they believed Colonel Rossi succeeded in serving as an independent IG. While their testimony is not conclusive, it is relevant and, at this point in time, uncontroverted.

In addition, General WC1’s testimony supports that he found himself in a situation that required him to do what was “normally not acceptable.” His O-6 (colonel) IG had moved pursuant to a PCS, he had no other colonel available to backfill the position, and his contacts at HQ AETC had assured him no replacement was inbound. He considered the option of filling the IG slot with a more junior officer (allowed with SAF/IGQ waiver) and determined that, based on the nature and quantity of the IG workload, this was not the best course of action. He “didn’t want to leave the shop uncovered with a, with a more junior field grader.” In addition, Colonel Rossi, an experienced prior IG, offered to fill the role while General WC1 saw the competitive sourcing business as “still, it’s coming, it’s coming, it’s, you know, it’s still around the corner...and we’re not actively involved in that.” Finally, his IG, Colonel Rossi, advised him that his course of action was permitted by the AFI. Based on all the facts and circumstances, such an interpretation of the AFI language is not unreasonable. In addition, at this time, higher headquarters had not offered guidance to suggest otherwise.

While Colonel Rossi was “dual-hatted” during a portion of General WC1’s tenure as wing commander, the evidence suggests that the nature of her positions allowed her to act independently as the installation IG. Hence, the preponderance of evidence, based upon the findings of fact and sworn testimony, do not support the allegation that General WC1 wrongfully assigned the CCO, Colonel Rossi, as the 82 TRW/IG in violation of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, February 8, 2005. Likewise, the evidence does not support a finding that Colonel Rossi violated the 2005 edition when she held both the 82 CCO and IG positions during the time period when General WC1 was the wing commander at Sheppard AFB.

### ***General Devereaux and Colonel Rossi (August 2006-July 2008)***

As discussed below, the IO found, based upon the documentation and testimonial evidence, that General Devereaux’s actions in assigning Colonel Rossi, the 82 TRW/CCO, as the 82 TRW/IG and DS, resulted in violations of both the 2005 and 2008 editions of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*. Likewise, the evidence supports a finding that Colonel Rossi was also in violation of both editions of AFI 90-301 when she held the CCO, IG and DS positions during the time period when General Devereaux was the 82 TRW/CC.

General Devereaux assumed command of the 82 TRW on August 25, 2006. At this time Colonel Rossi was serving as both the IG and CCO. The competitive sourcing’s A-76 study had not yet begun and the wing was scheduled to have its periodic Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) within 60 days of the general’s arrival. In the testimony and documentation he provided, General Devereaux indicated that his main concern at that time was preparing for the ORI. He also testified that the fact that Colonel Rossi’s dual-hatting might be a problem was never brought to his attention. He knew of several other bases where the IG was dual-hatted and he believed using Colonel Rossi to cover the positions was the best option for the wing’s mission at the time. He also stated several times during his interview that he did not learn about the statements in the AFI 90-301 regarding the assignment of other duties to installation IGs (*i.e.* that IGs should not be assigned other duties) until the publication of the 2008 edition, which was at the end of his two-year tenure as wing commander.

In the fall of 2006, after he took command and had viewed the operation of his wing headquarters for a couple of months, General Devereaux decided he needed a director of staff.<sup>6</sup> In September 2006, General Devereaux asked Colonel Rossi if she would be interested in performing the new wing DS position. He envisioned this position as being a communications and coordinating focal point with administrative oversight while he, as wing commander would retain the same responsibilities he presently had. Colonel Rossi replied to her boss she would like to do the job and was working on an organizational construct. General Devereaux stated:

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<sup>6</sup>The IO noted that in recent years, many AF wings had created a DS position. These positions have been taken “out-of hide” meaning without a manpower authorization, and are designed to coordinate wing functions and agencies. According to the IO, many wing commanders have found a DS position essential to ensuring the smooth functioning of their wing since the overall downsizing of the AF resulted in a loss in personnel supporting the day-to-day administration at a wing headquarters. The DS position is supposed to deal with and coordinate staff and wing functions. Depending on the wing, this dealing with the various wing offices can be as simple as purely administrative or can go further and assign certain offices to work directly for the DS.

W: ... I remember shortly after I arrived at Sheppard [AFB] and probably even before I arrived, searching for the, the DS position, because every wing I'd been affiliated with...before had had a Director of Staff. In fact, my last time as a Wing Commander at RAF Mildenhall over in the UK [United Kingdom], I had an O-6 Director of Staff, a funded billet on the books...and found that position very valuable to just coordinate the activities of the wing staff and so as I looked at Sheppard [AFB], a larger wing, responsible for an installation and as a host supporting a flying operation with the 80th [Flying Training Wing (FTW)] and then in some sense we were, although the 80th Flying Training Wing co-located at Sheppard [AFB] had a wing staff, it was a very, a very thin staff... We provided much of the functions like Public Affairs and...so forth for both wings. So I, I felt, I felt that that would, and I discussed with Col[onel] [LC], my Vice and I said, I've noticed that you're, you're kind of at times playing Director of Staff as well as being Vice Wing Commander and we discussed that and I asked Col[onel] Rossi to come in and discuss it with me and, and I just sort of threw out the idea and this was within the first thirty days of, what do you think about you taking on another job as Director of Staff and I said, my vision for this Director of Staff that you would perform simply a coordinating function, provide an alternative communication conduit for the wing staff agencies. I said I kind of need somebody to look after the administrivia of the wing staff like making sure the OPRs [Officer Performance Reports] and EPRs [Enlisted Performance Reports] for the staff get turned in on time...The T scores are up to date when it's Air Force assistance fund time that, you know...we have a POC [point of contact] for the wing staff...not just for the groups... But I said these are still my people, you know, my concept of the Director of Staff is you are not their quote, "Group Commander"...They work for me functionally and their access will always be direct to the Wing Commander, but I just, I need some help in terms of coordinating function, and, but I said first and foremost you're the Inspector General and you need to be, retain your independence as the IG...So what do you think and she said, you know sir, I think I could do that. And I, and she goes actually, I think me having a seat at the table as the Director of Staff could, in some ways, enhance my role as the IG because it just, it just adds to my credibility as a senior leader on the base, gets me more involved in the day to day workings of the mission and the interaction between the staffs and the groups, so that I can truly be eyes and ears...for you, but not own those functions so that therefore we could manage any perceptions of conflict of interest because I'm a conduit and a communicator...not an owner of those staff agencies. So I said okay, come back to me with a construct and, and she did and, and we dialogued a little more about that and I also talked with the senior leaders on the base, the Group Commanders and my SJA [staff judge advocate] and others...And, and just explained the construct and we decided to, to go ahead, go forward with it...So on the... and this, this didn't really come to fruition until after our ORI.

The 82 TRW passed their October 2006 ORI with an “excellent” rating and the AETC inspectors said nothing about the IG being dual-hatted.<sup>7</sup> At this time, the A-76 study had not yet started and the duties of the CCO position were considered by Colonel Rossi and the wing commanders as less than a full time job. However, on the day of the final ORI outbrief, the wing announced the commencement of the long awaited A-76 study that would analyze three separate support areas on the base to determine if they should remain governmental or switch to a contractor. At this point in time, Colonel Rossi’s CCO job took on a much more intense role – she would now be in charge of the wing office tasked with comparing government work with outsourced work. The CCO job had just become a true full-time position.

Like General WC1 before him, General Devereaux had been told by AETC/A1 and AFPC that he was unlikely to get a new colonel to fill his IG billet.<sup>8</sup> So in October 2006, General Devereaux sent a request to Headquarters (HQ) AETC/IG and SAF/IG, in turn, for “a waiver to fill our vacant IG position with a lieutenant colonel as soon as possible,” explaining that Colonel Rossi was “originally assigned as the Director of Competitive Sourcing...but dual hatted as interim installation IG in Jan 06,” and that, “in Sep 06, we started a large A-76 process that requires a full-time Director of Competitive Sourcing, leaving Col[onel] Rossi unable to fulfill IG duties.”

According to Colonel Rossi’s electronic staff summary sheet for the waiver request, dated October 11, 2006, Colonel Rossi had previously coordinated the request with AETC/IGQ, and local commanders of the 882d Training Group (TRG) and 82d Medical Group (MDG) had already “identified potential LTC [lieutenant colonel or O-5] candidates for the IG position & are discussing the job with candidates now.” AFI 90-301 did not allow appointing a lieutenant colonel to the IG position unless SAF/IGQ approved the waiver. In the meantime, General Devereaux continued to seek a candidate to fill the vacant IG position through his HQ AETC chain of command. Within a week of signing out the waiver request, General Devereaux discussed this with the AETC/IG and the AETC/A1 at an AETC Commander’s Conference, emphasizing that he needed their help because he had a “dual-hatted IG and I think we’re entitled to a full time one.” General Devereaux recalled that AETC/A1 and IG pledged to help. On October 31, 2006, it seemed that AETC/A1 was following through on that pledge when their O-6 (colonel) Gameplan<sup>9</sup> Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) sent General Devereaux an O-6 assignments spreadsheet highlighting the need for a candidate to fill the IG position.

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<sup>7</sup> Although the ORI did not inspect the 82 TRW/IG’s FWA or complaints resolution program, General Devereaux testified that the AETC/IG ORI Team Chief was aware of and sympathetic about Colonel Rossi’s dual-hatting.

<sup>8</sup> In late 2006 and early 2007, the AF embarked on a series of personnel programs as a result of Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720. With PBD 720 Congress gave the AF the authority to reduce manpower authorizations to save money. These programs, some under the overall heading of “Force Shaping” were designed to cut up to 40,000 manpower slots off the AF books with the resulting monetary savings to be used for upgrading aircraft and weapon systems. One of the areas affected by the PBD actions was colonel manpower and hence colonel manning across the AF. The decline in the number of colonels affected many wings’ ability to hire a colonel IG. Around the 2006-7 timeframe, many bases were looking for a colonel to fill the installation IG position and since there is no “IG career field,” there was no headquarters functional advocate fighting at the table to get these positions filled.

<sup>9</sup> The term “gameplan” here refers to the wing’s personnel planning document for colonel (O-6) assignments.

In November 2006, General Devereaux formally announced he was creating the DS position and that Colonel Rossi would fill it – this made her triple-hatted as the installation IG, the CCO with a newly on-going A-76 study, and the DS with administrative oversight of numerous wing offices. General Devereaux explained:

...I sent out an e-mail to all the wing staff agencies, Chiefs, and Group Commanders and so forth and just said hey, I'm announcing, going to announce at staff meeting... that we're going to have a Director of Staff. And as you can see there, I, to me, what I would characterize this is a fairly minimalist role for a Director of Staff. I use words like, I don't intend for this position to be a bureaucratic layer for the wing staff...The funct- they're going to work directly for me or the CV. Oversight on administrative matters, improve coordination and communication and then I go into some kind of examples of functions that she'll be performing...But again, a facilitative role, not an ownership kind of level of responsibility is how I characterized that.

This newly-created DS position was also a full-time job as it was designed to touch all facets of the wing. The November 6, 2006 e-mail referenced by General Devereaux in the above-quoted testimony stated that:

“Some of the functions Col[onel] Rossi will perform include:

- Group/CC equivalent for the Wing Staff for Protocol and representation purposes
- Provide oversight of wing staff administrative responsibilities (PT [physical training] testing, OPR/EPR timeliness, etc.)
- Augment the information flow to and from the Wing Staff from the command section and supporting groups
- Provide O-6 top cover for wing staff agencies chiefs as necessary for specific issues
- Ensure wing staff is appropriately organized and resourced to perform required functions
- Maintain tasking authority for the staff to carry out duties assigned by the Wing/CC/CV.”

Thus, within a 30-day period, Colonel Rossi, at General Devereaux's direction, went from being the installation IG and head of a CCO office that had not yet started its study to now holding three full, up-and-running offices. As discussed below, the inability of the AF to fill the IG position and General Devereaux's assignment of Colonel Rossi to three full time positions together compromised the ability of the installation IG to maintain its independence.

On November 30, 2006, General Devereaux learned that Lieutenant Colonel L (who had been selected for promotion to colonel) desired a humanitarian assignment to north Texas and would be available to fill the IG billet. However, a week later he was informed that Sheppard's IG billet was targeted to be permanently downgraded to O-5 and therefore Lieutenant Colonel L now could not be assigned against it -- a “Catch-22” situation. The downgrade became effective

at the end of December. Interestingly, the 82 TRW/IG was named AETC/IG of the year for 2006 in February 2007.<sup>10</sup>

With the position downgraded to O-5, General Devereaux reinvigorated his search for a new IG. March 2007 e-mail traffic documents a second effort since the start of the year to pull data on all eligible O-5s. The data was reviewed by subordinate commanders and sent to General Devereaux for his review and selection. With regard to his efforts to get a new IG assigned to Sheppard AFB, General Devereaux testified:

...And during this time, and really, contin- for my whole two years of command, all of my discussions with Col[onel] Rossi and the A-1 community were, okay you can have the requisition out there and we did for the whole time, but they said frankly we just don't fill IG positions, we don't do that. That's a wing responsibility to do out, out of hide. And I said well what about wings that can't do that really. Well I'm sorry, they're our lowest priority, literally they're our lowest priority...to fill action and we just don't have the, the resources and there's a lack of a functional advocate for filling your IG position.

General Devereaux was finally able to find Major WY, a civil engineer from one of the training squadrons who had been selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel, and officially appointed him as the installation IG in May 2007. Before she left her role as the IG, Colonel Rossi reported to her boss that the rate of complaints had risen 50%. To General Devereaux, this indicated Colonel Rossi's tenure as the IG, even though being triple-hatted, had in fact worked well.

Just two months later, in July 2007, the 82 TRW was tasked to provide members for two-short notice 179-day deployments and one called for a civil engineer. All the wing commanders in AETC had previously been told by the AETC commander (AETC/CC), General WL, that support of the war efforts were the command's top priority. As Major WY was the only available and qualified officer at Sheppard AFB to fill the one deployment, he went to training and was thereafter deployed to the AOR (Area of Responsibility). This again left a vacancy in the IG billet. Colonel Rossi again filled in as the installation IG, again triple-hatted but with the full intent for Major WY to re-assume the IG position upon his return from the AOR.

In September 2007, AETC/IGQ conducted a staff assistance visit (SAV) to the Sheppard IG office. In October 2007, the AETC/IG, then-Colonel CE sent a memo to General Devereaux with the results of the SAV. The report stated the wing's IG office was performing at an excellent level, but recommended that the wing seek a waiver to allow it to operate with a multi-hatted IG. More specifically, the SAV report stated:

(1) Issues:

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<sup>10</sup> Each year the AF/IG presents awards to the best wing IG office in the AF. Preceding the AF award, each MAJCOM nominates its best IG office. It is noteworthy that the Sheppard IG office won the AETC award for 2005, 2006, and 2008, including timeframes when Colonel Rossi was multi-hatted.

The 82nd Training Wing Inspector General (IG) and staff are performing at an excellent level. Their hard work and rigorous attention to detail are evident throughout their programs. Our recent staff assistance visit did identify, however, one major area of concern. The governing directive for installation Inspectors General, AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, stipulates IGs must avoid the perception of conflicts of interest. Section 1E of AFI 90-301 states, in part: "[t]he concept of separate full-time installation IGs was implemented to remove any perceived conflict of interest, lack of independence, or apprehension by Air Force personnel as a result of a previous practice of assigning vice commanders and IG roles to the same officials." With the deployment of Major [WY] and the interim measure of appointing Col[onel] Rossi (who is dual-hatted as the Director of Staff), the 82 TRW is not in compliance with the governing directive. Since, in her role as Director of Staff, Col[onel] Rossi is a direct report to the wing commander, the situation at the 82d is exactly analogous to having the vice commander as the IG.

(2) Recommendations: If a suitable replacement for the incumbent IG cannot be found, HQ AETC/IGQ recommends seeking a waiver from SAF/IGQ to operate in this manner. The HQ AETC/IGQ staff can facilitate the waiver request.

General Devereaux testified he had never seen the SAV report and did not remember the SAV even occurring. When shown a copy of the SAV report, General Devereaux restated he had never seen or heard of the document. This is consistent with his testimony throughout his interview that nobody mentioned any potential regulation violation until the 2008 edition of AFI 90-301 was published.

Testimony from several witnesses indicated they believed then-Colonel CE called General Devereaux about the SAV report. Mr. TG (then Major TG), AETC/IG, conducted the SAV and testified:

W: When I came back, I made that same report to our IG and our IG had a conversation with Gen[eral] Devereaux and expressed the same thing.

IO: And this would have been, would this have been Col[onel] [CE]t?

W: Then Colonel, now Gen[eral] [CE], yes.

IO: Okay, so he would have been the one to talk to, to Gen[eral] Devereaux.

W: Yes, I talked with Col[onel] [CE] and Col[onel] DIG our Deputy IG and the IG and when I got back from the SAV and I said guys there are big problems. We've got to get them to not do this and their direction to me was, okay lets offer them a way out, lets offer to help them with the waiver, we'll write the SAV report that way and I, Col[onel] [CE] will call Gen[eral] Devereaux and talk to him. And I know that that conversation happened. Gen[eral] Everhart briefed me afterwards.

IO: What did he brief you?

W: That he had spoken very clearly with Gen[eral] Devereaux and that he said I hold then Maj[or] [TG] in high regards and I appreciate his input, but we will continue to operate this way through necessity.

IO: Okay, and what did Col[onel] [CE] deem to do about it at that point?

W: He said make sure that we process their waiver request when it comes through.

IO: Okay, so he got the impression there was going to be a waiver request?

W: Yes sir.

IO: Did you all ever see a waiver request?

W: No sir.

Mr. TG further testified that he explained to Colonel Rossi that her multi-hatting violated the instruction:

W: I very clearly spoke eyeball to eyeball with Col[onel] Rossi and I told her in no uncertain terms, ma'am, you're operating in violation of the regs, you should not do this. Have you told your boss that you're doing this? She said yes, I have advised him [General Devereaux] of the situation. He knows full well what, what we're doing and it's his decision to operate this way. Okay ma'am, you know, y'all are big boys and girls here, you know, it's my job to let you know that you're operating in violation of the regs.

Neither Master Sergeant DD nor Ms. PD, the other two personnel in the IG office besides Colonel Rossi during the fall 2007 timeframe, spoke directly to General Devereaux about the SAV report. Both thought Colonel Rossi may have discussed it with him. Colonel Rossi remembered discussing her multi-hatting situation with General Devereaux but in context of a December 2007 series of emails, not the SAV report. (*See below*).

General CE, the former AETC/IG testified:

IO: And that's the, kind of the bottom line is that you recommended that they come back through you up to here for exactly that. Do you recollect having any... obviously, you know, when you signed out the report, it was a memorandum to the Wing Commander. Do you remember having any conversations with Brig[adier] Gen[eral] Devereaux after you had, had... either before or after you had sent the, the document up to Sheppard [AFB]?



W: I remember, I, I vaguely remember we were sitting in a board and we had, and I said hey your SAV is coming back up to you and there's some things that we need for you to address to make sure everything is copasetic and, and he acknowledged that and said that as soon as I get it, I'll, I'll either act upon it, I'm pretty sure that's how the conversation went, then again, that was two years ago...But, but I know Gen[eral] Devereaux too. He, he, when he says he's going to act, he acts. So and that's about all I remember of that conversation.

IO: Okay, you don't, this is, so this was then like a selection board of some type or an MLR [Management Level Review] or something like that?

W: It was either in the Commander's conference or an MLR or it was done right there at Randolph [AFB] and that's, that's about all I can remember.

IO: Do you recollect any prior, or not prior, but any subsequent conversations with him after he might have gotten the document itself?

W: No, no.

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W: So if he was made aware of those SAVs and things like that, he would have acted upon them without any doubt in my mind.

In December 2007, with the A-76 study on-going, Sheppard AFB was questioned by the *Federal Times* on the wisdom of having the IG double-hatted as the CCO. In a December 17, 2007 email to General Devereaux, Colonel BL quoted the inquiry from the *Federal Times*, “[m]y editor wanted to know whether it was a conflict of interest for the IG to be in charge of the A76 competition considering IGs might have to audit the competition if there is a protest post-award. How is she able to hold the two seemingly conflicting roles?” Colonel BL then informed General Devereaux that the AETC judge advocate (AETC/JA) considered the dual roles to constitute a conflict of interest:

In coordinating with the HQ AETC/JA staff they feel there is a conflict of interest for Col[onel] Rossi to serve in a dual capacity as both the CCO and IG. AETC/JA indicates the dual role can be considered a conflict of interest since Col[onel] Rossi's position as the wing IG could dissuade wing personnel from discussing/reporting an issue regarding the conduct of the study, since she is also responsible for managing the study. Given this development we wanted to make you aware of this latest information.

Colonel BL then went on to write, “...we understand the final decision rests with you as you balance the needs of your wing's mission and you assess the personnel you have to conduct that mission.” The email went on to say, “...the perfect solution is to provide you with an

additional colonel to serve as your IG. Unfortunately, given the current colonel inventory there is a shortage that would limit our ability to fill that position.”

General Devereaux emailed Colonel BL in reply stating that the Sheppard IG billet had been downgraded to an O-5 billet and that he had been told by AFPC that “they will not fill it.” He further indicated that there were no excess field grade officers at Sheppard AFB and that he had other open O-4/O-5 billets due to deployments. He further stated that, “I don’t know a base anywhere where IGs do nothing but IG duty. As a result there will always be some inherent conflict of interest. Remember the old days when Vice Wing Commanders were dual-hatted as wing IGs?” General Devereaux went on to state that the way they had been working it was for Colonel Rossi to recuse herself from any IG matters that might present a conflict of interest and that he thought this was working okay. General Devereaux copied his IG (Colonel Rossi) and his SJA on the e-mail. According to an email dated December 18, 2007 to Colonel Rossi, General Devereaux indicated that he had spoken with Colonel BL the day before and that “[w]e’re OK. Just be sure to recuse .., yourself on any complaints that may be perceived as related to your Director of Competitive Sourcing position.” No one from AETC/IG was copied on any of this e-mail traffic.

During General Devereaux’s tenure as 82 TRW/CC, Mrs. Armel, while working in the SARC office, had a complaint against Colonel Rossi as the DS. In the fall and winter of 2007-08, Colonel Rossi as the DS became involved in the SARC office. In October 2007, Colonel Rossi signed Mrs. Armel’s career brief for SARC duties. In the December 2007 – January 2008 timeframe, Colonel Rossi removed SARC credit from Mrs. Armel’s career brief and called Mrs. Armel into her office to discuss this with her. During this time, Mrs. Armel had FWA concerns regarding her supervisor, Ms. SARC. Mrs. Armel testified that she did not feel she could go through her command chain because Colonel Rossi, while not directly in the chain of command, was taking actions involving Mrs. Armel’s office. Mrs. Armel also did not feel she could go through the IG system since Colonel Rossi was the installation IG.<sup>11</sup> In April 2008, Colonel Rossi notified Mrs. Armel that she was being detailed out of the SARC office to a secretarial position.

Meanwhile, during the timeframe he was deployed, Major WY was selected for squadron command. Thus, when he returned to Sheppard AFB he had only a short time before he was transferred to Kunsan AB (Air Base), Korea for his command tour. Colonel Rossi remained the IG.

The new edition of AFI 90-301 was published in May 2008, about six weeks prior to the end of General Devereaux’s tenure as wing commander at Sheppard AFB. The 2008 edition of

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<sup>11</sup> In her testimony, Mrs. Armel indicated, “[b]ut my main concern is not only that she [Colonel Rossi] holds the multiple positions, it’s her contributing factors to the retaliation for me bringing forward the complaints [to the CV] about my boss.” According to AFI 90-301 at ¶5.4.3, “IGs will not conduct investigations into complaints of reprisal actions alleging Air Force civil service employees, nonappropriated fund employees, or defense contractor employees are the victims of reprisal. These victims receive protection from statutes other than 10 USC 1034.” The AFI at ¶5.4.3.1, further states, “[c]ivil service employee reprisal complaints (when the civil servant is the aggrieved party) must be referred to the Office of Special Counsel, DoD Hotline, Civilian Personnel Flight, or the EO office (for reprisal in connection with an EEO complaint).”

the AFI contained more direct language about the independent nature of an installation IG and even used a Director of Staff position as an example of additional duties that “must not be” assigned to an IG. ¶1.24.3.

By email dated May 28, 2008, Sergeant DD pointed out the new language to General Devereaux. The general stated this was the first time anyone had mentioned verbiage from AFI 90-301 to him. General Devereaux responded to the update AFI immediately. By email dated May 29, 2008 to Colonel Rossi and the 82 TRW/CV, he stated, “As much as I hate to admit this, we may need to react to this AFI change.”

General Devereaux had discussions with the 80 FTW/CC and directed Colonel Rossi and subordinate commanders to nominate candidates for the IG position. The 80 FTW/CC identified a potential pilot to be “detailed” into the IG position but claimed the officer had to remain on the 80 FTW manpower documents pursuant to the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program (ENJJPT) rules. In early June 2008, Ms. IW of AETC/IGQ provided the following guidance: “Per our conversation last week, it would not be appropriate to ‘detail’ an officer from the 80<sup>th</sup> [FTW] to work as the 82d TRW Inspector General, especially if he too will be dual-hatted and is not reassigned (Permanent change of assignment or PCA) to the 82 TRW, and continues to fly. However, if he were to PCA to the 82d [Training Wing] and continued flying that probably would be okay (if 82d [Training Wing] leadership okay’d that – some of our wing IGs are rated officers and do in fact fly).” According to the 80 FTW/CC, if the identified pilot was to continue flying under the ENJJPT program, a PCA move would not work. Colonel Rossi identified a PCA option that might work where a senior lieutenant colonel who is prepared to “come out of the cockpit” and wanted to stay in the area could be transferred to the 82 TRW/IG position. The 80 FTW/CC considered potential candidates for such an option but nothing came of it.

General Devereaux, aware that the position required an O-5, but that it was possible to request approval to appoint an IG of a lower rank, testified that he had also put a back-up plan in place: he had identified two majors who he thought were qualified to be either the 82 TRW/CC’s Executive Officer or the 82 TRW/IG.

Based upon the above, when General Devereaux transferred from Sheppard AFB in August 2008, he believed he had found a candidate at Sheppard AFB that might be able to be the IG and that there was a solution in place for permanently filling the IG position. General Devereaux left the decision of who to appoint to his replacement.

According to Colonel Rossi’s testimony, after the updated AFI was published in May 2008, there were concerted efforts to come into compliance:

.... We were jumping through hoops trying to get folks to, at AETC and AFPC to get us an IG. And we got a lot of pushback from them, hey we’re looking for people but, you know, no one is volunteering for this job. We said look, we’ve gotten the new guidance that says the IG should be acting alone. This is the only business they should be doing. Well we understand that. We’re, we’re doing what we can to get you a fill. You need to look at your own assets and see if you

have any people in there that you could put into the IG job. So we were looking all around, but you have to understand too, with PBD 720 and balanceable cuts, we took enormous cuts in our, our manpower here. Our officers were, you know, really drained. We just did not have a lot of manpower to turn back to. I was ecstatic when we found Lt Col [Lieutenant Colonel] [WY] to come in here as the IG. I thought wow, this is great. And then next thing you know, he deploys. And see, that's the problem with now too. If we could find someone in here to come in, then the next thing we know, we're deploying that officer. .... But yes, we were aware and we made efforts, we made a lot of efforts. I don't think I have my e-mail trail on that of how many times I went back to AETC and knocked at the door saying, where is our IG, can you non-vol somebody in here.

Based on documentation and testimony, the IO summarized the situation/actions during General Devereaux's tenure as 82 TRW/CC as follows:

- For all but three months of General Devereaux's tenure, Colonel Rossi was assigned multiple duties to include being the installation IG, the CCO and the DS;
- During the same timeframe, many attempts were made by General Devereaux and Colonel Rossi to hire a permanent IG, both at the O-6 and the O-5 levels; both AETC and AFPC were unable to help in assigning someone from off the base and except for Major WY's short tenure, efforts to hire from on-base were extremely difficult due to wing demographics and the criticality of command positions;
- On one occasion, a colonel-select was identified to transfer to Sheppard AFB to be the IG; however, the IG position was slated to be downgraded to a lieutenant colonel and the colonel-select could not be placed in the downgraded IG position;
- When a new lieutenant colonel-select (Major WY) was finally available and selected from within the wing to be the permanent IG, he was deployed after two months for 179 days to the AOR; upon his return from his deployment, he was transferred to Korea to assume command of a squadron;
- Colonel Rossi recused herself from issues where there might be a conflict of interest; members were told if they felt uncomfortable approaching the IG shop because of her multiple roles they could go directly to AETC/IG, which according to AETC/IGQ members did on more than one occasion;
- Evidence showed that each time his IG position became vacant, General Devereaux had several choices; General Devereaux chose Colonel Rossi as his IG (intended to be on an interim basis) even though she had other full-time jobs; as seen above he believed his choice was in the best interest of his wing and its mission;
- The effectiveness of the installation IG was diminished by Colonel Rossi's holding multiple jobs; the DS job was especially problematic because it touched across the entire wing structure and made it very difficult for her to maintain independence in her IG position;
- The independence of the IG was in fact compromised when a civilian employee, Mrs. Armel, had allegations against Colonel Rossi in her role as DS and believed she could not seek assistance from the IG since Colonel Rossi was the IG.

- Colonel Rossi was aware that her holding the IG plus other positions was viewed by some as problematic;
- While she did not assign herself to the multiple positions, Colonel Rossi, while acting as the IG, advised General Devereaux that she could hold the multiple positions while still serving as an independent IG.

According to the IO, the issue here is not simply how many hats Colonel Rossi wore, but whether Colonel Rossi's multi-hatting as CCO, DS, and IG under General Devereaux, prevented Sheppard AFB from having an independent installation IG, as required by the 2005 and 2008 editions of AFI 90-301.

As discussed earlier with regard to General WC1, the 2005 edition of AFI 90-301 conceived of a "separate full-time installation IG" without expressly mandating it. While the AFI did not expressly prohibit "additional duties," it held that such duties are "normally not acceptable" if they "diminish the effectiveness of installation IGs in the performance of their complaints management and FWA responsibilities", and "IGs and IG staff members should not be...assigned any duties that subsequently disqualify them from conducting an unbiased analysis of complaints ..." ¶¶1.20.1, 1.21.1, 1.21.2 and 1.21.2.1. The "Independent Installation IG" "...was implemented to remove any perceived conflict of interest, lack of independence, or apprehension by Air Force personnel as a result of a previous practice of assigning vice commanders and IG roles to the same official." The 2008 edition of the AFI explicitly stated that the IG position cannot be combined with another position and that the IG cannot be assigned additional duties ("such as Director of Staff") that subsequently disqualify the IG from conducting unbiased complaint analysis.

Colonel JD and Mr. MW, of SAF/IGQ, the office of primary responsibility to interpret AFI 90-301, opined that assigning a person duties as the installation IG, DS, and CCO would violate both the 2005 and 2008 editions of AFI 90-301. They emphasized the "need for an independent installation IG to be able to avoid any real or perceived conflict of interest" and that the 2005 edition highlighted "how making the IG someone in the chain of command did not allow that individual to be independent."

Upon taking command of the 82 TRW, General Devereaux found himself in a situation much like General WC1's – one that required him to do what was "normally not acceptable." Between August 2006 and October/November 2006, the relevant facts and analysis for General Devereaux are essentially the same undertaken for the allegations against General WC1. The preponderance of evidence does not reveal a lack of independence that rises to a violation of AFI 90-301.

However, in late October/early November 2006, this changed when the CCO position became full time and General Devereaux assigned Colonel Rossi to the IG, DS and CCO jobs at the same time. The IO found, based upon the evidence, that the general's intent all along was that Colonel Rossi's placement in the IG position be temporary and that he and Colonel Rossi made multiple and continuous efforts at finding another IG but were unable to do so. According to the IO, General Devereaux elected to continue with Colonel Rossi in all three positions -- a

course of action he felt would best accomplish the mission based on the resources he had available at the time. The evidence revealed many mitigating circumstances that explain why General Devereaux made the decisions he did regarding his IG position, including manning, demographics, and deployments to war zones.<sup>12</sup> In addition, General Devereaux acted and relied upon the advice of his IG, that she could in fact remain independent even while fulfilling all three positions. General Devereaux understood that Colonel Rossi was handling potential conflicts by recusing herself from those cases and referring those complainants to HQ AETC/IG. In spite of the circumstances facing General Devereaux, Colonel Rossi's responsibilities as CCO and DS ultimately diminished the IG's independence to such an extent and in such a manner as to violate first the requirements of the 2005 edition of AFI 90-301 and then the requirements of the 2008 edition of AFI 90-301.

The investigation revealed that during General Devereaux's tenure, the wing was on notice that multi-hatting Colonel Rossi as the IG and DS was not in compliance with the governing directives. The HQ AETC/IG SAV Report in October 2007 is compelling evidence that Colonel Rossi's multi-hatting compromised the independence of the IG in violation of the 2005 edition of AFI 90-301. The report documents the findings of a functional HQ AETC/IG expert who contemporaneously examined the facts underlying this allegation. Its language is clear: the multi-hatting violated the AFI's requirement for an independent IG. The report's recommendation is just as clear: to continue operating outside the authority of the AFI, the base should request a waiver from AFI's OPR, SAF/IGQ. From that point forward, the 82 TRW continued to operate with a multi-hatted IG for eight of the remaining ten months of General Devereaux's command.

Despite General Devereaux's testimony that he did not remember the SAV even taking place, the evidence indicates that General Devereaux was aware of the SAV at the time, having been told by then-Colonel CE that "your SAV is coming back up to you and there's [sic] some things that we need for you to address to make sure everything is copasetic." According to Colonel CE, General Devereaux acknowledged the statement and replied that he "would act on it as soon as he got the report." Mr. TG's testimony corroborates the existence of such a conversation between then-Colonel CE and General Devereaux. While General Devereaux knew about the SAV, the IO found conflicting evidence on whether or not General Devereaux ever saw the SAV report or was specifically briefed on it. The IO found the preponderance of the

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<sup>12</sup>The IO noted in his report that, prior to the SAV, AETC/IG was aware that Colonel Rossi was dual-hatted. For example, General Devereaux's O-6 grade waiver request, sent to AETC/IG and SAF/IGQ in turn, explained, as of September 2006, their "large A-76 process...requires a full time Director of Competitive Sourcing, leaving Colonel Rossi unable to fulfill IG duties." It is significant that the waiver relied on a manpower justification—not the regulatory requirement to preserve the independence of the IG. Soon after staffing the O-6 grade waiver request, from October 2006 through late December 2006, General Devereaux engaged in a number of conversations with AETC/IG and AETC/A1, seeking a person to fill the IG position. His efforts to fill the IG position are documented in the record, through October, November, December of 2006, and March 2007 until he found a local candidate to fill the position in May 2007. Despite this knowledge on the part of AETC/IG, nothing in the record suggests that AETC/IG raised any concern that the dual-hatting potentially violated the AFI requirement for an independent IG until AETC/IG issued its SAV report.

evidence indicated that General Devereaux did not see the report and was not briefed on its key points.

Whether General Devereaux saw the actual SAV report or not, he was on notice that a report was on its way which identified things he needed to address. The SAV report was in fact received by General Devereaux's IG office; the report was addressed specifically to 82 TRW/CC. Even if the report was received by General Devereaux's support staff and inadvertently not presented to him, General Devereaux bears ultimate responsibility for the operations of his support staff. His IG, Colonel Rossi, testified that she saw the report. Therefore, she had actual knowledge. Colonel Rossi should have understood that this was a matter of command importance. Moreover, it was incumbent on Colonel Rossi to brief General Devereaux on the findings and recommendations of the SAV report. The evidence supports a finding that General Devereaux was on notice and at the very least his staff had actual knowledge of the report's findings; that knowledge is imputed to General Devereaux as the wing commander who is ultimately responsible for ensuring the independence of the IG function.

In addition to the AETC/IG SAV report, AETC/A1 communicated with General Devereaux via email in December 2007 indicating that the attorneys in AETC felt that there was a conflict of interest where Colonel Rossi held dual positions as both the IG and CCO because it "could dissuade wing personnel from discussing/reporting an issue regarding the conduct of the study, since she is also responsible for managing the study." Colonel BL of AETC/A1 told General Devereaux that his solution of Colonel Rossi recusing herself on complaints related to the A-76 study was "a reasonable solution...it's simple and if it works, it works for me." However, the MAJCOM A1 does not have waiver authority for an IG regulatory requirement within the 90 series AFIs. AETC/IG was not copied on the e-mails and nothing in the record suggests that AETC/IG weighed in on the views contained in the emails. Thus, the inconsistent December 2007 message from AETC/A1 does not undo the findings of AETC/IG in their October 2007 SAV. Moreover, while AETC/A1 and General Devereaux believed that potential conflicts of interest could be resolved if Colonel Rossi simply recused herself from any complaints related to the A-76 study, neither acknowledged nor addressed the legal concern expressed by AETC/JA that the multi-hatting would actually dissuade complaints from being reported.

This is exactly what happened when Mrs. Armel found herself in a position of believing she could not go up her chain of command or go to the IG to address what she perceived as wrongdoings on the part of Colonel Rossi, in her capacity as the DS. The evidence presented by Mrs. Armel reveals that Colonel Rossi did more than communicate and coordinate among staff agencies. Interestingly, included with Ms. Armel's original complaint is a memo for record from the 365 Training Squadron (TRS) Training Operations (TO) Deputy Director, unwittingly revealing another perception of conflict: whether true or not, the Deputy Director saw Colonel Rossi as part of the chain of command when he described her as the TO Director's "boss."

An independent examination of the underlying facts supports the conclusion of the HQ AETC/IG SAV. In retrospect, what was not anticipated by the 82 TRW leadership is someone wanting to make allegations against Colonel Rossi herself in her role as either CCO or DS.

Although General Devereaux conceived of the DS role as one of communication and coordination, even the initial DS functions he assigned to Colonel Rossi posed potential conflicts of interest for an independent IG. Acting as a “Group/CC equivalent for the Wing Staff for Protocol and representation purposes” creates a perception of Colonel Rossi serving in a traditional Group/CC role. Providing “O-6 top cover for wing staff agencies chiefs as necessary for specific issues,” and ensuring the wing staff “is appropriately organized and resourced to perform required functions” furthers that perception. These functions seem more in line with command and management than “protocol and representation.” Providing oversight of “PT testing, OPR/EPR timeliness, etc” creates a conflict with the IG reviewing any complaint related to an abuse of authority with respect to one of the programs under DS oversight. Vesting such authority in Colonel Rossi could have made members of the wing staff apprehensive about going to Colonel Rossi as an independent IG.

The SAV report compared the combination of Colonel Rossi’s DS and IG roles to the prohibited past practice of combining the CV and IG positions. Colonel Rossi’s January 28, 2007 and January 28, 2008 multi-hatted OPRs progressively support this. While the January 28, 2007 OPR focuses on her IG duties, it raises other accomplishments with potential for conflict with her IG role: leading the “new AF sexual assault prgm [program]”; consolidating “WSAs [Wing Staff Agencies] additional duties; combined History & Security”; and “got agency chiefs on-board, held staff agencies accountable.” Her second OPR recounts guiding “admin/resources for WSA : JA [Judge Advocate], Chapel, XP [Plans and Programs], Safety, PA [Public Affairs], EO [Equal Opportunity], CP [Command Post], EET [Exercise Evaluation Team] and training ops [operations]”, which could have conflicted her out of any FWA complaints related to use of resources within those agencies. She “led wg [wing] AFSO21 [Air Force Smart Operations for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century] prgm [program]”, and was credited for “...wing’s PA shop “most effective” in AETC...” An IG who is also the “Lead exec on staff!” who “Synergized 2 wgs/6 gps [groups]/27 sqs [squadrons]/13 staff agencies...” could easily appear to be an integral part of the chain of command, increasing the risk that she would not be perceived as an independent investigator.

The CCO duties and accomplishments described in Colonel Rossi’s OPRs add another layer of conflict with her IG role: “defines bases CS methodology in 3 functions/355 positions; oversees personnel/facility resources” “A-76 guru; overcame every challenge w/ unions, protests, perf [performance] work stmt [statement] changes, media sorties—set to award in 2008.” Colonel Rossi testifies that the A-76 operations generally did not trigger IG complaints, and when or if complaints were raised, the complainants were referred to the civilian personnel office, if appropriate, or even to AETC/IG to prevent actual conflicts. However, it is simply not possible to measure whether concerns about the IG’s lack of independence prevented people from raising complaints.

Thus, despite some efforts otherwise, the multi-hatting of Colonel Rossi did result in the diminishing of the Sheppard IG’s ability to maintain independence, violating both the 2005 and 2008 editions of AFI 90-301. In essence, General Devereaux had unwittingly exacerbated the situation by both keeping Colonel Rossi as the IG when the A-76 study started and by also placing her into a third job as the DS.



According to the testimony of Mr. TG, he specifically wrote the SAV report with a recommendation that would “offer them a way out.” From the time of the October 2007 SAV, the wing was effectively on notice that multi-hatting the 82 TRW/IG violated the AFI 90-301 requirements for an independent IG. The SAV report recommended that “if a suitable replacement for the incumbent IG cannot be found,” the wing should seek “a waiver from SAF/IGQ to operate in this manner.” The wing continued to operate in violation of the requirement without seeking a waiver from the SAF/IG office with authority to grant an exception. The extended timeframe where Colonel Rossi served as IG while holding the CCO and DS positions afforded time to prepare, coordinate, and submit a waiver request. If indeed it was impossible to fill the IG position with a locally assigned officer, it would have been appropriate to include this information as supporting documentation to the waiver request. The 82 TRW/CC was in the best position to analyze and consolidate the facts supporting such a waiver request. Elevating the issue, as recommended by AETC/IG in the SAV report would have brought due attention to this issue which had AF and possibly even DoD-level importance. In addition, it would have appropriately placed in the hands of the office with ultimate authority, SAF/IG, the decision of whether or not the 82 TRW/IG’s independence was intolerably compromised or manageable with work-arounds and protections; a thorough waiver request would have placed the decision in the right hands with all necessary facts to decide the questions of whether or not to waive the AFI requirements or take action at the HQ AF level to address the problem. Even though the AFI violation was driven by mission requirements and manning shortages, General Devereaux and his staff did not request or obtain a waiver to authorize operating in such a way.

Despite General Devereaux’s best intentions and multiple extenuating circumstances throughout his tenure as wing commander, his actions of triple-hatting Colonel Rossi in three key full-time positions ultimately resulted in the installation IG not being able to act independently. Keeping her as the IG when the A-76 study began and then soon-after placing her in the newly-created DS position forced the lack of independence. Hence, the preponderance of evidence, based upon the findings of fact and sworn testimony, supports a finding that General Devereaux assignment of the 82 TRW/CCO and DS as the 82 IG resulted in violations of both the 2005 and 2008 editions of AFI 90-301.

Although Colonel Rossi can certainly be commended for her efforts in holding down essentially three wing positions, it was her responsibility to be the guardian of the IG program and to ensure its independence. Somehow, she seems to have overlooked the enormity of this task. As the installation IG, she advised General Devereaux that she could hold the multiple positions while still serving as an independent IG. Contrary to this assertion, Colonel Rossi was fully aware of the language and requirements of AFI 90-301. She also had been told directly by AETC/IGQ that the IG shop was in violation of the AFI because she was multi-hatted, and her holding these multiple roles simultaneously created the perception of a conflict of interest and a lack of independence of the IG and the IG programs.

Colonel Rossi in her testimony stated that she would just recuse herself if an issue came up that would overlap with one of her other duties. However, she failed to consider the situation of the young Airman or civilian who look up and see nowhere to go because Colonel Rossi is

holding down three jobs, one of which they feel the need to complain about. Also, the argument that a complainant can always go to AETC/IG might hold water when talking about a relatively senior officer, but more junior officers, young enlisted troops and young civilians are in a different position – going to the command headquarters with their personal problems can be a difficult ordeal. Colonel Rossi failed to fully appreciate that working two other positions simultaneous to her being the installation IG would adversely affect her ability to ensure the independence and effectiveness of the IG position.

The IO found by a preponderance of the evidence that Colonel Rossi's independence as the IG was in fact compromised on at least one documented occasion, resulting in Mrs. Armel filing her complaint with the OSC because her complaint involved Colonel Rossi. Again, it is impossible to determine the effect this conflict had on the perception of the independence of the IG. While Colonel Rossi may have thought she had a solution in place to recuse herself if there was a conflict or potential conflict, in at least Mrs. Armel's case that plan was flawed. As a result, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Colonel Rossi's performance of multiple positions simultaneously resulted in a lack of independence of the IG function at Sheppard AFB.

Thus, the evidence supports a finding, based upon the documentary evidence and sworn testimony, that Colonel Rossi did not act to maintain the independence and integrity of the IG position while she held the positions of IG, CCO and DS under the command of General Devereaux and mistakenly advised General Devereaux that she could simultaneously hold the positions of 82 TRW/IG, 82 TRW/DS and the 82 TRW/CCO, which resulted in violations of both the 2005 and 2008 editions of AFI 90-301.

### ***General Mannon and Colonel Rossi (July 2008 – March 2009)***

As discussed below, based upon the documentation and testimonial evidence, General Mannon was in technical violation of the 2008 edition of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution* when he allowed Colonel Rossi, the 82 TRW/CCO and DS to continue to serve as the 82 TRW/IG from July 2008 through March 2009. Likewise, the evidence supports a finding that Colonel Rossi was also in violation of the 2008 edition of AFI 90-301 when she, as the IG, continued to hold the 82 CCO and DS positions during the first ten months of General Mannon's tenure as the 82 TRW/CC.

General Mannon assumed command of the 82 TRW on July 17, 2008. At the time, Colonel Rossi was serving as the installation IG, the wing's DS and the wing's CCO. Sheppard AFB's A-76 study was on-going, but nearing its conclusion. According to General Devereaux, during the transfer of command to General Mannon, he presented General Mannon with candidates he had identified for the IG position, anticipating that General Mannon would be able to make the appointment that summer. In his testimony, General Mannon stated that during his short initial discussion on wing issues with his predecessor General Devereaux, he did not recall discussing the topic of the IG and her multiple roles.

During his first conversation with Colonel Rossi, General Mannon remembered:

W: However Col[onel] Rossi and I met somewhere in the next two to three weeks as, as I was getting all my in-briefs...and she laid out hey I'm your CCO. I'm also your IG. New change to regulations. We have, the position has been downgraded. I've been in the position dual-hatted through two, two General officers...We have asked for help. AETC is aware. AFPC is aware. There's [sic] letters on file. We are seeking to backfill this position. I recuse myself if there are competitive sourcing issues or if someone is uncomfortable with my position, we send it to the AETC/IG. We refer them to the AETC/IG. We won awards the last two years...from AETC for effectiveness. We have a solution moving. It will be September, October before the solution is, is in place...and do you have questions? I'm going, well I don't think so. Sounds like it's working pretty well and we will accept the risk at this point in time since the regulation just changed and we have a, we have a solution set in the works that was started by General Devereaux and we continue to move forward with that...I didn't have anybody else. There were no bodies available. Two of my deputy [g]roup [c]ommanders were deployed on 365s. There are no spare O-5s or O-6s...sitting around in our Air Force. We have PBD-720 and then we were going through the A-76 study.

General Mannon went on to explain the manpower situation at the base. It had been made very clear to all the AETC wing commanders that they were expected to support the AF war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan – that meant deploying several hundred people at any one time. In his testimony, he mentioned that two of his deputy group commanders were deployed -- his point being that deployments hit all ranks. At the same time, manpower cuts as a result of PBD 720 had already resulted in a slightly smaller wing and inhibited the ability of AETC and AFPC to find/recruit a lieutenant colonel to transfer to Sheppard AFB for the IG position. General Mannon also indicated that the 2005 BRAC resulted in Sheppard AFB losing an entire training group by 2011 which will result in further manpower cuts in the near future.

General Mannon also testified that he was aware of the SAV report.

IO: Okay, okay. You mentioned that you've talked to her [Colonel Rossi] about the, the multi-hatting. Did she mention to you any questions in the past that may have come up on this, of people calling into question either ... there was a, there was a , a SAV from AETC/IG back in, way back in '07 and there was a question by the Federal Times folks at one point in time on this. Did she [Colonel Rossi] ever give you any history behind that?

W: And the only reason I knew about the history was when, when this came up, I asked them to pull all the ...

IO: Yes sir.

W: whatever logic trail we had behind it.

IO: Okay.

W: And I read the, I read the, the document that talked about it.

IO: Yes sir.

W: But I, I don't recall that she [Colonel Rossi] told me about that.

Colonel Rossi also testified regarding her conversation with General Mannon:

W: Well Gen[eral] Mannon came in last year and when I had my first session, discussion with him and we went over my, my duties, he did ask me, you know, how am I doing with working all these jobs. And I said, you know, I've just learned to balance them, that my staff carries me and he said, well if there's a problem, you know, to let him know and also, I also informed him at that time that I'd be retiring this year, '09. And he said, okay, well do what you need to do to get ready for your retirement...And he was not really aware of the AFI. I didn't go in and quote it to him or point out that there, the, that guidance that was provided in the AFI.

Colonel Rossi also briefed General Mannon that a "fix" that was initiated under General Devereaux to come into compliance with the AFI was moving forward. The inference presented by Colonel Rossi to General Mannon led him to believe that an appropriate solution was in place to bring the wing into compliance with the AFI within two to three months. Given his understanding from Colonel Rossi, General Mannon felt the timing was reasonable as a solution was in the works.

In the end, both plans – the primary plan to recruit an IG from the 80 FTW and the back-up plan to fill the IG position from a pool of two majors identified to fill the wing executive officer and IG positions – fell through. Ultimately, after further efforts by General Mannon and Colonel Rossi, Lieutenant Colonel TR from the 882 TRG was identified to fill the position in or about October or November 2008. However, she was not appointed as the 82 TRW/IG until March 2009 when she was transferred from the 882 TRG. With regard to her hiring, General Mannon testified:

W: She was, she worked over at the 882nd...As an instructor. And, and seemed to have a pretty good background, mature, not on the leadership track per se, you know, not going to pop out on...to go be a Commander someplace and she wanted the job. And Col[onel] Rossi did some interviews and the 882nd Commander said, hey I can, I can allow her to move after she finishes this other stuff and it seemed like a really good fit. And she was, I talked to her, I talked to her before we said yes you have the job. Very energetic. Very excited about the having the opportunity to do that particular job. There were some personal reasons as well. She wanted to stay here in Wichita Falls. And so...you know, you go okay, two plus two is equal to four here, hey maybe equal to six because

we have got somebody that wants to do a job, wants to stay here, knows the system, knows the people and can be fair about it, looks like a pretty good fit to me. And so, and these, the, the feedback was hey you're going to have to wait until she finishes the other stuff and at that point, we, you know, I go okay how many complaints are we handling. Are you still comfortable with the recusement and stuff. The answer was yes, I'm recusing myself and, and we were, were taking duties off of her plate as fast as we could, in a, you know with a...reasonable matter where we didn't drop something through the crack and so that's why I waited a little bit of extra time. I wanted to have... quite frankly, Marty Rossi is pretty well respected here...And throughout the Air Force, I think. She's a very, very special lady as far as her ability to do lots of things and do them very, very well. That doesn't, irregardless, you know, I understand that we had an issue that we needed to fix and we were working to fix it...But Col[onel] [TR] seemed to be the right fit...and I wanted to wait for her instead of putting somebody in there temporarily.

In conclusion, General Mannon summed it up as follows:

IO: Okay. Sir, I don't really have any other specific questions. You kind of, you kind of covered the timeframe you know, pretty well. Obviously you've got Lt Col [Lieutenant Colonel] [TR] in the spot now. What else do I need to know about this during your tenure? Anything else I need to know? What am I not smart enough to ask?

W: I, I don't think so. I've kind of related to you, you know, that the focus is to take care of the people...And, and we tried to do the best we could with what we had available and still tried to comply with regulations. Understand that we were doing cost benefit analysis on... we, we didn't immediately say hey you're no longer the IG. We tried to put a plan in place to take care of people in a reasonable manner so it wouldn't create more gaps and, and angst inside the wing...because of all the other issues that were going on...and, and quite frankly, because the folks at AETC and AFPC for three years had known that we had personnel issues that we'd been trying to fill that and we continued to, to communicate with them and we continued to not be supported, I, I felt like that was a reasonable judgment to make that we would understand that we were breaking that rule for that period of time as we were putting a solid plan in place to finish it out.

Based on evidence gathered, the following can summarize the situation during General Mannon's tenure as wing commander:

- Upon his arrival, Colonel Rossi was assigned as the IG, DS and CCO;
- The recently published 2008 edition of AFI 90-301 stressed the independence of the IG and made it clear that IGs should have no other duties, specifically the duties of a DS;

- General Mannon was briefed there was a fix in place with a couple of possibilities of lieutenant colonels to fill the IG job, with a projected fill in October 2008;
- Those possibilities fell through a couple of months into his tenure but he then identified a new IG from on-base – this appeared to be his best chance of a permanent fix to the situation – he elected to hire that individual – Lieutenant Colonel TR, who would be available to fill the position in March 2009;
- Once Lieutenant Colonel TR was identified as the likely candidate to permanently fill the IG position, General Mannon chose to await her availability and keep Colonel Rossi in the position for a while longer rather than bring in another interim IG of lesser rank prior to Lieutenant Colonel TR permanently assuming the position; and
- Lieutenant Colonel TR was appointed as the installation IG, her sole duty, in March 2009 and she remains there as of today.

As discussed above with General WC1 and General Devereaux, the issue remains whether Colonel Rossi's multi-hatting as CCO, DS, and IG under General Mannon prevented Sheppard AFB from having an independent installation IG, as required by AFI 90-301.

General Mannon inherited the same difficult situation that led General Devereaux and General WC1 to do what was "normally not acceptable" under the 2005 edition of AFI 90-301, and multi-hat their IG. However, when he took command in July 2008, he was governed by the 2008 edition of AFI 90-301, which added clear baseline requirements necessary for preserving the independence: "the IG position will not be combined with another position in the organization," and "the IG and IG staff members must not be...assigned any duties (such as Director of Staff) that subsequently disqualify them from an unbiased analysis..."

General Mannon was informed upon taking command that multi-hatting the IG position violated the updated AFI. He was also told that appointing a dedicated IG was possible in October 2008, three months away. In the meantime, while Colonel Rossi continued to hold three positions including the IG position, she would handle conflicts by recusing herself. General Mannon chose to continue this course, awaiting imminent execution of the solution. When the October 2008 solution fell through, he re-grouped and soon identified a hopefully permanent solution in Lieutenant Colonel TR.

The underlying facts revealing the compromised independence are very similar to those analyzed above with regard to General Devereaux. Foremost, the simple uncontroverted fact of Colonel Rossi's holding more than one full-time position in the wing is now, in and of itself, a violation of the AFI. Although General Mannon testified that there was an attempt to reduce Colonel Rossi's duties, and in fact Colonel Rossi's A-76 workload was decreasing as the study came close to its end, she still without question held all three positions. Moreover, the record supports that Colonel Rossi's DS responsibilities had actually expanded. Sometime in the course of 2008, Colonel Rossi became responsible for a new function called Training Operations (TO). While serving under General Mannon, Colonel Rossi had a TO staff of eight people while she continued to have oversight of the wing staff agency "cats and dogs," including programs such as the SARC.

Her third multi-hat OPR, from January 28, 2009, is again telling. Her A-76 responsibilities are described in a manner fairly similar to the 2008 report, with credit handling “A-76...union, GAO [Government Accountability Office] protests....” Her DS duties and accomplishments grew to include “Admin oversight for 13 WSA ...,” citing a now longer list of agencies, and “On-top oversight of myriad wg spt prgms—BSC [Balanced Scorecard], AFSO21 [Air Force Smart Operations for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century], IDS [Integrated Delivery System], CAIB [Community Action Information Board] director, NSPS [National Security Personnel System] pay pool manager, VPP [Voluntary Protection Program] director.” She is credited with “Improves coord/comm....; matrixes activities across Sheppard’s ops.” Her multi-hatting is acknowledged with “...executes 3 vital wing tasks...” Finally, she is described as “WSA ‘cmdr’—oversaw calls, brds, personnel actions, holiday events, fitness; hands-on mgr, works for mbr buy-in.” Not only was she filling the three positions, her leadership in the wing staff positions and programs remained so visible and far-reaching, and had endured so long, that she would have undoubtedly been perceived as part of the command structure, increasing the risk that she not be seen as an independent investigator and impairing her ability to actually be an independent investigator.

Although facts do not reveal a second case such as Mrs. Armel’s arising under General Mannon’s command, the circumstances that prevented Mrs. Armel from having an independent IG continued. In addition, it is not possible to measure whether concerns about the IG’s lack of independence prevented others from raising complaints.

Thus, despite some efforts to avoid conflicts, the multi-hatting of Colonel Rossi violated the 2008 edition of AFI 90-301. General Mannon and his staff continued to operate this way knowing it was in violation of the AFI. Even though the violation was driven by mission requirements and manning shortages, General Mannon and his staff did not request or obtain a waiver to authorize operating in such a way.

Much like General Devereaux and General WC1 before him, it appears that General Mannon found himself in what seemed an impossible situation, and then made choices he believed best served his people and the mission. One could argue that General Mannon’s failure to seek a waiver from SAF/IG (through AETC/IGQ and AETC/IG) added to the situation, but a look at the timeline points to a different conclusion.

When he arrived on base in July 2008, General Mannon understood the situation was to be fixed in the very near term, based upon solutions put in action by his predecessor, General Devereaux. At that juncture, there did not appear to be a need to request a waiver of the AFI provision. These solutions did not, however, work out and General Mannon found himself, like General WC1 and Devereaux before him, having to attempt resolution of the problem without assistance from AFPC and AETC/A1. By the October/November timeframe he had done just that – he had hired Lieutenant Colonel TR, an individual who met all the requirements that a succession of wing commanders had sought – a lieutenant colonel who would be able to stay at Sheppard AFB for a few years, was not deployable, who wanted the job and was available in a few months. All things considered, hiring her was very reasonable for the long term and in the best interest of his wing even if it meant having to wait a few months for her placement into the

position. While the 82 TRW did not comply until 10 months after the AFI was updated, 8 months after General Mannon assumed command, General Mannon's actions under the difficult and unusual circumstances described above were not unreasonable. Unfortunately, execution of the permanent solution took longer than planned but was completed in March 2009. With the resolution in sight, General Mannon did not request a waiver.

The result here is similar to that for General Devereaux. Despite General Mannon's best intentions and multiple extenuating circumstances, his actions in keeping Colonel Rossi in three key full-time positions ultimately resulted in the installation IG not being able to act independently. Thus, the preponderance of evidence, based upon the findings of fact and sworn testimony, supports a finding that General Mannon's continued assignment of the 82 TRW/CCO and DS as the 82 IG resulted in a violation of the 2008 edition of AFI 90-301.

Similarly, the evidence supports a finding, based upon the documentary evidence and sworn testimony, that Colonel Rossi did not act to maintain the independence and integrity of the IG position while she held the positions of IG, CCO and DS under the command of General Mannon and mistakenly advised General Mannon that she could simultaneously hold the positions of 82 TRW/IG, 82 TRW/DS and the 82 TRW/CCO, which resulted in a violation of the 2008 edition of AFI 90-301.

### ***Gross Mismanagement and Abuse of Authority***

In addition, OSC's Referral Letter to SECAF mentioned the possibility of "potential gross mismanagement" and "abuse of authority" on the part of the officials at Sheppard AFB. AFI 90-301 defines those two terms as:

Gross Mismanagement—A management action or inaction that creates a substantial risk of significant adverse impact on the agency's ability to accomplish its mission. It is more than mere, trivial wrongdoing or negligence. It does not include management decisions that are merely debatable, nor does it mean action or inaction that constitutes simple negligence or wrongdoing. There must be an element of blatancy.

and

Abuse of Authority—An arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a military member or a federal official or employee. To qualify as arbitrary or capricious, the following must be met:

1) the action either adversely affected the rights of any person or resulted in personal gain or advantage to the responsible management official (RMO);

And

2) the RMO did not act within the authority granted under applicable regulations, law or policy; the RMO's action was not based on relevant data and factors; or the RMO's action was not rationally related to the relevant data and factors.

Arbitrary—Based on or subject to individual discretion or preference or sometimes impulse or caprice.



Capricious—Determined by chance or impulse or whim rather than by necessity or reason.

Based upon the documentary evidence and sworn testimony adduced in the investigation, the allegations of gross mismanagement and abuse of authority are not substantiated. In each case, the evidence indicated that neither gross mismanagement nor abuse of authority were applicable in these instances. Possible mismanagement is ruled out because the agency (both the wing and the IG office) was able to accomplish its basic mission. In fact, during the relevant time period, the wing's IG office twice won the best in command award. Abuse of authority is ruled out because the wing commanders certainly had the authority to appoint their own installation IG and did so after weighing and considering their options. No decision was made in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Thus, the actions and decisions of the three Sheppard wing commanders and the installation IG fall far short of the gross mismanagement or abuse of authority definitions cited above.

### CORRECTIVE ACTION

Despite the many efforts made by General Devereaux, General Mannon and Colonel Rossi to comply with AFI 90-301, Colonel Rossi's service as 82 TRW/IG while she was also the 82 TRW/DS and 82 TRW/CCO resulted in violations of AF policy. While reasonable minds may differ, violations at issue here stemmed, in large part, from systemic issues in the AF (including severe personnel shortages) and the fact that the nation was (and remains) at war. In light of this and the many mitigating circumstances set forth above, no personnel action with respect to any one officer is appropriate.

In these circumstances, the AF cannot hold these commanders and the installation IG responsible for violations of AF requirements which could not be appropriately met with the limited resources the AF gave to the commanders. The shortage of colonels in Air Education and Training Command (AETC), specifically at Sheppard AFB, and the 82d Training Wing's obligation to provide field grade officers to fill worldwide deployments combined to prevent the 82 TRW/CCs from complying with AFI 90-301. The commanders did the best they could given their situations. It should not be overlooked that the Sheppard IG office was named best IG in the command (AETC) for several of the years in the timeframe at issue. Additionally, Colonel Rossi reasonably believed that she could avoid conflicts by recusing herself when issues involving her roles as DS or CCO arose. While the evidence indicates that a technical violation occurred, the appropriate corrective action is remedial action by the SAF/IG rather than taking action against any of the wing commanders or Colonel Rossi.

At this time, the SAF/IG has taken appropriate corrective action regarding the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Inspector General position. On December 30, 2009, the SAF/IG sent a memorandum to the Complaint Resolution Divisions (IGQs) of the major commands. The memorandum directs the IGQs to advise their IG and commanders to process all requests for waivers of pertinent IG AFI requirements through their IG chain of command to SAF/IGQ for action—either approval or disapproval. Second, AFI 90-301 will be reissued to include, *inter alia*, language added to the preamble which emphasizes the requirement to process requests for waivers of AFI 90-301 requirements when necessary. Third,

the IGs of the major commands were directed to attend an IG conference which was held on January 12-13, 2010 in Washington, D.C. At the IG conference, all attendees received training on the proper procedures for seeking policy waivers of AFI requirements. Finally, an article will be published in an upcoming edition of the SAF/IG's quarterly magazine, *TIG Brief*, to publicize the issues raised in this investigation for AF installations and to discuss appropriate resolution(s) thereof.

## CONCLUSION

Upon review of the evidence and testimony adduced during the investigation, the following findings are based upon a preponderance of the evidence: 1) General WC1 did not violate AF policy as set forth in the 2005 edition of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution* when he appointed Colonel Rossi as IG while she held the position of DS; 2) General Devereaux's actions when he (a) appointed Colonel Rossi as DS while she held the IG position and (b) allowed her to hold the position of IG while she held the positions of DS and CCO resulted in a violation of AF policy as set forth in 2005 and 2008 editions of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*; 3) General Mannon's actions in allowing Colonel Rossi to hold the position of IG while she held the positions of DS and CCO resulted in a violation of AF policy as set forth in the 2008 edition of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*; and 4) Colonel Rossi violated AF policy as set forth in 2005 and 2008 editions of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, when she failed to act to maintain the independence and integrity of the IG position while she held the positions of installation IG, CCO, and DS under the commands of General Devereaux and General Mannon.

OSC's Referral Letter to SECAF mentioned the possibility of "potential gross mismanagement" and "abuse of authority" on the part of the officials at Sheppard AFB. Based upon the documentary evidence and sworn testimony adduced in the investigation, the allegations of gross mismanagement and abuse of authority are not substantiated.

The investigation did not reveal a criminal violation. Therefore, referral to the Attorney General, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sections 1213(c) and (d) is not appropriate.

This Report is submitted in satisfaction of my responsibilities under 5 U.S.C. Sections 1213(c) and (d).

**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**  
**OSC File No. DI-08-2693**

**WITNESSES INTERVIEWED**  
(Alphabetical Order)

Ms. Stephanie M. Armel  
Ms. PD  
Brigadier General Richard T. Devereaux  
Colonel JD  
Master Sergeant DD  
Brigadier General CE  
Mr. TG  
Mr. GK  
Brigadier General Otis G. Mannon  
Colonel Marcia Rossi  
Major General WC1  
Ms. IW  
Mr. MW

**LIST OF EXHIBITS**

OSC File No. DI-09-1734

Book 1 – includes Exhibits 1-23 as organized in the IG ROI

1. Memorandum from OSC to SECAF, dated March 24, 2009, re: “OSC File No. DI-09-1734” with enclosures.
2. Memorandum from SAF/IG to Mr. IO, dated March 4, 2008, re: “Appointment of Investigation Officer.”
3. Biographies and contact information for General WC1, General Richard Devereaux, General O. G. Mannon, and biography for Colonel Marcia Rossi.
4. Excerpts of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints*, January 30, 2001; excerpts of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, February 8, 2005; and excerpts of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, May 15, 2008.
5. Memorandum from AETC/IG to 82 TRW/CC, dated October 19, 2007, re: “Trip Report, Staff Assistance Visit (SAV), 82 TRW/IG, 13 Sep 07.”
6. Appointment letters and waiver requests from the 82d Training Wing: Memorandum from General Devereaux, 82 TRW/CC, to Major WY, dated May 24, 2007, re: “IG Appointment Letter (S/S Our Memo, 28 Aug 06)”; Memorandum from 82 TRW/CC

to AETC/IG and SAF/IG in turn, dated October 23, 2006, re: "Waiver of Assignment of O-5 to Fill O-6 Wing IG Position, 82 TRW, Sheppard AFB TX"; Email from General Devereaux to all 82 TRW Staff Agency Chiefs, all 82 TRW Group Commanders, and all 82 TRW Deputy Group Commanders, dated November 6, 2006, re: "82 TRW Director of Staff (DS)"; Reply email from Mr. TO, AETC/A1FO, to Ms. PD, 82 TRW/IG, dated November 2, 2006, re: "Request for IG Position fill"; email from Ms. PD to Mr. TO, dated November 2, 2006; email from Captain RS, AETC/A1L, to Captain DB, AETC/A1FOS, dated November 1, 2006, re: "IG Waiver Request Letter"; email from Ms. PD to Captain RS, dated November 1, 2006; email from Lieutenant Colonel BG, 82 MSS/CC, to Colonel Rossi, 82 TRW/DS, dated March 27, 2007, re: "CC's Brf on Hiring New IG"; email from Colonel Rossi to Lieutenant Colonel BG, dated March 26, 2007; email from Lieutenant Colonel BG to Colonel Rossi, dated March 22, 2007; email from Colonel Rossi to Lieutenant Colonel BG, dated March 22, 2007; email from General Devereaux to Colonel BL, AETC/A1, dated December 17, 2007, re: "IG and CCO Duties"; email from Colonel BL to General Devereaux, dated December 17, 2007; email from General Devereaux to Colonel DP, 80 FTW/CC, dated May 29, 2008, re: "Chgs to IG function"; email from Colonel DP to General Devereaux, dated May 29, 2008; email from General Devereaux to Colonel DP, dated May 29, 2008; email from Colonel Rossi to General Devereaux, dated May 29, 2008; email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, dated May 29, 2008; email from Colonel Rossi to General Devereaux, dated May 29, 2008; email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, dated May 29, 2008; and email from Master Sergeant DD, 82 TRW/IG, to General Devereaux, dated May 28, 2008; email from Colonel KB, 82 TRW/CV, to Colonel Rossi, 82 TRW/DS, dated June 10, 2008, re: "IG Fill for Sheppard"; email from Major RH, 82 MSS/CC, to Colonel KB and Colonel Rossi, dated June 5, 2008; email from Colonel Rossi to Major RH, dated June 3, 2008; email from Mr. ME, AETC/A1L, to Ms. IW, AETC/IGQ, dated June 2, 2008, re: "HQ AETC/IG UMD"; email from Ms. IW to Mr. ME, dated June 2, 2008; email from Mr. ME to Ms. RR, AETC/IGIX, dated June 2, 2008; email from Ms. RR to Mr. ME, dated May 30, 2008; email from Ms. IW to Ms. RR, dated May 30, 2008; email from Ms. RR to Ms. IW, dated May 20, 2008; email from Colonel MA, 82 TRW/CV, Colonel Rossi, 82 TRW/CCO, dated March 9, 2005, re: "Interim IG"; email from Colonel Rossi, 82 TRW/DS, to IO, SAF/IG, dated May 14, 2009, re: "FOUO: SAF/IGS Investigation – Doc/Chronology on IG"; memorandum from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, dated August 28, 2006, re: "IG Appointment Letter (S/S Our Memo, 17 Jan 06)"; memorandum from General WC1 to Colonel Rossi, dated January 17, 2006, re: "IG Appointment Letter (S/S Our Memo, 12 Aug 05)"; and email from Colonel Rossi to AETC/CCEA, dated October 11, 2006, re: "ESSS – IG Waiver Request Letter."

7. Colonel Rossi's last four Officer Performance Reports (OPRs): OPR for the period of January 29, 2005 through January 28, 2006; OPR for the period of January 29, 2006 through January 28, 2007); OPR for the period of January 29, 2007 through January 28, 2008; and OPR for the period of January 29, 2008 through January 28, 2009.

8. “Pertinent emails”: Email from Colonel Rossi to Colonel ND, 882 TRG/CC, dated January 5, 2009, re: “Lt Col [TR] into Wing IG Psn”; email from General Mannon to Colonel Rossi, dated November 23, 2008, re: “Candidate for Wing IG”; email from Colonel Rossi to General Mannon, dated November 21, 2008; email from Ms. IW to Master Sergeant DD, dated June 2, 2008, re: “HQ AETC/IG UMD”; email from Mr. ME to Ms. IW, dated June 2, 2008; email from Ms. IW to Mr. ME, dated June 2, 2008; email from Mr. ME to Ms. RR, dated June 2, 2008; email from Ms. RR to Mr. ME, dated May 30, 2008; email from Ms. IW to Ms. RR, dated May 30, 2008; and email from Ms. RR to Ms. IW, dated May 20, 2008.
9. Air Force Demographic Data (as of September 30, 2008) and Historical Summary of Active Duty and Civilians Assigned to 82d Training Wing, Sheppard AFB (as of end of fiscal years 2005-2009).
10. Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) articles: “Financial management of Euro-NATO programs: we cannot hide our heads in the sand” by Keith Hicks, *Armed Forces Comptroller*, Fall 2002; and “Changes to keep ENJJPT viable option for partners” by John Ingle, *Air Force Print News*, September 18, 2008.
11. Chronology from Brigadier General Devereaux
12. Sworn testimony of Ms. Stephanie M. Armel, April 10, 2009
13. Sworn testimony of Mr. TG, April 13, 2009
14. Sworn testimony of Ms. PD, April 28, 2009
15. Sworn testimony of Master Sergeant DD, 82 TRW/IG, April 29, 2009
16. Sworn testimony of Colonel JD and Mr. MW, both of SAF/IGQ, May 13, 2009
17. Sworn testimony of Colonel Marcia Rossi, 82 TRW/DS and 82 TRW/CCO, May 12, 2009
18. Sworn testimony of Major General WC1, former 82 TRW/CC, May 20, 2009
19. Sworn testimony of Brigadier General Richard Devereaux, former 82 TRW/CC, May 28, 2009
20. Sworn testimony of Brigadier General O. G. Mannon, 82 TRW/CC, May 29, 2009
21. Sworn testimony of Mr. GK, 364th Training Squadron, May 16, 2009
22. Sworn testimony of Brigadier General CE, former AETC/IG, May 19, 2009

23. Sworn testimony of Ms. IW, former AETC/IGQ, June 29, 2009

Book 2 – (as organized in separate book with 29 exhibits from General Devereaux)

1. Email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated August 2, 2006, re: “Info-Part 2c” and email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated August 2, 2006, re: “Info – Part 2” (includes Colonel Rossi’s biography).
2. Email from General Devereaux to Ms. JH, 82 TRW/CCE, dated September 1, 2006, re: “SURFS” and email from Ms. JH to General Devereaux, dated August 31, 2006.
3. Email from General Devereaux to Ms. SW, dated August 28, 2006, re: “Appointment Letters for BG Devereaux signature”; email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated August 24, 2006; and email from Ms. PD, 82 TRW/IG, to 82 TRW/CCEA, dated August 11, 2006.
4. Email from Captain JZ, AETC/A2, to General Devereaux, dated May 29, 2006, re: “Dual-Hatted DS and IG.”
5. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel LC, 82 TRW/CV, August 29, 2006, re: “2007 AETC Gameplan Movers List – Initial DRAFT – 82 TRW”; email from Colonel LC to General Devereaux, dated August 28, 2006; email from Captain RS to General WC1, dated August 28, 2006.
6. Email from General Devereaux to Ms. SW, dated September 6, 2006, re: “Gen Devereaux 5 Sep Orientation.ppt”; email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated September 5, 2006; and email from Ms. PD to Ms. SW, dated September 5, 2006.
7. Email from General Devereaux to Captain RS, dated September 13, 2006, re: “2007 AETC Gameplan Movers List – Initial DRAFT – 82 TRW”; email from Captain RS to Brigadier General WC1, 82 TRW/CC, dated August 28, 2006.
8. Email from Brigadier General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, 82 TRW/IG, dated September 20, 2006, re: “Initial Steps on Director of Staff Construct” and email from Colonel Rossi to Brigadier General Devereaux, dated September 19, 2006.
9. October 4, 2006 Report of AETC/IG’s Operational Readiness Inspection of 82 TRW/IG, September 24, 2006 to October 4, 2006.
10. Email from General Devereaux to Ms. SW and Colonel Rossi, dated October 23, 2006, re: “IG Waiver Letter Request”; email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated October 20, 2006; and email from Ms. SW to 82 TRW/CCEA, dated October 20, 2006.
11. Email from Captain RS, 82 TRW/A1L, to General Devereaux, dated October 31, 2006, re: “82 TRW Gameplan.”

12. Email from General Devereaux to all 82 TRW Staff Agency Chiefs, all 82 TRW Group Commanders, and all Deputy Group Commanders, dated November 6, 2006, re: "82 TRW Director of Staff (DS)."
13. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, dated December 5, 2006, re: "FOUO: Col (s) [L's] OPRs – Potential IG"; email from Colonel Rossi to General Devereaux, dated December 5, 2006; email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, dated December 5, 2006; email from Colonel Rossi to General Devereaux, dated December 4; email from Captain RS to Colonel Rossi, dated December 4, 2006, re "82 TRW/IG Interest"; and email from Captain RS to Colonel Rossi, dated November 30, 2006.
14. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, dated December 7, 2006, re: "Loss of Col (s) [L] for IG Position" and email from Colonel Rossi to General Devereaux, dated December 6, 2006.
15. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, dated December 20, 2006, re: "CSAF Approval of AF Colonel Grade Review"; email from Colonel GP, AETC/A1, to AETC Commanders and Staff Directors, dated December 20, 2006; and email from Lieutenant General RB, AF/A1, to Air Force A1 Community, dated December 6, 2006, re: "AF Colonels Grade Review."
16. Email from Major JU, 82 TRW/CCE, to General Devereaux, dated February 5, 2008; re: "Team Awards" and email from General Devereaux to Major JU, dated February 5, 2008.
17. Email from General Devereaux to Lieutenant Colonel DC, 982 TRG/CD, dated March 29, 2007, re: "82 TRW/IG, Maj [V]" and email from Lieutenant Colonel DC to General Devereaux, dated March 29, 2007.
18. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, 82 TRW/DS, dated April 20, 2007, re: "IG Statistics: Jan-Apr 07"; email from Colonel Rossi to General Devereaux, dated April 19, 2007; and email from Sergeant DD to Colonel Rossi, dated April 18, 2007, re: "Jan-Apr IG stats."
19. Email from General Devereaux to Ms. SW, dated May 24, 2007, re: "Request for Signature on Appointment Letters"; email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated May 23, 2007; and email from 82 TRW/CCEA to Ms. PD, dated May 22, 2007.
20. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel KB, dated July 29, 2007, re: "FYI: Sending Maj [WY] on a 177-Day Deployment?"; email from Colonel KB to General Devereaux, dated July 28, 2007; email from General Devereaux to Colonel KB, dated July 28, 2007; email from Colonel KB to General Devereaux, dated July 26, 2007; and email from Lieutenant Colonel [CV], 82 MSG/CD, to Colonel KB, dated July 26, 2007, re: "HOT!!! Approval to Send Maj [WY] on a 177-Day Deployment."

21. Email from General Devereaux to Major WY, dated July 30, 2007, re: "Maj [WY] @ CST" and email from Major WY to General Devereaux, dated July 30, 2007.
22. Email from General Devereaux to Ms. SW, dated November 13, 2007, re: "FOUO: 82 TRW Phone Listing (9 Nov 07)" and email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated November 9, 2007.
23. Email from General Devereaux to Sergeant DD, dated October 4, 2007, re: "Commanders/First Sgt Seminar" and email from Sergeant DD to General Devereaux, dated October 3, 2007.
24. Email from Captain RS to General Devereaux, dated December 11, 2007, re: "Gameplan 2008 Worldwide Movers List."
25. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, dated December 18, 2007, re: "IG and CCO Duties"; email from Colonel BL to General Devereaux, dated December 17, 2007; email from General Devereaux to Colonel BL, dated December 17, 2007; and email from Colonel BL to General Devereaux, dated December 17, 2007.
26. Email from General Devereaux to General Devereaux, dated April 19, 2008, re: "FOUO--#9913 ESSS for OPR on MAJ [WY], 82 TRW/IG, c/o date: 21 MAR 08"; email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated April 17, 2008; email from General Devereaux to Ms. SW, dated April 16, 2008; email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated April 16, 2008; email from Ms. SW to 82 TRW/CCEA, dated March 17, 2008; email from General Devereaux to Ms. SW, dated March 17, 2008; email from Ms. SW to General Devereaux, dated March 14, 2008; and email from Ms. SW to 82 TRW/CCEA on February 21, 2008.
27. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, dated May 29, 2008, re: "New AFI 90-301" and email from Sergeant DD to General Devereaux, dated May 28, 2008.
28. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel DP, 80 FTW/CC, dated May 29, 2008, re: "Chgs to IG function"; email from Colonel DP to General Devereaux, dated May 29, 2008; email from General Devereaux to Colonel DP, dated May 29, 2008; email from Colonel Rossi to General Devereaux, dated May 29, 2008; email from General Devereaux to Colonel DP, dated May 29, 2008; email from Colonel Rossi to General Devereaux, dated May 29, 2008; email from General Devereaux to Colonel DP, dated May 29, 2008; and email from Sergeant DD to General Devereaux, dated May 28, 2008.
29. Email from General Devereaux to Colonel Rossi, 82 TRW/DS, dated June 26, 2008, re: "IG Update"; email from Colonel Rossi to General Devereaux, dated June 25, 2008, re: "IG Update"; email from Ms. IW, AETC/IGQ, to Unnamed Recipient, dated June 2, 2008.